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The World Bank THE WORLD BANK Bouchard 547, 29th floor Tel.: (54-11) 4316-9700 / 44 IBRD*IDA I WORLD C1106ABG Fax: (54-11) 4313-1233 LeAnwrles & tho CarNbn Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos Aires Argentine Republic Oa aieics fo Al bnl OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS o 2017 Public Disclosure Authorized Mr. Luis Caputo Minister of Finance Ministry of Finance Hip6lito Yrigoyen 250 1310 Buenos Aires, Argentina Re: ARGENTINA: Loan No. 7301-AR (ProvincialRoad InfrastructureProject) Loan No. 7833-AR (AdditionalFinancing for the ProvincialRoad Infrastructure Project) Amendment to the Loan Agreements Public Disclosure Authorized Dear Minister, We refer to: (a) the Loan Agreement (Loan No. 7301-AR) dated April 18, 2006, as amended, between the Argentine Republic (the Borrower) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the Bank) and the Loan Agreement (Loan No. 7833-AR) dated April 11, 2011 between the Borrower and the Bank (jointly referred to as the "Loan Agreements"); and (b) the Borrower's letters No. 1146/2016 and 1147/2016 dated November 4, 2016, requesting the Bank to, inter alia: (i) reallocate loan proceeds among disbursement Categories of Eligible Expenditures; and (ii) increase the percentage of Eligible Expenditures to be financed. Please note that capitalized terms used in this letter ("Amendment Letter") and not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the Loan Agreements. Public Disclosure Authorized We are pleased to inform you that the Bank hereby proposes to modify the provisions of the Loan Agreements mentioned above, as set forth in Attachments I and II to this Amendment Letter, respectively. Please confirm your agreement with the foregoing, on behalf of the Borrower, by signing and dating two originals of this Amendment Letter and returning one fully signed original to us. The amendment set forth in this Amendment Letter will become Public Disclosure Authorized -2- effective as of January 1, 2016, upon receipt by the Bank of one fully countersigned original of this Amendment Letter. Sincerely, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT By_u Jes H-entschel iArector Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay Latin America and the Caribbean Region AGREED AND CONFIRMED: ARGENTINE REPUBLIC By: uthorized Representative) Name: LUIS ANPRtS CAPUTO MINIS I RU Uh HNANLAS Title: Date: Jnme 2q 2017 ACUERDO MF No 29/17 -3- Attachment I Loan No. 7301-AR 1. The definition of CEU under Section 1.02 (a) of Article I of the Loan Agreement is hereby replaced in its entirety to read as follows: "(a) "CEU" means the central executing unit established within the coordinating unit of programs and projects with external financing (Unidad Coordinadorade Programasy Proyectos con FinanciamientoExterno) under the jurisdiction of the National Roads Directorate (DNV) of the Borrower's Ministry of Transport, or any successor thereto acceptable to the Bank;" 2. The table under Section A. 1 of Schedule I to the Loan Agreement is hereby replaced in its entirety to read as follows: Loan Allocated % of (Expressed in Expenditures Category Dollars) to be financed (1) Works: (a) under CREMA Subprojects 108,200,000 100% (b) under Road Subprojects 33,000,000 (2) Goods: (a) under Institutional 2,750,000 Building Subprojects 100% (except as (b) under Part C.2 of the 0 provided in Section Project 5.08 of the General Conditions) (c) under Part D of the Project 0 (3) Consultants' services: (a) under Institutional 700,000 Building Subprojects (b) under Part C.2 of 0 100% the Project (c) under Part D of 3,600,000 the Project -4- Loan Allocated % of (Expressed in Expenditures Category Dollars) to be financed (4) Training: (a) under Institutional 400,000 Building Subprojects (b) under Part C.2 of 0 100% the Project (c) under Part D of 0 the Project (5) Operating Costs under 600,000 100% Part D. I of the Project (6) Front-end fee 750,000 Amount due under Section 2.04 of this Agreement (7) Premia for Interest Rate 0 Amount due under Caps and Interest Rate Section 2.09 (c) of Collars this Agreement (8) Unallocated 0 TOTAL 150.0000 -5 - Attachment II Loan No. 7833-AR 1. The definition of CEU under paragraph 5 of the Appendix to the Loan Agreement is hereby replaced in its entirety to read as follows: "CEU" means the central executing unit established within the coordinating unit of programs and projects with external financing (Unidad Coordinadorade Programas yProyectos con FinanciamientoExterno) under the jurisdiction of the National Roads Directorate (DNV) of the Borrower's Ministry of Transport, or any successor thereto acceptable to the Bank. 2. The definition of "SOP" in the appendix to the Loan Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and the remaining paragraphs are renumbered accordingly. 3. The table under Section IV.A.2 of Schedule 2 to the Loan Agreement is hereby replaced in its entirety to read as follows: Amount of the Loan Percentage of Expenditures Allocated to be financed Category (expressed in USD) (inclusive of Taxes) (1) Works: (a) under 93,500,000 100% CREMA Subprojects 81,062,500 (b) under Road Subprojects (2) Premia for 0 Amounts payable pursuant to Interest Rate Caps Section 2.07 (c) of this and Interest Agreement Collars (3) Front-end Fee 437,500 Amount payable pursuant to Section 2.03 of this Agreement in accordance with Section 2.07 (b) of the General Conditions (4) Unallocated 0 TOTAL AMOUNT 175,000,000.
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