Discrimination in Professional Sports: a Survey of the Literature Author(S): Lawrence M

Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of the Literature Author(s): Lawrence M. Kahn Source: ILR Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Apr., 1991), pp. 395-418 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2524152 Accessed: 11-11-2019 06:55 UTC

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This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms DISCRIMINATION IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: A SURVEY

OF THE LITERATURE

LAWRENCE M. KAHN*

This paper reviews studies of racial and ethnic discrimination in professional sports and briefly examines gender differences in pay among professional tennis players. Many of these studies include far more extensive controls for individual ability and performance than typical studies of discrimination that use labor force data. The cited studies show evidence of salary discrimination and customer discrimination against blacks in basketball, and positional segregation on the basis of race or ethnicity in baseball, football, and hockey. More limited evidence is found for the existence of salary discrimination and fan discrimination against French-Canadian hockey players and fan preferences for white baseball players. Finally, at several Grand Slam tennis tournaments, the money prize for the women's winner is somewhat smaller than that for the men's winner, despite some evidence that the women's matches draw at least as much revenue as the men's matches.

CONOMISTS and the public at large black; and in major league baseball in have become increasingly interested in 1987, 27.8% of the players were black.' the issue of discrimination in professional These figures are all substantially larger sports. The public perception has to some than the black percentage of the civilian degree been that sports are an oasis of labor force, which was 10.9% in 1988 equal economic opportunity for minorities (USBLS 1989:16, 18). (Eitzen and Sage 1978). Sports teams are Furthermore, many of the highest-paid sometimes viewed as being engaged in athletes in the United States are black. In intensive competition in which partici- the National Basketball Association pants are evaluated solely on their merits. (NBA), for example, in the 1988-89 The belief that sports provide exceptional season, four of the five players earning opportunities for minorities is reinforced salaries of at least $3 million were black; in by the fact that minority representation is major league baseball, of the twelve higher in major team sports than in the players making at least $2 million per year labor force as a whole. For example, in 1988, four were black and one was among experienced players in profes- Hispanic; and in the National Football sional basketball in the 1985-86 season, League (NFL), roughly half of the 30 74.3% were black; in the National Football players making at least $1 million for the League in 1988, 56.0% of the players were 1988 season were black.2

* The author is Professor of Economics and Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois 1 These figures were taken from Kahn (1989) at Urbana-Champaign. He thanks Ronald Ehrenberg (baseball); Kahn and Sherer (1988:49) (basketball); and Robert Smith for helpful comments and sugges- and Staudohar (1989:86) (football). tions. 2 Salary figures are taken from The Sporting News,

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1991). ? by Cornell University. 0019-7939/91/4403 $01.00

395

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Despite this evidence of economic correlated with the independent variable achievement, there is an undercurrent in of primary interest (such as race or the public's perception of the treatment of gender), the procedure will lead to biased black professional athletes. Until the estimates of discrimination. A particular 1940s, blacks were excluded altogether advantage of professional sports data is from professional sports. Although the that they include extensive, publicly avail- major sports have integrated since then, in able measures of the performance and many instances there was militant resis- compensation of athletes. Although the tance to allowing blacks to compete (Eitzen use of such information may still result in and Sage 1978; Okrent and Wulf 1989; biased estimates of productivity (and Tygiel 1983). Although blacks are now therefore possibly of discrimination), such well represented among players in major mismeasurement is likely to be much professional sports, they are rarely found smaller than that caused by the exclusive in managerial or executive positions.3 use of education and experience as mea- Further, blacks have relatively low repre- sures of productivity. sentation in such key positions as quarter- In addition to allowing for relatively back in football and pitcher in baseball. In precise measures of productivity, a focus recently publicized remarks, a team exec- on sports permits us to estimate the extent utive claimed that black athletes did not of forms of discrimination besides that have the qualities necessary to become based simply on wages. For example, the managers or executives; and a well-known availability of data on revenues in sports broadcaster was fired for making racist and the identity of the workers generating comments (Staudohar 1989:58). Anec- those revenues permits an evaluation of dotal evidence documents that many black customer discrimination. Further, infor- athletes believe they receive unequal treat- mation on the results of the draft in sports ment (relative to whites).4 allows us to study the issue of hiring The issue of discrimination in sports has standards in a much more precise way increasingly attracted the attention of than is usually done in the literature on economists, who have seen professional discrimination. sports as providing an unusually good Although the anecdotal evidence al- opportunity to study the extent of discrim- ready discussed on discrimination in ination. Economists have usually defined sports is suggestive, we need to know what discrimination as unequal treatment (for these stories add up to. Are they isolated example, on the basis of race, gender, or incidents or are they symptomatic of age) of equally productive workers general trends and patterns in profes- (Becker 1971). A major difficulty in sional sports? To answer this question, in estimating the extent of discrimination is this review I survey studies of discrimina- the problem of measuring productivity. In tion in sports that use statistical evidence practice, this problem is usually handled to explore whether discrimination exists by using in wage regressions variables with respect to salaries, hiring, positions such as education and experience as assigned, or customer preference.6 proxies for productivity.5 Such variables, however, are likely to measure productiv- Forms of Discrimination in ity with error; further, if this error is Professional Sports

