Turkmenistan by Annette Bohr

Capital: Population: 5.0 million GDP/capita: US$6,130

Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2010.

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Electoral Process 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Civil Society 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Independent Media 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Governance* 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.75 6.75 Judicial Framework and Independence 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Corruption 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 Democracy Score 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.88 6.93 6.96 6.96 6.93 6.93 6.93

* Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.

530 Nations in Transit 2010 Executive Summary

n 2009, during the third year of his presidency, ’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov made a visible effort to project himself to both Ithe domestic and international public as a youthful, energetic reformer. He could be seen on state media behind the steering wheel of a race car, in the cabin of a fighter jet, on horseback, riding a bicycle, and even performing surgery in a newly equipped clinic. Yet, although Turkmenistan’s state news agency went to great lengths to portray the president as a progressive leader with a new ideology, by 2009 it had become clear that the reform process under the new regime was lacking in substance, despite the initial high hopes for meaningful change. Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedov still retains many of the distinguishing features of former president ’s rule, including the frequent purging of senior officials, a one-party system, tight control of the state-run mass media, and severe restrictions on civil liberties. There has been no revival of civil society under the new president, the vast majority of political prisoners remain behind bars, and the cult of personality around President Berdimuhamedov has significantly strengthened. The leadership even embarked on regressive steps that demonstrated its unwillingness to allow the general public exposure to a variety of world views or to tolerate independent activism. On the other hand, mobile telephony expanded rapidly in 2009 and Internet access increased, albeit modestly.

National Democratic Governance. Turkmenistan is a police state where the activities of its citizens are carefully monitored by oversized internal security and law enforcement agencies. Since his formal election in February 2007, President Berdimuhamedov has largely maintained the structure of government and the command-administrative methods of rule employed by former president Niyazov. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, the government reverted to one legislative body rather than two; although the expanded parliament was accorded greater formal powers, the legislature remains a presidential appendage and the country continues to be run primarily by presidential decree and instruction. The president appoints the members of government, the country’s governors at all levels, high-ranking judges, and the Central Election Commission. Turkmenistan suffers from an acute lack of expertise in all spheres of civil service, given that the majority of experienced managers, educators, and specialists were purged under Niyazov, while the new generation was trained under the Ruhnama-dominated education system. The gradual phasing out of Niyazov’s quasi-spiritual guidebook for the nation, the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), continued in 2009, while its replacement national ideology, the “Era of Great Revival,” was steadily promoted. Turkmenistan’s national democratic governance rating remains at 7.00. Turkmenistan 531

Electoral Process. During Turkmenistan’s 18-year history of independent rule, electoral officials have declared near 100 percent voter turnout for all elections and referendums. To achieve this, electoral officials have engaged in irregular procedures, such as stuffing ballot boxes and making door-to-door visits where voters were urged to cast their ballots. Elections to gengeshes (local legislative councils) were held in July 2009. According to official reports, 12,450 candidates contested for 6,220 seats. Voter turnout was reported at 95.7 percent and no violations were documented by the state-approved observers. No parties or movements were legally registered in the country other than the government-sponsored Democratic Party of Turkmenistan and the National Revival Movement (Galkynysh). Unrelenting harassment by the authorities has driven the relatively small opposition either underground or into exile. Turkmenistan’s local council elections in July were multi-candidate, but could not be deemed free and fair given that the minimal media coverage was state-controlled and candidates who were not officially vetted by the government were barred from participation. Turkmenistan’s electoral process rating remains at 7.00.

Civil Society. Under President Berdimuhamedov’s rule, civil society groups without official sanction continue to be stymied. Since the prospects for registration are considered remote, some groups have chosen to forgo the bureaucratic process and operate covertly, although the penalties for unregistered activity can be severe. In October 2009, the government’s propensity to persecute civil society activists was demonstrated by the arrest of the internationally respected environmentalist Andrei Zatoka on trumped-up charges, likely prompted by his links to Turkmenistani dissidents living abroad. The government also denied entry to a group of United States Peace Corps volunteers scheduled to begin their service, although a larger contingent was already operating in the country. Religious activity is tightly controlled by the state; in 2009, citing fears concerning the spread of swine flu, authorities barred Muslims in Turkmenistan from making the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, urging them instead to sojourn to designated sacred sites across the country. Additionally, for the first time since 2007, several Jehovah’s Witnesses and other conscientious objectors were sentenced to imprisonment in labor camps for refusing to participate in compulsory military service on the grounds of religious conscience. Turkmenistan’s civil society rating remains at 7.00.

Independent Media. Turkmenistan’s media organizations continue to uphold the ideological line of the government, which maintains control over all forms of state-run mass media through the State News Agency of Turkmenistan (TDH). While President Berdimuhamedov criticized the state broadcast and print media as “lacking creativity,” all journalists of the official mass media were required to approve their materials with the TDH or designated officials and engage in self- censorship to avoid government reprisals. Internet access increased modestly in 2009, although Turkmenistan still had one of the world’s lowest rates of Internet penetration. In October 2009 the government announced its intention to acquire 532 Nations in Transit 2010

the country’s first-ever communications satellite with the aim of accelerating Internet connectivity. By contrast, mobile telephony expanded rapidly. In a positive development, the advent of a small Turkmen-language online community, or “Turkmenet,” allowed the expression of a surprising amount of dissenting views on topics ranging from underground popular music to Islamism. Despite modest gains in Internet access, a substantive improvement in information liberalization is unlikely without changes in the government’s censorship policy and rigorous training for journalists. Turkmenistan’s independent media rating remains at 7.00.

