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Water, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Management

Acknowledgments

This publication has been prepared for:

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

2nd Floor, Jackson Bldg. 122 Bank St. Ottawa, ON K1A 0W6 Tel: (613) 944-4875 Toll Free: 1-800-830-3118 Fax: (613) 998-9589 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca

Author:

R. A. Halliday R. Halliday & Associates Ltd.

This material is based upon work supported by the Division of Research and Development (DRD) in the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), under Contract Reference No. 2002D016. OCIPEP is now a part of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada.

 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (2003) Catalogue No.: PS4-7/2004E-PDF ISBN: 0-662-37714-1

ii Executive Summary

Water is vital to society’s well-being. Its use, abuse, and distribution are subjects of concern to many different sectors and the focus of attention by all levels of government and many government departments. Water administration falls almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provinces, yet water’s relation to human health, the environment, and economic development means individuals and governments at all levels have an interest.

This report surveys the types of water issues that may relate to federal interests in critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada∗ (PSEPC) is the new federal department with the most direct interest in these types of issues. For example, from its mandate, PSEPC’s interests in water issues include:

• Critical infrastructure protection • Critical infrastructure relations with the U.S. • Emergency management • Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) • Mitigation

Dams

In Canada, federal ownership of dams of any kind is minor. Dams are most likely to be owned by provinces, provincial crown corporations (hydro companies), and the private sector. The federal government has little or no direct oversight responsibility in assuring the safety of dams in Canada.

Canada has several hundred large dams, the failure of one of which would cause severe consequences to downstream life and property. Most of these are hydroelectric dams owned by provincial crown corporations who typically own multiple dams. Through normal due diligence, their dam safety record tends to be good, even in the absence of provincial legislation or formal oversight by a provincial agency. As well, most provinces have a permitting system that requires thorough consideration of new dams or modifications to existing dams from safety and other perspectives.

Canada lacks the basic consolidated information about what dams exist and the specific consequences if a particular dam failed. Dams having a consequence rating equivalent to the Canadian Dam Association’s “Very High” or “High” categories need to be identified.

Overall, Canada enjoys high professional engineering standards in the design and construction of dams. The regulatory and operational procedures in place for the largest dams and for at least three of the provinces (B.C., Alberta, and Quebec) appear adequate. There is a danger, particularly in provinces with few dams, of inadequate oversight.

∗ On 12 December 2003, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) became a part of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).

iii The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway is a vital transportation route connecting North America’s industrial centre to the Atlantic Ocean. The Seaway is critical infrastructure and of strategic importance to both Canada and the United States.

Water and Wastewater

Most Canadians depend on provincially regulated municipal water and wastewater facilities for their household water supplies and waste removal. From a federal perspective, water and wastewater facilities are critical infrastructure and their potential for failure as a consequence of any hazard has emergency preparedness implications. The main concern is to assure the continuation of a sufficient supply of water of suitable quality to meet the needs of Canadians in the face of threats from natural hazards, accidents, and malicious attack. How long could a high population density urban core function without working toilets? The consequences of a city enduring days or weeks without water for sewage disposal or relying on bottled water illustrates how critical a good water supply is and how dependent all other types of infrastructure are on basic water services.

Four components in the design of a public water supply system pertain to the safety and security of drinking water. They are:

• Raw water supply, including associated pipelines • Treatment systems • Distribution systems • Operation and control systems

While water treatment plant failures can lead to serious consequences, the main policy concern is to ensure that there is no public loss of confidence in municipal water systems. Under all but the most extreme circumstances, the responsibility for maintaining that confidence remains with the municipality, the province, and to a certain extent, Health Canada.

PSEPC may have a role in the event of catastrophic breakdowns. Of potential concern are breakdowns from widespread contamination, the consequences from which requires a federal government-wide response; from natural hazards such as floods and earthquakes; and from human actions, including accidents and malicious attacks that disrupt delivery of water. Also of concern are breakdowns in interdependent systems, such as energy supplies that threaten operation of the systems, or transportation failure that may limit supply of treatment chemicals.

Pipelines

Pipelines are critical infrastructure in Canada. The country is criss-crossed with 40 000 km of pipelines that transport natural gas, crude oil, and petroleum products to national and international markets. Pipelines carry some $85 billion of hydrocarbons annually.

This report identifies two interdependencies between pipelines and water issues. The first pertains to pipeline failures at river crossings and the second to biota transfer from pressure testing with fresh water.

iv Floods

Preparing for and responding to floods is a shared responsibility among individuals, families, municipalities, provincial and territorial governments, federal departments and agencies, and private and volunteer organizations. The major governmental responsibilities remain at the municipal and provincial levels. However, PSEPC responsibilities for flood events touch on all elements of the emergency management cycle – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. In the case of flood, requests from the provinces to the federal government are managed through PSEPC, which also maintains the Government Operations Coordination Centre (GOC).

Through the DFAA, PSEPC provides financial assistance for the recovery from flooding. Apart from the 1998 Ice Storm, the Red and Saguenay River floods have been the largest financial payouts under the DFAA. Canada has over 1 000 flood-prone communities. In the aftermath of floods, PSEPC, through the DFAA, is responsible for up to 90 percent of physical restoration costs. These costs account for a significant portion of payments made under the DFAA. To reduce human suffering, economic losses and disruption, and government financial payouts, mitigation is a key element of any approach for managing flood events. PSEPC is developing the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, in which flood mitigation is an important element.

Flood risk is further compounded by the prospect of climate change and the likelihood of increased flooding arising from extreme weather events.

The approach to reducing vulnerability to flood damages encompasses government policies, mitigation measures (structural and non-structural), and acceptance of personal responsibility by floodplain occupants.

Urban Infrastructure and Climate Change

Canada is a highly urban country. Eighty percent of its inhabitants live in urban areas, with 60 percent of those living in centres of 500 000 or more people. Urban areas are susceptible to water damage from severe rainfall events. For example, a severe rainfall in Winnipeg in 1993 caused $500 million in damages.

Incorrect calculations of maximum storm runoff could result in more urban flooding and hence increased potential for payouts under the DFAA. Several factors may lead to the need to re- consider the underlying assumptions about maximum storm runoff:

• increased urbanization will lead to increased runoff from the same design storm; • decreases in Environment Canada’s climatological network will lead to reduced accuracy in intensity-duration-frequency calculations; and • climate change may lead to shorter return periods for a rainfall event of the same magnitude.

The main challenge relating to urban infrastructure is to ensure that the infrastructure is designed, built, and operated to perform effectively throughout its life cycle.

v Conclusions

PSEPC has a number of potential roles relating to water and critical infrastructure. This includes a responsibility for administering disaster financial assistance, leadership in emergency preparedness, and engagement with the United States on issues of mutual concern, including terrorism.

Where infrastructure has some interconnection between Canada and the United States, there may be a good rationale for developing common or complimentary approaches to assuring the safety and security of the interdependent infrastructure. Examples are the St. Lawrence Seaway, inter- jurisdictional hydrocarbon pipelines, and high hazard dams in transboundary basins.

The table below summarizes responsibilities concerning critical infrastructure and emergency management. In general, responsibilities fall on the owner and local municipalities, then on provinces for oversight and due diligence, and finally, the federal government for research, international relations and financial programs. Industry organizations can also play a significant role in preparation of best practices and education.

Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Management

Issue Prime Responsibility Oversight PSEPC Other Federal Interest* Departments/Agencies Dam safety owner province 2, 3, 4, 5 Environment, Natural Resources Seaway seaway corporations Transport Canada 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 International Joint Commission Water/ owner (usually provinces 3, 4, 5 Health, wastewater municipalities) Environment, Fisheries Pipelines owner provinces, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Environment, National Energy Fisheries Board Floods municipalities provinces 3, 4, 5 Environment, Natural Resources, CMHC, NRC Other urban owner (usually provinces 3, 4, 5 Environment infrastructure municipalities) Biota Transfer provinces 3, 5 Fisheries, Environment, Transport

* PSEPC interest: 1) Critical Infrastructure; 2) Canada-U.S.A Infrastructure; 3) Emergency Management; 4) DFAA; and 5) Mitigation.

vi Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASDSO Association of State Dam Safety Officials AWWARF American Water Works Association Research Foundation CANUTEC Canadian Transport Emergency Centre (Transport Canada) CDA Canadian Dam Association CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.A.) CEA Canadian Electricity Association CEATI CEA Technologies Inc. CSA Canadian Standards Association CWWA Canadian Water and Wastewater Association DART Disaster Assistance Relief Team DFAA Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements DIAND Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development EPA Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.A) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.A) FCM Federation of Canadian Municipalities FDRP Flood Damage Reduction Program FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (U.S.A) FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.A) FIRM Flood Insurance Rate Map (U.S.A) GEOCC Government Emergency Operations Coordination Centre (PSEPC) ICOLD International Commission on Large Dams IDF Inflow Design Flood IFIP Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection (U.S.A) IJC International Joint Commission IRIA International River Improvement Act IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISACs Information Sharing and Analysis Centers LAN Local Area Network MAC Maximum Acceptable Concentration MW megaWatt (one million Watts) NEB National Energy Board NRC National Research Council OCIPEP Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness PDD Presidential Decision Directive (U.S.A) PFRA Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PMF Probable Maximum Flood PSEPC Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada RAM Risk Assessment Methodology SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition WCD World Commission on Dams

vii Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ...... ii Executive Summary...... iii Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... vii 1.0 Introduction...... 1 2.0 Infrastructure – Dams ...... 3 2.1 Introduction...... 3 2.2 Background...... 3 2.3 Dam Safety...... 5 2.3.1 Canadian Dam Association...... 6 2.3.2 Canadian Electricity Association...... 7 2.4 Legislation...... 8 2.4.1 British Columbia...... 9 2.4.2 Quebec ...... 10 2.4.3 Alberta...... 10 2.4.4 Ontario ...... 10 2.4.5 Other Provinces...... 11 2.4.6 Federal Legislation...... 11 2.5 Discussion...... 12 2.5.1 Dam Failure...... 14 2.5.2 SCADA Systems...... 15 2.6 Conclusions...... 16 3.0 Infrastructure – St. Lawrence Seaway...... 17 3.1 Introduction...... 17 3.2 Background...... 17 3.3 Safety and Security ...... 18 3.4 Conclusions...... 19 4.0 Infrastructure – Water and Wastewater ...... 20 4.1 Introduction...... 20 4.2 Background...... 20 4.2.1 Water Supply and Treatment ...... 21 4.2.2 Wastewater...... 23 4.2.3 Legislation...... 24 4.3 Safety and Security ...... 27 4.4 Conclusions...... 30 5.0 Infrastructure – Pipelines...... 32 5.1 Introduction...... 32 5.2 Background...... 32 5.2.1 River Crossings...... 32 5.2.2 Pressure Testing...... 33 5.3 Conclusions...... 33

viii 6.0 Floods ...... 34 6.1 Introduction...... 34 6.2 Background...... 34 6.3 Discussion...... 37 6.4 Conclusions...... 40 7.0 Urban Infrastructure and Climate Change...... 42 7.1 Urban Infrastructure...... 42 7.2.1 Conclusions...... 42 8.0 Conclusions...... 43 References...... 45 Appendix A – Federal Dams ...... A-1

ix 1.0 Introduction

Water is vital to the well-being of society. Its use, abuse and distribution are subjects of concern to many different sectors and the focus of attention by a number of different governments and government departments. Water administration falls almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provinces, yet water’s relation to human health, the environment, and economic development means individuals and governments at all levels have an interest.

• Critical infrastructure protection • Critical infrastructure relations with the U.S. • Emergency management • Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) • Mitigation

As with other areas of critical infrastructure, trends and events are pushing for reassessment of traditional approaches.

