DOCSLIB.ORG

Karabağ Rus 'Barişi Koruma' Gücü

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Karabağ Rus 'Barişi Koruma' Gücü Dış Politika & Güvenlik 2021/06/TR Mayıs 2021 KARABAĞ RUS ‘BARIŞI KORUMA’ GÜCÜ: MOSKOVA KAFKASYA’DA NE YAPMAYA ÇALIŞIYOR? Dr. Can Kasapoğlu | Güvenlik & Savunma Programı Direktörü, EDAM Oğul Tuna | Araştırmacı, EDAM DışDış PolitikaPolitika & Güvenlik 2021/06/TR2021/02/TR KARABAĞ RUS ‘BARIŞI KORUMA’ GÜCÜ: MOSKOVA KAFKASYA’DA NE YAPMAYA ÇALIŞIYOR? Dr. Can Kasapoğlu | Güvenlik & Savunma Programı Direktörü, EDAM Oğul Tuna | Araştırmacı, EDAM Yönetici Özeti • Rusya Federasyonu Karabağ Barış Gücü, bir barış • Karabağ Savaşı sırasında, Azerbaycan Silahlı Kuv- gücü misyonu kapsamının ötesine geçerek, bölgedeki vetleri’nin, Türk robotik harp kabiliyetini de kullanarak, fiili Ermeni işgal yönetimi ile sistematik siyasi-askeri ve Rus silahları ile teçhiz edilmiş Ermeni birliklerine karşı ekonomik ilişkiler kurmaktadır. Altyapı, iktisadi hayat ezici bir askeri-teknolojik üstünlük ortaya koyması, Rus ve kamu idaresi alanındaki faaliyetler de, bu bağlam- strateji çevrelerinde endişe ile karşılanmıştır. Türkiye – da dikkat çekicidir. Azerbaycan savunma entegrasyonunun geleceği, söz • Barış gücü misyonunun görev süresinin ucu açık bir konusu kaygıları artıran bir diğer faktördür. Belirtilen takvim ile belirlenmesi, söz konusu faaliyetin, fiili du- nedenlerle, Rus Barış Gücü, bölgede, çatışmaların rumun tahkim edilmesi ve kalıcı bir hal alması ama- engellenmesi ve hayatın normalleşmesinin ötesinde, cını taşıdığını göstermektedir. Moskova’nın, ‘görevini Moskova’nın jeopolitik çıkarlarının korunması ve Türki- tamamlayarak Karabağ’dan çekilmek’ gibi bir vizyonu ye – Azerbaycan ittifakının dengelenmesi misyonunun yoktur. uygulayıcısı konumundadır. • Askeri olarak, Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetle- • Karabağ Ermeni işgal idaresi ile Rusya Federasyonu ri’nin, Suriye ve Ukrayna tecrübelerinden elde ettiği arasında doğrudan bir stratejik hava köprüsü kurulma- kazanımların, Karabağ Barış Gücü’ne aktarıldığı mü- sı çalışmaları dikkat çekicidir. Bahse konu hattın, Mos- şahede edilmektedir. Ayrıca, ilgili görev kuvvetinin kova ile Azerbaycan toprakları üzerinde inşa edilmiş muharebe kuruluşunda, barışı koruma görevlerine olan Karabağ Ermeni işgal idaresi arasında gelişen tahsis edilmiş birlikler dışında, elit muharip unsurlar ve entegrasyonu ileri bir aşamaya taşıyacağı değerlen- istihbarat unsurları bulunması da, üzerinde durulması dirilmektedir. gereken bir diğer konudur. 2 DışDış Politika Politika && GüvenlikGüvenlik 2021/02/TR2021/06/TR Giriş: Rus Jeopolitiği ve Kafkasya’da Yeni Durum 2. Karabağ Savaşı sonucu Azerbaycan’ın anlamlı toprak Ayrıca, Azerbaycan Silahlı Kuvvetleri envanterinde bulu- kazanımı ve daha da önemlisi, Karabağ’da Ermeni işgal nan Türkiye ve İsrail savunma teknolojilerinin, Ermeni mu- nüvesinin rayonların kaybı ile savunmasız kalması, Er- harip unsurlarının kullandığı Sovyet-Rus envanterine karşı menistan’ı ve Karabağ’daki Ermeni idaresini Rusya’ya ve göstermiş olduğu kesin üstünlük, Şoygu & Gerasimov ko- Kremlin’in korumasına daha da bağımlı hale getirmiştir.1 mutasındaki Rusya Federasyonu askeri liderliği için ciddi Yine, Azerbaycan taarruzunun Kavkaz 2020 Tatbikatı’ndan bir alarm anlamına gelmiştir. hemen sonra, Rus güçlerinin bölgede yoğun yığınaklan- masının olduğu bir dönemde başlamış olması, Moskova Karabağ Rus ‘barış gücü’, yukarıda alıntılanan ve özetle- için bir diğer endişe faktörüdür.2 Zira Bakü, Türkiye ile stra- nen mülahazalar çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir. İncelemeye tejik ittifakına dayanarak, daha bağımsız bir askeri siyasa konu Rus faaliyetinin amacı, bir barış gücü misyonunun izlemektedir. Moskova’nın ise, on