Dynamic Fires High Technology of the Future Fight

A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals November - December 2018

Dynamic Fires High technology of the future fight

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters, Department of the Army. PB 644-18-6 http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 1 Table of contents 3 Countering the 34 Rising to the unmanned aerial challenge systems threat Fighting and winning with Editor By Col. Brian Gibson the M777A2 at National Marie Berberea Training Center 7 ON COMMS Art Director One battalion’s pursuit of By Capt. Aaron Palmer and Sgt. 1st Class Charles Lairson Rick Paape, Jr. secure long-range digital Assistant Editor communications Drone defense from By Lt. Col. Leighton Anglin Sr., Lt. 38 Monica Wood Col. Jonathan Shine, Capt. Lucas combined arms The Fires staff can be reached by email at usarmy. Fulmer, Sgt. 1st Class Brian Price, for air defense to [email protected] or by Staff Sgt. (P) Timothy Vinson II phone at (580) 442-5121. organic ground 11 Operationalizing Disclaimer cyber, electronic based air defense Fires, a professional bulletin, is published bi- By Lt. Col. Thomas Groborsch warfare, space, monthly by Headquarters, Department of the Army special technical 46 35th ADA Brigade under the auspices of the Fires Center of Excellence, leads the charge for 455 McNair Ave., Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views ex- operations for pressed within are those of the authors and not the decisive action C-UAS operations in Department of Defense or its elements. The content Lt. Col. Clint Tracy PACOM contained within Fires does not necessarily reflect the By Capt. Jonathan Pasley U.S. Army’s position or supercede information in oth- 15 Air defense artillery er official publications. Use of new items constitutes An atrophied warfighting 48 Target acquisition neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product en- skill dorsements. Fires assumes no responsibility for any By Lt. Col. Sean Dublin for long-range unsolicited material. By order of Mark A. Milley, Gen- An integrated precision Fires eral, United States Army, Chief of Staff. 18 By Patrick McKinney brigade deep fight Official: Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 49 Cross-domain By Capt. Joseph Schmid, 2nd Lt. Hector Lopez, 2nd Lt. Zach concerns Tousignant, and 2nd Lt. Paul Defeating a hybrid state’s Gerald B. O’Keefe Mirabile grand strategy Administrative Assistant to the 22 Strengthening light By Victor Morris Secretary of the Army HIMARS for multi- 52 Competitive Auth. 1513304 domain operations convergence By Capt. Brennan Deveraux, 1st How is the field artillery Lt. Sean Skelly and Staff Sgt. Evan Wilson A. Shoffner Fowler battalion preparing against pacing threats? Major General, United States Army 24 RIMPAC ‘18 By Sgt. 1st Class Andrew Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla. exercise highlights Campbell, Sgt. 1st Class Cole Deblieck, Sgt. 1st Class Randy Purpose versatility of Feliciano, Sgt. 1st Class Heath Originally founded as the Field Artillery Journal, SHORAD Weisiger and Sgt. 1st Class Fires serves as a forum for the discussions of all Fires By 1st Lt. David Lara Brandon Williams professionals, Active, Reserves and National Guard; disseminates professional knowledge about progress, 26 Tactical joint Fires 54 Advising at the development and best use in campaigns; cultivates a integration training battery level common understanding of the power, limitations and at Fort Sill By Capt. Daniel Cummings application of joint Fires, both lethal and nonlethal; A success story in a THAAD, Patriot, and fosters joint Fires interdependency among the armed resource-constrained 56 services; and promotes the understanding of and in- environment Avenger/Sentinel teroperability between the branches, all of which con- By Lt. Col. Nick Sargent interoperability tribute to the good of the Army, joint and combined forces and our nation. 28 From Chai to within Guardian Fires is pleased to grant permission to reprint; compatible Battalion please credit Fires, the author(s) and photographers. Security cooperation in By Capt. Adam Patterson, 2nd On the cover: A Soldier with 35th Air Defense Ar- Middle East Lt. Matthew Becker and Warrant tillery Brigade, loads a Stinger onto an Avenger Air By Lt. Col. Seamus Doyle Officer 1 Adam McGee Defense System during the Rim of the Pacific Exer- The synthetic cise (RIMPAC) 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility 32 59 If Henry Knox were Barking Sands, Hawaii, July 24. The world’s largest training alive today international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a environment A discussion on future unique training opportunity while fostering and sus- Bringing reality to fire artillery warfighting taining cooperative relationships among participants support training By Maj. Jeremy Blascak critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and securi- By Maj. John Morris and Victor ty of the world’s oceans. (Capt. Rachael Jeffcoat/U.S. Bond 64 Next issue of Fires Army)

2 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Commandant’s Foreword Countering the unmanned aerial systems threat In the last 20 years, no other branch in the tactics, identify/develop new capabilities to Army has seen the enemy undertake such a meet these threats and increase the rigor of dramatic expansion of capability inside its air defense training in our combat training threat portfolio as the air defense artillery. centers (CTCs). Competing nations continue to evolve and Countering the UAS threat has received adapt for future battlefields. To close the gap significant interest across the Army, and Col. Brian Gibson with the U.S., adversarial militaries and non- within the combatant commands the air U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery state actors engage in a continual cycle of defense artillery supports. The prolifera- School commandant improving strategy and technology. Current tion of smaller and more capable UAS (see operations in the Middle East, Europe and photo below) has dramatically altered how the Indo-Pacific region all show an enemy local, regional and global competitors will making an expanded array of unmanned ae- fight the U.S., now and in the future. Ene- rial systems (UASs) that survey, target and mies have focused on low, slow and small attack ground forces in ways not previously platforms that are nearly undetectable, often seen. To combat these evolving challenges using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tech- it is paramount that we clearly define the nology. These systems operate in ways that UAS threat, analyze counter UAS (C-UAS) we are unable to consistently detect, let alone

An unmanned aerial drone used the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. (Courtesy photo)

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3 defeat. Our adversaries will continue to de- C-UAS equipment, doctrine, training and velop more capable systems in the future, organization based on current and future including weaponizing systems for a direct threats. Every center of excellence in the attack against the U.S. and allied forces. Army, to include our joint partners, is par- Airborne threats were previously relegat- ticipating in a growing community of inter- ed to the near-exclusive focus of air defense est focused on bringing critical capabilities, artillery forces on the battlefield. The wide capacities and needs to the discussion. Ev- proliferation of UAS platforms now requires ery member of the modern battlefield plays a a holistic approach from the Army and joint role in C-UAS, and no solution to this grow- force that combines both kinetic and non-ki- ing problem is possible without integrating netic defeat mechanisms. The Fires Cen- the capabilities of each warfighting function ter of Excellence, as the Army’s proponent into a coordinated and complementary sys- for C-UAS, is leading a detailed analysis of tem. Each contribution strengthens a robust

Spc. Matthew Williams, a cavalry scout assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment, fires a Stinger missile using Man-Portable Air De- fense Systems during Artemis Strike, a live- fire exercise at the NATO Missile Firing In- stallation off the coast of Crete, Greece Nov. 6, 2017. (Sgt. 1st Class Jason Epperson/U.S. Army)

4 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires C-UAS system that provides detect, identify, lio. Recent experimentation with electronic mission command and defeat capabilities. warfare capacities on a company-level fire The air defense artillery and the greater support platform demonstrated both capa- Fires community are fielding capabilities bility and capacity for the future force. Sen- and experimenting with new technologies sors also play a significant role in advanc- now to address this threat. Upcoming ad- ing this capability. The Fires community is ditions to the capabilities of the Land-Based developing multi-mission radars designed Phalanx Weapons System will field kinetic to detect, identify and provide engagement defeat mechanisms to our C-UAS portfolio. data for the full array of airborne threats. With the reintroduction of MANPAD train- Nothing happens in this demanding ing to maneuver forces, the ongoing up- portfolio without training and enabling grades to the Stinger missile system will be leaders at all levels to combat this growing another huge addition to our C-UAS portfo- threat. Each of the combat training centers

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 5 has expanded the threats and effects that ro- (M-SHORAD) capability for the Army. This tational training units will face during their capability will provide maneuver command- exercises. Expanded use of fixed and rotary ers with air and missile defense capabilities wing assets, as part of the opposing forc- absent from their formations for more than es, will utilize the same COTS systems our a decade. Providing a detect and identify ground forces will see during operations. capability will enhance the maneuver for- This added emphasis by the CTCs provides mation’s ability to engage these small UAS’s unit leaders a greater understanding and with a broad array of kinetic and non-ki- appreciation of all aspects of air defense and C-UAS tactics and techniques. The C-UAS netic weapons. This new M-SHORAD ca- fight is a demanding activity that takes man- pability will use a combination of previous ning, training, prioritization and coordina- SHORAD doctrine and new lessons learned tion across all warfighting functions. to ensure today’s forces are capable of de- These factors are shaping the upcom- fending against formidable enemies. ing Maneuver Short Range Air Defense First to Fire!

Above: An artist depiction of a XM914 Stryker Stinger Hellfire weapon system. (Courtesy illustration) Right: The Mobile Expeditionary High Energy Laser, or MEHEL, is a laser testbed on a Stryker armored fighting vehicle chassis and serves as a platform for research and development. MEHEL 2.0 is an improved version of the original MEHEL with a laser upgraded from 2kW to 5kW. (Courtesy photo)

6 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires The near vertical incident skywave loop antennae installed on the battalion fire direction center. (Courtesy photo) ON COMMS One battalion’s pursuit of secure long-range digital communications By Lt. Col. Leighton Anglin Sr., Lt. Col. Jonathan Shine, Capt. Lucas Fulmer, Sgt. 1st Class Brian Price and Staff Sgt. (P) Timothy Vinson II

The Army is looking for ways to achieve iment began a year-long journey in pursuit ward Concept, began looking at options secure communications over greater dis- of secure long-range digital communica- to improve fire mission processing via se- tances in cannon artillery and we may have tion. The platform of choice maybe the cure, long-range digital communications. found a solution. With trust, support, and most underutilized communication system We needed to mass Fires using all six firing funding from the senior commander at Fort in the artillery— high frequency radios. platoons beyond standard frequency mod- Riley, Brig. Gen. Patrick Frank, and opera- In preparation for our National Training ulation (FM) range. Reports from previous tional leeway from the Dagger Brigade, 2nd Center rotation and deployment to U.S. Eu- NTC rotations stated that field artillery Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, the members ropean Command, 1st Battalion 7th Field units had difficulty maintaining FM com- of the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Reg- Artillery, Lightning, through the Fires For- munication (both voice and digital) from

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 7 Parallel construct of three high-frequency radios (right) and standard frequency modulation voice and digital (left). (Courtesy photo) the battalion to the batteries due to range retrans stations. Optimally positioned, a re- other communication medium for back-up and/or jamming. Continued use of common trans station can double the range of two that could match pace and range with the FM communication would likely result in a frequencies. However, retrans is a direc- HF. We decided that JCR would become the common after action review (AAR), such tional tool. If a battalion needs to communi- independent back-up to HF. as, “poor retransmitting station (retrans) cate with a battery 20 km to the west, a sin- Based on modification table of organi- positioning” or “failed tactical operating gle retrans station halfway between the two zation and equipment (MTOE), most units center jump triggers to maintain commu- echelons will likely suffice. But if a second have three radio platforms available. The nications.” We needed a communication battery is 30 km to the east, north or south, first and most familiar is the Advanced medium that had greater range, was less re- additional retrans assets are required to System Improvement Program of FM, or liant on retrans, and less susceptible to jam- extend the range in those directions. Ad- ASIP radio. A second, and somewhat fa- ming. Given current personnel readiness ditionally, we considered the following: 1) miliar option that units have for long-range and budget, we looked within the division Due to manning and/or equipment short- communications, is Tactical Satellite (TAC- for solutions. A conversation with Wolf 07, falls, the average direct support field artil- SAT). However, with limited channels and the senior fire support trainer at NTC, who lery battalion is likely capable of deploy- lower priority for satellite when stateside, mentioned the success Multiple Launch ing one retrans station at a given moment. most brigade combat teams only receive Rocket Systems had using High Frequency 2) Retrans teams are often positioned by one TACSAT channel. Additionally, TAC- Radios (HF), got us thinking, “Why can’t brigade to support priority FM networks, SAT is generally used for voice and is re- we? Why don’t we?” And so began a pur- making their availability MET-TC (mission, served for contingency communication, suit for high frequency (HF) radios for se- enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and not the primary or the alternate. The third cure, long-range digital communications at civilian considerations) dependent. 3) Ene- option is an organic communication radio the National Training Center. Throughout my forces often target retrans stations be- platform that is available to many FA units: our NTC rotation, the radios were never cause they are soft targets with a high val- HF. If most units are like ours, we did not jammed and the battalion maintained dig- ue. 4) FM digital’s back-up communication have the resident expertise for these radios ital communications for the duration of the is FM voice, a redundancy that depends on and most were locked away in a communi- fight, regardless of range. the same medium, thus not independent. cation cage, only pulled out for supply in- The problem Therefore, if digital gets jammed, so does spections, then put back in. Some forward FM is a line of sight (LOS) platform with voice. 5) Using FM voice as back-up to HF is observers use HF radios for voice commu- a maximum effective range of approxi- also not an option because the independent nication to address range shortfalls with mately 15km. In order to extend the range back-up is susceptible to all the challenges FM, but HF is seldom the primary means of of FM platforms, it is necessary to establish listed above. Therefore, we also needed an- communication in cannon artillery.

8 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Despite these challenges, we decided to with three FM radio mounts with six FM ra- still in the reception, staging and onward use HF because it was the only available dios, and one Harris HF radio mount (VRC- integration (RSOI) phase of training, we option that had a favorable cost benefit out- 104) with one PRC-150 radio. We removed pushed the batteries out into the training come. two of the FM mounts and replaced them box while the battalion FDC remained in The approach with two HF mounts. This also required the the Rotation Unit Basing Area (RUBA) and With the decision to use the HF (PRC- replacement of FM antennas with Harris 30 pushed the missions forward. It was suc- 150) made, our team worked on the con- foot whip antennas. These antennas are ca- cessful. We calibrated from the RUBA. For struction of a network that allows the bat- pable of ground waveform as well as near the next 14 days of training during force- talion fire direction center (FDC) to conduct vertical incident skywave (NVIS) waveform on-force and live-fire, range from battalion digital fire mission processing with six depending on how they are positioned. to batteries became less of an issue. platoon FDCs simultaneously. Initial trials Once the battalion FDC vehicle was The HF does have a number of down- during weekly digital sustainment training outfitted, we tested the viability of our de- sides. Due to the interference caused by revealed that in order to send and receive signs first by conducting long-range digital the close proximity of antennas, as well digital data, two radios must be linked. communications checks on Fort Riley. We as atmospherics during battle periods, the Unlike FM, HF requires a call to the station were able to send fire missions at ranges of battalion FDC could not guarantee that a that you want to send data. After calling, approximately 20km using ground wave mission sent would be received 100 percent the two radios link and digital data can be line of site with the 30-foot whip antennas. of the time. Approximately half of missions sent and received. This means that radios In order to truly test the range of HF, the sent were received complete within sec- must link one at a time in order to transmit battalion FDC then travelled approximate- onds. The other half took minutes to reach digital data. In other words, if you wished ly 90km from Fort Riley to Smokey Hill and some never confirmed receipt. JCR was to send a fire mission to six platoon FDCs, and attempted to send fire missions. While used concurrently to inform platoons of you would need to link and send the mis- still only using ground wave LOS, the FDC missions sent and platoons then confirmed sion to each platoon one at a time. Once a was able to send digital fire missions to all over JCR if they received it digital on AF- platoon received the mission, you would six firing platoons at distance. However, ATDS or not. If not, fire missions were sent need to break the link and repeat the pro- ground wave LOS was inconsistent at these over JCR. cess with the five remaining platoons. That ranges. FM versus HF (National Training simply takes too much time, resulting in Based on the inconsistency experienced Center observations) less responsive Fires. at longer ranges, the unit decided to pur- Wolf 07 (Lt. Col. Jonathan Shine) Ob- Our team went back to the drawing chase Harris Loop antennas which are servations: When we learned that 1-7th board and sketched out a communication capable of ground wave LOS and near FA was planning to use HF Digital as their diagram on a whiteboard, leveraged the in- vertical ionosphere waveform (NVIS) si- primary means of communications during trinsic routing capability of the Advanced multaneously (See Figures 1 and 2). This their training rotation, the Wolf Team re- Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AF- NVIS waveform essentially sends radio acted with a mix of excitement and skep- ATDS), and developed what we later called: waves into the ionosphere where the waves ticism. From our perspective, the experi- “parallel construct.” The battalion FDC “bounce” back down. When using this ment was a qualified success. We have not would need three HF radios and three HF waveform, the radios are capable of com- collected specific data on how often units networks in AFATDS. The three HF radios municating across hundreds of kilometers, are able to maintain communications and allow them to establish a “direct” route in or a few meters. This configuration gave us over what distances, so what follows are AFATDS with one FDC per battery. The the increased range we desired, however, subjective estimations based on observa- second FDC establishes digital with battal- it also had undesired second order effects. tions of the last 12 rotations. During all of ion FDC via an “indirect” route using the Having three HF antennas mounted so those rotations, challenges associated with first FDC as their gateway. This technique closely to each other, resulted in constant maintaining digital communications was allowed the battalion FDC to communicate interference. The interference was not sub- a major topic of discussion during one or with all six platoon FDCs simultaneously stantial enough to inhibit communications both of the battalion’s instrumented After and maintained the unit’s ability to mass but it was enough to make the connection Action Reviews. Since the re-introduction Fires or process six individual missions at inconsistent. Not all transmissions made it of the decisive action training environment, a given time. For example, if the battalion from the sender to the recipient. Some mis- every field artillery battalion has struggled. FDC wished to send a mission to 2nd Pla- sions were received within seconds while First Lightning struggled less. We estimate toon, B Battery, the mission is sent HF to 1st others took minutes. AFATDS may state that the battalion maintained digital con- Platoon, B Battery, who’s AFATDS trans- “successful” with the station that you are nectivity via HF from the battalion FDC to parently routes it to 2nd Platoon. The same communicating with, but it does not mean all six platoons over 95 percent of the time is done in reverse when 2nd Platoon wishes all transmissions were received. that they were “in the box.” This includes to send a mission/message to the battal- Soon after installing the NVIS loop an- while FDCs were moving, and with no re- ion FDC. There is no requirement for 1st tennas, we began our NTC rotation where quirement to maintain FM retransmission Platoon other than to maintain FM digital the new communication network faced its stations. However, without JCR, the battal- communications with their sister platoon. most challenging test. We leveraged the ion would likely have failed in at least 50 In order to outfit the battalion FDC with mandatory calibration of assigned pro- percent of their fire missions. About half of three HF radios, the Lightning Battalion re- pellant lots to test the Harris Loop anten- the time, the transmission was either not re- structured the interior of the battalion FDC na construct at ranges from 100 meters to ceived at all, or was received with a delay vehicle. Typically, the M1068 is outfitted 12,000 km in the desert environment. While of as much as four minutes after being sent

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 9 120 kilobytes per second, compared to the current system’s 15kbps. The 300H ad- dresses most of the inconsistencies experienced by our team with the current radios. We did not stress the 300H radios in a field environment, thus unable to attest to their durability, only power and data rate. The pursuit for reliable-secure-long-range-digital-communications in the Lightning Battal- ion continues with expansion of HF to the Bradley Fire Support platform for digital communication. Lt. Col. Leighton Anglin is currently assigned to the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Management. He was for- merly assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artil- lery at Fort Riley, Kan.; 1st Battalion, 6th Field The near vertical incident skywave loop antennae installed on M1068 Battalion Fire Direction Center. (Courtesy photo) Artillery at Bamberg, Germany; 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery at Fort Hood, Texas; Joint from battalion. As a result, the battalion’s (compared, for example, to WINT inc2), Multination Readiness Center at Hohenfels, tactics, techniques and procedures were to First Lightning demonstrated that HF has Germany; Chief of Plans, 1st Armored Division; simultaneously send all fire mission data extraordinary potential to substantially in- 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery at Fort Bliss over JCR as well as HF. Subsequent adjust- crease the range, survivability and depend- ments were sent entirely over JCR. During ability of a field artillery battalion, as it Texas; and recently commanded 1st Battalion, periods when the opposing force was jam- does for nearly all Multiple Launch Rocket 7th Field Artillery, Fort Riley Kans. He holds a ming JCR, the battalion relied on FM Voice System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket Sys- Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engi- and had to significantly reduce the disper- tem-equipped units. neering and a Master of Military Operational sion of their firing elements, with the add- Recommendations Art and Science from the School of Advanced ed risk to the guns from enemy counter-fire We have not broken the code on the em- Military Studies that this entails. ployment and use of HF systems for digital Chief Warrant Officer 2 Mark Horton serves Again, without having collected connec- fire direction. Through months of trial and as a Field Artillery Warrant Officer with the tivity as a metric, it is difficult to state pre- error, we discovered “a way” that conceiv- 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, 2nd Armored cisely how a rate of 95 percent connectivity ably works. Though proven more reliable Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division. with 50 percent loss of data compares with at NTC than FM, there are inconsistent gaps Horton has conducted two combat training the average FM-based unit. Every other FA and delays that our team was unable to center rotations, and deployed in support of battalion has failed to maintain consistent solve. Additional equipment, non-MTOE, Operation Spartan Shield and Atlantic Resolve. digital communications, especially on the is available that increases the reliability of He’s served previously as a battalion targeting move and over extended distances and with HF digital communications. For units us- officer, target acquisition platoon leader, and the dispersion necessary to survive against ing the PRC-150, we recommend purchase brigade targeting officer. the current OPFOR (who identify FA units of the IP6600 router ($600 ea.). This router Lt. Col. Dave Pasquale is the Senior Fire primarily with small UAVs and possess at is designed to translate the data between Support Trainer at the Joint Multination- least a 3.5-to-1 advantage in delivery sys- AFATDS and the PRC-150 more efficiently al Readiness Training Center in Hohenfels, tems). Our current ASIPs FM radios are and allows for a more reliable link and fast- not keeping up with the pace of change in er transmission. Germany. Prior to his current assignment, our other digital systems and the evolving However, if funding is available, the he served in Grafenwohr, Germany as the capabilities of our adversaries. Overall, HF optimal solution is the fielding/purchase battalion commander for 4th Battalion, 319th alone was clearly not sufficiently reliable to of the RF-300H- MP wideband HF tacti- Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, as a mem- be the primary means of fire direction for cal radio. It provides continuous coverage ber of the 173rd (Airborne) Infantry Brigade 1-7th FA. However, for a relatively low cost from 1.5 to 60 MHz with data rates up to Combat Team.

