Lívia Benková

FOKUS | 3/2018

The Rise of Russian in Europe

The generation and the spread of online passed an Act in 2017 in order to improve consultation on online disinformation and disinformation is becoming a worrying, enforcement of the law in social networks. launched a high-level expert group repre- wide-reaching phenomenon which can This act makes it possible to issue fines up senting online platforms, news media and result in having a serious impact on to €50 million by the authorities regarding civil society organizations, with publishing many European countries. In the last few social media companies that omit remo- a communication on “” in 2018.11 years, formal steps towards tackling this ving hate speech in 24 hours.4 This Expert Group will gather opinions on issue have been intensively taken.1 The actions that could be taken at EU level to European Commission warned, that “An The European security experts have provide citizens with an effective tool to orchestrated campaign by appealed to the EU High Representative, ensure reliable information and to handle the Russian government has been extre- to start taking the the challenges of the digital age easier. mely successful at spreading disinforma­ Russian disinformation threat seriously Experts will also analyze the problem, tion throughout the ”. The in 2015.5 Later that year, the European and investigate how citizens are aware of Kremlin is trying to regularly and conti- Council asked the EU High Representative online disinformation, or how they trust nuously deliver the same disinformation for an action plan regarding strategic different media.12 stories in as many languages as possible, communication targeting ’s ongoing through as many channels as possible ac- disinformation efforts.6 These actions Russia is aware of the “benefits” of its cording to the EU Security Commissioner resulted in the launch of the East Strat- disinformation campaign for achieving its Julian King.2 In his opinion, the Russian- Com task force in 2015, set up under the own political goals and views “fake news” driven disinformation campaign is aimed European External Action Service (EEAS). as a non-military measure, for example at turning open democratic systems StratCom is issuing a Disinformation the Gerasimov doctrine and the state- against themselves. Disinformation att- Review that collects examples of pro- ments of certain Russian generals made empts include threats in cyberspace like Kremlin false information articles in Europe it clear that the destabilising propaganda hacking attacks and malicious software, and allocates where disinformation has is a legitimate tool of Russia to achieve terrorist online propaganda, which are appeared. It also analyses how pro-Kremlin success. Disinformation can be viewed disrupting the democratic systems.3 The media perceive the world and focuses on as another type of armed forces, which is problem of online spread “fake news” key trends on Russian social media.7 The trying to destabilise and create divisions in became apparent in the context of the StratCom team does not dispose with its the West. Although there is only insuffici- crisis in and gained visibility at a own budget but rather draws on the exis- ent systematic research on the types and global level during the 2016 ting EU strategic communication budget. tools of disinformation, “Kremlin Watch” presidential election campaign. EU Mem- A network of volunteers collect the disin- and “Stop Fake” stress that not only big me- ber States such as Spain and the UK have formation stories and publish them in its dia outlets like RT or are deployed already accused Russia of conducting fake weekly newsletters. The task force has an but marginal fringe websites, blog sites information campaigns. The number of additional task and aims also at promoting and pages as well. “Trolls” are EU citizens, who are following news on the European Union’s policies mostly in often deployed to amplify disinformation social media is growing year by year (46 % the EU’s eastern neighborhood. In order messages. Russia uses different means of on average in 2016) and Russia diligently to make the StratCom more effective, the tools in different countries. For example, in continues with its hybrid war against the European Parliament at the end of 2016 the Baltics the Russian speaking minority is EU and the West. However, the Kremlin called for the need to reinforce the task being targeted as this is the most effective denies allegations of interference in the force and to provide adequate budgetary way of achieving impact in the countries US election campaign as well as in the UK resources for the team. The Parliament of the region. When it comes to Central referendum on EU membership. Accor- also proposed amendments to the EU Europe the use of “alternative “websites is ding to the Russian Defence Minister, budget for 2018 in regards to the pilot popular, while “trolling” is most prevalent Sergey Shoigu, an