yıllardır sürdürdüğü den- klasik görevlerini icra etmenin ötesinde, Rusya’nın Kafkas- ge siyasetini devam ettirme marjı giderek daralmaktadır. ya’daki çıkarlarının ve jeostratejik dizaynının korunmasıdır. Askeri – Stratejik Değerlendirme 10 Kasım 2020’den bu yana yürürlükte olan ateşkes anlaş- General Rüstem Muradov’un askeri şahsiyeti ve hususi- masının 3 ve 4. maddeleri gereğince Rusya Federasyonu, yetleridir. Dağıstan kökenli olan General Muradov, daha 1960 askerî personel, 90 zırhlı personel taşıyıcı, 380 askeri önce Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin Suriye ha- araç ve özel teçhizattan oluşan barışı koruma gücüyle şim- rekatında, Deyr ez-Zor bölgesi dahil olmak üzere, üst dü- dilik 5 yıllık bir süre için Dağlık Karabağ (DK) arazisinde zey görev yapmış bir komutandır. Kariyeri boyunca, ordu bulunmaktadır.3 Ayrıca, ilgili görev gücüne tahsis edilen komutanlığı dahil, farklı seviyelerde birçok birliği komuta kara-konuşlu ateş-destek vasıtaları ve bilhassa çok nam- etmiş olan General Muradov, 1990’larda her iki Rus – Çe- lulu roketatar sistemleri de dikkat çekicidir.4 çen savaşında yer almış, 2016 yılında Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin Ukrayna, Donbas’taki faaliyetlerine Anlaşma, sözü edilen barışı koruma gücünün görevlerini iştirak etmiştir.6 ve sınırlarını Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan ile daha sonraki görüşmelere bırakmış ve meşruiyetini bu iki devletin rıza- Bu noktada, Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin sına dayandırmıştır. Kasım 2020’ye dek eski Sovyet coğ- Suriye tecrübesinin General Muradov dahil olmak üzere rafyasında Rus askerî varlığına sahip olmayan tek çatışma askeri personele katkılarına ayrı bir parantez açmakta da bölgesi Dağlık Karabağ iken,5 bu durum belirsiz bir süre yarar var. Suriye harekatı, Rus askeri kapasitesi ve per- için son bulmuştur. Barış gücünün bölgede meşruiyet kay- sonelin harbe hazırlığı açısından dikkat çekici bir trendin nağını uluslararası anlaşmalardan almayan ve Birleşmiş de başlangıcı olmuştur. Genelkurmay Başkanı Valery Ge- Milletler nezdinde henüz meşru olmayan mevcudiyeti, hem rasimov’un belirttiği üzere, halihazırda görevde olan tümen bölge hem uluslararası toplum için soru işaretlerini berabe- komutanlarının hemen tamamı, karma sınıflar (combined rinde getirmektedir. arms) tugay ve alay komutanlarının yarısından fazlası, Suri- ye’de muharip görev icra etmişleridir. Ekim 2018 itibariyle, Rus Barışı Koruma Gücü’ne ilişkin kuşkusuz en dikkat çe- Suriye’de görev yapmış Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuv- kici detaylardan biri de, ilgili görev grubunun komutanı vetleri personeli altmış binden fazladır.7 1 Dumitru Minzarari, “Russia’s Stake in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Accident or Design?”, SWP, 12 Kasım 2020, https://www.swp-berlin. org/en/publication/russias-stake-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-accident-or-design/ [Erişim tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2021]. 2 Ibid. 3 Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federa- tion, President of Russia, 10 Kasım 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384 [Erişim tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2021]. 4 “Russia moves rocket launchers towards Nagorno-Karabakh after peace deal”, Reuters, 16 Kasım 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-armenia-azerbaijan-rockets-idUSKBN27W2H0 [Erişim tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2021]. 5 Jack Losh, “Russian Troops in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Clearly a Win for Moscow’”, Foreign Policy, 25 Kasım, 2020, https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/11/25/russian-troops-nagorno-karabakh-peackeepers-win-moscow-armenia-azerbaijan/[Erişim tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2021]. 