The United States Army's Evolution of Mobile

ADAPTING ON THE PLAINS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY’S EVOLUTION OF

MOBILE WARFARE IN TEXAS, 1848-1859

Mark B. Buchy, B.A.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

May 2013

APPROVED:

Richard B. McCaslin, Major Professor and Chair of the Department of History Randolph B. Campbell, Committee Member Richard G. Lowe, Committee Member Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Buchy, Mark B. Adapting on the Plains: The United States Army’s Evolution of Mobile Warfare in Texas, 1848-1859. Master of Arts (History), May 2013,121 pp., references, 99 titles.

The Army, despite having been vexed for a century on how to effectively fight the

Plains Indians, ultimately defeated them only a decade after the Civil War. This thesis will bring to the forefront those individuals who adapted fighting techniques and ultimately achieved victories on the Texas frontier before the Civil War. The majority of these victories came as a result of mounted warfare under the direction of lower ranking officers in control of smaller forces. The tactic of fighting Indians from horseback was shown to be effective by the Rangers and later emulated by the Army.

Mark B. Buchy

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapters

1. PROLOGUE ...... 1

2. CHARACTERISTICS of PLAINS FIGHTING ...... 10

3. OLD STUBBORN ARMY IN TEXAS ...... 28

4 INDIVIDUALS ADAPT ...... 44

5 FEDERAL RANGERS IN TEXAS ...... 66

6 FIND THEM, FIX THEM, FIGHT THEM, FINISH THEM ...... 91

7. EPILOGUE ...... 112

WORKS CITIED ...... 114

iii CHAPTER 1

PROLOGUE

Col. Ranald S. MacKenzie dealt a fatal blow to the Comanche when he attacked a series of their camps at the bottom of Palo Duro Canyon on September 28, 1874.

Similarly, Brevet Maj. Gen. George Crook and Brevet Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles are credited with finally defeating the Sioux and Cheyenne with mounted, highly mobile, highly lethal campaigns on the plains. Each of these men received their marching orders from Lt. Gen. William P. Sherman, whose path of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas during the Civil War provided a compelling example of total war’s effects. Therefore it seems logical that the Army’s mobile campaigns against the Plains

Indians grew from that experience. However, this is not the case.

The Army, despite having been vexed for a century on how to effectively fight the

Plains Indians, ultimately defeated them only a decade after the Civil War. It is interesting to find such a quick resolution to the issue, considering that frontier defense garnered little attention from 1861 to 1865. Most celebrated works on the Army fail to explain this metamorphosis. Renowned historian Russell F. Weigley characterizes the return to frontier warfare as period involving a strategy of annihilation, born out of a gruesome war and refocused on the Plains Indians. He touches on the subject by stating that prior to the Civil War Army confined itself to passive patrolling, but after the war, a new policy dictated that the Army would be on the offensive. Weigley justifies his theory by suggesting that Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan developed an “innovative strategy” by waging winter campaigns, reflecting his and Sherman’s experience in carrying war to the enemy's resources and people. The “new” mounted campaigns destroyed fixed

1 Indian camps by taking advantage of surprise and exploiting their malnourished herds.

These tactics, which share similarities with other campaigns during that time, proved to

be successful.1

The views of historians Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski’ resemble Weigley’s.

They wrote that to achieve success, the Army had to fight a ruthless winter-oriented total war, targeting the Indians’ fixed camps. Interestingly, they also state, “the factors that shaped colonial Indian wars still prevailed [in the West].” This assertion shows that these two historians did not consider the tactical changes espoused by the Army after the Civil War to be significant. But how did the Army suddenly arrive at a solution that ended decades of conflict? The key to understanding this answer comes from within

Texas, during the decade prior to the Civil War. The ultimate conflict between the

Comanche, arguably the best cavalry the Army ever faced, and the Texas Rangers who adapted Comanche tactics, provided the Army with the answer. Antebellum Texas provided a training field for the Army’s ultimate adaption. 2

Narrowing the focus to Texas, military historians such as Robert M. Utley have

produced influential histories of frontier defense relating to the Plains Indians, the Texas

Rangers, and the Army. His central theme can be expressed in the idea that the harsh

alien environment of the Texas frontier impeded the growth of white civilization for

decades. This thesis reflects Utley’s broad idea that the Army failed to adapt

conventional means of defense into effective methods of protection against hostile

Indians during the antebellum period. On a macro or strategic level, he is not incorrect;

1 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 159. 2 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 254.

2 Army leaders then, much like today, focused intently on the "next war." However, this

broad assertion, which many historians fail to question, obscures individual

accomplishments in specific campaigns. Like Utley, some historians mention

unconventional means such as federalized Rangers, tactical-sized mounted campaigns,

and seek-and-destroy missions. These deserve more attention. In the face of

conventional war theory, West Point instruction, limited funds, and official disinterest,

captains and colonels in the field adapted and learned new tactics in order to fight and win on their own. In antebellum Texas, some of these individuals adopted unconventional offensive tactics from the Rangers and Indians they encountered.

Although little evidence suggests that Army frontier veterans attempted to disseminate the lessons learned from these experiences in any systematic fashion, these earlier pioneers of frontier-style warfare paved the way for others after the Civil War.

Walter Prescott Webb, one of the preeminent frontier historians of his era, wrote

that the Great Plains stand as a distinct environmental entity, radically different from the

woodlands of the east. Webb stated that the plains had three dominant characteristics

to which Americans at that time were not accustomed: flat, barren, and dry. The

unfamiliarity of this environment impeded population growth and, accordingly, defined

the trials the Army would endure subjugating the Plains Indians. This analysis encapsulates the same broad idea that many military historians such as Utley, followed by Thomas T. Smith, and Robert Wooster, mention but do not pursue in depth. Utley later elaborated that this environment was absolutely foreign to the citizens of the

United States, who found the plains impossible to cope with for a long period of time.

Besides topography, the Army faced new challenges with “Indians [who] differed in

3 many ways from those of the Eastern Woodlands. A new geography and a new enemy

decreed that the Army evolve new attitudes and new capabilities.” As a whole, this

group concludes that the Army did not evolve during the decade prior to the Civil War.

After surveying much of the same information, this author suggests that the Army did

evolve on a tactical level and paved the way for success after the Civil War.3

At the end of the Mexican War in 1848, the War Department recalled its troops

from Mexico and reorganized the Army on the western frontier. As a result of the war,

the geographic frontier expanded by over 1,000,000 square miles, yet Congress

reduced the Army to one-half its wartime strength. Its slow rate of growth was noted in

1854, when Secretary of War Jefferson Davis stressed that while the Army had

increased by 305 members, the nation's population had grown by 18 million.

Furthermore, the country now had to safeguard two seaboard coastlines, a 3,000-mile

Indian frontier, and a 2,500-mile border with Mexico. Utley, adept at creating pictures

with words, notes that if the Army had three times the number of soldiers with the same

proportion stationed in the West, it would still have afforded less than fifty officers and

men for each post and no more than one soldier for every forty square miles of territory,

every 400 settlers, and every eight hostile Indians.4 Similarly, Smith reveals in The Old

Army in Texas that Brevet Maj. Gen. William Jenkins Worth’s 1849 departmental

command of Texas was a daunting task. At his disposal were three regiments of

infantry, two companies of artillery, and half a regiment of mounted troops, which

3 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1931), 15; Robert M. Utley. Frontiersmen in Blue; the United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 6. 4 Report of the Secretary of War, House Executive Document I, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., (1854), 3-6; Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue,.16.

4 amounted to a total of 1,488 soldiers. Statistically, this broke down to one soldier for

each 180 square miles of Texas. Simply surviving in the hostile environment consumed

a large percentage of the total military effort, which left little energy for patrolling such a

vast area or fighting any human enemy.5

Wooster expands on the notion of scant forces by elaborating about 19th century

public sentiment regarding the Army. He explains that “Americans were consistent in

their desire to restrict the Army’s role in the life of the nation [being] wary of a standing

army. Limiting the size of the Regular Army… they also expected the very same

government to provide them with services, assistance, and protection.” Severely

handicapped, the Army plunged into a mission for which it was not prepared. The

quandary of a lack of human resources would haunt the Army for decades.6

An irregular augmentation in manpower came on August 11, 1849, when Brevet

Maj. Gen. George M. Brooke asked Gov. George T. Wood to raise three mounted

Ranger companies for federal service in South Texas. Their mission was twofold in that

they were to act in support of regular Army units stationed on the defensive perimeter

and also seek out parties committing crimes against Texas. Few details exist about the

experiences of these three federalized Ranger companies. But there is no doubt that

their selection was a result of their previous experiences fighting Indians on the Texas

frontier. Brooke’s 1849 call for federalized Rangers marked a watershed in the Army’s

notion of frontier defense. Although insistent on maintaining their own identity, and

5 Thomas T. Smith. The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth- Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 15. 6 Robert Wooster, “The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West, 1865-1900,” Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 66.

5 developing a traditional, static system of forts to guard the frontier. the Army

subsequently adapted by espousing Ranger-like tactics and learned they could be effective. 7

This incorporation of Texas Rangers into the Army's defensive scheme on the

Texas frontier provides the opportunity for historical writing to step out from under the

umbrella of Utley. In Durwood Ball’s book, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier,

1848-1861, Ball maintains the Army ultimately waged a deliberate and successful “total

war” against the Indians that was characteristic of modern American warfare: a long war

of attrition that favored the side with more men and material. Ball draws the same

conclusion as Utley, Wooster, and Smith: the inadequate number of troops in Texas

failed to completely arrest Indian depredations before the Civil War. However, he differs

in his emphasis on specific guerilla-like campaigns and details about non-conventional

field commanders that yielded some success in the antebellum period, and which laid

the foundations for a final victory soon after the Civil War ended.8

Instead of focusing on strategic level miscues, Ball begins to introduce specific

individuals who thrived on the tactical level. Picking up where Smith and Wooster left off

concerning systematic training, Ball focuses on the soldier in the field. As policymakers

debated strategy, regulars improvised small-unit tactics adapted to the realities of

Western deployment, logistics, environment, and culture. The evolution resulted in

tactics coalesced around horses and modern small arms, which gave the regular troops

mobility over large areas and lethal killing power against superior numbers. Contrary to

7 [Austin]Texas State Gazette, August 25, 1849. 8 Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), 32.

6 West Point’s Dennis Mahan’s emphasis on massed forces, small units rather than whole brigades eventually combed the western deserts and mountains. Commanders, discovering that mobility yielded results superior to that of relying on infantry in posts, deployed “scouts” of dragoons and other mounted soldiers. Ball shows that experience proved to be vital for the survival of the soldiers and the populations they defended; however, he again is missing the last piece of the puzzle.9

If field experience came at a premium, how much greater would the proven example of those experienced with frontier fighting yield? Ball writes, “from regiment to regiment, the best units absorbed the lessons of western defense and warfare, developed into superb frontier combat units, and used surprise, geography, climate, forces, and technology to their advantage.” No single group embodied these characteristics more than the Texas Rangers, who utilized surprise and technology before and after federal troops arrived on the plains. Therefore, the line of civilization in

Texas became the incubator of tactics for the Indian and Rangers first, then the Army.

This thesis emphasizes the missing link of sorts, that the Texas Rangers directly and indirectly showed the Army how to fight the Plains Indians.10

A subtle similarity comes out of the writings of Utley, Smith, and Wooster that provides room for the ultimate direction of this paper. Regarding the frontier Army, Utley states, “the wonder is not that they so often failed to meet the test but rather, considering what they were and what they had to work with, that they scored any success at all.” Yet there were successes. Smith writes, “for the Army, successful tactical or operational techniques were a product of local individual frontier commanders

9 Ibid., 24. 10 Ibid., 37.

7 rather than the Army as an institution.” Finally, Wooster noticed that methods used in

the irregular, decentralized warfare against Indians were mostly up to the local

commander. Most excursions into New Mexico, along the Rio Grande, or into Oklahoma

saw mixed results. Ball theorizes a “total war” over decades produced victory. Still the

“total war” idea continues in the fashion similar to Utley and Weigley in that it is a broad

explanation. Closer examination suggests the Army’s ultimate success over the Plains

Indians came as a result of many tactical victories rather than larger operations during

the antebellum period. Furthermore, it was during this time period that winter

campaigning and total war tactics found their way into Army strategy. It was not

Sheridan or Sherman’s “innovative strategy” based on their experiences in the Civil

War.11

Conflict with the Plains Indians began as early as the birth of the nation. Certainly

President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase set the stage for almost a century of

conflict driven by a pursuit of manifest destiny and expanding wealth. What is interesting

is that American conflict with the Plains Indian was indeed a stalemate of sorts during

much of this long period. Whether a result of political indecision or failed military policy,

the “Indian question” was never fully resolved until the campaigns of the 1870s finally

forced the natives into recognizing federal demands. This thesis will bring to the

forefront those individuals who adapted fighting techniques and ultimately achieved

victories on the Texas frontier before the Civil War. The majority of these victories came

as a result of mounted warfare under the direction of lower ranking officers in control of

smaller forces. Smith already indicated in his West Point statistical study that the

11 Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 58; Thomas T. Smith. “West Point and the Indian Wars,” Military History of the West, 24 (Spring 1994), 43.

8 mounted arm had the highest death rate. The obvious assumption is that these losses were suffered when greater mobility took the fight to the elusive Indian. In fact, the tactic of fighting Indians from horseback was shown to be effective by the Rangers and later emulated by the Army. 12

12Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 58; Smith, “West Point” 43.

CHAPTER 2

CHARACTERISTICS of PLAINS FIGHTING

In spite of the fact that each of these fighters influenced the others, each remained the true representative of the customs and ideals of his respective race, a symbol of the fighting genius of his group. Walter Prescott Webb

When compared to other territories of the expanding United States, the

southwestern frontier presented a foreboding obstacle to Army planners, commanders,

and soldiers strung out on the vast plains. The distances, geography, and clashing of

cultures often stretched the Army beyond their capabilities. The victory against Mexico

provided these new lands as well as the responsibility to incorporate its peoples and

potential resources into the growing nation. By 1850, the unfamiliar environment in

Texas required that the Army adapt to survive. The interwar years would thus become

an arduous learning experience for the officers and enlisted men of the United States

Army. The changes they adopted as they campaigned against Indians would be

noticed, but not effectively analyzed, by historians such as Walter Prescott Webb and

Robert Wooster. 1

This chapter surveys the tactical fighting characteristics of the Apaches,

Comanches, and Texas Rangers, pointing out common tactics of Plains warfare. By the

early 1850s, the Apaches and Comanches were already in decline and successful

Ranger campaigns were increasing. During this period, the Rangers mirrored Indian

methods of fighting more than the Army. The latter lacked the knowledge and

1 Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), xxxi.

experience that it would eventually gain later in the decade by, ironically, adopting the

methods that the Rangers had in turn learned from the Apaches and Comanches.

What made the Plains Indians such a barrier to western expansion, and thus an

enemy to the Texas Rangers and the Army? A cursory look at their culture reveals an

obvious emphasis on warfare. Warfare played a significant role in the life and culture of

the Plains tribes, yet until recently it has not received a significant amount of accurate

scrutiny. Historian Brian DeLay’s acclaimed work, War of a Thousand Deserts is one of

the better examples of the “constant warfare” that became a defining characteristic of

Plains inhabitants.2 The overall lack of effective analysis is due to the fact that the

Plains Indians had no written language. The greater percentage of records come from

early Spanish, French, or American accounts, all of which contain a cultural bias and

perhaps unintentional muddling of facts. Utilizing these records, the best new historians

suggest that warfare for the Plains Indians developed over two centuries (1630-1830)

and focused on critical resources such as bison herds, fertile soils, and water.

Additionally, trade wars erupted between the French in the East and the Spanish from

the Southwest. This pattern remained with minor changes throughout the middle and

late 19th century until the military collapse of native cultures.3

Arguably, the horse became the most sought-after commodity during this period.

This particular resource not only changed the way warfare was fought on the Plains but

became synonymous with the legacy of the frontier. Environmental factors dictated the

2 Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 41. 3Frank R. Secoy, Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains; 17th Century Through Early 19th Century (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J.J. Augustin, 1953), 1; For more information on trade wars see, F. Todd Smith, From Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians Of Texas and the Near Southwest, 1786- 1859 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 27,31-40, 67.

natural boundaries of the horse frontier. The forested areas to the north and east of the

Plains were unsuited for both the natural expansion of horse herds or for their wartime

use in rapid mobility. On the other hand, the Plains afforded vast expanses of grass and

ideal horse breeding lands. Naturally the horse became the best mode of transportation

in this wide-open expanse. By the 17th century, most Indians in northern Mexico were

mounted. By the end of the 18th century, possibly two million horses grazed between the

Rio Grande and the Arkansas River, becoming a reliable source of mobility for the

Plains Indians.4

At this time, the Apaches dominated the extreme southwestern plains and were

therefore geographically closest to the primary source of horses, which was the herds

raised in Spanish settlements. The Apaches, subsisting on bison and a limited growing

season, quickly recognized the added advantage of the horse. Their semi-sedentary,

semi-nomadic life was based on an annual cycle. They chose favorable agricultural

areas to raise crops and then moved with the bison. The combination of crops and

greater access to buffalo furnished by the horse produced a population growth. The

increase Apache numbers stimulated a geographic expansion that by the early 18th century encompassed much of Southwest Texas, New Mexico, and areas stretching north. The enlargement inevitably brought Apaches into conflict with tribes of the

Eastern and Southern Plains borderlands. Repeated wars between tribes fostered a process that would culminate in a ranked society in which men could gain considerable

4 Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 3; David La Vere, The Texas Indians. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 95-96, Smith, 9.

social status through war exploits. Thus the Apaches had evolved a new aggressive

military culture founded on the horse.5

Most Apache engagements were small-scale, involving parties of twenty or fewer participants. Historian Marian W. Smith asserts, “It can be said with certainty that the

plains war party was frequently a small one.”6 Their attacks were generally brief, relying

on a constant offensive through continual maneuvering. The most frequent and effective

Apache tactic was the raid, which was often followed by an ambush of their pursuers.

The ambush usually occurred in the most difficult and punishing terrain. During a raid, a

leader would dispatch one group to a location well-suited for an ambush, and then send

others to lure the enemy, perhaps by stealing cattle or horses. Smoke signals or verbal

animal calls served as communication between the groups. Sometimes the Apache

utilized a rear-guard with fast mounts. A Spanish officer observed, “If the news from the

rear-guard makes it evident that inferior forces are pursuing them, they would conceal

themselves in a pass and ambush the pursuers, repeating this trick as often as their

good fortune and lack of skill of their opponents make it possible.” Finally, Apache raids

and ambushes reflected leadership characteristics that would be replicated in

successful plains warfare. Apache attacks started with extensive planning and a firm

knowledge of the terrain. Synchronized effort, communication, and deft leadership

combined to produce favorable outcomes.7

5 Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 39; Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 8, 9. 6 Marian W. Smith, “The War Complex of the Plains Indians,” The American Indian: Past and Present, eds. Roger L. Nichols and George R. Adams (Waltham, Mass: Xerox College Pub., 1971), 151. 7 Thomas A. Britten, The Lipan Apaches: People of Wind and Lightning (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 13-19.

Typically, a single leader directed an Apache raid or war party. On the Plains,

aggressive war activity was encompassed by one blatant concept, “the warpath.” The

warpath was not a physical road, but rather, a strictly ceremonial mindset that included

inception, execution, and the return home. The leader of a campaign was responsible

for the safety of his men. Unnecessarily endangering the lives of others in the war party

was avoided. Each man sought his own glory but never to the extent that he lost sight of

the ultimate triumphant homecoming of the war party. Smith indirectly notes the tactical

significance of this practice. She writes, “Nowhere in the literature is there a record of a

war party which did not return after its first fight. (This excludes chance meetings or

retaliation pursuits) Never is there mention of an attempt to locate a second

encampment of the enemy after the first had been encountered.” Thus the practical

application of easily comprehendible, limited objectives, which did not require a risk of

heavy losses, yielded a greater percentage of positive results.8

The Apaches often employed tactics tailored to the circumstances of a particular

battle. Some consistencies include ambush, surprise, and exploitation of mobility.

Militarily, these factors conserved manpower by utilizing mobility against a slower

enemy. A common battle formation included an advance in a crescent-shaped advance

with the ends thrown forward to outflank and surround an enemy as rapidly as possible.

Arguably, this method of encirclement developed out of mounted bison hunts and was

then transferred to the field of battle.9

8 Smith, "War Complex," 149,152. 9 William E. Dunn, “Apache Relations in Texas, 1718-1750” Texas State Historical Association Quarterly, 14 (Jan. 1911), 226.