information warfare project ‘StratCom Plus’, trying to increase in Scandinavia.13 force has been established within the capacity to fact-check disinformation.8 Ministry of Defence in 2013. There is a East StratCom is gradually expanding Russian disinformation, illiberalism and wide-spread concern of targeting the and has around 27,000 followers on political extremism, is emerging in Europe 2019 European elections with disinforma­ .9 The East Stratcom managed to and is mostly visible in the “Visegrad Four” tion. Facebook and Google have introduced gather 3500 examples of disinformation countries in Central Europe.14 In order to fact-checking tools, and Twitter banned stemming from the Kremlin in over two analyze the vulnerability of the V4 coun- ads from Russian state media companies years.10 Further efforts were made in 2017, tries to foreign influence, the GLOBSEC RT and Sputnik. The German Parliament when the Commission launched a public Policy Institute conducted an opinion poll

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and collected data, based on a measur­ which will monitor threats directly related been for many years the target of several able set of societal and political indicators. to internal security and will evaluate and conspiracy theories and depicted as the These efforts resulted into a fact-based detect challenges and introduce proposals person who wants to destroy the traditio- Vulnerability Index of Central European for legislative solutions that it will also nal values in Central Europe.29 The notion countries. The Vulnerability Index mea- implement. Last but not least, it should of this theory was mostly visible recently sures the vulnerabilities of countries on a disseminate information and spread in Slovakia, in regards to the Kuciak case, scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents the awareness about the given issues among where in order to alleviate the public highest vulnerability to foreign influence. the public.24 protests against the government and to According to this index, Hungary reaching counter the statements of the oppositi- 57 out of 100 is the most vulnerable The least vulnerable country to foreign on, the former Prime Minister of Slovakia country in the Visegrad group to foreign influence is Poland reaching a score of 30 Robert Fico, built his response and counter influence.15 This is caused by several fac- out of 100.25 Due to the difficult history of statements using this theory and accused tors, mainly by the attraction of Hungarian Poland in regard to Russia, Polish society is the President Andrej Kiska of having close political elites towards Russia.16 The party most stably pro-West oriented. However, ties to George Soros and that Kiska is sup- Fidesz switched to an openly pro-Russia having a pro-European population the porting the destabilization of the country. stance in 2010 and in 2014 Prime Minister current conservative Eurosceptic govern- Viktor Orbán called for the creation of ment, shares some common features with Conclusion an “illiberal” state.17 Hungary is following the Hungarian regime and is gradually Russia in restricting civil liberties and con- rejecting governance by Brussels.26 There are hardly easy solutions to the ducting a cultural and legal war against systemic problem of disinformation.30 It the civil society.18 In contrast, the public Russian influence is enjoying popularity is a growing world-wide phenomenon, a society in Hungary holds a pro-western mostly among the far-right oriented par- new type of hybrid warfare, which will be geopolitical orientation. ties, most notably in Slovakia and Hun- used by more and more state actors, trying gary,” according to Kreko, the Director of to achieve their political goals and subvert Ranked second is Slovakia with an overall the Political Capital Institute in Budapest. political processes in other countries, as score of 51 out of 100.19 The political elites The Jobbik, a Hungarian far-right party is it is a very effective and “quiet” way of in this country share opportunistic atti- a pro-Russian party, that introduced a law manipulating developments in one’s own tudes towards the EU and NATO, enhanced requiring NGOs with foreign funding to favor. It takes many forms and is driven by by the persistent energy ties to Russia, declare themselves as foreign agents and many factors, like fabricated information which makes Slovakia a vulnerable state.20 the People’s Party Our Slovakia an anti-EU, stemming from the people, domestic po- Slovakia’s President Andrej Kiska has anti-NATO oriented party with pro-Russian liticians misleading their own citizens for criticized Russia’s disinformation campaign views, won eight percent of the vote in the political profits31 governments using it as while the former Prime Minister Robert last elections.27 a weapon in internal political and external Fico showed a more friendly pro-Russian diplomatic strategies32 and its spread via stance. Russian