DOCSLIB.ORG

Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN for DANISH DEMINING GROUP by DR

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN for DANISH DEMINING GROUP by DR Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN FOR DANISH DEMINING GROUP BY DR. KEN MENKHAUS, FINAL, CORRECTED VERSION, MARCH 2015 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............ 1 7. APPENDIX / NORTHERN KENYA COUNTY CASE STUDIES ..................... 86 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............ 2 APPENDIX A / ISIOLO COUNTY .......... 86 1. INTRODUCTION ....................... 5 APPENDIX B / MANDERA COUNTY ..... 93 2. CONTEXTS ............................. 9 APPENDIX C / WAJIR COUNTY ......... 104 3. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT / APPENDIX D / GARISSA COUNTY ..... 111 NORTHERN KENYA ................ 16 4. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT / APPENDIX E / MARSABIT COUNTY .... 117 SOMALILAND ........................ 54 5. CONCLUSIONS ...................... 76 APPENDIX F / ELECTED OFFICIALS ....123 6. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ..... 81 REFERENCES ................................... 126 DANISH DEMINING GROUP Founded in 1997, the Danish Demining Group (DDG) is a specialised unit within the Danish Refugee Council. DDG works in more than 17 countries with the mission “to recreate a safe environment where people can live without the threat of landmines, explosive remnants of war, and small arms and light weapons”. Since 2008, DDG is applying a comprehensive approach to armed violence reduction under which the increasing problem of armed violence is addressed in five areas of intervention at mainly community, local and national levels. Each intervention area has a clear outcome and impact focus: • Security Governance: Enhancing Civic engagement in and influence over security governance • Security Provision: Strengthening effective, accountable and responsive security provision • Small arms and light weapons (SALW) management: Reducing the incidents with SALW • Mine Action: Reducing the incidents with mines and explosive remnants of war; and increasing the use of productive land • Conflict Prevention andTransformation: Strengthening effective conflict prevention and transformation. Photographs by Axel Fassio / Pete Muller ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study could not have been completed without the help of a great many people. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the field researchers Abdul Haro (DDG Kenya AVR Manager); Ahmed Hassan (DDG South Central Somalia AVR Manager); Gerald Wandera (Kenya School of Government); Mads Frilander (DDG Country Director, Kenya), Lucian Harriman (DDG Deputy Country Director for Somalia/Somaliland) and the DDG Somaliland field team (Abdirahman Warsame Nur (DDG District Safety Coordinator) and Muse Mohamed Muse (Monitoring and Evaluation Facilitator) in addition to four data collectors Abdirahman Ali Ahmed, Hamda Dahir Hassan, Abdiasiz Jama, Ased Mohamoud Mohamed), peer reviewers Sarah Bayne and Patricia Vasquez; and research managers Mads Frilander (DDG Country Director, Kenya) and Simon Rynn (DDG Regional Director, Horn of Africa and Yemen). Thanks as well to DDG’s Communications Assistant Angela Wachira for assistance with layout, DDG’s Victor Laktabai for the development of maps, and DDG’s Anab Hassan for administrative support. DDG and the author would further like to thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for their patience and generosity in support of this effort and the Kenya School of Government for its support. Finally, thanks to the many civic and political figures in Somaliland and Northern Kenya who generously shared their time and ideas with us, and to the dozens of regional analysts on whose work we drew. The author is solely responsible for errors of fact or interpretation in this study. 1 | CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Both eastern Somaliland and northern Kenya are experiencing spikes in political and social tensions, armed conflict, and communal clashes, and, in the case of northern Kenya, violent extremism. • Available evidence suggests that the trend toward greater levels of armed conflict is likely to intensify with the arrival of a combination of transformational changes in the regional political economy, including new county budget lines in northern Kenya and possible oil windfall revenues in both northern Kenya and Somaliland. • These changes are injecting or may inject substantial levels of new revenue into the national and regional economies, dramatically increasing the stakes over who controls local and national governments. • This anticipated influx of new revenue into state coffers is occurring in a context of poor economic governance, contested communal claims over rights to resources and revenues, and, in the case of northern Kenya, a new devolved political system with no established “rules of the game”. This is a dangerous combination and increases the odds that both regions could suffer destabilising levels of armed conflict. • Oil exploration is already setting in motion local reactions, including speculative land-grabbing, that increase the odds of violent conflict even if actual oil extraction is not viable in some areas. • Oil exploration may aggravate existing conflict issues, including contested communal and political borders, grievances over job and contract allocation, local anxiety over land loss, land-grabbing, disputed allocation of oil revenues to local constituencies, in-migration, and control over elected government positions. • In northern Kenya, large new county budgets have increased the stakes surrounding elections for top county positions. The political elite has successfully mobilised clans and tribes to vote in blocs to maximise odds of controlling county government revenues, and, as a result, elections are more likely to generate politically driven communal violence. • Major new development projects associated with Vision 