The Apaches' weapons included short bows and arrows, lances, spears, pikes, clubs, slings, hatchets, knives, and sticks. Warriors often carried circular shields constructed from layers of dried bison hide pulled around a wooden frame. They cut two slits into each side allowing the warrior to discharge arrows while still shielding the majority of his body from bullets and arrows. Rifle shots, unless they hit dead center, usually glanced off the surprisingly durable devices. During the 18th century, both horse and rider wore some form of leather armor; however, as firearms became more potent, the use of leather armor faded.10

The success of the Apaches drove neighboring groups to adopt similar methods of fighting. Among others, the Comanches championed mobile warfare and the mounted nomadic hunting life like no other. Their 18th-century warfare tactics borrowed heavily from the Apaches from the utilization of small raids to large coordinated attacks with hide-armored, full-body-shield-carrying horsemen used as shock troops. The

Comanches, benefiting from a greater proliferation of firearms and increasing availability of horses, streamlined the Apaches’ tactics into quicker strikes by smaller parties.11

Functionally, the Comanches coordinated decision-making at the national level without compromising social and strategic flexibility the local level. Comanche raids utilized a rigid but temporary operational level command structure. The most experienced captains from each tribe were put in command of subordinate chiefs. The latter would obey their temporary commander in all matters pertaining to the campaign through its entire duration. Here again the main leaders considered objectives,

10 Dunn, “Apache Relations,” 206; Britten, Lipan Apache, 13. 11 William C. Meadows, Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 257.

geography, stealth and surprise, and a victorious return home. All men were expected

to be fearless in battle. Veterans were all viewed with honor, resulting in a higher social

status for them. As the horse-based economy grew and warfare and raiding activities

intensified, the Comanches' decentralized command structure left smaller raiding parties

unencumbered. Numerous Comanche groups could react rapidly and creatively to the

constantly changing circumstances. As a result, the flexibility on the tactical decision-

making level made individual parties more potent. 12

Though the Comanches borrowed many ideas from the Apaches, one

characteristic set the Comanches drastically apart. The Comanches did not adopt the

combination of a sedentary horticulture and nomadic bison hunting cycle of the

Apaches. This phase of Apache life proved to be a great military liability, which was

exploited by the Comanches. Utilizing tactics that involved rapid, surprise encirclement,

the Comanches were able to locate Apache springtime encampments and prey upon

them. The unpredictability of the entirely nomadic Comanches also limited their enemy’s

ability to locate and counterattack. The Val Verde expedition of 1719 provides a glimpse

of the nomadic Comanches' advantage. Spanish and Apache assets had been gathered

for a retaliation mission against the Comanches. The campaign was ultimately a failure,

with the Spanish spending the majority of the time wandering throughout the West.

Thus another early lesson was also learned; a large body of warriors could be easily

detected and the camp moved before an offensive could be formed. In campaigns on

the Texas frontier, sacrificing surprise meant sacrificing mission success.13

12Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 29; Meadows, Military Societies, 257, 312; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 348. 13 Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 30, 31; For more information on Spanish campaigns see, DeLay, Thousand Deserts, 48-63.

The element of surprise undermined an enemy's ability to employ weapons and organize effectively. Smith writes, “the mortality in plains fighting was highest when the attacks took the enemy unprepared for defense or when offending parties were pursued and overtaken. In such cases the weaker groups were completely annihilated.” The effect of the Comanches' attacks on Apache camps proved to be one of the main reasons for the Apaches' decline by the turn of the 19th century. 14

Utilizing the same tactics developed by the Apaches, the Comanches attacked throughout Texas. Capitalizing on their long-range mobility, Comanches overwhelmed isolated Apache villages, using guerrilla tactics to plunder them for crops, horses, and other spoils. They moved flexibly between small-scale guerrilla raids aimed at plundering and larger frontal attacks whenever they had a numerical advantage. Their weapons included long metal-tipped spears and short bows specially designed for mounted warfare and rapid fire.15 One Spanish witness wrote, “Captains of the heathen

Apache nation. . . represented to me that the heathens of the Comanche nation, their enemies, had attacked them with a large numbers in their rancherias [sic] in such a manner that they could not make use of weapons for their defense. They launched themselves with such daring and resolution that they killed many men, carrying off their women and children as captives.”16

Renowned Comanche historian Pekka Hämäläinen concurs that the Apaches' main strategic weakness was their mixed hunting and farming economy. The agricultural side of the Apaches turned from an economic asset into a military liability.

14 Smith, "War Complex," 149. 15 Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 32, 40. 16Alfred Barnaby Thomas, trans. and ed., After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), 194.

Tied to the soil at exact times of the year, the always mobile Comanche knew when and

where to attack their enemies. The modern military refers to this strategy as a disruption

of an enemy’s “center of gravity.” Comanches often use their mobility and range to not

only steal or destroy stores but also to sever an enemy's trade links. One Spanish

official noted in 1719 that the Comanches “go about . . . for the purpose of interfering

with the little barter which this kingdom has with the nations (Apaches). They prevent

their entrance and communication with us.” The tactical level interference disrupted

Apache life and contributed to a Comanche strategic dominance over time.17

The Comanches' swift, wide-ranging guerrilla attacks, which were refined during

the protracted wars against the Apaches, wreaked havoc against Spanish settlers and

soldiers, who preferred to fight in sheltered places with tightly organized formations.

Exploiting mobility, the Comanches could strike unexpectedly and disable an enemy

with seemingly unorganized individual charges. Often a group of Comanches would bait

a group into discharging all of their weapons at once, then move en masse to attack

before they can reload. A skilled Comanche could loose half a dozen arrows in the time

it took an opponent to reload his rifle a single time.18 If chased, each warrior could

abruptly break off and ride hard for dozens of miles. Scattering forced pursuers to

choose among multiple targets and thus become divided and more easily ambushed.

The Comanches' highly mobile tactics are described in Randolph B. Marcy's Prairie

Traveler. He wrote that they were “an enemy that is here today and there tomorrow;

who is everywhere without being anywhere; who assembles at the moment of combat,

17 Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 32. 18 Stephen L. Moore, Savage Frontier: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas: Vol. I: 1835-1837 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2002), 1, 2.

and vanishes whenever fortune turns against him; who leaves his women and children far distant from the theater of hostilities, has neither towns or magazines to defend, who derives his commissariat from the country he operates in, who is not encumbered with baggage or packed trains, who comes into action only when it suits his purposes, and never without the advantage of numbers or position.”19

The Plains Indians practiced both defensive and offensive warfare. However, defense was included only to contain elements of aggression. Defense fell into two categories: first, the pursuit of small enemy parties which had been successful in obtaining horses or scalps, and second, an actual defense from attack. The individuals who suffered losses usually mounted the pursuit. Defense from a large attack involved the full fighting force of the camp. An equal strength of forces usually resulted in a lining up of the opposing parties. Yet surprise attacks allowed no time for preparation and a unified defense was rarely attempted. In such cases, safety usually consisted in flight and concealment.20

Comanche tactical characteristics of flexibility and willingness to embrace new ideas and innovations contributed to their strategic military dominance. Examples that emphasize their raw fighting ability alone miss a fundamental point: the Comanches' overwhelming military power stemmed from a dynamic economic, social, and cultural core. Beneath the martial surface were adaptable people who aggressively embraced innovations, subjecting themselves to continuous self-reinvention. The Comanches were an extraordinary adaptive people ready to exploit the possibilities of mounted

19 Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 65; Randolph B. Marcy, The Prairie Traveler. A Hand-Book for Overland Expeditions, With Maps, Illustrations, and Itineraries of the Principal Routes between the Mississippi and the Pacific (Bedford, MA: Applewood Books,1993), 201. 20 Smith, "War Complex," 150.

warfare to the full. Control of the frontier and its resources demanded an ability to adapt to environment and circumstance. Texans would learn this principle and later pass it to a reluctant United States Army.21

The first Rangers of Texas operated as smaller parties organized for a specific mission, such as retaliation for a raid. John Jackson Tumlinson and Robert Kuykendall are credited with the beginnings of what late became known as the Texas Rangers. The two men wrote to the governor, Jose Trespalacios, on January 7, 1823, and asked permission to raise a group of men to serve with ten regular soldiers from San Antonio in order to attack coastal Indians. Lieutenant Moses Morrison, a veteran of the United

States Army, became the commander of the volunteers and led the force for a three- month period.22

Morrison’s men were to be employed as mounted scouts and as a rapid deployment force to pursue Indians while a rear militia guarded the settlements. Rather than hunting Indians, Morrison's man spent the majority of their time hunting for food to survive. Interestingly, one goal that they failed to achieve was to build blockhouses to serve as isolated defensive positions against Indian attack. Contrastingly in 1827,

Stephen F. Austin ordered his militia out of the borders of his colony to maintain order.

This may be the first documented attempt of Texans taking the offensive against the

Indians. In order to protect his colony from surprise Indian raids, Austin ordered his militia (which consisted of nine men) to “range the country” between the Brazos and the

21 Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 65, 67. 22 Moore, Savage Frontier, Vol. I, 8-10.

Colorado rivers along the San Antonio Road.23 The men, still woefully ignorant of the

Texas environment and Indian methods of fighting, achieved little.24

The burgeoning colonies wavered between offensive tactics and the traditional approach on the English frontier of building blockhouses. By the early 1830s, Texans had erected a chain of small forts from the Red River to the Nueces River, endeavoring to protect settlements from raiding Comanches and other various tribes. Six forts lined the frontier, culminating with the largest defensive structure, Fort Colorado. Built in

1836, Fort Colorado consisted of log cabins surrounded by a heavy stockade. The fort had two blockhouses at the corners, diagonally across from each other with portholes cut into them for firing, and was manned by a company of sixty Rangers. Despite the foreboding obstacle the fort may have presented to attackers, it was used more as forward staging base from which Rangers set out to locate Indians. The last battle fought by the Rangers from Fort Colorado against the Comanche occurred October 13,

1837, and subsequently it was dismantled after only two years of operations. The fate of

Fort Colorado, it seems, reveals the learning process for how Texans would invest in frontier protection. They had already learned to abandon static tactics, such as blockhouses, and to adopt the aggressive, mobile tactics of their Indian opponents. 25

23 Alan G. Hatley, The Indian Wars in Stephen F. Austin's Texas Colony, 1822-1835 (Austin: Eakin Press, 2001), 54. 24 Moore, Savage Frontier, Vol. I: 10, 12. On July 20 1835, Robert Morris Coleman wrote a letter to the Political Chief for the Department of Nacogdoches requesting “to levy a general tax on the citizens of Texas sufficient toupee and provision 200 men… to be stationed high up on the different rivers.” Coleman's call for protection laid the groundwork for the formal Ranger Battalion that became known as the Texas Rangers. His plan for organizing man on the frontier was legally put into effect on October 17, 1835. See Moore, Savage Frontier, Vol. I, 21. 25 William T. Field, “Fort Colorado: A Texas Ranger Frontier Outpost in Travis County, Texas” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 72 (July 1968 - April, 1969), 184, 191, 192, 199.

This same year, 1837, the Republic of Texas passed legislation to generate a

new mounted battalion and permanent ranging companies within specific counties.

Fighting became more prolific between mobile units who sought the offensive and

Indians. In the trial and error of the battles of 1838 and 1839, Texans learned more new tactics specifically developed for taking the fight to their opponents.26 In 1841, the

reelection of President Sam Houston indirectly solidified the implementation and utility

of the Ranger unit. Houston found himself inundated with debt as a result of President

Mirabeau B. Lamar's policies. Consequently, Houston cut the army of the Republic to a

few companies of Rangers. Therefore the Rangers became, in most cases, the only

means of defense for isolated frontier communities.27

Indian conflicts during 1840 and 1841 marked a new era in Texas frontier

warfare. As Texans expanded into the Comancheria, conflict with the mobile tribe

increased and underscored the inefficiency of foot soldiers and blockhouses better

suited for sedentary tribes of the east. In the same fashion that the Comanches had

borrowed from the Apaches, Texas Rangers borrowed from the natives to fight and

survive. From its infancy, the Texas military worked with certain tribes such as the Lipan

Apaches, who were enemies of the Comanche. Through this alliance, the sharing of

tactics, especially the knowledge of scouting and tracking, proved to be instrumental in

subduing the hostile Indians. The nomadic Comanches did not dwell in permanent

settlements like the many Indians in the Eastern woodlands. Although Rangers were

26 Stephen L. Moore, Savage Frontier: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas: Vol. II: 1838-1839 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2006), ix, x, 2, 158; Col. John Moore’s raid in 1839, described in chapter 7, signaled a change from defensive fortifications to offensive expeditions. 27Thomas W. Cutrer, "Army of the Republic of Texas," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qja03 (accessed October 2, 2012)]; Robert Wooster, "Military History," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qzmtg (accessed October 2, 2012)].

learning the advantages of mobile warfare, simply finding the enemy remained an issue.

Ranger alliances with Indian allies, even temporary ones, bridged this gap. Individual

Rangers who initially incorporated Indian methods on the tactical level soon expanded to greater ideas (such as wintertime campaigns) on the operational and strategic levels.28

In the early 1840s the Rangers became more adept at their trade. Ranger companies became smaller units and adapted Comanche fighting techniques of surprise, stealth, and overwhelming force. Experience gave the Ranger a knowledge of

Indian methodologies, which made him a formidable force. In the words of an observer, a Texas Ranger “could ride like a Mexican, trail like an Indian, shoot like a Tennessean, and fight like the devil.”29

These Rangers had a well-defined and highly specialized duty. They were entirely distinct from the soldiers of the regular Army of the Republic of Texas, from the militia, and from local law officers. Their organization was simple and resembled a band of Comanches who followed their chiefs or captains; in other words, they obeyed leaders who emerged from successful battles with proven frontier ingenuity. This demand for real leadership grew from the trying environment of the western frontier. For

Ranger captains, intelligence and adaptability became the main requirement. The simple command structure lent itself to the simple tactic of the Ranger: “make a rapid,

28 William Yancey, “Injustice To Our Indian Allies: The Government of Texas And Her Indian Allies, 1836 - 1867” (Master’s Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008), 18, 40. 29 Moore, Savage Frontier, 2: 356; Stephen L. Moore, Savage Frontier: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas: Vol. IV: 1842-1845 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010), viii; Webb, Texas Rangers, 80.

noiseless march . . .strike the foe while he was not on the alert. . . punish him. . . crush him.”30

Like the Indians before them, the Rangers learned that the vast distances of

Texas could not be covered rapidly or at all except on horseback. By the early to mid-

1840s, the Rangers were all mounted. Because horses were of utmost importance to mobile warfare, a man could not enlist in a Ranger company unless his horse was as able bodied as he. Since the Rangers were constantly in war with mounted Indians, their horses had to be the best. As the United States Army would later learn, many expeditions stalled because the horses broke down long before the man. 31

As the Rangers' tactics evolved, so did their equipment. Generally each man was armed with a rifle, pistol, and knife, with a blanket tied behind his saddle. In addition he would carry a small pouch containing ammunition, food supplies, spices, and tobacco.

With these minuscule rations, the Ranger would be equipped for months of campaigning unencumbered by baggage wagons or pack trains, and he would be able to move lightly over the Plains as the Indians did. The first repeating firearms made their way into Ranger hands during the 1840s and significantly changed the way battles were fought. Rangers were first equipped with long rifles, shotguns, and single-barreled pistols. These weapons demanded use on the ground, where a stable platform contributed to a successful shot. Common tactics of the 1830s included the Rangers dismounting to fire or charge groups of Indians. The mounted Indians with short bows and spears were well able to inflict casualties from horseback. They could ride and

30 Webb, Texas Rangers, 82. 31 Webb, Texas Rangers, 80; Darren L. Ivey, Texas Rangers: A Registry and History (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 2010), 11, 27.

discharge their arrows with devastating effects and great rapidity. As mentioned, their tactics included drawing fire from the Texans and then charging while they were attempting to reload their guns. The introduction of a Colt revolver would change the

Rangers' woodland traditions to the open plain tactics of the Indians. With this new weapon, the Rangers could continue to fire on horseback.32

Mobility proved to be the most important characteristic adopted by the Rangers from the Plains Indians. Living off the land, the Rangers traded the comforts of the typical Army for mobility.33 A focus on mobility turned the Texas infantrymen into a rider and the blockhouse into a feed station. The early decision not to rely on blockhouses ironically precedes the Army’s attempts of deterrence via frontier forts in Texas thirty years later. As the United States began inserting its influence into Texas, blockhouses were among the first courses of actions taken against the Indians. In 1836, a letter to the Headquarters of the Western Department from General Edmund P. Gaines stated,

“Your post at Nacogdoches. . . must be fortified by a small breastwork . . . with a blockhouse or two at the opposite angles.” At the same time, the Texas Frontier

Regiment of the 1830s foreshadowed the United States Army’ reliance on infantry in the

1850s. Rather than pursuing and fighting Indians, the Regiment's largest contribution was the surveying and building of road systems. Both organizations would come to rely on the more mobile Rangers to provide more effective frontier defense, and the United

States Army would last long enough to adopt Ranger tactics as their own. 34

32 Webb, Texas Rangers, 15, 81; Moore, Savage Frontier, 2: 356. 33 Webb, Texas Rangers, 82. 34 Mexico. Legación (U.S.). Correspondencia que ha mediado entre la Legación Extraordinaria de México y el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos sobre el paso del Sabina por las tropas que mandaba el General Gaines, House Executive Doc. No. 190, 25th Congress, 2nd sess., (Febuary 28,

By aggressively embracing innovations and subjecting themselves to continuous

self-reinvention, the Apaches, and more especially the Comanches, developed a

pattern of warfare that would be crucial to their success on the Plains. Their tactics,

which were alter adopted by the Texas Rangers, included little defense, limited

objectives, operational control, smaller groups, and the use of surprise. Ball described

frontier warfare that resulted as “partisan, the fluid technique of the guerilla and counter-

guerilla. On both sides surprise, savagery, and terror were all too common methods and killing was swift and indiscriminate.”

Experience showed, and the Rangers, learned that one must adapt to survive.

Early excursions against the Indians utilizing Eastern Woodland tactics, such as blockhouses, produced little results. Texans at first suffered from an inability to locate the enemy and misunderstood how to properly fight the Plains warriors. The combination of experience and tutelage of tribes such as the Lipan Apaches enhanced the lethality of the Rangers by the 1840s. The greatest factor, mobility, contributed to an offense style of warfare against the Indians that remained unmatched until the United

States Army utilized the same tactics. Speed kills; and when it is combined with preplanning, knowledge of terrain, good timing, communication, flexible leadership and quick decisions, victory often ensues.35

On December 29, 1845, the United States Congress accepted the constitution of

the state of Texas, turning over frontier control to the Army. With the culmination of the

Mexican War, Texas's military forces disbanded, and the Army occupied the frontier,

1838), 98, on Portal to Texas History, http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6101/ (accessed October 09, 2012). 35 Webb, Texas Rangers, 11; Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), 24; Yancey “Injustice,” 24.

largely ignoring the lessons of the last two decades. As a result, the Army devoid of any real frontier strategy, struggled until the Texas Rangers showed them how to fight on the plains.

CHAPTER 3

OLD STUBBORN ARMY IN TEXAS

According to historian Walter Prescott Webb, in order to survive on the plains of

Texas, the Rangers “found it necessary to adopt weapons, tactics, and strategy to the

conditions imposed by their enemies.” Fresh from the victory over Mexico, the

pretentious United States Army was adverse to change. Americans were confident that

their Army was vastly superior to the feeble barbaric peoples of the frontier. In sum,

there was no motivation to adopt unconventional tactics; after all, the Army had just

conquered a continent. The Army’s resistance to change in the early 1850s provides the

framework of this chapter. Beginning at a strategic level, Army concepts of frontier

defense are traced to show a resemblance (on a grand scale) to the Ranger’s trials

discussed in Chapter 2. Lack of money, manpower, and experience led Army leaders

initially to rely on traditional methods of defense, which of course faltered on the Texas

plains, an untraditional environment. 1

The Army undertook an old mission on frontiers new to the United States:

occupying territory, policing conflicts between settlers and Indians, and indirectly

expanding white settlement. The migration of new people to Texas intensified

competition for natural resources, political independence, and cultural survival.2 Maj.

Gen. William J. Worth’s 1849 mission statement for the Army in Texas instructed his

unit commanders “to protect the lives and property of citizens, to prevent Indians from

the United States crossing into Mexico, and finally to protect non-hostile Indians against

1 Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers; A Century of Frontier Defense (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1935), 11; Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), 24. 2,Ball, Army Regulars, xii.

violence and injustice.” This basic outline remained the primary operational task for the

Army in Texas. Worth's order proved to be a lofty goal, one that the citizens of Texas

would hold against the Army daily. Palpably, the order was more easily given than

executed.3

Although the challenges for the Army in Texas were many, the defense of an

entire continent proved of more interest. The expanding nation required trade and

sought measures to increase and protect it. During the 1850s, much like today, the

United States pursued a traditional way of war similar to European models. Focus on

the “next war,“ one likely involving invasion from a European nation, dominated defense

planning and spending. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis made this all too clear. He

wrote, “the construction of permanent fortifications, and the creation of arsenals and

depots. . . in Texas and on the Pacific coast, should at the earliest practical period be. .

. [made] sufficient for defense against any sudden attack by a naval force.” Davis

continued to call for “sea-coast defenses” in every annual report during his tenure. As

historian Robert M. Utley noted, Army leaders generally regarded the wars against the

Indians as a “fleeting bother,” unworthy of serious scrutiny. Operationally, the Army was

too busy focusing on nation building to devote much attention to fighting Indians, which

further reduced interest in expanding the Army on the Texas frontier. A glimpse into

Washington's politics and limited finances reveals this fact. 4

3 Maj. Gen. William J. Worth, “General Orders No. 13” Feb. 14, 1849, [from] Thomas T. Smith, “Fort Inge and Texas Frontier Military Operations 1849-1869,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 96 (July 1992 - April, 1993), 7. 4 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. 1, 33rd Cong., 1st sess, (1853), 6.; Robert M. Utley, “The Frontier and the American Military Tradition,” The American Military on the Frontier: The Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, ed. James P. Tate (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978), 9; Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. 1, 4th Cong., 1st sess. (1875), 122.

President James K. Polk spoke before Congress on July 6, 1848, stating that,

“the old Army, as it existed before the war with Mexico. . . would serve peacetime

necessities.”5 He envisioned that a “suitable number” of Indian agents would be all that

were necessary to preserve the peace alongside a small military force on the frontier.

