Local Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism in Pakistan © Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware Girls

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Local Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism in Pakistan © Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware Girls Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan © Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware Girls. © Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware Contents Abbreviations 2 About this report 3 Executive summary 5 Language around ‘CVE’ 7 Background on violent extremism in Pakistan 8 The evolving threat of violent extremism across different regions of Pakistan 11 The threat from extremist groups in Pakistan 12 Pakistani government policies to counter violent extremism: expert analysis 15 Strategic priorities for countering violent extremism 20 Reforming the education system 22 Political, structural and governance reforms 29 Finding new national narratives 30 Aware Girls: promoting peace and empowering women 33 The role of civil society in preventing violent extremism 37 Lessons for the international donor community 39 Conclusion 44 Participants 46 Abbreviations AG Aware Girls NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority CSO Civil society organisation Pakistan CVE Countering Violent Extremism NAP National Action Plan FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas NCEP National Counter Extremism Policy FCR Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 for Pakistan JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa TNSM Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Muhammad LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba VE Violent Extremism Cover image: Young Pakistani boys actively listening in a local community session on the role of men in evading violence against women, human rights and the role of youth in building a peaceful society. 2 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. 3 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. About this report • This report is based on a week-long dissenting views as well. In this way, the report consultation and dialogue among 54 leading is a presentation of the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ Pakistani experts on violent extremism. The of a selection of local experts. consultation was held online over a five day period in September 2016. It was facilitated • Background information on certain topics has by Ruairi Nolan from Peace Direct, supported been contributed by Dr Zahid Shahab Ahmed. by Peace Direct’s Local Peacebuilding Expert • Participant quotes are included throughout for Pakistan, Dr Zahid Shahab Ahmed, and Bill to ensure the voices of local experts are Baue of Convetit. highlighted. • Convetit is an online platform designed to • The contents of the final report are the bring professionals together for intense responsibility of Peace Direct. The text in this dialogues in moderated online engagements. report should not be taken to represent the There were over 400 high quality posts views of any individual participant. analysing the situation in Pakistan. • Participants included academics, policy analysts and practitioners in civil society organisations that focus on preventing violent extremism. A full list of participants and their affiliations is included at the end of the report. • During the consultation, participants were able to debate and present a range of different perspectives on key issues relating to violent extremism in Pakistan. Participants were able to challenge each other on their ideas, including sharing content anonymously if they chose to do so. • Participants were able to indicate support for views shared by other participants by directly commenting, or voting up (or down) other content. • This report has been written by Peace Direct to present the views of the group on a range of the topics discussed. We have taken care to review and present arguments that represent the consensus of participants, noting Girls. © Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware 3 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. What is a peacebuilder? includes efforts to stop violence once it flares up, for example through mediation, advocacy and Peacebuilding was originally understood to be in indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. It the context of post-conflict recovery efforts to is stopping violence and destructive conflict as promote reconciliation and reconstruction in the well as building just and sustainable peace. aftermath of war. Often, local peacebuilders have unique But peacebuilding does, and should, start long knowledge of the context they work in, astute before the moment conflict ends. It is a long understanding of the issues affecting their term process which must address the root communities and yet remain overlooked in causes of violence in order to being about longer broader or external peacebuilding strategies and term, positive change. approaches. In this report, the term ‘peacebuilder’ or ‘local As this report shows, the breadth and depth peacebuilder’ refers to a person working in their of knowledge from local peacebuilders of both community to resolve underlying community conflict and post-conflict environments should tensions and prevent violence before it be a crucial part of all efforts to counter violent escalates, as well as supporting the process extremism in Pakistan, and in peacebuilding of recovery, rebuilding and reconciliation in more broadly. the aftermath of conflict. Peacebuilding also Photo of the online consultation, hosted by Convetit.com 4 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. 5 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. Executive summary Violent extremism has wreaked a terrible toll on is a relatively young and fast-evolving one. Pakistani society, and threatens further damage Its origins in the security and defence arena1, in the coming years. In 2010-2015, more than combined with a dominance by Western-based 10,000 people died from violent extremism, and institutions and researchers, has resulted in little Pakistan is consistently ranked among the top focus on locally-led peacebuilding perspectives five countries in the Global Terrorism Index. and strategies. This report aims to redress that balance by highlighting local analysis and In such circumstances, there can be few higher solutions. priorities for Pakistani policymakers and civil society, and members of the international The results of the consultation held in community who wish to support them, than September with over 60 Pakistani peacebuilding devising effective programmes and policies to practitioners and academics indicate serious counter violent extremism. areas of concern, including particular and growing threats. The participants identified the The field of ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) following key findings: Violent extremism is the greatest only on individuals and their motivations threat to peace in Pakistan. obscures the root causes of violent extremism. These include regional and geopolitical Violent extremism is the gravest threat that developments, political factors in Pakistan, Pakistan faces today. Traditionally, security and issues of corruption and governance. approaches in Pakistan have prioritised Whilst simplistic links between poverty international threats, but these are now and violent extremism are unproven, social eclipsed by the dangers posed by violent exclusion and resentments based on unequal extremist groups operating in Pakistan. The access to resources and representation are urgency in focusing on preventing violent critical in driving support for violent extremists. extremism in Pakistan has never been higher. The Pakistani government’s Violent extremism in Pakistan National Action Plan (NAP) to cannot be narrowly understood counter violent extremism is too by looking only at violent focused on military solutions, and extremists themselves. has not paid sufficient attention The causes of violent extremism are wide to the root causes of violent ranging. Some of these can be understood by extremism. looking at the factors driving individuals to To be effective, the NAP will need to take a join violent movements. However, focusing longer-term approach as well as tackle issues 1United States Institute of Peace, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective.” Special Report 336, September 2013. 5 Peace Direct. Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. such as governmental corruption and the The simplistic messages of extremists, often broader ideological climate that supports rooted in a misreading of religious teachings, violent extremism. In other words, the NAP have been remarkably effective in attracting needs to address not only the most visible support across Pakistani society. The symptoms but also the causes of violent weakness of counter messages needs to be extremism. Addressing violent extremism will addressed. However, this should not be done require a “whole-of-government” approach. through a state-centric, top-down narrative. Rather, they should be challenged through a Radical reform of the education range of narratives that celebrate the diversity system is required to equip of Pakistan. Both civil society and the state young people with the critical can develop broader narratives through analysis skills to challenge violent participatory approaches. In particular, extremist narratives. alternative narratives should be developed by and include a central focus on the role Educational reforms need to go much further of women as builders of social cohesion in than looking only at the much-discussed Pakistan. madrasas. While it is vital to better integrate madrasas into the mainstream education All peacebuilding and CVE system, this can only be done
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