Local Democratic Governance. Despite the official allocation of US$4 billion to develop the country’s rural infrastructure, the majority of planned projects outside the capital city Ashgabat remained unimplemented by the end of 2009. Projects undertaken tended to be of a showcase nature, such as 10,000-seat stadiums, while little public revenue was spent to improve basic amenities like sewer systems, piped water supply networks, and electricity grids. Many of President Berdimuhamedov’s changes to the decaying education system have lacked substance, and students are still required to demonstrate knowledge of Niyazov’s Ruhnama in state entrance examinations to higher educational establishments. In 2009, President Berdimuhamedov’s leadership prevented some students from pursuing an education in U.S.-affiliated universities, belying its declared willingness to bring Turkmenistan’s educational system up to international standards. State media reported on the “hundreds of millions of dollars” allocated for the construction of new medical facilities across the country, although most are neither accessible to the majority of the population nor staffed with qualified personnel. The international organization Doctors Without Borders Médecins( Sans Frontières) was not allowed to conduct a program to treat multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and, as a result, left Turkmenistan in December 2009, marking the departure of the last international NGO operating in the country. As in other public sector spheres, the government does not release reliable data on public health and denies altogether the existence of any HIV cases in the country. Turkmenistan’s local democratic governance rating remains at 6.75.

Judicial Framework and Independence. Although formally independent, Turkmenistan’s court system has no impact on the observance of human rights but rather acts as an instrument of repression for the regime. The Office of the Prosecutor General dominates a legal system in which judges and lawyers play a marginal role. Arbitrary arrest and detention are widespread practices despite laws prohibiting them. Of the thousands of prisoners amnestied by the president since coming to power in 2007, less than two dozen were considered political prisoners by international human rights groups. In 2009, only one political prisoner, Muhametkuli Aymuradov, was amnestied after serving fourteen years in prison for anti-state crimes. In April, the European Parliament lifted an 11-year ban on the Interim Trade Agreement with Turkmenistan, although that country fell far short of Turkmenistan 533 meeting the European Union’s (EU) human rights criteria. Turkmenistan’s judicial framework and independence rating remains at 7.00.

Corruption. The leadership of Turkmenistan is able to sustain its rule through the receipt of hydrocarbon export revenues, which it uses to finance pervasive security services and vanity construction projects as well as to obtain the support of patronage networks as needed. Patronage networks in Turkmenistan have given rise to a political culture of bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement. Bribe-taking is particularly prevalent among customs, licensing, and social-service agencies. President Berdimuhamedov has retained his predecessor’s pattern of assigning unrealistic targets to senior officials, then summarily removing them during publicized meetings, as shown by the removal of one-third of his cabinet in January 2009. Public reprimands, sackings, and probation periods have further deterred officials from implementing reforms. Turkmenistan’s corruption rating remains at 6.75.

Outlook for 2010. President Berdimuhamedov is likely to further consolidate his power and entrench his cult of personality while continuing to restrict the citizenry’s access to foreign ideas and influences. The slow pace of reform coupled with Turkmenistan’s relative isolation from globalization processes means that a decade or more could be required to see significant changes in the political and cultural fabric of the society. 534 Nations in Transit 2010 Main Report

National Democratic Governance 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