Intoxicated by the lower expense, Congress ignorantly agreed, and the Army thinned to

little more than 10,000 men with a mission centered on policing the frontier.6 Obviously,

dealing with the Indians was not exclusively a military task; in fact, noble aspirations of

“civilizing” the Indians demanded less violent means of interaction. Treasury Secretary

Robert Walker proposed in 1848 that the duties of Indian administration would “not

necessarily appertain to war, but to peace.” Accordingly, he believed the Indian Bureau

should be independent from the War Department and function as its own entity.7

In 1849, Congress concurred and created the Department of the Interior, which

included the General Land Office, the Patent Office, the Pension Office, and a civilian

Office of Indian Affairs. Army leaders consistently viewed this as a mistake that

hindered its efficiency. Historian Robert Wooster mentions that Indian agents often

believed the Army would easily default to force; “Army officers, accordingly, saw their

civilian counterparts as political hacks who had little appreciation for frontier subtleties.”

As a result, during the period between the Mexican War and the Civil War, neither the

Army nor the Indian Bureau made much progress in working together to neutralize the

Indian threat to settlements. For the next half-century, soldiers would regularly call for

5 James K. Polk, “Special Message,” July 6, 1848, American Presidency Project [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=68017 (accessed Nov.1 2012)]. 6James D. Richardson, comp., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York: U.S. Congress, 1897), 4: 645-46. 7 George D. Harman, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs, 1789-1850 (Chapel Hill.: University of North Carolina Press, 1941),172-73.

the transfer of the Indian office back to the War Department. Realistically, the Army

would never be able to cease its enforcement role.8

Congress thus created a new agency, but it gave little further effective consideration to frontier needs relative to the magnitude of the challenge that Indians presented. Rather, Congress more often focused on the question of expansion of slavery into the territories. A handful of senators and congressmen did loudly vent their

frustrations concerning frontier protection, but it was an uphill battle. Astonishingly,

Washington’s direction for Indian interaction in Texas became clear before Polk streamlined the post-Mexican War Army. Texans were simply instructed to not stir them

up. Secretary of War William Marcy wrote to Texas Governor James Pinkney

Henderson on April 3, 1847, that “it is hoped that the authorities and people of Texas

will not disturb or interfere with them [Indians] and let them remain quietly."9 Marcy wanted to establish a reservation within Texas. Unfortunately, the acquisition of the territories of California and Oregon ultimately undermined the concept of a permanent

Indian frontier, because it sandwiched the tribes between two frontiers of expanding white civilization.10

Frontier defense was far more expensive than many leaders in Washington

understood, which further undermined support for maintaining a large Army. In 1851,

Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad cited four reasons for this enormous cost. First, the

8 Robert Wooster. The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783- 1900 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 118. 9 William Marcy to James P. Henderson, April 3, 1847, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth, Tx. (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28). 10 Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue; the United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 14. Texas set aside land for two reservations by 1854, but they failed by1858.

greater percentage of the Army actively operated on the remote frontier. Second, military posts were sometimes hundreds of miles from navigable waters, requiring extra finances to supply. Third, frontier posts were often built in unproductive regions in the west, therefore making self-support close to impossible. Fourth, Conrad cited the expenses related to positioning or transferring troops over great distances. In 1853,

Davis wrote the absence of navigable streams in the West drove the cost of transportation up $451,775. He elaborated that the “modes of transportation used: wagons drawn by horses, mules, or oxen besides being very expensive, are extremely slow if not altogether inadequate.” All things considered, the frontier regular still was expected to execute the duties of his post despite this lack of manpower and materiel.

Unfortunately, the policy makers' aversion to spending money, and general vagueness and apathy about frontier protection, too often permeated to lower levels of command.11

The United States’ elected representatives thus refused to pay the price of

Manifest Destiny. Instead of pursuing only a defined role of protection, the Army became a multitasking mechanism for the settlement and growth of the West. This included mapping western territories, improving existing travel routes, making new roads, and providing safety to foster integration and further transcontinental transportation and communication. Wooster notes that the constant fatigue duty contributed to alarmingly high desertion rates, which could be as high as 25 percent annually. A deserter once insisted “he had enlisted to be a soldier and not a slave.”

Utley elaborates that while about three fourths of the Army was stationed on the frontier, only about one third could be counted as effective for anything but a passive mission of

11 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Executive Document II, 32nd Cong., 1st sess. (1851), 109; Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., (1853), 24.

guard and escort. The growth from ocean to ocean meant a greater responsibility on an

international scale, and the task in Texas fell to a much reduced Army. 12

As Utley, Wooster, and Smith have shown the lack of soldiers on the Texas

frontier was problematic. Compounding the manpower issue, every Annual Report of

the Secretary of War from 1849 to 1861 indicated that the reported number of

serviceable men on paper differed drastically from reality. Secretary of War Conrad

wrote in his 1850 report, “it rarely happens [that] every company is complete. . .

particularly in the case regarding troops stationed on the frontier.” Conrad cited

enlistment times proscribed by law, deaths, discharges, and desertions as a few

reasons for the disparity. Davis usually provided a more thorough study of the

inconsistency of established manpower versus the actual strength of the Army in his

reports. For example, in 1853 the authorized strength of the Army was 13,821; however,

Davis reported that the actual strength was only 10,417. In 1854 the authorized strength

of the Army was 14,216, but the actual strength was only 10,745. The significance is

that every Secretary of War from 1849 to 1861 called for an augmentation of troops,

which were badly needed in frontier regions such as Texas.13

Conrad became one of the foremost proponents for an increase of soldiers in

Texas, but he had little success. In 1849 he reported that the numerical strength of the

companies on the Western frontier must be increased and that part of the infantry

should be mounted. He wrote, “Without a large irregular force the Executive will find the

12 Wooster, “The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West, 1865-1900,” Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning (Fort Leavenworth, Ks: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 73; Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 21. 13 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. V, 31st Cong., 1st sess., (1849), 90; Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 31st Cong., 2nd sess., (1850), 3; Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., (1853), 3; Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 33st Cong., 2nd sess., (1854), 3.

occasions frequent and necessary to call upon state volunteers at the expense of the government.” In 1850 he reported again, “the force now stationed on the frontier. . . is entirely insufficient for its protection.” 14 On October 1, 1849, in a short letter to Governor

George T. Wood, Conrad replied to the governor's request for two additional regiments of mounted troops, telling him that the request “failed to receive the sanction of

Congress.” A letter dated February 5, 1852, indicated how lacking the Army was in certain regions of Texas. Conrad wrote Congressman Willis A. Gorman of Indiana saying that “the mounted rifleman. . . under orders for that frontier… have no horses, nor has the department funds to purchase them.”15

Like today, Congress in the 1850s dictated the size of the Army and indirectly its composition. The finances it allotted shaped the size and strength of the fielded forces.

Knowing that the distances were too great for an effective static defense by a greatly reduced Army on the frontier, mobility became a viable alternative for local commanders. Evidence shows that this idea was being considered quite early. Gen.

Winfield Scott pointed out in 1850 that “the great extent of our frontiers, and the particular character of the service devolving on our troops, render it indispensable that the cavalry element should enter largely into the composition of the Army.” Secretary

Conrad agreed that, “no other description of troops will answer for the protection of our immense lines of immigration and frontier settlements.” He continued, “the only description of troops that can actually put a stop to these forays, is cavalry.”16 Texas

14 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. V, 31st Cong., 1st sess., (1849), 4, 91. 15Charles M. Conrad to George T. Wood, Oct 1, 1850, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth, Tx. (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 30); Conrad to W.A. Gorman, Feb. 5, 1852, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth, TX. (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 34). 16 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 31st Cong., 2nd sess., (1850), 114-15.

Congressman Volney Howard agreed. He wrote that the Indians were “well-mounted

and the most expert riders in the world. . . you can neither fight nor pursue them with

infantry or artillery [and] each of the guns of the fort might as well be 1000 miles

distant.” Therefore, it can be concluded that the lack of money, manpower, and

Congressional support initially forced the Army to fall back on traditional methods of

defense, even as some leaders were urging a more mobile solution to the problem of

frontier protection. 17

Some leaders, ignorant of the unique fighting required on the Texas frontier,

persistently believed a line of defensive forts, built from the Rio Grande to the Red

River, would solve the manifold problems of the Texas border.18 The Secretary of War’s

1848 Annual Report echoed Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines’ 1836 reliance on

fortifications. The Secretary advised that "despite financial setbacks it may be advisable

to commence new works at some exposed points. . . particularly within the limits of

Texas.” While the “pendency of the war with Mexico” supported calls for an effective

defense in 1836 and 1848, Mexico rapidly decreased as a threat soon afterward, and

the sense of urgency passed. Therefore, the Army from the start overlooked the

immediate danger posed by the Plains Indians already within their borders.19

Ignoring the tactical experience Texans already had with blockhouses, General

Worth in 1849 ordered the continued construction of a first line of frontier forts already begun in 1848. To secure the lower Rio Grande border with Mexico, three forts were established upriver from the existing post at Brownsville. Fort Ringgold, Fort McIntosh,

17Congressional Globe, 31st Congress., 2nd sess., 722 (Feb. 27, 1851). 18William Y. Chalfant, Without Quarter: The Wichita Expedition and the Fight on Crooked Creek (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21. 19 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. I, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., (1848), 81.

and Fort Duncan respectively stood near the settlements of Brownsville, Laredo and

Eagle Pass. The forts, strung out along the international boundary, served to discourage a Mexican invasion, and so their garrisons viewed Indian responsibilities as a secondary distraction.20 These forts were located considerable distances from each other and garrisoned by about one hundred men, who were primarily infantry. The men lived in tents and cooked and ate in the open. At first, horses enjoyed the comfort of brush shelters built to protect them from the sun, but in a short time the elements destroyed the structures. Due to the Army’s shortage of funding, shade structures were not given a high priority.21

After Worth’s death in 1849, Maj. Gen. George M. Brooke assumed command of the Department of Texas and inherited the great responsibility of developing a defensive fort system for Texas. Brooke’s appointment letter, dated June 4, 1849, came with specific instructions to “defend and protect the extensive frontier from the Red River to the Rio Grande.” Of course, this defense focused not only on Indians but also an invasion from Mexico. In instructions that left little room for adaption, Secretary of War

George W. Crawford recommended that Brooke use Gen. Zachary Taylor's older model centered on fortified defensive positions (like Gaines), implemented while Taylor commanded the Western Division during the Mexican War. The Secretary noted that the amount of soldiers in Texas “was considered amply sufficient” for his purposes.

Interestingly, the same instructions were given to Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs stationed in New Mexico just a few months later. Crawford ordered Twiggs to establish posts after

20 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. V, 31st Cong., 1st sess., (1849), 152-53. 21Randolph B. Campbell, Gone To Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 197; Joseph B. Wilkinson, Laredo and the Rio Grande Frontier: A Narrative (Austin, Tex: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1975), 228.

a “full examination of the country” and that “this matter will be left exclusively under your

control,” thus signifying Washington’s apathy. 22

Early in the decade federal leaders seemed to have an ill-advised optimism concerning the situation. Secretary of War Crawford wrote, “it is believed that the regular troops in that country [Texas] will be sufficient for any emergency likely to arise.”23 He also reported favorable relations with the Indians in that, “the wisdom of our

policy in regard to the Indians is vindicated by the good effects which it has produced.”

He boasted of trading programs, gift giving, schools, and agriculture, adding that "Within

the newly acquired territories there is a numerous Indian population, over which our

supervision and guardianship must be extended of the frontier settlement against

attacks of hostile bands.”24 Perhaps Secretary Crawford was not as aware of the

problems in Texas as he needed to be.

A letter from Texas Governor George T. Wood to Secretary of War Crawford

more accurately depicted the situation on the Texas frontier. Governor Wood wrote,

“The settlers upon this line, throughout its extent, are exposed to Indian depredations

and outrage at every point, without exception. . . and have been for the last four years.”

The protection offered by the United States has been “wholly inadequate to ensure

them protection or security.” The governor acknowledged the difficulties imposed on the

Army to perform the proper amount of security due to the immense frontier size. In his

letter, he recommended a patrol barrier from the Red River to the Rio Grande able to

22 George M. Crawford to George Brooke, June 4, 1849, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth, Tx. (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 29), 204-205. 23 Report of the Secretary of War, House. Ex. Doc. V, 31st Cong., 1st sess., (1849), 94. 24 Ibid., 82, 94.

“keep continual inner communication” and more importantly “capable of moving from

this and celerity.” Wood concluded, “A considerable portion of the force-being infantry

and artillery is only a death to the particular service required."25

In his response, Secretary of War Crawford’s much published letter of January

19, 1850, communicated the idea that most of Texas's troubles were instigated by the

Texans themselves. He declared that it was not the Indians but bandits and other

outlaws and Mexicans causing most of the trouble along the Rio Grande. Additionally,

Crawford specified that Texas enjoyed a seven-to-one ratio of troops compared to the

rest of the United States. He concluded his letter with a request for the Texans to leave

the Indians alone.26

Governor Wood, understandably upset by the Secretary’s letter, replied that the

best method of defense, which “may wholly come into collision with the long-

established opinions of the best mode accomplishing the object” was a permanent line

of posts along the northwestern frontier. However, these posts differed in a major way.

They were to operate only as bases supporting “a strong cavalry mounted force.”

Infantry might be necessary for the protection of the posts themselves, but any other

use would be a waste of manpower. He added that “at least two regiments of mounted

troops must be armed with rifles and revolvers to pursue and punish. ” Finally, Wood

reiterated “the utter inadequacy of infantry troops to hold in subjugation an enemy of this

25 Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War to the President, Senate Executive Document 9, 31st Congress, 2nd sess. (1850), 13-14. 26 Ibid.,15.

character.” This advice, however, fell on deaf ears and the Army’s strategic level

concept of frontier protection, for the time, remained unchanged. 27

In 1852, the Army extended the line of defense in Texas and established a new

series of forts approximately 150 miles west of white settlements. The seven forts

formed a huge arc from the Wichita River to the Rio Grande. Infantry was stationed in

the outer forts while mounted troops garrisoned the interior posts. In theory, infantrymen

holding the outer line could warn the interior troops of Indian raids. Upon word of an

Indian presence, a patrol would be dispatched from an interior post to try to pick up the

trail or gather intelligence. The patrol would then follow the Indians until they caught the

raiders or abandoned the chase. The second most common operation practiced at all

posts was to “scout” for Indians. Walking their beats, soldiers moved along likely

avenues of Indian approach such as trails, streams, and watering holes. These efforts,

although quasi mobile, still failed to deter Indian raids. Locals were particularly critical of

the regular infantry who manned the exterior line of forts. The editors of the Texas State

Gazette pronounced the forts to be “as much out of place as a sawmill upon the

ocean.”28

Predominantly as a result of the Mexican War, the Army’s concept of frontier defense utilized methods more suited for European or formal battle, and why not? The

United States had just won an international conflict, defeating what was, to some, a superior enemy. Unfortunately, it was the wrong diagnosis. Historian Russell F. Weigley writes, “on the Western frontier, the Army's European conceptions of war did not serve it

27 Ibid.,16-18. 28 Wooster, American Military, 125; Thomas T. Smith, The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth-Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 17; Campbell, Gone To Texas, 197.

[well].” He concludes that the fort system, which was purely defensive in nature,

“offered no strategic plan at all, but [was] merely a response to the demands of the

pioneering Western communities.”29 During this period, Gen. Dabney H. Maury

observed, “The military system, as taught and practiced in our Army. . . was designed

for the operation against an enemy who made use of a similar system. The numerous

tribes of marauding and erratic savages, who are mounted upon fleet and hearty

horses. . .render[ed] our system almost wholly impotent.” Utley later agreed, observing

that, “the Plains warriors. . . effortlessly slipped through the cordon of forts, struck the

settlements, and escaped before pursuit could be organized.” Such a highly mobile

enemy rendered the Army’s celebrated concept of linear warfare ineffective.30

One veteran of the frontier noted, “In a campaign against Indians, the frontier is

all around and the rear is nowhere.”31 This statement paints a vivid picture of the

daunting task the frontier regular faced, especially in a region where he felt lost without

a map. Utley adds that “that no framework of strategy and few policy guidelines

emanated from the War Department or Army headquarters to give direction and

coherence to frontier defense measures.” In the absence of effective knowledge of the

area and operational guidance, many local commanders devised new policies and courses of action useful for survival or mission accomplishment. Utley confirms that the

Army's top commanders spent more time ratifying the decisions of the subordinates in

29 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 68-69. 30 Randolph B. Marcy, The Prairie Traveler: A Hand-Book for Overland Expeditions, With Maps, Illustrations, and Itineraries of the Principal Routes between the Mississippi and the Pacific (New York: Harper & Bros, 1859), 200-201; Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 72. 31 Erasmus D. Keyes, 50 Years Observation of Men and Events (New York: Scribner’s, 1884), 254.

the field rather than providing for directing their operations. How could the Army evolve

to such ineptitude?32

In his article “West Point and the Indian Wars,” published in the journal Military

History of the West, Thomas T. Smith demonstrates the Army lacked what modern

military professionals would call a clear mission statement. After providing statistics that

show the greater majority of West Point graduates during this period (i.e. 1850-1859)

engaged in some form of frontier combat, Smith shows that the institution did not

educate cadets about Indian fighting.33 West Point was becoming a premiere engineering school, but the technical curriculum would offer little to no value for future officers trying to survive in Texas. For example, the esteemed Professor Dennis Hart

Mahan developed one lecture on “Indian warfare” to be included within a four-year

curriculum. Mahan based the lesson on the catastrophe that an unfortunate column,

commanded by Major Francis L. Dade, faced in the Second Seminole War. Mahan

began by saying, “In carrying on the operations of an Indian war, expeditions composed

of small detachments should never be resorted to.” Unfortunately, manpower was

exactly what was lacking on the frontier. Additionally, this assumption stood in contrast

to Texas Ranger operations and small unit successes achieved by the Army. Mahan’s

speech concluded with an idea many would later emulate. He stated, “we must either

over-awe by strong measures. . . or else, when hostilities do commence, strike such a blow that it shall be handed down as memorable in the traditions of the tribe.”34

32 Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 48. 33 Thomas T. Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars, 1802-1891,” Military History of the West, 24 (Spring 1994), 31. 34 Mahan quote found in: Smith, “West Point,” 51; Wooster, American Military, 94.

Smith speculates that there was no other formal lesson offered concerning Indian warfare at West Point in the antebellum or post-Civil War period. Mahan’s capstone course was actually more concerned with engineering than other aspects of military studies, and similarly West Point would remain more of an engineering college than a school for engineering military professionals. Historian Samuel P. Huntington wrote that

American soldiers circa 1850 were “technicists rather than professionals.” The majority of the Army’s focus encompassed fortification in the field.35 As previously noted, the nineteenth century Army concentrated on molding the professional soldier in preparation for the next conflict with a European power. Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield stated it bluntly in 1875: “There is no glory to be won in savage warfare.” The Indians, therefore, were regarded by the Army as a “nuisance and a disagreeable distraction.”36

Policymakers in Washington never worried that Indians were going to burn down the national capital as the British did in 1814. In part because of that reason, Smith concludes that the Army “failed to develop a solid official tactical doctrine to cope with the unconventional and decentralized nature of fighting an Indian foe.” Regrettably, the lack of a systematic methodology to prepare officers for wars against the Indians resulted a larger proportion of Army deaths.37

The lack of an institutional tactical doctrine forced soldiers to rely solely on experience for mere survival. New methods used in irregular, decentralized warfare against Indians would mostly have to be developed by local commanders. The tactical

35 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 195-203. 36 Report of Schofield, September 20, 1875, Report of the Secretary of War, House. Executive Document I, 44th Cong., 1st sess., (1875), 122.; Smith, “West Point,” 31. 37 Wooster, American Military, 94; Smith, Old Army, 18.

innovations used were largely products of the geographic location, type of unit, and number of the enemy. In many circumstances, junior officers, leading small units, often had to become makeshift tacticians. Here, at the tactical level, is where the Army and

Rangers’ paths crossed, facilitating the exchange of experiences, and in most cases, providing the Army with an example of how to fight and win on the plains. As a result, commanders in the field emerged as the molders of what would become the Army's future strategies and methods of frontier defense. 38

In conclusion, by 1852 several effective tactics developed by the Plains Indians had been adopted by the Texas Rangers, yet these methods were ignored by the Army.

While the Texas Rangers on a tactical level “found it necessary to adopt weapons, tactics, and strategy to the conditions imposed by their enemies,” the United States

Army--hampered by lack of support, official apathy, and traditional training-- had no cohesive strategic level doctrine yet to provide much of any direction. The result of relegating command responsibilities to lower echelons, opened an avenue of influence in which new tactics would enter. 39

38 Wooster, American Military, 94; Smith, Old Army, 18; Thomas T. Smith. “West Point,” 43. 39 Webb, Texas Rangers , 11; Ball, Army Regulars, 24.

CHAPTER 4

INDIVIDUALS ADAPT

The previous chapters discussed how the Army’s strategic concept of frontier defense centered on fortifications prior to the Civil War. As a result of the frequent failure of this grand strategy, particular Army officers, left to their own stratagems, adopted alternative tactics and practiced them effectively. The doctrinal void for the

Army officer at the tactical level was filled by what they experienced in the field. A shift towards greater mobility aimed at specific targets began, which of course, already typified the average Texas Ranger. The structure of this chapter traces the evolution of tactics as practiced by individual Texas Rangers and later duplicated by the Army. For the sake of brevity, only a few individuals are discussed, whereas many more could be included. Looking at the Rangers, the offensive tactics of John Henry Moore in the

1830s were further refined by John Coffee Hays in the 1840s. By the end of 1850s,

John S. “RIP” Ford epitomized the evolution of new tactics by combining mobility, surprise, and technology into an efficient yet lethal fighting force. Individuals in the Army observed this progression and evolved in a like fashion. Men such as Brig. Gen. William

S. Harney and Maj. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy, refined tactics at the local level on the

Texas plains and produced favorable results until the specter of the Civil War diverted almost all attention from frontier defense. The chapter concludes by suggesting that

Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen was the Army's counterpart to Ford. Both men, like the

Rangers, adopted tactics that reflected those of their common foes, the Plains Indians.

