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Water, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Management Acknowledgments This publication has been prepared for: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 2nd Floor, Jackson Bldg. 122 Bank St. Ottawa, ON K1A 0W6 Tel: (613) 944-4875 Toll Free: 1-800-830-3118 Fax: (613) 998-9589 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca Author: R. A. Halliday R. Halliday & Associates Ltd. This material is based upon work supported by the Division of Research and Development (DRD) in the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), under Contract Reference No. 2002D016. OCIPEP is now a part of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (2003) Catalogue No.: PS4-7/2004E-PDF ISBN: 0-662-37714-1 ii Executive Summary Water is vital to society’s well-being. Its use, abuse, and distribution are subjects of concern to many different sectors and the focus of attention by all levels of government and many government departments. Water administration falls almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of the provinces, yet water’s relation to human health, the environment, and economic development means individuals and governments at all levels have an interest. This report surveys the types of water issues that may relate to federal interests in critical infrastructure and emergency preparedness. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada∗ (PSEPC) is the new federal department with the most direct interest in these types of issues. For example, from its mandate, PSEPC’s interests in water issues include: • Critical infrastructure protection • Critical infrastructure relations with the U.S. • Emergency management • Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) • Mitigation Dams In Canada, federal ownership of dams of any kind is minor. Dams are most likely to be owned by provinces, provincial crown corporations (hydro companies), and the private sector. The federal government has little or no direct oversight responsibility in assuring the safety of dams in Canada. Canada has several hundred large dams, the failure of one of which would cause severe consequences to downstream life and property. Most of these are hydroelectric dams owned by provincial crown corporations who typically own multiple dams. Through normal due diligence, their dam safety record tends to be good, even in the absence of provincial legislation or formal oversight by a provincial agency. As well, most provinces have a permitting system that requires thorough consideration of new dams or modifications to existing dams from safety and other perspectives. Canada lacks the basic consolidated information about what dams exist and the specific consequences if a particular dam failed. Dams having a consequence rating equivalent to the Canadian Dam Association’s “Very High” or “High” categories need to be identified. Overall, Canada enjoys high professional engineering standards in the design and construction of dams. The regulatory and operational procedures in place for the largest dams and for at least three of the provinces (B.C., Alberta, and Quebec) appear adequate. There is a danger, particularly in provinces with few dams, of inadequate oversight. ∗ On 12 December 2003, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) became a part of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). iii The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway is a vital transportation route connecting North America’s industrial centre to the Atlantic Ocean. The Seaway is critical infrastructure and of strategic importance to both Canada and the United States. Water and Wastewater Most Canadians depend on provincially regulated municipal water and wastewater facilities for their household water supplies and waste removal. From a federal perspective, water and wastewater facilities are critical infrastructure and their potential for failure as a consequence of any hazard has emergency preparedness implications. The main concern is to assure the continuation of a sufficient supply of water of suitable quality to meet the needs of Canadians in the face of threats from natural hazards, accidents, and malicious attack. How long could a high population density urban core function without working toilets? The consequences of a city enduring days or weeks without water for sewage disposal or relying on bottled water illustrates how critical a good water supply is and how dependent all other types of infrastructure are on basic water services. Four components in the design of a public water supply system pertain to the safety and security of drinking water. They are: • Raw water supply, including associated pipelines • Treatment systems • Distribution systems • Operation and control systems While water treatment plant failures can lead to serious consequences, the main policy concern is to ensure that there is no public loss of confidence in municipal water systems. Under all but the most extreme circumstances, the responsibility for maintaining that confidence remains with the municipality, the province, and to a certain extent, Health Canada. PSEPC may have a role in the event of catastrophic breakdowns. Of potential concern are breakdowns from widespread contamination, the consequences from which requires a federal government-wide response; from natural hazards such as floods and earthquakes; and from human actions, including accidents and malicious attacks that disrupt delivery of water. Also of concern are breakdowns in interdependent systems, such as energy supplies that threaten operation of the systems, or transportation failure that may limit supply of treatment chemicals. Pipelines Pipelines are critical infrastructure in Canada. The country is criss-crossed with 40 000 km of pipelines that transport natural gas, crude oil, and petroleum products to national and international markets. Pipelines carry some $85 billion of hydrocarbons annually. This report identifies two interdependencies between pipelines and water issues. The first pertains to pipeline failures at river crossings and the second to biota transfer from pressure testing with fresh water. iv Floods Preparing for and responding to floods is a shared responsibility among individuals, families, municipalities, provincial and territorial governments, federal departments and agencies, and private and volunteer organizations. The major governmental responsibilities remain at the municipal and provincial levels. However, PSEPC responsibilities for flood events touch on all elements of the emergency management cycle – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. In the case of flood, requests from the provinces to the federal government are managed through PSEPC, which also maintains the Government Operations Coordination Centre (GOC). Through the DFAA, PSEPC provides financial assistance for the recovery from flooding. Apart from the 1998 Ice Storm, the Red and Saguenay River floods have been the largest financial payouts under the DFAA. Canada has over 1 000 flood-prone communities. In the aftermath of floods, PSEPC, through the DFAA, is responsible for up to 90 percent of physical restoration costs. These costs account for a significant portion of payments made under the DFAA. To reduce human suffering, economic losses and disruption, and government financial payouts, mitigation is a key element of any approach for managing flood events. PSEPC is developing the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, in which flood mitigation is an important element. Flood risk is further compounded by the prospect of climate change and the likelihood of increased flooding arising from extreme weather events. The approach to reducing vulnerability to flood damages encompasses government policies, mitigation measures (structural and non-structural), and acceptance of personal responsibility by