• Terrorism: Since September 11, 2001 there has been a growing concern that terrorists may use our infrastructure against us. For example, in January 2002, U.S. forces in Kabul, Afghanistan seized a computer at an al-Qaeda office that contained models of a dam, made with structural architecture and engineering software that enabled the planners to simulate its catastrophic failure.

Canada’s built environment includes many structures that could draw the attention of terrorists, disaffected persons, or disgruntled employees. Water infrastructure, such as dams and municipal water treatment plants, are often cited as possible targets of malicious behaviour.

• Cyber: Increasing reliance on computer networks and computer-based operating systems may make water infrastructure facilities more vulnerable. U.S. investigators in 2001 have found evidence that unknown Internet users in the Middle East and South Asia were exploring systems used to manage emergency telephone systems, electrical generation and transmission, water storage and distribution, nuclear power plants and gas facilities. This intrusion, combined with the discovery in 2002 of al-Qaeda computers containing information about remote-control systems for dam floodgates, has increased concern about the security of the computer systems used to control water infrastructure.

∗ On 12 December 2003, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) became a part of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).

1 While not involving terrorists, there have been cases cited where computer-based water control systems have been manipulated by outside hackers. In Queensland, Australia in 2000, a malicious attacker with inside knowledge was able control a sewage treatment system and spill one million gallons of raw sewage.

The apocryphal story concerning a 12-year-old hacker who, in 1998, broke into the computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam increased public concern about the safety of our water systems. He supposedly had complete command of the system controlling the dam’s floodgates, threatening the downstream cities of Mesa and Tempe, which have a combined population of nearly one million people. (A 24-year-old hacker did in fact break into the computer system in 1994, but was unable to gain control of the dam.)

• Interdependencies: Our critical infrastructures are dependent on each other. The consequences of floods and severe weather for water infrastructure like dams and municipal systems also affect critical infrastructure such as energy and transportation. For example, in Montreal during the 1998 Ice Storm, the city was at extreme risk because the loss of most of the electricity supply to the city during the ice storm threatened continued operation of the water pumping and filtration systems.

• Hazards, accidents, risk: Major infrastructure such as large dams can put the public at risk if they are poorly designed or maintained or put under stress from extreme events such as floods or earthquakes. Aging infrastructure and possibly more extreme weather events, as predicted by climate change scientists, could increase the vulnerability of water infrastructure to failure.

While it is difficult to know how serious malicious threats are to water infrastructure, it is important that, in a heightened climate of insecurity, the public has confidence that reasonable measures are being taken to safeguard facilities. Any natural hazard that could threaten Canada’s current level of emergency preparedness is also of concern.

2 2.0 Infrastructure – Dams

2.1 Introduction Dams, dikes, canals and similar hydraulic structures are a fundamental component of Canada’s water infrastructure. Dams have been constructed from the earliest days of European settlement and their administration falls almost exclusively under provincial jurisdiction. In deference to provincial jurisdiction over natural resources, federal departments have not sought to exercise dam safety oversight.

2.2 Background According to the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) there are some 45 000 large dams in the world. A large dam is defined as one having a height of 15 m or more (from the foundation) or, if the height is between five and15 m, one whose reservoir volume is more than three million cubic metres.

One-third of the countries in the world rely on hydropower for more than half their electricity supply, and large dams generate 19 percent of electricity overall. Half the world’s large dams were built exclusively or primarily for irrigation, which is not the case in Canada. Many dams serve multiple purposes.

About three-quarters of the large dams in Canada were constructed for hydro-electric power and 95 percent of the storage capacity is used to generate electricity (Day and Quinn, 1992). In Quebec, Hydro-Québec – one of the world’s largest electricity producers – has an installed capacity of almost 32 000 MW, 96 percent from hydropower. The company manages 25 reservoirs and 566 dams, including 226 classed as large dams. Ontario Power Generation operates 258 dams on 25 river systems and has an installed hydroelectric capacity of 7 300 MW, almost half of that at only three projects. BC Hydro owns 61 dams and 42 reservoirs, including two of the highest dams in the world, and has an installed capacity of 11 000 MW, over 90 percent of which is hydro.

Figure 1 displays a global count of large dams. There are 793 such dams in Canada and, for the sake of comparison, 6 575 in the United States (World Commission on Dams [WCD], 2000). Other sources indicate somewhat higher numbers of large dams in Canada.

3 Figure 1 Global numbers of large dams, by country (from WCD 2000 [based on ICOLD and other sources])

While dams are generally associated with hydroelectric and water supply projects, dams may also be used to retain contaminated liquids such as mine tailings. While such dams tend to be relatively small, the consequences of their failure could be significant.

There is no single register of Canadian dams. Smith (2003) indicates that there are about 14 300 dams in Canada. Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario account for more than 10 000 dams. Numbers alone present an insufficient picture. Gardiner Dam in Saskatchewan, for example, stores more water than the 1 400 dams in Alberta.

In the United States, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains a national inventory containing about 80 000 dams, large and small. The Corps identifies 9 326 as “high hazard,” 1 600 being within one mile of a downstream city. The registry is available at http://crunch.tec.army.mil/nid/webpages/nid.cfm.

While the customary 10:1 ratio of the United States to Canada almost applies when it comes to numbers of large dams, there is a striking difference in federal ownership of dams. In the United States, federal agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority own over 7 000 dams.

In Canada, federal ownership of dams of any kind is minor and ownership of large dams is non- existent. Dams are most likely to be owned by provinces, provincial crown corporations (hydro companies), and the private sector. The Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration of Agriculture and Agrifood Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Parks Canada own fewer than 50 dams. These dams and related structures are discussed in Appendix A.

4 2.3 Dam Safety Simply put, except in the northern territories, dam safety in Canada falls entirely within the purview of the provincial governments. In the northern territories, the respective Water Boards are responsible for dam safety. These Boards are made up of federal, territorial and land claims settlement area appointed persons. There is one Water Board in Yukon and Nunavut and several in the Northwest Territories.

In the United States dam safety is the subject of federal law. Dams at least 7.6 m in height or that impound 61 700 m3 or more of water, or that in some way pose a significant threat to human life in the event of a failure are subject to the National Dam Safety Program and are identified in the national registry. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers this program.

Other U.S. federal agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation have significant dam safety responsibilities. The latter two agencies assist other federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis in meeting dam safety requirements. They also provide advice to state agencies.

Until recently, some of these federal programs were underfunded. According to the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO 2002), two-thirds of the non-federally owned high hazard dams in the United States do not have Emergency Action Plans. In December 2002, the Dam Safety and Security Act (Public Law 107-310) came into effect. It provides US$34.4 million in dam safety funding over four years and requires the FEMA director to prepare a strategic plan to establish goals, priorities, and target dates to improve dam safety as well as provide cooperation with and assistance to interested state governmental entities.

In addition, the act requires the FEMA director to establish a National Dam Safety Review Board to monitor state implementation of dam safety programs, monitor the safety of dams in the U.S., and advise the FEMA director on national dam safety policy. Lawmakers also require technical and archival support and maintenance of information systems to guide the formulation of effective public policy and to improve dam safety engineering, security, and management. FEMA must provide, at the request of any state that has or intends to develop a dam safety program, training for dam safety staff and inspectors.

As well, the United States has instituted the Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection (IFIP), aimed at reducing the vulnerability of dams and transmission systems to terrorist threats. The IFIP includes representatives of the FBI, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Southwestern Power Administration, Western Area Power Administration, and others.

Sandia has developed two new step-by-step processes, called RAM-D for “Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams” and RAM-T for “Risk Assessment Methodology for Transmission,” to enable owners, operators, and security managers of dams and transmission systems to review the security of a facility and perform cost-benefit analyses of possible security upgrades.

5 A recent report by the International Joint Commission (IJC, 1998) presents a stark picture of the differences in Canadian and U.S. dam safety practices. The Commission examined the status of dam safety measures of the structures for which it had issued Orders-of-Approval. (For a discussion of the role of the Commission in Canada-United States water matters, see Halliday, 1997.)

The Commission found that seven transboundary dams and seven entirely Canadian dams and dikes for which it has some regulatory authority under the aegis of IJC Orders-of-Approval do not have adequate documentation pertaining to safety inspections. In particular, the Commission was concerned about the apparent lack of government oversight of the safety process. There were cases where the U.S. portion of a dam was regularly inspected while the Canadian portion was not. The deficient dams are privately owned, except two owned by New Brunswick Power and two owned by Ontario Power Generation. The Commission recommended joint Canada-U.S. oversight of an open process of professional dam inspection.

2.3.1 Canadian Dam Association A key player in Canadian dam safety is the Canadian Dam Association (CDA). The Association, a voluntary not-for-profit organization, has 750 individual members from different sectors, as well as 75 corporate members. The CDA studies dam safety and is concerned with the technical, environmental, social, economic, legal and administrative aspects of dams. It organizes an annual conference, produces manuals and operates training courses related to dam safety.

The CDA describes its role as:

• fostering interprovincial co-operation; • promoting the adoption of regulatory policies and safety guidelines for dams and reservoirs throughout Canada; • providing information and assistance to dam owners in support of dam safety programs; and • sharing information with Canadian and international organizations interested in dam safety.

The CDA produces Dam Safety Guidelines – the most recent version in 1999 (CDA, 1999) – through working groups with representatives from major dam owners, engineering consultants and academe. While these are not obligatory, they form the basis for most dam safety regulation in Canada. The CDA consults many domestic and foreign sources in the preparation of the Guidelines.

The Dam Safety Guidelines define a dam as a structure 2.5 m or more in height and capable of impounding 30 000 m3 of fluid. The Guidelines also consider smaller structures when failure would be publicly unacceptable.

The Guidelines specify that owners classify dams according to the consequence of their failure. Table 1 details the classifications. It is important to note that the Guidelines define these categories in terms of incremental damages. A major flood could well cause fatalities and

6 significant damages in a river basin. The question for dam safety practitioners is “Would the failure of the dam during such a flood lead to increased fatalities or damages?”

Table 1 Classification of Dams According to Consequence of Failure (after CDA 1999)

Potential Incremental Consequence of Failure Consequence Category Life Safety Socio-economic, Financial & Environmental Very high Large numbers of fatalities Extreme damages

High Some fatalities Large damages

Low No fatalities anticipated Moderate damages

Very low No fatalities Minor damages beyond owner’s property

The Guidelines link the requirements for the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and surveillance of the dam to the Consequence Category. The design, for example, is based on a specified inflow design flood and earthquake. The Guidelines also specify the requirements for an Emergency Preparedness Plan and for Dam Safety Reviews.

The Guidelines place responsibility for dam safety on the owner of the dam. This responsibility is also subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the project is located.

Finally, the Guidelines prescribe the existence of a provincial regulatory agency having a number of responsibilities, including authority for dam safety legislation, maintaining an inventory of dams, and oversight of the dam safety process.

2.3.2 Canadian Electricity Association The Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) was founded in 1891 and is the primary national forum and voice of the electricity business in Canada. Utility member companies of the CEA account for about 95 percent of Canada’s installed generating capacity. As well, several hundred other related companies and individual members are grouped within the CEA’s broad structure.

Presenting a convincing and coherent industry viewpoint to policy makers and regulators is the number one priority at CEA. Through the Association, members identify and analyze issues, developing common industry policy positions, which help move agendas forward. Issues considered have global, national and regional ramifications.

In January 2000, CEA members formed the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Working Group in order to coordinate activities, share best practices, and relate to the federal government. The working group has: established an information-sharing intranet site; implemented methods for coordinating activities with the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and other partners; developed and implemented an Early Warning System for threats to electricity infrastructure; and worked closely with the federal government.

