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The History of Star Voting the History Of Learn More Learn More http://starvoting.us http://starvoting.us Our Non-Profit Our Non-Profit http://equal.vote http://equal.vote Contact Us Contact Us [email protected] [email protected] Create a STAR poll Create a STAR poll http://star.vote http://star.vote Like and Follow “STAR Voting” Like and Follow “STAR Voting” THE HISTORY OF THE HISTORY OF STAR VOTING STAR VOTING STAR Voting was created in 2014 STAR Voting was created in 2014 after a group of election after a group of election scientists from around the scientists from around the nation gathered at the Equal nation gathered at the Equal Vote Conference at the Vote Conference at the University of Oregon. University of Oregon. Necessity is the mother of Necessity is the mother of invention and STAR Voting invention and STAR Voting emerged as a new model for fair emerged as a new model for fair elections. elections. A hybrid of Score Voting and A hybrid of Score Voting and Instant Runoff Voting, STAR Instant Runoff Voting, STAR combines the best aspects of combines the best aspects of both to offer more accurate both to offer more accurate results than either. results than either. The Equal Vote Coalition, a The Equal Vote Coalition, a registered non-profit, remains registered non-profit, remains the driving force behind STAR. the driving force behind STAR. THE BASICS OF HOW TO GET THE BASICS OF HOW TO GET STAR VOTING INVOLVED STAR VOTING INVOLVED S.T.A.R stands for Score Then Vote YES on STAR Voting or S.T.A.R stands for Score Then Vote YES on STAR Voting or Automatic Runoff and that’s help collect signatures for an Automatic Runoff and that’s help collect signatures for an exactly how it works. initiative in your area. exactly how it works. initiative in your area. Score candidates from 0 up to 5 Volunteer or join the email Score candidates from 0 up to 5 Volunteer or join the email stars. You may give the same list: [email protected]: stars. You may give the same list: [email protected]: score to multiple candidates. score to multiple candidates. Put up a lawn sign Put up a lawn sign The top two scoring candidates The top two scoring candidates go on to an automatic runoff Come canvassing go on to an automatic runoff Come canvassing and your full vote goes to the with us: [email protected] and your full vote goes to the with us: [email protected] finalist you scored higher. finalist you scored higher. Donate: starvoting.us/donate Donate: starvoting.us/donate If you scored both finalists If you scored both finalists equally, then you vote no Follow “STAR Voting” and equally, then you vote no Follow “STAR Voting” and preference between those two. “Equal Vote” on social media. preference between those two. “Equal Vote” on social media. If you left a candidate's score If you left a candidate's score blank, they get a zero. Test drive STAR Voting with blank, they get a zero. Test drive STAR Voting with your own poll or election at your own poll or election at This system eliminates the http://star.vote This system eliminates the http://star.vote need for a primary election. need for a primary election. Spread the word! Spread the word! WHY IS STAR STAR Voting inspires voter WHY IS STAR STAR Voting inspires voter VOTING BETTER? participation by skipping the VOTING BETTER? participation by skipping the low-turnout primary and just low-turnout primary and just The 5 STAR ballot lets you show requiring one inclusive election The 5 STAR ballot lets you show requiring one inclusive election who you prefer, and how much in November. who you prefer, and how much in November. or little you like each candidate. or little you like each candidate. Only having to run a single If your favorites can't win, your If your favorites can't win, your Only having to run a single election saves taxpayers money, vote automatically transfers to vote automatically transfers to election saves taxpayers money, while helping candidates with the finalist you preferred, so the finalist you preferred, so while helping candidates with smaller budgets compete. your vote still makes a your vote still makes a smaller budgets compete. difference. difference. STAR Voting gives 3rd party STAR Voting gives 3rd party STAR Voting allows you to candidates and non-affiliated STAR Voting allows you to candidates and non-affiliated express your full, honest candidates a fair chance of express your full, honest candidates a fair chance of opinion without worrying winning. opinion without worrying winning. about strategic voting or about strategic voting or having to vote “Lesser Evil.” having to vote “Lesser Evil.” With STAR Voting every voter is With STAR Voting every voter is equally powerful, no matter equally powerful, no matter STAR Voting eliminates Vote STAR Voting eliminates Vote how many candidates are in the how many candidates are in the Splitting and the “Spoiler Effect.” Splitting and the “Spoiler Effect.” race. race..
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