Crafting the Taiwan Model for COVID-19: an Exceptional State in Pandemic Territory

Crafting the Taiwan Model for COVID-19: An Exceptional State in Pandemic Territory

Ian Rowen

developed and democratically governed Abstract: Taiwan was the first country to country that anticipated a health crisis and anticipate the threat of COVID-19, to send a calmly contained the virus—with only 55 medical team to investigate the initial outbreak confirmed cases of local transmission and in China, and to implement a comprehensive seven deaths as of July 2020, according to its and successful public health response that Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC). avoided repeated infections or catastrophic Astonishingly, the contested state of lockdowns. Counter-intuitively, Taiwan’s Taiwan—recognized (formally as the Republic success was achieved in part due to its of China) by only 15 other countries and exclusion from international bodies such as the marginalized in international organizations World Health Organization, which led it to such as the World Health Organization adopt a highly vigilant approach to health (WHO)—emerged in many ways as the most threats, especially those that emerge in China, normal country in the world whose irredentist claims impinge on Taiwan’s participation in the international community Taiwan’s success owed to past experience with and constitute an existential military threat. SARS, extreme wariness of China (Leonard, Taiwan’s response to COVID-19 was recast by 2020; Schubert, 2020), and a highly responsive its diplomatic representatives into “The Taiwan public health administration coupled with Model”, a formulation used to pursue increased universal health coverage, designed in part international recognition and participation. based on the counter-example of the US’s uneven and expensive system (Scott, 2020). An additional counter-intuitive factor, acknowledged even by Taiwanese medical Introduction authorities, may have been Taiwan’s exclusion from direct participation in the WHO, which led An “unexplained viral pneumonia” was first leaders to take a highly precautionary approach reported in Wuhan, China on December 31, (Lin et al., 2020; Watt, 2020). 2019. Taiwan’s authorities, accustomed to paying close attention to threats from China, Yet, even before the outbreak of COVID-19, anticipated the possibility of infection and Taiwan had already been caught within a new implemented a plan to contain it. After the round of tension and uncertainty between novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 epidemicChina, which claims its territory, and the US, spiraled out of control in Wuhan, China’s with which it has a complicated relationship as central government locked down the country guarantor of security and constrainer of after the disease had already begun to spread sovereignty. At a different conjuncture, such an abroad. With most of the world locking down or event might have engendered greater efforts suffering catastrophic losses due to thetowards regional if not national collaboration. contagion that was later named COVID-19, It unfolded instead in a time and region rattled Taiwan stood alone as an economicallyby talk of a new “Cold War”, with Hong Kong

1 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF activist Joshua Wong figuring his city as a 21st not send support until 50 days after Taiwan’s century Berlin. Its liberation, argued Taiwanese call for help, and only after the PRC gave sociologist Wu Jieh-min, required a USpermission. This episode marked the first time guarantee of Taiwan’s defense as the front line that representatives of a UN-affiliated agency of democracy (Wu, 2020). officially visited the island since the 1971 UN General Assembly decision to expel the As the disease invoked a global state of “representatives of Chiang Kai-shek”, which exception, the exceptional state of Taiwan inaugurated Taiwan’s isolation from the crafted a diplomatic campaign to expand its international diplomatic community (Chen, international space. Taiwan’s officials used its 2018). successful public health management to enhance the national image, expand space for After 8096 reported cases and 774 casualties, international participation, and assert Taiwan’s SARS was contained globally in less than one sovereignty and distinction from China. The year through aggressive quarantining and country’s public health approach, whichcontact tracing of infected patients. Despite the included inbound travel bans, wide mask tragedy of individual deaths, and the severe coverage, and contact tracing, was alsodamage to affected economies, the rapid presented, perhaps improbably, as a replicable containment was hailed by many as a triumph approach for other countries to follow. This of global health governance. Still, SARS diplomatic campaign included designing and accelerated an already-ongoing reorganization promoting the so-called “Taiwan Model” of of global health governance designed to health governance, and coining and circulating address the risk of emerging infectious disease. two slogans: #TaiwanCanHelp, andIn particular, the WHA sped up its revisions to #HealthForAll. its International Health Regulations (IHR), which are the only legally-binding international To understand Taiwan’s public health treaty on global health governance. However, governance and the diplomatic campaign it the IHR, as an international treaty structured precipitated, it is necessary first to take a brief through UN mechanisms, can only be ratified trip back in time to consider how the response by UN member states, which made Taiwan to SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome), ineligible to sign (Fidler, 2004). a disease caused by an earlier novel human coronavirus, set the stage for “The Taiwan For Taiwan, which suffered 73 deaths, the third Model”. highest number after China and Canada, SARS was a tragedy, but also a lesson to better prepare for future health threats, knowing they Taiwan and the World Healthmay be multiplied by diplomatic isolation (Lin Organization: From SARS to SARS-CoV-2 et al., 2020). To address this, Taiwan continued its campaign to join the World Health SARS, caused by deadlier but less infectious Association (WHA), the UN representative body coronavirus, hopped from an animal to a that governs the WHO. human in China in 2002 and then travelled to a Taiwan that was poorly prepared to receive it. During negotiations over the IHR revision, Initial suppression of reports about the disease Taiwan’s diplomatic allies supported the in China exacerbated the severity of the inclusion of a clause for “universal application”, outbreak there and abroad. Taiwan’s crisis was which could potentially include Taiwan. At the worsened by the slow and politically-next session, PRC representatives responded constrained response of the WHO, which did by declaring that the new IHR applied to all of