7 The CEA has also developed a research arm with a separate identity – CEA Technologies Incorporated (CEATI). CEATI shares information, identifies research priorities, and funds research concerning many aspects of electrical power generation, including dam safety. Research is required to develop and evaluate new diagnostic methods, monitoring techniques, and tools for assessment of the stability and safety of existing dams. Additionally, new repair materials and techniques can reduce the cost of required dam safety improvements. Current research interests of the Dam Safety Interest Group, which has members from several countries, include:

• risk assessment for dam safety; • the use of geophysical methods in the diagnostics and monitoring of embankment dams; • erosion and piping in dams; • reliability of discharge facilities; • ice loading; and • probability (frequency) of extreme floods.

The first volume of the anticipated four-volume, Guide for Risk Assessment of Dam Safety, has been released.

2.4 Legislation In practice, all provincial governments have assigned responsibility for dam safety to specific departments or agencies. Most have permitting systems for construction of dams, but relatively few have specific dam safety legislation or provide for legislated oversight of dam safety. Table 2 summarizes the present legislative framework. The following sections discuss some of the more significant legislation, provincial and federal. A more detailed discussion is contained in Smith (2003).

8 Table 2 Summary of Dam Safety Legislation (after Smith, 2003)

Province Agency Dam Safety Regulations Guidelines Permit Number Legislation of Dams Land and BC Water Act yes yes yes 2 600 Water BC AB Environment Water Act yes yes yes 1 400 Watershed SK no no no yes 1 300 Authority MB Conservation no no no yes 570 Lakes and Natural ON Rivers no draft yes 2 400 Resources Improvement Dam Safety QC Environment yes no yes 5 200 Act Environment yes – new Clean Water NB and Local yes no dams and 240 Act Government modifications Environment NS no no uses CDA yes 200 and Labour Environment NF no no no yes 500 and Labour Fisheries, Aquaculture PE no no no — 0 and Environment YK DIAND1 no no — yes 21

NWT DIAND no no CDA yes small

NU DIAND no no — yes 0

1 Yukon assumed responsibility 1 April 2003

2.4.1 British Columbia The B.C. Water Act authorizes dams as works. The province passed its Dam Safety Regulation under that Act in 2000 (British Columbia, 2000). The Dam Safety Regulation makes dam owners responsible for inspecting, reporting, and ensuring that their dams are being maintained to a standard of care and diligence that will minimize the risk associated with their dams. The province provides guidance material for inspections by dam owners (British Columbia, 1998).

The regulations establish a four-level downstream consequence guide and prescribe the dam safety inspection, testing and other requirements for each level. The very high and high downstream consequences require that an emergency preparedness plan be prepared. Dam safety reports must be filed with a provincial dam safety officer. The inspector has the authority to order inspections and take other actions in the interests of public safety.

9 Land and Water BC, a provincial crown corporation, is responsible for dam safety in the province. BC Hydro, a major dam owner, also has a significant internal dam safety program that is subject to provincial oversight.

British Columbia has about 2 600 dams in an on-line inventory. The inventory identifies “High” and “Very High” consequence dams. The listing is available through an Internet map interface.

2.4.2 Quebec The Quebec Dam Safety Act and regulations came into effect in 2002. The Act defines three levels of high-capacity dams and one of low capacity dam that are subject to regulation. It defines six levels of dam failure consequence, based on downstream inundation mapping. All high capacity dams must undergo safety review in the next three to 10 years, depending on the consequence of failure. Reports must be submitted to the Ministry of Environment. Emergency action plans are required for every dam in the moderate, high, very high, and severe consequence category.

There are special provisions for owners of 10 or more dams. Hydro-Québec has its own dam safety organization operating under provincial oversight.

Quebec has also instituted an on-line inventory of all its 5 200 dams. Entry is through a map interface.

2.4.3 Alberta In 1978, Alberta became the first province to enact dam safety regulations. The 1996 Water Act and the 1998 Water (Ministerial) Regulation require that any dam higher than 2.5 m or storing more 30 000 m3 be licensed. The 1999 Regulations establish an incremental consequence scale identical to CDA (1999). The regulations call for an emergency preparedness plan, flood action plan, and an operation, maintenance and surveillance manual.

The regulations are written in such a way as to require an owner to respond to a request from Alberta Environment rather that obliging the owner to perform certain tasks and submit the results to the department. In practice, the result is nearly the same.

2.4.4 Ontario The Ontario Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act was instituted in 1927 through an amalgamation of other legislation, substantially revised in 1960 and 1998 and has had minor amendments since, the last being in 2002. The Act specifically allows the Minister of Natural Resources to make regulations governing the design, construction, operation, maintenance and safety of dams. (It also obliges the province to issue orders regarding water levels that conform to the requirements of the International Joint Commission, where applicable.)

The Act requires the review and approval of new dams but does not mention dam safety. The Act does provide authority for the province to order changes to reservoir levels and to review reservoir operating plans. A province-wide review of operating plans for hydropower dams is

10 currently underway. This provides an opportunity for review of instream design flows and other issues with dam safety implications.

The province has had a dam safety program addressing design and construction of new dams and improvements to existing dams since 1960. While there is considerable oversight of dam safety using internal guidelines, the process depends on situations being brought to the attention of administrators. It is not an offence to operate an unsafe dam. In 1999, the Ministry of Natural Resources established a task group to examine policy issues regarding draft Ontario Dam Safety Guidelines. Draft guidelines were prepared in 2000 but have not yet been promulgated. It is anticipated that the province will make dam safety mandatory and will impose requirements that are at least as stringent as the CDA guidelines.

Ontario Power Generation maintains its own dam safety organization under oversight by the province. Like some other jurisdictions, Ontario is considering divestment of generating facilities and enabling the addition of electrical generation to existing dams. This step adds to the regulatory challenge, especially in basins having more than one dam owner.

2.4.5 Other Provinces Other provinces have permitting systems for authorizing new dams that require plans to be approved by a professional engineer. The CDA Dam Safety Guidelines are often used as the basis for approvals. Dam owners are obliged to maintain their structures but provincially initiated comprehensive dam safety reviews of existing dams are rare.

At least one province regulates tailings ponds separately from water-retaining structures. This is done under separate legislation and is overseen by a different department.

For the most part, dam safety is carried out by owners as part of due diligence using internal or CDA guidelines, or perhaps in accordance with informal provincial guidelines that lack legislative support. Crown corporations (such as Manitoba Hydro or New Brunswick Power) that operate major structures have internal dam safety organizations.

2.4.6 Federal Legislation In each of the three northern territories, water boards established under the authority of the Yukon Waters Act and Northwest Territories Waters Acts (federal legislation) allow various parties to appoint members. (The Nunavut Water Board was initially appointed under the authority of the Northwest Territories Waters Act.) These boards have the authority for developing and issuing licenses for natural resources development projects. Safety of dams is addressed in developing and renewing licences for hydroelectric dams and in licensing mining operations that lead to the construction of tailing ponds. Dam safety regulations, as such, have not been prepared but licensees are obliged to follow the CDA Guidelines. The requirements include the conduct of periodic dam safety reviews and the preparation of emergency preparedness plans.

The Dominion Water Power Act (Canada, 1985b), an act administered by DIAND, provides the federal crown the authority to develop hydroelectric power on federal lands or to license such developments. In effect, this right currently relates almost exclusively to the federal lands in the provinces. Projects in Banff and Jasper National Parks were licensed years ago.

11 The International River Improvements Act (Canada, 1985), an act respecting the construction, operation and maintenance of international river improvements, arose out of federal-provincial conflicts during the negotiation of the Columbia Treaty in the 1960s. The Act, administered by Environment Canada, specifies that any project affecting the flow of a river running from Canada into the United States must receive an IRIA license. There is also provision for “exceptions.” The Act specifies that the project must be constructed in accordance with provincial law, except when the law contravenes the Act. It makes no other inferences concerning maintenance. That is, if provincial law is silent on dam safety, the Act and its regulations do not automatically impose any requirements.

2.5 Discussion Canada has several hundred large dams, the failure of which would constitute severe consequences to downstream life and property. Most of these dams are hydroelectric dams owned by provincial crown corporations who are multiple owners of dams. Through normal due diligence, their dam safety record tends to be good, even in the absence of provincial legislation or formal oversight by a provincial agency. As well, most provinces have a permitting system that requires thorough consideration of new dams or modifications to existing dams from safety and other perspectives.

The weakness in the current system appears to be a lack of demonstrable provincial oversight. British Columbia, Quebec and Alberta are clear exceptions to this observation. A significant number of Canadians are therefore dependent on the voluntary efforts of provincial public servants and dam owners for the protection of the public interest.

Older dams are unlikely to meet contemporary standards for safety and security. Deficiencies may be hydrological, that is, an inability to safely withstand the current-day Inflow Design Flood (IDF); or structural, that is, the stability of the structure under current-day loadings may be insufficient. The relatively high vulnerability of these structures can be reduced by thorough dam safety reviews that lead to implementation of mitigation measures. Many provinces require licences for alterations to dams; this process does allow some oversight by regulatory agencies. Aging dams in particular have drawn the attention of the International Joint Commission (IJC, 1998).

Smith (2003) identifies a number of dam safety issues that should be covered by dam safety legislation. These include:

• public safety – the protection of the public from hazards associated with dam operation; • professional qualifications of dam safety reviewers; • emergency preparedness plans, including testing and updating; • requirements for dam inspections; • requirements for multiple dam owners in a single basin; and • regular testing of flow control equipment.

12 The present level of informal oversight in some provinces means that these items are potentially not being addressed in a way that ensures public confidence. That said, Smith (2003) observes that about 64 percent of Canadian dams are covered by existing dam safety regulations. This would rise to about 80 percent when Ontario enacts legislation, and to over 90 percent if Manitoba and Newfoundland & Labrador were to enact legislation.

Some provincial governments are taking steps to divest themselves of power utilities or to provide mechanisms to enable greater private sector participation in the electrical energy sector. This potentially poses a problem: these steps could lead to multiple ownership of hydro-dams in some jurisdictions. Where currently the major utilities have their own dam safety units, fragmented ownership may eliminate or weaken such internal review mechanisms. In addition, many deregulated projects may be new, and it is possible that hydroelectric facilities could be added to existing structures, perhaps involving change in dam ownership. This latter scenario involving older dams would require much more concerted and formal provincial oversight.

Global climate change could compromise the safety of Canadian dams. A key factor in dam safety is the magnitude of the IDF. In general, one can expect rainfall to become more intense as average temperatures increase. One calculation for Alberta (Figliuzzi, 1989) indicated that a one- degree increase in temperature will lead to a 10 percent increase in Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). There is a need to revisit PMP calculations and the associated IDF periodically, especially in view of climate change scenarios. This review tends to be done now for larger high consequence structures, but not for smaller ones. Pentland et al. (2002) is an example of such a review.

Finally, there is the question of malicious attacks on dams and the current level in activity in the United States in that regard. While it is safe to say that no dam in Canada evokes the symbolism of the Hoover Dam (or perhaps the Grand Coulee dam), large dams with large associated reservoirs upstream of population centres could be considered particularly significant. The Columbia River dams, which present a scenario of cascading failures ultimately affecting the United States, may be of particular concern.

The current dam safety activity in the United States, even though some of that activity is directed at remedying past problems unrelated to terrorism, will lead to questions of, “What is Canada doing?” From a national perspective, Canada may be challenged to demonstrate that its house is in order. Furthermore, possible pressures in the United States for extraterritorial application of their law or practices could bring pressure to bear on companies exporting hydropower to conform to U.S. practices.

Apart from the broad policing and national security responsibilities of PSEPC, the department is directly implicated in dam safety issues in two ways. First, as the administrator of the DFAA program, PSEPC will be obliged to deal with payments arising from any dam failure whose damages exceed the provincial threshold. (However, any finding with respect to tort or lack of due diligence by the dam owner would make the owner, not PSEPC, liable for compensation.)

Second, PSEPC is the key contact on Canada-United States matters related to critical infrastructure protection. Water resources administration is almost entirely the purview of the

13 provinces, yet international relations are a clear federal responsibility. Dams on watercourses leading to the United States should be of interest to PSEPC, and in fact PSEPC is engaged through the bilateral Critical Infrastructure Protection Steering Group.