Turkmenistan is a police state where the activities of its citizens are carefully monitored by oversized security and law enforcement agencies, and the president’s private militia whose members receive favorable treatment relative to the rest of the population. The Ministry of National Security (MNB) has the responsibilities held by the Committee for State Security during the Soviet period—namely, to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of society and by discouraging dissent. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) directs the criminal police, who work closely with the MNB on matters of national security. Both ministries abuse the rights of individuals and enforce the government’s policy of repressing political opposition. In 2009, construction was completed of ultra- modern, fully equipped apartment buildings in the capital, Ashgabat and luxury hotels in the Avaza tourist zone on the Caspian Sea that were designed specifically for the use of MNB and MIA personnel and their families. No parties or movements other than the government-sponsored Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) and the Galkynysh National Revival Movement of Turkmenistan, are legally registered in the country. While the revised 2008 constitution allows political parties in theory, the document is not self-executing and, as such, requires implementing legislation prescribing the necessary details to allow political parties to register and carry out activity. At the end of 2009, a law on political parties had yet to be adopted, although this circumstance had not proved a hindrance to the registration and activity of the DPT. The constitution proscribes the formation of parties with a religious or nationalist orientation (Article 30). However, since no parties other than the DPT have been registered, this ban is of little relevance. Since his formal election in February 2007, President Gurbanguly Berdi- muhamedov has largely maintained the structure of the government and the command-administrative methods of rule employed by former president Saparmurat Niyazov. In similar fashion to Niyazov, President Berdimuhamedov holds the posts of president of the Republic, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (prime minister), chairman of the Council of Elders, head of the Gengesh (Council for Religious Affairs), supreme commander-in-chief of the National Arm ed Forces, chairman of the Higher Council of Science and Technology, and chairman of both the DPT and the Galkynysh National Revival Movement of Turkmenistan. As was the case throughout Niyazov’s rule, under the new Turkmenistani leadership only the executive branch exercises any real power in practice, despite constitutional Turkmenistan 535 stipulations regarding the formal existence of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. A new constitution was formally adopted in September 2008 that introduced a number of chiefly cosmetic reforms. After approving the new constitution, Turkmenistan’s highest representative body, the 2,500-member Halk Maslakhaty (People’s Council), dissolved itself, delegating its powers to an expanded 125-member Majlis (Parliament). In so doing, the government reverted to one legislative body rather than two. Although the Parliament was accorded formal powers to, inter alia, adopt and amend the constitution, take decisions on the holding of referendums and elections, and ratify and cancel international agreements, the expanded Majlis remains a presidential appendage and the country continues to be run primarily by presidential decree and instruction. While the constitution allows parliamentarians to elect a speaker and form committees, President Berdimuhamedov usurped this prerogative at the first session of Turkmenistan’s newMajlis in January 2009 by selecting a presidential stalwart, Akja Nurberdieva, to serve as parliamentary speaker, “recommending” the five committees to be formed, and even nominating specific members of Parliament to head them. The president appoints the members of government and the Central Election Commission, as well as high-ranking judges. He also has the power under the revised constitution to directly appoint the country’s governors at all levels, although, ironically, Niyazov had changed the system to allow for local gubernatorial elections only a year before his death. The revised constitution retains the changes adopted in the immediate aftermath of Niyazov’s death granting greater authority to the State Security Council, a body that includes leading defense and security officials. As such, according to Article 58, it is the Security Council rather than the Parliament that is empowered to choose a deputy prime minister to serve as acting president in the event that the president is no longer able to perform his duties. Turkmenistan’s civil service suffers from an acute lack of expertise and qualifications among personnel in all spheres, given that the majority of experienced managers, educators, and specialists were purged under Niyazov, while the new generation was trained under the Ruhnama-dominated education system. Yet, a surfeit of experience can also serve as the cause of an official’s downfall, as in the case of Deputy Prime Minister Tachberdy Tagiev—a veteran energy minister with deep insider knowledge of the country’s hydrocarbons sector—who was removed from his post in July 2009. The construction of a new personality cult around President Berdimuhamedov received considerable impetus during 2009, as portraits of the new president steadily replaced those of Niyazov both inside and outside government buildings. Many residential areas named after Niyazov and his relatives were renamed, the former president’s birthday was eliminated from the country’s official holiday list, and his name was removed from the state hymn. When Turkmenistani officials redenominated the national currency in January 2009, Niyazov’s portrait was replaced by ancient Turkmen heroes and rulers on all but the highest-value banknote, the 500-manat bill. Meanwhile, President Berdimuhamedov was widely 536 Nations in Transit 2010

quoted on television, his activities were the primary focus of state media, and his ever-expanding collected works were widely promoted. During the course of 2009, the president was declared a Hero of Turkmenistan—the state’s highest civilian honor—and bestowed with the Vatan (fatherland) order and numerous state awards. In March, a new cathedral mosque in the southern city of Mary was named after President Berdimuhamedov. On June 29, the president’s birthday, a new Museum of the President of Turkmenistan was opened that displayed documents and photographs illustrating his reforms. Aside from school textbooks, the majority of newly published works in Turkmenistan either exalted the president or were ostensibly authored by him on topics as diverse as Ahal- horses and the use of medicinal plants. The gradual phasing out of Niyazov’s quasi-spiritual guidebook for the nation, the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), continued in 2009, as its replacement national ideology, “The Era of Great Revival,” was steadily promoted. Yet the only manifest evidence of this new ideology was a chain of planned, grandiose construction projects intended “to serve as man-made symbols for the Era of Great Revival,” including a US$70 million monument to the constitution, an Olympic village, and a multitude of white-marbled architectural complexes.1

Electoral Process 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

During Turkmenistan’s 18-year history of independent rule, electoral officials have declared near 100 percent voter turnout for all elections and referendums. To achieve such spectacularly high participation rates, electoral officials have engaged in irregular procedures, such as stuffing ballot boxes and making door-to-door home visits during which voters were urged to cast their ballots. Pressure is exerted on all civil servants to vote, and failure to do so can lead to reprisals. In December 2008, Turkmenistan held elections to fill an enlarged, 125-member parliament under a revised constitution. The majority of candidates represented the DPT and the Galkynysh Movement, while less than one-quarter were put forward by citizen initiative groups. According to the Law on Elections of Deputies to the Majlis of Turkmenistan, citizen initiative groups as well as political parties and public associations are empowered to nominate independent candidates for election to parliament. However, a minimum of 200 citizens must be present at the nomination of an independent candidate, and all must provide authorities with their full name, date of birth, and place of residence. By contrast, the committees of the DPT and the Galkynysh Movement are allowed to nominate candidates at regular meetings of their central or rural organs without regard to the number of participants. The Central Election Commission registered only officially vetted, “inde- pendent” candidates, and the applications of at least two Turkmenistani dissidents Turkmenistan 537 were rejected by the authorities. In contrast to the presidential elections of February 2007, pre-election campaigning by candidates for the Majlis was not broadly advertised and did not generate even a modest debate on those issues regarded as taboo under Niyazov, such as the state of the country’s healthcare and education systems. Reports by opposition groups noted voting irregularities, such as block or “family” voting and voting without proof of identity. They also observed a low voter turnout, despite official claims of a 93.87 percent participation rate.2 Elections to local gengeshes (legislative councils) were held in July 2009. According to official reports, 12,450 candidates contested for 6,220 seats. In the usual fashion, voter turnout was reported at 95.7 percent and no violations were documented by the state-approved observers. No opposition parties or movements are officially registered in Turkmenistan. Unrelenting harassment by the authorities has driven the relatively small opposition either underground or into exile. The opposition-in-exile remains weak and prone to internal division.