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“Chinese territory”, including Taiwan, and state votes. Such coordination included signed a confidential Memorandum ofcultivating relationships with candidates whom Understanding (MOU) with the WHOthe PRC supported for Director-General, Secretariat to enforce its claim. The MOU, including Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of which was later leaked, stipulated that Taiwan Ethiopia, confirmed in 2017 (Buryani, 2020). should not be allowed to participate under the Dr. Tedros went on to sign an MOU in support name of “Taiwan” or “ROC”, that its invitee list of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and must be approved in advance by the PRC, and traveled to Beijing to praise Xi’s proposal to that all communications between the WHO and pave a “medical silk road” that same year Taiwan must be conducted through contacts in (Murphy, 2018). China. For the next several years, Taiwanese health authorities chose instead to conduct most communications with the WHO through “Wuhan Pneumonia” their longtime contacts at the US Centers for Disease Control. On 31 December 2019, the same day Wuhan police announced that they were investigating In 2008, Taiwan received a limited welcome doctors for spreading unsubstantiated rumors into the WHO following the election of and “disturbing social order”, municipal health President Ma Ying-Jeou, who had pursued officials released information about a viral closer economic and political ties with China. pneumonia that had infected visitors to a In January 2009, with the assent of the PRC, seafood market. The statement said that there WHO invited Taiwan to establish a direct point was no clear evidence of human-to-human of contact through IHR mechanisms totransmission, and claimed that, “The disease is exchange information on health emergencies. It preventable and controllable”. Wuhan police also allowed Taiwanese officials to log in to the detained more doctors for sharing warnings in WHO’s Event Information Site, where it could private Wechat groups, as scientists in Wuhan, examine advisories shared between member Shanghai and Beijing identified the pathogen states. Furthermore, WHO promised that it and sequenced its genome. Early reports would send experts to Taiwan in the event of a suggested that, like SARS, the disease may health emergency. A few months later, with have originated in horseshoe bats, before only a few weeks’ notice, the WHO Director- jumping to humans through an intermediate General invited Taiwan, as “Chinese Taipei”, to species, possibly pangolins. join the meeting of the WHA as a non-voting observer, which did allow its representatives to Chinese officials did promptly report the make personal contacts share information. disease through its WHO IHR point of contact After Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), but claimed for weeks that the disease was not which advocates for the “unification” of Taiwan contagious between humans, a claim that was and China, lost the presidency to Tsai Ing-wen repeated by WHO officials through mid- of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in January. Although Xi Jinping later announced 2016, Taiwan was no longer invited to the that he initiated an inquiry and response team meetings of the WHA. No explanation was in the Politburo as early as January 7, the city’s provided by the WHA or WHO (Chen, 2018). health commission reported zero new cases and continued to maintain that there was no The WHO’s changing posture towards Taiwan evidence of human-to-human transmission or was shaped not only by its the MOU with the infected medical personnel between January 12 PRC, but also by China’s increasinglyand 18. This period coincided with the annual sophisticated coordination of WHA member- People’s Congress of the municipal branch of