2.5.1 Dam Failure The risk of dam failure is small, yet the consequences of such a failure can be large. W.A.C. Bennett Dam Sinkhole The object of dam safety risk management is to assess risks and mitigate those risks with the In July 1996, a small sinkhole was objective of making the chance of failure as low discovered in the crest of the dam. Investigation revealed a major problem and as reasonably practicable (Bowles, 2001). The a second sinkhole on the upstream face of U.S. Bureau of Reclamation sets an annual the 180-m high dam. To ensure dam safety probability of failure from all sources at less during repairs, Williston Lake (one of the than 1:10 000 as the threshold for taking action world’s 10 largest reservoirs) was drawn to reduce risk (USBR, 1997). Interestingly, this down to a low level. is the oft-accepted return period for a Probable Maximum Flood. The sinkholes had developed around the corrugated metal pipe survey benchmarks All dams fall into two broad categories, used during construction. It was resolved embankment dams and concrete dams, and the by a technique known as compaction manner in which they can fail is somewhat grouting to a depth of 120 m in the embankment. different. British Columbia (1998) provides a simplified discussion of failure modes.

Failure of embankment (earth or rock fill) dams may involve external erosion, either of the spillway or the embankment itself. This could be the result of inadequate design or of poor maintenance.

A second mode of failure is internal erosion or piping failure. In effect, the erosive force of water seeping through the embankment removes fill material to the extent that the dam fails. Potential piping failures can be identified as part of routine inspection.

Structural failures can occur in the foundation, abutments, or the embankment itself. As well, structural failures of riparian outlets, gates and other features can lead to dam failure. Structural failures can be attributed to design, construction, or maintenance deficiencies.

Concrete dams fail structurally and usually without much warning. The most common cause of failure is overtopping. The dam could overturn, or the foundation or abutments could fail. The failure could arise from design or construction faults. Incipient failure in a concrete dam is much harder to detect than in an embankment dam.

Professional engineers design and supervise the building of Canadian dams to a high standard. Major dam owners also have engineering staff to operate and maintain their dams in accordance with documented procedures. Systematic surveillance and dam safety reviews should ensure dam safety.

14 Periodic reviews are particularly important for older dams that have not been built to contemporary standards. These reviews should identify risks and mitigative measures.

Sabotage of a large dam is feasible but it would require specialized knowledge and equipment. Inducing a fracture in an embankment dam and letting the erosive force of the emptying reservoir finish the job would be one likely scenario. A more probable scenario is deliberate damage to gates and other ancillary structures.

Some Canadian dam owners have stopped offering public tours of dams and restricted access to dam sites since September 2001. Measures taken to protect the public from hazards associated with dams and dam operation tangentially increase the security of the facility.

2.5.2 SCADA Systems Dam owners use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems to monitor the performance of their dams and reservoirs and to operate gates and other facilities. Depending on the consequence classification of a dam, monitoring may consist simply of reading a number of manual gauges on an established schedule and recording the results. Or, a SCADA system under computer control could capture and record the requisite operating data. Even where a dam has on-site personnel, its operation may be controlled from a remote operations centre.

One scenario identifies the possibility of saboteurs hacking into a SCADA system and manipulating gates or conduits to cause a failure, say of a penstock. However, it is not the practice of dam operators to use the public switched telecommunications network or Internet as their means of transmitting control commands because of the obvious potential problems with interception of communications, viruses and everyday hackers. SCADA systems generally operate over dedicated microwave or enterprise networks leased from the public system and maintain an “air gap” with other communication systems.

Some operators do use the Internet for read-only data from a SCADA system. The usual practice is to connect the project sensors to a separate computer, which in turn may be accessible by an intranet or the Internet itself.

There is no recorded case of anyone hacking into the control system for a large hydroelectric dam. A more likely scenario is a malicious attack by a knowledgeable person such as a disgruntled employee who knows the system. Such a person would also be more likely to wait until river and reservoir conditions were such as to cause the most damage.

Nevertheless, computer security should be an important element of dam safety. While SCADA systems should be isolated, mapping the computer network of a large utility is difficult and there are many potential indirect means by which a control system might be inappropriately connected to public telephone systems or the Internet. According to Computerworld (January, 2002), 80 percent of all attacks originate from inside a network’s firewall. Any assessment of SCADA system security should therefore include an assessment of the risk of “insider” damage.

15 2.6 Conclusions The federal government has little or no direct oversight responsibility in assuring the safety of dams in Canada. Unlike in the United States, where the federal government is responsible for 10 percent of the nation’s dams and has regulatory responsibility for dams of any significance, the safety regime in Canada is a patchwork of provincial legislated requirements, project licensing conditions, informal oversight, and professional due diligence. As the 1998 International Joint Commission study highlighted, Canada compares badly to the United States in assurance of a regular inspection regime and transparent oversight of dam safety, particularly for small and older dams.

The Canadian Dam Association provides professional leadership in developing and promoting common design and operational guidelines while CEATI sponsors research into dam safety issues. Overall, Canada enjoys high professional engineering standards in the design and construction of dams. The regulatory and operational procedures in place for the largest dams and for at least three of the provinces (B.C., Alberta, and Quebec) appear adequate. There is a danger, particularly in provinces with few dams, of inadequate oversight and too high a dependence on good luck rather than good management.

The new threats to infrastructure from terrorists or malicious attack have not been absorbed into the formal methodologies of those groups that undertake the risk and vulnerability assessment of dams in Canada. This state of affairs may reflect complacency; lack of awareness of the threats and methodologies to assess them; an appreciation that the threat appears low, particularly from cyber attack; or a consensus that ad hoc measures already taken for the physical protection of dams are adequate.

Canada lacks the basic consolidated information about what dams exist and the consequences if they fail. Dams having a consequence rating equivalent to the Canadian Dam Association’s “Very High” or “High” categories need to be identified. The list could easily involve a thousand or more dams. At present, with the exception of British Columbia and Quebec, this information is available only in internal provincial files.

Dams fall almost entirely under provincial jurisdiction and the number of dams owned by the federal government is small. None of the federal dams are likely to appear in an inventory of critical infrastructure. It is therefore impossible for the federal government to lead by example on issues related to dam safety.

16 3.0 Infrastructure – St. Lawrence Seaway

3.1 Introduction The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway is a vital transportation route connecting North America’s industrial centre to the Atlantic Ocean. PSEPC’s interests in the Seaway relate to its evident status as critical infrastructure and to its bi-national status.

There are many aspects of safety and security concerning the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence and these do not, by any means, all relate to water or water infrastructure. Security issues may pertain to ships and the materials carried by ships, ship traffic control, bridges and other channel crossings, flows and levels, and dams, locks, and dikes. A thorough discussion of all of these issues is beyond the scope of this report. What follows is a brief discussion of the matters relating specifically to water.

3.2 Background The St. Lawrence Seaway is a bi-national waterway that connects the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the heart of the North American continent, a distance of 3 700 km (8.5 days sailing). It was completed in 1959 through an expansion of earlier navigational facilities. Ships with a length of up to 222.5 m, a beam of 23.8 m, and draft of 7.9 m can pass through the system. That is, ships capable of carrying 25 000 tonnes.

The Great Lakes basin through which the Seaway passes encompasses two Canadian provinces and eight American states. The basin is home to 8.5 million Canadians – over one-quarter of Canada’s population – and to an even larger percentage of the country’s economic activity. The basin also has about 25 million American residents and constitutes an important part of the U.S. economy.

The Canadian portion of the Seaway includes five of the seven locks between Montreal and Lake Ontario as well as the Welland Canal (eight locks) between Lakes Ontario and Erie. The U.S. portion comprises the other two locks in the Montreal to Lake Ontario reach plus the St. Mary’s Canal (four parallel locks) connecting Lake Huron to Lake Superior. (A small lock on the Canadian side of the St. Mary’s Falls can handle recreational craft.)

Development of the Seaway also led to enhanced hydroelectric development along the St. Lawrence. The New York Power Authority and Ontario Power Generation own these facilities. (Great Lakes Power owns an older hydroelectric facility at Sault Ste. Marie.)

The Seaway is used primarily as an economical transportation route for bulk cargo (grain, iron ore, coal, and other commodities). Finished goods make up less than 10 percent of the weight of goods shipped. Since 1959, more than two billion tonnes of cargo with an estimated value of US$300 billion have moved to and from Canada, the United States, and nearly 50 other countries.

On both the Canadian and American sides, the responsibility for the Seaway is federal. The St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, a not-for-profit letters patent corporation, operates

17 the Canadian portions of the Seaway under a long term agreement with Transport Canada. Tolls charged are intended to cover operating and maintenance costs. The federal government retains an equity share in the project. The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, a similar U.S. entity, operates the two locks near Messena, N.Y., while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers operates the locks on the St. Mary system.

The Canadian and U.S. Coast Guards provide marine navigation services for the Seaway. Transport Canada regulates the Canadian portion of the Seaway under the Canada Marine Act and is also responsible for the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre (CANUTEC), which assists emergency responders in handling dangerous goods emergencies. The Department has devolved its operation of ports to local authorities.

Federal interests in marine and non-marine security are led by Transport Canada. Transport Quebec has similar responsibilities in that province’s portion of the Seaway. Security responsibilities on the U.S. portions are complex, with the Corps of Engineers having significant duties. The two Seaway Corporations also have internal security operations.

Several International Joint Commission Orders-of-Approval apply to the St. Lawrence Seaway developments. In addition, four of the five Great Lakes, portions of the connecting channels, and the St. Lawrence River itself constitute boundary waters as defined under the 1909 Canada-U.S. Boundary Waters Treaty.

There are therefore several reasons to consider matters relating to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system in a bi-national context.

3.3 Safety and Security The Seaway is an integral part of the transportation system in both Canada and the United States. It is without doubt critical transportation infrastructure that could cause severe economic disruption if its integrity cannot be assured. The threats to the Seaway are much the same as for dam safety, but with added complications of ships and the materials carried by ships, ship traffic control, bridges and other channel crossings. Terrorists could disable ships in Seaway locks and paralyze the system. Similarly, accidents involving the transportation of hazardous or explosive goods by ship could have the same effect.

The major water resource issue affecting shipping in the Seaway is the control of levels and flows. Works constructed in the St. Mary’s River at the outlet of Lake Superior and structures in the St. Lawrence River near Cornwall control the levels of Lake Superior and Lake Ontario, respectively. These structures are subject to International Joint Commission Orders-of-Approval and the Commission has an ongoing responsibility to ensure that the structures are operated in a manner consistent with the Boundary Waters Treaty. That is, flows and levels are regulated equitably.

Regulation has important implications for shipping. When flows are low, shipping companies must reduce drafts by lowering tonnage carried. Hence shipping costs increase. Prolonged low levels can lead to a need for increased dredging. They may also affect municipal water supply

18 intakes. On the other hand, high flows can lead to strong currents in the connecting channels that pose a hazard to shipping. High levels also aggravate shoreline erosion and expose low-lying coastal areas to increased risk of flooding. Extremes can also affect wildlife habitat. The levels of the lakes and the St. Lawrence are subject to periodic extremes that test the ability of the regulatory regimes to satisfy shipping and the many other interests that depend on the Great Lakes.

Global climate change may have long-term effects on lake levels. While it is premature to be definitive, the best evidence appears to suggest at least some lowering of average levels (IJC, 1999).

Dam safety was discussed in some detail in the Welland Canal Incident previous section. The structural integrity of dams

On August 11, 2001 the freighter Windoc and dikes associated with the Seaway may affect struck Bridge 11 on the Welland Canal the safety and security of the Seaway itself. causing considerable damage to the bridge and the ship. The ship came to a Similarly, the bridges and other facilities that cross stop 700 m downstream of the bridge. the Seaway must be protected by their owners and maintained so as not to threaten navigation. That Ship movement in the Canal was said, shipping on the Seaway probably poses a restored within 48 hours. The bridge was greater threat to the crossings than vice versa. The re-opened in November. consequences of disruption of Seaway shipping, however, are greater than the loss of a single crossing.