Civil Society 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

There has not been a rebirth of civil society under President Berdimuhamedov’s rule. In October 2009, the government’s propensity to persecute civil society activists was demonstrated by the arrest of the internationally respected environmentalist Andrei Zatoka on trumped-up charges. Originally sentenced to five years in prison for hooliganism, Zatoka’s sentence was converted to a $350 fine following an international outcry and behind-the-scenes Russian diplomacy. However, Zatoka, who held both Russian and Turkmenistani passports, was subsequently forced to renounce his Turkmenistani citizenship and leave the country. Observers have speculated that the arrest of Zatoka, who ran an environmental protection group that was closed by the authorities in 2003, was prompted by his links to Turkmenistani dissidents living abroad, in conjunction with reinvigorated efforts on the part of the authorities to keep civil society under firm state control. All public associations are required by law to register with the Ministry of Justice (renamed the Ministry of Fairness in September 2003), thereby allowing the government to deny official status to groups that are critical of its policies. Although civil society has never thrived in Turkmenistan, steady repression by government authorities, from 2002 in particular, has forced those independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that had managed to gain a foothold in the newly independent country to dissolve, redesignate themselves as commercial enterprises, or merge with progovernment public associations. While in 2000 there were approximately 200–300 registered and unregistered NGOs in Turkmen istan, by 2005 that number had dwindled to 88, the vast majority of which either supported the government or received direct government support.3 No new NGOs 538 Nations in Transit 2010

were registered from 2005 until July 2008, at which time the government reported that it had registered 11 new civic organizations. Although 10 of these were sponsored by the government, the first community-based NGO in the country, the Ak Bugday Gardener’s Association, was also registered. The government deregistered 11 NGOs during 2008 as well.4 One NGO (The Association of Accountants) was registered in 2009, bringing the total number of registered NGOs operating in Turkmenistan to 89.5 Groups without official sanction wishing to register as NGOs continue to be stymied; according to a report issued by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in August 2009, NGOs that have been unable to achieve state registration include, inter alia, scientists aiming to teach farmers how to grow organic produce; charity workers intending to set up business training courses for housewives and the unemployed; and a group seeking to organize summer camps for children.6 Since the prospects for securing official registration are considered remote, many groups have chosen to forgo the bureaucratic process and operate covertly, although the penalties for unregistered activity can be severe. In September 2009, the government denied entry without explanation to 47 United States Peace Corps volunteers scheduled to begin their service in Turkmenistan, despite the fact that some 70 Peace Corps volunteers were already operating in the country, primarily in the spheres of healthcare and English-language education. In the sphere of religious freedom, no fundamental changes have taken place since President Berdimuhamedov’s ascent to power, and religious activity remains tightly controlled by the state. Religious matters are administered by the Council on Religious Affairs (CRA), whose members are appointed by the government and report to the president. The CRA controls the hiring, promotion, and firing of Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, who are required to report regularly to the CRA. As with public associations, all religious congregations are required to register with the Ministry of Fairness to gain legal status. Before 2004, the only religious institutions that had managed to successfully register represented Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity, although they were still subject to tight government controls. In March 2004, President Niyazov issued a decree pledging to register all religious groups regardless of creed or number. As a result of these changes, a handful of minority religious groups managed to gain registration in 2004–05, including the Bahá’í, Pentecostalists, Seventh-Day Adventists, several Evangelical churches, and the Society for Krishna Consciousness. Despite this minimal progress, many minority religious groups remain unregistered, such as the Catholic, Lutheran, Jehovah’s Witness, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish communities. The benefits of formal registration remain unclear, however, as registered and unregistered groups alike continue to experience police raids or check-up visits, fines, and other forms of harassment. As the religious freedom watchdog Forum 18 News Service reported, registration can lead to greater state control and does not facilitate the finding of a legal venue for worship services, which continues to be a major problem for many religious groups.7 Meeting in private homes or Turkmenistan 539 unapproved areas is prohibited, and the construction of places of worship is strictly regulated by the state. In a policy unchanged since Niyazov’s death, no religious literature may be published in Turkmenistan or imported into the country without permission from the Committee for Religious Affairs. As no alternative civilian service is offered, conscientious objectors to military conscription are regularly given suspended jail sentences. However, in May 2009, two brothers from the city of Serdar became the first Jehovah’s Witnesses since July 2007 to be jailed for refusing compulsory military service on the grounds of religious conscience. In July, they were joined by two other conscientious objectors from Dashoguz; all four youths were subsequently transferred to a labor camp in the eastern town of Seydi, where inmates are reported to experience harsh desert conditions. In December, a fifth conscientious objector was sentenced to two years in a general regime labor camp. In 2009, citing fears concerning the spread of swine flu, Turkmenistani authorities barred aspiring Muslim pilgrims from making the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, urging them instead to sojourn to 38 sacred sites across the country (although many of the domestic sites had historical or cultural rather than religious significance). In previous years, only 188 pilgrims—including MSS secret police and other officials—had been allowed to make the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, which represents less than 5 percent of the yearly quota allocated to Turkmenistan by the Saudi authorities.