3 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and a (CDC), awoke to a text message from his massive, 40,000-family public banquet to colleagues in the media monitoring unit. The celebrate the Lunar New Year. These events message contained laboratory reports and went ahead as scheduled despite official warnings from Wuhan doctors about an knowledge that the pneumonia may beunusual viral pneumonia that had been contagious (Buckley and Myers, 2020). circulating for days. The reports had been deleted within China but preserved on PPT, a Official denial ended when China’s most- freewheeling Taiwanese internet site. The same famous epidemiologist, Zhong Nanshan, who day, Taiwan officials emailed their IHR point of helped lead the response to SARS, visited contact to ask for more information about the Wuhan and on January 20 announced during an new disease. The email noted that patients interview on state television that there was no were being isolated for treatment, which doubt of human-to-human transmission. Wuhan implied concern about the possibility of human- officials banned the entrance of tour groups to-human transmission. The email was never and locked the entire city down on the morning answered. “We were not able to get of January 23, undoubtedly with the assent of satisfactory answers either from the WHO or Beijing (Buckley and Myers, 2020). Travelers from the CDC, so and we got nervous as and we who had already left Wuhan and Hubei started doing our own preparation,” said province continued moving across China as Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (Watt, 2020). other provinces began implementing lockdowns Taiwanese medical staff began performing and the central government formulated a more health checks on inbound flights from Wuhan comprehensive response. International travel the same night. Still concerned about what they continued to depart from elsewhere in the were hearing through their contacts within country, until outbound tour groups were China, Taiwanese officials sent a medical team banned, and various countries shut their land to the city to investigate between 13 and 15 or air borders to arrivals from China. January (Watt, 2020). Based on the team’s Although WHO officials consistently denounced collection of confused and alarming responses border closures, tourists and travelers were about infection clusters reported by among the first targets for preventive measures interviewed doctors, Taiwan’s CDC listed the against the spread of the virus, first in China virus as a highly communicable disease on 15 and then internationally. Hotels across China January. refused to house travelers from Hubei, until the Before Chinese authorities or the WHO publicly central government coordinated a list of venues confirmed that the virus could spread from that would take them in and even offered to human to human, Taiwan had already set up a repatriate ones who had already left the Central Epidemics Command Center, headed country. As for other countries, many simply by the minister of health and welfare, to banned arrivals from China and a growing list coordinate response efforts by various of other sending regions, sometimes including agencies, including the ministries of Taiwan, before formulating other public health transportation, economics, labor, and education responses. and the Environmental Protection Administration. The legal basis for this had been established through post-SARS Taiwan’s Public Health Response legislation.

The morning of December 31, the deputy Anticipating a possible shortage of protective Director of Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control gear, authorities also banned mask exports,

