DOCSLIB.ORG

Government Communication in Times of Crisis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Government Communication in Times of Crisis Government Communication in Times of Crisis An Analysis of Egyptian Government Actors’ Responses to Terrorism and Protests (2011-2019) Yasmine Ahmed Hassan Hassanain Student ID: 12906190 Master’s Thesis Graduate School of Communication Master’s program Communication Science Erasmus Mundus Journalism Supervisor: dr. mr. J.H.P. (Joost) van Spanje Date of submission: 29/05/2020 Word count: 7499 Abstract The necessity of effective communication in the aftermath of a crisis has been established in literature and in practice. However, governmental responses to nationwide crises are still greatly neglected in this field of research, calling for better attention to how such critical events are communicated to the public. Accordingly, this study aims to extend existing crisis communication literature in two ways. Firstly, it seeks to extrapolate corporate-rooted theories, which dominate the field, into the arena of government communication. Secondly, it adds a contextual perspective by tapping into the nuances of contemporary Egypt. A quantitative content analysis of 1,390 governmental statements, in response to a selection of terrorism and protests events between 2011 and 2019, was conducted. Findings reveal that the Egyptian government’s discourse included two components of strategic crisis communication: information-giving strategies that emphasize public well-being, and reputation-management strategies that focus on offsetting negative perceptions and affects about the government. Moreover, the government’s strategic approach was found to deviate from best practice advice in theory, especially regarding the selection of reputation-repair strategies. Findings are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical implications for crisis communication researchers and government communicators. Keywords: Crisis Communication; Crisis Response Strategies; Egypt; Crisis in Egypt; Protests, Terrorism Word count: 202 2 Introduction Terrorist attacks. Earthquakes. Epidemics. Demonstrations… Governments often encounter undesired and unexpected ‘crises’, where public safety and/or their own political survival are at high risk. At such critical moments, everyone looks to the leaders who are expected to deal with the immediate threats and are pressured to contain their citizens’ dissatisfaction (Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2008; Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Liu & Levenshus, 2012). Accordingly, political crisis communication research constitutes a rapidly growing field that aims to understand and inform governments’ crisis response efforts (Auer, 2016). In that light, this study zooms in on two types of crisis that impose significant pressure on governments worldwide, seeking to answer the following research question: What crisis communication strategies do governmental actors employ in response to domestic terrorist attacks and anti-regime protests, and to what extent does the type of crisis inform the selection of strategies? In particular, the study examines how Egyptian government actors responded to eight terror attacks and two nationwide protests between 2011 and 2019. A quantitative content analysis of governmental statements was conducted, applying two mainstream paradigms in crisis response literature: The Model of Crisis Communication Content (Sturges, 1994) and The Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007, 2010). This paper seeks to advance crisis communication literature in two ways. Firstly, political and governmental crises still constitute a “blind spot” (Auer, 2016, p.118) in this research field that has almost exclusively focused on the private sector. Most established theories are corporate- centered (Liu & Horsley, 2007; Olsson, 2014); and few studies examined their applicability in governmental contexts (Adkins, 2010; Chua & Pang, 2012; Clements, 2016; Jin, Pang, & 3 Cameron, 2006; Peijuan, Ting, & Pang, 2009; Zhang & Benoit, 2004). The present study follows in the latter’s footsteps by applying two well-established corporate crisis communication theories to nationwide crises. In doing so, it sheds light on some unique attributes of governments’ strategic goals, and offers a replicable operationalization of relevant crisis response strategies in the language of public officials. Secondly, tapping into the nuances of the Egyptian context, this research adds to a growing interest to contextualize crisis communication theories outside the liberal democratic settings where they are originated (Kim, 2014; Kimotho & Nyarang’o, 2019; Pang & Hu, 2018; Wu, Huang, & Kao, 2016). For instance, Wu et al. (2016, p.65) called for revising Western theories to account for China’s “hierarchical authoritarianism and relation- centered values”. In similar vein, this study addresses the extent to which crisis response paradigms hold up in yet another setting, where values of democracy and accountability manifest very differently than in the West. Few studies examined crisis communication in Egypt (Alharbi, 2012; Anagondahalli, 2013; Koa, 2018), of which none addressed government-level discourse. More practically, crisis communication research provides useful tools to crisis managers and the lay public (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2017). Crisis response theories seek to establish systematic frameworks for the most “appropriate strategic communication approaches and techniques” (Jin et al., p.83). Furthermore, unveiling the strategic aspects of crisis communication is believed to contribute to the public’s awareness and autonomy as political consumers (Koa, 2018; Spiller & Bergner, 2011). Not only is political education essential for modern democracies to survive (Gutmann & Ben-Porath, 2014), but it also plays a key role in democratic transitions as in the Egyptian context (Liu, 2015). Accordingly, the findings of this study could offer sensible insights for government communicators and their audience of citizens. 