Independent Media 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

In 2 009, Turkmenistan’s media organizations continued to toe the ideological line of the government, which maintains control over all forms of official mass media through the retention of a single information agency (TDH). While the president has criticized the state broadcast and print media as “lacking creativity,” all journalists of the official mass media are still required to approve their materials with the TDH, designated ministry, or agency officials, with the consequence that most journalists engage in self-censorship for fear of government reprisals. Despite some gains in Internet access, a substantive improvement in information liberalization is unlikely without changes in the de facto censorship policy and the establishment of a rigorous system for training journalists. In addition to 24 newspapers and 15 journals, the 5 state television channels and 4 state radio stations function as mouthpieces for government propaganda.8 The output of the TDH continues to be overwhelmingly concerned with praising the president and tracking his daily movements. Aside from the programs of the Turkmen Service of Radio Liberty and the German Deutsche Welle in Russian, which are specifically targeted at Turkmenistani listeners, satellite television 540 Nations in Transit 2010

(widely viewed in Ashgabat and other cities) provides the only source of alternative information in Turkmenistan. In 2008, President Berdimuhamedov technically lifted the ban on the importation and circulation of foreign print media, which had been introduced by Niyazov in 2005, but ordinary citizens are still unable to subscribe to foreign newspapers and magazines, and foreign print matter remains largely inaccessible. Independent journalists continued to be harassed and foreign journalists were generally unable to access the country other than for showcase events such as international gas or investment conferences, where they tended to be closely monitored. The government required all foreign journalists to apply for accreditation, although there were no defined criteria for either receiving or denying it. According to the U.S. Department of State, as many as 13 correspondents representing foreign media services operated without accreditation. Internet access increased modestly in 2009, although Turkmenistan still has one of the world’s lowest Internet penetrations at 1.4 percent with an estimated 70,000 users.9 While over a dozen Internet cafes were in operation, resource centers sponsored by Western embassies, international organizations, and NGOs offering free Internet access to the general public were more popular. A new Internet center with 18 terminals opened in 2009 at the National Library in Ashgabat, but the number of terminals available to the public was still far from sufficient to cope with the growing number of Internet users. Turkmentelecom undertook to connect private citizens to the Internet for the first time in June 2008, although long waits and administrative requirements for getting connected—including a signature from the local police station—continued to hinder access. Additionally, service was slow and unreliable, dial-up access rates were relatively expensive for the average citizen, and most Internet Web sites critical of government policies remained blocked by the authorities. Another important development in 2008 was the introduction of high-speed wireless Internet on mobile telephones by Russia’s largest mobile telephone operator, Mobile TeleSystems (MTS), which offered the possibility of a significant expansion of Internet access throughout the country and signaled the end to Turkmentelecom’s monopoly on the Internet. Mobile telephony has expanded rapidly in Turkmenistan; as of October 2009, MTS, which provided mobile telephone services in about 80 percent of the populated territory, reported more than 1.5 million subscribers in the country, representing an increase of 500,000 since February.10 It was not clear how many MTS subscribers also paid for Internet access. In November 2009, President Berdimuhamedov announced an initiative to set up a unified electronic government throughout the country, despite the fact that Turkmenistan’s communications infrastructure is not up to the task. Perhaps to facilitate this move, the previous month the government announced its intention to acquire the country’s first-ever communications satellite to accelerate the development of communications systems and Internet connectivity. In a positive and unexpected development, 2009 saw the advent of a small Turkmen-language online community, “Turkmenet,” which allowed a surprising Turkmenistan 541 amount of dissenting views. Blogs have been posted on a number of subjects not discussed in state media, ranging from Turkmen-language hip-hop and other popular underground music to political Islamism and the September clashes in eastern Turkmenistan between Chinese and Turkmen workers.11 While Turkmenet might be a manifestation of the government’s promise to increase Internet access, some observers have speculated that the authorities might also be using Turkmenet to monitor political dissent.

Local Democratic Governance 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.75 6.75

State power in Turkmenistan’s fivevelayats (regions) and the capital city of Ashgabat is formally vested in the largely decorative Halk Maslakhaty (People’s Councils), elected in December 2007. Elections for district and city Halk Maslakhaty took place in December 2006. In the villages, the 1992 constitution provided for the replacement of local soviets by gengeshes (legislative councils), whose members are directly elected for five-year terms. The more than 600gengeshes are administered by archins, who are elected from among their respective memberships. The gengeshes were formally granted greater powers in 2008, but in reality they follow the instructions of the hakims (local governors). The country’s hakims are directly appointed by the president at all levels. Tribal identities remain strong in Turkmenistan and continue to play an important role in Turkmenistani society and informal local politics. Tribalism manifests itself primarily in social practices, such as the maintenance of preferential networks, endogamy, and the persistence of dialects. Virtually all Turkmen have at least a minimal knowledge of their own tribal affiliation, which is still a relatively reliable indicator of birthplace. A disproportionate number of influential positions in the central government tend to go to members of Niyazov and President Berdimuhamedov’s own tribe, the Ahal Tekke, although this is at least in part owing to the fact that the capital Ashgabat is located in the Ahal region, where Ahal Tekkes predominate. After coming to power, the Berdimuhamedov leadership announced that it would undertake a US$4 billion plan to develop the country’s rural infrastructure and grant urban status to certain large villages with populations ranging from 8,000 to 32,000. In addition to the construction of administrative buildings, schools, and cultural centers, the program was intended to transform these “overgrown” villages into small towns with adequate infrastructure through the provision of sewer systems and sewage treatment facilities, new roads, gas pipelines, electricity grids, piped-water supply networks, and fiber-optic communications equipment. Despite the massive funding officially allocated to the program, the majority of planned projects outside the capital city remained unimplemented at the end of 2009. In fact, the projects that had been constructed tended to be of a showcase 542 Nations in Transit 2010