3.4 Conclusions As a bi-national waterway, the safety and security of the St. Lawrence Seaway is a matter of strategic importance to both Canada and the United States.

19 4.0 Infrastructure – Water and Wastewater

4.1 Introduction Most Canadians depend on provincially regulated municipal water and wastewater facilities for their household water supplies and waste removal. Such infrastructure is a major responsibility and represents considerable public investment.

From a federal perspective, water and wastewater facilities are critical infrastructure and their potential for failure for whatever hazard has emergency preparedness implications. The main concern is to assure the continuation of a sufficient supply of water of suitable quality to meet the needs of Canadians in the face of threats from natural hazards, accidents, and malicious attack. How long could a high population density urban core function without working toilets? The consequences of a city enduring days or weeks without water for sewage disposal or relying on bottled water illustrates how critical a good water supply is and how dependent all other types of infrastructure are on basic water services.

The Department of National Defence does have a small Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) with capability to provide emergency supplies of potable water. However, the DART would not have sufficient capacity to meet the needs of a major urban centre in case of an emergency involving disruption of water supplies.

4.2 Background Water infrastructure includes sources of untreated surface and ground water for municipal, industrial, agricultural, and public use. It includes the dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, and pipes that contain and transport the raw water and the treatment facilities that remove raw water contaminants. Finished water reservoirs and the distribution systems to users, as well as wastewater collection and treatment facilities, are also part of this infrastructure.

The provision of potable water and other municipal infrastructure lies under provincial jurisdiction. The federal government holds that responsibility on federal lands, such as national parks and First Nations reserves, and in the northern territories. (Yukon assumed direct responsibility on 1 April 2003.)

According to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), there are 4 000 municipal water treatment and 3 000 sewage treatment plants in Canada. Most of these systems are small, serving populations of 1 000 or fewer. Environment Canada (2001) indicates that there are only 1 200 sewage treatment plants serving communities of over 1 000 people. Approximately 87 percent of the Canadian public is served by municipal water supply systems and 74 percent by municipal sewers.

In addition to the FCM already mentioned, there are numerous industry and professional organizations that hold interests and responsibilities for water and wastewater. The Canadian Water and Wastewater Association (CWWA) has an interest in policies, programs, and legislation concerning water and wastewater and in national codes and standards.

20 In addition to these national bodies, there are international, provincial and regional associations that meet annually and provide opportunities for training and information exchange. The provincial associations of professional engineers that govern the practice of engineering in each jurisdiction also take a keen interest in water and wastewater issues.

4.2.1 Water Supply and Treatment Safe drinking water has long been one of the most fundamental issues in public health. Any threat to the water supply or incidents that affect public confidence in municipal water supplies quickly becomes of professional and political concern. The Walkerton, Ontario case of bacterial contamination and the North Battleford, Saskatchewan case of parasitic contamination have focused public attention in recent years on the importance of securing drinking water systems. The scenario that terrorists might disrupt water distribution or use chemical, biological, and radiological agents to deliberately contaminate drinking water supplies has prompted serious attention in the United States. While given less priority in Canada, these emerging threats to water supply are receiving increasing attention. Many owners and operators of municipal water systems accept that they need to demonstrate that they have performed objective evaluations of threats and vulnerabilities, and have taken steps to reduce the vulnerability of drinking water supplies.

Safe drinking water and the public health and environmental consequences of municipal effluents are shared concerns among municipal, provincial, and federal governments. The federal government has little direct authority over drinking water supplies. However, Health Canada works through a federal-provincial-territorial committee on drinking water standards to develop the Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality (Health Canada, 1996). The committee takes into account health assessments (both domestic and international), treatment costs, and other economic factors. The Guidelines specify maximum acceptable concentrations (MACs) of substances known to or suspected of causing health effects. Provincial governments have primary jurisdiction and responsibility for drinking water quality. They usually accept the Guidelines without change but may produce provincial guidelines containing more stringent MACs. The current guidelines, produced in 1996, are the sixth version; a seventh is under preparation.

As the Walkerton and North Battleford events indicate, Canadians cannot always be assured that their public systems will provide safe drinking water. During any year, many public health authorities issue boil water orders. In the event of disease outbreaks or contaminated sources, municipal and provincial authorities have responsibility and are the first responders.

Four components in the design of a public water supply system pertain to the safety and security of drinking water. They are:

• Raw water supply, including associated pipelines • Treatment systems • Distribution systems • Operation and control systems

21 Raw water supplies are drawn from lakes, rivers or ground water. Source water may be affected by both quantity and quality issues. The quality and variability of raw water supplies have a bearing on whether the supply can be treated to achieve the requirements of the Canadian Guidelines. As well, raw water may be transported a considerable distance from the source to treatment facilities. Winnipeg, for example, pipes raw water over 100 km from Lake of the Woods.

Water treatment systems may include coagulation and flocculation to remove small particles from the raw supply, clarification to remove agglomerated particles, filtration to remove small particles, and disinfection prior to distribution. Large communities may have several water treatment Pembina Valley plants and sources of supply. One central water Water Cooperative Inc. treatment plant may serve one or more smaller

The PVWC is owned by 17 municipal communities (one plant serves both Regina and governments and is the second Moose Jaw, for example). The trend to centralize largest water system in Manitoba. water supply systems, while beneficial from regulatory, economic, and management perspectives, It draws water from the Red River, means that increasing numbers of people are treats it in two treatment plants and vulnerable to the failure of centralized systems. distributes it to a population of 40 000. Major pipelines run some 80 km from Distribution systems may include a number of the treatment plants. reservoirs, trunk pipelines, local pipelines, and individual supply pipes. Depending on the needs of the system, the distribution system may also include disinfection capability. In general, more than half the cost of a municipal water treatment system is in the distribution system.

Distribution systems are designed to store water to meet peak demands and firefighting needs. This storage also provides a degree of protection against system interruption. That interruption may be direct, through equipment failure or deliberate action, or indirect, through floods, power failures or fires. In most cases the within system storage is in the order of one and a half days, and with emergency rationing this could be doubled.

Operation and control procedures include standardized tests of raw and finished water, plus routine component maintenance shutdowns. Treatment plants also may include an automated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Administration has indicated that municipal treatment systems serving more than 20 000 people tend to be safer than smaller systems. Larger systems are more likely to have thoroughly trained staff and be better maintained.

22 In British Columbia, there are 3 300 water Canberra Firestorm systems. Of these, 96 municipally-owned systems serve 90 percent of the population. A In January 2003 Canberra, Australia was multiplicity of public and private systems serve struck by a series of firestorms that killed the remaining 10 percent; 2 000 systems have four people, destroyed 530 homes, fewer than 15 connections. Such small systems damaged reservoirs, and burnt a significant are unlikely to meet current standards for portion of the catchment area for the city’s design, operation, and maintenance. water supply. The municipal sewage treatment plant was surrounded by fires and power to the plant was cut, with the The situation in other provinces, except Prince likelihood that raw sewage would have to Edward Island, is similar. That is, most people be dumped in a nearby stream. are served by large municipally-owned systems; the remainder are served by many, Emergency officials sought public many small systems. These small systems are cooperation in minimizing water use, often not as stringently regulated, and therefore restored power in two days to avert a have a greater potential for public health sewage spill, and issued boil water orders concerns. to protect the public from potentially contaminated source water. This was About four million rural Canadians, including accomplished while dealing with the fire over half the population of P.E.I., depend on emergency. private (household-operated) water supplies. That is, consumers are responsible for the safety of their own supply. A number of studies cited by Corkal et al. (in press) present a disturbing picture of rural water supplies. A two-year study of rural Saskatchewan drinking water found that the water quality in nearly all (99.6 percent) of several hundred wells did not meet health or aesthetic objectives. A similar study in Alberta found that 93 percent did not meet objectives. An Ontario study of farm wells found that 40 percent did not meet objectives for at least one contaminant. Finally, a national study found that 20 to 40 percent of Canadian wells have nitrate or coliform bacteria concentrations exceeding drinking water guidelines.

Rural Canadian raw water supplies do not usually meet Canadian guidelines and thus should be treated. However, there is no legislation in Canada governing residential water treatment devices. Bottled water in Canada is also unregulated, other than as packaged food under the Food and Drug Act.

4.2.2 Wastewater Municipal wastewater systems gather and (usually) treat the waste originating in homes, businesses, and other facilities. These systems may also handle storm water runoff (Environment Canada, 2001). In general, wastewater comprises both sanitary sewage and storm water. Some industries treat their effluents entirely on site and then discharge directly to receiving waters or landfill; others may carry out a degree of treatment then discharge to the municipal sewer system.

Environment Canada (2001) found that 97 percent of the sewage produced in some 1 200 municipalities having a population of 1 000 or more receives some degree of treatment. Communities discharging directly into the ocean tend to treat their sewage less than those

23 discharging to rivers and lakes. Canadians living in rural area or in very small communities use septic tanks with tile fields.

Contemporary municipal wastewater systems separate sanitary sewers from storm sewers. Older combined systems often cannot handle the increased volume of water for treatment during heavy rains and thus direct raw sewage to receiving waters. Some communities, even if they treat sanitary sewage, will discharge urban runoff untreated. Others communities may discharge storm water to retention ponds or constructed wetlands prior to discharging to the environment.

A municipal wastewater system will include:

• Sanitary and storm sewers, collectors, trunk sewers and pumps • Treatment systems • Discharge/retention systems • Operation and control systems

Wastewater treatment is an industrial process carried out at a central location in a community. Treatment is commonly considered as: primary, screening and removal of solids; secondary, biological activity to remove fine solids and organic material; and tertiary, advanced treatment to remove additional material, particularly nutrients.

Wastewater is a significant source of pollution even when treated (Environment Canada, 2001). Receiving waters can be degraded by additions of nutrients or pharmaceuticals, depletion of dissolved oxygen, and introduction of toxic substances that bio-accumulate. The effects of wastewater may vary from year to year or season to season. Also, one community’s receiving water may be another’s source water.

4.2.3 Legislation Municipalities generally own and operate their systems under provincial regulation. Provincial oversight of water and wastewater systems is extensive. Regulatory systems require permits for construction, source water protection, certification of operators, and so forth. Provinces also require periodic water testing and may provide financial support for householder testing as well as financial support for capital construction. In addition, provincial emergency measures legislation requires municipalities to have emergency response plans. Although water systems are included in these plans, the degree of detail varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Table 3 summarizes provincial legislation related to drinking water. The responsible agencies usually include departments of health and environment. In the northern territories and on First Nations reserves, DIAND plays a key role in concert with territorial and band governments.

24 Table 3 Provincial legislation concerning drinking water

Province Agency Drinking Water Regulations Publicly Mandatory (plus Health Act Funded Operator Departments) Testing Certification BC Water, Land and Drinking Water Safe Drinking Air Protection Protection Act Water (under yes 2004 Health Act) AB Environment Environmental Potable Water Protection and yes 1982 Enhancement SK Environment/ Environmental Water Watershed Management and Regulations yes 15 July 2005 Authority Protection Act MB Conservation Drinking Water no yes 2006 – 2008 Safety Act ON Environment Safe Drinking Drinking Water Act Water yes yes Protection QC Environment Regulation Respecting the — Quality of yes 2001 Drinking Water NB Environment and Clean Water Act Local no no voluntary Government PE Fisheries, Environmental Aquaculture and Protection Act no no 2003 Environment NS Environment and Environment Act Water and Labour Wastewater no 1995 Facility Regulation NF Environment Environment Act Guidelines no voluntary only

In general, the U.S. federal role in water and wastewater is significantly greater than that of the Canadian government. The United States designated water as critical infrastructure under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, issued in May 1998, and Executive Order 13231, issued in October 2001. One intent is to improve information flow between government and industry concerning the well being of and threats to critical infrastructure through the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).