4 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF ramped up domestic mask production, and much of the negotiation took place not between implemented a rationed mask distribution formal government bodies, but through system with the help of computer scientist informal business and political party channels Audrey Tang, a social movement veteran who that included KMT officials with CCP ties. had earlier been tapped by the Tsai administration as “Digital Minister” toFor the first charter flight in February, spearhead e-governance and civic technology operated by Taiwan’s flag carrier—the initiatives (Chang, 2020). To identify suspected confusingly-named China Airlines—Taiwan’s cases and facilitate isolation and contact Mainland Affairs Council prepared a passenger tracing, national health insurance andlist that prioritized short-term visitors to immigration databases were integrated. Mobile Wuhan and other people who lacked nearby phone network monitoring systems were support. The agency also insisted on incorporated to help enforce home quarantine preventative measures, including pre-boarding (Wang et al., 2020). Taiwan was praised by health checks and provision of protective gear medical scholars for its “astounding” success in for passengers. While pre-approved passengers conducting robust contact tracing, testing, and readied to board, Chinese authorities did not reporting of the results of its first 100 cases to issue the protective gear, saying it was the international medical communityunnecessary, and attempted to include an (Steinbrook, 2020). additional 30 people who had not been cleared for arrival in Taiwan. Furor erupted when Technocratic decision-making and a high level Taiwan media reported that three of the of public compliance primed by pastpassengers that arrived at Taoyuan Airport experiences with SARS maintained Taiwanese were not included on the pre-approved list. life at a nearly normal pace. Apart from a This included a passenger who was detected precautionary two-week extension of the New with a fever upon arrival and later diagnosed Year holiday, schools, cinemas, and bars with COVID-19 (Lee et al., 2020; Yang and remained open. Although this was done without Hetherington, 2020). It also turned out that invoking emergency decrees, and inmany of the passengers were PRC nationals accordance with constitutional courtmarried to Taiwanese businessmen, renewing interpretations of post-SARS legislation, legal older controversies about the entry and scholars and some critics raised concerns about residence rights of such spouses and their the extent of expanded government powers. children (Friedman, 2015). It turned out that a These at least were set to expire with the end Taiwanese businessman, Hsu Cheng-wen, who of the epidemic and were likely tempered by led a “Parents Association” for Taiwanese reluctance to invoke extreme measures that families based in China, coordinated some of might evoke grim memories of the past the communication with Chinese officials. Hsu, authoritarian KMT regime (Lin et al., 2020). a member of both the KMT Central Committee and the Chinese People's Political Consultative As the domestic public health response was Conference, a CCP body, went on local media implemented, national sentiment grew inflamed to criticize DPP officials for “playing politics” by a fraught evacuation process for Taiwanese over the evacuation. He was later suspended people trapped in a locked-down Wuhan. While from his KMT position after a public backlash several other countries smoothly evacuated (S Lin, 2020). their nationals from the city, Taiwan’s efforts to transport roughly 500 citizens were stymied by While China scrambled to ramp up its own their unusual diplomatic position. As with many mask production, and party-state agents and arrangements between Taiwan and China, concerned citizens alike purchased large

5 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF supplies overseas to ship home, Taiwan’s early Taiwan’s president an astonishingly high and decision to ban mask exports was criticized as consistent approval rating of over 70%, likely “heartless” both by PRC media outlets and the most sustained level of public support ever KMT officials. Taiwan’s later agreement to polled in Taiwan (Batto, 2020). Health officials donate masks to the US in exchange for other held daily briefings which were used to share protective gear, which came after the PRC not only information about the epidemic, but reported it had turned the corner with disease also other messages about national values, as containment, received a further round of well as to promote places of pride. In April, blistering criticism. “The DPP authority’s following news reports of a boy who hatred of China and flattery of the US is more complained that only pink masks were poisonous than the virus itself” declared a available, which made him fear that he might headline on 19 March in the PRC outlet, Xinhua be bullied, all of the officials at that day’s (Minjindang dangju ‘chou Zhong mei Mei’ bi briefing, including male ministers, wore pink bingdu hai du民进党当局“仇中媚美” 比病毒更 masks to show that color needn’t be gendered. 毒). Despite its expression of concern about As daily cases diminished, popular fruit cross-Strait sentiment, the article did not including guavas and watermelons were consider how the many People’s Liberation artfully arrayed on stage to count the number Army air force and naval exercises that took of days without new cases, while also place during the same period, includingpromoting Taiwanese agricultural products. warship cruises and fighter jet fly-bys directed The tourism industry was hit hard, although towards Taiwan’s territory, might be perceived some compensation for the sector was included in Taiwan. These were likely intended to in a large subsidy package (Chang, 2020). At demonstrate that the PRC could still pose a the Sun Moon Lake Ita Thao pier, the frog credible military threat even while it was under sculpture used to measure the water level wore lockdown (Brown and Churchman, 2020). a Hakka-style floral print face mask and stood behind placards that announced the growing In the meantime, Taiwanese health officials number of days without infections. No Chinese collaborated with Stanford Universitytourists were there to see it. researchers to develop a new protocol for international travel, saying they hoped it might be adopted elsewhere. By testing ways to safely shorten quarantine for pre-tested travelers, “Taipei and Environs” vs “The Taiwan “We hope to develop a safe travel protocol Model” which we could use to gradually restart some travel links with like-minded countries,” said Taiwan made an early decision to block Chen Chi-mai, Taiwan’s deputy premier. A inbound flights from Hubei and later all similar collaboration with China, however, was inbound travel from China, a move followed off the table. As Vice President Chen Chien-jen, later by many other countries, including the the celebrated epidemiologist who had led the US. Such decisions flew in the face of WHO SARS response, told the Financial Times, “Until officials’ discouragement of travel blocks and today, we don’t even have data on how many praise for China’s response (Associated Press, people have been tested in China. So we have 2020). Several other countries that reported to be more cautious” (Hille, 2020). Needless to serious outbreaks, including Italy, South Korea, say, these officials did not view China as a and Iran, were later added to Taiwan’s ban list. “like-minded country”. By late March, as global caseloads rose, all inbound arrivals were barred except for Steady leadership and clear messaging earned residents, citizens, and exceptional cases.