Historian Stephen L. Moore begins his acclaimed series Savage Frontier by depicting an 1835 battle between the Texans and the Indians. A party of Indians

attacked a group of traders in South Central Texas. The minicamp scrambled to make a

stand. Improvising breast works of carts, pack-saddles and trading goods, the traders

fired back at the Indians, who outnumbered them by more than six to one. The highly

mobile Indians finally slaughtered the immobilized men. The following morning a party

was put together to chase down the Indians, who arrogantly tied thread to the tails of

their horses, leaving an easy trail to follow. Their camp was soon discovered by the

posse of “rangers,” who dismounted in an attempted surprise attack. Once alerted, the

Indians made a charge and the Texans fired, killing three. Realizing they lacked the

initiative, the Indians dispersed and minor scuffles ensued. On the whole, this conflict

provides a glimpse of the changes that would occur from 1835 into the next decade as

Texas Rangers left static defensive posts and attacked their Indian foes.1

A comprehensive look at 1835-1845 reveals that groups of Texans began

organizing and going on the offensive. Col. John H. Moore, a veteran of the Texas

Revolution from Tennessee, stands out as one of the earlier proponents of taking the

fight to the Indians. Moore gained a reputation for being the most efficient organizer of

retaliatory attacks by leading multiple brutal campaigns. In 1835, Moore led the first true

Ranger campaign against Indians. In analyzing the campaign, one characteristic stood

out amongst others, mobility. The campaign consisted of four groups, under the

command of Moore, and attacked Indian villages from July to September. The fact that

Moore attacked villages, and not war parties in the field, signals a significant change in

tactics. Additionally, Moore used Lipan scouts, which perhaps made the assaults

1 Stephen L. Moore, Savage Frontier: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas: Vol. I: 1835- 1837 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2002), 1-4.

possible.2 The attacks demonstrated the ability of the Texans to locate and destroy

tribes when they were most vulnerable, just as the Comanches did to the Apaches.

During these attacks, stealth and surprise gave the Texans the upper hand. In one

attack on July 4, 1835, Robert M. Coleman led a group of men against Tawakoni and

Caddo Indians. Coleman's men, under the cover of darkness, crawled into the very

midst of the Indian camp and waited for daylight to begin the attack. When the signal

was given, the Texans sprang up and, despite their inferior numbers, defeated and

scattered the Indian village.3

Within Texas, such offensive tactics gained notoriety. Some settlers in 1837 pressed Pres. Sam Houston to allocate funds for this novel type of frontier warfare. The

Texas government resolved on June 9, 1837, “that the president be and is hereby authorized and required to spend a sum not exceeding $100,000 for the purchase of horses and munitions of war, to be used by the Rangers and mounted gunmen and in a campaign against the Indians.”4 Later, the aggressive attitude of Pres. Mirabeau B.

Lamar pushed a newly formed frontier regiment and the Rangers into major offensive

thrusts that eventually drove the Cherokees and Shawnees largely from Texas.5

Building on past experiences and allied Indian knowledge, Moore concluded that

the nomadic Comanches settled for longer periods of time during the cold season. In

1839, he fielded another mixed group of volunteers and friendly Indians to exploit this

2 William Yancey, “Injustice To Our Indian Allies: The Government of Texas And Her Indian Allies, 1836 - 1867” (Master’s Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008), 21. 3 Gary C. Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 100, 102; Moore, Savage Frontier, 1: 21, 25. 4 [Houston] Telegraph and Texas Register, July 22, 1837. 5 Moore, Savage Frontier, 1: xii.

characteristic. This expedition departed La Grange, Texas on January 26, 1839, with

the intent of driving Comanches out of the area. The group endured a harsh winter

storm and limited food supplies. Moore, stout in his resolve, would not be deterred. A

member of this campaign later remarked they would continue, “if there were horses

enough to justify the fight.” Despite the elements, the Texans understood the benefit of

attacking the Comanche’s greatest asset, horses. Trailing the Comanches, Lipan scouts

eventually found their camp bustling with a multitude of horses.6 Moore's men

dismounted and crept into position to surprise the Comanche camp at sunup. The early

shock stampeded the horses and dispersed the Comanches. Eventually realizing they

outnumbered the Texans, the Comanches rallied and pinned Moore's forces into a

ravine. A cease-fire was called and the Texans were allowed to fall back to their horses, which unfortunately the Comanches had stolen.7

Moore's 1839 expedition is considered by some to be a defeat, however, it

indicates the changes occurring on the Texas frontier. The winter operation targeting

horses, amongst other things, suggests the Rangers had now come to a full

appreciation of the importance of mobility and surprise on the Plains. The citizens on

the frontier were becoming less reactionary and more proactive against potential

threats.8 Not to be deterred, Moore mounted a similar campaign a year later.

Resembling the Apache practice of planning, Moore waited for several months,

6 By 1839 it was common practice for Lipan Apaches, archenemies of the Comanche, to scout for Texans. The same practice was adopted (utilizing various tribes) for the Army before and after the Civil War. See: Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 267,268; Yancey, “Injustice,” 6. 7 Moore, Savage Frontier, 2: 158-168; "Moore, John Henry," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fmo30], (accessed October 06, 2012). Moore’s men were forced to walk a considerable distance before catching up to the Lipan scouts, who departed during the conflict with a group of stolen horses. 8 Ibid., 168.

collecting information on the whereabouts of the Comanches. He set out during the

winter again, knowing that the Comanche villages would never expect an attack. This

time there would be no stalemate. With the use of scouts, he located and moved

undetected around a Comanche camp. As dawn broke, the Texans besieged the village

and decimated it. According to Moore, “bodies of men women and children were seen

everywhere wounded dying and dead.” The total victory came as a factor of four specific

traits borrowed from Indians: planning, surprise, attacking the camp, and the use of

mobility.9

The next milestone in Ranger development came with the advancement of

tactics by John Coffee “Jack” Hays. A native of Tennessee, Hays came to Texas in

1837 and established himself as a surveyor. One cannot underestimate the importance

of his intimate knowledge of the land and its inhabitants that later contributed to

improvements in fighting. Knowing the vast distances, lack of water, and harsh terrain,

Hays would be able to build upon Plains Indian tactics and eventually mold a potent and

deadly Ranger force. Hays dictated what his men could carry on campaigns, inevitably sacrificing comfort for mobility. He taught a blend of guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics, which included the benefits of surprising a superior enemy by taking advantage of the terrain, night raids, and unrelenting pursuit. He trained his men to fight like Comanches, shooting from their horses while being shielded by their mounts' necks. Another peculiar

example born from experience included locating Indians by observing the flock of

buzzards that usually hung over their camps. Like Moore, Hays utilized Indian scouts

and learned their tactics, such as stampeding enemy herds and targeting killing tribal

9 Anderson, Conquest, 190. Moore's official report appears in [Houston] Telegraph and Texas Register, November 18, 1840.

leaders to demoralize the enemy.10 Unlike Moore, Hays benefited from an advance in

technology and was able to combine mobility with greater firepower.11

Up until this time, tactics for Anglo settlers and soldiers usually included

dismounting to fire or leaving the horses behind to charge or surprise the enemy.

Texans often fired in platoons so that some men would have ready weapons at all

times. This was necessary because the standard weapon was a single-shot muzzle-

loaded rifle. The invention of the Colt revolver and its adoption by Hays put to rest

woodland tactics and gave birth to a new era of frontier fighting. Despite the initial Army

rejection of Colt’s revolver, Hays and his men found the gun admirably adapted to the

needs of a man who had the fight on horseback. Later, the collaboration between

Samuel H. Walker, a Texas Ranger, and Samuel Colt produced a pistol perfectly suited

to the task of riding and shooting. Now the Rangers began to fight Comanches without

dismounting. In most battles, Hays and his Rangers were usually outnumbered, but

their effective use of revolvers finally brought parity to the Indians' rate of fire.12

On June 8, 1844, Hays, in command of fifteen Rangers, came upon an

unsuspecting group of sixty Indians near Walker Creek. Alerted to the Rangers'

approach, the Indians ascended a bluff and dismounted. Under Hays's orders, the

Rangers, outnumbered almost four to one, charged the Indians. First using rifles and

then pistols, the Rangers gunned down the much larger Indian party. With twenty-three

10 Yancey, “Injustice," 27. 11 Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers; A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 80,84; Michael L. Collins, Texas Devils: Rangers and Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 21. 12 Harold J. Weiss, Jr., "Hays, John Coffee," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fhabq], (accessed September 14, 2012); Webb, Rangers, 80, 84.

Indians dead and many others wounded, the remaining Indians retreated. The use of rapid mobility and overwhelming firepower routed the group. The battle of Walker Creek dispelled any doubts as to the potency of Colt’s revolver. In summary, Hays’ example clearly illustrates Anglos adopting Apache and Comanche tactics. Hays used Indian scouts, calculated attacks, showed extreme courage, embraced new technologies, and rode horses better suited to the environment. In 1849, another Texan would emerge from the tutelage of Hays and professionalize the Rangers.13

John S. “RIP” Ford, like Hays, was a Tennessee immigrant to Texas who became well acquainted with the environment. Ford joined Hays’ Rangers when they were sent to serve under Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott during the Mexican War. Ford idolized Hays for his fighting skills, leadership ability, and endurance. Ford later, quite literally, picked up where Hayes left off. In 1848, the Army and people of San Antonio commissioned Hays to find a practical wagon road to El Paso. After a perilous journey during which the guide lost his way and the party nearly starved, Hays reached a

Mexican village at the junction of the Río Conchos and the Rio Grande. He returned to

San Antonio after an absence of 107 days. In early 1849, Ford was commissioned to blaze a trail from San Antonio to El Paso as well. Borrowing from Hays’ previous West

Texas survey work, Ford concluded Hays had failed in this project because he did not have “an able and efficient guide.” Ford understood that Indians knew the country better than anyone else and were effective interpreters as well as guides or trackers. The significance of the expedition is that it again gave a future great Ranger an intimate

13 Thomas G. Western to Sam Houston, June 16, 1844, A. J. Houston Papers. Texas State Library, Austin; Anderson, Conquest, 206.

knowledge of the western frontier of Texas, based upon what he had learned from the

Indians he would later fight.14

The well-accomplished Ford played many roles in the history of Texas. One of

his more remarkable features was his ability to embody or exercise all the traits of

frontier fighting that had been evolving on the Texas frontier. In 1849 the Army departed

from traditional thought and federalized four companies of Texas Rangers. Ford

commanded one of these companies, and his success forced Army leaders to

recognize the importance of a mission-dedicated mounted force. Like the Comanches,

Ford had strategic level vision and tactical level brilliance. On the battlefield, he was fearless, bold, intelligent, and relentless. But he also demonstrated that he could combine thoughtful planning and disciplined execution with his personal bravery.

Exploiting the advantages of mobility and firepower, Ford distinguished himself in that

he mandated that his company drill regularly and become experts in tactical maneuvers

and weaponry. Ford and his Rangers built upon Hays’ earlier successes to not only

become iconic to the citizens of Texas but also by 1858 force the Army to become

envious of his success, and to try to copy it.15

Reiterating the information from chapter two, historians such as Thomas T. Smith

and Robert Wooster discuss the absence of any established practical strategy for the

Army in Texas. Furthermore, they acknowledge that certain resourceful individuals

were able to break the mold and achieve some success. Building from the experience of

14 Seymour V. Connor, "Ford, John Salmon [RIP]," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/ffo11], (accessed September 17, 2012); Richard B. McCaslin, Fighting Stock: John S. “RIP” Ford of Texas (Fort Worth: TCU Press, 2011), 23, 26. 15 Early in 1858 Ford accepted another commission in the state troops and defeated the Comanches in two major battles in Indian Territory. As a result, Gen. David Twiggs ordered Col. Earl Van Dorn north, in what became the Wichita Expedition. See McCaslin, Fighting Stock, 38. More details on these campaigns can be found in chapters four and five of this thesis.

Moore, Hays and Ford, more than a handful within the Army understood that they must

adapt to survive. Specifically, ideas such as mobility, adaptability, surprise, total

destruction, limited objectives, and flexible leadership began to be incorporated into

Army tactics. Maj. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy provides one of earliest and clearest

examples of Army personnel beginning to adopt “ranger-like” tactics prior to the Civil

War. Marcy concluded, “The military Academy is doubtless well adapted to the art of

civilized warfare, but cannot familiarize [cadets] with the diversified details of border

service: and they often, at the outset of their military career find themselves compelled

to improvise new expedients to meet novel emergencies.”16 His statement summarizes

the argument presented in this chapter. The doctrinal void for the Army Regular at the

strategic level left room for the adoption of tactics already used by the average Texas

Ranger.17

Marcy first saw combat while serving with the 5th United States Infantry in the

Black Hawk War in Illinois and Wisconsin. Like many officers of his time, he was

transferred to Texas and served during the Mexican War. In 1847, Marcy returned to

Texas, where he became a noted western explorer. In 1849, he determined the route of

the Marcy Trail, from Fort Smith to Santa Fe. In 1851, he commanded Maj. Gen. William

G. Belknap's escort on the tour that selected the sites for forts on the Texas frontier. In

March 1852, Marcy was assigned the command of a seventy-man exploring expedition

16 Randolph B. Marcy, The Prairie Traveler. A Hand-Book for Overland Expeditions, With Maps, Illustrations, and Itineraries of the Principal Routes between the Mississippi and the Pacific (Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 1993), xi. 17 Thomas T. Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars, 1802-1891,” Military History of the West, 24 (Spring 1994), 31, Robert Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 94; Thomas T. Smith, The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth-Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 18.

across the Great Plains in search of the source of the Red River and directed to "collect

and report everything that may be useful or interesting." Between May 2 and July 28,

1852, his party (accompanied by future general George B. McClellan) crossed a

thousand miles of previously undocumented Texas and Oklahoma territory. Reflecting

upon his journeys, Marcy stated, “I have been thrown exclusively upon my own

resources, far beyond the bounds of the populated districts, and where the traveler must

vary his expedients to surmount the numerous obstacles which the country continually

reproduces.” In other words, Marcy widely publicized what the Plains Indians and Texas

Rangers already knew: one must adapt to survive.18

Like Hays and Ford, the knowledge base Marcy gained proved invaluable to his

concepts of Indian warfare. Marcy, a prolific and skilled writer, documented much of his

experiences, which inevitably contributed to the Army’s education on the frontier. Marcy

wrote The Prairie Traveler to foster safe passage over the Plains. Concerning the book,

he stated, “the main object at which I have aimed… [is] to establish a more uniform

system of marching and campaigning in the Indian country.” He observed, “The very

limited numerical strength of our Army, scattered as it is over a vast area of territory. . .

necessitates tireless energy and self-reliance, that can only be acquired through an

immediate acquaintance with the [environment].” William C. Yancey’s 2008 thesis

focuses on this idea. Most of the time the “acquaintance” with the environment came via

allied Indians. Yancey wrote, “in this type of environment, [the Army] needed military

allies who were [better acquainted].” Yancey concludes that, “the influence of the Lipans

18 Thomas W. Cutrer, "Marcy, Randolph Barnes," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fma43], (accessed September 17, 2012); Marcy, Prairie Traveler, 200-201; Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue; the United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), xi.

and Tonkawas on the Texans…is clear.”19 By Marcy’s time, the Army benefitted from

both allied Indians and Texas Ranger influences. A specific example includes the

trailing and tracking of men and animals. Marcy observed such an art cannot be taught

from a book “as it pertains almost exclusively to the school of practice.” He therefore

advocated the incorporation of Indian scouts just as the Rangers had been practicing. 20

The inadequacy of soldiers’ training was already well known, but Marcy again

warned his fellow officers about the deficiency and that it took initiative to learn the

environment. Another specific example comes from Lieut. William W. Averell, who

ardently trained his company of mounted riflemen. Averell attributes his motivation to

practice from his observations gained while transitioning though Texas. At Fort Craig,

New Mexico, he consistently ordered “drill and target practice.” His men exercised both

on horseback and foot. Adapting to the unknowns of Plains warfare, Averell developed

“a special drill for Indian fighting.” Marching in a column of twos, his company could

deploy in sets of four “one hundred yards in any direction” in less than sixty seconds.

Averell’s mandate to drill is important not simply because of his men training, but

because the innovation taken to counter an enemy attacking from all sides later became

common on the Plains. His example shows the changes that Marcy wrote about being

applied on a tactical level prior to the Civil War. 21

19 Yancey, “Injustice,” 18,25. 20 Marcy, Prairie Traveler, xi, xii, 173. The Prairie Traveler served as a field guide and was a “best-seller. . . essential to western travel.” This thesis suggests his ideas and leadership permeated into Army practices. Mary Ann Thompson, Susan Stafford, Lynn Nelson and Judith B. Glad, “About the Author,” Prairie Traveler, [http://www.kancoll.org/books/marcy/marcyaut.htm, (accessed November 6, 2012)]. 21 William Woods Averell, Ten Years in the Saddle: the Memoir of William Woods, 1851-1862, edited by Edward K. Eckert and Nicholas J. Amato (San Raphael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 59, 131- 132.

Other tactical improvements Marcy stressed included the use of advance and rear guards. Their duty would be to keep a vigilant lookout in all directions, and to

“reconnoiter places where Indians would be likely to lie in ambush.” He elaborated that the guards should remain on low ground to be concealed and have a vantage point so that the enemy could be seen against the skyline. He continues, “These guards should not be allowed to keep fires unless they can be concealed. During the day the guard should be posted on the highest ground in the vicinity of the camp.” Upon the detection of an enemy, immediate warnings and communications via telegraphic signals or gunshot should be initiated. Marcy, of course, gained this knowledge directly from the

Indians he intended the fight. In Prairie Traveler, he elaborated on Comanche observation techniques: “When observing approaching enemies, [the Indian] selects the highest position available and places himself near the summit at such an attitude that his entire body was concealed from observation.” Meanwhile his horse was secured at the base of the hill, ready when required.22

The significance of Marcy’s work was that some early Army officers began to understand better the nature of Plains warfare. Any new serviceman stationed on the frontier could understand the danger when reading that “every man who goes into

Indian country should be armed with a rifle and revolver, and he should never, either in camp or out of it, lose sight of them. They should be placed in such a position that they can be seized at an instant’s warning.” Unfortunately, most of the Army did not have access to Marcy's knowledge prior to the Civil War.23

22 Marcy, Prairie Traveler, 55, 64, 223. 23 Marcy, Prairie Traveler, 41.

If the antebellum Army suffered from a lack of strategic guidance, it suffered

because it also did not listen to Brig. Gen. William S. Harney. Harney had no formal

military education, and like Marcy he relied on experience rather than training for

combating Indians. Beginning his service under Andrew Jackson in 1818, Harney

served with distinction in the Seminole Wars and the Black Hawk War. During the

Mexican War, he was appointed colonel and commanded the 2nd United States

Dragoons. His contemporaries, military and civilian alike, admired his skill and ingenuity as a combat leader.24

Maj. Gen. William J. Worth commanded the Eighth Military Department when

Harney reported for duty in 1848. In 1849, when Indian raids were becoming more

prolific, Worth suddenly died, and Harney became the interim department commander.

Harney, understanding the needs of his military command, immediately requested more

mounted troops for greater mobility. In July 1849 Maj. Gen. George M. Brooke, an

infantry officer, arrived to assume command. While the two generals were somewhat

committed to more mobile tactics, they disagreed about the best method of Texas

frontier defense. Brooke preferred that mounted troops ride out to scout and pursue

Indian raiders, while infantrymen would protect the fort. Harney, on the other hand,

considered foot soldiers “useless” against the Indians. He argued that unless the Army

utilized sufficient mounted troops, raiding parties could easily slip through the line of

forts unchallenged. Furthermore, he doubted that the Indians would attack an Army post

and argued that maintaining large numbers of infantry at distant forts would only

increase both supply and transportation costs. Much of Harney’s tactics in Texas came

24 George R. Adams, General William S. Harney: Prince of Dragoons (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), xvi, 37-42, 98, 148-158.

from his experiences in Florida. Although the horse was not as effective in the swamps

of the Everglades, Harney understood the advantage of mobility. In Florida, Harney had

developed rapid employment tactics with the use of canoes. The greater mobility

allowed sailors and Marines to attack Seminole villages and keep the Indians in a state

of disarray.25 Unfortunately, General Scott, the commanding general of the Army in

1849 and a man committed to older tactics, favored Brooke’s plan and ordered it

implemented.26

In March 1851 General Brooke died and once again General Harney took command of the department. He decided immediately to implement his more mobile tactics. Harney directed Ranger Captain Henry E. McCulloch to engage in “energetic scouting (which) would enable him best to protect the settlements.” Utilizing a form of roving columns, Harney also kept dragoon attachments constantly in the field. This activity produced results in that patrols located marauding Indians and secured the return of stolen goods. On a strategic level, Harney asked the War Department for the return of 2nd Dragoon companies serving in New Mexico and an increase of all companies to one hundred men each. He intended to distribute the mounted soldiers among the outermost posts and station the infantry as well as mounted volunteers in the inner forts. However, the Department denied both requests.27

Perhaps overstepping his jurisdiction, Harney allowed Col. Juan Paul Donnell of

the Mexican army to pursue raiding Indians into the United States. Lastly, he ordered

Fort Mason erected on the Llano River and instructed the commanders of all nine

25 George E. Buker, Swamp Soldiers: Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835-1842 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 98-104, 110-18. 26 Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney, 110. 27 Ibid., 112.

garrisons with mounted troops to constantly keep a scouting party in the field.

