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The Anti-Takeover Power of Classified Boards ISSN 1045-6333 THE POWERFUL ANTITAKEOVER FORCE OF STAGGERED BOARDS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian Discussion Paper No. 353 03/2002 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business is supported by a grant from the John M. Olin Foundation. This paper can be downloaded without charge from: The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ FORTHCOMING, 54 STANFORD LAW REVIEW _ (2002) The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Lucian Arye Bebchuk,* John C. Coates** IV & Guhan Subramanian*** Staggered boards, which a majority of public companies now have, provide a powerful antitakeover defense, stronger than is commonly recognized. They provide antitakeover protection both by (i) forcing any hostile bidder, no matter when it emerges, to wait at least one year to gain control of the board, and (ii) requiring such a bidder to win two elections far apart in time rather than a one-time referendum on its offer. Using a new data set that includes all hostile bids in the five-year period 1996-2000, we find that not a single hostile bid came close to winning a ballot box victory against an “effective” staggered board (ESB). We also find that an ESB nearly doubles the odds that the average target in our data set will remain independent, from 34% to 61%, halves the odds that a first bidder will be successful, from 34% to 14%, and reduces the odds that our average target will be forced to sell to a white knight, from 32% to 25%. Furthermore, we find that the shareholders of targets that remain independent in our data set are made substantially worse off compared with accepting the bid, and that ESB’s do not provide sufficient countervailing benefits in terms of increased premia to offset the increased costs of remaining independent. Overall, our estimates indicate that, in the period that we study, ESB’s reduced the expected returns of the shareholders of hostile bid targets by 8-10%. Finally, we show that most staggered boards were adopted before the developments in takeover doctrine that make ESB’s such a potent defense. Our findings call for a reconsideration of the rules governing takeover defenses. In particular, we argue that, at least in the absence of explicit shareholder authorization, managers who lose one election over an outstanding bid should not be allowed to further block the bid with a pill-ESB combination. JEL classification: G30, G34, K22 Key words: Takeovers, Defensive tactics, boards, mergers and acquisitions ©2002 Lucian Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian. All Rights Reserved * William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research and Center for Economic Policy Research. ** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. *** Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School. For helpful comments we are grateful to Barry Cohen, Susan A. Chen, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jack Jacobs, Roberta Romano, Leo Strine and participants in presentations at Harvard Business School, Harvard Law School, the Harvard JD/MBA alumni meeting, the Vanderbilt conference on empirical research in corporate law, the 2001 annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, the NYU Law and Business “bridge group,” and the University of Tilburg. In a companion paper, The Effect of Takeover Defenses, we plan to develop further our empirical analysis of takeover defenses. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 II. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................5 A. The Law of Staggered Boards...................................................................5 B. The Proliferation of Staggered Boards .....................................................7 C. Justifications for Staggered Boards ..........................................................8 1. Nontakeover justifications........................................................................8 2. Antitakeover justifications. ....................................................................11 D. The Growing Opposition to Staggered Boards ......................................13 E. Conventional Wisdom on Staggered Boards..........................................15 III. THE SPECIAL ANTITAKEOVER POWER OF STAGGERED BOARDS...................16 A. Before the Pill .........................................................................................17 B. Enter the Pill ..........................................................................................18 1. The pill and the power to keep it. ...........................................................18 2. The ballot box safety valve......................................................................21 3. The need for a ballot box safety valve.....................................................22 C. Three Types of Targets ...........................................................................23 1. No minimum term. ................................................................................24 2. Effective annual term. ............................................................................26 3. Effective staggered board........................................................................27 D. The Delay Problem.................................................................................29 1. Average delay. ........................................................................................29 2. Minimum delay......................................................................................32 E. The Two-Election Problem.....................................................................34 1. The importance of a firm offer for winning a proxy contest. .................35 2. The importance of a firm offer against an ESB. .....................................36 3. The cost of committing to a price. ..........................................................37 4. Comparison to the one-election case.......................................................38 F. Conclusion..............................................................................................39 IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ....................................................................................40 A. Data Description....................................................................................40 B. Viability of the Ballot Box Mechanism ..................................................43 C. Remaining Independent in the Short Run.............................................45 1. General findings.....................................................................................45 2. Controlling for other parameters............................................................46 3. Selection problems..................................................................................52 D. Remaining Independent in the Longer Run ..........................................53 1. General findings.....................................................................................53 2. Controlling for other parameters............................................................54 E. The Cost of Remaining Independent......................................................58 1. General findings.....................................................................................58 2. Controlling for other parameters............................................................60 F. Do ESB’s Produce Offsetting Benefits by Increasing Premia ? ............61 G. Overall Effect on Target Shareholder Value ..........................................62 1. General findings.....................................................................................62 2. Controlling for other parameters............................................................63 V. DID SHAREHOLDERS CONSENT?.....................................................................66 A. A Brief History of Takeovers and Staggered Boards: From Inco to Moran to Time ..................................................................................................................67 B. Assessing the Degree of Shareholder Consent .......................................69 VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKEOVER LAW .............................................................71 A. Redeeming Pills Following Defeat in One Election...............................71 1. Consistency with fundamental principles of Delaware case law. ..........71 2. Legislative intervention not required.....................................................73 3. Minimal disruption to existing corporate governance regime...............74 B. The Permissibility of Opt-Out ...............................................................75 VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................76 FIGURES & TABLES Figure 1: SB Incidence by Industry ....................................................................7 Figure 2: SB Incidence by Firm Size ...................................................................8 Figure 3: Staggered Board Incidence by Industry Deal Activity .................12 Figure 4: Bid Outcomes in the Short Run........................................................46 Figure 5: Bid Outcomes
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