4 Conceptual Framework Political Crisis The definition of a ‘crisis’ has been subject to a long debate in academic literature. Hermann (1963, p.64) identified it as an event that “(1) threatens high-priority values of the organization, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization”. Auer (2016) later offered a more specified conceptualization of a ‘political crisis’, arguing that the political dimension had remained “ambiguous” (p.119) due to the focus on the private sector. She defines ‘political crisis’ as: “A situation in which a political entity perceives a higher than normal threat to one or more of its core values and finite time for response triggered by the behavioral change of another entity and that is characterized by disruptive interaction between the opposing entities” (Auer, 2016, p.123). Adopting Auer’s definition, ‘terrorist attacks’ and ‘protests’ are addressed in this study as two types of political crises. Both impose high threats to the government by obstructing national security and stability, require quick response, and involve disruptive actions by protestors or terrorists. According to Lerbinger (1997, 2012)’s seven-categories crisis typology, ‘terrorism’ exemplifies a crisis of ‘malevolence’ when “opponents or miscreant individuals” (Lerbinger, 2012, p.185) use criminal actions to express hostility or seek gains from a company or country. Meanwhile, ‘protests’ are an example of ‘confrontational crisis’ where discontented people fight a company or government to satisfy certain demands. Terrorism has attracted growing interest in crisis communication research following 9/11 attacks (An & Cheng, 2010; Boin et al., 2005; Boin et al., 2008; Canel & Sanders, 2010; 5 Clements, 2016; Kimotho & Nyarang’o, 2019). National protests are also identified in literature as ‘crisis situations’ (Bostan-Ünsal, 2013; Kavanaugh, Yang, Sheetz, Li, & Fox, 2011). Yet, few studies addressed protests from a communication perspective (Alharbi, 2012; Anagondahalli, 2013). Crisis Communicators According to Auer (2016), the political ‘entity’ or ‘actor’ involved in crisis communication can be an individual (politician, diplomat), a political organization (government, military), or the whole state/territory (referring to public diplomacy). These categories reflect a micro, meso and macro level of reference to crisis communicators. Most empirical studies have focused on individual politicians, including Presidents (Alharbi, 2012; Anagondahalli, 2013; Benoit, 1982, 1999, 2006; Benoit & Henson, 2009; Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991) and international leaders (Edwards, 2008). Fewer studies addressed government discourse, often underlining public diplomacy in crises where international reputation is jeopardized (Chua & Pang, 2012; Zhang & Benoit, 2004). In this research, the political entity is conceptualized on the meso-level, addressing the ‘government’ as one encompassing organization managing domestic crises (Jin et al., 2006). ‘Government communication’ is defined by Canel and Sanders (2012, p.86) as a type of communication carried out by “executive politicians and officials in public institutions in the service of a political rationale”. To identify these officials, Walter (2017)’s operationalization of ‘government actors’ in EU countries was adopted. It covers national executives (e.g., heads of states, ministers), legislative actors, political administrations (e.g., civil servants, diplomats) and judiciary actors. Equally, the crisis communicators addressed in this study include the incumbent 6 president, cabinet
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Download (2118Kb)
    Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published elsewhere. Persistent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/131653 How to cite: Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing it. Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Publisher’s statement: Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further information. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected]. warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications Searching for Answers: The Impact of Student Access to Wikipedia Laura Derksen, Catherine Michaud Leclerc and Pedro CL Souza (This paper also appears as CAGE Discussion paper 450) December 2019 No: 1236 Warwick Economics Research Papers ISSN 2059-4283 (online) ISSN 0083-7350 (print) Searching for Answers: The Impact of Student Access to Wikipedia Laura Derksen, Catherine Michaud Leclerc and Pedro CL Souza∗ December 21, 2019 Abstract Young people across the developing world are gaining access to the internet.