The U.S. EPA is the lead agency for the water supply sector and has funded the development of WaterISAC. This Internet-enabled system allows authorized participants to gather, analyze and share information concerning physical, contamination, and cyber threats to water systems. Currently there is no provision to allow Canadian utilities or Canadian government agencies to participate or receive information through the WaterISAC.

25 With EPA funding and the participation of the American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AWWARF), Sandia National Laboratories developed the risk assessment methodology for water (RAM-W) to assess the vulnerability of water supply systems. There is also a small system wastewater vulnerability assessment security checklist developed by the National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities.

In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (PL107-188) that forces the pace of municipal vulnerability assessments. The drinking water aspects of the bill include:

1. Mandatory vulnerability assessments followed by mandatory preparation (or revision) of emergency response plans by all except the smallest public water systems (fewer than 3 300 people). 2. Funding of US$160 million for the EPA to use in assisting utilities in: (a) conducting vulnerability assessments; (b) preparing emergency response plans; (c) initiating "basic security enhancements" identified in the assessments (but no O&M costs); and (d) responding to and alleviating urgent vulnerabilities (up to US$5 million in grants). Vulnerability assessments are exempt from federal freedom of information requirements and subject to tight security once submitted to the EPA. 3. Deadlines for completing vulnerability assessments vary by population served: 31 March 2003 for municipalities with populations greater than 100 000; 31 December 2003 for those between 50 000 and 100 000; and 30 June 2004 for those less than 50 000. 4. Funding of US$15 million to the EPA to assess prevention, detection and response information on contaminants and supply disruption, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

There is no similar effort in Canada, although the CWWA has developed a vulnerability assessment template with support from the former OCIPEP. The template covers both water and wastewater and is comprised of four sections: Risks from Human Interventions, Risks from Natural Causes, Chemical, Biological and Other Hazards, and Risks from Technical Failures. The template emphasizes the legal requirements for elected officials and staff to exercise due diligence.

26 4.3 Safety and Security A number of hazards can put municipal water systems at risk. These include both physical and contaminant threats and may be driven by natural hazards, system failures, accidents, and deliberate action.

Natural hazards that affect drinking water supplies include floods and drought, contamination, and outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as giardiasis and cryptosporidiosis. For example, in Milwaukee in 1993 cryptosporidium passed through two water treatment plants and caused 400 000 illnesses (mostly diarrhea) and an estimated 50 to 100 deaths among 800 000 consumers.

Systems may fail because of inadequate design or construction, but more often they fail as the result of a combination of factors that often include accidents, natural phenomena, inadequate maintenance or operator error. (It is only recently that some provinces have required water treatment plant operators to be certified; others still do not.)

According to the AWWARF (2001) the most probable causes of source water contamination are industrial spills, transport spills, runoff or flooding, or sewage treatment plant upsets. These account for about 80 percent of all incidents; combined sewer overflows, low flows, and mining effluents account for the remaining 20 percent.

The usual response to such incidents is to close water intake valves. To enable timely valve closures, considerable effort has been devoted to online biological monitoring systems using fish, daphnia, mussels, algae or bacteria as indicator species. Advanced systems are currently in place on rivers such as the Rhine in Germany and The Netherlands and the Seine in France.

The most common accidental cause of contamination in distribution systems is a cross- connection to the wastewater system. Cross-connections between sanitary sewers and storm sewers may also contaminate source waters.

Deliberate sabotage arises from vandalism, disgruntled past and present employees, or terrorism. Terrorists could contaminate water supplies with biological, chemical or radiological agents that may cause widespread illness and death or at least spread public fear and even panic. They could also disrupt supply through attacks on the physical infrastructure – dams, pipelines, pumping stations, valves, water towers, and so on – or through cyber attacks that take control of parts of a system or immobilize the control systems. Disruption of energy or transportation systems could also affect potable water supplies. (Water treatment facilities use considerable quantities of chemicals that must be transported to the site.)

Jesperson (2002) cites a U.S. Army research paper that indicates only six of 84 terrorist events from 1942 to 1989 involved water. Only one of those, involving cholera contamination in Italy, had any measure of success. Welter (2003) reports on an AWWARF survey of security events at water utilities. The study identified 246 incidents, 178 in North America, up to March 2003. Table 4 provides a summary of these incidents.

27 Contamination of source water supply would require large quantities of most biological, chemical and radiological agents. The risk from deliberate contamination that may affect human health appears to be greater following treatment, thus making post-treatment components such as reservoirs and distribution systems a more likely target.

Treatment processes already in place will deactivate many contaminants. Chlorination, or other disinfection processes used in municipal systems, kills most bacteria and viruses such as E. coli and salmonella. Those plants with ozone treatment can kill protozoa like cryptosporidium. Filtration that removes particles larger than one micron in size will eliminate anthrax and botulinum spores.

Introduction of non-toxic contaminants that may affect taste and odour, or simply the threat of contamination, may be sufficient to cause loss of confidence in the water supply system. Lack of apparent due diligence by system managers may raise questions of legal liability if industrial processes are affected by water contamination.

Table 4 Attack Events at North American Water Systems (after Welter, 2003)

North American Events

Attackers Modes Targets

Criminal 3 Assault 6 SCADA 6

Disturbed 10 Break-in 52 Dam 7

Contractor 3 Chemical feed disruption 2 Distribution system 10

Employee 14 Contamination 65Employee 5

Extortionist 7 Explosives 13 Groundwater well 3

Hacker 4 Hacking 10 Hazardous chemical 1

Terrorist (U.S.) 15 Hijack 1 Pump station 3

Terrorist (foreign) 7 Information gathering 6 Storage facility 48

Unknown 75 Sewage discharge 2 Surface source 14

Vandals 35 Theft 3 Wastewater system 3

Other 8 Unspecified 6Water system 56

Valve tampering 2 Water truck 1

Vandalism 10 Water treatment plant 13

Misc. 8

Water and wastewater systems use SCADA systems to perform many tasks. These systems and the threats to such systems are discussed in section 3.5.2 pertaining to dams. As indicated in that

28 section, SCADA systems should not use the public switched telecommunications network or Internet as their means of transmitting control commands.

Although SCADA systems in water and wastewater facilities tend to be more isolated than general purpose networks, they are all too often connected to internal business systems. In addition, wireless LAN connections are used in order to provide a link to unattended facilities. In other instances utilities do not install encryption devices at remote locations, or fail to turn on built-in security features in SCADA systems.

Irrespective of the degree of threat, it is safe to say that municipal water and wastewater operators do not always have the tools to assess and deal with malicious threats. At the same time, however, measures undertaken to reduce other system vulnerabilities will also reduce the risks from external malicious attacks.

Unlike dam safety issues, there is no corresponding interdependency between Canadian and U.S. water supply systems. Apart from some minor exceptions (e.g. Point Roberts, Washington supplied from Vancouver), there are no transboundary water supply systems.

The new approaches to vulnerability and risk assessments suggest that water treatment plants can be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in such a manner as to provide a high degree of safety and security. Some examples of what should be standard practices include:

• Using professional engineers for design and maintenance • Restricting site access • Securing unattended facilities • Employing security personnel and surveillance systems • Training and certifying plant operators • Security screening personnel • Preparing an operations manual • Preparing and practicing an Emergency Response Plan • Using back-flow preventers • Securing SCADA systems • Providing manual backup for controls

If the plant itself is well designed and managed, the main residual problem relates to source water protection. Municipal water systems obtain water from both ground water and surface water sources. Ensuring the availability of a sufficient quantity of treatable supply on a continuous basis is a key challenge for municipal governments.

Many provincial governments in concert with industry organizations have developed codes of practice for drilling groundwater wells and sealing abandoned wells. Some provinces also have legislation in this area.

A variety of measures protects and improves surface water quality, a significant example being the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Provinces also have codes of practice and legislation

29 related to riparian buffer strips and other best management practices aimed at restricting access to surface water supplies.

Safety and security issues related to wastewater Winnipeg Sewage Release systems are similar to those for water supply systems. Generally, the threat to wastewater A valve failure in the North Winnipeg systems relates to the operation of the plant to Pollution Control Centre in September reduce the likelihood of combined sewer 2002 led to the release of 462 500 m3 overflows, plant upsets, and deliberate actions to of untreated sewage into the Red release sewage to the natural environment. The River. This mechanical problem was required actions are similar to those for water aggravated by a lack of an emergency treatment plants. response plan, insufficient training of plant operators, and inadequate operating procedures. With few exceptions (e.g. Hamilton and Moncton) larger Canadian water and wastewater facilities are municipally or provincially owned and operated. There are, however, many corporately owned water and wastewater facilities in Europe and increasingly in developing countries. Privatization in Canada should lead to changes in provincial regulations to establish clear accountabilities for safety and security.

4.4 Conclusions While events of the last few years have shown that plant failures can lead to serious consequences, the main policy concern is to ensure that there is no public loss of confidence in municipal water systems. Under all but the most extreme circumstances, the responsibility for maintaining that confidence remains with the municipality, the province, and to a certain extent, Health Canada. The safety and security of drinking water supplies is of great concern to Canadians. For the most part these concerns can be addressed through the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, whose federal representative is the minister responsible for Environment Canada.

With respect to support for the prevention and mitigation initiatives that reduce the risk and consequences of major breakdowns, the federal role is indirect. There are several reasons for this:

• Water and wastewater systems are, almost without exception, owned and operated by municipal governments and it is their responsibility to ensure operation of such systems is included in municipal emergency preparedness plans.

30 • It is within the financial capability of virtually all Canadian municipalities to provide a safe and secure supply of drinking water at reasonable cost. Financial support from senior governments is required only in rare cases pertaining to small systems.

• There is no apparent need to consider harmonizing water system efforts with American actions.

• The risk of a devastating attack on water supply appears low, with hoaxes being a more probable form of attack.

• Unless part of some wider natural catastrophe, the DFAA would not likely finance restoration of water supply systems. Floods, disruption of power supplies, or transportation failures that curtail shipment of treatment chemicals are examples of these interdependencies.

31 5.0 Infrastructure – Pipelines

5.1 Introduction Pipelines are deemed to be critical infrastructure in Canada. A complete discussion of pipelines as critical infrastructure is beyond the scope of this report. There are, however some interdependencies between pipelines and water. These are reviewed in the following sections.

5.2 Background Canada is criss-crossed with 40 000 km of pipelines that transport natural gas, crude oil, and petroleum products to national and international markets. Pipelines carry some $85 billion of hydrocarbons annually.

The National Energy Board (NEB), an independent federal agency that reports to the Minister of Natural Resources, regulates the international and interprovincial industry. The NEB regulates several aspects of Canada’s energy industry, including pipelines. Its purpose is to promote safety, environmental protection, and economic efficiency in the Canadian public interest while respecting individuals’ rights. Provinces regulate pipeline systems constructed entirely within a province. For example, the Alberta Energy Utilities Board regulates pipelines that exist entirely within Alberta.

The NEB’s Onshore Pipeline Regulations cover federally regulated pipelines. A number of federal laws (such as the Fisheries Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act) and provincial laws also cover pipelines.

Pipelines are constructed in accordance with the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) standard CSA Z662-1999, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems. This standard is applicable to the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipelines.

This report identifies two interdependencies between pipelines and water issues. The first pertains to river crossings and the second to pressure testing.

5.2.1 River Crossings Pipelines cross many rivers and streams, and while a failure at a river crossing is rare, it can happen. Such failures could lead to significant environmental and property damage.

For the most part pipelines are installed under a river using directional drilling but, in some cases, may be supported by a bridge or similar structure over the river. Engineering specialists design pipeline crossings based on site-specific needs.