10 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Spc. Clayton McInnis, with 1st Battalion, 155th Infantry Regiment, Mississippi Army National Guard, reviews reports in the unit’s tactical operations center in June 2018, at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Staff Sgt. Shane Hamann/U.S.Army) Operationalizing cyber, electronic warfare, space, special technical

Byoperations Lt. Col. Clint Tracy for decisive action Army cyber and electronic warfare Sol- and electronic warfare equipment to dis- out when it happens.” Unfortunately, in the diers are routinely conducting day-today rupt, degrade and deny command, control, cyber domain or the electromagnetic spec- operations that have little to do with their communications, computers and intelli- trum, your odds of “figuring something unique skillset. They are being used as gence within their formations. out” on the fly is practically zero. The prep school noncommissioned officers, Defense Since cyber and electromagnetic activi- work required for CEMA personnel to un- Travel System administrators, permanent ties (CEMA) are relatively new to the Army, derstand current threat capabilities, poten- gate guards, battle captains, battle non-com- and there are no programs of record (minus tial mitigation techniques, and the enemy’s missioned officers, and the list goes on. This the counter-improvised explosive device vulnerabilities is extensive. The 1st Cavalry is an unfortunate circumstance that is the systems) there is a perception that CEMA Division just completed a warfighter exer- result of lack of understanding on what Soldiers don’t bring much to the fight. cise and it took a full six months of home- options these Soldiers can provide for a There is a reluctance to ask what is in the work to be prepared for execution of the commander. In the aggregate, this results realm of possibility because there is the as- Warfighter mission. That was six months of in poorly trained formations that have no sumption that without equipment there is daily research on Joint Worldwide Intelli- ability to mitigate the enemy’s maneuver little they can contribute. As a result, units gence Communications System and Secret in the electromagnetic spectrum with cyber maintain the status quo of “We’ll figure it Internet Protocol to understand enemy ca-

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 11 pabilities, frequencies and vulnerabilities. In the six months we spent training for tion it provided to the commander and the Six months of building and refining pro- Warfighter, the structural flaws of the divi- selected group of senior leaders and prima- cesses for targeting, CEMA working group, sion CEMA section became very clear. The ry staff members who would be involved in generating and synchronizing requests 153 individual and collective tasks can’t be targeting. Once we had established a base- and building standard staff products. Six accomplished by a five-man team that is line of information on capabilities, we de- months of training personnel on Command spread between a division tactical command veloped and named “CEMA Operations” Post of the Future, staff interaction, and post and the main command post both con- that targeted specific enemy capabilities. In information receipt, analysis and distri- ducting 24/7 operations. The ability to not actuality, this prevented us from needing bution, and we still left capabilities on the only attend the required working groups, to have TS discussions and allowed discus- table because we were not as informed as but to maintain situational awareness and sion around the table at the targeting work- we needed to be. Especially with regard to to generate all of the required requests to ing group under this guise. This allowed us cyber capabilities during execution. support targeting can’t all be simultaneous- to focus on the effects at the working group CEMA, much like the G2, requires daily executed with five personnel, even if they and work the specifics for how to achieve ly engagement and research to maintain are all in one place. Multiple times during the effect in an area with the appropriate currency on threats and potential mitiga- the day there are more requirements than classification in a small CEMA huddle. tion techniques. Cyber threats pose a great personnel and at some point people must This smaller huddle was really where we risk not only to our networks but the very sleep. The first step in solving a problem leveraged the capabilities of the combined lives of our Soldiers. Imagine a cyberattack is to see yourself, and the five-man section section and synchronized the effects in time that shuts down a brigades upper Tactical looks anemic when compared to all of the and space with the maneuver and Fires Internet while they are in the middle of a requirements. In discussion with our G2, we plans. As we talked through the effects we movement to contact, or worse, while they discussed the CEMA section absorbing the wanted to achieve, we were able to discuss are in contact. While not directly affecting space and special technical operations (STO) the options available from each function- maneuvering platoons that are probably personnel into a combined CEMA, Space, al area and then determine how best to communicating on FM, it has the ability to and STO section. It provided three more employ those capabilities so that we did sever their link to the Fires battalion that is personnel but more importantly it combined not establish patterns. As an example, we supporting their maneuver, can break the three sections that all possess complementa- would use different capabilities on a daily link to their sustainment support and po- ry effects. After consideration and looking basis to deny enemy command and control, tentially sever the links between them and at the nine-man FDU proposal for a CEMA this prevented the enemy from figuring out the supporting close air support or rotary section I decided to use the additional per- how we were denying their command and wing. Combine that cyberattack with GPS sonnel as a proof of principal, so we rolled control and thus allowed us to maintain the and communications jamming and you the Space and STO sections into CEMA and ability to use capabilities throughout most have a unit that is unable to communi- we started training. of the exercise. cate … soon to be followed by an inabili- One of the initial objectives was to ful- Structure, roles, responsibilities ty to shoot or maneuver as they run out of ly understand everything space and STO As mentioned, we utilized our Space ammo and fuel because they are unable could offer and to train those officers on and STO team of three personnel to help to request resupply. While we may think what CEMA could provide. This was a crit- round out the section, but there was still this is a stretch, the Russians have already ical step in developing a cohesive team, as not enough manpower to accomplish all used similar techniques linked to lethal they understood what options I wanted to of the essential tasks. Doctrinally, there Fires in Ukraine with devastating effects on provide for the commander. In a very short are 153 collective and individual tasks that Ukrainian Army units. A cursory search of amount of time, we all began to see where must be conducted in the CEMA Section in the Russian doctrine of “Information Con- we could integrate the collective capabili- order to meet the requirements of 71-DIV- frontation” that combines cyber, electronic ties into an overarching plan, this layering 5900 Conduct CEMA. With five personnel warfare, propaganda and information oper- of effects would later prove to be extremely in a division CEMA section it’s not possible ations and how it has been used in Ukraine effective. to meet the requirements, much less be able should be a wake-up call to everyone in the Access and understanding to conduct 24/7 CEMA in a high operation- United States military. Access and understanding were initial- al tempo environment. The CEMA section As you read this article, the Russians, ly two areas we struggled with. It would we built with Space and STO added was re- Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans and oth- not be beneficial for the combined CEMA sponsible for integrating and synchronizing ers have developed sophisticated cyber section to have all of the knowledge and cyber, electronic warfare, space, and STO teams and tools, and have an arsenal of simply interject ideas or “effects” during operations within the division and as part electronic warfare jammers and collectors targeting if the staff around us did not have of the corps. This required continual inte- that dwarf the current capabilities that exist an understanding of what we could do or gration with the G2 as the CEMA section in the U.S. Army. The first step in counter- at least a concept of what was possible – the was a customer of electronic intelligence, ing this growing capability is to start with how we would do it was really irrelevant, signals intelligence, human intelligence, employing electronic warfare Soldiers in it was the end effect they needed to under- and imagery intelligence among others. their military occupational specialties and stand. With that in mind, we began to de- This also required integration with the G6 insisting they provide subject matter exper- velop a list of personnel that needed to be in order to maintain situational awareness tise when developing plans and orders in read-on to specific programs we could use of the threats the G6 was seeing on the order to help mitigate the capabilities we during the exercise. The read-on was really network and compare those threats to the know our enemies possess. less important than the baseline of informa- reporting that the G2 was receiving with

12 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) Early warning (EW) Joint air ground integration cell (JAGIC) Current operations (CUOPS) Electronic attack (EA) Special technical operations (STO)

Organization of the cyber and electromagnetic activities organization. (Rick Paape, Jr./Fire Bulletin, courtesy information) regard to cyber threat actors. The CEMA The structure provided the manpower and decisions on how to attack the threats section was also integrated with the Fires necessary to effectively integrate with the in real-time was key to our success. section joint air ground integration cell staff and to generate the required requests Three personnel were placed in the (JAGIC) and division current operations to support division operations. In order to JAGIC, this provided 24 hours of coverage (CUOPS) in order to control EA aircraft on adequately integrate and synchronize with plus an NCO who was on-duty focused station, receive tactical elint (TACELINT re- the staff, a CEMA section needs a minimum on EA requests working 16 to 18 hours a ports and push requests to the Combined of eight CEMA personnel, two FA40 space day. This cell in the JAGIC was the central Air Operations Center for confirmation/lo- officers and one STO officer. This places point of EA requests (JTASRs (DD1972s) cation so identified threats could be target- and EARFs), refinement of EA requests, two 17 series personnel in the T-SCIF to ed and engaged by the JAGIC. Finally, the management of subordinate EA requests, provide 24/7 capability to generate offen- CEMA section was integrated with target- management of aircraft on station, central sive cyber operations requests and to inte- ing and plans in order to ensure the right point for receipt of TACELINT reports from grate with Space (two personnel), STO (one assets were requested and synchronized in the CEMA personnel in the temporary sen- officer), G2 SIGINT, collection and the field time and space to enable the division’s op- sitive compartmented information facilities erations in the deep fight. artillery intelligence officer. This enables re- or G2 SIGINT, and the principal integration Luckily the section received another al-time receipt and analysis of intelligence point with the CAOC for confirmation of warrant officer just before the Warfighter reporting and provides the ability to pass emitter locations. This proved to be an es- and we pulled two 29Es from our subordi- the analyzed information for lethal target- sential link in providing immediate input nate brigades for a total now of 11 person- ing to the FAIO for potential immediate to the JAGIC for the targeting of fire sup- nel. As those brigades were not training au- strike. The importance of this integration port, air defense artillery, and electronic diences for the exercise and had adequate in the G2 shop can’t be overstated. The attack equipment on the immediate strike manning for CEMA there was no impact on minute-to-minute receipt of intelligence list. Once the process was ironed out we their brigade operations (see figure above). followed immediately by the discussions were able to routinely destroy enemy emit-

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13 Final thoughts Our success was directly attributable to task organizing for combat and our division leadership trusting we could deliver on the effects we were describing. Being given the latitude to define what the combined CEMA section needed to do up front (visualizing, describing and directing) and then working through our shortfalls with regard to personnel and capability was an ongoing process. After action reviews and discussion within the shop following every command post exercise allowed us to arrive at the right mix of personnel which equated to capability for the division. Un- like the warfighting functions where capabilities change in increments of years, CEMA, Space and STO all change in increments of weeks. In order to be value added to a commander, these Soldiers must be focused daily on learning and understanding the capabilities our adversaries possess; understanding tactics, techniques and procedures we can use to mitigate enemy systems or effects; and most importantly un- Lt. Col. Clint Tracy and Maj. Ryan Pless update the cyber electromagnetic activities common op- derstand how to operationalize the effects erating picture in the 1st Cavalry Division’s command operations and intelligence center on the we can deliver while integrating with the Command Post Of the Future system. (Sgt. 1st Class Michael Garrett/U.S.Army) division staff, thus providing options for ters in less than 10 minutes (this continued the previously described responsibilities al- the commander. This only happens with to improve throughout the exercise) from lowed the section to simultaneously receive, command emphasis and recognition that the time of initial detection. analyze and distribute information, request, daily work must be done by these Soldiers The final three personnel were used for synchronize and integrate capabilities and that is focused on CEMA, Space and STO. current operations and planning. These provide options to the commander through- Ninety percent of the capability we will be able to provide for a commander is the re- personnel maintained situational aware- out division operations. This presented the sult of months of homework, requests and ness on the CUOPS floor, they understood enemy with complicated problems as his re- condition setting. Due to the lead time re- what assets were available in addition to connaissance, mission command, and Fires quired for many capabilities in these fields, allocated assets and they ensured input to systems progressively moved from disrupt- all of the homework and training must be briefs and meetings were updated (battle ed to degraded to denied. completed in Phase 0. update assessment, commander’s update Integration assessment, operational synch, working If you expect that a small section with- The roles and responsibilities described groups). In addition they coordinated with in the division or a brigade will be able to above would have been only moderately subordinate brigades, received Joint Spec- truncate the homework, training, or request effective without integration and buy-in trum Interference Reports (JSIR), and eval- process in Phases 1, 2 or 3, be prepared to from the other staff sections. We worked to uated if on station aircraft needed to move “Figure it out when it happens” and quick- build relationships, especially with the G2, or were providing effects on the appro- ly be combat ineffective. As stated above, G6 and Fires in order to establish cohesive priate areas during operations. Most im- our adversaries are investing heavily in teams through mutual trust, create shared portantly, this allowed the CEMA chief to these areas, as an Army we must recognize understanding, enable the exercise of disci- participate in the targeting working group, these threats and train our force to utilize targeting board and to run the CEMA/IO plined initiative and inform the command- the capabilities we have to their full extent. working group. er where it was prudent to accept risk. The We must have nothing at rest when it comes The final person required was the spec- result was ironclad trust in the information to CEMA, Space and STO capabilities in or- trum manager who maintained and de-con- we were providing and receiving from the der to provide our commanders the best flicted the JRFL, pushed JSIRs up for reso- staff. The ability to rely on the information options for defeating our near peers in an lution, conducted spectral scans, provided provided to be correct every time acceler- increasingly complex and contested cyber, recommendations for emissions control ated the throughput during analysis and electromagnetic and space environment. and integrated with the G6 and G2 to en- ultimately helped the section synchronize Lt. Col. Clint Tracy is the Cyber and Elec- sure EA missions had no effect on friendly both lethal and non-lethal effects on enemy tromagnetic Activities chief for the 1st Cavalry communications or collection operations. formations throughout the depth of the di- Division and has been assigned to the division The establishment of these positions with vision area of operation. since October 2017.

14 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires U.S. Army air and missile defense Soldiers in 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, take a knee to observe a live fire from an Avenger air defense system, during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands Hawaii, July 24. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Rachael Jeffcoat) Air defense artillery An atrophied warfighting skill By Lt. Col. Sean Dublin The current environment the United gap that has atrophied at the corps and di- COIN environment. Instead of including States military is operating in is one of un- vision due to the lack of necessity during 15 AD planning and employment into their ex- familiarity and a general lack of training years fighting the Global War on Terror and ercises, the maneuver force at all levels has and availability of air defense artillery Sol- instead, begin rebuilding it. This is a mon- ignored it and instead re-tasked those per- diers assigned to the maneuver force. There umental responsibility and must be driven sonnel to fill other vital roles in the COIN is zero to minimal participation by the by the expertise resident within the Patriot fight. Recent changes in the global geopo- ADA community in the Mission Command brigades and battalions who have flour- litical and strategic environment have high- Training Program’s (MCTP) corps/division ished in their echelons above corps roles. lighted a re-emergent aerial threat at tacti- Warfighter Exercise (WFX) to assist in fill- Over the past decade, the United States cal echelons to include rotary wing, fixed ing this void. military has been fighting in counter-insur- wing and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). As the Army moves forward with train- gency (COIN) operations that lack many Unfortunately, SHORAD is an atrophied ing the next generation of Army officers, of the air threat capabilities our near-peer skill and is only planned and employed as non-commissioned officers and Soldiers competitors have and are trained to em- an afterthought during the WFX. Even with for the multi-domain, near-peer fight, the ploy. Understandably, the maneuver force the shift from COIN to multi-domain oper- Army must be prepared to fill the current has not viewed AD as a necessary warf- ations, the maneuver forces are still ignor- Air and Missile Defense (AMD) knowledge ighting capability when preparing for the ing the enemy’s ability to effectively and at

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 15 times decisively, utilize the airspace during plan to ensure that systems are placed in their WFX. the proper location and the commander’s The current WFX operating environ- assets are properly defended. ment permits short range air defense artil- In the WFX the AD component is not be- lery (SHORAD) simulation to counter the ing represented by knowledgeable person- air threat, but often results in early culmi- nel at the unit and work cell levels. Over the nation due to a lack of SHORAD training course of observing 10 warfighter exercis- and personnel. With untrained personnel es with units ranging from military police to plan and employ the assets, and minimal brigades, engineer brigades, maneuver en- participation by the AD community in the hancement brigades, field artillery brigades WFX, there exists a vacuum of air defense and division artillery there is an observed understanding throughout the maneuver gap of knowledgeable personnel to prop- community. At the staff level, Soldiers are erly plan and employ ADA assets within not versed or experienced enough to con- the units or their work cells. AD assets are, duct a proper intelligence preparation of the more often than not, placed in locations battlefield analysis on all the capabilities a that prevent them from being properly em- near-peer enemy has or its potential effects ployed, either there is no line of sight (criti- on the commander’s plan. Maneuver forces cal to the Avenger and shoulder-fired Sting- are instead, comfortable handwaving the er) or the Avengers themselves are placed threat away and assuming air superiority behind the assets they are supposed to be against near-peer rivals who have invested protecting. The lack of knowledge results in strengthening their air breathing threats in a frustrated training audience throwing while the United States has been at war. up their hands and giving up on a sys- The lack of trained personnel to conduct tem that if properly employed, integrated, proper AMD planning and employment is planned for, and protected can be effective ever more prevalent in observations made within it’s given limitations. The less com- within MCTP. At every stage of the plan- plex ADA responsibility of providing ear- ning process, there is minimal effort put ly warning is even lacking, and each Air forth to the proper planning and employ- Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) ment of AD assets against a well-defined cell continues to struggle with the proper and capable threat. Generally, the Aveng- emplacement of their sensor as it relates to ers and Sentinel radars are pushed to the the enemy, the enemy’s capabilities and the divisions with minimal consideration for given terrain. their doctrinal employment. The lack of a The division ADAM cells are often un- sound AMD plan by higher headquarters derstrength, or the AD Soldiers are not when determining task organizations of- doing their AD jobs within division head- ten excludes integrating the commander’s quarters. In my experience AD officers are most capable ground-based radar into the placed in positions like assistants to the division’s reconnaissance and surveillance chief of operations or battle majors instead (R&S) plan. The lack of planning is not of being placed in the ADAM cell designat- due to derelict intent, but to a clear lack of ed for them at the division level. During understanding of how AD assets are to be two WFXs with two different divisions the employed and planned for. Training audi- overall manning of the ADAM cell for the ences often conflate a sensor and missile unit was at less than 40 percent. The obser- systems ability and assume they are cov- vation made was, this had negative effects ered by a notional AD “umbrella.” There is on the cell’s ability to plan for future oper- no understanding of SHORAD capabilities, ations. This lack of manning also restricted limitations or employment principles and the cells from being able to provide per- guidelines. sonnel to the Support Area Command Post There is minimal to no assessment done (SACP), leaving the SACP with little to no does the Army go next? I recommend that by units to nominate assets for the Critical AMD situational awareness or planning the Army fills the gap of knowledge and Asset List and Defended Asset List (CAL/ ability. trained personnel by both utilizing and DAL). The CAL/DAL is what a corps and With more than a decade in a COIN training the organic AD personnel within division headquarters produces to deter- fight the Army has not just lost the “garri- the corps and division for their core mis- mine what will receive AD coverage. This son skills,” so many screamed for, but also sion. Additionally, Patriot battalion’s par- very issue begins during mission analysis the ability to employ personnel and equip- ticipation in WFXs for divisions and Patriot of the planning phase of the operations be- ment to fight our near-peer competitors. brigade’s for corps WFXs is an essential fore the unit(s) deploy. As a result there is No skill seems more atrophied than the part of the Army’s preparation for the next no enemy air threat capability planned for employment of AD assets. fight. This also helps corps and division and no integrated air and missile defense Given the current problem set, where commanders begin to synthesize how they

16 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires An air and missile defense crewmember with 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, prepares a remote control apparatus for the AN/TWQ-1 Avenger air defense system during Artemis Strike, a live-fire exercise off the coast of Crete, Greece, Nov. 6, 2017. (10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command PAO Office) plan on integrating with their area of re- similar structures with similar experienc- tacking the issue can the military hope to fix sponsibility senior ACC. There is an addi- es and expertise supporting the corps and it and prepare the Army for the full range of tional danger in thinking that the paradigm division commander. The post GWOT AD enemy threat capabilities. of the pre-GWOT force structure is still rel- force will need to be ready to plan and fight Lt. Col. Sean Dublin is a Mission Command evant in the multi-domain, near-peer fight; against threats ranging from unmanned inviting Patriot battalions and brigades to aerial vehicles to intercontinental ballistic Training Program military police observer, WFXs will validate the necessity to have missiles and only through aggressively at- coach and trainer at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 17 Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, fire an M119A3 during a live-fire training exercise. (Courtesy photo) An integrated brigade deep fight

BrigadeBy Capt. Joseph Schmid, 2nd Lt. Hector Deep Lopez, 2nd Lt. Zach Tousignant, Battle and 2nd Lt. Paul Mirabile 2.0 servation posts, as well as an aggressive to project manned and unmanned sensors A Product of Raider Fires University fire support plan to systematically decon- forward while directing 120 mm mortar, di- “Small unmanned aerial systems will struct an adversary’s will to fight due to rect support artillery fire, and rotary/fixed not replace the fire support team. It will catastrophic loss of key supply capabilities, wing assets. In support of Brigade Deep enhance the fire support team by allowing target acquisition radars, critical air defense Battle 2.0 Raider Fires teamed with 3-4th teams to observe and engage adversaries artillery platforms, as well as command CAV to conduct a FIST/SUAS experiment that cannot be observed due to obscuration, and control nodes. Drawing on lessons during the June 2018 3-4th CAV mounted distance, darkness, observation angle or flat learned from Joint Readiness Training Cen- gunnery rotation at Pohakuloa Training terrain.”1 ter 18-04 rotation, specifically friction asso- Center on the big island of Hawaii. Third Battalion, 7th Field Artillery and ciated with projecting lethal Fires into the FIST/SUAS experiment 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment are brigade deep fight, the integrated brigade Raider Fires teamed with 3-4th CAV to developing concepts intended to maximize deep fight offers a technique to couple 3-4th conduct a deliberate seven-day FIST/SUAS manned unmanned-teaming among for- CAV’s forward positioned sensor plan with experiment with the aim of validating an ward positioned fire support teams (FIST), 3-7th FA’s massed lethal Fires between the RQ-11 Raven’s ability to accurately observe small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS), in- brigade coordinating firing line and the di- indirect fire. The FIST/SUAS research prob- direct fire platforms, and rotary/fixed wing vision coordinating firing line. The system- lem was as follows: How accurate are SUAS aircraft. The joint effort between these two atic execution of Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 while observing indirect Fires between the organizations will serve to generate multi- during the initial reconnaissance phase sets brigade coordinated firing line and divi- ple dilemmas beyond the forward edge of favorable conditions for an infantry battal- sion coordinated firing line when given battle area while specifically targeting ad- ion’s forward passage of lines with 3-4th two lightweight laser designator rangefind- vancing combat power attempting to con- CAV. Favorable conditions for forward ers, two troop 120 mm mortar systems, 954 test terrain within the maneuver close fight passage of lines are created by fire support 120 mm training rounds and two Ravens? as well as secure terrain within the adver- teams augmented with small unmanned The FIST/SUAS experiment compared one sarial tactical support zone. The integrated aerial system operators who will infiltrate independent variable, a Raven’s “did hit” brigade deep fight leverages dismounted under period of darkness deep within an data, with one control variable, the same infiltration tactics, forward positioned ob- adversary’s tactical support zone in order target verified by redundant lightweight

1 Paul Niggl, Mark Sousa, Frank Miner, 2017. “Use Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems to Call for Fire,” The Cove. JUL 2017, Accessed on 28 JUN 18. p. 1.

18 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires laser designator rangefinders “should hit” Key to note the Raven’s elevation acted as a became obscured during 50 percent data. In total, two Ravens and four opera- vertical observer target line and was already of the Raven target circle. As the Ra- tors performed 28 dry calls for fire and nine calculated into the left/right add/drop cor- ven circled the target area 1,000 feet live calls for fire. Of the 28 dry calls for fire, rections. Exploiting this data, a Raider Fires above ground level, uncontrollable 26 of the Raven’s initial “did hit” data were fire support officer simply relayed the left/ crosswinds manipulated the Raven within 75 meters of the “should hit” data. right add/drop correction provided by the in such a way the wing itself ob- Raider Fires assessed the two outliers to be Raven as well as the direction multiplied by scured the target area. After timing effected by heavy fog between the target 17.7. The multiplication is needed to solve how long the Raven took to complete and observation post. Of the nine live calls for observer target line in mils from orig- one full circle above the target area, for fire, Raider Fires achieved effects on inal data provided in degrees. This data operators applied the round’s time of the first adjustment round after the initial enabled the mortars to solve for deflection/ flight in order to solve for when the round landed within 75 meters target loca- quadrant elevation producing effects on Raven could observe impact while tion error. Raider Fires blended elements of target with first round adjustment. Specific experiencing crosswinds. manual gunnery with digital computations insights relating to FIST/SUAS teaming are Observation: Gimbal camera zoom affects in order to compute accurate deflection/ highlighted below: accuracy of initial Raven call for fire quadrant elevation from initial Raven cor- Observation: Target grid versus Raven lo- grid. rections. cation grid. Insight: A Raven’s gimbal camera has four Raider Fires, 3-4th CAV Raven opera- Insight: After the Raven operator lazes a zoom settings: wide, medium, nar- tors, and mortar men teamed while pro- target, the target grid appears in the row, and ultra. During the third live ducing a simple mathematical equation for bottom left of Falcon View while the call for fire the Raven pulled one grid rapidly computing the Raven’s “did hit” Raven location grid appears in the for each setting while observing the data into actionable deflection/quadrant top left of Falcon View. Both grids same target. Raider Fires found accu- elevation. Upon impact of first round, the are unlabeled and easily confused by racy of initial target grid is greatly im- Raven operator froze an image depicting a Raven operator who has not called proved while using the gimbal cam- target “should hit” data and point of im- for fire from an RQ-11 platform. This era’s ultra-zoom setting as opposed pact “did hit” data. Initial corrections were confusion is easily mitigated by add- to the wide zoom setting. However, generated by the Raven’s line tool within its ing a Raven call for fire requirement when in ultra-zoom setting, a Raven Falcon View operating system. The Raven into an operator’s quarterly currency operator will have increased difficul- operator manipulated the (S) and (T) icons requirements. ty maintaining line of sight with tar- placing them over the target and point of Observation: Leveraging time of flight and get while experiencing high winds. impact respectively. Raven target circle to solve for line- This friction point reinforces the need This manipulation triggered the Raven’s of-sight friction. for Raven operators to complete Ra- ground control station line tool to automat- Insight: During three of nine live Raven ven call for fire in ultra-zoom setting ically generate highly accurate add/drop, calls-for-fire line of sight between the during quarterly flight training. left/right, range and elevation corrections. Raven’s gimbal camera and target Observation: Collocation of sensor shooter.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 19 The methodology used for airspace deconfliction during the integrated brigade deep fight exercise. (Courtesy illustration)

Insight: During the FIST/SUAS experiment cles, support platforms, air defense artillery commander stated “Manned-Unmanned Raven operators collocated with the and command and control nodes. All ob- teaming is essential, as is air-ground team- 120 mm firing point greatly reducing servation posts maintain communications ing (e.g. Bradley Fire Support Team and call for fire routing length. Raven op- with a forward positioned Raider Fires Apache Helicopters-64E).”2 Within the erators literally stood next to tubes M1200 Knight relay station who assists by integrated brigade deep fight forward po- while verbally declaring targeting relaying digital and voice call-for-fire mes- sitioned Raven operators provide critical grids enabling rapid identification, sages from forward positioned operations targeting data on enemy air defense assets computation of firing data and firing to a direct support platoon fire direction and [will team] with artillery to destroy of rounds. center located inside or slightly offset from those assets immediately.3 Following the The quantitative analysis portrayed the 3-4th CAV tactical operations center. destruction of all known air defense artil- above suggests deliberate FIST/SUAS team- This collocation shortens the call-for-fire lery targets, Raven operators will conduct ing has the potential to severely attrite ad- routing process assisting in rapid indirect armored target handoff with 25th Combat versarial combat power within the brigade fire response time as well as enhanced Aviation attack rotary wing platforms. Loss deep fight. Raider Fires will integrate this common understanding between the cav- of life is mitigated by leveraging troop FIST/ tactic in four phases designed to offer both alry and Fires organizations. The domina- SUAS teams to specifically hunt and gen- the squadron and field artillery battalion tion phase is achieved when a catastrophic erate targeting data for adversarial ADA commander tailorable options for project- amount of disruptive Fires is employed ef- pieces. Once destroyed, attack aviation ing lethal disruptive Fires into the brigade fectively paralyzing an adversarial decision will retain the necessary freedom of ma- deep fight. cycle. The adversary’s ability to contest neuver to destroy armored targets received Infiltrate, observe, communicate, terrain by moving combat power through via MUM-T with troop FIST/SUAS teams. dominate the tactical support zone into the close fight Artillery, armor targets, air de- The integrated brigade deep fight is becomes so degraded that he or she loses confliction broken into four phases: infiltrate, observe, the will to fight. The 105 mm weapon system is unique- communicate and dominate. FIST/SUAS Manned unmanned teaming ly qualified as an all-weather 24/7 deliv- team infiltration occurs under period of (MUM-T) essential to generate ery asset able to inflict, when massed ap- darkness 24 to 48 hours prior to 3-4th CAV’s rotary wing freedom of maneuver propriately, a high level of battle damage main body establishing screen in prepara- While contesting terrain with a near- over time within an adversary’s maneuver tion for forward passage of lines. Once peer or peer adversary, a critical component close fight and tactical support zone. As the FIST/SUAS teams establish observation of the integrated brigade deep fight will be Army continues to pivot away from stabil- posts within an adversary’s tactical sup- MUM-T initiated by forward positioned ity operations, while placing increased fo- port zone, the observe and communicate troop FIST/SUAS teams. This concept is cus on peer/near peer adversaries, we proj- phases are conducted in a continuous cycle further reinforced by Maneuver Center of ect a higher rate of unobserved and area until domination within the brigade deep Excellence in the June 20, 2018, Cavalry focused call for fire at the expense of sta- fight is achieved. FIST/SUAS teams hunt Warfighter’s Forum. In reference to recon- bility oriented precision Fires. Yet, cannon for advancing adversarial combat power in naissance within the brigade deep fight, artillery Fires are notoriously ineffective order to initially disrupt and then destroy Col. David W. Gardner, 2nd Armored Bri- while employed against an armored target dismounted formations, light skinned vehi- gade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division generating the need for target handoff with

2 Gardner, David COL. 2018. “Cavalry Warfighter’s Forum,” Maneuver Center of Excellence. JUN 2018, Accessed on 20 JUN 18. slide 17. 3 Sickler, Bobby MAJ, Henderson, David MAJ, and Hansen, John, 2017. “An Integrated Division Deep Fight: Deep Battle 2.0,” Center forArmy Lessons Learned. FEB 2017, Accessed on 18 JUN 18. p. 4.