6 Ayrıntılı bilgi için, bkz.: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 11 Kasım 2020, https://www.kp.ru/daily/2171207/4320131/ [Erişim tarihi: 15 Mayıs 2021]. 7 Ayrıntılı bir yayın için bkz.: Mason Clark. The Russian Military’s Lessons Learned in Syria, ISW, 2021. 3 DışDış Politika Politika && GüvenlikGüvenlik 2021/02/TR2021/06/TR General Rüstem Muradov, Rus Devlet Başkanı Putin tarafından, ‘Rusya’nın Kahramanı’ Nişanı ile taltif edilmiştir. Nisbi olarak, Rusya Federasyonu Hava-Uzay Kuvvetleri, ğunu belirtmeliyiz. Zira, savaşın ardından Rus uzmanların Suriye’de yürüyen harekat kapsamında en çok tecrübe yayınları, Ermeni güçleri ile Azerbaycan Silahlı Kuvvetle- kazanmış aktör olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. 2020 yılı itiba- ri arasındaki çatışmaların, esasen, İsrail ve Türk silahları riyle, taktik askeri havacılık pilotlarının yüzde 87’si, stratejik ile Sovyet-Rus çözümleri arasındaki asimetriyi de ortaya havacılık pilotlarının (Tu-95, Tu-160 gibi ağır bombardıman koyduğunu değerlendirmiştir.9 Dolayısıyla Ruslar açısın- uçakları pilotları) %60’ı, döner-kanatlı platform pilotlarının dan Karabağ, sadece Sovyet dünyasının - bugünkü arka ise (taarruz ve genel maksat helikopter pilotları), %91’inin bahçesinin, etki altında tutulması değil, aynı zamanda, Suriye’de görev yaptığı bildirilmektedir.8 2020 yılı verileri Kafkasya’da savunma teknolojilerine ilişkin trendlerin de ile, söz konusu tecrübe, toplam 44,000 muharip sorti çer- kontrolden çıkmaması için önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağ- çevesinde elde edilmiştir. Söz konusu durum, Rusya Fe- lamda bir diğer gündem, Azerbaycan tarafından ağır bir derasyonu Savunma Bakanı General Sergey Şoygu ve Ge- savunma-ekonomisi yıkımına uğratılan Ermeni güçlerinin nelkurmay Başkanı General Valery Gerasimov tarafından yeniden teçhiz edilmesidir.10 temsil edilen Rus askeri liderliğinin, personelin muharip tecrübesini artırmak için yoğun bir Suriye rotasyon progra- Rus Barışı Koruma Gücü’nün muharebe kuruluşu da, mı yürüttüğünü göstermektedir. Moskova’nın stratejik amaçlarının kestirilmesi hususunda dikkat çekicidir. İlgili görev kuvvetine katılan başat unsur- General Rüstem Muradov ve Karabağ ‘barış gücü’ çaba- lardan biri, Merkez Askeri Bölgesi birliklerinden olan ve larınının yukarıda özetlenen çerçeve ile birlikte değerlen- Rusya’nın barışı koruma misyonlarını yürüten 15. Motorize dirilmesinde yarar görmekteyiz. Zira, Suriye’den öğrenilen Tugay’dır.11 Bununla birlikte, açık-kaynaklı istihbarat
Load more

Recommended publications
  • B COUNCIL DECISION 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March
    02014D0145 — EN — 15.03.2017 — 010.001 — 1 This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document ►B COUNCIL DECISION 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSP of 21 March 2014 L 86 30 21.3.2014 ►M2 Council Implementing Decision 2014/238/CFSP of 28 April 2014 L 126 55 29.4.2014 ►M3 Council Decision 2014/265/CFSP of 12 May 2014 L 137 9 12.5.2014 ►M4 Council Decision 2014/308/CFSP of 28 May 2014 L 160 33 29.5.2014 ►M5 Council Decision 2014/455/CFSP of 11 July 2014 L 205 22 12.7.2014 ►M6 Council Decision 2014/475/CFSP of 18 July 2014 L 214 28 19.7.2014 ►M7 Council Decision 2014/499/CFSP of 25 July 2014 L 221 15 25.7.2014 ►M8 Council Decision 2014/508/CFSP of 30 July 2014 L 226 23 30.7.2014 ►M9 Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP of 8 September 2014 L 271 47 12.9.2014 ►M10 Council Decision 2014/801/CFSP of 17 November 2014 L 331 26 18.11.2014 ►M11 Council Decision 2014/855/CFSP of 28 November 2014 L 344 22 29.11.2014 ►M12 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/241 of