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Although the WHO advocated against flight Taiwan’s reported case figures under PRC bans and border closures, a number ofprovinces, designating it, variously, as “Taiwan, countries began to implement them anyway, China” (starting with the 2nd report on 21 and seemed to choose sites based on WHO January), “Taipei Municipality” (from 23 regional designations, rather than a risk January), “Taipei” (from 25 January), and calculus. Italy banned all flights from China and finally, the never-before-seen “Taipei and Taiwan, evidently following the representation Environs” (from 5 February). In response, of Taiwan as a part of China within the Foreign Minister Joseph Wu lambasted the International Civil Aviation Organization, WHO on Twitter. “What’s wrong with you? First another UN-affiliate agency. Vietnam and the you called us ‘Taiwan, China,’ then you Philippines also initially blocked flights from changed to ‘Taipei.’ You misreported the Taiwan, in at least one case temporarily confirmed cases, & now you call us ‘Taipei & stranding already-boarded passengers on the Environs.’ Look! Taiwan is #Taiwan & not any tarmac, until officials reversed their positions part of the #PRC.” and resumed flights following complaints from Taiwan’s foreign ministry (Lema and Blanchard, 2020).

The WHO’s seemingly slow response to a growing global crisis, and its consistent praise for PRC leaders, called the political allegiances of the organization into question. WHO officials publicly acknowledged human-to-human transmission of the virus only on January 21, well after Taiwan’s CECC had made its own determination. The WHO went on to classify the disease as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January. During a Figure 1. Taiwan Minister of Foreign media briefing on 11 March, the WHO Director- Affairs Joseph Wu response to WHO. 6 General said it “can be characterized as a February 2020. pandemic”, itself a term which is ambiguously defined by WHO’s own regulations. In the meantime, a number of countries less vigilant Taiwan’s bizarre diplomatic plight was than Taiwan had already failed to craft a demonstrated during an awkward video comprehensive response. interview with a senior WHO official, Dr. Bruce Aylward, conducted by a journalist from Hong The contrast between the WHO’s slow response Kong public broadcaster RTHK (Chan, 2020). and Taiwan’s pro-active measures earned After the journalist asked him if Taiwan might Taiwan the most positive international press it be allowed to join the WHO, Aylward blinked had received in years. At the same time, several times and claimed that he could not Taiwan found its own figures grouped further hear the question. After the journalist offered with those of China under a confusing set of to repeat the question, he said “No, that’s OK, changing designations in the WHO Daily let’s move on to another question then,” before Situation Report, which was posted on the dropping the call without explanation. After the organization’s website and narrated in its journalist called back and said she would like to briefings. The Situation Report tabulated cases talk more about Taiwan’s epidemic response, by “Countries, territories, or areas”, and listed Aylward answered, “Well, we’ve already talked