20 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires The mission brief for the fire support team/small unmanned aerial systems-experiment live-fire. (Courtesy illustration) rotary or fixed wing aviation. However, in with a direct support artillery battery, can opportunity for the systematic projection of order for fixed and rotary wing aviation to integrate emerging SUAS technology with lethal Fires within the brigade deep fight. expeditiously close with an armored tar- an aggressive fire support plan while at- Capt. Joseph Schmid is the fire support of- get, oftentimes it must traverse numerous tempting to paralyze an adversarial deci- ficer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment. gun target lines originating from multiple sion cycle. Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 was orig- He holds a bachelor of arts in English from West firing points. Multiple firing points within inally conceptualized at a May, 2018 Raider Florida University. Schmid attended Field Ar- a brigade’s area of operation tend to cre- Fires University leader professional devel- tillery Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort Sill, ate varying projectile flight paths placing opment session after reviewing how Rus- Okla., He attended the Captains Career Course SUAS, rotary, and fixed wing aircraft in sia, during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian jeopardy. Haphazard air de-confliction conflict, exploited FIST/SUAS teaming at Fort Sill and is now stationed at Schofield at either brigade or battalion level has ex- while projecting indirect Fires during the Barracks, Hawaii. tremely debilitating effects on target decay seizure of Donetsk airport. This event, Second Lt. Zachary Tousignant is the fire time. Therefore, if both manned and un- along with friction within the brigade deep support officer for B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th manned aircraft hope to maneuver towards fight during our recent JRTC 18-04 rotation, Cavalry Regiment. He holds a Bachelor of Sci- a position of relative advantage, key leaders served as a catalyst for the development of ence in Textile Engineering from North Caroli- within brigade, field artillery battalion and Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 theory. This theo- na State University. Tousignant attended Field squadron tactical operation centers must ry will be continually tested during 25th Artillery Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort achieve a collective conceptualization of Infantry Division’s Lightning Forge field Sill, Okla., and is now stationed at Schofield how best to de-conflict air between shooters training exercise, upcoming JRTC deploy- Barracks, Hawaii. on the ground and flyers in the sky. During ment, 3-4th CAV tactical operations center 3-4th CAV’s recent June, 2018 gunnery ro- validation exercise, and experiences gained Second Lt. Hector Lopez is the fire support tation, Raider Fires teamed with 3-4th CAV at Cavalry Leaders Course. officer for A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Caval- in order to nest within 25th Division Artil- In closing, Maj. Nick Brunetti-Lihach, a ry Regiment. He holds a Bachelor of Science lery’s goal post de-confliction method al- Marine Corps officer currently attending in Management and Spanish from the United lowing “aircrews to fly under… incoming U.S. Army Command and General Staff States Military Academy. Lopez attended Field rounds [while retaining] acceptable levels Officer Course, said “a clear external threat Artillery Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort 4 of freedom of maneuver.” The air de-con- coupled with rapid technological change Sill, Okla., and is now stationed at Schofield 5 fliction method proven during 3-4th CAV’s presents challenge and opportunity.” The Barracks, Hawaii. gunnery rotation can be further applied to reality of FIST/SUAS teaming within Rus- Second Lt. Paul Mirabile is the fire support de-conflict airspace within the integrated sian and Chinese conventional forces pres- officer for C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry brigade deep fight between artillery, SUAS, ents one of many threats to historical U.S. Regiment. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Busi- Shadow UAV and rotary/fixed wing avia- dominance within the military domain. Bri- tion. gade Deep Battle 2.0 recognizes this chal- ness and Economics from Virginia Military In- The FIST/SUAS experiment coupled lenge, conceptualizes how emerging tech- stitute. Mirabile attended Field Artillery Basic with Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 theory por- nology can be joined with existing doctrine, Officer Leaders Course at Fort Sill, Okla. and trays how a light cavalry squadron, teamed and presents key leaders with a tailorable is now stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

4 Ibid. 5 Brunetti-Lihach, Nick, 2018. “Voices from the Disruptors: Profiles in Leading Military Innovation,” Small Wars Journal. Accessed on 26 JUN 18. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/voices-disruptors-profiles-leading-military-innovation

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 21 Strengthening light HIMARS for

Bymulti-domain Capt. Brennan Deveraux, 1st Lt. Sean Skelly operations and Staff Sgt. Evan Fowler It is not just destructive power that element was on the firing point and in posi- tactical data exchange network, became makes artillery king. Throughout time the tion ready to fire. instant combat multipliers. The arrival of artillery has been an adaptable force, able HIMARS loaded onto a plane equipped these systems at the TAC location gave the to rapidly adjust to changes in mission and with the Joint Precision Airdrop System al- MDTF the communication linkage, as well stay relevant. The uniqueness of indirect lows the panel inside the launcher to main- as necessary situational awareness of the fire forces the artillery community to have tain its Global Positioning System while in battlefield. Once operational the LHP and an in-depth understanding of the battle- transit; the launcher can then shoot guided ADAM cell became a cohesive team, rath- field as fire missions can range from- sup munitions almost immediately upon land- er than separate entities, and were thrust port to an infantry squad through a corps ing. Once the plane lands the launchers are into a role as the Fires coordination center/ headquarters. Increased battlefield situa- unchained and set a minimum of 500 me- TAC for the MDTF. This was primarily due tional awareness allows the artillery com- ters from the exit point where the mission to the capability to communicate with aeri- munity to adapt to assume a pivotal role in can be executed. After conducting the real systems that the headquarters on Oahu the continuous development of combined connaissance, selection and occupation of could not. The linkage and interoperability arms warfare. As the military continues position at RIMPAC, the LHP established is vital to the fire cell. This was validated to develop doctrine to support multi-do- a hide site that allowed the simulation of on the last day of the live fire when the Ad- main operations (MDO) it is no surprise exiting a C-17, ingress to a firing point and vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System that artillery, especially the High Mobility egress as if it was getting on a plane. During (AFATDS) and LINK-16 were directly con- Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), is at the exercise the LHP was able to execute a nected. As this integration develops further the forefront. A properly equipped light fire mission in under three minutes from it is imperative to continue to work the con- HIMARS package (LHP) provides an early the time of receipt of mission, to the time of nectivity and training of these systems to- entry option for a multi-domain task force the rockets fired, while simulating the exit gether, with a goal of sending fire missions (MDTF) to build combat power. When of an aircraft. straight through LINK-16 to the FDC, expe- followed by the Air Defense and Airspace Fire missions were one aspect of the role diting fire mission processing. Management (ADAM) cell the combined of the LHP during RIMPAC. The FDC was LINK-16 is an integral part of a Fires cell capabilities create a Fires cell crucial to the involved in more than just the prosecution for the MDTF. The system provides a con- success of the establishment of the MDTF. of the two fire missions for the exercise. It stantly updating 360 degree view of the bat- This article outlines the role of the LHP in acted as the MDTF tactical action center tlefield, and up-to-the-minute information support of the MDTF, as well as discusses (TAC) due to enhanced communication on friendly and enemy forces in the region. the integration of the ADAM cell and the systems. Outside of the normal FDC com- This makes the ADAM cell the perfect part- complementary communication capabili- munication platforms, the LHP utilized ner for the LHP in order to conduct opera- ties it presents. The article is based on the the Command Post Node from the brigade tions while building initial combat power. experiences of B Battery, 1st Battalion, 94th signal company. This allowed the FDC to The 25th Division Artillery ADAM cell did Field Artillery Regiment as the LHP during communicate digitally with the MDTF this excellently at RIMPAC. The early in- the MDTF validation exercise, Rim of the headquarters on Oahu. This capability en- tegration and partnership gave the MDTF Pacific (RIMPAC) 18. hancement provided a necessary role as the ability to receive targets via aerial assets Light HIMARS package a TAC, and not just the FDC for the LHP. and send them direct to an AFATDS via The LHP is designed for rapid deploy- Although the LHP was able to establish op- LINK-16. The rapid relay of information ment in order to provide a combatant com- erations and prepare for follow on forces, available via LINK-16 allowed a real time mander a range of indirect fire options it was the combination with the adjacent update of the battlefield for the operation across an area of responsibility. The stan- ADAM cell that allowed the full realization which created a high level of situational dard package for a C-17 aircraft has four ve- of the MDTF Fires cell. awareness in the TAC. Giving the FDC the hicles: two launchers, a fire direction center Integrating the ADAM cell ability to connect to LINK-16 is paramount (FDC) vehicle, and a command HMMWV The ADAM cell is a brigade-level asset for the MDTF in order to be relevant in fu- with a generator trailer. The package is and it is uncommon for it to be directly ture engagements. With the other military ready to shoot rockets or missiles, depend- linked with a small battery level element services already using the system, integra- ing on the mission set, within 10 minutes like the LHP. The ADAM cell established tion by Army assets would enhance sit- of unloading the aircraft. For RIMPAC, B/1- operations adjacent to the FDC vehicle at uational awareness and allow for a more 94th FAR loaded four vehicles onto a C-17 RIMPAC, and once both elements under- cohesive information flow throughout the and flew to the Pacific Missile Range Facil- stood how they complemented each other, force. TACSAT radios, coupled with the ity on the island of Kauai, Hawaii. Within a strong team was formed. Tactical Satellite live LINK-16, allows for the successful and one hour of downloading the aircraft, the (TACSAT) radios and LINK-16, a military rapid integration of HIMARS. The LHP

22 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Soldiers from B Battery, 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment, load a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System onto a C-17 Globemaster in support of the Rim of the Pacific 2018 exercise. (Courtesy photo) can be thousands of miles from the MDTF long term, but combined with the ADAM tionary Warfare School and holds a bachelor’s headquarters and still receive digital fire cell it is clear the pairing has the potential degree from the University of Washington in missions with the use of TACSAT radios, to be the future of the MDTF. The LHP is Political Science. greatly enhancing the range of the weapon rapidly deployable and provides an initial 1st Lt. Sean Skelly is the 1st platoon leader system and the influence of the MDTF on fighting force capable of basic mission com- of B Battery, 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery the battlefield. mand and Fires capability. If habitual as- Regiment. He served as the fire direction officer The methods of conducting warfare are sociations are established with the ADAM for the Light HIMARS Package that executed forever changing, adapting to both updates cell to build and develop tactics, techniques Rim of the Pacific 18. Skelly holds a bachelor’s in technological capabilities and emerging and procedures for fighting in MDO then degree from Liberty University in Religious doctrine. As the doctrine for the employ- the combined capabilities will create a Fires Studies. ment of the MDTF begins to develop, two cell critical to the success of the MDTF. things are key for the artillery community: Capt. Brennan Deveraux is the B Battery, Staff Sgt. Evan Fowler is a 13J and the Head- the LHP stays a pivotal role as an early entry 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment quarters platoon sergeant of B Battery, 1st Bat- asset, and the relationship with the ADAM commander. He also previously served as the talion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment. He served cell is codified. Independently the LHP is Headquarters and Headquarters Battery com- as the fire direction non-commissioned officer not equipped to handle the communication mander for the 17th Field Artillery Brigade. for the Light HIMARS Package that executed systems necessary to maintain the fight Deveraux is a graduate of the Marine Expedi- Rim of the Pacific 18.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 23 RIMPAC ‘18 exercise highlights versatility of

SHORADBy 1st Lt. David Lara The 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Ar- tillery cells trained to classify live air tracks tillery Regiment recently had the opportu- and disseminate firing orders from the nity to participate in the first-ever training brigade tactical operations center (TOC) exercise for the Multi Domain Task Force directly to the Avenger firing units. From Pilot Program (MDTF-PP) in support of the there, the Avenger teams prioritized tracks world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of and identified hostile ones using targeting the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2018. consoles and crew chief air situational dis- Their mission was to provide short- plays to send positive confirmation back range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities up to the TOC on Oahu in real-time via in the form of Avenger firing units as part data and voice communications. of an unknown aircraft live-fire scenario at In the first of the two live-fire engage- Pacific Missile Range Facility located on the ments, Spc. David Fausz and Pfc. Matthew island of Kauai, Hawaii. Munoz fired from the Avenger platform The tactical scenario of the live-fire demonstrating fully operational SHORAD exercise was a proof of concept for com- capabilities. They received their weapons mand and control of air defense assets that control status and air defense warning are forward deployed away from the task updates, and were notified of a hostile force footprint by combining all joint intel- unmanned aircraft entering their engage- ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ment area. They received the firing order platforms into a common operational pic- which provided them the live track data ture by utilizing Link-16. To accomplish necessary to complete the engagements. Si- this task, the force employed the 17th Fires multaneously, other personnel ensured the assets to effectively operate in degraded Brigade to disseminate air defense warn- battlespace was clear of all friendly aerial operations. The scenario required the pair ings and weapons control statuses that and maritime assets. The crew was able to to simulate a loss of their Avenger system come directly from the task force com- immediately relay the engagement report and convert to manned portable air defense mander. They then employed members of directly to the TOC on Oahu after the en- (MANPAD) operations which is the shoul- the Sentinel Section from the 25th Infantry gagement. This allowed the task force com- der-fired variant of the Stinger missile. They Division Artillery cell on the island of Kau- mander to have immediate knowledge of also lost the capability to communicate and ai to act as a local command and control a destroyed enemy reconnaissance, intel- receive air tracks through real-time data, node and disseminate early warning to ligence, surveillance and target acquisition restricting them to voice communications Avenger firing units. or RISTA threat in the task force’s area of with the command and control node. The In accordance with the training objec- operations. command and control node communicat- tives outlined by the MDTF commander, The second engagement conducted ed the real-time track data to the Stinger Col. Christopher Wendland, the air defense by Sgt. Aaron Nash and Spc. Cody Crab- team allowing them to identify the remote and airspace management and division ar- tree demonstrated the ability of SHORAD control miniature aerial target (RCMAT)

24 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Army Pfc. Matthew Munoz, air and missile defense crew member with the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, observes the sky prior to engaging an unmanned aerial vehicle target, during the Rim of the Pacific 2018 exercise at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, July 24. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/U.S. Army)

which simulated an enemy unmanned ae- The ability to demonstrate that these assets 1st Lt. David Lara comes from Tehachapi, rial system. Utilizing their visual aircraft could tie into the joint network and success- Calif., and earned his commission from North- recognition training, the team executed a fully complete the mission while forward ern Arizona University in 2016. Upon gradu- successful engagement. They then used the of the task force footprint met the com- ating ADA BOLC as the Distinguished Honor control node as a relay to send an updated mander’s intent and showcased SHORAD Graduate, he was assigned as an Avenger pla- situation report which allowed the MDTF during a time where the Army is working toon leader for E Battery, 6th Battalion 52nd Air commander to have the same updated sit- to rebuild capability throughout its forces. Defense Artillery at Camp Casey, Republic of uational awareness as when the team oper- Moving forward, exercises such as this that Korea. After the relocation of his unit to Suwon ates from the Avenger system. The success of the live-fire scenario was employ a wider variety of intelligence, sur- Air Base he was assigned as the officer in charge a large victory for the air defense commu- veillance, reconnaissance assets and joint of providing short-range air defense to the 210th nity as it was part of the first attempt at platforms will allow the knowledge and Counter Fire Task Force. He is currently a battle integrating U.S. Army SHORAD assets in utilization of SHORAD capabilities to ex- captain assigned to 6-52nd ADA at Suwon Air support of the pilot program for the MDTF. pand across the Army. Base, Republic of Korea.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 25 Tactical joint Fires integration training at Fort Sill A success story in a resource-constrained environment By Lt. Col. Nick Sargent Being based at Fort Sill, Okla. since July ground-based alike, and then synchroniz- ability of aircraft. Understanding this main- 2015, I quickly became aware of the almost ing training audiences in time and space. tenance schedule reality, and other home daily live artillery training conducted on Planning in combat station factors like approved takeoff and the East and West Ranges. What took a little However, planning is a skill that has landing times, should not be overlooked by longer to notice was that adjacent to West atrophied during recent campaigning over those planning CAS training from a ground Range is Falcon Range, the busiest range nearly two decades in the Central Com- perspective and can be accounted for by in the Air Force. In fiscal year 17, Falcon mand area of responsibility. CAS has been considering the following: Range hosted 3,026 aircraft sorties with 561 the most prevalent air mission on the air 1. Identify potential “joint Fires” partners involving joint tactical attack controllers tasking order. Pre-planned CAS has been in your local area (account for flying (JTACs). I therefore asked myself, is it pos- the exception and immediate CAS has units that are in proximity to your local sible to synchronize any of this training? been the norm. Pre-planned CAS existed range facilities), establish a network and A lack of resources? essentially when air alert CAS was waiting build relationships. There is a perception across the U.S. for a higher priority immediate request, 2. Identify common training objectives, services and U.S. Special Operations Com- particularly as its ubiquitous nature and desires and goals based on higher head- mand that there are not sufficient close air reach compensated for the limited range quarters’ tasking and guidance. support (CAS) sorties available for JTACs, coverage of organic land component Fires 3. With all parties involved, simply ask forward air controller (airborne) [FAC(A)] assets. There is of course the contention that “what can I offer you?” some missions were termed CAS but were and joint Fires observer (JFO) certification By way of example, here is what was not CAS when considering the Joint Publi- accomplished when these factors were con- and qualification training to meet the min- cation 3-09.3 definition however, that is for sidered recently at Fort Sill. imum standards articulated in the associ- another article. As transition back to large- Re-establishing tactical joint Fires ated Joint Fire Support Executive Steering scale combat operations occurs, a more pro- integration training at Sill Committee (JFS ESC) memorandum of active approach to CAS planning must be In 18 ½ weeks, the Field Artillery Ba- agreement (MOA). When considering train- taken. CAS, in the context of counter-land sic Officer Leadership Course (FA BOLC) ing beyond these minimum standards, to operations, will compete with air interdic- teaches Army second lieutenants the criti- achieve proficiency in what are perishable tion for its apportionment and allocation cal tasks required of a platoon leader, fire skills, this perceived shortfall is even great- of resources. Counter-land operations will direction officer and fire support officer er. Whilst the statistics themselves are plain also compete with other air missions for as- (FSO). Since September 2016, the FSO syl- to see – over the past 15 years the number sets – strategic attack, offensive counter-air labus has included JFO MOA tasks. The FA of JTACs, FAC(A)s and JFOs has increased and defensive counter-air to name but a BOLC’s capstone exercise, Red Leg War, as the number of close air support capable few – as it will likely be the same multi-role sees student FSOs plan and execute the in- aircraft has decreased. I believe this statisti- aircraft flying these missions. All this in the tegration of Army and joint Fires with com- cal mismatch is exacerbated by a disconnect context of a contested or highly contested pany-level maneuver. that exists when considering the planning operational environment. Proactive plan- After a 10 year absence, the Air Force of training between JTAC, FAC(A), JFO and ning for and requesting of CAS, in order once again routinely supports institutional CAS capable aircraft communities. to “compete” with the other tasks the joint training at the Army’s Fires Center of Ex- Coming from a much smaller military force air component command is required cellence, Fort Sill.1 At the time of writing, in the U.K., but having had the good for- to accomplish, becomes a necessity. there has been fighter and bomber support tune to work as an exchange officer for both Planning in garrison to four Red Leg War exercises since Octo- the U.S. Marine Corps (2009-2011) and U.S. Air tasking order planning in combat is ber 2017, with support planned for each Army (2015-present), I look at the number driven by a multitude of factors, in partic- of the 17 exercises out to the end of Fiscal of CAS sorties the U.S. services can gener- ular mission and targeting requirements, Year 2019. During Red Leg War, student ate for training with envy. As an outsider which generate an air asset in time and FSOs put their JFO skills to the test – re- looking in, I suggest the U.S. services could space. However, when planning in garrison questing, adjusting and controlling cannon be much more efficient with the assets that it is frequently a unit’s maintenance sched- artillery Fires; providing target information are available. Planning is the key. The chal- ule, more often than not established a year to JTACs and FAC(A)s in support of CAS lenge is identifying common training objec- in advance to support a training and/or missions; and conducting terminal guid- tives across all CAS players, airborne and deployment cycle, which drives the avail- ance operations. So far, live and dry CAS

1 https://www.army.mil/ article/196484.