Throughout the summer, Harney kept constant pressure on the Indians with a variation of the roving column strategy.28 Constantly in the field, Maj. William J. Hardee’s and

Maj. Henry H Sibley’s dragoon detachments remained in contact with Caddos, Wacos,

Kichais, Tawakonis, and other tribes.29

Harney identified more key problems with the Army's overall efficiency in Florida and Texas. The large numbers of staff officers, coupled with the lack of a retirement system, kept senior officers away from the fight, hence there was a lack of strategic vision within the out-of-touch higher echelons. As mentioned, officers received little or no instruction in tactics that had practical application against the Plains Indians. Enlisted men received no physical training or shooting instruction. Therefore, the Army neither trained nor equipped its troops for Plains warfare. Harney went as far as to request that his men dress as Indians to help avoid detection during their patrols; however, higher authorities would not allow this deception. Like Ford, Harney advocated giving soldiers athletic exercise, target practice, and instruction in basic skills adapted to the environment. Harney thus championed physical fitness and effective leadership or in other words, tactical intelligence coupled with operational flexibility on the battlefield.30

Harney ordered 445 experimental hats with floppy wide brims that would protect his dragoons from the Texas sun. A variation of these covers became the standard head gear of the 1870s. He personally bought four mountain howitzers for the 2nd

28 See Chapter 5 for more about roaming columns. 29 H. K. Yoakum, History of Texas: From Its First Settlement in 1685 to Its Annexation to the United States in 1846, Vol.2 [http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth2386 (accessed December 06, 2011)], 337; Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney, 112, 113. 30 Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney, 74-76.

Dragoons and, in contrast to Mexican War configurations, he had the weapons mounted

on special four-wheel carriages that transported both guns and ammunition.

Additionally, General Harney attempted to have a French cavalry tactics manual

translated into English for the use of the 2nd Dragoons in 1854. It is supposed he did

this because no such manuals existed in the Army at that time.31

Gen. Dabney H. Maury described Harney as a man “of strong convictions and

extraordinary physical powers, he made his presence felt by all sorts of people.” Once

in Florida he had narrowly escaped death when a group of Seminole Indians crept into

his camp at night. Upon reaching the bedsides of the soldiers sleeping under mosquito

nets, the Indians killed many. Harney, somewhat removed from the main group, was

alerted before being attacked. Barely dressed, Harney took flight and “no Indian was

able to run with him.” Upon reaching the next Army station, he gathered together a

considerable force and succeeded in capturing the majority of the attacking band.

Harney hanged Indians because they had a superstitious horror of hanging. This

particular group believed that no man's soul would be received into a happy afterlife if it

did not pass through the throat, which was impossible when closed by a rope. The

significance is that Harney was a determined fighter who understood something other

Army leaders did not until much later: the effect of psychological tactics on the Indians.32

Historian Durwood Ball agrees. Like the Texas Rangers, the Army began to understand

that “frontier warfare lacked the honor of pitched battles between professional armies.

31 Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney,117; Harney to Ordinance Col., December 7, 1848, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1822– 1860, Record Group 94 National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 567, Roll 401); Davis to Harney, March 8, 1854, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 35). 32 Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian (New York: Scribner’s, 1894), 44.

To fight American Indians, officers and men searched for and invaded their villages;

attacked men, women, and children; and burned their homes, belongings, and stores.

Doggedly pursuing bands into fatigue and starvation was a common practice of

seasoned campaigners. In this kind of warfare, psychological victories were as decisive

as battlefield victories.”33

Harney understood that defeating unorthodox fighters such as the Indians required determination as well as a willingness to adapt. He, like some of the Texas

Rangers of his time, had the ability, perseverance, ingenuity, and battle-hardened

experience that made him perhaps the most successful Indian fighter in the antebellum

Army. Harney recognized that in order to fight the Indians, “cavalry alone can pursue

and catch them.” He arguably accomplished more during his three short stints as the

interim department commander for Texas than any of the commanding officers under

whom he served. Historian George R. Adams describes Harney as courageous, bold,

and innovative; the same characteristics that the Plains Indians and Rangers

championed in Texas.34

Despite the improved security he provided in Texas, Harney did not long retain

his interim command. Maj. Gen. Persifor F. Smith took command in September 1851.

Scott, still the commanding general and committed to old methods, continued to favor

the traditional plan of frontier posts and ordered it to be implemented. Arguably an

earlier clash between Scott and Harney contributed to the reasons why Harney never

received a permanent command in Texas or had his “unconventional” ideas adopted.

33 Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), 25. 34 Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney, 278, 286, 281.

Previously, in 1847, Scott had sought to have Harney arrested and demoted in rank for

disobeying a direct order. However, Pres. James K. Polk had denied the request, much

to Scott’s displeasure. The citizens of Texas favored Harney over Scott. The Texas

State Gazette in Austin declared Harney to be “a model of the true soldier” and

predicted that if “he had his own way … we might reasonably hope for security

throughout our borders.” Instead, Smith took up where Brooke left off and erected a

second line of forts, occupying them with infantry. As a result, and because of

diminished food supplies, Indian depredations increased sharply during the summer of

1852.35

Not all Harney’s ideas were ignored. Col. Albert S. Johnston adopted the

Ranger-Harney total war strategy. In 1836 Johnston had moved to Texas and enlisted

as a private in the Texas army. On December 22, 1838, he had become secretary of

war for the Republic of Texas under the unforgiving administration of President Lamar.

Johnston began leading expeditions against the Indians in Texas by 1839 and spent

time with Harney on the Great Plains fighting the Sioux. Johnston, an experienced

Indian fighter who understood the importance of mobility and offensive measures, was

given command of the 2nd United States Cavalry in 1855 and ordered them to

prosecute the most destructive war possible, treating Comanches “with rigorous

hostility.” 36

35 [Austin] Texas State Gazette, September 13, 1849, June 15, 1850; Adams, Gen. W. S. Harney, 119. Marcy to Scott, Feb. 22,1847, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 35). 36 Jeanette H. Flachmeier, "Johnston, Albert Sidney," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fjo32], (accessed September 17, 2012); Ball, Army Regulars, 33. More about the 2nd United States Cavalry can be found in Chapter Five.

Johnston, differing from his predecessors, ordered his troopers to the outer ring of the forts, contrary to General Smith’s original vision. His goal was to begin bringing the war directly into Indian camps regardless of the season and constantly put the

Indians on the defensive. By 1856 the Comanches as well as other tribes began feeling the sting from the continued raids. A new and more energetic breed of regulars manned the Texas defenses, and they began to think and act more offensively. Resembling the

Rangers more, the Army’s new aggressiveness now took the war to the homes of the marauders. The mobile techniques utilized by the 2nd Cavalry under Johnston made such an impression that Indian Agent Robert S. Neighbors wrote, “our frontier has, for the last three months, enjoyed a quiet never heretofore known.” Neighbors had accurately detected a new aggressiveness, learned from the Rangers, that was to characterize the conduct of military affairs practiced in Texas.37

By 1858 there had been a notable shift in the mindset of the Army. Once content to distance themselves from the Texas Rangers, the Army prided itself in maintaining its civilized image. However, fighting in Texas proved to be anything but civilized. In the antebellum West, the Army's field duty was rarely peaceful, generally dangerous, and often violent. The only rule was to survive by any means possible. The elaborate two- tiered fort system in Texas failed to produce lasting effects. This inadequate attempt at defense allowed swift-moving Indian raiders to penetrate lines and attack almost at will.

Furthermore, treaty arrangements were equally ineffective in that neither whites nor

Indians could completely accept terms or boundary lines. By 1858, the two Texas reservations were also failing due to resistance from both sides. Overwhelming public

37 Utley, Frontiersmen, 126.

sentiment supported the view that the only good Indian was a dead Indian. As a result,

1858 marked a new peak for Indian raiding activity in Texas. Historian Walter Prescott

Webb later declared that there was more fighting on Texas soil in 1858 and 1859 than

at any time since 1836. In 1858 Lt. William B. Hazen (later Major General) was thrust

into the chaotic battle between Indians and the Army.38

“Wild Bill” Hazen served as a horse mounted infantryman in Texas. He earned a

reputation as one of the most aggressive small unit commanders in the department,

conducting numerous scouts and fighting in a half-dozen skirmishes. Hazen had a simple combat style. Like Ford, upon sighting an Apache or Comanche war party, he would launch a violent direct attack, regardless of the number of Indians that confronted his small patrol. By 1859 he was famous in Texas, utterly fierce, daring, and audacious, sometimes bold to the point of recklessness. He had more Indian fighting experience than any other company grade Army officer in the state, and his exploits rivaled those of prominent Ranger captains such as Ford.39

Hazen, like the Texas Rangers, engaged in far-ranging scouting operations

against Indian raiding parties. His successful expeditions against Indians included

stealth, rapid mobility, and overwhelming firepower. Each of his expeditions recovered

captives, stolen goods, and garnered recognition. Col. Robert E Lee, who assumed

command of the Department of Texas on February 20, 1860, praised Hazen for his

successful exploits against the Comanche. His “gallant acts and patient endurance

under great and very hardships,” stood out to Lee. At a time when the public ridiculed

38 Marvin E. Kroeger, Great Plains Command: William B. Hazen in the Frontier West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 25; Webb, Texas Rangers, 151. 39 Smith, “West Point,” 46.

the Army for not doing enough, a San Antonio resolution was adopted (by public meeting) praising Hazen. Ultimately he was the first officer since the Seminole wars to be brevetted for Indian fighting. His effectiveness undoubtedly came from utilizing tactics practiced by the Apaches, the Comanches, and the Rangers. 40

Like Ford, Hazen was refined, scholarly, and intelligent. He consistently showed resourcefulness and effective leadership on the battlefield. He concluded that the large

American grain-fed horses were not acclimated to West Texas. He recommended that mules and a breed of horses better acclimated be used by the military. During his short duty in Texas prior to the Civil War, Hazen embodied the future offensive mindset that would eventually pacify the Indians on the Plains. Hazen’s courageous, innovative, and

Ranger-like style of fighting brought a measure of security to the highly exposed frontier settlements. 41

In 1840, a Texan wrote to Lamar, “we cannot check the Indians unless we follow them to their place of rendezvous or where they have their families and visit them with the same kind of warfare that they give us I know it will be said this is barbarous and too much like the Savage. . . and it certainly is.” 42 John H. Moore’s offensive tactics in the

1830s were further refined by John C. Hays in the 1840s. Until Hays entered the scene,

Ranger successes were mixed, and their tactics were a bit unorganized. Hays streamlined tactical level interaction between Rangers and allied Indians, thus heightening the lethality of the Rangers. He also embraced the key technological improvement of the Colt revolver. Further refinement came under Ford, and both

40 Kroeger, Command, 31, 35,168. 41 Ibid., 27. 42 Charles A. Gulick Jr., Winnie Allan, Kathryn Elliott, and Harriet Smither, The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, 6vols. (1922; reprint, Austin, Texas: Pemberton Press, 1968),2: 464-465.

Rangers passed their knowledge directly and indirectly to the Army. Harney advocated

the Texas Ranger’s practices of total war and pronounced, “It is my conviction that a

large force should, by all means, be thrown through their country. . . to convince them of

the ability and intention of the government to enforce obedience to its commands.” Like

Harney, and Marcy before him, individuals such as Johnston and Hazen adapted the

experiences they gained in the field and paved the way for future successes, despite

the continuing restrictions of small budgets and stagnant strategic thinking.43

43 Message of the President of the U.S. Communicating a report of the proceedings of a council help at Fort Pierre by General Harney, Senate Executive Document, 94, 34th Congress 1st sess., (1856), 40.

CHAPTER 5

FEDERAL RANGERS IN TEXAS

The previous chapters have shown that the Texas Rangers benefited greatly

through the incorporation of ideas from allied Indians. The plains of Texas became the

testing ground where older tactics combined with newer technologies to form lethal

strategies. The individual Ranger became the conduit through which tactical

information, crucial for survival, passed from group to group. Despite the Army’s general

disdain for the Texas Rangers, the two groups were required to serve with one another

on multiple occasions. These instances undoubtedly gave the Army direct experience

with how the Rangers fought, in addition to the indirect lessons learned by virtue of

residing in Texas. This chapter presents federalized Rangers as one of the most

obvious but unexplored examples of the two groups' interaction.1

The love-hate relationship between the Army and the Texas Rangers began with

a one-sided courtship during the Mexican War. During the war, the federal government

made it a habit to call out volunteers for augmenting frontier protection or supplementing

regulars. After the Mexican War, twelve Ranger companies were sanctioned by the

federal government and served at various times, culminating in 1855. Two distinct

conclusions can be drawn from the decisions to federalize these Rangers. The first, one

that is shared between various historians, is that the use of federal Rangers fostered a

misperception that the federal government would fund companies at the request of the

state. The second conclusion suggests that federalized Rangers convinced Congress of

the need to alter current strategies on the Texas frontier, and fund a more mobile arm of

1William Yancey, “Injustice To Our Indian Allies: The Government of Texas and Her Indian Allies, 1836 - 1867” (Master’s Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008), 18, 25.

the frontier military. It is not a coincidence the last antebellum federal Rangers

terminated in 1855, the same year as the creation of the 2nd United States Cavalry. The

Rangers also became the main conduit by which the Army learned the same tactics

developed by the Apaches and Comanches.

On June 26, 1846, Col. William S. Harney requested that five companies of

Rangers be mustered into federal service for the protection of the Texas frontier.

Texans enthusiastically answered the call. Volunteers spent their own money to travel,

arm themselves, purchase blankets, horses, and rations. The men gathered in Austin to

await mustering. Unfortunately, Army Maj. Thomas I. Fauntleroy, under orders from Maj.

Gen. Zachary Taylor, countermanded this request and told governor pro tem Albert C.

Horton to dismiss the companies in spite of the volunteer’s expenses. Horton kept these

specific companies in the field, however, and the question of who would pay them

remained unresolved.2 It is clear the federal government paid other Ranger companies

such as John C. Hays’ for their services during the war. An act approved by the United

States Congress on June 16, 1848, declared that “the Regiment(s) of Texas mounted

troops which was mustered into service for the United States for six months in the year

1847” would be paid.3 Historian Frederick Wilkins writes, “in addition to the Ranger units fighting in Mexico, there were a considerable number of Ranger companies protecting the Texas frontier, all financed by the United States.”4

2 Albert C. Horton to John E. Wool, August 20, 1846, Texas Governor’s Papers, James P. Henderson, Folder 7, August 1846, Texas State Library and Archives, Austin [henceforth cited as TSLA]. 3 Joint Resolution Providing for Payment of the Regiment of Texas Mounted Troops called into the Service of the United States, Public Resolution 9, 30th Congress, 1st sess. (June 16, 1848), 9 stat., 335. 4 Frederick, Wilkins, Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 1848-1861 (Austin: State House Press, 2001), 1.

The Army’s refusal to accept these five unknown companies exemplifies the

future practice of the state calling out Rangers and assuming the federal government

would pay commissions and expenses. Who could blame them? During the war with

Mexico, Texans volunteered for federal service by the droves. Secretary of War Charles

M. Conrad reported in 1850 that the total number of volunteers received in the service

from Texas was 8,018.5 This was the largest number of volunteers from any state as

well as an astonishingly large proportion of the male population in Texas. Newly

appointed governor James Pickney Henderson wrote a letter to President James K.

Polk, stating “I regret that I am under the necessity of informing you that . . . [more]

regiments required of the state of Texas cannot be raised.”6 Texas ran out of men

capable of deploying deep into Mexico. Further evidence comes from a March 22, 1847,

letter from Secretary of War William S. Marcy to Bvt. Maj. Gen. George M. Brooke, at

the time stationed in New Orleans. Marcy stated, “I am directed by the President to

authorize you to extend the call for volunteers for Mexico to 2,000 more. . . on the

whole, 4,000 men.” Recruiting beyond Texas, Marcy gave Brooke liberty to call upon

the citizens of Mississippi and Louisiana for more troops.7 A June 23, 1847, letter from

Marcy declared, “the governor of Louisiana. . . will cause to be raised and organized,

upon your application, two companies of acclimated mounted volunteers.” The massive

outpouring of men for the war effort fostered common misperceptions that federal

5 Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War, House Executive Document 24, 31st Congress 1st Sess. (1850), 22. 6 Henderson to Polk, February 18, 1847, Texas Governor’s Papers, Henderson, Folder 13, August 1847, TSLA. 7 William S. Marcy to George M. Brooke, March 22, 1847, Letters by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs 1800-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28). This order was rescinded on April 3, 1847; see Marcy to Brooke, April 3, 1847, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28).

coffers were limitless and more importantly, that Washington would later support the

same great effort towards frontier security. 8

Other factors contributing to Texas expectations of federal support came in early

June 1847. The effectiveness of John C. Hays and his Rangers did not go unnoticed by

Taylor. Hays received orders to report to Monterey for duty under Taylor, indicating the

Texas Rangers could provide something the Army could not. Departing from the “Indian

frontier,” Hays took his highly aggressive tactics into Mexico and left a lasting

impression on his enemies as well as the Army.9 His orders included instructions to

“disperse the guerrillas. . . and to serve in General Scott's column of the Army.”10

Marcy's letter ordering Hays south also contained the statement, “the Governor of

Texas… will be authorized if deemed by him to be necessary, to call out an additional

force for the defense of the Texas frontier.” The blanket authorization reinforced the

perception that the United States was ready and willing to subsidize more volunteers. 11

At the conclusion of the Mexican War, the United States had achieved its

strategic goals, and rather than maintaining hundreds of Texas Rangers under arms

had them disbanded. General Taylor stated, “I fear they [Rangers] are and will continue

to be too licentious to do much good.” Once the fighting subsided, Taylor issued Special

Order Number 149, which called for the final discharge of the volunteers. Taylor

8 Marcy to Brooke June 23, 1847, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28). 9 Marcy to Henderson, June 2, 1847, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28). 10 Marcy to John C. Hays, July 16, 1847, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28). 11 Marcy to Hays, July 16, 1847, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 28).

exclaimed, “Get the (so-called) Rangers, out of service.”12 Wilkins indicates Capt.

Samuel Highsmith’s company were the last of the Mexican War Rangers to be

discharged from the United States payroll on December 10, 1848. Despite the fallibility

of newspapers of that era, Wilkins may well have been wrong that Highsmith’s company

was the last Mexican War Ranger unit on the federal payroll.13 On the contrary, the

Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register reported that several Ranger companies led by Highsmith, Henry E. McCulloch, James S. Gillett and others were mustered out of service at that time. Capt. William F. Fitzhugh’s company of Texas Rangers, while marching to Austin to be mustered out, received intelligence of an Indian disturbance.

Fitzhugh’s company returned to the field and awaited orders from Col. Albert S.

Johnston, and his Rangers were eventually relieved by regulars. According to a January

24, 1850 report, Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War, the last Mexican War

Rangers mustered out of service in February 1849. Lt. Col. Peter H. Bell and Maj.

Walter P. Lane were listed as the commanding officers. The report does not indicate the individual company commanders.14

Although the Rangers in federal service were disbanded, the idea that the

governor could call out a company in an emergency and have the United States pick up

the tab remained. After the Mexican War, the state of Texas faced a severe shortage of

funds, and there was not an abundance of money to keep Rangers in the field for

extended periods of time. Similarly, the Army slashed its mobile forces to three mounted

12 Gary C. Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 229. 13 Wilkins, Defending the Borders, 5; [Houston, Tx.], Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, January 11, 1849. 14 Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War, House Executive Documents 24, 31st Congress 1st sess. (Jan. 3, 1850), 22.

regiments, the 1st and 2nd Dragoons and the Mounted Rifles.15 At the same time,

Brevet Maj. Gen. William J. Worth began building forts on the Texas frontier. With limited funds and resources, Worth “supposed that a less number of posts, judiciously selected, with larger force at each, would better effect [their defensive] objectives.”16

However, as described in chapter one, infantry inside these forts offered no real protection. That this was understood can be seen in Brooke’s letter dated July 11, 1849, which provided a picture of the forces apportioned to Texas. He reassured Gov. George

T. Wood that 116 men were being moved to the Rio Grande and a portion of these will be given horses and be joined by the 2nd Dragoons. Brooke continued, “Your

Excellency has already ordered out 100 Rangers on the Nueces. . . I am inclined to believe that [these numbers] will stop all further depredations.”17 Within one month from penning these words, Brooke would realize that he underestimated how many mounted men were needed.

It is worth noting that historian Gary Anderson cited Brooke’s July 11, 1849, letter in his book Conquest of Texas. Anderson, referring to the Rangers on the Nueces

River, writes, “Brooke. . . noted that the federal government had continued to employ over 100 Rangers.”18 But Anderson's conclusion that the federal government paid for these Rangers is incorrect. Evidence for this can be found in the previously mentioned

February 1849 mustering-out reported in Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War.

15 Randolph B. Campbell. Gone To Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 196. 16 William J. Worth to George T. Wood, Feb. 15, 1849, Texas Governor’s Papers, George T. Wood, Folder 14, February 1849, TSLA. 17 Brooke to Wood, July 11, 1849, Texas Governor’s Papers, Wood, Folder 19, July 1849, TSLA. 18 Anderson, Conquest, 234.

The next group of Texas Rangers called out and funded by the United States came in

response to Brooke’s August 1849 request for help.