nature, such as 10,000-seat stadiums and hippodromes in every region, while little public revenue had been spent to improve basic amenities. From approximately 2000, Niyazov’s government engaged in the systematic dismantling of key areas of the public sector, notably education, healthcare, and social security. Since coming to power in 2007, President Berdimuhamedov has made a number of changes to the decaying system of education, including restoring the tenth year of compulsory education and extending the period of higher education from two to five years. High school students are no longer required to undergo two years of practical work experience before applying to universities, foreign degrees are once again recognized, new areas of study have been introduced, and postgraduate and doctoral studies have been reintroduced in certain higher education institutions. The defunct Academy of Sciences, which before its closure in 1993 had acted as the mainstay of the scientific and academic community, was re-opened, and a new presidential Higher Council on Science and Technology was established to coordinate the state’s scientific and academic policy. Universities have widened their intake by 10 percent, although the demand for places still far exceeds supply. Unofficial reports indicate that the long-standing practice of paying bribes to procure a place in universities, institutes, and even some secondary schools has not abated, and in some cases bribes can rise to as much as US$40,000 to enter the most prestigious institutions. As of 2009, Niyazov’s Ruhnama was no longer taught as a separate course but rather as part of a new discipline that included philosophy, political science, the country’s history, and works ostensibly authored by President Berdimuhamedov. Nonetheless, students wishing to gain entry to higher education establishments are still required to demonstrate knowledge of the Ruhnama in state entrance examinations. As late as September, the “sacred” Ruhnama was lauded at a conference devoted to the Era of Great Revival for its “unsurpassing role in the education of the young generation in the spirit of true patriotism.”12 Despite some progress, many educational reforms have been lacking in substance: while the tenth year has been restored, its curriculum is reported to be essentially the same as that of the ninth year; textbooks for most years and subjects are outdated and in short supply; and there is a severe shortage of qualified personnel to teach the newly introduced areas of study. During the year, Berdimuhamedov’s regime prevented some students from pursuing an education in U.S.-affiliated universities, thereby belying its declared willingness to bring Turkmenistan’s educational system up to international standards. In July, the plans of over a thousand students enrolled in foreign universities were disrupted when authorities declared that special stamps from various state agencies would be required for departure from the country; the new requirement was dropped in August and the majority of young scholars managed to leave the country. A notable exception was a group of over 100 students who were refused permission to return to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to resume their studies at the American University of Central Asia (AUCA), which offers a U.S.-style liberal arts education. Another group of AUCA students from Turkmenistan who had won places in the Turkmenistan 543

United States State Department-sponsored program to spend an academic year in U.S. universities was also prohibited from leaving Turkmenistan. In October, some 50 AUCA students were again denied permission to leave the country in order to continue their studies at the American University in Bulgaria, despite an agreement between United States authorities and the Turkmenistani government. Although the leadership has not provided an explanation for its actions, many believe it is reluctant to allow students to be exposed to Western, “freethinking” models of education; moreover, many young Turkmenistanis studying abroad have chosen not to return after receiving their degrees. Additionally, some Turkmenistani students in Kyrgyzstan are reported to have given critical interviews to the foreign media and to have met with members of the Turkmenistani opposition in exile while in Bishkek.13 Along with the education sector, healthcare services in Turkmenistan were systematically undermined by Niyazov. By late 2006, most rural hospitals were reported to have closed, although some hospitals in district and regional centers offering specialized care continued to operate. Since 2008, the state media has reported on the “hundreds of millions of dollars” allocated for the construction of new medical facilities across the country, including those for specialized diseases. However, most of these facilities—many of which contain state-of-the-art equipment—are neither accessible to the vast majority of the population nor staffed with qualified medical personnel. In 2009, Turkmenistan’s repeated promises to radically overhaul the country’s healthcare system stood in stark contradiction to the government’s refusal to allow the international organization Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to treat multi- drug resistant tuberculosis. Whereas MSF was ready to commence its program in October 2010, the Health Ministry wanted the program to begin in 2013. As a result, MSF left Turkmenistan in December 2009, marking the departure of the last international NGO operating in the country.14 As in other public sector spheres, the government does not release reliable data on public health and denies altogether the existence of any HIV cases in the country.

Judicial Framework and Independence 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00

Although formally independent, the court system of Turkmenistan has no impact on the observance of human rights but rather acts as an instrument of repression for the regime. Unchanged since the Soviet era, the court system consists of a Supreme Court, 6 regional courts (including 1 for the city of Ashgabat), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city courts. In addition, the Supreme Economic Court hears all commercial disputes and cases involving conflicts between state enterprises and ministries. The president appoints all judges for five-year terms without legislative 544 Nations in Transit 2010