disinformation is active in In order to counter the spread of “fake social media and various platforms.33 Slovak media, with pro-Russian indica- news”, a Slovak activist Juraj Smatana tors, for example when it comes to the collected a complex list of disinformation- Intended “fake news” is nothing new but is extreme far-right magazine Zem a Vek and websites in the Czech Republic and more extensive and harder to identify than the Slovak state media outlet TASR, which Slovakia. According to this list, the number before due to the evolving technologies. announced a “content sharing” deal with of pro-Russian websites in these two Digital technologies and the Internet ease Sputnik.21 countries might be around 100. Alter- the way and the reach of false information native news websites, were launched in misleading citizens and misrepresenting The Czech Republic ranked third with 38 Slovakia, like the platform Konšpirátori.sk. reality.34 Although there are currently seve- out of 100.22 The Czech are not unanimous This website is aimed at countering false ral means available to tackle this problem, in their relations towards Russia and show information coming from the Kremlin and there is no real effective tool to reliably signs of paradox. The society rejects a pro- experienced early success as only after stop or reduce the spread of “fake news”. Russian orientation, however the political two months after its launch, more than The rising speed and reach of the internet spectrum headed by President Miloš 3,000 online campaigns started to use can result in worsening the spread of “fake Zeman, has a pro-Russian rhetoric. At the Konšpirátori.sk’s automated script that calls news” and technology-based solutions same time, the current Czech government attention to untrustworthy websites.28 may find it difficult to overcome them.35 supported the setting up of the anti- There is a need to address structural chan- hybrid threat task force Center Against One of the most well know disinformation ges and opportunities that the “fake news” Terrorism and Hybrid Threats at the Minis- stories in Central Europe is the discre- present, as the structures change, so must try of Interior.23 This Centre will function diting campaign against George Soros, the solutions. Citizens and journalists can as an analytical and communications unit, a Hungarian-American Investor. He has contribute by identifying false informa­

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7) TEPSA. 2016. EEAS’s East StratCom Task Force publishes two tion and filtering it. Important is to invest  The propaganda network should weekly newsletters. in new and better ways of connecting be exposed to the public in order http://www.tepsa.eu/eeass-east-stratcom-task-force-publishes- people. Moreover, the platforms and net- to increase resilience, because this two-weekly-newsletter/ works are now facing a growing challenge delegiti­mizes and thus destroys illicit 8) European Parliamentary Research Service Blog. 2017. Disinfor- mation, ‘Fake News’ and the EU’s Response. of achieving a healthier digital public information channels. https://epthinktank.eu/2017/11/20/disinformation-fake-news- sphere without censoring the information. and-the-eus-response/ Google, Twitter, Facebook are focusing on  Also, of essentiality is the upgrading of 9) MCDONALD-GIBSON, CH. 2017. The E.U. Agency Fighting removing offensive, dubious or disruptive the security system needs, including Russia’s Wildfire of Fake News with a Hosepipe. http://time. com/4887297/europe-fake-news-east-stratcom-kremlin/ information from their networks, which alterations in the legislative and the 10) Stone, J. 2018. Russian disinformation campaign has been means changing their algorithms to try to setup of the government institutions, ‘extremely successful’ in Europe, warns EU. promote the “right” content.36 not to forget the importance of the http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/russian-fake- news-disinformation-europe-putin-trump-eu-european-parlia- communication of political represen- ment-commission-a8164526.html The most effective ways to fight state- tatives from both government and 11) European Parliamentary Research Service Blog. 2017. Disin- sponsored media outlets Sputnik and RT, opposition camps. formation, ‘Fake News’ and the EU’s Response. are to improve media literacy, promote https://epthinktank.eu/2017/11/20/disinformation-fake-news- and-the-eus-response/ investigative journalism, raise awareness  Hybrid warfare is targeting the young 12) Unian. 