Because Army efforts proved ineffective, the threat of the Indians pervaded

public sentiment. Multiple Texas papers sounded the alarm. An editorial in the Corpus

Christi Star criticized the federal government for not doing enough. The author warned that Texas citizens might have to take matters into their own hands until “every red

intruder is driven beyond our borders.” The Texas State Gazette chided that the federal

defense system was “but a mockery.” 19 Indian Agent H. George Catlett’s 1849 letter

provided a persuasive eye-witness argument for change. More important, Catlett

emphasized the effectiveness of the Texas Rangers while doubting that of the Army. He

asserted, “for two months it was expected almost daily that active hostilities would be

commenced, and being upon the ground myself, I know that nothing prevented it but the

great prudence and indefatigable exertions of. . .the Rangering service.” Based on his

own experience, he recommended that, “instead of keeping. . . officers of dragoons

tented up in barricades, send them out to scour and explore the country. . . the

appearance of 200 dragoons. . . would cause them (Indians) to leave.” Catlett finished

by establishing that he had “given much attention to this subject for several years.”

Unfortunately, the Army was still in a drawdown period from the war, which begged the

question: why not fund more Texas Rangers?20

Texans insisted that their mounted Rangers were far superior to the Army's

infantry or artillery. The Army’s line of forts on the frontier had done little to deter Indian

19 Corpus Christi [TX] Star, July 14, 1849; [Austin] Texas State Gazette, Aug 12, 1849. 20 United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824- 81, Stamped page 0292-0310 (Microfilm Publication T234, Roll 858).

transgressions. Governor Wood claimed that foot soldiers were “wholly unfit for the

particular service required.” Brooke hesitated to mobilize the Rangers because he

feared their presence would ignite a large-scale war with the Indians. He explained, “I have an objection to placing rangers in immediate contact with the Indians on the frontier as I am fearful, from their feeling. . . that they would be very apt to bring about what we wish to avoid-a general war.”21

It is not enough to say that the constant barrage of newspapers containing statements such as “The blood of our murdered citizens must rest upon them (the

Government) and always be a loud condemnation of their inhumanity and official neglect,” brought about a change in General Brooke’s reasoning.22 Perhaps the event

that changed his mind regarding use of the Texas Rangers came on June 2, 1849. That

day, the captain of the steamer U.S.S. Monmouth wrote Pres. Zachary Taylor directly

about the impact of Indian depredations. The letter, which is prefaced by a note from the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, recounted how Capt. Benjamin F. Willse’s wife was

kidnapped by a party of marauding Lipan Apaches near Brownsville. Willse, who had

brought Taylor home from Mexico after the war, implored the commander-in-chief to furnish any means necessary for the return of his wife. In a response dated July 6,

1849, Adjutant General Roger Jones wrote that “instructions have been given to Brevet

Major General Brooke, commanding in Texas, to adopt all proper measures for the rescue of the wife.” Therefore, with the eyes of Washington upon him, and concerned

21 Darren L. Ivey, The Texas Rangers: A Registry and History (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Publishers, 2010), 74; Brooke to Roger Jones, August 31, 1849, Message From the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, Senate Executive Document I, 31st Congress, 1st sess. (December 24, 1849), 143. 22 [Austin] Texas Democrat , August 18, 1849.

with the rising trend Indian attacks and incessant pressure from the Texas public,

General Brooke turned to the Texas Rangers for help.23

On August 11, 1849, General Brooke asked Governor Wood to raise three

mounted ranger companies for federal service in South Texas. The Texas State

Gazette reported that John S. "Rip" Ford, John G. Grumbles, and Henry Smock were

the new captains. However, the captains actually fielded were Ford, Grumbles and

Jerome B. McCown. Henry Smock served as McCowns’s second lieutenant.24 The

objective of the three companies was to patrol between the Colorado, Nueces, and Rio

Grande rivers. Their mission was twofold in that they were to act in support of regular

army units stationed on the defensive perimeter and also seek out parties committing

crimes against Texas. Few details exist about the experiences of these three

federalized Ranger companies. But there is no doubt that their selection was a result of

their previous experiences fighting Indians on the Texas frontier. By this time, other

legendary Indian fighters such as Hays and Ben McCulloch had departed for California

in search of riches. Hardly the lesser of the two, Ford had served under Hays and

arguably was the best choice for the job.25

Ford wrote about his experiences and multiple Indian battles in his memoirs, part

of which was transcribed as Rip Ford’s Texas. To cover the vast ranges of the region

and to maximize the effectiveness of his force, Ford often split his company into smaller

detachments. He strategically positioned his men in areas so that they could respond to

23 Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Printed page 367-373 (Microfilm Publication T234, Roll 858). 24 [Austin]Texas State Gazette, August 25, 1849; September 15, 1849. 25 Michael L. Collins, Texas Devils: Rangers and Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 39.

any contingency without being vulnerable to attack.26 The Texas State Gazette provided

a brief contemporary summary of his federalized service. Significantly, the article

highlighted the mobility of the Ranger captain’s operations: “He ranged through a

portion of the Nueces Valley and the Rio Grande for 400 miles. . .he extended his

scouting operations for several hundred miles, and completely reconnoitered the section

assigned to his command.” Ford effectively combined the elements of mobility and

surprise just as the Apaches and Comanches had done throughout the century. The

article also highlighted Brooke’s recognition of the many successes Ford accomplished.

Praised publicly in 1850 by both General Brooke and Assistant Adjutant General

George Deas, Ford’s reputation as a successful Indian fighter led to future campaigns.27

General Brooke’s initial praise of Ford and other Rangers may have been

disingenuous. Brooke declared on August 31, 1849, that he “[had] an objection to

placing rangers in immediate contact with the Indians on the frontier.” This was less

than three weeks after his August 11 request for three Ranger companies. If his fear

was that the Rangers would bring about a “general war,” one can surmise why these

companies were sent to specific localities within the Nueces Strip. Undoubtedly, this

area needed policing, being infested with thieves, bandits and mercenaries; however,

the real threat from the Comanches lay in the Northwest. Historians echo a common

theme concerning these three companies in that there are not many accounts of their

experiences. Perhaps minimizing the Ranger’s exposure directly with the Comanches

26 Ibid., 48. 27 [Austin] Texas State Gazette, December 12, 1857. For stories of Ford's experiences battling Comanches, see Stephen B. Oates, Rip Ford's Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 154-222, or Richard B. McCaslin, Fighting Stock: John S. "Rip" Ford of Texas (Fort Worth, Tex: TCU Press, 2011), 38-44, 64, 71-75, 79-81.

was the ultimate objective of Brooke in the first place. His 31 August letter expressing

concern over Ranger use also requested permission to transfer Army personnel and

horses from Fredericksburg north to the Leon River, blocking a major avenue of

Comanche incursion. “Sending the Rangers to the Nueces Strip quelled public demand,

freed Army regulars to be redeployed to an area of greater concern, and kept potentially

volatile Rangers on a leash.28

With federally funded Rangers back in the field, many Texans attempted to secure a commission. After all, this is what had been done during the Mexican War.

Just twenty days after Brooke called for Rangers to augment Army operations, public pressure waxed strong to raise more companies. Brooke wrote, “The calling out of these troops already seems to have greatly increased the desire of the people of the state for the raising of more--a feeling which I have to contend against.”29 Pressured by

the public or not, Brooke, beginning to see the effectiveness of the Texas Rangers, re-

commissioned the original three companies as well as augmented the total number of

companies to six over a two-year period. Jerome O. Bagby, Henry E. McCulloch, and

William A. A. "Bigfoot" Wallace joined Ford, Grumbles, and McCown as captains of

federally subsidized Ranger companies.30

28 The location for the new fort proposed by Harney lies just southeast of present day Comanche County. Brooke to Roger Jones, August 31, 1849, Message From the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, Senate Executive Document I, 31st Congress, 1st sess. (December 24, 1849), 143,144. 29 Ibid., 143. 30 Brooke to Peter H. Bell, August 10, 1850, Texas Governor’s Papers, Peter H. Bell, folder 2, Indian Papers, 1850, Texas State Library and Archives, Austin. In this letter, Brooke requested the re- mustering of 4 companies. He named Ford, Grumbles, McCown, and William A. A. Wallace, and urged them to volunteer again. Additionally, a fifth company under Jerome O. Bagby served from 5 September 1850 to 5 March 1851 and a sixth under Henry E. McCulloch from 5 November 1849 to 5 May 1851. See Charles M. Conrad to Benjamin F. Larned, January 11, 1851, Letters received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1822-1860 (Microfilm Number 567, Roll 468); Conrad to Thomas Corwin, January 13, 1852, Paymaster Gen.'s Office to Conrad, January 13, 1852, Letters Relating to Military

The effect of the Ranger companies produced a noticeable shift in Brooke’s

concepts of frontier defense. On July 28, 1850, roughly after a full year of service with

the Rangers, Brooke realized that “3000 men or more stationed at the frontier posts

[can not] prevent these deluded people from secretly passing the line of posts. . . and

commit acts of murder and depredations. . . neither stopping day or night.” He theorized

that an offensive into the Indian homelands offered the only solution to eliminating the

threat, but he knew his forces were too weak to be effective in such a task. In other

words, as early as 1850, Brooke noticed that the Army needed to try something else.

This is substantial evidence that offensive tactics practiced by the Texas Rangers were

being regarded as a more effective military solution to the Indian problem. Within

Brooke’s statement lies a glimpse of the changes that would occur within the Army in

Texas prior to the Civil War. In sum, Brooke cited the inadequacy of not only the amount

and but type of troops that he commanded. If a historian had to put a proverbial finger

on when the Army realized how to succeed on the Plains, Brooke’s 1850 enlightenment

resulting from the use of Texas Ranger stands out. Originating with the Indians,

offensive tactics adopted by the Rangers were now being considered by the Army.31

In the summer of 1850, General Brooke, influenced by a year of the Texas

Ranger’s active service, began more offensive operations. Displaying more Ranger-like

mobility, Brooke sent Capt. William J. Hardee with four mounted companies and a

Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 32); Conrad to E. L. Phelps, November 16, 1852, Paymaster General to Conrad, November 16, 1852, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 33); Jefferson Davis to Bell, March 11, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 35). 31 Brooke to W.G. Freeman, July 28, 1850, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, November 30, 1850, House Executive Docs., No. I, 31st Cong. 2nd sess. (1850) 51-52; Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue; the United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 72.

group of Rangers south to drive Indians out of the Nueces Strip. It was also the first

year of a large-scale Indian campaign in which Hardee directed the efforts of ten

columns of soldiers and mounted volunteers against hostile Indians. Born out of

necessity, the combined operations signaled the beginning of the Army's evolution

towards greater mobility on the Texas frontier.32 The effectiveness of this can be seen in

historian Thomas T. Smith's data indicating that Texans from 1851 to 1853 enjoyed the

lowest Army-Indian conflict in a 31-year period.33 General Brooke’s letter to Governor

Bell on February 7, 1851, reported that there were five volunteer companies in service

in early 1851 and due for discharge in March. Brooke recognized he had a continuing

need for these companies and hoped to renew at least four after their March expiration

unless he received Army reinforcements. When no Army regulars were sent to Texas,

the Rangers were reorganized.34 Washington began to take notice of Ranger merits as

evidenced by Secretary Conrad’s letter to Brooke on March 8, 1851. Conrad praised

Capt. McCulloch and his men, extending the “thanks of this department for the spirit and

zeal displayed by them. . . the Indians must be held in check by increased activity on

the part of your troops until a sufficient force can be placed on the frontier.”35

The significance of the two-year Ranger utilization is that it showed Army leaders

how to be more effective. Concerning the reenlistment of the four companies in 1851,

32 George R. Adams, General William S. Harney: Prince of Dragoons (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2001), 111; Thomas T. Smith, The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth-Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 17; Ivey, Texas Rangers, 75 33 Smith, Old Army, 17. 34Brooke to Bell, February 7, 1851, Texas Governor’s Papers, Bell, Folder 3, Indian Papers 1851, TSLA. 35 Conrad to Brooke, March 8, 1851, Letters Relating to Military Affairs, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 31).

historian Wilkins gleans from muster roles that Wallace's company moved to Fort Inge and McCulloch went to Fredericksburg. He concludes that, “these reorganizations and changes suggest the danger had shifted west away from the Nueces Strip.”36 This is a valid conclusion because Comanche and Apache raiders shifted their focus to easier targets west and south into Mexico. Accordingly, the mere fact that Brooke reenlisted the companies, despite his initial concerns, and launched mobile campaigns shows that he changed his mind and altered the tactics of his command to incorporate more

Rangers and Ranger-like operations. Secondly, due to their effectiveness, Brooke gave the Rangers greater latitude to expand their operations.37

After Brooke died, Maj. Gen. Persifor F. Smith took command of Texas in

October 1851. Compared to the previous decade, Smith inherited a relatively quiet period due to the active pursuits of the federalized Rangers and the Army’s active campaigning. Smith largely ignored the tactical progress Brooke had achieved and reverted to a strategy of constructing forts. Smith's initial assessment of Rangers mirrored that of Brooke’s. Smith voiced his displeasure for Rangers by stating, “they have a tendency to create hostilities and [prefer] to endanger the peace of the frontier then to preserve it.”38 Smith, not seeing the need for an augmentation of troops, declared that he was more than content with the Army resources under his command, and he allowed the Ranger enlistments to lapse. However, a rising trend of Indian depredations forced him to follow in the footsteps of Brooke. In 1854 Indian raids became so extensive that Smith asked Gov. Elisha M. Pease for six Texas Ranger

36 Wilkins, Defending the Borders, 36. 37 Smith, Old Army, 18. 38 Persifor F. Smith to Bell, August 9, 1852, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Main Series, 1801-1870, Record Group 107, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm Number M221, roll 163).

companies. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis’s 1854 annual report indicated that Indian

attacks in Texas had “been so frequent and so threatening. . . that it was considered

necessary to authorize [Smith] to call upon the governor. . . for volunteer forces."39

Historians such as Wilkins do not offer much information on the six companies;

in fact, he states that “the Rangers are not identified.”40 Darren L. Ivey’s 2010 book, The

Texas Rangers: A Registry and History may be the first published work to name the six

Ranger companies. Designated A-F, they were commanded respectively by Capts.

Giles S. Boggess, John G. Walker, William R. Henry, William F. Fitzhugh, Charles E.

Travis, and Patrick H. Rogers. However, Ivey offers few more details.41 Records indicate that the federal government was expected to furnish the companies with ammunition, forage, and subsistence. Individual Rangers were to supply their own horses, weapons, clothing and equipment. Upon the approval of Congress, the men would be reimbursed by the United States.42 Wilkins writes, “this would in effect make the Rangers federal troops, but initially Congress did not make any funds available, although the Army did provide subsistence. Eventually, after much paperwork, the state had to pay the men.”43 Wilkins indicates that Texas was reimbursed by an act of

Congress approved March 3, 1855. This may well have happened for some companies

but not all. Additionally, it is unclear if the state was ever fully reimbursed for the pay

39 Persifor F. Smith, “Report from 8th Military Dept. -Texas,” July 18, 1852, Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive. Document I, 32st Cong., 2nd sess. (1852), 18; Report of the Secretary of War, House Executive Document, I, 33st Cong., 2nd sess., (1854), 4. 40 Wilkins, Defending the Borders, 34. Wilkins does mention Capts. William R. Henry and Charles E. Travis due to their surviving muster rolls. 41Ivey, Texas Rangers, 87. 42 Proclamation, Aug. 18, 1854, Governor’s Papers, Elisha M. Pease, Folder 9, August 1854, TSLA. 43 Wilkins, Defending the Borders, 43.

and expenses of these Ranger companies. The State Gazette reported on October 1,

1855 that Congress approved provisions only for the payment of the Rangers under the

command of Travis, and “that Paymaster Hill, U.S. Army, is now in Texas paying them.”

On March 3, 1855, Congress actually approved two acts that appropriated

$162,755.38 for the expenses of these six companies. A 1906 Congressional review on

the matter indicated that by June 30, 1859, only $93,612.47 had been refunded to

Texas and the balance of $69,142.91 was carried over to surplus funds.45 The unpaid

balance would be contested between the state of Texas and Congress through 1912,

when a House document declared the issue to be unresolved.46 Therefore by definition,

these Rangers were not “federalized” because the national government did not directly

fund them. However, they were requested by General Smith, sanctioned by the

Secretary of War, and some were indirectly paid by the federal government. More

important, while the six companies were under the command of the state adjutant general, they were subject to the orders of General Smith. 47

As one can surmise from the convoluted command structure, and the dispute

over financial responsibility, these six companies did not get a good start. A study of the

remaining sources shows they were mismanaged, tactically squandered, and ineffective

44 [Austin], Texas State Gazette, March 8, 1856. 45 William H. Taft, and Fred C. Ainsworth. Payment of State Volunteers, Etc, Senate Executive Document, 169, 59th Cong., 1st sess., (1906), 3. 46 House Committee on Appropriations, Claim of the State of Texas. Letter from the Acting Secretary of War, transmitting a report of the result of an investigation made by the Adjutant General of the Army as to the sums of money actually expended by the State of Texas between 1855 and 1860, in payment of State volunteers, etc, House Executive Document, 551, 62nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1912), 4- 7. 47 [Austin], Texas State Gazette, December 2, 1854.

in furthering frontier protection. After Smith proclaimed in November 1854 that he

required six companies, Governor Pease publicized the request through a proclamation.

In the subsequent weeks, while these companies awaited orders, the federal

government and the state of Texas argued over legal periods of enlistment, pay, and

weapon requirements.48 An article from the Texas State Times dated November 25,

1854, stated that Travis, Walker, and Henry were active in the field in pursuit of Indians.

The article also indicated that, “there would be an expedition fitted out against the

Wichitas by Captains Boggess and Fitzhugh. The order for mustering into U.S. Service

may delay it.”49 This proved not to be accurate. Captains Travis and Walker may have

been utilized in December 1854, however, the other four companies did not become

active until January 1855. On the same day, a different report indicated that “Brevet

Colonel Waite will muster the six companies at the earliest possible day. . . He will

divide them and send one group to Fort Mason and the other to Fort Clark for active

service."50 This was more correct in that the groups were split and sent to Forts

Chadbourne and Clark in January. Yet another newspaper article dated December 16,

1854, stated, “These misused men have been partially mustered into service. . . the

companies of Capt. Walker and Travis have only been mustered in, and these but

partially.”51 Finally the Texas State Gazette reported on January 6, 1855 that all six

companies of Rangers had been mustered into the service of the United States. The

Gazette reported the companies commanded by Walker, Henry, and Travis had been

48 Proclamation, Aug. 18, 1854, Governor’s Papers, Pease, folder 9, August 1854, TSLA; Pease to Ranger Captains, in State Times-Extra, Nov. 3, 1854, article found in Governor’s Papers, Pease, folder 12, Nov., 1854, TSLA. 49 [Austin], Texas State Times, November 25, 1854. 50 [Austin], Texas State Times, November 25, 1854. 51 [Austin], Texas State Times, December 16, 1854.

sent to Fort Clark, and those led by Boggess, Fitzhugh, and Rogers had gone to Fort

Chadbourne.52

At this point information diminishes. Using the evidence cited, this author concludes that Smith grossly mismanaged these six companies by confining them to forts in support of his “defensive net concept” on how to intercept raiders. Smith placed infantry and the Rangers within the outer line of forts and assigned his cavalry to the inner line of forts. The outer net had the job of spotting incoming war parties and somehow reporting their presence to the cavalry, who would then hunt down the raiding enemy. In reality, 220 miles separate Fort Clark from Fort Chadbourne and 180 miles lie between Fort Chadbourne and the Red River. Therefore a reactionary strategy of wandering policeman, tethered to a specific fort, operating over distances too vast, was doomed from the start.53 It stands to reason not much is known of these companies because, in their words, they were misused by being placed in posts too remote to be effective. An Austin newspaper published an “anonymous” article from a member of

Henry’s company lambasting the entire operation. Regarding the results of the campaign, he chided, “it has turned out just as I expected. . .we have killed our horses by hard marching, on half forage, and long distances without water, and have effected nothing.” Ultimately the editor of the paper, John S. Ford, agreed with the Ranger’s conclusion and expressed concern that the misuse of the companies would prove to be detrimental to the volunteer service in Texas, which might be “just what General Smith

52 [Austin], Texas State Gazette, January 6, 1855. 53 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 197.

intended.” This conjecture speaks to Smith’s inherent distrust of the Rangers in the first place. 54

Compounding the chaos generated at the inception of these six companies, newspaper articles indicated a growing discontent among the Rangers. The San

Antonio Ledger reported on March 1, 1855 that, the companies of Walker, Henry and

Travis would continue in service for the period of six months under the command of Maj.

John S. Simonson of the Army. The other three companies would be mustered out at

Fort Chadbourne.55 Captain Henry addressed his men at the end of their original three- month enlistment and advised them not to reenlist. He concluded that, “General Smith's order to continue our company in service of the United States unconditionally and without consulting our interests [is not lawful].” Walker also urged his men to quit because their horses were not in a condition to perform good service. He had opposed deploying to the frontier, as it would remove them from their immediate settlements that they represented. He stated, “Every day we hear of depredations committed, of the most revolting character, in our own neighborhood, and here we are, 500 miles distant, not able to afford them any protection. . . and here General Smith desires to keep us in order to gratify [his] whimsical idea.” Walker added that Smith had treated his men with contempt and would not listen to other’s suggestions. The Texas State Times confirmed on April 7, 1855, that “Major Simonson (U.S. Army) sent all the companies to Fort Clark to be mustered out of service of the United States.” The friction between the Rangers

54 [Austin], Texas State Times, April 7, 1855. 55 San Antonio [TX] Ledger, March 1, 1855; [Austin], Texas State Times, April 7, 1855.

and the Army caused all six companies to end their service by late April or March

1855.56

Smith’s skepticism of the Rangers was not completely misguided. The 1855

Annual Report of the Secretary of War reveals the Rangers, at least Captain Henry’s

company, may have worsened Army relations. Smith wrote that part of Henry’s

company “broke open the D’Hane’s [sic] (D’Hanis) post office and pillaged most of the

town.” Some men were arrested and marched to Fort Davis to be discharged. Henry

was charged for misconduct while drunk. The same report indicated that two

unspecified companies were “usefully employed,” but all six were ordered to be

discharged.57 After all, the Army had begun to integrate a new weapon to take their

place: the 2nd United States Cavalry, sanctioned by Congress on March 4, 1855, and

organized specifically for service on the Texas frontier.58

To say that these companies of Rangers were displeased with General Smith is

an understatement. In San Antonio on April 10, 1855, there was a meeting of the

Rangers in which captains Walker and Henry addressed the public and formally

denounced General Smith. Their grievances can be encapsulated in the statement,

“General Smith has exhibited a desire to cripple and injure the volunteer services of

Texas. . .[sending us] to a region of country where there existed no enemy to contend.”