32 Typical design features for a pipeline crossing La Salle River Failure may be to install the pipeline about a metre below maximum scour depth and beyond the reach of In April 1996, a rupture, followed by an probable channel migration through the entire explosion and fire, occurred on a natural floodplain. In difficult cases the pipeline may be gas pipeline at the crossing of the La encased in concrete or a protective pipe. The Salle River near the town of St. Norbert, design flood used to analyze for scour and Manitoba. migration varies from the 50-year to 500-year flood, depending on the nature of the crossing. An investigation by the Transportation Safety Board determined that the CSA Z662-99 includes requirements for shut-off rupture was caused by a ductile valves on both sides of major stream crossings. overload fracture, the result of high external stresses on the surface of the While stream crossings are designed to well- pipeline; stresses which were, in turn, established engineering principles and contain a the result of movement of the slope in number of safety factors, there is a concern that which the pipe was buried. The rupture incomplete understanding of regional hydrology may have been assisted by an initial and potential effects of climate change on severe crack that could have been present weather could lead to a higher degree of design since the original construction of that uncertainty than may be currently assumed. section of the pipeline.

5.2.2 Pressure Testing Prior to commissioning, pipelines are pressure tested to ensure their structural integrity. Generally this involves pressurizing segments of a line to between 1.25 and 1.5 times the pipe’s maximum operating pressure using locally available water. Leaks are then repaired prior to the carrying of hydrocarbons via the pipeline. Depending on the procedure used, a pipeline could become a means of transferring biota from one water body to another.

In Canada, untreated water is used in pressure testing pipelines and provincial governments regulate the withdrawal and discharge of such water. In general, the water should be returned to the body of water from which it came to prevent any biota transfer. As well, water that may become contaminated by the contents of the pipeline must be disposed of in such a way as to avoid environmental damage.

5.3 Conclusions Pipelines are designated as critical infrastructure in Canada. From that designation flow a number of activities and responsibilities that are well beyond the scope of this report.

While hydrocarbon pipelines are designed and maintained to high standards, and there is evident oversight by provincial governments and the National Energy Board (NEB), two factors come into play regarding the interaction of pipelines and streams. That is, interdependencies between pipelines and river crossings and the risk of biota transfer.

33 6.0 Floods

"Floods are acts of God; flood losses are the results of acts of humans."

Gilbert White (1945)

6.1 Introduction Preparing for and responding to floods is a shared responsibility among individuals, families, municipalities, provincial and territorial governments, federal departments and agencies, and private and volunteer organizations. The major governmental responsibilities remain at the municipal and provincial levels. However, PSEPC responsibilities for flood events touch on all elements of the emergency management cycle – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. PSEPC launches public awareness campaigns and self-help advice brochures such as, Floods: What to Do Before and After, to provide individuals with the information they need to become better prepared. In the case of flood, requests from the provinces to the federal government are managed through PSEPC, which also maintains the Government Emergency Operations Coordination Centre (GEOCC).

Through the DFAA, PSEPC provides financial assistance for the recovery from flooding. Apart from the 1998 Ice Storm, the Red and Saguenay River floods have been the largest financial payouts under the DFAA. To reduce human suffering, economic losses and disruption, and government financial payouts, mitigation is a key element of any approach for managing flood events. PSEPC is developing the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, in which flood mitigation is an important element.

6.2 Background As a northern country, Canada receives a portion of its annual precipitation as snow and its rivers feature seasonal ice covers. Snowmelt, rain on snow, or ice jams during the spring cause many floods. Severe or lengthy rains, primarily in smaller watersheds, tend to drive summer floods. Coastal flooding due to storm surges is relatively rare, while shoreline flooding along the Great Lakes is common. (For detailed descriptions of the nature of flooding in Canada, see Watt 1989, Andrews 1993, and Brooks et al., 2001.)

Flooding has been implicated in the deaths of at least 198 people and caused at least $2 billion of damage during the 20th century (Brooks et al., 2001). The greatest single Canadian flood disaster occurred when Hurricane Hazel struck southern Ontario in 1954, killing 81 people (Andrews, 1993). Recent notable floods include the 1996 flood in the Saguenay region of Quebec and the 1997 Red River flood in Manitoba.

According to Shrubsole et al. (2003), between 1975 and 1999, 63 floods resulted in DFAA payments of almost $720 million (1999 dollars). In addition, between 1984 and 1998, insurance claims for flooding, which do not include residential losses, were in excess of $750 million (1999 dollars).

34 Figure 2 Flood Damages in Canada (Pietroniro et al., in press)

90 3000 80 2500 70

60 2000 50 Count

1500 $Million 40 30 1000 20 500 10 0 0 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 deaths 2 0 5 13 17 84 36 8 20 13 Number of Floods 4 8 8 10 13 9 21 41 37 28 Cost ($ Millions) 0.13 2.65 5.80 7.58 126.80 109.30 30.29 253.35 410.98 2231.70 Cost Adjusted 2.16 30.25 53.26 79.78 1119.60 714.21 163.92 724.60 597.92 2651.13 Decade

In the past, government programs, both federal and provincial, have been aimed at reducing vulnerability to flooding. The most significant initiative has been the Canadian Flood Damage Reduction Program (FDRP), initiated in 1975. Before then, flood-related programs tended to be ad hoc or single-purpose. For the most part, federal support was directed to disaster assistance following a major flood and to construction of engineering works aimed at reducing future flood damages, for example the Red River Floodway. The Program incorporated planning, non- structural and structural measures (Bruce, 1976).

The federal-provincial FDRP sought to identify flood risk urban areas, map and zone them to discourage future development, investigate means of protecting existing development, and ensure policies where kept in place. In addition, non-structural measures such as flood forecasting, and structural measures such as diking, were part of the program.

By the mid-1990s, some 1 000 flood-prone communities had been mapped. While damaging floods continued to occur throughout the nation, the program was deemed to be successful in reducing flood damages. Brown et al. (1997) examined comparable flood damages in southern Ontario and Michigan from a major rainstorm and found damages in Ontario were an order of magnitude lower than comparable damages in Michigan. Thorough evaluations are difficult, as they require estimates of damages that would have taken place in the absence of a program.

35 Nevertheless, at this time the federal

The Saguenay Flood government withdrew from the program because of budget constraints arising from program review. The federal-provincial In 1996, torrential rainfall inundated south- agreements obligating governments to enforce central Quebec and caused devastating floodplain restrictions have now expired. Now, floods in many waterways in the Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean region. According some years later, in the absence of federal cost to Environment Canada, 150 to 280 mm of sharing, many provinces have ceased new flood rain fell over a 72-hour period in an area of damage reduction activity although previously several thousand square kilometres. Most developed flood risk maps are still in use. of this rainfall was recorded in a 36-hour period on July 19 and July 20. This rainfall Generally provinces continue to enforce caused extensive damage to waterways floodplain zoning restrictions originating in the and the infrastructure of the region. An FDRP; little new work is being carried out, estimated 16 000 people were evacuated however. Table 5 summarizes the current status and flooding damaged approximately 1 350 of flood damage reduction in Canada. homes. In addition to the rainfall event,

flood levels along some rivers increased significantly when water retention There are 1 300 flood prone communities in structures failed. At the Lake Ha! Ha! Canada. Of these, over 900 are in Quebec and Reservoir, rising waters overtopped and Ontario, most in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence breached an earthen saddle dike causing basin. Despite the work undertaken in the Flood the rapid drainage of the reservoir. Damage Reduction Program, flooding remains the most significant threat to Canadian life and property.

Following the major flood events in the 1990s, The Red River Flood the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment initiated a review of flood In 1997, a snowmelt flood inundated a management programs. That process is 1 945 km2 area in Manitoba’s Red River currently continuing and is considering all valley. At the peak the river width was as aspects of flood management warning, much as 40 km. Over 2 500 homes were response, recovery and mitigation. A report will flooded and 28 000 residents in 21 be available later this year. At the same time, communities were evacuated. Total damages were in excess of $500 million. PSEPC has issued a discussion paper Many homes were inundated by concerning the possibility of establishing a floodwaters for a week or longer. Winnipeg National Disaster Mitigation Strategy. had an extremely close call but the operation of the Red River Floodway and other flood control measures saved the city. The flood also had devastating impacts in the states of North Dakota and Minnesota. The city of Grand Forks was totally flooded.

36 Table 5 Status of Flood Damage Reduction Programs in Canada

Province Agency Regulations New Enforce Existing Remarks Mapping Mapping BC Land and Water yes no yes BC AB Environment yes minor yes SK Watershed no no yes Authority MB Conservation yes Red River yes ON Natural yes Resources (conservation ad hoc yes authorities) QC Environment yes no yes NB Environment and Local yes no Government PE Fisheries, some storm Aquaculture and n/a no no mapping surge risk Environment NS Environment and no no yes Labour NF Environment no no yes YK Yukon riverine government after no mapping flood risks 1 April 2003 exist NWT DIAND no no yes

6.3 Discussion Reducing vulnerability to flood hazards requires a suite of structural and non-structural measures. Typical structural measures may include community dikes or upstream dams and diversions that lower water levels. Non-structural measures may include flood forecasting and floodplain management policies to discourage inappropriate use of the floodplain.

Structural measures in themselves may not reduce long-term flood damages (Forget et al., 1999). There are several reasons why this may be the case.

Structural measures may prompt a false sense of security. People frequently have an optimistic view of the extent to which an upstream reservoir will protect them against a very large flood. Similarly, the presence of a community dike may actually mislead people into assuming they are protected against all floods. This structural protection may protect against the event for which it was designed but a larger event could overwhelm the protective measures and cause even greater flood damages. Structural measures may therefore postpone flood damages without necessarily reducing them over the long term.

37 Structural measures may also encourage unfettered development in the area at risk. Most communities will remove the flood-risk zoning for the area protected by the dike. Increased development leads to increased property values. In the event of a dike failure, the losses may vastly exceed pre-development values. Regina is one of only a small number of communities in Canada that require flood-proofing behind a dike.

Canadian policy does not encourage construction of flood resistant structures. For example, national building codes, unlike U.S. codes, do not include requirements pertaining to flood proofing. The logic for this is that people should not build in floodplains, however, millions of Canadians do live in floodplains. The DFAA does not provide financial assistance for flood damaged structures to be rebuilt to any higher flood-proofing standard than before they were damaged. (The DFAA does, however, require buildings to be rebuilt to the current standard so, if flood-proofing requirements are incorporated into a zoning by-law or building code, financial support would be available.)

The long-term solution to reducing flood losses is safe and suitable occupancy of floodplains. This will require non-structural as well as structural measures. It will also require that people take some personal responsibility for their actions. There are two key elements relating to non- structural approaches: flood forecasting and floodplain management.

While enormous strides have been made in flood forecasting in the last 20 years and most provinces now have a reasonably effective forecast system, there are still some improvements needed. Some parts of the country that have not experienced flooding for many years have let forecast systems degrade, in particular the hydrometeorological systems that support the system. As well, emergency plans may need to be updated and revised.

One specific technical problem relates to flash flooding. The Saguenay region is not the only part of Canada subject to extreme flooding from intense rainfall. The short warning time associated with such floods makes cities such as Calgary and smaller centres in both British Columbia and Alberta vulnerable.

A human problem associated with flood forecasting is translating the impact for individuals. Manitoba has developed an effective approach. Following the 1997 Red River flood, the province used detailed topographic mapping and sophisticated flood forecast modelling to provide over the Internet personalized spring forecasts for individual rural land owners in the valley. The system even includes a calculator that allows landowners to determine the number of sandbags needed to protect their property. Plans are to extend the system to show evacuation routes and their accessibility. Even with that level of sophistication, personal responses to a clear and unambiguous forecast will vary.

