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International Biodefense Handbook 2007 Sergio Bonin INTERNATIONAL BIODEFENSE HANDBOOK 2007 AN INVENTORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BIODEFENSE PRACTICES AND POLICIES Series Editors Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and Myriam Dunn Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich The Biodefense Handbook is also available on the Internet in full text: www.crn.ethz.ch All comments on the Biodefense Handbook are most welcome. Sergio Bonin Series Editors Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and Myriam Dunn Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) © 2007 Center for Security Studies Contact Center for Security Studies Seilergraben 45–49 ETH Zentrum / SEI CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Center for Security Studies. The Handbook represents the views and interpretations of the author, unless otherwise stated. Layout and Design Fabian Furter Fonts Adobe Caslon Pro and The Sans (Cover) ISBN 3-905696-13-4 ISSN 1662-1808 (print version) 1662-1816 (online version) Sergio Bonin International Biodefense Handbook An Inventory of National and International Biodefense Practices and Policies Series Editors Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and Myriam Dunn Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich CSS ETH Zurich Contents Preface 7 Foreword 11 Abbreviations 1 Introduction 27 Part One: Country Surveys 49 France 51 France’s Approach to the Biological Threat 51 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 52 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 72 Laws and Legislation 77 Germany 81 Germany’s Approach to the Biological Threat 81 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 8 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 105 Laws and Legislation 108 Russian Federation 111 Russia’s Approach to the Biological Threat 111 Organizational Overview –Roles and Responsibilities 11 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 10 Laws and Legislation 1 Contents Sweden 19 Sweden’s Approach to the Biological Threat 19 Organizational Overview –Roles and Responsibilities 141 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 156 Laws and Legislation 160 Switzerland 16 Switzerland’s Approach to the Biological Threat 16 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 165 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 181 Laws and Legislation 186 United Kingdom 189 The UK’s Approach to the Biological Threat 189 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 190 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 217 Laws and Legislation 22 United States 227 The US Approach to the Biological Threat 227 Organizational Overview –Roles and Responsibilities 228 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 262 Laws and Legislation 269 Part Two: International Organizations 27 World Health Organization (WHO) 275 The WHO’s Approach to the Biological Threat 275 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 275 4 Contents The European Union (EU) 291 The EU’s Approach to the Biological Threat 291 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 29 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 09 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 19 NATO’s Approach to the Biological Threat 19 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 20 Organizational Overview – Roles and Responsibilities 21 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 25 The ICRC’s Approach to the Biological Threat 25 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 25 The G8 Group 1 Past and Present Initiatives and Policies 1 Part Three: Civil Society Initiatives 9 The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) 41 The Sunshine Project 47 Conclusions 55 Glossary of Key Terms 8 Select Bibliography 40 Important Links 417 List of Experts 4 5 Preface he nature of risks and vulnerabilities in modern societies is becom- ing more and more transnational today. An open, non-hierarchical Tdialog on newly recognized vulnerabilities is needed at the physical, virtual, and psychological levels to create new knowledge and a better understanding of new risks and of their causes, interactions, probabilities, and costs. It was on the basis of these premises that the “Crisis and Risk Network” (CRN; www.crn.ethz.ch) was launched in the year 2000 as a joint Swiss-Swedish initiative. The CRN (the former Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network) is an initiative for inter- national dialog on security risks and vulnerabilities, risk analysis and management, emergency preparedness, and crisis management. Through the interchange of views, the CRN helps to promote a better under- standing of the complex challenges and opportunities confronting the risk community today and serves to establish a collaborative relation- ship and exchange among likeminded experts. The CRN is run by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich), in cooperation with the current CRN partner institutions: • The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Sweden; • The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), Norway; • The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), Germany; • The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), Denmark; • The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), the Netherlands; 7 Preface • The Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS), Switzerland; and • The Federal Office for National Economic Supply (FONES), -Fed eral Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA), Switzerland. The menace of diseases caused by naturally or deliberately released viruses, bacteria, or toxins poses a serious challenge to society and politics. It confronts states with a multitude of complex tasks, many of which have an interdisciplinary character affecting various distinct government entities. In an analysis of various national frameworks, the “International Biode- fense Handbook” compares different political, strategic, and structural approaches to biosecurity in seven countries and five international and supra-national organizations. It provides an overview of national and multilateral biodefense efforts by examining important policies in this field and through an inventory of the institutions and actors involved. It is an important step towards a comprehensive overview of existing efforts in biodefense. Because of the dynamics in the field and in order to include additional country surveys, a regular update of the Biodefense Handbook is planned. We therefore ask the readers to inform us of any inaccuracies or to submit any comments regarding the content. Those countries not yet included are especially encouraged to submit information to us. Please see the front inside cover for contact information. The entire publication plus additional features will be freely available on the internet (http://www. crn.ethz.ch/). The editors would like to thank Sergio Bonin, researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich), for his efforts and high-quality contri- bution to this important topic. Additionally, the editors would like to thank all the partners involved, in particular the national experts who generously shared their experience and knowledge with us. We also thank the following for their help in the completion of this proj- ect: Isabelle Abele-Wigert, Ryan Cross, Christopher Findlay, Fabian 8 Preface Furter, Susanne Schmid, Manuel Suter, and Reto Wollenmann, who prepared the ground for this project. We look forward to continuing the development of the CRN and further enhancing cooperation within the network. Zurich, March 2007 Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger Director Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Dr. Victor Mauer Deputy Director, Head of Research Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Dr. Myriam Dunn CRN Coordinator Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich 9 Foreword Dear Reader, n recent years, biological threats and hazards have been discussed and investigated intensely Iall over the world. Scientists, public health agencies, policymakers in the security field, military leaders, intelligence services, journalists, industrial experts, international organizations, and many other profes- sionals are concerned with this issue. With regard to natural biological threats, many experts believe that a global influenza pandemic occurs about every 25 years. However, with regard to man-made biological threats, there is no scientifically sound way to forecast the next deliberate use of germs by states, terrorists, or criminals. In the face of the vast potential for damage from a bioterrorist attack, this threat can certainly not be neglected. Governments must protect their citizens. A plethora of agencies and experts in various countries are working on different programs to this end, including the Spiez Laboratory. To achieve efficient protection, all these players must coordinate their work closely. The “International Biodefense Handbook” describes the preparations made by various countries in this context, listing the relevant civilian and military authorities as well as important scientific and economic players. I am strongly convinced of the usability of this Handbook: the synopsis of the different countries, their similarities and differences, their originalities, and their common structures helps to improve the efficiency of the protective systems currently in place. Biological threats and haz- ards are not at all solely national issues. In the case of an adverse event, the biological agent would certainly not stop at any frontier. Therefore, 11 Foreword it is crucial that international cooperation should already begin in the area of precautionary measures. This handbook offers a great overview with comprehensive information and will further foster international cooperation. It should serve as a useful reference book for all of the concerned parties mentioned above. Dr. Marc Cadisch Director, SPIEZ LABORATORY www.labor-spiez.
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