2018. EU sets up team to tackle fake news, disinfor- and improve the transparency of media generation which is poorly educated, mation. ownership.37 Disinformation can be tackled therefore adaptation of the education https://www.unian.info/world/2347087-eu-sets-up-team-to- with available “soft power” or “hard power” system should be introduced.40 A large tackle-fake-news-disinformation.html 13) ISPI. 2017. Means, goals and consequences of the pro- measures, however the latter is considered number of young people lack notion of Kremlin disinformation campaign. to be problematic in particular when the European Union values and they have http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/means-goals-and- target is unclearly defined. So instead no knowledge of critical thinking.41 An consequences-pro-kremlin-disinformation-campaign-16216 of banning “fake news” and tasking law educated young society will be more 14) Ytamkin, E. 2017. The Real Russian Threat to Central . enforcement with combating disinfor- resilient towards disinformation, and http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to- mation soft power methods should be conspiracy theories.42 central-eastern-europe-2/ used. Content regulation of material and 15) GLOBSEC. 2017. The Vulnerability Index: Subversive Russian censorship can be contradictory to free- Influence in Central Europe https://www.globsec.org/publications/vulnerability-index- dom of expression. Therefore, it is essential Lívia Benková is a Research Fellow at the subversive-russian-influence-central-europe/ to realize that soft power measures like AIES. 16) European Values. 2017. Guide to Kremlin’s disinformation & encouraging and supporting collaboration influence operations in Europe. Summary of what every policy- of the different stakeholders who are all maker should know. http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ challenged by different disinformation Endnotes Guide-to-Kremlins-disinformation-influence.pdf problems provide an effective response 17) Ytamkin, E. 2017. The Real Russian Threat to Central Eastern to disinformation as well.38 Increased res- 1) Fletcher, R., Cornia, A., Graves, L., Nielsen, R. 2018. Measuring Europe. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to- ilience to disinformation can be achieved the reach of “fake news” and online disinformation in Europe. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/ central-eastern-europe-2/ by investing in media and information files/2018-02/Measuring%20the%20reach%20of%20fake%20 18) Kreko, P., Gyori, L. 2017. Hungary: a state captured by Russia. literacy, increasing the supply of credible news%20and%20online%20distribution%20in%20Europe%20 https://www.boell.de/en/2017/10/11/hungary-state-captured- information. Moreover, the governments CORRECT%20FLAG.pdf russia 19) GLOBSEC. 2017. The Vulnerability Index: Subversive Russian and institutions such as the European 2) Stone, J. 2018. Russian disinformation campaign has been ‘extremely successful’ in Europe, warns EU. Influence in Central Europe Commission should encourage and sup- http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/russian-fake- https://www.globsec.org/publications/vulnerability-index- port collaboration to counter disinforma­ news-disinformation-europe-putin-trump-eu-european-parlia- subversive-russian-influence-central-europe/ tion and increase resilience.39 ment-commission-a8164526.html 20) European Values. 2017. Guide to Kremlin’s disinformation & 3) UNIAN. 2018. The official has accused Russia of deliberately influence operations in Europe. Summary of what every policy- faking reports on Europe. maker should know. Recommendations https://www.unian.info/world/2369383-eu-commissioner-scour- http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ ges-pro-russian-disinformation-campaign-media.htmlhttps:// Guide-to-Kremlins-disinformation-influence.pdf  Efforts against the spread of disinfor- www.unian.info/world/2369383-eu-commissioner-scourges- 21) Ytamkin, E. 2017. The Real Russian Threat to Central Eastern pro-russian-disinformation-campaign-media.html Europe. mation should be conducted at lower 4) European Parliamentary Research Service Blog. 2017. Disinfor- http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to- levels of state bureaucracy by iden- mation, ‘Fake News’ and the EU’s Response. central-eastern-europe-2/ tifying the threat in documents such https://epthinktank.eu/2017/11/20/disinformation-fake-news- 22) GLOBSEC. 2017. The Vulnerability Index: Subversive Russian as intelligence services’ annual reports and-the-eus-response/ Influence in Central Europe 5) European Values. Open Letter of European security experts to https://www.globsec.org/publications/vulnerability-index- and national security strategies. The Federica Mogherini: Please start taking the Russian disinformati- subversive-russian-influence-central-europe/ public identification of the problem is on threat seriously. http://www.europeanvalues.net/mogherini/ 23) GLOBSEC. 2017. The Vulnerability Index: Subversive Russian important as it is needed for the non- 6) European Parliament. 2017. Disinformation, ‘fake news’ and Influence in Central Europe governmental sector and media to the EU’s response. https://www.globsec.org/publications/vulnerability-index- http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ subversive-russian-influence-central-europe/ enhance public awareness activities. ATAG/2017/614584/EPRS_ATA(2017)614584_EN.pdf 24) Ministry of Interior-Czech Republic. 2018. Centre Against