26 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires missions have been executed by F16s, T38s and B52s controlled by JTACs and FAC(A) s, and supported concurrently by live artillery suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). How was this achieved when resources are perceived to be scarce? The planning technique used the combined lines of effort outlined above – along with networking and relationship building, identification of common training objectives and asking “what can I offer you?” Planning was collaborative in nature involving all stakeholders, training audience as well as training enablers. Notably, training enablers played a critical role. The Fort Sill Range Operations developed new weapons danger zones for CAS targets outside the existing target set; the two local airspace control agencies were also critical, ensuring that non-exercise participants could continue to train with minimum of impact and that exercise participants (air and ground) could optimize the use of lo- An A-10 Thunderbolt II conducts a show of force over an observation point during a combined arms cal military operating areas and restricted maneuver live-fire exercise at the Orchard Combat Training Center, Boise, Idaho in Sept. 20, 2018. airspace. (1st Lt. Robert Barney/U.S. Army) The foundation for planning this level of talion, 30th Field Artillery (part of the USA- 5. Class 1-19, March 18-22, 19 joint integration started with establishing a FAS) offered a dedicated firing unit for one 6. Class 2-19, May 13-17, 19 network of and relationships between joint hour per day with 50 rounds in support of 7. Class 3-19, June 17-21, 19 Fires players within a 200 mile radius of JTACs and FAC(A)s conducting call-for-fire 8. Class 4-19, Aug. 5-9, 19 Fort Sill. From an Army perspective this in- training as the primary training audience. 9. Class 5-19, Oct. 14-18, 19 cluded the Army Multi-Domain Targeting On two occasions, 138th Combat Training 10. Class 6-19, Nov. 18-22, 19 Center, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Flight integrated contract CAS night sorties 11. Class 7-19, Jan. 13-17, 20 Fort Sill Range Operations and Fort Sill scheduled to support their pre-JTAC Qual- 12. Class 8-19, Feb. 17-21, 20 Army Radar Approach Control. From an ification Course instructor cadre work up. Lt. Col. Nick Sargent is the Army Multi-Do- Air Force perspective this included 80th The result is the establishment and con- main Targeting Center Joint Integration chief. Flying Training Wing, 138th Combat Train- tinuation of outstanding tactical joint Fires Sargent was commissioned in 1996 from the ing Flight and 457th Fighter Squadron. This integration training. Royal Military Academy Sandhurst into the network is ever expanding. Although resources are finite, better Royal Artillery. His service has been predomi- Once the network was established and planning can and will lead to better tacti- nantly in the operational force with peacekeep- relationships built, aspirations and objec- cal joint Fires training opportunities for ing deployments to Cyprus, Bosnia and Kosovo, tives for training opportunities were dis- JTACs, FAC(A)s, JFOs and CAS capable air- cussed. In doing so, common JTAC, FAC(A) craft alike. This planning must account for and combat deployments to Afghanistan (four), and JFO training objectives were identi- the training schedule of each community, Iraq and Libya. The majority of his appoint- fied by cross-referencing the three JFS ESC endeavor to synchronize these schedules ments have been fire support and targeting MOAs and service training regulations. Ex- where resources are available in the same related, including battery commander of 148th amples included: time and space, and consider the common Commando Forward Observation Battery, Sec- • Live CAS attacks with JFOs providing training needs of each community. ond in command of 3rd Regiment Royal Horse targeting information to JTACs and For further information on tactical joint Artillery, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and FAC(A)s, while integrating live artillery Fires training opportunities at Fort Sill in Air Officer. This is his second exchange tour SEAD. FY19-FY20 during Red Leg War, please in the U.S. having previously spent two years • Lateral and altitude separation tech- contact the author. In particular, opportu- as I Marine Expeditionary Force’s Assistant niques in order to mass Fires on a com- nities exist for CAS capable flying units as Force Fires Coordinator. He holds a Balchelor mon timeline using USMC SEAD proce- well as FAC(A)s. Upcoming Red Leg War dures. dates are as follows: of Science degree in Sports Science and Busi- • JTAC-FAC(A) battle handover. 1. Class 5-18, Oct. 15-19, 18 ness Studies from Brunel University and is • FAC(A) live artillery call for fire. 2. Class 6-18, Nov. 26-30, 18 currently reading for a Master of Arts degree Finally, having asked “What can I do for 3. Class 7-18, Jan. 14-18, 19 in ‘Airpower in the Modern Work’ with King’s you?” the battalion commander of 1st Bat- 4. Class 8-18, Feb. 11-15, 19 College London.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 27 Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery conduct tactical maneuvers during the Air and Missile Defense Exercise 17-02, May 2017. The exercise was a combined field training exercise between U.S. and United Arab Eremites High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. (Courtesy photo)

28 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires From Chai to compatible Security cooperation in Middle East By Lt. Col. Seamus Doyle The 169th Field Artillery Brigade de- Engagement rhythm and execute engagements using the in- ployed to the Middle East as U.S. Army The Soldiers in 169th FAB established an teroperability focus areas. We developed Central Force Field Artillery Headquarters engagement rhythm of at least one brigade interoperability assessments using U.S. in support of Operation Spartan Shield or battalion-level collective engagement Army Regulation 34-1 (Interoperability), (OSS) and Operation Inherent Resolve event each quarter consisting of field train- which identifies five focus areas: Fires, (OIR) from January to September 2017. As- ing exercises, live-fire exercises and com- communication and information systems suming the USARCENT Force Field Artil- mand post exercises. Third-321st FAR and and information management, informa- lery Headquarters mission, 169th FAB was 79th HRR conducted HIMARS field train- tion sharing, sustainment, intelligence sur- operational control to 29th Infantry Divi- ing exercises and live-fire exercises during veillance and reconnaissance and fusion. sion for OSS and general support to Com- Exercise Saif Strike in March 2017. The We assigned rating levels which spanned bined Joint Task Force for OIR. The 169th exercise served to improve the integration from no demonstrated interoperability to FA BDE provided High Mobility Artillery between U.S. and UAE HIMARS units, and full interoperability. While conducting the Rocket System (HIMARS) Fires in support most importantly, identified compatibility multi-lateral and multi-echelon engage- of both operations. issues which had the potential to negatively ments described earlier, we assessed our fo- As our C-130 Hercules flew directly over impact combined operations in UAE. The cus area interoperability in the field along- the Burj Khalifa skyscraper, we pondered 169th FAB and the 29th ID command teams side our Arab partners. We analyzed our our brigade’s security cooperation mission. attended Exercise Saif Strike which- fos assessments to create engagement plans, Lessons learned during previous Middle tered good relationships between the U.S. field artillery exchange curriculum, senior East deployments reinforced the criticali- and UAE senior leadership. Next, 169th leader engagements and most importantly ty of building positive relationships with FAB and subordinate units conducted joint, – collective field engagements. As a result our Arab partner militaries. Luckily, the combined, multi-national HIMARS general of our assessment model, 169th FAB suc- relationship between U.S. and United Arab support artillery operations during the Air cessfully rehearsed our contingency plans Emirates artillery forces was strong upon and Missile Defense Exercise 17-02 in May on numerous occasions by processing dig- our arrival. We took over the relationship of 2017. In coordination with the U.S. Air ital fire missions from the Combined Air from the 197th Field Artillery Brigade with Force Combined Air Operations Center – Operations Center all the way to UAE HI- the intent to aggressively improve compati- 169th FAB, 5-3rd FA Battalion, and B Bat- MARS and Kuwait Land Force Artillery bility and contingency plan readiness. How tery, 3rd Battalion, 157th FA conducted a Soviet-made Multiple Rocket Launcher would we determine our compatibility is- command post exercise and field training Systems. sues and how would we influence our part- exercise along with the Emirati and Ku- Implementation ner artillery units? waiti artillery units. We conducted recurring staff engage- We were determined to quickly transi- We collectively processed hundreds ments which helped influence the imple- tion from chai conversations to compatible of fire missions — exercising the entire mentation of our engagement strategy. We operations. multi-echelon digital Fires process, from met bi-weekly with the 7th Artillery Corps One of 169th FAB’s key tasks in support target acquisition to dry fire field oper- commanders or staff officers. It was uncom- of OSS was to integrate the UAE field ar- ations. These exercises were also instru- mon for our Arab partners to conduct long- tillery forces into contingency operations mental in identifying compatibility issues term security cooperation planning due to in support of the combined defense of the which could impact the defense of the the uncertainty of their on-going opera- UAE and the Arabian Gulf. The UAE De- Arabian Gulf. Finally, 169th FAB conduct- tional deployment demands, so we focused fense Force has the 79th Heavy Rocket Reg- ed a culminating engagement exercise instead on short-term engagement plan- iment which consists of a HIMARS battal- named Exercise Spartan Thunder in Au- ning, usually four months in advance. We ion. As such, UAE is an integral part of the gust of 2017. This exercise was a combined, always included different 169th FAB staff combined defense of the Arabian Gulf. An- multi-national HIMARS general support members to reveal our organic Fires bri- other task of OSS was to conduct artillery artillery command post exercise and field gade capabilities and promote engagement operations in the same geographic battle training exercise. It served as a full digital opportunities. This was critical to establish- space as the Kuwaiti Land Force Artillery. and field rehearsal of the contingency plan ing relationships across the UAE artillery The following provides an overview of the along with our partner Kuwaiti and Emirati force. This method was also implement- efforts between 169th FAB, 7th Artillery artillery units. ed with the Kuwaiti Land Force Artillery Corps (UAE) and the KLF Artillery to build Interoperability leadership and our persistence resulted in partner capacity and provide for the com- The Soldiers of 169th FAB implemented numerous combined command post exer- bined defense of the Arabian Gulf. an interoperability model to assess, plan cises and field training exercises with the

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 29 Soldiers in 169th Field Artillery Brigade drive a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HI- MARS) during Spartan Thunder in August 2017. This was a combined field training exercise with U.S. military and the United Arab Emerite HIMARS units. (Courtesy photo)

Kuwaiti artillery forces. Next, we synchronized our efforts with our partner nation civilian defense advisors to create a mu- tually beneficial plan. The civilian defense advisors helped promote our programs and provide feedback to our interoperability assessments, and we subsequently helped to reinforce the advisors’ curriculum as well. These discussions were always in the presence of our Arab partners. Our key to success was persistence. Our Arab partners were busy so it was necessary to constantly demand their attention, establish professional credibility and add value in order to gain participation in our engagements. Adapting Our Arab partners’ military force structure and doctrine was constantly evolving, so 169th FAB sought creative engagement opportunities as the operating environment changed. The U.S. and UAE artillery battalions participated in a Subject Matter Expert Exchange Program. Officer, noncommissioned officer and Soldier participants conducted personnel exchanges throughout our deployment. The program promoted interoperability and built close relationships. Another example, we incor- porated U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps joint terminal air controllers (JTACs) into our engagements. This helped UAE determine how the U.S. military differentiates between JTACs, joint forward observers and forward observers. Next, we conducted numerous engagements at the UAE and Kuwaiti Artillery Schools. We focused our curriculum on interoperability shortfalls and future field engagement objectives. Finally, 169th FAB conducted the UAE Fires Lessons Learned Seminar in July of 2017. The seminar highlighted U.S. and UAE lessons learned in combat operations to improve our combined capabilities and interoperability. The seminar culminated with the U.S. and UAE military senior lead- tery echelon. During our engagements, we the targeting process. Our success and our ership discussing the lessons learned and persuaded our Arab partners to operate at strategy were sound and we provided a developed plans to integrate the lessons into follow-on combined engagements. an echelon above battery level. Our exercis- “way ahead” to our U.S. artillery successors Doctrine es were designed to ensure the Arab artil- to expand on our achievements. Our combined engagements helped our lery units operated as independent artillery During our final aerial movement back Arab partners develop new capabilities and battalions, developed battalion operational to Ali Al Salem, we reflected upon our per- implement new doctrine. Our Arab partner and fire control capabilities and incorpo- formance as the USARCENT Force Field artillery units trained at the platoon or bat- rated the higher-level corps echelon into Artillery Headquarters in support of OIR

30 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires and OSS. Soldiers in 169th FAB performed relationships with our Arab partner Red- the 147th Brigade Support Battalion command- their security cooperation duties in an ex- legs. On Target! er and Colorado National Guard CBRNE En- Lt. Col. Seamus Doyle is currently serving ceptional manner. We successfully influ- hanced Response Force Package commander. In enced our Arab partner artillery units, built as the U.S. Northern Command Colorado Army his civilian career, he is the director of opera- partner capabilities and improved our com- National Guard Mobilization Element J3-5 bined interoperability. While numerous in- staff officer. Doyle returned from deployment as tions and service delivery for NTT-Virtela, the teroperability issues remained, our mission the 169th Field Artillery Brigade deputy com- leading provider of enterprise networking and was rewarding and we established valuable mander. Prior to deployment, Doyle served as virtualized IT services.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 31 The synthetic training environment Bringing reality to fire support training By Maj. John Morris and Victor Bond During my (Maj. John Morris) 10 years fire support training. The Army and Ma- locations. This allows Soldiers to tailor the of service as a field artillery officer and Vic- rines are developing S/SVT together. The terrain to their upcoming operating envi- tor Bond’s 28 years of service as an infantry STE CFT is also working to enhance joint ronment (OE) prior to deployment. In ad- and Special Forces officer, we realized the fire support in the live/virtual training envi- dition, the depiction of patterns of life for Army lacks the ability to replicate the ef- ronment and capture data points in training civilian, friendly, neutral, coalition and en- fects of fire support during training. to apply in lessons learned. The STE CFT is emy forces as well as updated vehicles and This revelation was cemented when I also working to build the One World Ter- structures will provide more accurate rep- served as the senior artillery/fire support rain (OWT) capability for both rehearsals, resentations of the OE. As the STE matures, observer controller trainer (OCT) at the training and support operations. The STE HUDs will offer the potential to employ Joint Readiness Training Center’s Live Fire may also have the potential to augment the target acquisition capabilities — magnifi- Division. At JRTC we wanted to provide targeting process in both training and oper- cation and target recognition capabilities. rotational units a realistic understanding ational environments. The S/SVT will be more mobile due to its of the devastating effects of fire support. Fire supporter’s individual and team software-based technology that is primari- We were limited by multiple constraints training will be dramatically improved by ly contained in a heads up display. The last such as minimum safe distances and sur- the STE and S/SVT. Currently, the CFFT leap for the HUDs will be the jump from face danger zones. We partially mitigated has two transportable configurations (1:4 the training environment to the battlefield these constraints by using full-range train- and 1:12), a classroom fixed configuration being developed in conjunction with the ing rounds (non-explosive rounds), but this (1:30), and one Immersive Training Sys- Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team at work-around failed to provide the rotation- tem available only at Fort Sill, Okla. Ad- Fort Benning, Ga. al unit a full appreciation of fire support ditionally, there is a mobile training team The S/SVT has the potential to make the munitions and effects. Understanding this configuration developed for the Joint Fires combat training center “fire markers” a dis- is critical for combined arms live-fire ex- Observer School. These systems represent tant memory. The STE is improving joint ercises, as commanders must truly under- legacy technology that will not provide for fire support effects in the training environ- stand and master how to effectively syn- the joint fire supporter’s future training re- ment with a two-pronged approach. The chronize maneuver forces with the effects quirements. Emerging technology require- first approach is the previously mentioned of fire support munitions. Understanding ments provided by S/SVT include new S/SVT. Within this training capability are these effects allows maneuver commanders target locating devices; Lightweight Laser HUDs that project an augmented reality al- to effectively plan and assess risks, which Designator Rangefinder and Joint Effects lowing Soldiers and Marines to view joint cannot be fully achieved in training with Targeting System; Precision Fires Warrior existing training aids, devices, simulators Dismounted; Precision Fires terrain data- fire support effects which better replicate and simulations. bases; improved fire support coordination the live environment. This capability can Joint fire support personnel have limit- measures and airspace coordinating mea- potentially be achieved through integra- ed ability to experience realistic training for sures; and new Advanced Field Artillery tion of the HUDs and the Precision Fires multi-domain operations in diverse, com- Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The STE, Dismounted, which is the upgraded Pock- plex operational environments. A potential through OWT, heads up display systems et-Sized Forward Entry Device used by solution to these shortfalls is the capabili- (HUDs) and other technologies are going to forward observers in acquiring and trans- ties the Synthetic Training Environment provide a robust joint Fires training capa- mitting target data. This can be achieved by (STE) Cross Functional Team (CFT) is cur- bility combined with geographical terrain sending the templated point of impact and rently developing. developed by OWT. By employing HUDs projecting the effects into the HUD. Other The intent of this article is to explain the and OWT, Soldiers will be able to train in considerations that may be included are potential of the STE CFT’s Soldier/Squad virtualized, realistic terrain from any part fuze/shell combinations, and proximity of Virtual Trainer (S/SVT) (which will replace of the globe. The five terrain databases the Soldier to the point of impact, which the Call for Fire Trainer, or CFFT, and En- found in CFFT will be replaced with ter- can assist to further bring reality to the live gagement Skill Trainer) to enhance joint rain of the user’s choosing or deployment training environment.

32 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires The second prong of this effort is hap- platform. This can facilitate collaborative al munitions effects when applied to the tics which replicates the feeling of shrapnel. planning, and assess the recent effects of training environment. This increases accu- Haptics is a maturing technology current- munitions on both terrain and structures racy for standard and precision munitions ly constrained to a suit that is too bulky to before arriving on the battlefield. During and allows for battle damage assessments wear in a field environment. The STE CFT my time deployed and at JRTC it was diffi- and collateral damage estimates based on is working with industry partners on this cult to review plans with fixed wing pilots detailed target characteristics. to allow Soldiers to “feel the heat” pri- prior to execution. The 30-45 minutes spent The STE with S/SVT can revolutionize or to touching the fire of combat. Haptics reviewing de-confliction measures and tar- the fire support effects in the live training can replicate the effect of shrapnel raining geted areas of interest saved immense time environment and provide many other ad- down on friendly forces. When combined and resources. In my experience, the time vantages. This capability is going to give with HUD technology, it provides the dis- spent discussing this information allowed maneuver commanders and fire supporters orienting effects associated with fire sup- pilots to engage targets with little guidance a true understanding of fire support pri- port munitions. after their initial check-in. Our primary is- or to combat. It also has potential to bring Currently, the lessons learned from sue was the inability to discuss topics such greater collaboration, detail, fidelity and training are typically compiled into a Pow- as de-confliction measures/targets with a speed to the targeting process. erPoint presentation, burned onto a CD, common set of maps that could easily be Maj. John Morris is a Synthetic Training and then stored in a Modular Lightweight shared. Employing a common set of maps Environment Cross Functional Team operations Load-Carrying Equipment or computer bag allows personnel to synchronize operations officer who previously served as a field artillery until … forever. As an OCT in a tactical en- from multiple locations using the same in- vironment, the capture of data is largely left formation. This capability will not be lim- officer. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Univer- to the naked eye, memory, the accuracy of ited to training, but can be used operation- sity (College Station) and holds a Masters of notes, clear communications and luck. The ally. OWT will be used in a classified up to Military Arts and Sciences from the Command STE CFT is working to change this by cap- secret, or unclassified level. and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, turing data points during training while it The combination of HUDs with OWT Kan. He has served three tours in Afghanistan. is happening. Subjective observations will can revolutionize the targeting process His assignments include the 82nd Airborne be combined with quantitative observa- through automation and greater fidelity. and 101st Airborne divisions where he served tions captured by the STE. The STE intends HUDs will eventually be employed oper- as a company and squadron fire support officer, to use equipment to capture biometric data. ationally. The potential to apply facial rec- targeting officer, executive officer and battery There is potential to capture differences in ognition software to HUDs with augment- commander. At Joint Readiness Training Cen- the optical perception as the FO becomes ed reality capability allows for increased fatigued. In addition, the STE has the po- target acquisition accuracy based on the ter, Morris served as the Live Fire Division Fire tential to automatically incorporate accu- target characteristics. Tying this capability Support/Battery observer coach trainer. racy details for joint fire support mission to targeting priorities, target selection stan- Victor Bond is a retired Special Forces offi- data into a feedback mechanism available dards, and OWT can lead to automation of cer with 28 years of service. Currently, he is a to both Soldiers/Marines and their leaders. the targeting process. OWT allows recently Department of the Army civilian, who serves During the Field Artillery Captain’s acquired images to be imported into a com- as the Army and Special Operations capability Career Course I remember consistently be- mon operating picture while simultane- developer for Joint Fires and Joint Medical. He ing told by instructors pitching classes on ously being analyzed by a computer using holds a Master of Arts degree in Human Re- mission command systems (MCS) such as target selection standards and the maneu- sources Development from Webster University Command Post of the Future, or AFATDS ver commander’s targeting guidance. The in St. Louis, Mo. and Masters of Military Arts that each system is “the Army’s mission interactive capability of OWT allows those command system.” Unfortunately, my ex- conducting the targeting/collateral damage and Sciences in History from the Command perience revealed a myriad of MCSs with estimates the ability to better forecast ef- and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, different maps. The discrepancies in the fects on the battlefield. The increased fideli- Kan. Bond served in numerous command and systems’ maps, their lack of transportabil- ty can be used to analyze the effects of mu- staff assignments in the infantry, Special Forc- ity, availability and classification issues nitions on different building types, ground es and the United States Special Operations forced me to rely on paper maps or terrain surfaces, and more. When OWT is incorpo- Command. Additionally, he served as an ad- tools to conduct planning at home station. rated with drone mapping, recent changes visor in Central/South America and Africa. While some of the issues are mitigated, we to the operating environment can be incor- Bond worked extensively with the Fires Center still lack a common virtual, interactive map porated and shared almost immediately. of Excellence and the Army Special Operations of the world that is easily accessible and fre- Furthermore, it can allow fire supporters to Command on the Call for Fire Trainer Program. quently updated. The solution is the STE’s adjust observation posts and de-confliction One World Terrain. This will allow fire sup- measures based on weather or geographic He is the Joint Fires capability developer for the porters to plan complex training events, as- changes to terrain, to include target areas Soldier/Squad Virtual Trainer, Line of Effort, sess risk (range bearing tools, range circles, located in micro terrain such as narrow as part of the Synthetic Training Environment etc.), and analyze terrain using the same mountain valleys. OWT replicates actu- Cross Functional Team.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 33 The M777A2 howitzer provides general support field artillery firing for the U.S. Army’s infantry and Stryker brigade combat teams. The M777A2 is the first ground combat system whose major structures are made of high strength titanium alloy, making it more than 7,000 pounds lighter than its predecessor, the M198.1 This decrease in weight allows the howitzer to be towed by any four-wheel drive vehicle over 2.5 tons, transported via rotary or fixed-wing aircraft and traverse terrain that was previously untrafficable using the M198 howitzer. Throughout the Global War on Terror, the M777A2 continues to be used successfully on firebases and forward operating bases throughout the world, providing direct support artillery Fires to American and coalition forces. However, how does the United States Army use this asset to fight and win a decisive action engagement against an artillery-centric army while operating in challenging terrain? The following article attempts to answer this question using the Army’s current doctrine, as well as the authors’ experiences as an observer, coach/trainer at the National Training Cen- ter, in Fort Irwin, Calif. Physical fitness Fighting in high desert As stated by the Sergeant Major of the Army, “Physical training may not be the most important thing we do that day, but it is the most important thing we do every day in the United States Army.”2 High levels of physical fitness are re- Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, quired of all field artillerists, and cannon 2nd Infantry Division, send a round downrange from an M777A2 during Decisive Action Rota- crew physical fitness plays a major role tion 18-06 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., April 16, 2018. (Staff Sgt. Ernesto in the emplacement of howitzer sections Gonzalez/U.S. Army) during operations. M777A2 units routinely perform at a lower level than the operational environment demands. Many M777A2 units at NTC “run out of steam” within 72 hours of contact with the enemy, resulting in occupation times nearing 15 minutes and Rising to the out of traverse missions averaging between 20-30 minutes. Although many see the desert and mountainous environment of the National challenge Training Center as a daunting physical and mental challenge, the desert is essentially Fighting and winning with neutral, affecting both the opposing force (OPFOR) and the rotational training unit.

1 United States Marine Corps. 2005. Marine Corps Concepts the M777A2 at National and Programs. December. Accessed August 21, 2017. https:// marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/fire-support/ lightweight-155-mm-howitzer-lw-155. 2 Tan, Michelle. 2015. Army Times. November 23. Accessed Training Center February 02, 2018. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2015/11/23/sma-dailey-s-top-10-leadership-tips-for-ser- By Capt. Aaron Palmer and Sgt. 1st Class Charles Lairson geants-major/.