    [Show full text]
  • Avrasya Incelemeleri Merkezi Center for Eurasian Studies
    AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ CENTER FOR EURASIAN STUDIES AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA EXCHANGE PRISONERS WITH RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPERS' MEDIATION - 29.12.2020 TASS (28 December 2020) Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan announced on Monday that four Armenian prisoners had returned home with the mediation of Russia and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Azerbaijan and Armenia held a new round of a prisoners swap, in which two Azerbaijanis were delivered to Baku and four Armenians to Yerevan, Russian Peacekeeping Contingent Commander Lieutenant-General Rustam Muradov announced on Monday. "Today, for the purposes of implementing the trilateral statement by the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia of November 9, 2020, a new swap of prisoners has taken place. As a result of the work done, the Russian peacekeepers under my personal control have delivered two captive Azerbaijanis to Baku and returned four prisoners to Erebuni by a plane of Russias Aerospace Force," the commander said. The Russian peacekeepers "will continue contributing to the strict fulfillment of the trilateral agreement," he stressed. Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan announced on Monday that four Armenian prisoners had returned home with the mediation of Russia and the International Committee of the Red Cross. On December 15, 44 prisoners returned to Armenia from Azerbaijan with Russias mediation. On the same day, 12 Azerbaijani prisoners returned to their home land. On November 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on a complete ceasefire in Nagorno- Karabakh starting from November 10. The Russian leader said that Azerbaijan and Armenia would maintain the positions that they had held and Russian peacekeepers would be deployed to the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Insights from Young Scholars and Peacebuilders from the Caucasus
    insights from young scholars and CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II Sebastian Relitz (Ed.) peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL.II peacebuilders fromthecaucasus insights from youngscholarsand Sebastian Relitz(Ed.) Sebastian Relitz (Ed.) insights from young scholars and peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II imprint insights from young scholars and peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II CORRIDORS – Dialogue through Cooperation gUG Reuterstraße 32 D –12047 Berlin www.opencorridors.de Editor: Sebastian Relitz Layout: Karen Blume www.karen-blume.de The information and views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and to not necessarily reflect the opinion of Corrridors or our project partners. First published in Berlin 2020. ISBN: 978-3-00-067751-9 table of content sebastian relitz – introduction seda shekoyan insights from young scholars and spaces for talking about peace: peacebuilders from the caucasus 7 reflections on the potential of cultural exchange in the armenian-turkish normalization process 93 aynura babayeva the aftermath of forced internal displa(y)cement: anonym understanding home and belonging overlooking the pre-conflict period: among internally displaced women 16 why is it important for azerbaijan to emphasize coexistence? 99 azamat tatarov ruling over ceremony: the post-soviet state darejan tsurtsumia and institutionalization of islam how does “anti-occupation discourse” in kabardino-balkaria 34 shape public facebook discussions about reconciliation
    [Show full text]
  • Situation in Der Ukraine: Verordnung Vom 27
    Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions Version of 24.03.2017 Sanctions program: Situation in der Ukraine: Verordnung vom 27. August 2014 über Massnahmen zur Vermeidung der Umgehung internationaler Sanktionen im Zusammenhang mit der Situation in der Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), Anhänge 2, 3 und 4 Origin: EU Sanctions: Art. 8 (Verbot der Eröffnung neuer Geschäftsbeziehungen) Sanctions program: Situation en Ukraine: Ordonnance du 27 août 2014 instituant des mesures visant à empêcher le contournement de sanctions internationales en lien avec la situation en Ukraine (RS 946.231.176.72), annexes 2, 3 et 4 Origin: EU Sanctions: art. 8 (Interdiction de nouer de nouvelles relations d’affaires) Sanctions program: Situazione in Ucraina: Ordinanza del 27 agosto 2014 che istituisce provvedimenti per impedire l’aggiramento delle sanzioni internazionali in relazione alla situazione in Ucraina (RS 946.231.176.72), allegati 2, 3 e 4 Origin: EU Sanctions: art. 8 (Divieto di apertura di nuove relazioni d’affari) Individuals SSID: 175-27287 Name: Aksyonov Sergey Valeryevich Spelling variant: a) Aksenov Sergei Valerievich (Russian) b) Аксёнов Сергей Валерьевич (Russian) c) Aksyonov Serhiy Valeriyovych (Russian) d) Аксьонов Сергій Валерійович (Russian) DOB: 26 Nov 1972 POB: Beltsy (Bălți), Moldova Justification: a) Aksyonov was elected "Prime Minister of Crimea" in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 Feb 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His "election" was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 Mar 2014. He actively lobbied for the "referendum" of 16 Mar 2014 and was one of the co- signatories of the "treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation" of 18 Mar 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • Armenians Evacuate Kashatagh/Lachin
    DECEMBER 5, 2020 MMirror-SpeirTHEror-SpeARMENIAN ctator Volume LXXXXI, NO. 21, Issue 4663 $ 2.00 NEWS The First English Language Armenian Weekly in the United States Since 1932 IN BRIEF Karabakh Leader Says 600 Bodies of Soldiers Recovered so Far STEPANAKERT (PanARMENIAN.Net) — Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) President Arayik Harutyunyan said Monday, November 30 that the bodies of 600 soldiers killed in the recent fighting have been recovered since the beginning of search- and-rescue operations. Harutyunyan met with the family members of missing persons and servicemen and prisoners of wars and captives on Monday. The Commander of the Russian peacekeeping troops, Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov, and Director of Karabakh’s State Emergency Service Karen Sargsyan too participated in the meeting. President Says Government behind ‘Tragedy’ Must Go Armenians Evacuate Kashatagh/Lachin YEREVAN (PanARMENIAN.Net) — President Armen Sarkissian has weighed in on the situation in Armenia in the aftermath of a devastating war Including Berdzor and The school has some 220 students. The worse, so she took her 81-year-old mother unleashed by Azerbaijan, maintaining that the gov- Tekeyan Cultural Association of the United and left. After the ceasefire was ernment whose activity has led to “such a great Tekeyan School States and Canada announced, she returned, went to Yerevan tragedy” must resign. has been providing for two days, and then came back again. “There is one solution if such a great tragedy has BERDZOR, ARTSAKH — Azerbaijani support to the Approximately three or four hundred sol- taken place: the government behind it must go. If a forces entered the Kashatagh or Lachin teachers and staff diers from the Armenian forces had been politician is strong, they can return later,” District, which through its using the school, she said, as a barracks.