review. There is no constitutional court, and the prosecutor general remains a political appointee whose primary function is repression rather than oversight. The Office of the Prosecutor General dominates a legal system in which judges and lawyers play a marginal role. As in the former Soviet Union, convictions are generally based on confessions that are sometimes extracted by forcible means, including the use of torture and psychotropic substances. Arbitrary arrest and detention remains a widespread practice in Turkmenistan, despite laws prohibiting it. Under an annual amnesty, mandated by a 1999 law and presidential decree, the government releases thousands of prison inmates each year on the eve of the Muslim feast Gadyr Gijesi (Night of Forgiveness) in October, primarily to relieve overcrowding. Although individuals convicted of serious crimes are theoretically ineligible for amnesty, those who can pay bribes— excluding political prisoners—are generally freed, regardless of the type of crime for which they were imprisoned. In addition to this annual mass pardoning, President Berdimuhamedov pledged to release a number of convicts on certain state holidays: Flag Day (February 19), Constitution Day (May 18), Independence Day (October 27) and Neutrality Day (December 12). However, of the thousands of prisoners amnestied by the president since coming to power in 2007, less than two dozen have been considered political prisoners by international human rights groups. The most well-known was Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who had served as Turkmenistan’s chief religious leader from 1996 to 2003 before being sentenced in 2004 to 22 years in prison on treason charges. Upon his release in 2007, Ibadullah thanked the President and accepted a post as adviser at the President’s State Council for Religious Affairs, thus remaining under the close supervision of administration officials. In 2008, only one known prisoner of conscience was released; likewise, in 2009 only one political prisoner, Muhametkuli Aymuradov, was amnestied after serving fourteen years in prison for anti-state crimes. In April 2009, the European Parliament lifted an 11-year ban on the Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) with Turkmenistan, although the country fell far short of meeting the European Union’s (EU) human rights criteria, such as granting the International Red Cross access to prisons, allowing international human rights organizations to enter Turkmenistan, and releasing all political prisoners. While the European Commission argued that the EU would be in a better position to influence Turkmenistan’s human rights situation after signing the agreement, observers speculated that, in lifting the ban, the EU was attempting to better position itself as a prospective importer of Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbons. In January 2004, the exit-visa regime requiring citizens to obtain visas to travel to foreign states was abolished, although the government replaced it with a number of unofficial measures to prevent free travel, including a “blacklist” of citizens prohibited from leaving the country and the arbitrary confiscation of passports. The blacklist was still in existence at the end of 2009; in many instances, individuals discovered their status at the border or after being refused permission to board a plane. However, the new leadership has enacted reforms easing internal travel Turkmenistan 545 restrictions, which in practice has meant a reduction in the number of roadside document checks and inspections between cities. Significantly, the president signed a decree abolishing the requirement to obtain a special permit in order to travel to the country’s sensitive border regions. In another positive move, the installation of a new, US$6 million checkpoint equipped with state-of-the-art technology— financed by the United States—on Turkmenistan’s border with Uzbekistan was reported to have eased crossing procedures for the many people visiting relatives on both sides of the border. In line with other post-Soviet states after independence, Turkmenistan accorded a de facto higher status to its titular population, ethnic Turkmen, and legitimized the adoption of policies and practices that promoted their specific interests. Most jobs in the public sector were effectively closed to non-Turkmen, and senior state officials needed to demonstrate ethnic purity by tracing their Turkmen ancestry back several generations. The state continued to promote only those media and performing arts productions that featured “national” culture.15 According to the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, the Ministry of Culture prohibited the December 2009 staging of a production by a Russian playwright in the Turkmenbashi State Drama Theater, although performances were already set to begin. A de facto ban exists on all ethnic cultural centers and non-Turkmen media sources (with the exception of two print publications in the Russian language) and on education that is not conducted in the . Whereas at the end of the 1990s there were 49 Russian-language middle schools and 56 schools with partial teaching in Russian, currently there is only one Russian-language school in Ashgabat and a handful in the regions that teach one or two classes in the Russian language.16 There are no Uzbek- or Kazakh-language schools in the country. Higher education establishments teach exclusively in the Turkmen language. The new constitution adopted in 2008 formally enshrined Turkmenistan’s non-recognition of dual citizenship (Article 7). This circumstance, in conjunction with the issuing of new biometric passports in the summer of 2008, was reported to have exerted further pressure on residents holding both Turkmenistani and Russian passports under a 1993 agreement to renounce their Russian citizenship. According to the Memorial Human Rights Society in Moscow, an unofficial policy has gone into effect requiring holders of both Russian and Turkmenistani passports to give up their Russian citizenship in order to receive the new passports, possession of which will become mandatory in 2013 for travel outside the country.

Corruption 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75

Insofar as there are no business leaders or oligarchs manipulating policy formation or shaping laws, Turkmenistan is a low-capture economy. Rather, it is the President 546 Nations in Transit 2010