2030 are generating potential both for expanded economic opportunity and for armed conflict across northern Kenya, as they exacerbate tensions over communal and county claims to valuable land. • Pastoral poverty, urban drift, and high urban unemployment in both eastern Somaliland and northern Kenya contribute to social frustrations that can facilitate recruitment of young men into armed criminal, tribal, or insurgency groups. The enormous refugee population in northern Kenya is an additional site of social frustration and recruitment. • Much of the worst communal and political violence in both regions can be traced back to violence entrepreneurs, including some individuals in positions in the government and others in the diaspora, who stoke communal tension and incite violence to advance their own political and economic interests. • Land disputes – conflicting communal claims over rangeland, private claims on rangeland, land grabbing, disputed and corrupted land titling systems in urban and peri-urban areas, and contested county borders – remain a major underlying cause of conflict. • While local resilience to conflict drivers in these areas has been very impressive over the past decade, it is now under unprecedented strain and is poorly equipped to deal with the new conflict dynamics in play. • In both locations, oil risks becoming a “resource curse” unless stronger social compacts are brokered between communities on land and resources; greater levels of trust are built between peripheral communities and the state; and more robust political regimes governing resource allocation and accountability are forged. • Violent extremism, in the form of Al Shabaab and its Kenyan affiliate, Al Hijra, is a rapidly mounting source of political violence in northern Kenya and a potential threat in eastern Somaliland. Oil extraction sites and related infrastructure, along with security sector personnel, civil servants, foreigners, and non-Muslim Kenyans, will all be attractive targets for these groups. This violence may deter investment in northern Kenya and is already impeding the retention of professional Kenyans engaged in health, education, and other vital sectors. • In the past, government security forces in northern Kenya have at times engaged in collective punishment and abusive behaviour. For local populations, such operations have been more a source of insecurity than protection. • One of the principal sources of resilience to drivers of armed violence in both Kenya and Somaliland has been their vibrant democracies, which allow grievances to be articulated and addressed through non-violent political processes. The governments of Kenya and Somaliland have, however, recently pursued policies and passed laws that risk eroding civil liberties in the name of national security. When abused, expanded state security, for whatever reasons, may exacerbate local grievances against the state and increase the risk of insurgency. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND | 2 MAP / NORTHERN KENYA Mandera Marsabit Wajir isiolo Garissa KEY Research Areas 3 | CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND MAP / SOMALILAND TOGDHEER SOOL WAJIR KEY Research Areas CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND | 4 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY This study assesses the conflict dynamics in two regions of the eastern Horn of Africa, namely, five counties in northern Kenya1 and Sool and southern Togdheer2 regions of Somaliland. It considers the full range of actual and potential causes of conflict in the two areas, as well as conflict dynamics in the wider region, but pays particular attention to the role of hydrocarbon exploration.3 The study also provides policy recommendations for mitigating the risks of armed conflict and building local resilience to conflict drivers. Both Kenya and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Country of Origin Information Report Somalia July 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT SOMALIA 30 JULY 2008 UK BORDER AGENCY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE 30 JULY 2008 SOMALIA Contents Preface LATEST NEWS EVENTS IN SOMALIA, FROM 4 JULY 2008 TO 30 JULY 2008 REPORTS ON SOMALIA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 4 JULY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.04 ECONOMY ................................................................................................. 2.01 Currency change, 2008 ................................................................ 2.06 Drought and famine, 2008 ........................................................... 2.10 Telecommunications.................................................................... 2.14 HISTORY ................................................................................................... 3.01 Collapse of central government and civil war ........................... 3.01 Peace initiatives 2000-2006 ......................................................... 3.14 ‘South West State of Somalia’ (Bay and Bakool) ...................... 3.19 ‘Puntland’ Regional Administration............................................ 3.20 The ‘Republic of Somaliland’ ...................................................... 3.21 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................... 4.01 CONSTITUTION .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia Terror Threat