    [Show full text]
  • In Russia's Hands | Nagorno-Karabakh After the Ceasefire Agreement
    IN RUSSIA'S HANDS BRIEF / 8 Apr 2021 Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement SERIES by András Rácz Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin Summary Nearly five months have passed since the 9 › The ceasefire of 9 November 2020 brought November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second an end to the second Nagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as war and appears to have stabilised the stra- a culmination of tensions that had been mounting tegic situation until the first mandate of the for years, and had already resulted in two smaller Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). to the region expires in November 2025. The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives › However, the ceasefire agreement does of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and not provide for a political settlement of the resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 conflict. Due to Armenia’s military defeat Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakhi Armenians are left with no option but to rely on Russia as a security guarantor. This Brief(1) analyses to what extent the ceasefire › Hence, the most important factor shaping agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable the long-term outlook for the region will and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability be the policy pursued by Moscow. If Russian of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of peacekeepers leave after the expiration of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables their mandate, Azerbaijan will easily be that could affect the resilience of the post-war status able to retake the territories it lost in the quo in the medium and long run.
    [Show full text]
  • Insights from Young Scholars and Peacebuilders from the Caucasus
    insights from young scholars and CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II Sebastian Relitz (Ed.) peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL.II peacebuilders fromthecaucasus insights from youngscholarsand Sebastian Relitz(Ed.) Sebastian Relitz (Ed.) insights from young scholars and peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II imprint insights from young scholars and peacebuilders from the caucasus CORRIDORS PROCEEDINGS VOL. II CORRIDORS – Dialogue through Cooperation gUG Reuterstraße 32 D –12047 Berlin www.opencorridors.de Editor: Sebastian Relitz Layout: Karen Blume www.karen-blume.de The information and views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and to not necessarily reflect the opinion of Corrridors or our project partners. First published in Berlin 2020. ISBN: 978-3-00-067751-9 table of content sebastian relitz – introduction seda shekoyan insights from young scholars and spaces for talking about peace: peacebuilders from the caucasus 7 reflections on the potential of cultural exchange in the armenian-turkish normalization process 93 aynura babayeva the aftermath of forced internal displa(y)cement: anonym understanding home and belonging overlooking the pre-conflict period: among internally displaced women 16 why is it important for azerbaijan to emphasize coexistence? 99 azamat tatarov ruling over ceremony: the post-soviet state darejan tsurtsumia and institutionalization of islam how does “anti-occupation discourse” in kabardino-balkaria 34 shapes public facebook discussions about reconciliation
    [Show full text]
  • JULY-2021 Table of Contents I. Armenia Ignores an Offer to Sign a Comprehensive Peace Treaty with Azerbaijan 2 II. Azerbaijan S
    JULY-2021 H I GHLBULLETII GHT OF THE FORE I G N P O L I CY OF REPUBL I C OFN AZERBA I JAN Table of contents I. Armenia ignores an offer to sign a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan 2 II. Azerbaijan sets up Karabakh and East Zangazur economic regions 3 III. Armenia continues to escalate the situation along the border with Azerbaijan 4 IV. Armenia hands over additional minefield maps to Azerbaijan 5 V. Azerbaijan opens trade mission in Israel 6 VI. President of European Council Charles Michel visits Azerbaijan 7 VII. President Ilham Aliyev visits Russia amidst Armenia’s increasing provocations at the border 8 VIII. Armenia continues its deliberate destruction of regional ecosystem 9 IX. Armenians in Karabakh are not entitled to special status 11 I. Armenia ignores an offer to sign a ministers and an EU delegation, adding that “I comprehensive peace treaty with have repeatedly said that we want to move Azerbaijan from a post-conflict situation to peaceful development and cooperation in the South For the past few months, Azerbaijan has been Caucasus. Unfortunately, we have never heard consistently emphasizing the need for a anything like this from the Armenian comprehensive peace treaty with Armenia. government. The Armenian government is Just recently, Minister of Foreign Affairs ignoring any of our statements about starting Jeyhun Bayramov pointed out that “this is negotiations on a peace agreement with realistically the first time after the obtaining of Armenia.” independence by both Armenia and Azerbaijan when our countries have a unique chance to Azerbaijan’s position on this issue has been normalize their relations,” adding that now very clear.