and his close circle of advisors who shape the rules of the regime to their own substantial advantage. As is the case with some other resource-rich countries, the leadership of Turkmenistan is able to sustain its rule through the receipt of hydrocarbon export revenues, which it uses to finance pervasive security services and vanity construction projects, as well as to secure the support of patronage networks as needed. All major expenditures from the state budget and the conclusion of production-sharing agreements in the oil and gas sector are approved by the president and his close circle of advisors. As liberalization and market reform undermine established hierarchies of authority, they are not generally undertaken. There is still a notable lack of transparency with regard to true economic figures, since budget data and statistics are not accessible to the public. Those figures that are published are often compiled out of local economic reports that have been inflated to show growth. In Turkmenistan, political elites have traditionally built up local power bases by allocating key posts and opportunities to their loyalists. These informal networks, which survived the demise of the Soviet system, are frequently referred to as “clans,” although they are based on patron-client relationships, often with links to extended families, rather than on actual blood ties. A limited number of patronage networks commanded by President Berdimuhamedov control the country’s economy, which is divided into spheres of influence dominated by a close circle of the president’s appointees. The existence of patronage networks as the basis of power has inevitably given rise to a political culture of bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement. Bribe-taking is particularly prevalent among customs, licensing, and social-service agencies. Large amounts of government revenue are spent on flamboyant construction projects carried out primarily by Turkish and French firms. According to Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, Turkmenistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world with a score of 1.8 (on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 indicating “highly clean”) and ranking 168 out of the 180 countries surveyed. The London-based international watchdog Global Witness estimated that as much as 75 percent of government spending did not form part of the state budget under former president Niyazov.17 It remains unclear what share of export revenues are currently being diverted by the Berdimuhamedov government to off-budget accounts. While authorities have stated that several extra-budgetary accounts have been closed and foreign exchange revenues are being transferred to a new stabilization fund, this process has not been subject to full independent verification. President Berdimuhamedov has continued his predecessor’s practice of using state revenue to fund grandiose construction projects, such as the transformation of the Caspian Sea town of Turkmenbashi into a free economic zone and world-class resort—complete with artificial river, yacht club, and oceanographic center—at an estimated cost of US$5billion. In July, the president launched the latest stage in the creation of the US$20 billion artificial lake in the middle of Turkmenistan’s desert, although the ambitious project was put on hold in December, reportedly owing to a lack of funding and a shortage of water. Turkmenistan 547

Rather than embarking on structural reform of the political system, it quickly became evident that the new president planned to retain his predecessor’s pattern of assigning unrealistic targets to senior officials and then summarily removing them at publicized meetings. In January 2009, President Berdimuhamedov staged his single, largest purge of the country’s top power echelons, removing one vice premier, four ministers, the chief of the State Border Service, six directors of state companies, a provincial governor, and the chairman of a state committee. Following the dismissal of approximately one-third of his cabinet, including the long-serving defence minister, Agageldy Mammetgeldiev, only three ministers appointed by former president Niyazov remained in office. While some officials were replaced for incompetency and failure to meet targets, others were dismissed for establishing their own bribe-taking networks or in order to make room for the president’s cronies and relatives from his native region. Public reprimands, sackings, and six-month probation periods, which created a general atmosphere of paralysis, further deterred officials from implementing reform.

Author: Annette Bohr Annette Bohr is an associate fellow of the Russian and Eurasia Program at the Institute of International Affairs in London (Chatham House). She is the author or coauthor of two monographs and numerous articles on Central Asian politics, contemporary history, and ethnic and language policies.

1 The New Constitution of Turkmenistan Adopted,” Turkmen Government official website, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_en/?idr=4&id=080928a. 2 “Turkmen Election Reveals Depressingly Familiar Abuses,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 15, 2008, available at www.iwpr.net; and “Report on the Elections,” Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, December 16, 2008, available. http://www.chrono- tm.org/. 3 The 2007 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ ngoindex/2007/turkmenistan.pdf. 4 2008 Human Rights Report: Turkmenistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, February 25, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/ sca/119142.htm. 5 The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ ngoindex/2008/turkmenistan.pdf. 6 “No Light on the Horizon for Turkmen NGOs,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, August 18, 2009, available at www.iwpr.net. 548 Nations in Transit 2010

7 Felix Corley, “Turkmenistan: Religious Freedom Survey,” Forum 18 News Service, August 2008, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1167. 8 Turkmenistan’s fourth television channel, the multilingual satellite television service TV-4 Turkmenistan, which was created in 2004 at an estimated cost of US$12 million, was a major propaganda effort undertaken to improve Turkmenistan’s international image. It broadcasts programs in Turkmen and in six foreign languages: English, Chinese, Russian, French, Arabic, and Persian. A fifth television channel created under Berdimuhamedov is devoted almost exclusively to Turkmen culture. 9 Available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/list4.htm#low. 10 Turkmenistani Government official website, http://www.turkmenistan.ru, October 22, 2009. 11 Neweurasia, September 29, 2009, http://www.neweurasia.net/media-and-internet/turkmenet -the-same-kind-of-repression-toward-the-uighur-turks-in-china-is-being-applied-to-us/; and Neweurasia, November 24, 2009, http://www.neweurasia.net/media-and-internet/ influenzastan-part-5-the-internet-is-a-far-more-dangerous-virus/. 12 State News Agency of Turkmenistan, December 9, 2009, cited in Turkmenistan News Brief, September 11–17, 2009, Turkmenistan Project. 13 Naz Nazar, “Window Dressing,” Transitions Online, January 7, 2010. 14 “Turkmenistan’s Opaque Health System,” Medecin San Frontieres, April 2010, http://www. msf.org/source/countries/asia/turkmenistan/2010/turkmenistan_health_system.pdf. 15 Exceptions were occasionally made to this policy, such as when the cultural attaché of the German Embassy was allowed to organize a concert in an Ashgabat state theater in May 2009 that was devoted to the music of German composers as performed by Turkmen artists. 16 Information provided by Vitaliy Ponamarev, a researcher on Central Asia for the Memorial Human Rights Society in Moscow. See “Rodina—ne mat,” Rossiia ne zhelaet zashchishchat’ svoikh grazhdan v Turkmenii’ [The Motherland Is Not a Mother—Russia Does Not Want to Defend Its Citizens in Turkmenistan], Fergana.ru, March 3, 2009 http://www.ferghana.ru/ article.php?id=6081. 17 “All That Gas?” Global Witness, November 2009, http://www.globalwitness.org/media_ library_detail.php/879/en/all_that_gas_the_eu_and_turkmenistan.