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F a S T Special Update Russian Federation / Kabardinožbalkarian Early warning program F A S T Special Update Russian Federation / Kabardino-Balkarian Republic Special Update October 2005 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Russian Federation / Kabardino-Balkarian Republic | October 2005 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Government and Non-Government Conflictive Events (relative) 4 Domestic Conflict and Cooperation (relative) 5 Appendix: Description of indicators used 6 The FAST International Early Warning Program 7 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 06 FEWER Eurasia Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Russian Federation / Kabardino-Balkarian Republic | October 2005 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Risk Assessment: • The number of conflictive events has been steadily growing in Kabardino-Balkaria throughout the last three years, although the republic remained one of the most stable in the North Caucasus. The volatility of the socio- political situation increased dramatically in the past three months against the backdrop of the leadership succession in the republic. Valery Kokov, who has been seen as one of the most influential post-Soviet regional leaders in the North Caucasus, decided to resign in September 2005 due to a serious illness that made him unable to continue as president. Arsen Kanokov was nominated by Vladimir Putin as Kokov’s successor and on 28 September his candidacy was approved by the republic’s parliament. • Most observers believe that economic stagnation and the accompanying popular radicalization in the republic are unlikely to be overcome if the dominant clan group retains the monopoly on power. Kanokov will also have to address an acute popular dissatisfaction with the Kokov clan, which is at a very high level among young people affected by unemployment and the lack of equal economic opportunities. Rapid proliferation of Islamism in Kabardino-Balkaria is yet another challenge, linked to protesting against corruption, poverty and a spiritual vacuum. • In an effort to eradicate networks of religious extremists operating in the republic the authorities under Kokov have engaged in a repressive campaign against all non-traditional Islamic groups regardless of whether they are proponents of extremist views or not. Repressive measures included limitations imposed on mosques’ opening hours (and closure of some local mosques), pressure on Islamic researchers, and often unfounded accusations of loosely defined “Wahhabism” which in public consciousness is now firmly associated with jihad and armed violence. These measures proved counter-productive. The number and activism of religious extremists is increasing in response to harsh policies adopted by the republic’s authorities, largely because the recruiting base is constantly replenished. • At the same time, Kabardino-Balkaria has a higher level of social activism for a peaceful and democratic development than in other North Caucasian republics. Interviews indicate that people realize the need to be more active in putting constructive pressure on the government through political mechanisms and dialogue. There are no serious inter-ethnic tensions in Kabardino-Balkaria at the moment, although there are some imbalances negatively affecting Balkars, Russians, Abazins, as well as other ethnic minorities in the republic. An influx of Chechen migrants caused by the lack of security in Chechnya increases pressure on a weak economy and troubled social infrastructure. Frequent fights and clashes among local youths and Chechen students may be regarded as one of the consequences of such imbalances. © swisspeace FAST Update Russian Federation / Kabardino-Balkarian Republic | October 2005 | Page 4 Government and Non-government Conflictive Events (relative) Risk Assessment: • It is clear that in comparison with Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan, the conflictive events dynamics in Kabardino-Balkaria is of lesser magnitude. Despite a certain growth in conflictive events on the part of the government sector in autumn 2005, and the most recent attack in Nalchik in October 2005, the socio-political situation in the republic remains generally stable on the surface. There are some undercurrents, nevertheless, that threaten to destabilize the entire North-West Caucasus, including Kabardino-Balakria. The attack in Nalchik is only one of the manifestations of these processes. • On October 13, approximately 220 militants attacked mostly law enforcement sector targets in the city of Nalchik. Over 90 of them were killed during the day of fighting, 30 were arrested and about 100 escaped. 12 civilians were killed in crossfire. Local observers, including those who witnessed the events, reported that the leaders of the attackers appear to have been well trained and equipped, while most of the other militants were armed local youths (15-30 years of age). • It appears premature to draw conclusions about the nature of the attack, but there are some facts, which pose serious questions: (1) most of the attackers were local youths with no apparent motivation for jihad, apart from poverty and social exclusion; their protesting energy might have been channeled by outsiders towards violence against the law enforcement bodies; 2) it is likely that the attack was an act of violent protest and a demonstration of the presence and the force of the Islamists, aimed at impressing a potential recruiting base; 3) the seizure of arsenals, the airport as well as any other militarily meaningful objective by a small force at daytime in such a military stronghold as Nalchik, was clearly not feasible and was hardly part of the attackers’ plans; and 4) the attackers could have seized any civilian object with a large number of hostages, but they explicitly avoided casualties among civilians. • Proliferation of Islamism in the North-West Caucasus is rapidly growing with so called “Wahhabi” cells being discovered even in predominantly Christian North Ossetia. Youths are joining the Islamists because of their disappointment with traditional Muslim leaders and the policy of official religious institutions (Spiritual offices of Muslims) and in protest against overwhelming corruption and injustices. In Kabardino-Balkaria, however, before the attack in Nalchik, there were just a few cases of unquestionably jihadist radicals being arrested or killed with little credible evidence produced. The attack on 13 October demonstrated, according to N. Shepel – Russia’s Deputy Prosecutor General – that “the ideology of Wahhabism is a serious real force which threatens the integrity of the state” (ITAR-TASS, 21 October 2005, Nalchik). © swisspeace FAST Update Russian Federation / Kabardino-Balkarian Republic | October 2005 | Page 5 Domestic Conflict and Cooperation (relative) Risk Assessment: • The trend-chart adequately reflects the tendency towards the decline of social cohesion and cooperation in Kabardino-Balkaria, observable during the whole year and especially in the last four months. Unsurprisingly, the conflictive events trend-line’s curve displays an opposite development. • The new president Arsen Kanokov gave a precise explanation: “Unemployment, poverty and inability to start one’s own business without knowing the right people in the bodies of power have created a favorable environment in which the ideology of Wahhabism promptly gained a following among young people. The elite has lost bonds with the nation. It has been obsessed with building up personal wealth. It has ignored the people’s problems and this is a root cause of Kabardino-Balkaria’s worst problems”. He also described as a mistake the policy of bans on the young followers of Islam, pursued by the previous authorities (ITAR-TASS, 19 October 2005, Nalchik). The expectations are high that Kanokov’s own policy should bring about tangible change. It will depend, however, not only on his ability to govern and support from the Kremlin and South federal district administration, but largely on the general federal policy in the North Caucasus. • It has become obvious that unless systemic corruption and weak governance are addressed decisively in the region, the North Caucasus may rapidly descend into chaos, exacerbated by the actions of separatists and radical Islamic forces, which appear to be well-coordinated across the region and internationally. Job-creation and economic reconstruction should be on top of the priority list together with targeted security measures, coupled with the strengthening of human security and protection of rights. Kabardino-Balkaria has all the necessary structural pre-conditions for a peaceful socio-economic development and if it fails there, it will fail anywhere in the sub-region. • The presence of a significant share (25%) of ethnic Russian population in Kabardino-Balkaria plays a stabilizing role, as well as the high level of education and relatively well-developed economic infrastructure, including opportunities for tourism. If the economy of the republic is regulated towards the creation of equal economic opportunities, and the management of federal subsidies is unaffected by the corrupt practices of the previously dominant clan elites, the situation in Kabardino-Balkaria will begin to improve slowly in the next 6-12 months. The networks of jihadists, however, will continue to pose an unpredictable security risk, and one cannot exclude further attacks. © swisspeace FAST Update
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