    [Show full text]
  • Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the Uk
    CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:18/09/2019 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Ukraine (Sovereignty) INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABISOV 1: SERGEY 2: VADIMOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: 27/11/1967. POB: Simferopol, Crimea a.k.a: (1) ABISOV, Sergiy, Vadymovych (2) ABISOV, Serhiy, Vadymovych Other Information: Former so-called “Minister of Interior of the Republic of Crimea”. Listed on: 31/07/2014 Last Updated: 18/03/2019 Group ID: 13071. 2. Name 6: AIRAPETYAN 1: LARISA 2: LEONIDOVNA 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: 21/02/1970. a.k.a: (1) AIRAPETYAN , Larisa (2) AIRAPETYAN, Larysa (3) AYRAPETYAN, Larysa Other Information: Former Health Minister of the “Lugansk People's Republic”. Listed on: 02/12/2014 Last Updated: 18/03/2019 Group ID: 13172. 3. Name 6: AKIMOV 1: OLEG 2: KONSTANTINOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: 15/09/1981. POB: Lugansk a.k.a: (1) AKIMOV, Oleh (2) AKIMOV, Oleh, Kostiantynovych Position: Deputy of the Lugansk Economic Union in the National Council of the Lugansk People's Republic Other Information: Since 2014 he is the Head of the so called Federation of Trade Unions of the Lugansk People's Republic. Member of the so-called People´s Council of the Lugansk People's Republic. Listed on: 02/12/2014 Last Updated: 11/04/2017 Group ID: 13171. 4. Name 6: AKSYONOV 1: SERGEY 2: VALERYEVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: 26/11/1972.
    [Show full text]
  • Today All Forms of Authority Are Being Challenged
    April 4, 2021 Issue #669 In This Issue: Today all forms of authority Today all forms of author are being challenged ityare being challenged President and Vice- President of Armenian Engineers and Scientists America on PAREV-TV Dr. Ani Kalayjian on Parev-TV On Palm Sunday, Prime of authority are being actions of the current Minister Nikol Pashinyan challenged. This includes government. They claim Remembering Vahan announced he will resign religious institutions, that the Pashinyan Tekeyan next month, but stay in political parties, cultural government is too western office until parliamentary organizations, the military, and liberal and was moving Poetry presented by Mrs. elections due on June 20. "I big business, and the country dangerously out Zarmine Boghosian will resign not to resign, but “traditional” family of the Russian orbit while in order for early elections structures. There are many supporting movements that to take place… this is the reasons for this, but the undermined traditional This week’s videos from best way out of the current primary drives are that large Armenian values. In some PAREV-TV internal political numbers of people especially extreme cases, they actually situation...I will continue to among the younger blame the democratization Current news from serve as interim prime generations across the world process of the country itself around the world minister...if voters support have come to believe that as a reason for our defeat. me and my team, we will these traditional institutions Most importantly they Directory continue to serve you better do not have answers to the ideologically place the than before.
    [Show full text]
  • Geopol Consequences
    Security Review GiorgiZurabDavid B BatiashviliilanishviliBatashvili Turkey-Greece Confrontation and Georgia: Threats and Challenges Immediate GeopoliticalTurkey's Place Consequences and Role in of the the Second Second Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh War War 2020 1 All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Copyright © 2020 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies 2 For 44 days in the fall of 2020, the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in a dramatic clash in Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite both being minor powers, they possess considerable military capabilities which were engaged in an intense war of maneuver – probably the most dynamic military conflict in 2020. It was a typical case of two nation-states having developed national identity narratives regarding one and the same bit of territory and deciding the resulting dispute on the battlefield. Azerbaijan won the war. It recovered most, although not all, of its internationally recognized territory that had been under Armenian control since the early 1990s. The war and its outcome also had other geopolitical consequences, however. Russia brokered the ceasefire agreement and, crucially, deployed its troops to Karabakh as its guarantors. Consequently, it now has military bases in all three nations of the South Caucasus. Even more importantly, it has gained a new and very strong lever to influence the behavior of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
    [Show full text]