    THECHRISTOPHER TERROR February 12, THREAT FROM THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AL SHABAAB CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH APPENDICES AND MAPS BY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN FEBRUARY 12, 2010 A REPORT BY THE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH February 12, 2010 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 IMPORTANT GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN SOMALIA 3 NOTABLE INDIVIDUALS 4 INTRODUCTION 8 ORIGINS OF AL SHABAAB 10 GAINING CONTROL, GOVERNING, AND MAINTAINING CONTROL 14 AL SHABAAB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AL QAEDA, THE GLOBAL JIHAD MOVEMENT, AND ITS GLOBAL IDEOLOGY 19 INTERNATIONAL RECRUITING AND ITS IMPACT 29 AL SHABAAB’S INTERNATIONAL THREATS 33 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 35 APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF MAJOR SECURITY EVENTS IN SOMALIA 37 APPENDIX B: MAJOR SUICIDE ATTACKS AND ASSASSINATIONS CLAIMED BY OR ATTRIBUTED TO AL SHABAAB 47 NOTES 51 Maps MAP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST 5 POLITICAL MAP OF SOMALIA 6 MAP OF ISLAMIST-CONTROLLED AND INFLUENCED AREAS IN SOMALIA 7 www.criticalthreats.org THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH February 12, 2010 Executive Summary hree hundred people nearly died in the skies of and assassinations. Al Shabaab’s primary objectives at TMichigan on Christmas Day, 2009 when a Niger- the time of the Ethiopian invasion appeared to be ian terrorist attempted to blow up a plane destined geographically limited to Somalia, and perhaps the for Detroit. The terrorist was an operative of an al Horn of Africa. The group’s rhetoric and behavior, Qaeda franchise based in Yemen called al Qaeda in however, have shifted over the past two years reflect- the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region
    SIPRI Background Paper April 2019 THE FOREIGN MILITARY SUMMARY w The Horn of Africa is PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security AFRICA REGION environment. A wide variety of international security actors— from Europe, the United States, neil melvin the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating I. Introduction in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced The Horn of Africa region has experienced a substantial increase in the a proliferation of foreign number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001, especially in the military bases and a build-up of 1 past decade (see annexes 1 and 2 for an overview). A wide range of regional naval forces. The external and international security actors are currently operating in the Horn and the militarization of the Horn poses foreign military installations include land-based facilities (e.g. bases, ports, major questions for the future airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and security and stability of the naval forces on permanent or regular deployment.2 The most visible aspect region. of this presence is the proliferation of military facilities in littoral areas along This SIPRI Background the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.3 However, there has also been a build-up Paper is the first of three papers of naval forces, notably around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to devoted to the new external the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden. security politics of the Horn of This SIPRI Background Paper maps the foreign military presence in the Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • February 2021
    FINANCIAL CRIME DIGEST February 2021 Diligent analysis. Powering business.™ aperio-intelligence.com FINANCIAL CRIME DIGEST | FEBRUARY 2021 ISSN: 2632-8364 About Us Founded in 2014, Aperio Intelligence is a specialist, independent corporate intelligence frm, headquartered in London. Collectively our team has decades of experience in undertaking complex investigations and intelligence analysis. We speak over twenty languages in- house, including all major European languages, as well as Russian, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin and Cantonese. We have completed more than 3,000 assignments over the last three years, involving some 150 territories. Our client base includes a broad range of leading international fnancial institutions, law frms and multinationals. Our role is to help identify and understand fnancial crime, contacts, cultivated over decades, who support us regularly integrity and reputational risks, which can arise from a lack in undertaking local enquiries on a confdential and discreet of knowledge of counterparties or local jurisdictions, basis. As a specialist provider of corporate intelligence, we enabling our clients to make better informed decisions. source information and undertake research to the highest legal and ethical standards. Our independence means we Our due diligence practice helps clients comply with anti- avoid potential conficts of interest that can affect larger bribery and corruption, anti-money laundering and other organisations. relevant fnancial crime legislation, such as sanctions compliance, or the evaluation of tax evasion or sanctions We work on a “Client First” basis, founded on a strong risks. Our services support the on-boarding, periodic or commitment to quality control, confdentiality and respect retrospective review of clients or third parties. for time constraints.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia Question(S) Security Situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019)
    COI QUERY Country of Origin/Topic Somalia Question(s) Security situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019): 1. Short description of the region 1.1 Somaliland 1.2 Puntland 2. Control of territory and presence/activities of non-state armed groups 2.1 Somaliland 2.2 Puntland 3. Recent security trends, impact on the civilian population and overview of documented incidents with civilians casualties 3.1 Sanaag and Sool 3.2 Somaliland 3.3 Puntland Date of completion 12 December 2019 Query Code Q39 Contributing EU+ COI --- units (if applicable) Disclaimer This response to a COI query has been elaborated according to the Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI and EASO COI Report Methodology. The information provided in this response has been researched, evaluated and processed with utmost care within a limited time frame. All sources used are referenced. A quality review has been performed in line with the above mentioned methodology. This document does not claim to be exhaustive neither conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to international protection. If a certain event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. The information in the response does not necessarily reflect the opinion of EASO and makes no political statement whatsoever. The target audience is caseworkers, COI researchers, policy makers, and decision making authorities. The answer was finalised on the 12 December 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • SOMALIA BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION in SOUTHERN and CENTRAL SOMALIA Country of Origin Information Service