    [Show full text]
  • Five Years of Egypt's War on Terror
    FIVE YEARS OF EGYPT’S WAR ON TERROR The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) is dedicated to influencing policy toward the Middle East and North Africa through rigorous research and targeted advocacy efforts that promote local voices. TIMEP is fully registered and acknowledged under Section501(c)(3) in the District of Columbia. For more information about TIMEP’s mission, programming, or upcoming events, please visit timep.org. This report is the product of the collaborative efforts of TIMEP's staff and fellows. Cover image: A security checkpoint in the Egyptian Western Desert and the Bahariya Oasis in Siwa, Egypt, May 15, 2015 (photo by Amr Abdallah Dalsh for Reuters) CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 TERRORISM 5 COUNTER-TERRORISM 10 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 14 FINDINGS 15 TERRORISM 17 ACROSS EGYPT: Intensification and evolution in terror attacks after 2013 17 NORTH SINAI: Violence has become an entrenched insurgency 19 MAINLAND: Low-scale violence gives way to sporadic, deadly attacks 26 COUNTER-TERRORISM 35 ACROSS EGYPT: Tens of thousands of citizens ensnared in the war on terror 35 NORTH SINAI: Continuous military occupation 36 MAINLAND: Sweeping and broad crackdown 39 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 43 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CONTEXT: The war on terror trumps rule of law 43 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT: The war on terror as pretext for political consolidation 46 GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT: Continued global support 49 FINDINGS 52 METHODOLOGY 54 Egypt Security Watch 3 Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror INTRODUCTION On July 24, 2013, then-Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El Sisi asked for a popular mandate to fight terrorism, marking the declaration of the “war on terror” that has lasted five years.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Extremism Monitor: Islamist Violence After ISIS
    Global Extremism Monitor: Islamist Violence after ISIS SANDUN MUNASINGHE RACHAEL GARNER JEAN HEERY GAVIN JAMES DANIEL REY CO-EXISTENCE Contents Executive Summary 6 Introduction 11 The Ten Deadliest Countries 22 Seven Places to Watch 60 Sector Impact 75 Methodology 85 Published at https://institute.global/insight/co- existence/global-extremism-monitor-islamist- violence-after-isis on January 15 2020 FOREWORD FROM TONY BLAIR We publish this Global Extremism Monitor as a data point around violent extremism and its impact; but also to drive a wider point which the recent tension and conflict vo er Iran, underscores. Though today there are elements of extremism associated with most mainstream religious faiths, the threat of Islamist extremism has had the largest impact on lives, on nations’ development and on world peace. What is apparent is that the roots of this run deep, go back way beyond 9/11, and have two different strands – one linked to Sunni Islam and most obviously connected with the plethora of groups like al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS; and one deriving from Shia Islam and in particular the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. This report has shown that state-building remains the over- arching ambition for Islamist extremists, as is all too clear through their military, communications and recruitment tactics. Despite stripping ISIS of its amassed territories, the pursuit of an ‘ideal’ state continues to embolden fighters, attract new followers, undermine governments and threatens the fabric of societies around the world. Many of the 140 Islamist extremist groups my Institute has tracked and documented since 2017 routinely exploit political vacuums, weak infrastructure, ethnic and cultural divides, resource scarcity and unemployment in order to establish systems of governance where state-enacted services are perceived to be failing.
    [Show full text]
  • “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!” Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai
    HUMAN “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, RIGHTS Leave Sinai!” WATCH Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!” Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai Copyright © 2019 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-37359 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amman, Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org MAY 2019 ISBN: 978-1-6231-37359 “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!” Egyptian Security Forces and ISIS-Affiliate Abuses in North Sinai Map of North Sinai, Egypt .................................................................................................... i Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Government
    [Show full text]
  • Extremism and Terrorism
    Egypt: Extremism and Terrorism On August 13, 2021, ISIS claimed responsibility after a roadside bomb targeted an armored military vehicle in New Rafah along the Gaza border, killing eight and wounding six. On July 31, ISIS fighters ambushed Egyptian forces at a security checkpoint in Sheikh Zuweid, killing at least five and wounding six. Security forces killed three of the attackers. (Sources: Al Jazeera, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera, Times of Israel) Extremist attacks in the Sinai became rarer in the first half of 2021, though they have not ended altogether. In February 2018, the Egyptian military began an ongoing operation called Sinai 2018 to capture or kill ISIS militants in the northern and central Sinai. On September 10, 2021, prominent Sinai Province leader Mohamed Saad Kamel, a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Qadi, turned himself in to the Association of Sinai Tribes, which coordinates with the Egyptian military. In March 2021, the Egyptian government began implementing major economic development projects in the Sinai to further dissuade extremists. Despite the successes of Egypt’s counterextremism initiatives, ISIS’s Sinai Province has continued to sporadically carry out attacks in and around the Sinai Peninsula. (Sources: Al-Monitor, Times of Israel, Al-Monitor) Human Rights Watch and other rights groups have accused Egypt of failing to hold its forces accountable. A September 2021 Human Rights Watch report concluded dozens of alleged armed militants killed in so-called shootouts with Egyptian forces did not pose an imminent danger to security forces or others when they were killed. In many cases, the suspects were already in custody when they were killed.