Floodplain management is aimed at first informing floodplain residents of flood risks, and second, regulating the use of that floodplain. In a general sense, floodplain management encompasses most of the elements of the former FDRP. A regulatory flood is defined (in the case of FDRP, the 1:100-year flood or greater), flood frequency and hydraulic analyses are performed to determine the spatial extent of the flood in the urban area, and the flood-prone lands are zoned to restrict the nature of development that can take place in that area. Finally, responsible parties,

38 usually municipal governments, enforce the restrictions on development. The FDRP succeeded in defining the areas at risk, but was less successful in ensuring appropriate zoning and zoning enforcement.

It is important to periodically redefine the floodplain in accordance with current knowledge. The vagaries of flood frequency analysis and the possibility of climate change mean that the size of a specified regulatory flood is not fixed; it may vary significantly with time. For example, the 1997 Red River flood was believed to have a 160-year return period. Analysis following the flood showed the return period was in the order of 100 years (IJC, 2000).

Floodplain management practices vary in different parts of the world. Some European countries provide relatively high levels of flood protection at public expense and relatively low levels of disaster assistance, leaving that field to volunteer agencies. For example, the Netherlands provides 1:1 250-year protection for dikes along its rivers and 1:10 000 for its seawall dikes.

U.S. practices are similar to Canadian but in the United States there is a much greater federal involvement (FEMA, 1994) and a much more concerted effort to promote mitigation. U.S. federal flood insurance drives much of the effort. Federal agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determine the 1:100 and 1:500 floods for about 20 000 communities and present the flood extent on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM). These maps become the basis for the sale of flood insurance administered by FEMA, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. This insurance is available to states and communities that enforce floodplain management measures that meet or exceed minimum federal requirements.

U.S. officials say the program is not subsidized; it just operates at a loss that someday will be recovered. The cost of identifying flood risk areas is not borne by the insurance program. The United States also has a number of statutory programs aimed at reducing flood risk through property acquisition, construction of structural measures, and community participation. In Canada, such programs tend to be ad hoc, implemented in communities in response to a major disaster. The United States, under the Stafford Act, also devotes 15 percent of the cost of any disaster to mitigation measures.

Very few other countries offer flood insurance to homeowners. In Great Britain, private sector insurers have included flood insurance in standard policies for the last 40 years. The national government provides ‘indicative maps’ of risk while the industry carries out detailed mapping. Coverage tends to be available only outside the 200-year floodplain and never within the 75-year floodplain.

Some insurers are backing out of this coverage on account of lack of enforcement by municipal planners. In the period 1997 to 2000, 11 percent of the new dwellings built in England were constructed on floodplains. The national government provides no disaster relief but does make funding available for mitigation measures (Crichton, 2000).

One could say Canada currently has a zero-premium, entirely tax-supported, flood insurance program (the DFAA) in which the provincial and territorial governments determine the risk and the federal government pays a significant share of the costs in the event of a major disaster.

39 Further, there is only a cursory effort to reduce those costs through continuing mitigation programs. (National support for continuing flood mitigation ended with the Flood Damage Reduction Program.) As evidenced by the Red and Saguenay floods, Canada’s current mitigation approach is to implement post-disaster recovery programs aimed, in part, at reducing the impacts of a repetition of the same event.

In this regard, the proposed use of the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund as a federal contribution to a federal-provincial-city project for enhanced flood protection for Winnipeg represents a significant development. The implication is that if a structural mitigation measure is high enough on an agreed priority list for strategic infrastructure, it may be funded. Likely, such funding may only be made available in exceptional circumstances, as mitigation projects will have to compete for attention with a host of other worthy projects, but this initiative is a step in the right direction.

Any new Canadian program aimed at reducing flood losses could be considered as part of a national mitigation program that would reduce the social, environmental, and economic impacts of disasters through strengthening community resiliency and creating a supportive environment. Such a program should include an all-hazards approach, use of risk assessment, enforcement, incentives and public education. The program should recognize that the current level of development in Canada does not permit flood risk areas to be turned into no-go zones; rather it should encourage appropriate occupancy of those areas.

Technological improvements in recent years make it easier and less costly to carry flood risk assessments and to define specific areas at risk. It is now financially possible to define rural and urban areas that are subject to flood hazards. This definition can include the ‘floodway’, an extreme high hazard area where all development would be discouraged, and a two-zone ‘floodway fringe’ where development would be permitted under certain circumstances. The first zone would allow, for example, flood-proofed houses and businesses, but discourage infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and so forth. The second zone may allow houses that are not flood-proofed but require that critical facilities be flood-proofed. Flood risk areas protected by flood-proofing dikes would be identified as such.

Such a program could be funded as part of a national mitigation program and could include cost- sharing by a number of partners. The program should also take into account the many human issues related to the emergency management cycle. Shrubsole et al. (2003) describes in some detail the program and research needs associated with a revised national flood damage reduction plan.

6.4 Conclusions Canada has over 1 000 flood-prone communities. In the aftermath of floods, PSEPC, through the DFAA is responsible for up to 90 percent of physical restoration costs. These costs account for a significant portion of payments made under the DFAA. PSEPC then has a large stake in working towards the reduction of flood risks and in mitigating the damages from floods. The problem of dealing with flood risks is further compounded by the prospect of climate change and the likelihood of increased flooding arising from extreme weather events.

40 The approach to reducing vulnerability to flood damages encompasses government policies, mitigation measures (structural and non-structural), and acceptance of personal responsibility by floodplain occupants.

41 7.0 Urban Infrastructure and Climate Change

7.1 Urban Infrastructure Canada is a highly urban country. Eighty percent of its inhabitants live in urban areas, with 60 percent of those living in centres of 500 000 or more people. Aside from the public health and security aspects of water and wastewater systems discussed previously, other urban infrastructure, individuals, and businesses are susceptible to water damage from severe rainfall events. For example, a severe rainfall in Winnipeg in 1993 caused $500 million in damages.

In general, urban features such as bridges, surface drains, storm sewers, pump stations and so on are designed using rainfall intensity-duration-frequency curves provided by the Meteorological Service of Canada. For the most part, urban features are designed to convey the waters arising from relatively modest precipitation events, for example, the 1:25 year event. One United Kingdom study (Tedd, 2000) indicated that the magnitude of the 1:50 flood may increase by 20 percent under climate change.

If the assumptions underlying the calculation of rainfall runoff are incorrect, the result could be more urban flooding and hence increased potential for payouts under DFAA. Several factors can influence the design of urban water infrastructure:

For the most part, uncertainty related to these factors increases the risk of an event that exceeds design values and hence affects life-cycle management of the infrastructure (Denault et al., 2002). There could be increased risk of destruction of the infrastructure as well as increased need to improve the conveyance capacity of urban infrastructure within its normal lifetime.

As a means of responding to the first bullet in the previous paragraph, some municipal development approvals processes require that the development have no effect on increasing urban runoff. This procedure is considered a best practice and should be incorporated into standard designs.

7.2.1 Conclusions The main challenge relating to urban infrastructure is to ensure that the infrastructure is designed, built and operated to perform effectively throughout its life cycle.

42 8.0 Conclusions

A review of these issues leads to the conclusion that, where water infrastructure has some bearing on both Canada and the United States, there is ample reason for consistency in declarations of critical infrastructure and to harmonize the objectives of programs aimed at safety and security. Examples would be the St. Lawrence Seaway and high hazard dams in transboundary basins.

Unlike the United States, however, the federal government owns very little critical infrastructure. Also, water administration falls almost entirely under provincial government administration.

While there is a need to be cognizant of U.S. issues and needs, it is even more important not to lose sight of exclusively Canadian issues. Much of Canada’s water infrastructure is vulnerable to natural hazards and system failures, in addition to threats of terrorism or other malicious damage. Canada tends to rely on first-rate engineering and exemplary due diligence by owners rather than government oversight to ensure the safety of life and property.

Provincial governments in their roles as natural resources administrators and responsibilities for municipal affairs bear a primary responsibility for the safety and security of water infrastructure.

Table 6 summarizes current responsibilities concerning critical infrastructure and emergency management. In general, responsibilities fall on the owner and local municipalities, then on provinces for oversight and due diligence, and finally the federal government for research, international relations and financial programmes. Industry organizations can also play a significant role in preparation of best practices and education.

43 Table 6 Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Management

* PSEPC interest: 1) Critical Infrastructure; 2) Canada-U.S.A Infrastructure; 3) Emergency Management; 4) DFAA; and 5) Mitigation.

44 References

Andrews, J. (ed). (1993). Flooding: Canada Water Year Book. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services.

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48 Appendix A – Federal Dams

1. Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration, Agriculture and Agrifood Canada

In the 1930s, the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) was given the responsibility of conserving water and combating the severe soil erosion that blighted the southern Prairie Provinces. Construction of numerous water storage works and irrigation projects were initiated by both the federal and provincial governments to stabilize and drought-proof forage production for livestock, which in turn stabilize the economy and population base of the region.

PFRA has played a leading role in the development and construction of over 850 dams. Most of these structures were transferred after one or two years of operation to irrigation districts, rural municipalities, communities and private individuals.

The agency presently owns, operates and maintains a network of 34 earth dams, 12 major diversion structures, and the water distribution infrastructure for six gravity irrigation projects, all in southern Saskatchewan. These works also provide water to eight provincial irrigation projects and over 100 private irrigation developments for more than 1 700 producers served through irrigation of approximately 18 200 hectares.

PFRA-Owned Dams and Related Structures

Admiral Dam IHTN Dam #2 Altawan Dam IHTN Dam #3A Braddock Dam Junction Dam Cadillac Dam La Fleche Dam Craven Dam Middle Creek Reservoir Cypress Lake East Moosomin Dam (Pipestone) Cypress Lake West Nashlyn Dam Downie Lake Dam Pheasant Creek Dam Duncairn Dam Roughbark Dam Eastend Dam Round Lake Dam Echo Lake Dam Russel Creek Dam Gap Creek Weir Sauder Dam Gouveneur Dam Shaheen Dam Harris Reservoir Valeport Dike Highfield Dam Val Marie Dam IHTN Dam #1 West Val Marie Dam

A-1 2. Public Works and Government Services Canada

The Government of Canada through Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) owns and operates three dams on Lake Nipissing at the headwaters of the French River. The lake and river were once a major link to Georgian Bay along Canada’s historic fur trade and voyageur route. The Big Chaudière Dam, Little Chaudière Dam and Portage Dam each play a fundamental role in effective water management. The dams help to ensure that appropriate water levels are maintained for general boating and commercial navigation on Lake Nipissing, while balancing additional water management considerations.

Other PWGSC-owned structures include the Rideau Falls dam on the Rideau River, in Ottawa, and St. Andrews Lock and Dam in Red River, Manitoba.

3. Fisheries and Oceans Canada

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans owns three small dams in British Columbia. Fulton Dam, near Babine Lake, is classified as a “High Hazard” dam because of the potential impact on fisheries in the event of a failure.

4. Parks Canada

The Trent-Severn Waterway is an interconnected series of lakes, improved river channels, and artificial canal cuts stretching 386 km through the heart of Ontario. The water in the system comes from two major watersheds, the Trent and Severn. The Trent-Severn Waterway, including its tributary lakes and rivers, is an important economic, environmental and recreational resource used by thousands of boaters, shoreline residents and vacationers every year. It also provides water for power generation, municipal water supplies and agriculture, and supports a tremendous variety of fish and wildlife. Water levels and flows throughout the Trent and Severn drainage basins are managed by Parks Canada.

The Rideau Canal stretches 202 km from Kingston to Ottawa and includes two watersheds: the Rideau and the Cataraqui. For the most part it is a natural system with only 19 km of the system being cut channel. Built for defensive purposes in the 19th century, the Canal is now a major recreational waterway. The Rideau system encompasses 47 locks, 24 lock stations, and numerous historic buildings.

Parks Canada also operates a number of dams in national parks for the purpose of water supply and river regulation. In recent years, the agency has been involved in decommissioning structures as a means of returning aquatic systems to a more natural state.

A-2