    SOMALIA BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA Country of Origin Information Service Date: 17 August 2012 SOMALIA – BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA 17 AUGUST 2012 Contents Preface Paragraph 1. SECURITY SITUATION - OVERVIEW .............................................................................. 1.01 Events of 2011 ...................................................................................................... 1.07 Numbers of casualties in 2011 ........................................................................... 1.11 Events of 2012 ...................................................................................................... 1.22 Numbers of casualties in 2012 ........................................................................... 1.18 Type and nature of violence ................................................................................ 1.26 2. KEY ACTORS ........................................................................................................... 2.01 Government and pro-government forces ........................................................... 2.01 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ..................................................... 2.01 Ethiopian troops to withdraw from Belet Weyne and Baidoa .............................. 2.08 Transitional Federal Government forces ............................................................ 2.09 Insurgent groups .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • IN THIS ISSUE: Briefs
    VOLUME X, ISSUE 4 uFEBRUARY 23, 2012 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS................................................................................................................................1 IRANIAN CRISIS SPURS SAUDI RECONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS By Nicholas A. Heras and Andrew P. Dean.............................................................4 HAVE THE NIGER DELTA’s MEND MILITANTS RESUMED OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA? By Mark McNamee..................................................................................................6 MEND Nigeria Attack NEGOTIATING AN ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN: QATAR HOSTS THE TALIBAN By Chris Zambelis....................................................................................................8 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy- makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed DESPERATE MEASURES: SOMALIA’S AL-SHABAAB JOINS AL-QAEDA within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily In what he described as “good news” that would “annoy the Crusaders,” al- reflect those of The Jamestown Qaeda leader Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the incorporation of Foundation. Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants as an official new chapter of al-Qaeda on February 9. [1] Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr” appeared Unauthorized reproduction or in the 15-minute videotape to pledge his movement’s obedience to al-Zawahiri redistribution of this or any and promised to follow “the road of jihad and martyrdom, in the footsteps that Jamestown publication is strictly our martyr Osama bin Laden has drawn for us.” prohibited by law. The merger may be the first step in an al-Qaeda effort to ensure the survival of the movement by expanding into the larger Islamic world through the creation of official al-Qaeda affiliates without the so far apparent and unstated requirement for an Arab leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Scramble for the Horn of Africa – Al-Shabaab Vs. Islamic State
    DOI: 10.32576/nb.2019.4.3 Nation and Security 2019. Issue 4. | 14–29. Viktor Marsai Scramble for the Horn of Africa – Al-Shabaab vs. Islamic State Over the past three years, the so-called Islamic State (IS) has made significant pro- gress in building an international network of Jihadist groups that pledged allegiance to the organisation. The affiliates of IS are both new-born movements like the Islamic State in Libya, and older groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria. The latter are much more valuable for the ‘Caliphate’ because they have broad experience and capacities that allow them to operate independently of IS. In its global Jihad, therefore, the Islamic State tried to gain the support of the members of former al-Qaeda franchises, shifting their alliances from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi. The paper offers an overview of such IS efforts in the Horn of Africa and an evaluation of how successful this quest had been until 2017. Keywords: Somalia, Libya, terrorism, extremism, Africa, Islamic State, al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab in Somalia (full name: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, or ‘Movement of Striving Youth’) is distinct from other Jihadist organisations. Al-Shabaab established and extended territorial control in Somalia over at least 250,000 square kilometres in 2008–2009 – five years prior to IS.1 It created effective administrative and judiciary systems and launched military, political and ideological attacks against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and its foreign supporters. In 2011–2012, offensives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) inflicted serious setbacks on the movement, and it had to vacate the capital, Mogadishu.