34 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires However, when properly prepared and trained, the desert and mountainous environment of the National Training Center offers specific advantages to units fighting with the M77A2. Howitzer employment The terrain at the National Training Center offers distinct advantage to a towed howitzer battalion through its ability to provide excellent concealment. In numerous locations within the training area, wa- dis and washes provide complete cover and concealment to individual M777A2 sections and sometimes to an entire battery. The use of the terrain gun positioning in conjunction with properly assembled camouflage netting enables the battery to decrease its probability of detection from enemy ground and air assets. Dispersion also plays a key role in the survivability of the M777A2 battery. The near-peer threat is an artillery-centric force placing great emphasis on massing indirect Fires. The average OPFOR field artillery battalions consist of 54 122 mm howitzers U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade and 36 multiple launch rocket systems. On Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, fire an M777A2 during Decisive Action Rotation 18-06 at average, OPFOR fire missions consist of 45 the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., April 16, 2018. (Pfc. Carlos Cameron/U.S. Army) rounds of a dual-purpose improved conventional munition fired in an open sheaf. requirements and survivability move crite- lection and occupation of a position (RSOP) This results in a large area within the po- ria upon contact. Appendix B, Table B-4 of is also key to the M777A2 battery’s survival sition area for artillery (PAA) affected by Army Techniques Publication 3-09.50 also at the National Training Center. As outlined a single OPFOR fire mission. Although provides a thorough pre-combat checklist in ATP 3-09.50, pages 3-4, Table 3-1, the doctrine teaches us that there should be for an air threat. battery commander should always use the 250 m to 300 m of dispersion between gun Moreover, in order to mitigate the high reconnaissance movement order prior to sections, it is best to provide a minimum risk of enemy counterfire and observed in- movement and conducting the RSOP. In ad- of 300 m to 350 m dispersion between sec- direct fire on the M777A2 battery, the gun- dition to the battery commander, gunnery tions. And if terrain permits, to disperse up nery sergeants must reconnoiter, identify sergeants and security element, an effective to 500 m or greater when in open terrain and inform the battery of their alternate and techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) without concealment. Although this results supplementary positions upon receiving found at the National Training Center is for in extremely large PAAs, it will greatly mit- indirect fire. A common mistake made at the reconnaissance party to also include a igate the formidable counterfire risk that is the National Training Center is the gunnery fire direction center. This allows the battery ever-present during the rotation and is a re- sergeants and battery commander plan for to thoroughly test their ability to communi- ality when fighting a near-peer adversary. one alternate battery position within the cate at the new PAA and, if needed, provide Another new threat faced by the M777A2 PAA. Thus, once the battery has moved to bottom up refinement to the battalion staff battery is that of unmanned aerial surveil- this position and receives enemy contact, as to the suitability of the proposed PAA. lance. Dispersion and use of terrain as con- there is rarely another position planned for The battery commander should also concealment play a key role in mitigating the the battery to survive into, resulting ina duct a time distance analysis of estimated threat of unmanned aerial systems (UASs). frantic (and dangerous) movement at night battery movement time from the current to Routinely, batteries will come in contact as gun crews attempt to find adequate po- the future PAA. This estimation must take with a UAS through either sight or sound, sitions to occupy. As stated in ATP 3-09.50 into account the terrain and whether or not and battery personnel are unaware of ac- the gunnery sergeant is the battery’s pri- the movement will be conducted during tions to take. This normally results in the mary reconnaissance expert and spends a daylight or periods of darkness. This time OPFOR neutralizing or destroying a bat- great deal of time away from the battery. distance analysis must be submitted to the tery through observed Fires. In addition to Thus, the gunnery sergeants and battery battalion command post, as it is a crucial using the terrain and dispersing the battery, commander must be constantly thinking component of the staff’s running estimates. it is recommended that the Fires battalion ahead and reconnoitering future positions As stated in Chapter 3 of ATP 3-09.50, provide clear guidance to the batteries on for the guns and fire direction centers. the battery commander selects the battery the measures to take when making contact Reconnaissance, selection, firing area and once the general location with a UAS. This guidance should be in the occupation of a position has been determined, the gunnery ser- form of air guard requirements, reporting Conducting a proper reconnaissance, se- geants conduct a detailed preparation of

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 35 their respective platoon areas. However, load system truck, normally a part of the saves the energy of the Soldiers, which is it is commonly observed at NTC that this distribution platoon, should be attached to consumed quickly as the rates of fire and preparation is not fully conducted, result- each firing battery. This attachment greatly resupply increase during the duration of ing in the battery taking additional time to enhances the ammunition haul capacity of the rotation. Battery commanders and pla- occupy and report in position ready to fire. the battery as well as allows the battery to toon leadership should make a dedicated This may be avoided by using a templat- anticipate and be ready for future missions effort to ensure that the cranes are opera- ed gunnery sergeant’s report; an excellent through the increased amount of ammuni- tional and load tested prior to arrival at the example of which is found in ATP 3-09.70, tion on hand. NTC and that Soldiers are properly trained Figure 3-2. Once the advance party con- Furthermore, attaching forward mainte- on their use to benefit from the distinct ad- duct’s RSOP, it must take up hide positions nance teams (FMTs) with adequate resourc- vantage this system provides. If the use of within the PAA. Often at NTC, the advance es to make repairs to the firing batteries, fully mission capable crane systems is not party will remain in the open for long pe- assists in keeping the maximum amount of possible for the battery, then the battery riods of time resulting in enemy forward howitzers in the fight. As observed at the commander must understand the amount observers calling fire missions onto the new National Training Center, the most suc- of time it will take to resupply the battery. PAA and compromising the PAA prior to cessful FMTs are those that have been ade- This is accomplished by understanding the main body’s arrival. quately resourced at the battery level. This how long it takes Soldiers to breakdown As previously mentioned in discussing usually includes the battery having at least and distribute Class V from flat rack to gun survivability, once the gunnery sergeants one 91B and 91F, a contact truck, and/or a section using the planning factor of one have determined the primary positions for shop stock van, as well as at least one U6 round, per one Soldier, per minute to trans- the howitzers and fire direction centers, qualified noncommissioned officer with the fer a round from one location to another. they must immediately begin thinking of proper U6 tool kit. Through this modified Fire control, digital fire control the next positions the battery must move task organization for combat in an environ- system advantages to upon receiving indirect fire. As stated in ment such as NTC, the battery is better able When operating in a decisive action en- ATP 3-09.50 Chapter 3-5, the alternate posi- to quickly repair and conduct important vironment, the M777A2 battery will find tion must be reconnoitered as part of posi- maintenance, ensuring maximum firing ca- improved situational awareness, personnel tion improvement activities for the gunnery pability and mobility at all times. management, and massing of Fires when sergeant. The alternate and supplementary Combat configures loads (CCLs) also using the battery operations center (BOC) in positions must be far enough away to avoid provide the field artillery battalion the abili- conjunction with a platoon operations cen- the effects of enemy indirect fire while sity to provide a quick and effective means of ter (POC) that controls the howitzers. The multaneously ensuring that the battery can managing ammunition at the battalion and BOC provides tactical situational aware- service preplanned targets. battery level. Prior to arrival at the National ness to the battery command team as well In addition, the battery commander Training Center, the unit should establish as providing pertinent information to the must take the sustainment of the battery a menu of CCLs that are codified and pub- battalion main command post resulting in into consideration when conducting RSOP. lished in the battalion’s standard operating bottom-up refinements for battalion plan- In doing so, they must ensure the battery procedures. Prior to ordering CCLs, the ning. Simultaneously, the POC controls all will be able to conduct resupply operations battalion staff must take the field artillery firing howitzers resulting in an increased in the PAA and that the terrain itself will tasks, commander’s guidance and desired ability to rapidly mass Fires and provide a not result in a risk to mission accomplish- munition effects into account. The -battal larger sheaf onto a target. BOC/POC oper- ment to the battery by inhibiting it from ion fire direction officer and S3 then give ations also allow the battery fire direction quickly and efficiently conducting resupply guidance to the S4 on what CCLs to order personnel a realistic long-term work/rest operations. and the staging location at either the Com- cycle that will be necessary during decisive Sustainment bat Trains Command Post or Field Trains action operations. As simply stated by Maj Gen. J.B.A. Bai- Command Post. This deliberate planning of The block 4 upgrade to the Digital Fire ley of the Royal Artillery, “Logistics are the CCL composition and staging will greatly Control System provides several advan- foundation of artillery tactics, for where assist the unit in providing responsive and tages to the M777A2 battery. It provides there is no ammunition, there is no fire con- flexible Fires to the brigade. howitzer location, navigation, digital com- centration.” At the battery level, maintaining the munications and emplacement/displace- A lack of a detailed plan for sustainment cranes equipped on the M1084s will great- ment-aid capabilities.3 The distinct advan- will always result in inadequate Fires or no ly decrease the battery resupply time. The tage with the block 4 upgrade is in its ability Fires available for the maneuver forces. As National Training Center utilizes a “one to allow batteries to fight similar to that of observed in the desert environment of the round, one person, per minute” guideline a self-propelled howitzer using the “goose National Training Center, the following for loading notional 155 mm ammunition egg” concept of survivability moves. This TTPs can assist the rotational training unit and propellants. Through proper utiliza- concept of conducting survivability moves in creating a successful sustainment plan. tion of the crane systems, the overall re- allows each howitzer to quickly displace It is highly recommended that the bat- supply times may be reduced from the cur- and emplace within 1,500 m from their last tery task organization be modified in or- rent 30 minutes per M1083/1084 by hand, location without relaying and conducting der to better assist the logistics of the firing to five to 10 minutes by using the cranes. a dry fire verification in the new position. unit. In order to facilitate the most flexible This reduces the times that resupply assets This is especially advantageous in the de- sustainment support, at least one palletized are exposed in a stationary position. It also cisive action fight as it allows the battery to

3 Systems, Towed Artillery. 2017. M777A2 Digital Fire Control System (DFCS) Operator's Notes. Picatinny Arsenal, January 11.

36 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, fire an M777A2 during Decisive Action Rotation 18-06 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., April 16, 2018. (Staff Sgt. Ernesto Gonzalez/U.S. Army) conduct survivability moves and quickly be to the battery. Prior to arrival at the Nation- based on survivability move criteria) en- in position ready to fire against a near-peer, al Training Center, units must diligently ables howitzer sections to survive when artillery centric threat. develop a physical readiness program that enemy counter-fire radar and delivery sys- Recommendations for home station prepares Soldiers for the rigors of combat tems fire counter-fire missions. training and their profession. Creating a PRT pro- Repetitions of duty-oriented condition- It is understandably challenging to program to meet specified unit standards on ing training during daily physical readiness vide realistic home station unit training. the APFT are counter-productive, as many training is necessary for all M777A2 units These challenges are normally twofold: of the exercises are not tailored toward to gain and maintain the stamina needed 1. The challenge to simulate the effects of artillery specific functions. Field Manu- to win the first fight. Only through incor- indirect Fires and 2. The tendency to focus al 7-22, Appendix A, page A-1 states, PRT porating both technical and tactical train- primarily on technical aspects of artillery, programs must be developed to take this ing into each home station training event, while neglecting the tactical aspects.4 Al- base level of conditioning and raise it to though we cannot always effectively simu- help meet or exceed mission-related phys- no matter how mundane, will the M777A2 late a battalion six at home station, leaders ical performance tasks. Commanders must battalion be enabled to overcome every ob- within the artillery battalion and division ensure that physical fitness testing does not stacle that the Mojave Desert and the OP- artillery are able to ensure tactical aspects of form the foundation of unit or individual FOR can throw in the battalion’s way. training are not atrophied at home. Home PRT programs. In order to prepare for op- Sgt. 1st Class Charles Lairson serves the station unit training, to include all cannon erations in the high desert, PRT must focus Fire Support Training team (Wolf) battery first qualification tables should encompass tac- on conditioning geared towards sprinting sergeant and headquarters trainer at the Na- tical aspects of training, such as dispersion from truck to trails; cross-loading ammuni- tional Training Center. of gun sections and react to counter-battery tion; digging spades quickly and efficiently, Capt. Aaron Palmer serves as the Fire Sup- fire. especially in hard, rocky ground; and the Physical readiness training (PRT) and ability to emplace/displace/shift azimuths. port Training team (Wolf) battalion fire direc- the stamina required to sustain high vol- The conditioning required to occupy and tion center trainer at the National Training umes of fire are of the utmost importance displace multiple times (6-20 times daily Center.

4 Bailey, Jonathan B. A. 2004. Field Artillery and Firepower. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 37 Drone defense from combined arms for air defense to organic

Byground Lt. Col. Thomas Groborsch based air defense The following conceptual thoughts are The railgun seems to be the effector of ing job of leveraging the efficiency of our meant to describe a sustainable future air choice for the second Layer as it answers infantry. Consequently, below the orches- defense response to current and future the problem of many of the dilemmas and trated Combined Arms for Air Defense, the threats in the third, fourth and fifth dimen- is available at this moment. Emission-free near-future solution to the problem relies sions (airspace, space and cyberspace). This solutions autonomously executed concern- on drone technology enhancing the single analysis is derived from the eight dilemmas ing their organic abilities seems to be the Soldier’s situational awareness, reach and which are: sustainable solution for Layer 1 for maneu- killing efficiency. This could be sustainable 1. The area/surface-space dilemma ver forces. Installations with known posi- economically. During the last couple of de- 2. The quantity dilemma – staff/material tions should have organic solutions with cades, the number of bullets shot per killed 3. The mobility dilemma greater range at Layer 1 and this fixed capa- enemy rose from a few to several thousand, 4. The connectivity dilemma bility is what brings the laser back into the which is a lot in terms of weight, money 5. The camouflage dilemma game. Offensive drone use seems to be the and time used compared to what a drone 6. The signature dilemma better defense for the infantry fighting in could bring to the game. Since it is mass 7. The mass dilemma urban areas, mountains and in forests not produced, the “flying hand grenade” and a 8. The definition and selection dilemma directly supported by mechanized forces. simple camera could be the focus weapon The deductions and conclusions in this Throughout this paper, one will realize on the infantry squad level with a reach of paper are a result of threats driving the op- a lot of current problems, such as choppers 2 to 5 km and would be economical. With- timization of force capabilities for the pro- or cruise missiles, are theoretically includ- in the firefight, the opponent would be at- tective mission of the U.S. and supported ed and solved within the derived future tackable from all directions and in the third forces. This paper does not reflect current setup. The deductions and conclusions for dimension. Even buildings shelter the ene- German positions or concepts, but the au- each dilemma will be described starting at my only if there is no hole in the building. thor’s own thoughts. Layer 1 and ending with the consequences A backpack with two to three single-use Taking the current systems and those at Layer 3. hand-started drones and a remote control under development into consideration, this Below Layer 1 would bring greater leverage to the squad paper elaborates on a sustainable future air There seems to be demand for a differ- on the ground. defense (AD) capability and possible pos- ent setup and way of thinking about the Elaborating on Combined Arms for Air tures. Partly, current trends and develop- infantry fight as the Combined Arms for Defense starts not at the very bottom of ments are seen to be unsustainable in the Air Defense has its limits when the fight the fight, but at a level where mechanized midterm. Therefore, some aspects are not in is brought to areas where constant vehicle troops are the decisive force. line with the foreseeable setup concerning support to the fight is denied. In this envi- 1. The area/surface-space dilemma system solutions. The Army Integrated Air ronment, even with today’s technology, the – distance limitations caused and Missile Defense approach as a whole idea to enable the Soldier to defend himself by the flight level of the threat is seen as the base for the future AD with from the opponent’s hand grenade or bul- considering reaction times, earth some modifications concerning the links to lets would be much too complex and would curvature, urban structures and the organic maneuver force (the lower end). bring with it all the described dilemmas incrustation. Future drone offensive and defensive and power and weight issues to the Soldier. The fight against low, slow, small (LSS) operations are raising questions for classi- The very limited capabilities of the infantry drones can only be conducted by organic cal role differentiation between the services in terms of mobility and payload should troops at platoon or company level and has (especially the Air Force) on the upper end not be further dragged down by complex to take place across the entire battlefield of air defense. On the lower end, this paper defensive systems against the thousands and on the lines of control (LOCs) in the touches the limits of drone defense using of different future means of nano and mi- vicinity of the friendly forces. Specialized foreseeable technological development for cro-size drone technology. Research and AD Soldiers not trained in the mission be- at least the next 10 years in infantry units development should concentrate on small havior/tactical principles of the respective that are not mechanized-supportable due gadgets to beef up passive defense. Supe- troops would first cause more risk, burden to the setup of the battlespace. This paper rior offense, including drone-based recon- and friction than use. Think about missions finally advocates for passive sensors and naissance and weapons, is the best defense in an urban environment and within areas autonomous/decentralized command and for the foreseeable future at this level. A with difficult incrustation. Second, it would control (C2) for Layers 1 and 2 to the largest war of attrition at the tactical level is not cause an enormous demand of additional extent possible. avoidable and drones can do an outstand- Soldiers. Third, it would drive the Army

38 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires A visual depiction of the result of a variety of facts, assumptions, deductions and conclusions in this paper. (Courtesy illustration) into an organizational problem and last, economically too high and in the mid to with an additional qualification. In the but not least, it would lead to the question long term – especially concerning the mass good old days, this was the Air Guard with of whether the Army is responsible for do- aspect – they are simply not sustainable. To binoculars and target acquisition for the ing this also for the Air Force and Navy in- minimize the amount of systems needed troops. With regard to the modern drone stallations/mobile components. (C2, logistics, force protection), the future fight, this will be sensors, notational and Therefore, it is recommended that all effector has to be able to cover the respec- information processing media that enables troops on the ground should have the addi- tive flight levels of the drones in classes two the troops to proceed and identify the find- tional task to fight LSS drones. But in terms and three nearby and also as far out as pos- ings of organic sensors and display them on of reach of their effectors, ground troops’ sible. Conclusively, the solution to the area/ organic notational capabilities of the troops abilities are very limited to fight drones of surface-space dilemma within Layer 2 is at the platoon or company level. Based on class two and higher. To fight those drones passive radar technology and railguns with this air picture, the engagement of hos- is a classic air defense task of organic air de- embedded or remote tracking and engage- tile classified targets will be done relying fense forces. ment capabilities linked into Integrated Air heavily on one to be a developed effector AD forces have to be enabled to cover and Missile Defense Battle Command Sys- as a focus weapon and the hand weapons significant amounts of airspace in a cost tem (IBCS). of the troops. The actual developments of efficient manner with regard to sensors 2. The quantity dilemma – staff/ the Russian forces show clearly one threat- and effectors because drones are mass pro- material ening trend in that manner. Russia rolled duced and fabricated on an industrial scale. Taken as given, that the fight against out its first drone-borne anti-tank weap- They will be available covering the whole drones LSS at Layer 1 is a problem to be on. The new Russian tank is promoted to possible airborne mission set anywhere, solved at platoon or company level, a quan- have at least organic anti-rocket artillery anytime. Cyber space is the enabler, the tity problem becomes obvious. As elaborat- mortar (RAM) abilities working based on drone is the means. Conclusively, AD sen- ed before, it does not make sense to create a passive sensor. This development could sors have a connection, camouflage, cost new military occupational specialties for make friendly focus weapon systems like and signature problem, which seems (aside this task, as costs to benefits are in no rela- tanks and artillery irrelevant on the battle from tracking) to be controllable and man- tion and as today existing and future mate- field of the future as long as they are unable ageable in terms of costs by passive radar rial solutions will enable the force to deal to defend themselves against drone-borne technology. For the effector, this means with the problem with their organic means engagements. there is primarily a connection, area, cost in terms of Layer 1. The quantity problem Above the Combined Arms for Air De- and mass problem. Missiles will not solve implies the growth of organic capability to fense in Layer 2, the quantitative problem those problems. The price to overcome the fight LSS drones with the means of organic in terms of the effector is only shrinkable space to the target and to navigate the mis- troops. The ability encompasses a material with reach. The more reach we have at sile to hit the relatively simple target are solution for the troops, which gets along minimized costs, the lower the number of

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 39 Second Lt. La’Portia London, support platoon leader and 2nd Lt. Jessica Slade, launcher platoon leader, both assigned to Delta Battery, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery coordinate positions for the two launch stations during Juniper Cobra 18 at Mount Eitam, Israel Feb. 27, 2018. Juniper Cobra 18 is a ballistic missile defense joint U.S.-Israel exercise that uses computer simulations to train U.S. and Israeli military service members and to enhance interoperability. (10th Mountain Division) systems necessary. Being part of the cen- still had a decent number of emission free tasks for the protected troops. The sensors, trally organized AD fight, the effector and Roland I systems, which caused the allies the display devices and the effectors should the sensor for Layer 2 will be part of the to avoid low flight levels. Unless Layer 2 is conclusively be mounted on the respective organic ADA forces. But, the effector also supported accurately by satellite or other transportation means or focus weapons of has to be fast in terms of mission execution technology, it needs to be covered by pas- the respective units, which is also import- to cover the air space as low as possible to sive technology on the ground in addition ant in terms of self-protection. create overlap with Layer 1. An anti-drone to those active currently existing systems Above the Combined Arms for Air De- drone, for example, would be much too in order to deal with the fact that we will fense, sensors and effectors are to be fully slow to overcome the distances at Layer 2 never have enough material to address the mobile on their own. The deployment con- at the needed speeds. whole scenario. cept of DA Weapons of Layer 2 is, beside It is highly probable we will never be 3. The mobility dilemma the abilities of the current available mis- able to cover the entire battle field and all The mobility capability to fight drones at sile-based weapon systems, similar to old LOCs at flight levels of Layer 2. Conclusive- Layer 1 has to be 1:1 in line with the mobil- short-range air defense concepts at a larger ly, we can counter the quantity problem at ity of the respective troops dependent on it. scale (belt defense, point defense, Layered Layer 2 only by putting the enemy into a In order to not endanger or deteriorate the defense, cloud defense, etc.). Mobility is dilemma using his drone assets. Only by tactical behavior of the fighting troops or to not really the issue at Layer 2. The issue is using passive (radar) technology, are we determine tactical decisions by the needs of logistics and force protection. Friendly AD able to blur and hide the parts of the sce- a fight supporting task, no additional vehi- assets have to morph into organic troop nario we cannot cover which are in danger cles or trailers should be introduced when structures on the battlefield as much as from enemy drones. The enemy is in a con- possible. Furthermore, the use of sensors possible to be protected and lined by those stant planning dilemma on where and how and effectors should neither determine units. By being passive, they do not endan- to use drones within Layer 2. Historically the mobility nor the dislocation of tactical ger the troops they are embedded with and this effect showed up at the air operations units. The presence of those capabilities being close to them provides significant air at the no fly zones in Iraq, where Saddam should not lead to further force protection cover/protection.

40 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires 4. The connectivity dilemma – ders, airspace coordinating measures and additional burden to the troops complicat- marginal utility viewing so on. ing or hampering their mission execution? The embedding of the organic capability To give as much efficiency as possible to Living in the age where every cart and “Combined Arms for Air Defense” (Layer the troops, but also to enhance and maxi- fork-lift truck exchange uses GPS-based 1) into air warfare does not make sense. mize airspace safety for the friendly air as- data within the internet, it should be possi- Some minor data exchange features that sets, the following conditions/prerequisites ble to provide strongly encrypted IP-based leverage the abilities on all layers are ex- should be given: identification assistance to the troops on cluded from this statement. • The troops should have an organic laser the ground to foster the troops’ decision On one hand, to connect the abilities of device as part of their equipment in or- cycle. Bringing this concept into reality Layer 1 in order for them to be centralized der to determine the flight level of an ob- would spare a lot of coordination in terms or decentralized in our current understand- ject before an engagement. This capabil- of C2 and make a lot of C2 entities dragging ing of such terms, are (beside some internet ity will be part of the Air Guard sensor down the engagement order (EO) process- protocol (IP) based data exchange, mate- set and the optic of the focus weapon. es superfluous. Time is not money, but the rial and staff elements) enormous task re- • The troops are autonomous with some main resource, blood, is saved while exe- quirements and one quickly runs into the IP-based information exchange. They cuting drone wars. Machines are superior dilemmas 1 through 3. On the other hand, are principally under WH and act in to humans in terms of speed of executing the sensor data of the battlefield with all self-defense. Their limited battlespace the decision cycle. We should at least make the false alerts created by the battle turmoil in terms of engagement reach of their ef- sure that Soldiers on the ground are not fur- and reflections would corrupt the allover fectors justifies any engagement as being ther bogged down by decision cycles of the RAP with a lot of clutter. Besides that, the done in self-defense. EO chain when they could react in a sort of redundant ubiquity of the internet in the • An IP-based RAP tailored to the Air coordinated reflex as self-defense. Conversely, the live data of those troops battlespace (satellite, drone based, through Guard’s position gives additional help fed into the net should not be more than cable and radio) enables us to provide an for the decision cycle. However, its assumed hostile tracks in IBCS. Providing IP-based and encrypted RAP to the troops availability is not a prerequisite for an this data, they can give an early warning to on the ground to give them additional help engagement. other units and receive support of the sec- in terms of early warning and identifica- • Optical and acoustic sensor data togeth- ond layer. Even passively tracked targets tion. This also gives our own air assets a er with optical verification are means of can be provided to the net with a rough, further plus in terms of safety maneuvering identification. but good enough, position and flight level at the flight levels of the Combined Arms • Optical identification is mandatory be- if you have a laser measurement from your for Air Defense. One should strive for a pos- fore the engagement. The devices of the position to the threat – either produced by sibility of information exchange over radio Air Guard and the focus weapons have the sensors of the Air Guard including a horizontally and vertically without being a the ability to magnify the picture and a distance measuring laser, or the measure- mandatory prerequisite for an engagement. processor that identifies the objects of ment of the focus weapon. The reporting All drone engagements will be in self-de- the picture in the way of face recogni- and data provided by the troops should not fense and the steady weapon control status tion software. The database, of course, be more than a standard after-action report (WCS) for the troops will be weapons hold are shapes of drones, choppers, CMs concerning origin points of drones, if pos- (WH). The drones they can identify as hos- and aircrafts. sible on the EO and their organic chain of tile, but not engage, are the suggested hos- • Any engagement can only be executed command. tile put by these forces on the net, which act in a manual mode, no semi-automatic or Above the Combined Arms for Air De- in an autonomous-like mode all over. automatic mode possible. fense, all sensors and effectors should be This is a very important point and can- • Beside their crypto radio and an en- on the net and contribute directly to the not be stressed enough: If we give the troops crypted IP address, nothing in the cyber EO. Also here at Layer 2, the claim to lead too much airspace in terms of engagement and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) everything centralized seems to be only by providing them means like a laser that space should reveal the troop’s position doable via an existing internet. However, fights a drone in five to 10 kilometers at an or type of weapon system used (charac- decentralized mode should stay as mode of altitude of 500 meters, those troops become teristics of high energy (HE) laser, RS operation in doctrine as the opponent may part of the all over AD fight in terms of C2. etc.). be only partially able to deny GPS/inter- It is highly recommended not to do this as Those taking the efficiency of avoiding net access. As local bubbles of systems are it would complicate/paralyze the whole AD blue-on-blue engagement into question still able to identify, track and engage they machinery. It would drive inefficiencies for should remember the old times with peer should be encouraged to do so by doctrine. a limited improvement to the protection of opponents when - with much less tech- 5. The camouflage dilemma the ground troops that may not be guaran- nical support - the troops had permission The basic problem of all organic AD teed. The troops are then put into a contin- to shoot down whatever threatened them forces embedded in troops on the ground uous dilemma of whether or not to follow with their means on hand. Or, how the is to provide air cover, was in the good old their own tactical procedure, or give room troops on the ground interact with their days the active sensors of the surface-to-air to the needs of the AD combat supporter. own air assets having loaded weapons on missile (SAM) systems contradicting all Last, but not least, the poor Air Guard must hand while those assets land or pick-up. camouflage measures of the troops by being become a tactical specialist for AD working Even if their own LSS drone is shot down deployed in their vicinity or accompanying with different WCSs, airspace control or- on occasion – so what? Does this justify any them on the march. This mistake should