Tactically handcuffed, the companies were restricted to a single operating radius,

eliminating any chance of striking Indian settlements. In theory, Smith added more

56 [Austin], Texas State Times, April 7, 1855. 57 Persifor F. Smith, “Report from 8th Military Dept. -Texas,” March 14, 1855, in Documents Accompanying Report of the Secretary of War, House. Executive Document, I, 34th Congress, 1st sess., (1855), 52. 58 Harold B. Simpson, "Second U.S. Cavalry," Handbook of Texas Online [http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qls03], (accessed October 29, 2012.)

mobility to frontier garrisons; however, in practice their limited employment failed to produce results. Scouting for Indians on the move remained a reactionary tactic. As the early Texas Rangers discovered, and Colonel Harney accepted, the only effective tactic was to use mobility and take the fight to the Indian camps. The editor of the Texas State

Gazette, John S. Ford, scoffed at the Army for wasting these six companies, and he would soon get a chance to do better.59

The San Antonio Texan article provides an answer as to why the federal government and the state of Texas would haggle for almost a century over pay for the six companies. When Captain Walker advocated quitting federal service, he advised all the Rangers to disband as a whole. He warned, “If some remain and some go, it will create confusion in the muster rolls and in getting our pay.”60 Though it seems everyone mustered out at Fort Clark, not every Ranger returned to San Antonio to collect his pay.

Apparently the federal paymaster in San Antonio received funds and instructions for the payment of Henry's, Walker's, and Travis's companies of volunteers, but “Capt. Bogges,

Capt. Fitzhugh and Capt. Rogers companies [would later be] paid as soon as the funds and instructions [were] received.” Apparently, the unpaid companies’ muster rolls had not yet reached the Adjutant General's office in Washington. Interestingly, one of the problems cited in the 1912 Claims of the State of Texas report is that the complete muster roles with documented expenses were never received in Washington. 61

59 [Austin], Texas State Gazette, Saturday, April 14, 1855. 60 [Austin], Texas State Times, April 7, 1855. 61 San Antonio Texan, May 31, 1855; House Committee on Appropriations, Claim of the State of Texas. Letter from the Acting Secretary of War, transmitting a report of the result of an investigation made by the Adjutant General of the Army as to the sums of money actually expended by the State of Texas between 1855 and 1860, in payment of State volunteers, etc, House Executive Doument, 551, 62nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1912), 5.

Although the early 1855 dismissal of the six Ranger companies marked the end

of federal Rangers during the antebellum period, a series of events later in the decade

warrant mention in that they became fundamental for the Army’s frontier fighting

education. In 1857, Brevet Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs assumed Smith’s command and

ordered the majority of the cavalry to Utah in support of the fight against the Mormons.

The limited number of horses remaining in the Department of Texas, as well as capable

officers, negatively affected the Army's ability to maintain peace in Texas. Governor

Pease concluded that Army forces assigned to the frontier were no longer adequate,

necessitating the muster of an entire volunteer Ranger Regiment. On January 27, 1858,

newly elected Gov. Hardin R. Runnels signed an act "for the better protection of the

frontier.” This called into service 100 mounted Rangers in addition to the 90 men

already in service. The following day, Ford was given senior captain status.62

In February 1858, Ford, his Rangers, and a contingent of Indian allies drove

north to conduct a campaign against the Comanche homeland. By early March Ford

arrived on the upper Brazos River, having split his troops into four main groups to

sweep the terrain as they drove north. In late April 1858, Ford’s Rangers crossed into

the Indian Territory and began the first of many offensive campaigns that struck the

Comanches where they assumed they had a safe haven. Ford’s Rangers launched

surprise attacks on Comanche camps with devastating results. On Ford's first attack he

estimated that he engaged over 300 warriors, killed 76, and captured 18 women and

62 Anderson, Conquest, 292; David P. Smith, Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992), 11.

children. He only lost two Texans killed and two wounded.63 The actions by Ford

signaled that the war was now transferred from the frontier settlements to the villages of

the Indians. The attack dispelled long-held perceptions that the illusive Comanches were untouchable. Ford proved that the Comanche villages could be reached by military

expeditions. More importantly, he demonstrated that a small well-organized force could

decimate the Plains Indians with the handed-down tactics of mobility, surprise, and firepower. 64

Lt. Allison Nelson, serving under Ford, described the first battle in a report

published in the State Gazette. Encapsulated in his words, one finds the zenith of Anglo

frontier conflict, boldly proclaiming the answer to successful campaigns on the Plains.

Nelson wrote, “the beneficial results [of the campaign] do not stop with the single

[battle]. It demonstrates the practicability of following the enemy. . . to the fastnesses

[sic] from which they have [come, that until now] they have relied on their

inaccessibility.”65 Whether he knew it or not, these words would be taken to heart by

Army personnel such as Twiggs and Col. Earl Van Dorn, who subsequently organized and executed a similar campaign known as the Wichita Expedition. Ford’s success forced Twiggs to admit that the Army's usual defensive policy was inadequate.

Beginning in the spring of 1858, Twiggs ordered troops at the frontier posts to take the

63 Smith, Frontier Defense, 14; Ford to Runnels, March 31, 1858, in Dorman H. Winfrey and James M. Day, eds., The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest, 1825-1916, 5 vols. (Austin: 1966. reprint, Texas State Historical Association, 1995), III: 279-280. 64 Rupert N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to Southern Plains Settlement (Austin: Eakin Press, 1996), 120; Anderson, Conquest, 299-300; McCaslin, Fighting Stock, 72-79. 65 Texas State Gazette [Austin], May 29, 1858.

offensive. “As long as there are Indians on the Prairie,” he stated, “Texas cannot be free

from depredations.”66

In conclusion, the history of the federalized Rangers shows how a stubborn Army

learned how to fight by example in Texas. Starting with General Worth, the order to

defend Texas began a dispute over tactics between experienced Texas Rangers and a

host of overconfident Army generals. Worth, Brooke, Smith and Twiggs all struggled to

get a grip on the problem of frontier defense. Undoubtedly, Congress undermined the

Army’s mission by reducing Army personnel, material, and coffers. In 1849, the

deficiencies of money and manpower left Brooke with few options. He wrote to

Governor Wood, stating, “at the present moment I have not disposable the cavalry force

to send.” 67 Fortunately his appointment letter from Secretary Crawford included a

provision for situations such as these. Crawford wrote that, should the need arise, the

President authorized Brooke to “make a requisition on the executive of the state of

Texas for a limited force of mounted men” to be called into the service of the United

States.68 Brooke’s call for Rangers marked a watershed in the tactical employment of

the Army. As distasteful as it may have been for the Army to cooperate with the

Rangers, the success of the latter culminated in joint operations and ultimately the

incorporation of Ranger-like methods. These tactics, (including weaponry) ultimately

contributed to the Army’s success on the frontier. Finally, the federal Ranger

66 David E. Twiggs to Hardin R. Runnels, September 9, 1858, Texas State Archives, Governor’s Papers, Hardin R. Runnels, folder 9, September 1858, TSLA. 67 Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), XX; Worth to Wood, February 15, 1849, Texas State Archives, Governor’s Papers, Wood, folder 14, February, 1849, TSLA. 68 Crawford to Brooke, June 4, 1849, Letters Relating to Military Affairs (Microfilm Number 6, Roll 29).

experiment’s merits as well as the shortcomings convinced Congress to allocate funds for a highly mobile force, specifically designed for combat in Texas.

CHAPTER 6

FIND THEM, FIX THEM, FIGHT THEM, FINISH THEM

Between the years 1845-1860, a tumultuous relationship existed between the

Texas Rangers and the United States Army. Each group attempted to maintain their

identity in matters including, dress, discipline, and tactics. However, simple survival on

the Plains of Texas necessitated the amalgamation of each other’s ideas. The Army’s defensive fort system proved inadequate because it could not deter Comanches or other antagonistic raiders. Limited by funding and mistaken about the effectiveness of infantry, the Army began to look for other solutions. Brevet Maj. Gen. George M.

Brooke’s 1849 request for state help signaled a change in the tactical employment of

Army soldiers, which culminated in Maj. Earl Van Dorn’s expedition into Indian Territory almost ten years later. The Army used the same tactics created by the Indians centuries

prior but only after the Rangers proved it could be done. This chapter focuses on the

evolution of the Army’s mobile arm in Texas as well as offers other examples of where

the Rangers' influence is detected. The purpose is to show that post-Civil War tactics

contributing to the pacification of the Plains Indians were first tried in antebellum Texas.

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway is famous for allegedly saying "Find them, fix them, fight

them, finish them," but he was certainly not the first Army leader to think in those terms.

A cursory look at the antebellum Army on the Plains shows they struggled with

differing concepts of mobility. Underutilized or not, Texas enjoyed six companies of

1 George W. Collins, "Korea in Retrospect," http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/ airchronicles/aureview/1968/nov-dec/collins.html (Accessed November 5, 2012).

mounted regiments, a higher proportion than anywhere else, from 1848-1851.2 During

this time the Army’s concept of mobility functioned within Denis H. Mahan’s prevalent

theory of overwhelming force, which led to a strategy of roaming columns. As early as

1845, Brevet Maj. Gen. Stephen W. Kearney contested establishing the typical army

post on the Northern Plains near Fort Laramie. Instead he advocated implementation of

a roaming column. Kearney felt that a substantial “military expedition” should be

planned as a show of force. In the event of war, the cavalry could respond quickly to

developing situations.3 In 1851, General Winfield Scott and Quartermaster General

Thomas J. Jesup criticized the system of company-sized outposts in a defensive cordon and called for an offensive policy based on large mounted columns attacking vulnerable

Indian villages. Scott insisted that the Army should periodically dispatch multiple dragoon or mounted rifle companies to police the Plains. He theorized that mobile columns of troops tracking and attacking enemy Indians at a moment's notice would force them into respecting the laws that governed them. Civilian and military leaders such as Col. Edwin B. Sumner attempted variations of the roaming column tactic throughout the 1850s. 4

Heeding the words of Scott, Sumner, newly assigned to the 9th Military District in

New Mexico, attempted a large excursion. Under orders from Secretary of War Charles

M. Conrad “to whip the Navajos, Apaches, and Utes” as well as “revise the whole

2Thomas T. Smith, The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth- Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 93-95; Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War to the President, Senate Executive Document 9, 31st Congress, 2nd sess. (1850), 15. 3 Stephen W. Kearney to Roger Jones, September 15, 1845, in Documents accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 29th Congress, 1st sess., (1845), 212; Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2001), 29. 4 Ibid., 29-30.

system of defense,” Sumner prepared to lead a mobile campaign.5 On August 17, 1851,

he consolidated his forces and personally led four mounted companies, one company of

artillery, and two companies of infantry into Navajo country. Eventually the harsh

environment and elusive enemy logistically broke down the campaign. After admitting

that his expedition had struck no crushing blows, Sumner ordered the withdrawal of the

column in the fall of 1851.6

Although the campaign was an attempt at greater mobility, the exercise lacked

two important Ranger tactics, surprise and limited objectives. Plains Indians such as the

Comanches thrived because their villages could be packed and on the move in a

relatively short amount of time. A large body of soldiers could easily be detected. Their

size and commotion often alerted Indians to their presence and whole Indian villages

could dodge the large column before it had a chance to attack. On the Texas frontier,

sacrificing surprise meant sacrificing the mission. Secondly, Sumner’s mission to “whip

the Indians” proved too ambiguous and ostentatious in that it ignored the importance of

limited objectives. Whether trailing a specific raiding party or preplanning attacks,

victories on the Plains came as a result of defining an objective, as the Texas Rangers

knew and the Army later learned. 7

As the fort system grew in Texas, the ability to locate war parties became more

difficult. After numerous military posts were established in the early 1850s, the practice

of utilizing larger war parties diminished due to their easy detection. In addition to

mobility, technology and experience lowered the number of Indian warriors required to

5 Conrad to Edwin Sumner, 1 April 1851, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 1st sess., (1851), 125. 6 Ball, Army Regulars, 20, 21. 7 Ibid., 31.

accomplish missions. Historian William C. Meadows pointed out in Kiowa, Apache, and

Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present, the proliferation

of horses and firearms meant smaller war parties could be more efficient than larger

ones. Smaller parties were less detectable, while firearms increased the lethality of an

individual. In the same fashion, John C. Hays and John S. Ford often ranged with

smaller groups while the Army was experimenting with larger roving columns. Perhaps

the earliest example of the failure of large columns is the Spanish Val Verde Expedition

in 1719. That punitive campaign accomplished little because the larger groups of

soldiers were easily detected and avoided. Similarly, the early chastisement campaigns

by the United States Army, such as Sumner’s, failed to produce results. 8

The roaming column strategy, manageable in the North where grass was more

prevalent, proved less advantageous in the Southwest. Sumner observed, “It is

impossible to make long marches with cavalry, on grass alone.” West Texas suffered

from the same arid environment as New Mexico and could not support the Army’s grain-

fed horses. Despite the loss, Sumner offered the beginnings of a solution. He

recommended campaigning with infantry, but attaching a small specialized unit of “very

select horse” to the column. This specialized mounted strike force would be highly

trained, heavily armed, and well mounted. Sumner concluded, “A small body of this kind

would be worth ten-times the number of ordinary men on broken down horses.”

Ironically, Sumner unintentionally described a Texas Ranger company.9

8 William C. Meadows, Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 371. 9 Sumner to Jones, October 24, 1851, in Annie H. Abel, The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915), 416-19.

Specific instances such as Sumner’s campaign, as well as Brooke’s call for federalized Rangers in 1849, hints that the Army’s static nature was beginning to change. In Texas, Brooke issued Order Number 27 on June 4, 1850. In it he ordered a

“vigorous campaign against the savages” occupying the Nueces Strip. He combined every available dragoon from four forts with the companies of Texas Rangers led by

Captains Ford, John G. Grumbles, and William A. A. Wallace. Brevet Lt. Col. William J.

Hardee commanded the group, whose mission was to completely clear the Nueces

Strip of hostile Indians.10 As previously mentioned in chapter four, this campaign produced excellent results as evidenced by zero Army-Indian incursions in 1851.11

Furthermore, Gen. Persifor F. Smith, who reaped the benefits of the operation, boasted,

“I respectfully call upon the general to observe that. . . since the establishment of the advanced line of posts, not a single murder has been committed by the Indians, nor theft or other outrages that can be traced to them.” Since Indian depredations drastically increased in 1854, Smith’s advocacy of the forts must have been in error and the immediate peace after 1851 was a result of something else.12

By the end of 1852 Smith received an additional eight mounted rifle companies.

Until a mounted rifle regiment was organized in Texas, most of the soldiers on the border were in artillery and infantry regiments.13 This mounted regiment differed from those that served during the Mexican War. In Mexico, the mounted rifleman had limited

10 George M. Brooke, Order No. 27, June 4, 1850, Texas Governor’s Papers, Peter H. Bell, Folder 2: Indian Papers 1850, Texas State Library and Archives, Austin [henceforth TSLA]. 11 Smith, Old Army in Texas, 17. 12 Persifor F. Smith to Samuel Cooper, October 3, 1852, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1852), 18, 21. Smith also ordered five companies of riflemen to patrol the whole country between the Frio River, the Rio Grande and Eagle Pass. 13 Smith, Old Army in Texas, 94-95.

training with their rifles while mounted. Historian Robert Utley points out that the

awkwardness of the rifle encouraged them to ride down the enemy with the saber and

dismount to fire. Texas mounted riflemen began firing from their horses and more-or- less functioned as light cavalry.14 Smith’s decision to station most of his mounted troops

in the inner ring of forts, later countermanded by Brevet Brig. Gen. William S. Harney,

does indicate that he was considering ways to increase mobility. Smith wrote, “I suggest

that a quantity of posts. . . be placed at various points. . . to meet the wants of mounted

troops.” Much like gas stations strung out along the highway, feed stations were

required to support the troopers in Texas. Unsurprisingly, the forts of West Texas

became forage depots more than defensive structures.15

Smith did make positive changes, albeit influenced by Ranger experiences. In

1850, Gov. George T. Wood suggested to Secretary of War George W. Crawford that

an arms depot be built in Corpus Christi. The depot’s location adjacent to the Nueces

Strip provided better access to arms for troops in the field as well as easy resupply by

ship. Crawford dismissed the idea, stating that, “a depot in Corpus Christi would be

wholly indefensible as a military option.” Yet the same request would be made and

carried through by Smith in 1852, yielding yet another example of the Army acquiescing

to Texan experience.16 That same year Smith recognized the usefulness of multi-shot weapons such as the Colt revolver in the hands of Texas Rangers. As a result, he wrote that “mounted men, serving against mounted Indians, have need of repeating firearms”

14 Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 22. 15 Persifor F. Smith, “Report From 8th Military Dept.,” in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1852), 19. 16 George T. Wood to George W. Crawford, December 14, 1849, and Crawford to Wood, January 19 1850, Texas Governor’s Papers, Bell, Folder 5, January 1850, TSLA.

and that revolving pistols were “absolutely necessary.” He conceded, “the universal

opinion among [citizens and soldiers]. . .is identical on this point.”17 Smith followed up

this request in a letter dated October 3, 1852, in which he elaborated on the merits of

rifles to hold positions at a distance. However, close combat required a multi-shot revolver that yielded an advantage over bows and arrows. Due to Smith’s advocacy, dragoons, mounted riflemen, and cavalry were outfitted with these newer technologies by the mid-1850s. 18

After the election of 1852, Jefferson Davis, a veteran of the Mexican War, was appointed as Secretary of Defense. Davis instituted sweeping reforms within the Army.

A West Point graduate and former dragoon, he recognized the different geographical and military conditions in the West. As early as 1850 General Scott had lobbied for

additional regiments of horse troops. Finally, Davis concluded that only large garrisons

of mounted troops actively pursuing raiders would put an end to the threat of mounted

Indians.19 A staunch advocate of West Point, Davis believed in the effectiveness of the

professional soldier and was adamant in his refusal to use Texas Rangers. His attitude

toward Rangers can best be summarized in his observation on Hays’s regiment while it

was serving under Zachary Taylor. He stated, “our experience in Mexico would tell us

that we wanted none but regular cavalry. . . no irregular mounted men of any kind.”

17 Smith to Cooper, October 3, 1852, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1852), 18. 18 Ibid.,20. 19 William Y. Chalfant, Without Quarter: The Wichita Expedition and the Fight on Crooked Creek (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 27; Winfield Scott to Conrad, November 30, 1850, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 31st Congress 2nd sess., 114, 115.

Although he plainly intended that the Army should remain distinctly separate from the

Rangers, the experience of the 2nd United States Cavalry proved to be very different.20

The persuasive Davis overcame previous budgetary concerns and argued the

greater cost of cavalry was more than justified by its effectiveness. On March 4, 1855,

Congress authorized two additional mounted regiments that would be designated as

cavalry. Of these two, the 2nd United States Cavalry was uniquely organized for service

on the Texas frontier. This unit rode the finest horses and was issued the latest

equipment and firearms. They utilized the model 1854 .58 caliber rifled carbines, Perry

breach-loading carbines, Springfield model 1855 pistol-carbines, and the Colt model

1851 .36-caliber revolvers. The significance of these weapons is the rate of fire

dramatically increased with breach loading rifles and revolving pistols. Despite these

upgrades, the 2nd Cavalry lacked field experience and their early employment yielded

limited success. Even the most deadly weapon is useless unless aimed a specific

target. 21

To counter the lack of experience among the ranks, Davis placed Col. Albert

Sidney Johnston in command of the 2nd Cavalry.22 In addition to his experience

previously described, Johnston served as the Army’s paymaster in Texas. Similar to the

surveying of Hays, Ford, and Army captain Randolph B. Marcy, the occupation of

paymaster required Johnston to ride a 620-mile circuit along the Texas frontier multiple

times a year. Undoubtedly, he became intimately familiar with the environment and

20 Thomas W. Cutrer, Ben McCulloch and the Frontier Military Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 131. 21 Chalfant, Without Quarter, 29, 30. 22 James R. Arnold, Jeff Davis’s Own: Cavalry, Comanches, and the Battle for the Texas Frontier (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000), 24. Texas Ranger Benjamin McCulloch received an appointment as a major in the 1st Cavalry. Arnold, Davis’s, 25.

occupants of the frontier. Johnston understood that simply chasing the raiding parties

was a reactionary tactic that sacrificed the offensive to the Indians. Johnston stated, “to

give peace to the frontier. . . the troops ought to act off offensively and carry the war to

the homes of the enemy.”23

In 1856, Lieut. Col. Robert E. Lee of the 2nd Cavalry set out to attempt such an

endeavor. Enlisting the help of Jim “Bear Head” Shaw and fifteen other Delaware

Indians as guides, Lee's troopers set out on a forty-day expedition. Slowly scouring the

frontier, Lee and his men suffered greatly from the West Texas environment.. Doomed

to replicate the consequences of a large column, the group found more disease and dry

creek beds than Indians. Lee attempted to expedite his approach by separating the

mounted troops from his wagon train. He ordered his men to carry seven days rations

and relegated their horses to survive on prairie grass alone. For all their effort the 2nd

Cavalry only reported two Indians killed and one female prisoner. During its first year of

service the 2nd Cavalry made approximately thirty minor expeditions similar to Lee’s

and numerous short patrols, but it scored only minor victories, hardly the results anyone

would have expected considering the investment.24

Occasionally the 2nd Cavalry patrols happened to locate enemies and force the

Indians to fight. By this time the troopers mimicked the Rangers and made it common practice to utilize Indian guides. On December 15, 1856, Lieut. Richard Johnson departed with twenty-five men from Camp Cooper. Happening upon a Comanche camp,

Johnson ordered his troops to first separate the Indians from their horses in order to

23 Albert Sidney Johnston to William Preston Johnston, July 28, 1850, in Charles C. Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, Soldier of Three Republics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), 178. 24 Arnold, Davis’s, 85, 89, 128.

eliminate any chance of escape. Second, using a pincers movement, much like the

Apaches' crescent shaped advance, he surrounded the enemy and destroyed the camp.