7 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF about China. And when you look across all the the slogans, “Taiwan Can Help” and “Health for different areas of China, they’ve actually all All,” and the following account: done quite a good job.” He then thanked the interviewer and promptly ended the call. After When a SARS-like virus, later named the video went viral, Aylward’s profile vanished as coronavirus disease 2019 from the WHO website. WHO spokespeople (COVID-19), first appeared in China in late 2019, it was predicted that, later clarified in a press release that Taiwan’s other than China, Taiwan would be membership is up to member states and not one of the most affected countries, staff, and asserted that the organization is given its geographic proximity to and working closely with Taiwanese health experts, close people-to-people exchanges a claim refuted by Taiwan officials (Blanchard, with China. Yet even as the disease 2020; Davidson, 2020). continues to spread around the globe, Taiwan has been able to The apparent suppression of Taiwan’s contain the pandemic and minimize international participation heightened media its impact on people's daily lives. The attention and amplified a pushback from transparency and honesty with which prominent figures in technology, public health, Taiwan has implemented prevention measures is a democratic model of and entertainment, many of whom excellence in fighting disease...The characterized it as a country. Bill Gates said in materials found here also help an interview, “I don't think any country has a explain the different aspects of perfect record. Taiwan comes close. They really Taiwan's epidemic prevention work, were talking about it, and it's unfortunate they and how Taiwan is helping the weren't part of the WHO to really get those international community. warnings paid attention to” (Financial Times, 2020). This was a striking position to take for As of May 2020, the site specified the someone who heads a foundation that is one of “measures” and “results” of the model: the WHO’s largest financial donors. In an ironic “Taiwan's comprehensive national health twist, singer Barbra Streisand, for whom the insurance system and our experience of Streisand Effect was named—for making fighting the SARS epidemic; A whole-of- information more widely known by trying to government system coordinating interagency suppress it—joined the fray. She noted in a resources and manpower—battling against tweet: “Taiwan, despite being just 100 miles COVID-19 through unified, decisive efforts; from mainland China with regular flights to and Advance preparations and early response to from Wuhan, has successfully staved off the COVID-19 pandemic; Public-private worst of the coronavirus pandemic. The country partnerships to contain COVID-19; Tackling has so far seen five deaths and just under 350 COVID-19 with the help of big data and AI; confirmed cases, and most schools and[and] Open and transparent information businesses remain open” (Shattuck, 2020). promoting social stability”. Each element linked to an explanatory document watermarked by Building on such earned press, the so-called the “Taiwan Can Help” and “Health for All” “Taiwan Model” was coined by diplomats not slogans. merely to denote an epidemic response, but deployed as part of a wide-ranging strategy for The same slogans were circulated by Taiwan’s increasing Taiwan’s international space. MOFA formal and informal diplomatic allies in a series added an English-language section to its of ads, social media posts, and even a website, “The Taiwan Model for Combatting skywriting message spotted over the Chinese COVID-19”, which featured a large banner with embassy in Canberra, some of which were

8 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF state-supported, and some of which were effort to rebrand the anachronistically-named crowdfunded by Taiwanese citizens. The US national flag-carrier, China Airlines, whose State Department officials promoted a Twitter airplanes were busy moving the “Made in campaign with the hashtags #TweetforTaiwan Taiwan” model around, also got a renewed and #TaiwanModel. The #TaiwanCanHelp push, even as global news outlets continued to campaign included donations of masks to a misuse images of China Airlines’ airplanes in variety of countries, including the US, where stories about China’s air carriers. White House officials donned “Made in Taiwan” masks during press conferences (McLaughlin, The campaign was directed towards lobbying to 2020). expand the scope of participation in the WHA. Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies were expected to submit proposals for Taiwan’s admission at the annual meeting on May 19. Several days before, when asked at a press conference about a PRC foreign affairs official’s demand that Taiwan accept a “One China” premise in order to participate in the WHA, Taiwan’s Minister of Health and Welfare, Chen Shih-chung, flatly stated, “We have no way to accept something that does not exist” (Wintour, 2020). With a successful vote looking unlikely, and Taiwan’s allies expressing concern for their Figure 2. MOFA Instagram announces a own public health crises, diplomats withdrew donation of 300,000 masks to Indonesia. the motion. 15 May 2020. Even as Taiwan’s policy makers looked towards eventual WHO membership as a stepping-stone Even as US federal and state governments to international normalization, their way clashed over crisis coordination, andforward looked even more uncertain when US congressional Democrats and Republicans President Trump announced that he would fought over financial bailout packages, Taiwan withdraw the US from the international body. represented a rare bipartisan cause forApparently seeking to deflect from his agreement. The US Congress and Senate administration’s catastrophic response to unanimously passed the Taiwan AlliesCOVID-19, Trump complained that China’s International Protection and Enhancement crisis response was unfairly praised by WHO Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, which was signed into leaders. He implied that the WHO was under law on March 26 and called for the US to undue Chinese political influence, even if the support Taiwan’s increased participation in US remained by far the WHO’s largest funder international institutions (J Lin, 2020). Beyond (Associated Press, 2020). the US, the campaign included unprecedented expressions of support from leaders in Canada, In the very same speech, Trump indicated that Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and much of the US would no longer recognize Hong Kong’s Europe. Literally mobilizing their “model”, separate customs status, as a response to the MOFA officials also allowed nationals of several PRC’s announcement of a new national security other countries to board an evacuation flight law for Hong Kong. The bill was denounced in from locked-down Lima to Miami in late March, the US and in Taiwan—even by KMT “out of humanitarian concern, and to show that leaders—as the effective end of Hong Kong’s ‘Taiwan can help’” (Lu, 2020). A long-running