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 41 not be repeated today with the EMS and the shooters if they should have tracking components into the air is too expensive. cyberspace being more and more the focal mounted or the radar that guided the shot. Keep it simple and straight seems to be the point of reconnaissance. That’s why there Believe me, as I’m German Air Force, a war call of the hour in terms of Combined Arms are strong endorsements in terms of using of attrition is never won by the air assets for Air Defense, including defense against passive technology within Layer 1. More among peer competitors. The third Reich helicopters and more in self-defense. than an IP address within a certain radio had some experiences there in Britain. It Above the Combined Arms for Air De- cell that could be the one of - for example - took a superiority of the Allies over Ger- fense, it should be scrutinized what dis- a civil truck or the one of an air guard with many to successfully penetrate and execute tances passive radar technology could cov- his passive sensors should not be revealed an air attritional strategy. Even then, more er in terms of the signatures of drones of in the EMS and cyber spectrum in terms of than six or seven Schweinfurts would may- parts of Class 1, and Classes 2 and 3. A min- Combined Arms for Air Defense. All signa- be not have been politically sustainable. imum of 30-40 kilometers should be easily tures above this level like active radar, laser A last aspect of passive radar technology achievable. With 20-35 kilometers distance weapons, tracking beams etc. would lead to feeding into IBCS at Layer 2 is that one has and the troops able to defend themselves negative cost, risk and benefit relation do- additional radar coverage for those times up to a maximum of 200 meters altitude ing the troops more harm than usage com- he wants to stay passive with the systems by themselves, there is – looking at the 4/3 plicating the allover AD fight, revealing the like Patriot to hamper the enemy’s suppres- earth curve diagram — a huge overlap of troops position, overloading the troop with sion of enemy air defense approach. How up to 100 meters in altitude given between additional needed skills and tasks and slow relatively successful one can be by doing Layer 1 and Layer 2 to be potentially eaten down the decision cycles. Effort neutral this, was best shown in Serbia in the ‘90s. away by incrustation etc. This setup would Combined Arms for Air Defense in terms 6. The signature dilemma enable passive radars to give early warning of mobility, energy demand, camouflage, On a regular basis, the characteristics and cueing information to the troops and in staff, C2, material and detectability seems of LSS drones in classes one and two are the same way enable effectors in the area to to be the way to go. Blurring our own po- not suitable to construct effectors based engage the respective targets. sition in all spectrums balances the advan- on those characteristics for the Combined 7. The mass dilemma tages of the drones and has the potential to Arms for Air Defense. This statement seems Based on rapid technological progress, bring back the moment of surprise to our to be valid for the infrared (IR) spectrum as we could be confronted with a mass prob- own troops on the ground. Limited reach is for the radar spectrum. Optics and acoustics lem against enemy drones within any sce- the price to be paid that has to be balanced appear to be plausible fields to register and nario. Therefore, the LSS drone defense has by a sophisticated approach on Layer 2. We track targets and guide effectors with max- to be set up to primarily answer quantita- have to be able to cover large volumes of imum cost efficiency. The question that has tive aspects of the threat. Defense should airspace while being able to endanger the to be answered is whether the use of these be done with operating agents whose use opposing drones and other air assets. spectrums is, with the support of modern produces as low of a cost as possible and Excluded from this statement is the de- computer-based sensor data management needs a minimal technical effort and logis- fense of stationary objects, whose position and processing, sufficient to fulfill the task tical footprint. Also if the example is not 100 has to be assumed to be known to the en- in terms of self-defense? In the author’s percent accurate, here is another analogy: emy. At those objects, signature poverty, view, it is. It is no problem that data is only In WWII, the use of tiger tanks being su- tactical considerations, mobility, material, given to the Air Guard if there is something perior and able to take out 12 Allied tanks staff and energy demand are subordinate hostile in the air, leaving the monitor black per Tiger as an average rate, did not mean factors to maximum protection against the the rest of the time. With face recognition anything in terms of the final result. The airborne threat. A basic survival factor to technology in place, why shouldn’t the pic- same way, it does not make sense to give invest in is laser-based drone defense side- ture data processor be able to identify the missile-based technology (like Stinger) to by-side to RAM protection. drone as friend or foe? Magnification is not the troops fighting drones at least in Class 1 For the rest of the battlefield, the for- an issue as it exists in every commercial and Class 2. Also extra vehicles given to the mula for Layer 2 should conclusively be: camera. Adding night vision and infra-red troops going after this task on a larger scale Even if Layer 2 is only covering 60 percent etc., as additional support is also not new than self-defense with highly sophisticated of the battle space, this would give more technology. The laser can be used to calcu- weapons based on laser, microwaves, EMP, than enough opportunity to hinder enemy late, out of the distance, the size of the ob- missiles demand high development costs, drones in their mission execution. With ject providing additional data to the recog- brings possibilities for malfunction under this prerequisite given, we are able to hide nizing software scanning its own database. rough battlefield conditions. This would sensor and shooter position at this layer as So this should not be an issue. be sluggish, create significant energy de- much as possible while constantly putting Also in terms of the effector, the ques- mands, an additional ballast for the troops the enemy into a planning dilemma and tion is whether it should have its own sen- and the AD in terms of C2 and tactics, re- the drone war evolves into a war of attri- sors to give the projectile its own homing veal positions (by own high IR signature tion within the execution cycle. The conse- abilities. Also in that manner, the answer and emitting while engaging), are partly quence for Layer 2 is to be as signature poor is obviously “no” as this would bring big weather dependent and could cause collat- as possible. At least, the air surveillance cost benefit trouble with the drone technol- eral damage even to our own assets behind should be hidden. The concept “any sensor, ogy enhancing in terms of miniaturization, the target … up to the space etc. (All other any shooter” gives enough maneuver space swarming and more. The marginal utility disadvantages as described before.) There- for the tactical directors to change positions in drone fighting is so low that any high fore, this solution set is not recommended, of the revealed equipment, predominantly tech consumed by shooting the high tech although they theoretically would solve the

42 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires problem for the troops on the spot in the task (e.g. most are not expected to have projectile in order to reduce the amount of first view. missile warning equipment). Third, they do energy needed to shoot without losing too Above the Combined Arms for Air De- not maneuver at high G-rates which makes much precision. But those things have to be fense, the mass dilemma is much more them fairly sluggish. The space dilemma in investigated further. complex as it shows up in combination with combination with the mass dilemma leads As drone wars develop, one has to think the space dilemma followed by the camou- to the conclusion that today’s effectors like about the sustainability of centralized C2 flage dilemma. The setup can principally missiles are not feasible to cope with the having the Tactical Battle Management only be addressed by having a sensor and drone threat on Layer 2. Consequently, the Functions “identification authority” and effector being able to conceal those areas multi-missile launcher, even when updated “engagement authority” as much as pos- that cannot be covered, having unknown with energy weapon solutions in the future sible within a given tactical situation. As positions, and cover the largest volume of (weather restrictions) is a possible answer mentioned before, an anti-tank drone hov- possible air space engaging in the shortest to many threats, but has to be supported by ering over the battlefield with a database possible reaction time and at the lowest another executor when it comes to drone of enemy tanks and other focus weapons possible costs in terms of costs/shot and wars including CMs. Anti-drones sound fu- onboard will constantly scan the battle- logistical/force protection footprint. The turistic and smart, but those have the disad- field it flies over. It will analyze its camera advantage that should be leveraged within vantage of being too slow running heavily picture with the database of the onboard Layer 2 is the fact that doctrine-wise Layer into the space problem on the executor side. system recognition software and destroy 2 would overlap with Layer 3 and therefore The railgun with its reach, precision, low its targets with a 0.1 second decision cycle. the capabilities of the robust SAM systems costs and speed seems to be the missing This setup puts humans at a disadvantage could be consolidated. In order to do this, link needed by the ADA pushing through because they are outpaced in terms of reac- the sensor (passive) and the effector have to on drone wars from the author’s point of tive actions. That’s why passive air defense be part of the IBCS battle-net. Furthermore, view. Railgun technology was developed including passive sensors and shooters the primary targets are, besides the rela- to penetrate hardened targets on long dis- becomes so essential. In terms of C2 and tively small signature, easy ones. First, elec- tances, but it is only beginning to be suited foreseeable masses of drones on the battle- tronic warfare will physically not be a big for the characteristics needed by the ADA. field, the answer to this threat is not “any capability as this needs much energy nor- The capabilities of the Blitzer Railgun, in sensor – any shooter” with a centralized mally not provided within drones. Second, terms of size of the projectile, are even more C2 stovepipe with regard to TBMFs in the drones are relatively slow and do not have than what seems to be needed. Physically, background that is all about the avoidance much situational awareness outside their it should not be a problem to downsize the of blue-on-blue engagements. But, in the

An Avenger Air Defense System crewmember with the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade enters the gun turret before a live-fire training exercise, during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands Hawaii, July 24. (Capt. Rachael Jeffcoat/U.S. Army)

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 43 author’s understanding “any EO command in terms of secondary ground-based mean by a “face recognition” like software post – any sensor – any shooter” having of indirect fire support on the battle field. and presented to the Air Guard already engagement authority executed at all com- To sum it up, the new capabilities take categorized F/F so that the reaction time mand posts in the mid- to long-term. This the classic service differentiations into of the troops to the air threat is min- point leads to Dilemma No. 8, which talks question the farther we go. We have to imalized. The laser measurement, if about how to deal with the much contested address this and start a discussion as this available, supports the face recognition very low airspace, too low in terms of flight could lead us into a crisis with paralyzing identification software by measuring the levels. concepts and a lot of money wasted sense- shape of the object, giving distance and 8. The definition and selection lessly invested into systems and structures. flight level of the object and therefore dilemma Terminologies as “air superiority” or “fa- ensures troops stay in self-defense lim- In the future, it will get even busier at vorable air situation” will become relative its and engage only what is in the range the lower flight levels as airspace conges- and situationally contextual. We will like- of their weapons. The processed sensor tion significantly increases while reducing ly redefine what we understand by saying data is translated into direction, distance space for the Air Force to be efficient with- “we have air superiority” while the enemy and height to the single Soldier’s app out hampering the whole force in its mis- is still lethal using drones at the very low (little arrow with a distance and height sion execution. Soon there will be no space and lowest flight levels. figure) in order to leverage their weap- for the “Red Barons” of the future because Alternatively, those discussions and de- ons and passive force protection abilities their contributions to the fight on those low velopments could bring up the real symbi- within the AD of all troops to a maxi- flight levels will hamper indirect field artil- osis of Fires with the ADA providing aerial mum extent possible. lery and drone support to the fight. Taking denial capabilities in terms of drone attacks • The focus weapon’s optic should also the mass of the cockpits out of the lower and the FA simultaneously providing the be directly linked with the passive sensor data and be able to give the gunner flight levels (beside some airlift operations), same precision indirect fire support at all ranges with all scales of effects backed up within the optics guidance on where will push the blue-on-blue problem enough by real-time drone reconnaissance bring- to aim as a first step. Once they track to the background to open up AD tactics ing maximum support for the maneuver the target, the second step is the optic, to paradigm shifts. It would give space for forces. Bringing such an approach into re- together with a distance measuring la- urgently needed drone attack concepts to ality would enable the Air Force a return to ser and a picture processing processor, enhance the friendly recce, offensive and their natural role, gaining air superiority by should enable the device to create an ac- area denial capabilities beginning with the wrestling down the enemy’s air force and curate aiming point for the gunner. With future queen and ending at the future king going for decisive battlefield air interdic- such a synthetic aiming point, engage- of battle in their roles and responsibilities tion and strategic bombing missions. ment should be easy within the reach of within the fight. Last, but not least, it would Finally, the Combined Arms for Air De- the focus weapon. redefine the role differentiation between fense could conceptually be described as • It is highly recommended the focus Army and Air Force. the following: weapon is also a minimal energy con- Here, the railgun becomes the hybrid • The troops are autonomous, the WCS is sumer and emission-free leading to a fitting into the last commanding general’s WH with self-defense as their primary machine gun/cannon-like weapon also vision of having one executor. The same reason to engage. having optional programmable explo- railgun can be used for ground-to-air and • The troops have, if available, no pre- sive grenades as effectors to be effective ground-to-ground engagements (same requisite, a GPS position and IP based against air and ground threats like the counts for the focus weapon of Layer 1). RAP, and can actively feed identified standard cannon of the German PUMA The development for both has advanced hostile targets and identified positions for ground engagements. If an effector sufficiently enough that it is not a question of origins of drones that are shown as like this could be beefed up in terms of if, but of how to further engineer that assumed hostile targets on the net on of optical tracking as described and be technology in order to make this vision a IBCS/the data net. A standardized C2 able to shoot into the air, this could be a reality. Of course, the railgun will not pro- report is done on their organic C2 chain. very promising solution. In comparison duce the magnitude of effects in the target • Data accumulation and distribution to a laser weapon, those effectors have zone that rocket or other artillery is able within the platoon or company is suffi- not only the advantage to execute on to simply by physical limits. But, it could cient in order to maximize force protec- ground and air targets, but also have the produce some addition as indirect support tion and the effectiveness of all means of advantage to be efficient against a broad with a high cadence and more precision engagement. Data display has to be not variety of air assets within range. The avoiding many of the physics taught at the more than an app-like software at the in- laser is not efficient against many other gunnery education. As I am ADA, this is dividual Soldier level. non-drone air assets besides some very just rough first guess and should be inves- • The troops have passive autonomous complex blinding (needs to have the cor- tigated further. sensors (e.g. optics and acoustic sensors) rect angle etc.). Hovering drones will not necessarily be supported by laser measurement in or- • Such a weapon can efficiently support deployed by the Air Force as the Russian der to support the Tactical Battle Man- the ground battle one second later, if anti-tank drone shows. Drones are a hybrid agement Function “identification” and needed. indirect fire support means where the FA “tracking” in the best way possible. An • Taking all those points into consider- has to think about the drones’ role in terms example is the Hover Mast-100 of Sky ation, it could also be possible to bring it of recce operations for its classic means and Sapience. The sensor data is processed into one sensor/shooter package on one

44 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires vehicle. Losing some redundancy, one would win efficiency. • Installations with known positions being able to afford a big effort of means to defend themselves, need a whole different approach. As active emission is not taken into question and AD experts as part of force protection is no problem, such entities can be given weapon engagement zones being part of the IBCS- net with their own sensors and effectors from MML and laser beams down to RAM to defend the systems defending the base. Above the Combined Arms for Air De- fense, additions to the setup could be described as following: • A further passive sensor should be added to the IBCS AD family. This sensor is collocated with C2 entities on the battlefield to minimize the logistical and force protection footprint. • There should be effectors added that cover significant amounts of battle space at minimum costs and maximum speed. As they have to overlap with the troop’s abilities, they will be collocated no more than 20-30 kilometers away from the fighting ground troops. Those effectors should, besides tracking within an engagement, also be silent and part of the A Patriot missile radar system set assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment IBCS family. during the unit’s table gunnery training exercise on Kadena Air Base in Japan, in October. Preci- • Although having some disadvantages, sion Fires and Air and Missile Defense are top priorities in Army science and technology research, and newer versions likely will be smarter and more accurate. (Capt. Adan Cazarez/U.S. Army) the railgun seems to be the technology that is able to overcome most of the di- ◦◦ Dependent of the distance, the whole and long-range air defense taking out slug- lemmas the ADA is confronted with for air threat spectrum could be fought gish targets like air surveillance technology, drone wars of the future. (ABT (2x), CM, BM). refueling and strategic bombing capabili- • The disadvantages are predominantly ◦◦ One could choose a reach and effect ties could be a starting point. Once the ener- that the energy has to be provided at the mix based on the energy input in the gy is in place, maybe two different guns on shooter and there are no experiences to future. one vehicle could use the same energy. One shoot the projectile with remote sensor ◦◦ Ground-to-ground and ground-to- gun focusing on the delivery of masses in data. The railgun needs line of sight and air engagement could be done with terms of indirect fire support at a maximum the technology is still under develop- one effector going for one shooter for distance of e.g. 70 kilometers and one gun ment. But, with everything else going Fires. focusing on speed delivering small projec- electric, not only the car manufactures, ◦◦ As positioning and steering have tiles at a range of 40 kilometers. It is, once the armed forces will move in the same proven to work within the projec- engineered, only the question of what you direction. The theoretical advantages of want to achieve with the produced kinetic tile, the implementation of proximity the railgun are in my view, that: energy of K.E.=1/2*m*V2 at your gun. fusing into the projectile should be ◦◦ Each shot is theoretically up to 90 Lt. Col. Thomas Groborsch spent five years percent cheaper than missile technol- doable which will enhance the kill at the Fires Center of Excellence as the assistant ogy. probability. to the director in the Directorate of Training ◦◦ You don’t have to think about a mis- Layer 3, overlapping with Layer 2, is and Doctrine as part of a personnel exchange sile mix at the effector. reality and is to be further developed for ◦◦ One can shoot at a high cadence the future. Current concepts are given and program between the U.S. and Germany. He (mass problem). under development. However, long-range has been involved with the German SHORAD ◦◦ Huge chunks of battlespace can be Fires seem to be the sweet spot to synchro- system and the Patriot system and now serves covered at high speeds (space prob- nize both sides of Fires. A railgun as a focus as the commander of the System Center 23 for lem). weapon for long-range indirect fire support the German Air Force.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 45 35th ADA Brigade leads the charge for C-UAS

Byoperations Capt. Jonathan Pasley in PACOM Keen observers in the world of air de- “drone swarm” conducted an attack on a sion of defense against deadly ballistic mis- fense have been watching one trend in par- Russian airbase in Syria which resulted in siles. ticular during the past several years: the several key airframes lost to fires started What about Short Range Air Defense Ar- proliferation of unmanned aerial systems by the drones.3 As hostile actors refine this tillery (SHORAD)? While certainly a more (UAS). Once an advantage enjoyed solely type of coordinated attack, the drone threat practical solution than firing Patriot inter- by technological Western nations, the use will only become more dangerous to ongo- ceptors, even the Stinger-missile-equipped of drones has transitioned into the hands ing operations. Avenger and supporting Sentinel radar of the civilian consumers and by exten- Why are we not able to engage drones systems employed in the Army’s SHORAD sion into the hands of insurgents such as with existing air defense weapons systems? batteries are not designed for C-UAS. In the Islamic State militants encountered in In many cases, it is because such small tar- the absence of a credible air threat during Iraq and Syria. Their tactics and techniques gets did not exist when the current weapons the counterinsurgency operations of the could easily be adopted by hostile actors systems were designed. The high-to-me- past decade and more, there has been lit- around the globe. Our military procure- dium air defense, or HIMAD weapons tle emphasis on development or employment system has struggled to compensate systems, such as Patriot and the Terminal ment of SHORAD forces for this role. Most for the emergence of this new threat, but High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) sys- SHORAD batteries were relegated to the E Battery, 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense tem that make up the bulk of U.S. Air De- National Guard, and the unarmored Aveng- Artillery, under 35th Air Defense Artillery fense Artillery weapons are not well suited ers they employ are typically not permitted Brigade in Korea, has now become the lead- to counter-UAS operations. Even detecting to deploy overseas. There are programs un- ing element in Pacific Command to address such small and often nonmetallic targets is derway to adapt these systems to C-UAS this new and dangerous threat. a tricky balancing act; most air defense sys- duties (including new Stinger variants and What makes drones dangerous? The tems are designed to filter out small objects Sentinel radar upgrades). However, these Russians have demonstrated the ability of in the environment (such as birds) so that systems still have the disadvantage of be- unmanned systems to put real-time intel- they do not overwhelm a system with pos- ing kinetic systems which were originally ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sible threats. This can allow small aircraft designed for a wartime environment – they (ISR) capabilities to devastating use against to slip through detection, which may have present a significant risk of collateral dam- Ukrainian forces as artillery spotters.1 been what enabled Yemeni Houthi rebels age if employed in an environment with a Many UAS models (military or civilian) can to crash an Ababil-type unmanned drone large civilian presence. Operations during provide accurate location data from ranges into a United Arab Emirates Patriot radar the armistice between North and South Ko- that make them almost undetectable with being employed in Saudi Arabia.4 Notably, rea provide an objective example – no risk the naked eye, so that the first warning software changes and system upgrades are to civilian lives or property will be tolerated forces on the ground will get is deadly in- refining the C-UAS abilities of existing sys- during armistice operations. A non-kinetic coming artillery fire. The insurgents in Iraq tems, as illustrated by the successful Israeli solution is needed. and Syria have added another spin, equip- engagement of a UAS with a Patriot missile Enter E/6-52nd ADA. As part of Com- ping off-the-shelf Chinese-made quadcop- in November of 2017.5 However, this is a bined Task Force Defender, they are tasked ters with grenade munitions for precision very expensive solution as drones may cost with defending D Battery, 2nd Air Defense placement of explosives in urban conflict.2 tens of thousands of dollars where a single Artillery THAAD Battery at Seongju-ri Even commercial quadcopters are surpris- Patriot interceptor will cost more than $2 near Daegu. This is a challenging mission ingly difficult to destroy with small-arms or million. This is a wasteful use even if you with a genuine North Korean threat6 and crew-served weapons, because they pres- ignore the financial implications because restrictive armistice rules of engagement. ent a very small and highly maneuverable every Patriot missile used this way is one To accomplish this mission, the battery target and have redundant engines. A small not available for the primary system mis- became the first unit in U.S. Pacific Com-

1 Freedberg, Sydney J. “Russian Drone Threat: Army Seeks Ukraine Lessons”. Breaking Defense, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/russian-drone-threat-army-seeks-ukraine-lessons/.Accessed 13 May 2018. 2 Watson, Ben. "The Drones of ISIS". Defense One, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/01/drones-isis/134542/. Accessed 13 May 2018. 3 Trevithick, Joseph. "Russia Offers New Details About Syrian Mass Drone Attack, Now Implies Ukrainian Connection". The Drive, 2018, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17595/russia-offers-new-details-about- syrian-mass-drone-attack-now-implies-ukrainian-connection. Accessed 20 May 2018. 4 Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. "Houthi Forces Appear To Be Using Iranian-Made Drones to Ram Saudi Air Defenses in Yemen, Report Says". Washington Post, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ wp/2017/03/22/houthi-forces-appear-to-be-using-iranian-made-drones-to-ram-saudi-air-defenses-in-yemen-report-says/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7f667ce035ac. Accessed 13 May 2018. 5 Associated Press. "Israel Uses Patriot Missile to Shoot Down Drone". Defense News, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/11/13/israel-uses-patriot-missile-to-shoot-down-drone/.Accessed 13 May 2018. 6 Reuters Staff. "Suspected North Korea Drone Spied on U.S.Anti-Missile System". U.S., 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-souhtkorea-idUSKBN1940J8.Accessed 13 May 2018.