    [Show full text]
  • EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Hoa S1 2020 REPORT COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2020
    EUTF Monitoring and Learning System HoA S1 2020 REPORT COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2020 Altai Consulting for the European Union – December 2020 © European Union December 2020 Unless specified otherwise, all pictures in this report are credited to Altai Consulting. Cover photo: Midwife training conducted by Strengthening Resilience in Eastern Sudan AICS project in River Atbara, Kassala State, Sudan. Cover photo credit: Michele Pasquale, AICS. ALTAI CONSULTING Altai Consulting provides strategy consulting and research services to private companies, governments and public institutions in developing countries. Altai teams operate in more than 50 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since its inception 15 years ago, Altai Consulting has developed a strong focus on governance and civil society related research and programme evaluations. Contact Details: Justine Rubira (Project Director): [email protected] Eric Davin (Altai Partner): [email protected] www.altaiconsulting.com MLS HOA S1 2020 REPORT Altai Consulting 2 November 2020 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was prepared by Eric Davin, Justine Rubira, Philibert de Mercey, Bruno Kessler, Dhanya Williams, Emile Rolland, Hugo Le Blay, Marie Bonnet, Erick Ogola and Rebecca Christensen at Altai Consulting. We gratefully thank project staff from the implementing partners who took the time to sit with us and comply with our reporting requirements. We are specifically indebted to: AFD, IOM and WFP in Djibouti; ACF, AECID, Amref, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee
    [Show full text]
  • PROTECTION of CIVILIANS REPORT Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia
    UNSOM UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SOMALIA PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS REPORT Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia 1 JANUARY 2017 – 31 DECEMBER 2019 Table of Contents Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................7 Civilian Casualties Attributed to non-State Actors ....................................................................9 A. Al Shabaab .............................................................................................................................9 B. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama ..........................................................................................................16 C. Clan Militia ..........................................................................................................................17 D. The Islamic State Affiliated Group ......................................................................................17 Civilian Casualties Attributed to State Actors and other Actors ............................................18 A. Somali National Army ...................................................................................................18 B. Somali Police Force .......................................................................................................21 C. The National Intelligence Security Agency
    [Show full text]
  • Mombasa, Kenya
    How Refugees Take Control of Who “Belongs” A Case Study of Refugees in Towns Mombasa, Kenya Aisha Adan and Ella Duncan March 2020 Contents Location ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Looking to the Future ........................................................................................................................... 12 References ............................................................................................................................................ 12 Appendix A: Methods ........................................................................................................................... 13 Appendix B: A Very Brief History of Somalis in Mombasa ............................................................... 15 Appendix C: Violent Extremism in Kenya .......................................................................................... 16 About the RIT Project ........................................................................................................................... 17 About the Authors ................................................................................................................................ 18 Cover photo: A street view of Marikiti Market. Photo by Aisha Adan. refugeesintowns.org 2 Location The
    [Show full text]
  • How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,And the Islamic State
    How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin, Editor “Al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations never stopped being a primary terrorism concern for me, for the U.S. intelligence community, and for the broader counterter- rorism community. Not a day has gone by in my entire tenure at NCTC where our emphasis on al-Qaeda has been anything less than a top priority. That’s the beauty of working on terrorism issues. You get the privilege of having multiple top priorities.” —Nicholas Rasmussen Director, National Counterterrorism Center, comments at The Washington Institute March 1, 2017 How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin EDITOR THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 153 First publication June 2017 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | v ABOUT THE WORKSHOP | vi CONTRIBUTORS | viii KEY AL-QAEDA-RELATED EVENTS, 2009–17 | xii ■ OVERALL THREAT Introduction AARON Y.
    [Show full text]