9 18 | 14 | 9 APJ | JF promised autonomy under the “One Country, Many commentators argue that the Two Systems” framework. While some in implications of Taiwan’s exclusion from Taiwan celebrated the strong stance taken by international bodies extend beyond the human the US against the PRC, Taiwan’s geopolitical rights of its 24 million citizens. Refusing position looked all the more tenuous, especially Taiwan direct access to the WHO constitutes a given that the Tsai administration had just clear and present danger to global public promised to help resettle Hong Kongers who health, suggested The Economist, among other might face political persecution under the new prominent outlets that acknowledged its world- national security law. leading response and bemoaned the fact that its vigilance was unfollowed (Banyan, 2020; Leonard, 2020). Taiwan, of course, may have come out all the healthier for being on its own. Conclusion: The Absurdity of Taiwan’s However, in this otherwise unmitigated Exceptionality moment of triumph, its polity still navigating through a brewing conflict between the US and The WHO’s treatment of Taiwan would likely China, the archipelago appeared as precarious have shocked its first Director-General, Brock and vital as ever. Chisholm, who, like Bruce Aylward, hailed from Canada. A pioneering globalist, Chisholm advocated the replacement of national citizenship with world citizenship andReferences denounced the ROC international representation of China as “an absurdity which Arendt H., (1958).The Origins of is outstanding even in this era of absurdities” Totalitarianism. 2nd ed. Meridian Books. (Farley 2008, 90). China’s contemporary claims to represent Taiwan are no less absurd, but by Associated Press, (2020).China delayed now, Chisholm’s calls to “sacrifice much of our releasing coronavirus info , frustrating WHO. own national sovereignties” for the sake of Associated Press, 2nd June. world health sound quaint, urgent, and unthinkable all at once. Banyan, (2020). Let Taiwan into the World Health Organisation. The Economist. Cast against the pandemic, the geopolitical absurdity of Taiwan’s exclusion could be posed Batto, N., (2020). Public opinion in May 2020. as another pathological condition plaguing a Frozen Garlic. (accessed 24 June 2020). world in which, as put by Hannah Arendt, “the right to have rights, or the right of every Blanchard, B., (2020). WHO says following individual to belong to humanity, should be Taiwan virus response closely, after guaranteed by humanity itself”. However, given complaints. Reuters, 29th March. the limited efficacy of international law, the Brown, D.G. and Churchman, K., (2020). China- practice of human rights effectively “operates Taiwan Relations: Coronavirus Embitters in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties Cross-Strait Relations.Comparative between sovereign states”, as Arendt Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral presciently argued after the 1948 international Relationsin the Indo-Pacific 22(1): 73–82. adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1958: 298). As such, the rejection of Buckley, C. and Myers, S.L., (2020).As New Taiwan’s participation signifies a persistent Coronavirus Spread , Chinaʼs Old Habits disavowal of the United Nations’ constitutive Delayed Fight. New York Times, 1st February. promise of universal application.

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This article is a part of the Special Issue: Pandemic Asia, Part I. See the Table of Contents here.

See the Table of Contents for Part II.

Readers of this special may be also interested in another COVID-19 special, Vulnerable Populations Under COVID-19 in Japan, edited by David H. Slater.

Ian Rowen is Assistant Professor of sociology, geography, and urban planning at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he holds cross-appointments in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and School of Art, Design, and Media. He has published articles in The Journal of Asian Studies, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, Annals of Tourism Research, and Asian Anthropology, among other outlets. He has been a postdoctoral research fellow at Academia Sinica Institute of Ethnology, an Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), a World Economic Forum Global Future Council Fellow, and a Fulbright Fellow.