46 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires mand to receive the Expeditionary Low, Slow, A Stinger missile team with the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, identify an unmanned Small UAS Integrated Defeat System (E-LIDS). Al- aerial vehicle target, during Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility ready employed in several countries in U.S. Cen- Barking Sands, Hawaii, July 24. (Capt. Rachael Jeffcoat/U.S. Army) tral Command, this system uses many of the same components employed successfully in the Count- er Rocket, Artillery and Mortar system and turns them against UAS platforms instead. E-LIDS was sped into production and is not yet a program of record, but operational testing has already been conducted to ensure the system is ready and capable of accomplishing its mission. In addition to this, E Battery has also fielded the Drone Defender man-portable C-UAS system which will enable a flexible and layered defense against any UASin- cursion with minimal risk of collateral damage. These systems permit the battery to conduct not only area denial, but also to electronically “defeat” enemy UAS that could threaten critical U.S. assets. This in turn ensures that the THAAD system is able to continue to preserve freedom of movement around the peninsula. The THAAD site at Seongju-ri presents a ready testbed for C-UAS systems, as systems like E-LIDS and THAAD have never before been integrated into a single defense design. Additional systems are already being considered for incorporation and testing. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery and 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade are maximizing the opportunity and recording a number of lessons learned from the first such site in the PACOM area of operation (AOR). The units on CTF-Defender are engaged daily in shaping the doctrine for the use of these systems. From this initial test site comes the possibility of expanding the use of these systems to units across the Korean peninsula and across the PACOM AOR. E Battery has already demonstrated the capability to emplace the systems in new locations, and will continue to improve integration into air defense planning on the peninsula. The danger from increasingly creative use of UAS is a real threat, and the capability gap for existing systems is clear. However, with such a unique opportunity for integration of the C-UAS mission set into air defense artillery units, E Bat- tery and by extension the 35th ADA Brigade are in a key position to lead the development of tactics, techniques, procedures and doctrine governing the effective employment of these systems. Air defense artillery will help blaze a path in this new domain for the rest of the Army to follow. “First to Fire! Ready in Defense!” Capt. Jonathan Pasley is E Battery, 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery commander. Pasley has deployed twice to U.S. Central Command in support of the Global War on Terror and Operation Inherent Re- solve. While deployed he served as battle captain, Patriot tactical control officer, and served 18 months as an air defense liaison.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 47 Target acquisition for long-range

Byprecision Patrick McKinney Fires The Army has identified long-range pre- for dedicated target acquisition capabilities tics and sensors. In a contested A2AD en- cision Fires as a top modernization priority (such as unmanned aerial vehicles). vironment, the Army may lack ground and to support great power competition and de- The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 air observers and electronic collection sys- feat and deter peer competitors on the bat- surprised the Army and raised new con- tems at the ranges needed for long-range tlefield. Though informed by recent chal- cerns of competitor superiority in Europe. Fires. There are non-materiel solutions lenges in Europe and Asia, conflicts of the Though the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact (such as deploying batteries and launchers past half a century have taught the Army dissolved in 1991, NATO continued an further behind the forward line of troops), the criticality of not only long-range and ac- eastward expansion that included Baltic but these will minimize the Army’s ability curate Fires, but also the need for accurate States bordering Russia. A possible NATO to strike deep targets. target acquisition. To utilize its future long- expansion into Ukraine and the Ukrainian To utilize long-range precision future range precision Fires, the Army must field government’s western-tilt were deemed Fires in a contested A2AD environment, the Army needs to develop alternate multi-do- capable and reliable multi-domain long- unacceptable to Russia, and through prox- main target acquisition capabilities. Studies range target acquisition capabilities. ies and non-declared Russian “little green questioned the need for long-range preci- At the start of the Cold War, the Army men,” Russia invaded the Crimea and the sion Fires in the 1970s and 1980s because of prepared for large-scale combat against the Donbas regions of Ukraine. the challenges in identifying deep targets, Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in These forces utilized massed artillery, and longer range enemy systems proved Europe, but instead found itself commit- unmanned aerial systems, electronic war- ineffective in 1991 due to their lack of target ted to sustained combat in Southeast Asia. fare, information warfare and other capa- acquisition capabilities. Accuracy and long The Vietnam War taught the importance of bilities that have not challenged the United States in recent conflicts. Russia continues range are wasted if the Army cannot see its firepower and artillery, but diverted the Ar- to develop missile technologies, air defense target. If the Army continues to prioritize my’s resources and investments from mod- radars and other anti-access, area deni- long-range precision Fires, it must develop ernization for fighting in Europe. Army al (A2AD) capabilities to slow and deter and invest in multi-domain target acquisi- studies and analysis identified an emerg- NATO forces in Eastern Europe. In Asia, tion. ing Soviet force superiority of materiel and China develops and fields similar systems Patrick McKinney is a civilian working as numbers in Europe and recommended that aimed to deny its potential enemies access the Department of the Army Systems Coordina- the Army refocus its force to the threat. to China’s shores and the region’s waters. tor in Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Army’s AirLand Battle and its “ac- More than a decade of combat in south- He served as an Army field artillery and mili- tive defense” sought to keep the Army and west and central Asia have diverted the tary intelligence officer. The views expressed in its North Atlantic Treaty Organization al- Army’s resources and investments from this piece are his own and may not reflect the lies fighting while attriting the larger ene- modernization for fighting a peer compet- views of the U.S. Army or Department of De- my force. A critical component of AirLand itor, and the Ukrainian invasion exposed fense. Battle was long range precision Fires to dis- the Army’s readiness challenge in Europe. References rupt and destroy Soviet targets at deeper In response, the Army identified new mod- Dastrup, Boyd L. Dr. Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field Artillery echelons of the fight. These requirements for the 21st Century. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies ernization priorities, with long-range preci- Institute Press, 2018. led to the Multiple Launch Rocket System, sion Fires at the top. Dastrup, Dr. Boyd L. Dr. Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991. Advanced Tactical Missile System, and im- United States Army Field Artillery Center and School, 1991. The Army fears that Russian, Chinese Dastrup, Boyd L. Dr. Operation Desert Storm and Beyond: Moderniz- proved lethal munitions that proved their or other competitor systems will outrange ing the Field Artillery in the 1990s. United States Army Field effectiveness in Operation Desert Storm in Artillery Center and School, 2005. American Fires, and that threat A2AD Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. “Army Will Field 100 Km Cannon, 500 Km 1991. systems risk American air superiority or Missiles: LRPF CFT.” Breaking Defense. 23 March 2018. Ac- cessed on 04 June 2018. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/ Combat in Kuwait revealed that though control, and in turn, that the Army cannot army-will-field-100-km-cannon-500-km-missiles-lrpf-cft/ Iraqi artillery often outranged American assume it will have air support in future Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. “Artillery, Drones, Missiles Will Help FVL Penetrate Air Defenses: FVL CFT.” Breaking Defense. 21 cannon artillery, its lack of coordinated fights. If this is true, how will the Army March 2018. Accessed on 10 July 2018. https://breakingdefense. target acquisition and fire support made it identify and verify long-range targets in a com/2018/03/artillery-drones-missiles-will-help-fvl-penetrate- air-defenses-fvl-cft/ ineffective. The Army however, maximized future fight? If the Army needs long-range Gouré, Daniel. “The U.S. Army Could Revolutionize Long-Range its target acquisition and fire support ca- precision Fires due to this aerial capability Fires.” Real Clear Defense. 18 MAY 2018. Accessed on 04 June 2018. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/18/ pabilities to provide accurate targets and gap in an A2AD environment, can it rely on the_us_army_could_revolutionize_long-range_fires_113463. deliver accurate massed Fires. Despite the air assets to provide target acquisition for html Osborn, Kris. “New Army Artillery Doubles Attack Range & Out- successes, the Gulf War revealed limita- its long-range precision Fires? guns Russian Equivalent.” Defense Maven. 13 June 2018. Ac- tions with U.S. artillery’s range, mobility Traditional target acquisition comes cessed on 10 July 2018. https://defensemaven.io/warriormaven/ land/new-army-artillery-doubles-attack-range-outguns-rus- and rate of fire, and reinforced the need from ground and air observers, radars, op- sian-equivalent-EAew8QuDH0ih_KoSc1Nv9Q/

48 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Cross-domain concerns Defeating a hybrid state’s grand strategy By Victor Morris This article analyzes joint and multina- this comprehensive understanding of the pled with effective means of intelligence tional wargames designed to understand, operational environment encompasses collection are advantages enabling effec- mitigate and overcome dilemmas pre- planning considerations including geopo- tive large scale combat operations. The venting long-term mission success. These litical rival or competitor’s critical factors rival’s grand strategy accounts for these dilemmas are at both the operational and enabling strategic purposes and shifts to advantages preventing their strategic ends. strategic levels and are associated with the parity. Critical factors are the critical capa- Every strategy has ends, ways and means contemporary operational environment, bilities, requirements and vulnerabilities interrelated with critical factors. Because multinational alliances and hybrid threat associated with interrelated centers of grav- ends, ways and means have limitations, actors. The analysis also identified impli- ity (COGs).4 COGs are the “doer”5 or phys- indirect approaches reduce disadvantages cations for NATO crisis response planning ical agents possessing the ability to achieve and allow innovative alternatives oriented associated with a hybrid state’s strategy. objectives. towards opponent COGs. A peer or near State and non-state competitors develop The following lessons outline how a peer competitor operationalizes a hybrid strategies across competition continuum hybrid state builds its grand strategy and approach through mixed threat actors op- relative to rival advantages. The compe- what critical factors it considers offsetting erating across all domains. tition continuum consists of cooperation, disadvantages. The lessons also elucidate Therefore, shaping campaigns with sub- competition below armed conflict, and countermeasures targeting vulnerabilities versive actors prior to, or in concert with armed conflict.1 The resulting strategies and enabling resilience to multi-domain conventional force are critical strengths emphasizes both direct and indirect ap- drivers of conflict. The goal of the below as- for the adversary. This refers to limited or proaches across all domains to reach stra- sessment is identifying friendly and adver- major joint operations employing multiple tegic ends. A domain is defined as a criti- sary critical vulnerabilities for engagement forms of warfare across all domains to en- cal macro maneuver space whose access and conditions change. able decisive conditions and affect. Manip- or control is vital to the freedom of action Wargame lessons learned prioritize a ulating national and international policy and superiority required by the mission.”2 geopolitical rival’s indirect approach using using fluctuating diplomatic, informational The domains included in this assessment enhanced proxy forces as a significant ad- and economic elements of national power are human, land, air, sea, space and cyber. vantage and long-term dilemma for NATO supported by overt, covert and/or un-at- Dense urban, information and electromag- and key partner nations. Waging so-called tributable offensive options are also critical netic environments are also overlapping “Hybrid Warfare“ within a grand strategy factors for deep operations. spaces for military and non-military effects. requires conducting political, conventional, Next, offensive options involve com- Cross-domain effects are accelerated by unconventional, asymmetric, proxy and cy- bined arms direct and indirect fires and hybrid states and non-state actors. Hybrid ber warfare to both directly and indirectly electronic warfare capabilities. Cyber, elec- states are described as states with a mix of influence objectives across all domains and tromagnetic and information environmen- autocratic and democratic features. This as- instruments of national power. tal effects are technologically accelerated sessment uses the term “hybrid state” to de- 1. A hybrid state develops an in this type of strategy and prioritized to scribe a state blurring boundaries between unbounded grand strategy across affect the depth of the adversary’s opera- organizations and institutions3 enabling an the competition continuum tional environment. The threat of nuclear unbounded grand strategy. This type of relative to perceived rival weapons employment and large-scale mil- state also has low competition in elections advantages. itary force capabilities reinforce deterrence and low constraints on governmental pow- Fundamentally, the western multi-do- and influence the near-abroad, and interna- er. These characteristics facilitate statecraft main operations concept acknowledges tional community. and unbounded policy to offset perceived the competition continuum and involves Furthermore, proxy organizations disadvantages, deliver key narratives and achieving positions of relative advantage present significant dilemmas for joint and shape international norms. through joint reconnaissance, offensive multinational alliances when used as a Target states must understand the oper- and defensive operations. Limited stabili- key component of an unbounded grand ational environment, cross-domain effects ty operations and a whole of government strategy. Proxy organizations, however, and evolving character of war to develop approach are designed to consolidate gains are not limited to non-state paramilitary or resilience to both direct and indirect ap- and enable operational and strategic ends. insurgent networks. These un-attributable proaches of the strategy. It is imperative Precision air, ground and naval fires, cou- groups also include convergent terrorist,

1 McCoy, Kelly (2018, April). In the Beginning, There Was Competition: The Old Idea Behind the New American Way of War. Article retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/beginning-competition-old-idea-behind-new-american-way-war/ 2 Donnelley, Jared and Farley, Jon (2018, September). Defining the “Domain” in Multi Domain. Article retrieved from https://othjournal.com/2018/09/17/defining-the-domain-in-multi-domain/ 3 Galeotti, Mark (2016, December). Russia’s Hybrid War as a Byproduct of a Hybrid State. Article retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/russias-hybrid-war-as-a-byproduct-of-a-hybrid-state/ 4 Strange, Joe (1996). Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Article retrieved from http://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf 5 Eikmeier, Dale (2016, October). Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept. Article retrieved from http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/969689/lets-fix-or-kill-the-center-of-gravity-concept/

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 49 Soldiers assigned to Company A, 1st Battalion, 155th Infantry Regiment, 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, Task Force Spartan, bound toward an objective during a rehearsal for a combined live-fire exercise near Alexandria, Egypt, Sept. 10, 2018. The 155th ABCT took part in exercise Bright Star 18, a multilateral U.S. Central Command training exercise. (Sgt. James Lefty Larimer/U.S. Army) transnational organized crime and interna- after an Article V response and territorial vulnerabilities and manipulate non-mili- tional hacker organizations. Multination- restoration campaign. As mentioned earli- tary settlements. al companies, political parties and civic er, both asymmetric and conventional op- Critical factors not translating across all groups also act as proxy organizations with erations occurring linearly or non-linear- institutions and levels of policy are mitigat- access to high-end technologies and capa- ly across all domains and are included in ed by several combinations. For instance, bilities. These organizations cooperate or the hybrid state’s grand strategy as critical supra-national, supra-domain, supra-tier compete with other proxy actors based on and supra-means combinations6 as well as strengths. The battlespace may also vary various motivations. All or some of these non-linear systems behavior ensure effects between contiguous and non-contiguous groups may be enabled or incentivized by escalation and third order effects. For ex- physical terrain. Un-attributable proxy the hybrid state or local population pro- ample, supra-national combinations are forces with access to emerging and disrup- viding sanctuary for them. Regardless, the a synthesis of national, international and need to deliberately expand sanctuaries tive technologies support the hybrid state’s non-state organizations. over time is a critical requirement and po- critical capability to accelerate both indirect To summarize, a hybrid state’s critical tential critical vulnerability. and asymmetric campaigns, whilst assess- factors are contained in complex systems Potential dilemmas for NATO military ing the effects of long-term lawfare and capable of delivering effects across the com- operations involve irregular and asym- political warfare activities. Conventional petition continuum. The systems 1) con- metric warfare activities in member states limited military campaigns are also accel- ventional joint and irregular proxy forces against borderless proxy actors, during or erated under unbounded policy to leverage with integrated air, ground and sea defense

6 Liang, Qiao and Xiangsui Wang (1999, February). Unrestricted Warfare. Art Publishing House.

50 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires capabilities, 2) emerging and disruptive cohesion. These objectives are met through pabilities should not overshadow critical technologies and 3) super-empowered in- sustained lawfare and irregular warfare capabilities and requirements for security dividuals conducting subversive activities. activities and operations. Lawfare misuses services, law enforcement and indigenous Subversive organizations cooperate and or manipulates the law for political or mil- population intelligence development. Shar- compete in all domains to exploit vulnera- itary objectives, effectively using the legal ing intelligence is equally as important bilities of targeted states. system against an adversary to delegitimize and inevitably involves interoperable in- Based on the above analysis, critical vul- them. telligence functional services and shared nerabilities are identified. Some adversary Additionally, every citizen needs to be databases. Multinational counterintelli- critical vulnerabilities are subversive state educated and prepared for resistance and gence, human intelligence and identity or non-state actors, combined arms tactical role in hybrid defense9 which includes de- intelligence sharing agreements must be groups, proxy sanctuary and malicious in- liberate planning and cumulative innova- refined and validated down to the tactical formation campaigns. From a NATO per- tion. Populations must enable interorgani- spective, counter-irregular or hybrid war- zational resilience across the continuum of level adequately ensuring all that relevant fare dilemmas include a variety of factors government and competition spectrums. intelligence disciplines are processed and during states of exception, emergency and NATO, European Union and United Na- disseminated in a timely manner. war. tions partnerships are critical requirements Furthermore, mission command The remaining two sections outline di- for collective defense and deterrence. through human-machine teaming is inev- rect and indirect targeting of rival critical During states of exception, emergency or itable and will undoubtedly leverage hu- vulnerabilities to develop resilience to driv- war it is imperative to synchronize unified man adaptability, automated speed and ers of hybrid conflict. Identifying and trans- action partners. These include law enforce- precision as future critical factors. The forming friendly critical vulnerabilities ment, special operations, volunteer defense global competition for machine intelligence through self-assessment are also included and home guard forces in key support, dominance will also become a key element to counter a hybrid state’s grand strategy. close and deep areas. of both the changing character of war and 2. Conduct joint, bilateral and Next, collective defense treaties and technical threat to strategic stability. multinational collaborative joint security cooperation consists of both Scenarios and wargames designed to planning early and often. foreign internal defense and security force force multi-national COG and critical fac- Understanding multinational systems is assistance to shape and prevent conflict. tors analysis, decision making and assess- a key aspect of friendly or blue force crit- Foreign internal defense when approved ments are critical to understanding 21st ical factors analysis. Early and recurring involves combat operations during a state collaborative planning is crucial to joint op- of war, where offensive, counteroffensive century conflict. The joint operational area erations and assessment processes that fuel or counterattacks enable forces to regain the must be assessed as one interconnected do- multi-level shaping and crisis response ac- initiative. Thus, defensive tasks are a count- main and put in the correct context to as- tivities. Equally important for political level er to the enemy offense, while protection sess the level of military effort and where contingency planning is understanding an determines which potential threats disrupt required service targets in domains that en- adversary’s strategy employing indirect operations and then counters or mitigates able the land component to reach strategic approaches and use of asymmetric prox- those threats. Examples of specific threats objectives. The interconnected domain is ies to reach objectives.7 These objectives include explosive hazards, improvised where conventional, asymmetric, criminal extend beyond the joint operation plan weapons, unmanned aerial and ground and cyber activities occur at the same time and hinge on limited military activities systems, and weapons of mass destruction. in the same spaces with predictable and and frozen conflicts as desired end states. Defeating the enemy and consolidating unpredictable effects. A long-term indirect Reaching these objectives within a NATO gains inherently involves more forces and and proxy-led approach within the hybrid member state or region presents even more is an operational headquarters planning state’s grand strategy offers innovative, in- complex dilemmas and lasting effects for requirement. Specific requirements include expensive and unbounded opportunities the international community and alliance joint force assignment, apportionment, to reach geopolitical objectives below the cohesion. An indirect or “Gray Zone” ap- contingency and execution sourcing. Addi- threshold of armed conflict. proach is more immune to NATO collective tionally, adversary related Anti-access Area defense and strategic deterrence planning. Denial (A2/AD) capabilities consisting of Victor Morris is a former military officer, -ir The Gray Zone is “the hostile or adversarial integrated multi-domain defense systems regular warfare and counter-improvised explo- interactions among competing actors be- are a joint problem. They require joint capa- sive device instructor at the Joint Multinational low the threshold of conventional war and bilities to exploit windows of superiority, Readiness Center in Germany. He has conduct- above the threshold of peaceful competi- freedom of action and gains consolidation ed partnered training in 17 European nations, tion.”8 This approach also exploits seams in to revise, maintain or cancel the plan. with four NATO centers of excellence, and at the competition continuum involving dual 3. Get closer to the ground truth in the NATO Joint Warfare Center. The views ex- cooperation and competition in geo-politics the human domain and prepare and economic systems. The hybrid state’s for human-machine teaming. pressed in this article are based on the author’s ultimate objectives are to discredit and de- World-class intelligence, surveillance, observations alone and do not reflect the official grade the target’s governance and societal target acquisition and reconnaissance ca- policies of any mentioned organizations.

7 Mumford, Andrew (2017, November). The New Era of the Proliferated Proxy War. Article retrieved from https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/16/the-new-era-of-the-proliferated-proxy-war 8 Morris, Victor R. (2018, May). Quanta of Competition: Quantum Mechanics, Multi-Domain Battle, and the Gray Zone (Part I). Article retrieved from https://othjournal.com/2018/05/14/quanta-of-competition-quantum-mechanics-multi-domain-battle-and-the-gray-zone-part-i/ 9 Galeotti, Mark (2015, July). Time to ThinkAbout “Hybrid Defense”. Article retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense/

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 51 Competitive convergence How is the field artillery battalion preparing against pacing threats? By Sgt. 1st Class Andrew Campbell, Sgt. 1st Class Cole Deblieck, Sgt. 1st Class Randy Feliciano, Sgt. 1st Class Heath Weisiger and Sgt. 1st Class Brandon Williams After years of fighting counter insurgen- Center, we focus training on complex sce- Some members of the alliance incorpo- cy, how do we successfully transition to narios with allied and partnered nations rate the use of Artillery Systems Coopera- fighting against an enemy with similar ca- that improve interoperability. Exercises tion Activities with their respective digital pabilities as the U.S. military and the North such as Dynamic Front, Swift Response, fire systems, similar to the U.S. Advance Atlantic Treaty Organization? A few capa- Allied Spirit and others challenge the Unit- Field Artillery Tactical Data System to bilities come to mind. We could attack with ed States military and NATO, as a unified counter the disturbances, communicate, unmanned aircraft, or employ special oper- force, to adapt to, prepare for and fight a and send digital fire missions. With the rise ation forces. But what if it is not that sim- modern-day conventional war against a of electronic warfare threats and the reli- ple? Field artillery battalions throughout near-peer threat. Disruption on the battle- ability on digital Fires, units are developing NATO need to train to mitigate the capabil- field will come well before we can see the creative communications plans and fur- ities of our pacing threat. We must consider enemy. Constant threats of CEMA forces thering interoperability within the alliance the enemy’s capabilities to observe our for- us to rethink the way we fight. CEMA can to continue to deliver destructive Fires on mations from the air and ground, as well prevent the fire direction centers from dis- the enemy. as through cyber electromagnetic activities tributing a valuable digital database and In addition to the CEMA threat, pro- (CEMA). We must consider how we con- to linking the command and control sys- longed exposure to enemy intelligence, ceal ourselves while simultaneously main- tem, thus hindering a common operational surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as- taining the initiative, and further, we must picture. Because of the struggle to remain sets pose a significant problem to artillery realistically prepare ourselves if our efforts ahead of any CEMA threat, at JMRC, we units. Prosecuting targets with 54 rounds fail to mitigate the identified risk to force. encourage units to develop and implement of high explosives places the firing unit’s Preparation starts with complex and a primary, alternate, contingency, and survivability at risk. If firing units expose innovative training in a decisive action emergency (PACE) plan on different eche- themselves for greater than 15 minutes training environment (DATE), not just for lons of communications equipment. Some while delivering a large quantity of rounds, U.S. military forces, but also our allies and units initially are reluctant to use high fre- they increase the potential of enemy coun- partners. The DATE scenario at a combat quency and tactical satellite, but once they terfire or ISR assets honing in on their posi- training center (CTC) has been an integral are implemented into their PACE plan, they tion. To mitigate the risk, Paladin units can step in preparing units for the next con- are more capable of delivering Fires in an incorporate bounding techniques during flict. At the Joint Multinational Readiness increased CEMA environment. fire missions. For example, units can shoot

52 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, assemble a M777 howitzer while conducting airborne operations during exercise Allied Spirit II at the U.S. Army’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Sgt. 1st Class Caleb Barrieau/U.S. Army)

six rounds, move, shoot six more rounds, namic fighting element. It is noted that our trauma skills is essential for maintaining move, and continue until rounds complete. potential adversaries have documented a basic skills, but it lacks the realism that is This method prevents the enemy from hon- counter fire battle drill time that when trig- needed to truly be ready for the battlefield. ing in on their position and limits the expo- gered; will mass a battalion-sized element Real scenarios with sutures, starting IVs sure time when delivering a high volume of destructive Fires in an 8-12 minute time and applying bandages and tourniquets to of Fires. Once complete, the guns position frame. This type of destructive power can a bleeding patient are needed to ensure suc- themselves in hide positions to conceal cripple a unit’s capabilities and produce a cess of the medic when it truly counts. their location from possible aerial obser- high number of casualties. The military has many successful years vation. A current concealment tactic used Recognized throughout history, medics of fighting experience and as our Warrior by most artillery is the use of tree lines and cannot answer every call for help on the Ethos tells us, we will “Never accept de- nets. This type of concealment has no effect battlefield. This realization has prompting feat.” Technology will continue to shape on observation platforms equipped with IR the Medical Command to improve training the battlefield and as new generations fill and thermal sights. and materials for all Soldiers. Tactical com- the ranks, our force will change as well. To conduct counter-fire operations it bat casualty care has replaced the outdated Now is the time to start the changes to en- must be a joint operation, involving all combat lifesaver (CLS) training provid- sure our success for the next battle. Now is branches of the U.S. military and NATO ing every Soldier with effective life-saving the time to build our strength with NATO, due to our long-range capabilities, world- techniques. The individual first aid kit and to predict and counter CEMA, to ensure all wide censors and global threats. In prepa- modern CLS bag have increased capabil- our systems are field tested and ready, and ration for this, allied training should not ities for self-aid and buddy-aid. The force bring realism to all aspects of training to en- be limited to the CTC. The alliance should has been educated and trained with basic sure we will always be the King of the Battle. constantly work together at home station lifesaving techniques and routinely train on Sgt. 1st Class Andrew Campbell is a 68W through all training requirements. This how to quickly segregate, load and trans- medical observer controller trainer. ensures basic issues are resolved prior to port casualties to the nearby treatment facil- Sgt. 1st Class Cole Deblieck is a 13B firing spending millions of dollars for a CTC ro- ity on the battlefield but the medics are be- platoon observer controller trainer. tation. Through true commitment to our ing left behind. To sustain the force during Sgt. 1st Class Randy Feliciano is a 13J fire allies and under a similar style of leader- a field training exercise, medics establish a direction center observer controller trainer. ship, our communication in training will Role 1 Aid Station where they focus on the Sgt. 1st Class Heath Weisiger is a 13R radar strengthen our ability to fight as an alliance. full spectrum of their skills. The Role 1 al- observer controller trainer. Training to win against a near-peer lows the medic to treat everything from mi- Sgt. 1st Class Brandon Williams is a 13B threat requires an expansion to the scope nor illnesses to a notional blast injury with firing platoon observer controller trainer/mas- of mission planning to become a more dy- amputation. Practicing both clinical and ter gunner.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 53 A Soldier wears a 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade unit patch. (U.S. Army) Advising at the

By Capt. Daniel Cummings batteryFourth Battalion, 1st Security Force As- 1412 did not have muchlevel information on Initial friction sistance Brigade was rapidly established in their ANA partners before the initial en- The team’s initial engagements with August of 2017. The purpose of 4-1st SFAB gagement. The team’s information require- ANA partners exposed unanticipated fric- is to provide expert artillery advisors to ments focused on the five requirements for tion points. CAT 1412 experienced frus- conduct security force assistance with for- accurate fire, section certification program tration while communicating through eign security forces (FSFs). Combat advisor and maintenance status of the battery’s linguists. Linguists must have a basic teams (CATs) deployed under Operation D-30s. understanding of the nomenclature and Freedom’s Sentinel experienced a wide While maneuvering to the firing point, functions of the D-30s and fire direction range of diverse missions during their tour the advisors noted the impact of the terrain equipment to communicate effectively with of duty in Afghanistan. One team experi- on nonstandard conditions. The provincial FSF partners. To solve this issue, the team enced a unique situation while advising capital resides in a high desert plain with developed an introductory class for their an Afghanistan National Army D-30 bat- an elevation of 4,300 feet. In April, the tem- assigned linguists. This class consisted of tery in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province. This perature would swing from 9 to 26 degrees pictures with Dari and English captions team’s experience provides lessons learned Celsius (48 to 78 degrees Fahrenheit). These of D-30 components and operating proce- for future artillery advising missions at the meteorological conditions would have a dures. The class created a shared under- battery level. significant impact on the accuracy of the standing between the advisors, linguist and CAT 1412 began their walk-to-advise projectile if not constantly updated by the ANA partners. mission in April 2018. Since advising mis- fire direction center (FDC). Advisors must be patient while attempt- sions below the corps level are rare, CAT ing to develop rapport with their FSF part-