Multiple instances such as Johnson’s attack did not produce the monumental victory most sought, but over time they did produce a desired cumulative effect.25

What remained unseen were the indirect effects of the 2nd Cavalry’s active

operations on the frontier. By mid-1856, the aggressive patrolling caused the main body

of Comanches to withdraw into Indian Territory. Texas citizens lavished praise upon

Colonel Johnston for the apparent peace. Historian James R. Arnold stresses that the

temporary peace during the second half of 1856 was due to the Comanches choosing

to withdraw rather from a forced retreat. Arnold suggests they had done this before in

1851 and 1852 after the construction of forts in Indian Country, in order to assess the

strength of these new defenses.26 Arnold is somewhat correct in that a withdrawal and

perhaps observation period by the Indians occurred. However, this author suggests the

withdrawal was a result of the combination of active pursuits by Brooke’s federalized

Rangers and Harney's campaigns. To insinuate that the Indians feared mounted troops

more than infantry or ominous fortifications in not a stretch. Dabney H. Maury described

an interesting trait about certain bands of Lipan Apaches who raided the country around

San Antonio and the lower Rio Grande. Shockingly, these Indians had a resting place at

around Fort Worth, and maintained peaceful relations with the 2nd United States

Dragoons stationed there. Evidently the Mounted Rifles stationed at Fort Inge were

regarded as a weaker, separate tribe. Maury reports whenever these Apaches were

about to make a raid south, “they would tell the Dragoons that they had [to make] ‘war

25 Ibid. 91, 95. 26 Ibid., 91,92.

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with the rifles’ prior to bidding them goodbye.” This minor example shows Plains tribes

feared some mobile detachments of the Army more than others. It also validates the

suggestion as to why the Comanches withdrew at the end of 1852 and 1856 despite the

lack of tangible results from the Army’s active campaigning.27

Complementing some of the 2nd Cavalry’s scattered success was the creation

and enforcement of reservations. The reservation experiment in Texas indirectly

resulted in a clarification between hostile Indians and friendly Indians. In 1849 Brooke,

new to Plains warfare, assumed that the enemy Indians could easily be differentiated

from others and that the “hostiles” would stand and fight.28 But the underground nature

of guerrilla warfare, especially that of Texas prior to the Civil War, was not so clear-cut.

As a result of the confusion created by the multiple tribes in Texas, Smith implored

Washington leaders to adopt “some different arrangement [between] Congress and the

state of Texas” regarding Indians. He wrote in 1852, “I cannot protect them against the

encroachments of settlers or traders. . . I cannot even tell them what is expected of

them. I can only wait until they commit a depredation [and react to it].”29 By 1854, Davis,

a key proponent in convincing Texas to set aside land, instituted a short-lived

reservation experiment. With boundaries now drawn, any Indian caught outside the

reservation could be regarded as “hostile” and subject to immediate attack. Historian

Gary Anderson suggests that this plan finally placed the United States cavalry on the

offensive. The Texas reservation experiment set into motion Army tactics that would be

27 Dabney H. Maury, Recollections of a Virginian (New York: Scribner’s, 1894), 76. 28 Gary C. Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 237. 29 Smith to Cooper, October 3, 1852, in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1852), 18.

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practiced up until the beginning of the Civil War and subsequently rekindled.30 Begun by the Plains Indians, copied by the Rangers, and promoted by Harney in the 1850s, a total war strategy was actively executed by Johnston and the 2nd Cavalry. The United

States cavalry, which had initially sought to retain its noble image, was becoming as rough as the environment they inhabited, just like the Texas Rangers. Historian James

R. Arnold described the transformation best. He concludes, “They cast aside most of the rules of civilized warfare. They fought without scruple. They fought to kill.” Only by adapting to the Indians' way of life and learning their habits, just as the Rangers had, could the Army operate successfully against them.31

The culmination of years of Ranger influence came to light in one letter written by a newly appointed 8th Military Department commander, Brevet Maj. Gen. David E.

Twiggs. His July 16, 1857 letter to Army Headquarters decried the previous decade’s defensive posture. Twiggs wrote that even with “31 companies stationed from the Rio

Grande to Eagle Pass. . . and West to Fort Davis over 1300 miles of country. . . marauding Indians can easily pass between them without being discovered.” He acknowledged the forts were situated at practical locations, but “ten-times the number of forts and men” could not protect citizens from raiding Indians. He complained, “We are acting entirely on the defensive.” Twiggs’ letter is evidence that the need for tactics for successful Plains warfare, developed by the Apaches, incorporated by the Comanches, and perfected by the Rangers, had now permeated the strategic level of command within the Army. Like Ranger leaders such as Col. John H. Moore and Hays had proclaimed decades earlier, Twiggs now called for a relentless campaign to target

30 Anderson, Conquest, 285. 31Arnold, Davis’s, 90, 96.

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enemy Indian homes and families outside the boundaries of Texas. Twiggs credited

Johnston for conceiving the strategy of total war, but as this study shows, these brutal

tactics had developed over centuries and the Army was late to the game.32 Johnston

was given the green light to prosecute the most destructive war possible and to treat all

Comanche people “with rigorous hostility.”33

During the beginning of 1858, Twiggs set into motion a major offensive against

the Comanches and other antagonistic tribes. On January 27, 1858, Gov. Hardin R.

Runnels paired Rangers with the Army "for the better protection of the frontier.” It

included a direct order for Rangers to cooperate with Major Van Dorn as well as to comply with the rules and regulations of the Army. Accordingly, General Twiggs, alongside Texas Ranger John S. “Rip” Ford, concentrated nearly all of the cavalry under his command at Fort Belknap. These soldiers and Texas Rangers were to ride north and invade the Comanche lands above the Red River. Ford’s orders were specific in

that he was locate enemy camps and chastise them by destroying supplies as well as

break up their trade links with other tribes. 34 On May 12, Ford’s group located and

attacked a large camp of Comanches on the Canadian River. He ordered the Rangers

to charge and quickly overtook the camp. Comanches erected their teepees in family

groupings in open areas, often along flowing streams. Consequently, little to no

defensive barriers were available to separate the village from an attack. As a result,

Ford’s men killed seventy-six Comanches and only lost two of their own number. The

32 David E. Twiggs to Lorenzo Thomas, June 16, 1857, Texas Governor’s Papers, Elisha M. Pease, Folder 43, June 1857, TSLA. 33 Ball, Army Regulars, 33. 34 “Memoranda of Instructions Forwarded to Col. Bourland,” [copy] January 10, 1859, Texas Governor’s Papers, Hardin R. Runnels, Folder 1153-10: Ranger Correspondence, January 1859, TSLA.

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stunning success reaffirmed Ranger offensive tactics and paved the way for the Army to later exploit this characteristic in mass. 35

Undoubtedly pressured by the recent success of Ford, Twiggs proposed to send two expeditions north of Texas and attack the Comanches. On August 9, 1858,

Secretary of War John B. Floyd authorized Twiggs to launch a punitive expedition into

Indian Territory.36 Later called the Wichita Expedition, Major Earl Van Dorn led the 2nd

Cavalry and other Army assets on a highly mobile campaign into Indian Territory in the same manner as Ford and his Rangers. The Wichita Expedition utilized mobile tactics that would later pacify the Plains Indians after the Civil War. A cursory look at the operation reveals several of these characteristics. First, authority was given to field commanders to follow any Indian trails without regard to boundaries or departmental limits. Second, to expedite mobility, most infantry would remain behind to guard the camp. Mounted troops lightened their loads to two days rations and ammunition.37

Third, operating out of a base camp rather than a defendable fort, mounted soldiers constantly patrolled. Indian scouts radiated out from the base camp in order to locate specific targets for the cavalry to attack. Finally, the Army utilized rapid surprise attacks in crescent shaped or encircling advances supplemented by heavy firepower.

The most notable battles included the Battle of Wichita Village and Crooked

Creek. In the both battles, Van Dorn ordered his men to scatter or capture the

Comanches’ horse herd. Next, two companies of cavalry charged the Comanche camp with great speed and heavy fire, thus drawing their attention. Two other companies of

35 Utley, Frontiersmen, 6, 128. 36 Chalfant, Without Quarter, 37. 37 Arnold, Davis’s, 197.

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cavalry swung around back of the camp in order to trap the Comanche warriors in a

vice. Without their horses, the Comanches were routed. A man on foot stood little

chance against a Colt wielding, mounted fighter. Twiggs described the Battle of Wichita

village as “a victory more decisive and complete than any recorded in the history of our

Indian warfare.” He was now convinced that it was wise to “abandon the defensive

system” that had produced so little. The aftermath of Crooked Creek revealed that the

Army lost four soldiers with nine wounded, while the Comanches suffered more than

seventy dead. The violent and unexpected offensive action of the 2nd Cavalry during

the Wichita Expedition marked a change in how the Army operated on the Plains. 38

A balanced evaluation of the Wichita Expedition recognizes that Indian depredations continued despite the Army's success. After the Battle of Crooked Creek,

Van Dorn noted that the main body of Comanches still resided outside the operating radius of his supply line. But the 2nd Cavalry's effectiveness can be ascertained by events that transpired after the regiment departed. By the fall of 1859, many Army units returned to Texas and a protective frontier focus became undermined by the deterioration of the reservations, unrest along the Rio Grande, and secession. Indian raids increased to the point that the line of civilized frontier receded east during the Civil

War. However, from a purely tactical standpoint, historians fail to recognize the impact of the Wichta Expedition. Historian Russell F. Weigley suggests that in the 1870s Maj.

Gen. Philip Sheridan and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman developed an “innovative strategy” by waging winter campaigns, and carrying war to the enemy's resources and people. Furthermore, the “new” mounted campaigns destroyed Indian camps by taking

38 Twiggs to Thomas, October 22, 1858, Letters Received, 1805-1889, Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94, National Archives, Fort Worth (Microfilm 567, Roll 592); Arnold, Davis’s, 202 203, 240, 247, 318; Chalfant, Without Quarter, 43, 118.

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advantage of surprise and denying access to their herds. Yet these tactics were clearly

practiced by Van Dorn during his 1858-1859 excursions. More importantly, the Rangers

provided the examples that convinced Army leaders to espouse the same tactics

Indians had used centuries before. 39

Noted historian William Y. Chalfant wrote, “Success in fighting Plains Indians

came only when the Army adopted the Indian’s own tactics, pursing doggedly, with

mounted troops and striking without warning at unsuspecting and unwary villages deep

in enemy country.”40 After surveying the facts, this statement lacks some key

components. Fresh from its impressive victory over Mexico, the United States Army was

adverse to change. The belief ran deep that the Army, led by Anglos, was of course

vastly superior to the feeble barbaric peoples of the frontier. In sum, there was no

motivation to adopt the Indians' tactics. Therefore, without the examples provided by the

Texas Rangers, the Army may well have still been sending masses of infantry to the

frontier as the Civil War began. Instead, the Army witnessed how to fight effectively on

the frontier and consequently changed its tactics.41

In addition to battlefield practices, other examples of the Army's evolution require

attention. By 1861, the Army’s formal adoption of less static, mounted tactics began to

be written into official doctrine. Gen. Dabney H. Maury is one who borrowed from

Ranger experiences and translated them into a modern mobile tactics guide for the

Army. Commissioned by Secretary of War John B. Floyd, Maury authored Tactics for

39 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 159. 40 Chalfant, Without Quarter, 114. 41 Cooperation between Ford’s Rangers and the Army occurred once again in 1859-1860 during the Cortina Conflict on the Rio Grande. Richard B. McCaslin, Fighting Stock: John S. “RIP” Ford of Texas (Fort Worth: TCU Press, 2011), 82-100.

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Mounted Riflemen, which was published in 1859. Maury’s other writings provide insight

to the revolutionary ideas discussed in Tactics for Mounted Riflemen. He stated, “I

found occupation in scouting and drilling, and in making a new system of tactics for

mounted troops. The general introduction of the revolver and long-range rifle called for

such changes in Calvary tactics. . . the working out of these problems occupied my

thoughts and interest for a long time.”42 The tactics he wrote about were “universally

adopted in the Indian fighting upon the plains.” In contrast an earlier cavalry tactics

manual from 1855 instructs, “whenever a trooper fires with the carbine, he holds, facing

the object at which he is to fire, and places his horse in such a direction that the piece is

directed between the shoulder and the left ear. To fire the pistol in marching, the

troopers should not halt, neither change the direction or gait." The 1855 manual

advocates limited, and sometimes stationary, firing, hardly the fluid tactics required for

survival on the Plains. 43

An official tactics guide published in 1861 undoubtedly shows Maury’s influence,

and a shift in mindset can be detected. The guide, Tactics for Light Dragoons and

Mounted Riflemen, begins by stating that “no military work is in more demand at present

than a cheap, plain, brief compendium of cavalry tactics.” This printed manual was one

of the first in widespread dissemination that incorporated the use of the revolver while

riding. Differing from the 1855 manual, Tactics for Light Dragoons and Mounted

Riflemen advocates firing in all directions and at all speeds. Moreover, more effective

42 Maury, Recollections, 95, 96. Dabney H. Maury reveals in his book Recollections of a Virginian that he published Tactics in 1859 under the direction of the Secretary of War. Unfortunately, an exhaustive search could not locate Tactics for Mounted Riflemen for reference in this paper 43 United States War Department, Cavalry Tactics, Second Part (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo and Co., 1855), 94.

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riding maneuvers were discussed: “A troop-horse, when thoroughly trained, can be guided by the arms and legs alone, thus allowing the trooper to use both hands, if necessary in combat.” It is easy to recognize the similarities between the Texas

Ranger’s style of fighting and those being incorporated into Army training by 1861.44

During the decade prior to the Civil War, the Army incorporated many Ranger- like nuances into its tactics. In 1859, Maury was appointed to a board of cavalry officers that included Robert E Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and Philip St. George Cooke. These men took seven weeks to decide upon a uniform and horse equipage for the Army. The most pertinent adaption was the Cossack saddle brought over by George B. McClellan, later dubbed the McClellan saddle. This functioned more like a Mexican saddle rather than the traditional cavalry one, therefore it became generally used by Army frontiersmen. Uniforms became less ostentatious and more functional. Tactics for Light

Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen criticized fancy hats and advocated waterproof covers that when unrolled covered the shoulders and neck. In other words, the practical equipment of the Ranger replaced the extravagant uniforms preferred by earlier Army leaders. 45

Other instances of the Army embracing outside influences can be traced to the antebellum decade. Major H. H. Sibley invented the “Sibley tent,” which is similar to the

Comanche lodge. Resembling the teepee, the framework consisted of one upright standard resting upon an iron tripod in the center. Marcy pointed out that this tent constituted the entire shelter of the Army in Utah during the winter of 1857-1858 and,

44 James Lucius Davis, The Trooper's Manual, or, Tactics for Light Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen (Richmond, VA: A. Morris, 1861) iii, 55-70. 45 Maury, Recollections, 107; Davis Trooper's Manual, XVII.

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despite the harsh conditions, it kept the troops quite comfortable. Marcy was so impressed with the merits of the tent that he wrote, “in my judgment none will compare with the Sibley tent for campaigning in cold weather.”46

Rangers such as Ford, almost without exception, employed Indian scouts.

Marcy’s influential writings placed a premium on the importance of trailing or tracking men over the plains. He wrote, “Almost all the Indians whom I have met are proficient in this knowledge, [it] appears to be innate with them.” He added that he had “seen very few white men who were good trailers, and practice did not improve their faculties in this regard; they have not the same acute perceptions for these things as the Indian.” Much to Marcy’s credit, his writings and field experience eventually taught the Army. He noted that, when pursued, Indians often scattered with “the understanding that they are to meet up again at some point in advance, so that if the pursuing party follows any one of the tracks it will invariably lead to the place of rendezvous.” Defining trail features such as a mountain pass or any other route that afforded the only passage through a particular section of country, “should receive immediate attention because the Indians probably went there.”47 Marcy learned that an Indian trail covered with the marks of lodge-poles indicated women and children were among those on the move. Therefore the group of Indians was not a war party, which exclusively consisted of men. If a trail of horse prints was found, one could distinguish between a war party and a wild group of mustangs by the way the animal’s dung fell to the ground. If the dung fell in a pile, it was a sure indication of a herd of mustangs due to the fact that Indians would keep their horses in motion, therefore scattering dung along the path. Additionally, if a trail passed

46 Marcy, Prairie Traveller, 144. 47 Ibid., 177.

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through low-lying woodlands, the mustangs would occasionally go under the limbs of trees too low to admit the passage of a man on horseback.48 Comparatively, when held up against the teachings of Mahan, lessons such as Marcy’s signal the evolving Army, and therefore, illustrate borrowed tactics foundational to the Army's future success after the Civil War.

Mahan’s one lesson on frontier fighting, although severely lacking in tactical or operational guidance, foreshadowed the Army's evolution in Texas. He insisted that the

Army “should draw from [the Indian] what is useful, in prudent modification of American operations.” He suggested lessons from the Roman model, in particular Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul and Britain. Mahan believed that like the Romans, the Army needed to borrow ideas from the enemies but not as far as to imitate the institutions of other nations. Frankly, the Army needed to modify how the Indian operates to meet the emergency without sacrificing its national character.49 Despite Army leaders' reluctance to change, as well as outright contempt for the Rangers, the two groups emulated each other. As a result, Army officers in the field adapted and learn new tactics from the

Rangers in order to fight and win. In Texas, these individuals adopted ‘unconventional’ offensive frontier fighting from the Rangers and Indians they encountered. These earlier pioneers of frontier-style warfare paved the way for others after the Civil War.

In conclusion, the Army initially failed to comprehend the dynamic nature of fighting Indians on the Texas frontier. The challenging mission of controlling Indian depredations, which certain Rangers had greater experience with, often forced the two

48 Marcy, Prairie Traveller, 174. 49 Thomas T. Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars, 1802-1891,” Military History of the West, 24 (Spring 1994), 49-51.

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to work together. The dubious alliance culminated in the sharing of strategies and tactics. By the time the 2nd Cavalry began concerted mobile efforts, most Texas forts began to suffer the fate of Fort Colorado. Instead of defensive positions, they functioned

more as rest and recovery stations. The cavalry in Texas shifted duty stations

frequently. Consequently, there was little incentive to improve physical structures.

Rather soldiers made a habit of burning whatever wood was easiest to come by,

whether come from fence rails or doors.50 Although not what he had in mind, some forts

devolved into the feed stations General Smith wrote about years earlier.51 The idea of

bringing the war directly into Indian country regardless of the season and constantly

putting the Indians on the defensive, came out of Texas during the antebellum period.

Marcy wrote, “The only way to make these merciless freebooters fear and respect the

authority of our government is. . . to chastise them well by striking such a blow as will be felt for a long time, and thus show them that we are superior to them in war.” The

Wichita Expedition reflected what the Army had learned from the Texas Rangers, and what would be the successful tactics employed against the Plains Indians after the Civil

War. 52

50 Arnold, Davis’s, 99. 51 Smith, “Report From 8th Military Dept.,” in Documents Accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War, Senate Executive Document 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd sess., (1852), 19. 52 Marcy, Prairie Traveller, 211.

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CHAPTER 7

EPILOGUE

The decade prior to the Civil War saw the genesis of Army frontier operations in

Texas that would eventually culminate in pacification of the Indian. Offensive warfare was developed by the Indians, refined by the Rangers and mass-produced by the Army.

Realizing their inadequacy in 1849, the Army temporarily relied on state help and eventually adopted their more mobile tactics. An evolution it seems at the tactical level that ultimately influenced the strategic level. Units became less static and therefore more effective in locating the enemy. Statistics indicate that horse regiments such as dragoons, cavalry, or mounted rifles fought 85 percent of all of the engagements against

Indians in Texas. The majority of those conflicts occurred after the 1852 increase of mounts.1 Enough proof for this author, to question: what or who got the infantry out from

behind a fort and into the saddle?

Sam Houston stated the Texas Rangers were “men who are acquainted with

action; they are efficient; they are athletic; they are inured to toil, to enterprise, to

danger; and they carry with them a spirit that is not to be found in the troops that are

generally collected in the regular Army.” The Army referred to the Rangers as

disheveled, undisciplined warmongers. Seemingly there would be zero coordination

between the two. However, the needs of the frontier drove the two together. As

distasteful as it may have been for the Army to cooperate with the Rangers, the success

of the latter culminated in joint operations and ultimately the incorporation of Ranger-like

1 Thomas T. Smith, The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth- Century Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2000), 21.

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methods. Finally, it was these tactics (including weaponry) that ultimately contributed to the Army’s success on the Plains.2

2 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress 1st sess., 493; Robert M. Utley, Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88.

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