    [Show full text]
  • Overall Risk Level
    Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 EGYPT Overall risk level High Reconsider travel Can be dangerous and may present unexpected security risks Travel is possible, but there is a potential for disruptions Overview Emergency Numbers Medical 123 Upcoming Events 30 August 2021 - 14 September 2021 Medium risk: Chinese officials suspend flights from Paris and Cairo on 30 August-13 September - Update Air China flight CA934 from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG) in France to Tianjin Binhai Airport (TSN/ZBTJ) in China and Egyptair flight MS953 from Cairo Airport (CAI/HECA) in Egypt to Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport (HGH/ZSHC) in China will be suspended from 30 August for two weeks, due to COVID-19. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / Egypt 2 Travel Advisories Medium risk: Militant attacks in mainland Egypt Exercise caution for travel to Egypt until further notice because of potential attacks by militant groups. Domestic and international terror groups, including the Islamic State (IS), have proved that they have both the capability and intent to strike security and tourist sites within mainland Egypt, including Cairo, Giza, and 6th of October City since 2013. At least five militant attacks occurred in Cairo in 2019, killing at least 25 people and injuring 54 others. These attacks mostly targeted security forces, unlike some of the attacks from previous years, which struck places popular with tourists – including a roadside bomb attack targeting Vietnamese nationals on a tour bus near the Giza pyramids (28 December 2018), knife attacks targeting hotels and beachgoers in the resort city of Hurghada (14 July 2017 and 8 January 2016) and a suicide bombing outside Karnak Temple in Luxor (10 June 2015).
    [Show full text]
  • Broken: the Situation of Egypt's Minorities Since 2014
    report Justice Denied, Promises Broken: The Situation of Egypt's Minorities Since 2014 A nun cries as she stands at the scene inside Cairo's Coptic cathedral, following a bombing, in Egypt December 11, 2016. Reuters/Amr Abdallah Dalsh Acknowledgements Minority Rights Group International This report has been produced with the financial assistance Minority Rights Group International (MRG) is a of the European Union and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of non-governmental organization (NGO) working to secure the Netherlands. The contents of this report are the sole the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and responsibility of Minority Rights Group International and can indigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperation under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the and understanding between communities. Our activities are position of the European Union or the Ministry of Foreign focused on international advocacy, training, publishing and Affairs of the Netherlands. outreach. We are guided by the needs expressed by our worldwide partner network of organizations, which represent minority and indigenous peoples. MRG works with over 150 organizations in nearly 50 countries. Our governing Council, which meets twice a year, has members from 10 different countries. MRG has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). MRG is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under English law: registered charity no. 282305, limited company no. 1544957. Some of the contributors to this publication have been anonymized. Mohamed Azmy, Nourredine Bessadi and Mina Thabet have contributed to this report.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt
    H U M A N R I G H T S ALL ACCORDING TO PLAN The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt WATCH All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1661 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org AUGUST 2014 978-1-62313-1661 All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Map .............................................................................................................................................. I Summary and Key Recommendations ........................................................................................... 1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Geopolitics of Violent Extremism: the Case of Sinai
    36 The Geopolitics of Violent Extremism: The Case of Sinai Giuseppe Dentice IEMed. European Institute of the Mediterranean Consortium formed by: Board of Trustees - Business Council: Corporate Sponsors Partner Institutions Papers IE Med. Publication and coordination: European Institute of the Mediterranean Proof-reading: Neil Charlton Layout: Núria Esparza ISSN: 1888-5357 February 2018 This series of Papers brings together the result of research projects presented at the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference 2017. On the occasion of the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference “Confronting Violent Extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean Region”, held in Barcelona on 1-2 June 2017, distinguished analysts presented indeed their research proposals related to the phenomenon of violent extremism. The papers were articulated around the three main tracks that were discussed: the link between violent extremism and geopolitics, the complex nexus between violent extremism and populist, nationalist and islamophobic trends in EU countries on the one hand and authoritarian trends on the other, as well as policies and initiatives in the fields of preventing and countering radicalisation. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean. CONTENTS The Geopolitics of Violent Extremism: The Case of Sinai Giuseppe Dentice* INTRODUCTION 6 THE MEANING OF “TERRORISM”? A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 10 A HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW 14 CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN SINAI 18 THE GROWTH OF MILITANCY (MID-2000S) 22 THE RISE OF A NEW TERRORIST THREAT IN THE PENINSULA (JANUARY 2011-JUNE 2013) 26 THE MORSI OUSTING AND SINAI AS SANCTUARY (JULY 2013-OCTOBER 2014) 30 FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL: ISLAMIC STATE IN SINAI AND A NEW TERROR THREAT (2014-2017) 36 SINAI AT A CROSSROADS 40 ESTABLISHING A PRIORITY.