54 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires ners. CAT 1412’s partners accused past hit data) against where the round actually teams to determine the shooting strength advisors of failing to follow through on impacted (did hit data). Determining the of their partner’s D-30s. This equipment is promises. The truth of these accusations is difference between the “should hit data” adaptable for artillery advisors in any en- not verifiable, and was most likely a tech- against the “did hit data” allowed the FDC vironment. nique to weaken CAT 1412’s position while to quantify cumulative error. The battery Recommendation for future negotiating future training. Advisors must fired the first round, and cumulative error advisors be prepared for their FSF counterparts to was determined. Prior to this deployment, 4-1st SFAB treat them as a necessary disruption to their CAT 1412 assessed several challenges provided its advisors with D-30 familiar- operations until they prove their value. for achieving desired effects on the second ization training at the Joint Multinational The battery leadership was hesitant to round. Achieving accuracy with indirect Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. provide candid feedback regarding their Fires requires the FDC to compensate for Advisors developed technical expertise capacity to generate capable sections and nonstandard conditions. Nonstandard con- on D-30 maintenance, theory of operation, conduct operations. CAT 1412’s partners ditions include factors such as the type of emplacement standards and fire direction would not answer any questions directly projectile, erosion of the tube and the effects procedures. This training enabled its teams or demonstrate their standard operating of weather. CAT 1412 possessed the capa- to advise with confidence during our walk- procedures (SOPs). They claimed most of bility to account for air temperature, charge to-advise mission in Tarin Kot. their equipment was broken or missing; temperature and the projectile zone weight. Currently, the Fires Center of Excellence new equipment was required in order for However, the team had no capability to is developing a similar Foreign Weapons the battery to function effectively. CAT 1412 account for any other nonstandard condi- Training program at Fort Sill, Okla. This ca- carried the burden of proof that they could tions. In addition, the team did not have the pability will be an asset for future advisor be trusted, and that their proposed changes capability to provide a secondary indepen- teams. One aspect that this program should were worth the effort. dent check of the unit’s directional control emphasize is maintenance. The ability to Quick wins or computation of firing data. conduct pullover gauge readings and cor- CAT 1412’s logistical advisor counter- The second round landed closer to the rectly identify faults on the D-30 would parts provided the team with credibility by target due to corrections for charge tem- greatly enhance the credibility of future ad- delivering “quick wins” for the team. The perature and projectile zone weight. CAT visors with their FSF partners. logistic advisors rapidly resourced materi- 1412 exploited this improvement by cre- Future artillery advisors must have a als to fix non-mission capable faults. This ating enduring changes to the battery’s plan to earn the trust of their counterparts caused a positive change in the team’s rela- SOP. The advisors influenced their ANA following their initial engagements. Artil- tionship with their ANA counterparts. counterparts to account for projectile zone lery advisors must exercise patience until At this point, the battery leadership was weight and charge temperature while cal- they have earned the trust of their part- fully committed to conduct advisor-led in- culating firing data. The team also devel- ners. Once they have earned the trust of dividual and section training. The advisors oped the ANA’s procedures for storing am- their partners, the onus is on the artillery attempted to adjust the battery’s SOP in -ac munition by storing the rounds on dunnage advisors to provide their counterparts with cordance with the ANA D-30 Master Gun- with overhead cover. Additional changes to compelling quantifiable evidence that will ner’s guidance. This included accounting their battery SOP were not applied since the convince their partners to adjust their SOPs. for meteorological conditions and ammuni- round did not directly strike the target. Finally, artillery advisors must have the tion information. While observing the bat- After action review ability to serve as a secondary independent tery fire live rounds, the advisors noted that Artillery advisors at the battery level check for their partner’s firing data. They the battery did not apply proposed changes must have the ability to act as a secondary may have to provide compelling quanti- to their SOP. When questioned, the battery independent check of their FSF counter- fiable evidence without notice as part of a leadership responded that they trusted the parts. This capability enables artillery advi- live-fire exercise. advisors, but would not implement any sors to quantify the effects of all nonstan- CAT 1412’s mission was successful due changes until they could verify their effec- dard conditions on the accuracy of their to the ability of the advisors to adapt in an tiveness with live rounds. partner’s indirect Fires assets. uncertain environment. The team increased Live-fire exercise This effect is achieved by equipping ad- the lethality of their ANA partner’s indirect The challenge was set. The battery lead- visors with the same equipment that their Fires, and enabled their success for future ership determined they would fire one partner’s utilize. Artillery advisors should missions. The team experienced much frus- round without the assistance of the advi- have their own aiming circle, gunner’s tration while developing rapport and nego- sors. CAT 1412 would then have one chance quadrant and charge thermometer in order tiating with their ANA partners. However, to solve all sources of error. Once the ad- to verify that their partner’s equipment is the positive effects of their mission were visors applied their corrections, the ANA fully mission capable. In addition, artillery immediately evident during their partner’s would fire a second round. If the second advisors must be able to account for me- operations. The advisors sought out to im- round hit the target, then the ANA would teorological conditions at the firing point. prove an ANA battery, and ultimately im- adjust their SOP. Environmental meters that account for proved themselves in the process. The battery conducted an abbreviated air temperature, air pressure, wind speed Capt. Daniel Cummings is the 4th Battal- radar-observed registration. Radar deter- and wind direction at the firing point are ion, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade team mined the difference between where the available at little cost. Finally, equipping leader in support of Operation Freedom’s Sen- round was supposed to impact (should advisors with a pullover gauge will enable tinel.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 55 THAAD, Patriot, and Avenger/ Sentinel interoperability within

ByGuardian Capt. Adam Patterson, 2nd BattalionLt. Matthew Becker and Warrant Officer 1 Adam McGee Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense Artillery branch is to protect first battalion in the United States Army Defense (THAAD), and Avengers assigned the force and selected defended assets from that has integrated the three distinct weap- under a single battalion (2nd Battalion, enemy/hostile aerial attack, missile attack on systems, consisting of an organic Patriot 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 35th and surveillance.1 The threats that air de- battalion, Avenger battery and a THAAD Air Defense Artillery Brigade) provide a fense artillery units prepare for extend battery. unique opportunity to exercise integrated from intercontinental ballistic missiles cost- THAAD’s mission is to “protect the air and missile defense (IAMD), creating ing millions of dollars, to unmanned aerial United States, forward deployed forces, a significant advantage to the combatant systems (UASs) costing as little as $100. De- friends and allies against short- and me- commander. veloping the capabilities to respond to and dium-range ballistic missiles.”2 The radar This article discusses the capabilities of meet these threats make the ADA one of the component of THAAD (AN/TPY-2) is high- each weapon system, their tactical missions, most versatile branches in the United States ly mobile, multi-functional and capable of and the importance of integrating them into Army. long-range surveillance.3 It acquires targets one common network. The Guardian Battal- Across the force, you will find a unit’s in boost, midcourse and terminal phases, ion, based out of Camp Carroll, South Ko- mission consists of THAAD, Patriot or providing commanders and operators a rea, truly embodies the concept of air and Avenger. As a result, air defenders often proper air picture long before the threat is missile defense. describe the different components as “three in range of the weapon system itself. The mission of the United States Army separate worlds.” Second-1st ADA is the Patriot’s mission is to “Provide protec-

1 Field Manual 3-01 paragraphs 1-6 2 Field Manual 3-01 paragraphs 3-1 3 Field Manual 3-01 paragraphs 3-10

56 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires An Avenger system crew from E Battery, 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 35th ADA Brigade, fires at a target during a live-fire exercise. (Staff Sgt. Todd L. Pouliot/U.S. Army) tion against theater missiles and air threats ty with its variety of functions. It employs Mission command allows commanders to critical assets in the corps and theater eight ready-to-fire Stinger missiles with the to quickly and accurately employ the troop areas.”4 Theater missiles constitute the pri- capability to convert those Stinger missiles leading procedures and expedite the mili- mary threat to be countered by Army ADA into man-portable air defense systems. Ad- tary decision making process and is critical forces. Patriot can be tailored to the tactical ditionally the Avenger has an M3P .50 cali- to mission success. Secretary of Defense situation in defending against air and mis- ber machine gun mounted on it. James Mattis summarizes the importance sile attack. The radar set of the Patriot mis- Given the growing level of complexity of mission command, “[Mission command] sile system (AN/MPQ-53) is monitored and of the battlefield, the need for increased is something that I am passionate about. I controlled by the engagement control sta- mission command between THAAD and believe it’s absolutely critical to our warf- tion and performs very low to very high-al- Patriot is even more critical. Mission com- ighters … It is also something that encom- titude surveillance, target detection, target mand is defined by the U.S. Department of passes all the military functions of leader- classification, target identification, etc. Defense as, “the exercise of authority and ship but nothing is more important because Finally, the Avenger’s mission is to direction by the commander using mission no essential warfighting function or activity “provide protection from enemy reconnais- orders to enable disciplined initiative with- is possible without [mission command]”8 sance, intelligence, surveillance and target in the commander’s intent to empower ag- (Institute for Defense and Government Ad- acquisition (RISTA) efforts.”5 Avenger is ile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of vancement, 2009). designed to counter low-altitude UAS, unified land operations.” The purpose of the integration is to high-speed fixed-wing/rotary-wing aircraft This criticality alone provided the initial provide commanders and operators an and RISTA threats. The Avenger is highly implementation of these weapons system enhanced air picture that allows the com- mobile and provides the fire unit flexibili- integration. mander to make better informed deci-

4 Field Manual 3-01 paragraphs 4-1 5 Training Circular 3-01.64 paragraph 1-1

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 57 sions. With the enhanced air picture, the commander can implement decisions that would increase the protection of friendly assets and units. The integration of all three weapon systems is a difficult process and continues to present new challenges as the unit looks to incorporate additional weapons systems, such as counter-unmanned aerial systems. The integration of multiple tier air defense assets into one operational air picture at 2-1st ADA was conducted in three separate phases. The first phase consisted of integrating THAAD and Patriot into a consolidated network utilizing multicast Tac- tical Digital Information Link – J over the Indo-Pacific Command Ballistic Missile De- fense Tactical Interface Node architecture. The two weapon systems were successfully able to pass numerous Link-16 message sets and validate their ability to conduct automatic engagement coordination between An Avenger system crew from E Battery, 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 35th the two. ADA Brigade, reloads an M3P .50-caliber machine gun during a live-fire exercise. (Staff Sgt. Todd The final phase of this operation will be L. Pouliot/U.S. Army) consolidating all three tiers of air defense tems and ultimately expand the footprint of range air defense capability, especially into 2-1st ADA’s base operations center. the ADA branch. Maintaining this network within the 14G military occupational spe- The implementation of this integration of allows for 2-1st ADA to operate in accor- cialty. This integration has afforded the op- capabilities provides the battalion with the dance with the Fires Center of Excellence’s portunity for Soldiers of different ranks and enhanced air picture that provides com- stated goal of transitioning to the Integrated MOSs to work together to create a blueprint manders with appropriate command and Air and Missile Defense Concept outlined – one that will allow other units to integrate control within their respective units. Ad- in the 2017 Joint Publication 3-01. Focusing their systems and will have the capability to ditionally, in the event of an Avenger unit on the latter half of the definition of IAMD, augment any unit into their air pictures. Ul- being co-located with a forward stationed interoperability amongst all three tiers of timately, it has provided a comprehensive unit, this enhanced and integrated air pic- air defense provides “overlapping opera- understanding of Joint Data Networks to ture will provide the forward-based unit the Guardian Battalion and its Soldiers. commander with enhanced early warning tions to defend the homeland and U.S. na- Capt. Adam Patterson is the 31st Air De- and allow them to make better informed tional interests, protect the joint force and fense Artillery Brigade assistant S3. decisions. The consolidation of these air de- enable freedom of action by negating an ad- Second Lt. Matthew Becker is E Battery, 6th fense assets will ultimately enhance early versary’s ability to achieve adverse effects warning across the Korean Peninsula and from the their air and missile capabilities.”6 Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery platoon increase the readiness status of the force. Additionally, the training value that it leader. Once the network architecture is built, affords the junior enlisted, noncommis- Warrant Officer 1 Adam McGee is the 2nd 2-1st ADA will be able to seamlessly incor- sioned officers and junior officers at the bat- Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery C2 Systems porate additional air defense weapon sys- tery level is essential to rebuilding the short integrator.

6 Joint Publlication 3-01

58 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires Paratroopers from Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division sight in an M1193A Howitzer during an air assault and live-fire exercise held Oct. 24, 2018 on Fort Bragg, N.C. The operation tested the paratroopers’ and aviators’ abilities to integrate their capabilities while demonstrating their technical expertise and tactical capability to provide lethal Fires. (Maj. Thomas Cieslak/U.S. Army) If Henry Knox were alive today A discussion on future artillery warfighting By Maj. Jeremy Blascak An artillery unit is conducting a mount- ond, artillery Soldiers speed off the road, itzers to provide security with dismounted ed tactical movement when a fire mission howitzers move into position and the fire machine guns and grenade launchers, how- comes over the radio. Months of training direction center (FDC) quickly computes itzer section chiefs give their orders, and ar- kick in like second nature as everyone takes fire mission data. Soldiers begin rapidly tillery Soldiers put muscle to metal as they immediate action. Without losing a sec- establishing sectors of fire around the how- heave high explosive projectiles into place

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 59 to rain hell on the next target. This process celebrated Knox’s contributions with the bodied during his service to the Continen- is known to a select few as the artillery fire annual presentation of the Henry A. Knox tal Army and Gen. George Washington. In mission. The unit achieves a ready-to-fire Award to the top active-duty Army field 1775, Washington tasked Knox to retrieve status in only a few minutes from the first artillery battery. The award acknowledg- as many artillery pieces as possible from radio call, but to the Soldiers, it felt like es the top battery based on “performance, New York, and specifically, from the re- mere seconds. Anxiously, the howitzers wait, protected by fighting positions that excellence, leadership, and proficiency,” cently captured Fort Ticonderoga in order cover all possible avenues of approach the all characteristics that Knox lived and em- to prepare for a siege of Boston. Despite enemy may attempt. The metal dragons ea- gerly standby for permission to breathe fire as the FDC completes final calculations and sends word across the radio. Finally, the howitzer section chief shouts and motions as if chopping wood by hand…FIRE! An artillery unit preparing to fire is a thing of beauty—a well-oiled and rehearsed machine with the mission to destroy, neu- tralize, or suppress the enemy. What if Maj. Gen. Henry Knox, appointed the first Chief of the Artillery by Gen. George Washing- ton, was alive today to see the current state of U.S. Army Field Artillery? He would likely appreciate the effort for precision and ever-increasing range through any environment or weather condition, but may not understand current technology in use or the consequences if digital systems were not operable. With the ever-changing character of war, the artillery community strives to be at the forefront of technological innovation to provide maneuver commanders with the most lethal fire support asset available. As the future battlefield evolves, it is paramount that units are able to operate with and without digital systems since the next conflict may not be as permissive across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as the last. As Henry Knox would likely say, artillery must continually train fundamental core competencies while maintaining the ability to provide fire support in a contested environment through complex terrain. To understand the future direction in which the field artillery community must go, it is important to understand how artillery training and employment evolved under the guidance of the first Chief of the Artil- lery, Henry Knox. Background on Henry Knox: A focus on artillery core competencies Since 1924, the artillery community has

U.S. Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Com- bat Team, 3rd Infantry Division in M109A6 Paladin howitzers maneuver while conducting a Fires mission during exercise Combined Re- solve IV at the U.S. Army’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Staff Sgt. Carol A. Lehman/U.S. Army)

60 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires the magnitude of this task, Knox returned support by demonstrating that “artillery and lethal artillery units. During the winter just nine weeks later after traveling over could be made mobile, even in the frozen of 1778, Knox established an artillery acad- 300 hundred miles through extremely chal- wilderness and [through] difficult terrain.” emy where leaders studied and trained to lenging terrain in the middle of winter with A study of Knox reveals his focus on the “confront the specialized complexities of nearly 60 cannons. Knox’s cannons proved fundamentals of employing artillery on the artillery and warfare … [with] lectures on essential in the 1776 seizure of Boston and battlefield, which if trained and applied a variety of topics such as tactics, gunnery more importantly changed the future of fire correctly could result in extremely capable and mathematics in order to master basic

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 61 Soldiers assigned to A Battery, 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment (HIMARS), 18th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, N.C., fire an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System at Fort Greely, Alaska, Oct. 19, 2018, during Red Flag-Alaska 19-1. Their unit was tasked to provide long- range artillery support during RF-A, allowing the unit to showcase its capabilities and develop relationships with other services. (Airman 1st Class Jonathan Valdes Montijo/U.S. Air Force) military principles that they could apply opportunity to see modern fire support in ists for potential adversaries to utilize elec- to combat.” Due to the artillery school’s action, the capability, speed and discipline tronic warfare (EW) to electronically jam rigorous winter training, the Continental would shock him. Knox likely would not global positioning systems (GPS) signals, Army’s artillery became a key component understand the technological develop- disrupt electronic fuzes on artillery projec- in its future success. Only a few years later, ments, but would certainly see room for tiles, and locate/target signals from artillery Washington requested that Congress pro- improvement as artillery Soldiers struggle units presenting an electronic signature. mote Knox to major general and chief of with proficiency on the continuous flow of As artillery units train for future conflict, it the Continental Army’s four artillery reg- new and updated digital systems. Artillery is necessary to prepare for an enemy who iments. Congress approved Washington’s units acknowledge the added benefit of may have the ability to deny U.S. forces request, making Maj. Gen. Knox the young- speed and reduced human error with dig- the use of digital systems through cyber-at- est person to hold that rank at the age of 32. ital systems when functioning properly, tacks or EW. The current application of When studying Knox, it is important to but Knox may question how well artillery digital systems in the artillery community highlight how he gathered concepts from Soldiers could provide fire support if those has certainly increased speed and overall recent European conflicts and applied them systems ceased to function. The ability capability, but exposes a new weakness to the Continental Army’s artillery. As artil- to provide fire support in a degraded en- that requires protection through electronic lery units trained in the newly established vironment (without digital systems), has signature management or SIGMAN, and artillery schools, Knox transitioned the or- atrophied over the years as a result of the the ability to provide Fires without the ganization to smaller and lighter field guns emphasis on the technological innovation use of computer-aided devices and GPS focused on the ability to quickly shoot and of artillery and continuous deployments to process fire missions and occupy/fire move across the battlefield. From humble and training rotations where degraded op- howitzers. Some of the current precision beginnings with the Continental Army, erations lose focus. In training for decisive munitions have undergone changes to pro- modern artillery in comparison to today’s action at the Joint Readiness Training Cen- tect against GPS jamming/spoofing and to fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft has ter on Fort Polk, La., observers reported a operate without GPS if necessary, but it is the ability to provide 24/7 fire support re- pattern of units that failed to plan or train still vital to maintain a degraded capability gardless of weather conditions or crew rest for degraded operations. Over-reliance across the inventory of howitzers and asso- cycles, and with limited fuel/power gener- on digital systems along with the atrophy ciated munitions. ation requirements. Thus, Knox refined for of degraded artillery skills creates a signif- The 2017 National Security Strategy the early American military what is now icant vulnerability in a contested environ- states that great powers such as China and one of the most capable and lethal fire sup- ment against a competitor with similar if Russia are “fielding military capabilities port assets in the U.S. military's inventory. not better capabilities. designed to deny America access” and that Fires in a contested environment A study of the systems used in the 2014 past adversaries have studied the “Ameri- If the first chief of the artillery had the Ukrainian conflict shows the capability ex- can way of war and began investing in ca-

62 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires pabilities that targeted our strengths and conditions that emphasize degraded capa- presented by the next adversary. In 2016, sought to exploit perceived weaknesses.” bilities [because] threats will attempt to im- Milley stated that “we are on the cusp of a In a future multi-domain operation, pede joint force freedom of movement and fundamental change in the character of war. great power competition could see U.S. action across all domains [and] disrupt the Technology, geopolitics and demographics forces outgunned and outranged further electromagnetic spectrum.” Over-reliance are rapidly changing societies, economies necessitating the need for a precise and ac- on modern systems can create a culture that and the tools of warfare.” curate first strike that, if necessary, can op- no longer sees the need for analog methods This change in the character of war is erate between digital and degraded systems and foregoes training on them. This creates evident with the growing digitization in all seamlessly. U.S. forces will need to function an inability to quickly transition to degrad- areas of artillery from the observation post with reduced and protected electronic sig- ed systems and methods when the situation to the gunline. The artillery community will necessitates it. natures in a contested environment against continue to innovate and implement new an adversary with EW capabilities. Several In 2017, JRTC produced a study of the digital systems to increase lethality, but examples exist in the warfighting doctrine top 10 shortcomings across the warfight- must not forget the adversary has a vote of comparable military forces such as Chi- ing functions. Rotation after rotation of as well. Therefore, the ability to provide na where the goal of the People’s Liberation Fires units at JRTC further highlighted the maneuver commander with integrated, Army is a paralysis “through kinetic, and that artillery battalions lacked procedures synchronized and responsive fire support non-kinetic attacks, as either type of attack for degraded operations in a GPS-denied requires artillery units to train digital and may be able to destroy or degrade key as- environment or when a loss of digital con- degraded operations equally as well as the pects of the enemy’s operational system, nectivity occurred. As evidence of a loss thus rendering it ineffective.” in degraded expertise, “all fiscal year 2016 ability to transition between the two with- As described in “U.S Army’s Operating live-fire firing incidents attributed to the out fail. Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020- firing unit occurred while units were oper- In preparation for the future of artillery 2040,” it is necessary to both train to pro- ating in a degraded status.” warfighting, it is important to understand tect digital systems across the EMS while In a contested environment where po- how the Fires community has evolved and also ensuring units can fight without them tential adversaries have the ability to im- taken lessons learned over the years to pro- in order to effectively prepare for the next pact digital operations and the EMS, it is vide the most lethal and capable force pos- conflict. crucial for the artillery community to place sible for the next conflict. A look at the histo- Digitization of artillery, degraded equal focus on training for both digital and ry of Knox’s Continental Army Artillery in operations degraded operations. Artillery units must the winter of 1778 reminds leaders to con- In October 2016, the Chief of Staff of not lose focus on the importance of training tinuously train and hone fundamental core the Army, Gen. Mark Milley stated Sol- on degraded systems to transition between competencies as they are critical to success diers will “operate routinely in a partially the two without impacting the ability to on the battlefield. While the implementa- or significantly degraded environment … provide accurate and responsive Fires to tion of digital systems in the artillery com- that means we must invest in hardening the maneuver force. munity has certainly increased the speed at our systems and, equally important, train Finding time on the training calendar to which a unit can execute a fire mission, it on the techniques of operating with limit- sharpen both digital and degraded skillsets has simultaneously created vulnerabilities ed electronics. That'll be a shocker for all of will always be difficult. To gain and main- through an over-reliance on digital systems us. We may have to read a paper map again tain an advantage over the next adversary, and failure to properly train digital and de- and learn to use a magnetic compass." it is crucial to equally integrate digital and graded methods equally. If Fires units focus An issue arises with artillery innovation degraded training plans so that they rein- training plans on artillery fundamentals, that leaders need to acknowledge and units force each other where one or the other will train digital and degraded systems equally, must train for: a loss in the ability to effec- not become an exploitable weakness in a and are able to shoot and move while also tively fight degraded or without the combat contested environment. Recently, several protecting against adversaries, then there multiplier of digital systems and communi- artillery units started a culture change by is no doubt that Knox would be extremely cations. referring to degraded operations as “man- proud of how the artillery community has In this age when a GPS is in everyone’s ual procedures” in order to eliminate what evolved for future conflict. pocket, Soldiers still train land navigation some consider a negative connotation with with a compass and paper map before using the term “degraded.” This is one example Maj. Jeremy Blascak, is a field artillery offi- a digital tracking system to navigate. This that acknowledges the issues surrounding cer and a division Fires planner with 3rd Infan- training method engrains an understand- degraded procedures and shows that it is try Division. He earned a Bachelor of Science ing of how to navigate with analog systems the job of artillery leaders and profession- in Information Technology from George Mason before using a modern digital method. This al Redlegs to ensure training is thorough, University, a Master of Arts in Management method is similar to training artillery core creative and challenging to Soldiers on both and Leadership from Webster University, and competencies where Soldiers must contin- aspects of providing Fires while finally put- a Master of Arts in Military Studies from Ma- ue to train degraded methods of processing ting a stop to years of atrophied core com- rine Corps University. His military experience fire missions, how to lay howitzer positions petencies. and how to fire them without the aid of Where some artillery skills have atro- includes assignments with 82nd Airborne Di- digital systems. Army Reference Doctrine phied, some have also grown, marking a vision, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Publication (ADRP) 3-0: Operations de- time to shift focus towards the future of Pacific Command and two deployments to Af- scribes the necessity to “train in contested artillery warfighting and the challenges ghanistan.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 63 In the next issue of Fires

Jan.-Feb. 2019, The 2018 Red Book. The Red Book is a year in review for the Fires force including Reserve, National Guard and Marine units. The Red Book highlights U.S. Army Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and U.S. Marine Corps Field Artillery unit activities at the brigade-level and lower. The deadline for submissions is Dec. 1, 2018. Submissions should capture significant events, such as deployments, training, etc., for the past year. Send your submissions to usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx. [email protected] or call (580) 442-5121 for more information. Col. Shane Morgan (right), 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division commander, points out areas of interest to Brig. Gen. Gregory Ander- son (left), Deputy Commanding General-Support, during a live-fire iteration at Range 44 during a combined arms live fire exercise, Fort Drum, N.Y., Oct 19, 2018. (Staff Sgt. James Avery, U.S. Army)

64 • Fires, November - December 2018, Dynamic Fires