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ment-censorship-is-the-key-to-fighting-disinformation-and- Terrorism and Hybrid Threats. fake-news/ http://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/centre-against-terrorism-and- 40) GLOBSEC. 2016. Russia’s information war in Central Europe: hybrid-threats.aspx New trends and counter-measures. 25) GLOBSEC. 2017. The Vulnerability Index: Subversive Russian https://www.globsec.org/publications/russias- Influence in Central Europe information-war-central-europe-new-trends-counter- https://www.globsec.org/publications/vulnerability-index- measures/#frLPhJkPIf7R17TE.99 subversive-russian-influence-central-europe/ 41) European Security Journal. 2017. Russia Tailors Its Informa- 26) European Values. 2017. Guide to Kremlin’s disinformation & tion Warfare to Specific Countries. https://www.esjnews.com/ influence operations in Europe. Summary of what every policy- information-warfare-specific-countries maker should know. 42) European Security Journal. 2017. Information: V4’s New http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ Security Threat. Guide-to-Kremlins-disinformation-influence.pdf https://www.esjnews.com/russian-propaganda-europe 27) Ytamkin, E. 2017. The Real Russian Threat to Central Eastern Europe. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to- central-eastern-europe-2/ 28) PSSI. 2016. Countering Pro-Russian Disinformation: Current Challenges And The Way Forward. http://www.pssi.cz/download/docs/361_summary-paper- countering-pro-russian-disinformation.5 29) GLOBSEC. 2017. Information war monitor for Central Europe: July 2017 George Soros. https://www.globsec.org/publications/information- war-monitor-central-europe-july-2017-george-so- ros/#TjOVkDuPYZtLfD0m.99 30) London School of Economics. 2017. Dealing with the disin- formation dilemma: a new agenda for news media. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/12/22/dealing- with-the-disinformation-dilemma-a-new-agenda-for-news- media/ 31) Nielsen, R. 2018. Soft power — not government censorship — is the key to fighting disinformation and “fake news”. http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/03/soft-power-not-govern- ment-censorship-is-the-key-to-fighting-disinformation-and- fake-news/ 32) London School of Economics. 2017. Dealing with the disin- formation dilemma: a new agenda for news media. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/12/22/dealing- with-the-disinformation-dilemma-a-new-agenda-for-news- media/ 33) Nielsen, R. 2018. Soft power — not government censorship — is the key to fighting disinformation and “fake news”. http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/03/soft-power-not-govern- ment-censorship-is-the-key-to-fighting-disinformation-and- fake-news/ 34) London School of Economics. 2017. Dealing with the disin- formation dilemma: a new agenda for news media. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/12/22/dealing- with-the-disinformation-dilemma-a-new-agenda-for-news- media/ 35) Pew Research Centre. 2017. The Future of Truth and Misin- formation Online. http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/19/ the-future-of-truth-and--online/ 36) London School of Economics. 2017. Dealing with the disin- formation dilemma: a new agenda for news media. © Austria Institut für Europa- http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/12/22/dealing- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2018 with-the-disinformation-dilemma-a-new-agenda-for-news- media/ Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ 37) Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 2018. EU Issues Call to gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des Action to Combat Russian ‘Propaganda’. Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik https://www.rferl.org/a/european-commission-russia-disinfor- (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger mation-propaganda-call-to-action/28981394.html Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus 38) Nielsen, R. 2018. Soft power — not government censorship veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die — is the key to fighting disinformation and “fake news”. Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren wieder. http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/03/soft-power-not-govern- ment-censorship-is-the-key-to-fighting-disinformation-and- Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau fake-news/ Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 39) Nielsen, R. 2018. Soft power — not government censorship E-Mail: [email protected] — is the key to fighting disinformation and “fake news”. Website: www.aies.at http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/03/soft-power-not-govern- Layout: Medienbüro Meyer

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