    [Show full text]
  • Hotels As Targets of Jihadist Terror: an Empirical Analysis of the Period from 1970 to 2016
    IFSH Adrien Delafontaine Hotels as Targets of Jihadist Terror: An Empirical Analysis of the Period from 1970 to 2016 Working Paper 12 | January 2017 Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg Beim Schlump 83, 20144 Hamburg Tel: +49 40 866 077-0 About Zeus The Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) is divided into three specialized research units. The Centre for European Peace and Security Studies (ZEUS) focuses on the theoretical and practical aspects of the European Union’s efforts to strengthen peace and security in the various fields included within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – both within and beyond Europe. Contact: Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ehrhartatifsh.de About the author Adrien Delafontaine originally studied hospitality management at the École hôtelière de Lausanne. He has held various operational and administrative positions in the casino and hotel industries in Switzerland, England, Germany and the French West Indies. In 2016, he received the degree of Master of Peace and Security Studies from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. He wrote his Master’s thesis at ZEUS under the supervision of Dr Hans-Georg Ehrhart. The key results of this thesis are presented in the following working paper in an updated version that includes data from 2015 and 2016. Contact: adrien.delafontaine.researchatgmail.com Hotels as Targets of Jihadist Terror: An Empirical Analysis of the Period from 1970 to 2016 Adrien Delafontaine Abstract Hotels are by their nature the ultimate soft targets.
    [Show full text]
  • Death Passage
    Death Passage Annual Report February 2017 Justice for Human Rights– JHR www.jhrngo.com 1 Violations of human rights in Egypt within 2016, “Extrajudicial Killing, the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights Defenders” February 2017 Justice for Human Rights foundation – JHR: An Independent human rights foundation supports justice and protect human rights, operates according to the rules, mechanisms, and systems of International Organization and has a considered partnership with relevant organizations. JHR protects human rights based on international standards endorsed by the United Nations and International concerned Conventions and Covenants, supports and defends the oppressed people. 2 ** Notice: Report sources: - JHR Monitoring and documentation unit. - JHR reports and researches unit. - Some reports from a number of human rights organizations and official web sites. 3 Index Subject Page number Introduction 5 Report’s method 6 Executive Summary 7 Arbitrary executions 8 Statistical table of murder and torture cases 9 Systematic crimes 11 Murder cases that have been monitored and documented 12 Murder cases in Sinai 24 Murder due to medical negligence in prisons and police stations 25 Statistical table of murder cases by medical negligence 26 Examples of medical negligence murder 29 Death sentence cases 31 Table of executed death sentence cases 32 Murder of the taxi driver 34 Murder of the Chancellor’s son 35 Death sentences by Military Courts 41 Case of “Kafr El-Sheikh Stadium” executions 42 Military Case No.174 execution tragedy,
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai Sahar F
    Nebraska Law Review Volume 95 | Issue 2 Article 2 2016 Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai Sahar F. Aziz Texas A&M University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Sahar F. Aziz, Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 307 (2016) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol95/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Sahar F. Aziz* Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS: Lessons from Sinai TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .......................................... 308 II. Economic Deprivation and Political Marginalization in the Sinai ............................................. 318 A. The Sinai’s Strategic Significance .................. 321 B. Neglect and Criminalization of the Bedouin ........ 324 III. Bringing the Sinai into the National Fold ............. 328 A. Long-Term Investment in Development ............ 330 B. De-Securitizing Development in Sinai .............. 335 C. Political Inclusion and Integrating Bedouin into Security Services .................................. 338 IV. Contextualizing Sinai’s Transition into a Failing Sub- State ................................................. 342 A. Festering Grievances and Militants in Sinai Before the 2011 Uprising ................................. 344 B. 2011 Uprisings Create a Security and Political Vacuum ........................................... 350 C. Violence in Sinai Reaches New Heights after Morsi is Deposed ........................................ 357 V. Conclusion ............................................ 363 © Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW * Professor, Texas A&M School of Law and nonresident fellow at Brookings Doha Center.
    [Show full text]