Economists have identified a variety of January 2, 1989, pp. 56-65, and January 16, 1989, sources and forms of labor market dis- pp. 32, 52. crimination, which, as remarked earlier, is 3 In addition, blacks are very rarely represented in such lucrative sports as golf and tennis. See Eitzen and Sage (1978) and U.S. Tennis Association (1989). 6 These studies were concerned with racial or 4See, for example, Halberstam (1981) or Bradley ethnic discrimination. Below, I review data relevant (1976). to the issue of gender discrimination in professional 5 See Cain (1986) for a review of studies on tennis, one sport in which men and women on discrimination. occasion are paid by the same "employer."

This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS 397 taken to mean unequal treatment of again taking the example of race, whites equally qualified workers.7 It is important require a premium for working with to identify possible sources of discrimina- minorities. There was much evidence of tion in order to analyze the impact of co-worker discrimination when Jackie market processes on the persistence of Robinson entered the major leagues:9 discrimination. Becker (1971) argued that several members of his team (the Brook- labor market discrimination could result lyn Dodgers) approached the manage- from employer prejudice, co-worker dis- ment to protest his place on the roster; the crimination, or customer preferences. St. Louis Cardinals reportedly threatened In the context of sports, employer to strike rather than play against him; and (owner) prejudice has been cited as an one member of the Dodgers asked to be important reason for the exclusion of traded rather than play alongside Robin- black players from major league baseball son (a request that was granted). The until 1947 (Okrent and Wulf 1989). In trade of Robinson's teammate can be seen addition, even after Jackie Robinson broke as an illustration of the segregation mech- the color line in 1947, some teams anism Becker (1971) mentioned as a likely appeared to be more prejudiced against market outcome of co-worker discrimina- blacks than others and were reluctant to tion. Free agency can also lead to a similar field teams with minorities (Okrent and allocation of players. Wulf 1989; Gwartney and Haworth 1974). Finally, customer prejudice has a long Moreover, Gwartney and Haworth (1974) history in sports. In boxing, for example, showed that in the first ten seasons of the wait for "the great white hope" is integrated baseball (1947-56), teams that legendary. Bill Bradley (1976:204) quotes used more black players had, on average, a reporter's view of racism among white higher winning percentages than teams fans in the early 1970s: "Take the ordi- that chose not to integrate as fast. The nary ethnic, white, working stiff. ... authors argued that this difference in There he sees Frazier, this black ... who is winning performance illustrated the com- making $300,000 a year for playing. ... petitive advantage that Becker (1971) Then there he [Frazier] is, playing poorly. maintained non-discriminators would ... I have watched crowds and those boos have. Further, we would expect preju- for Frazier were vicious." Of course, fans' diced teams to trade black players to reaction to the introduction of Jackie non-prejudiced teams, or, in the era of Robinson was also in many cases highly free agency, blacks to move directly to antagonistic (Tygiel 1983:180-208). Un- non-prejudiced teams. The elimination of like employer or co-worker prejudice, pay differentials based on team prejudice, discrimination based on customer preju- then, depends on the existence of non- dice will not be eliminated by market prejudiced teams or non-prejudiced po- forces, since teams are rewarded for tential buyers of teams.8 bidding hardest for the players the fans In the case of co-worker discrimination, want to see most (Kahn, forthcoming). Just as discrimination can have several sources, so can it take various forms. 7Most economists accept this definition of discrimination, but some observers have proposed an Perhaps the simplest form is unequal pay alternative definition: the setting of unequal stan- for equal work. For example, Pascal and dards in allocating job opportunities or pay levels Rapping (1972) suggest that white rookies (Conway and Roberts 1983). This definition is closely in the 1950s received considerably higher related to hiring discrimination, which is discussed below. In addition, there may be discrimination in signing bonuses than equally qualified training opportunities before people enter the labor blacks. I will survey a wide variety of market. This possibility is also mentioned below. studies of pay equality. 8 An exception to this rule has been noted by Discrimination can also take the form of Goldberg (1982). Specifically, if prejudice takes the form of favoritism toward whites (rather than an aversion to blacks), then discriminators and non- 9This discussion is based on Okrent and Wulf discriminators can coexist. (1989) and Tygiel (1983).

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unequal hiring standards. As we will see however, that whites and nonwhites receive below, several authors have alleged that the same return to higher performance lev- black athletes face higher performance els and to other variables that influence sal- standards than whites for entry into and ary.'2 As can be seen in Table 1, some stud- retention in professional sports. ies examine this assumption by performing An additional form of discrimination a statistical test for the equality of the (non- that some believe has occurred in sports is slope) coefficients in separate white and positional segregation. Whites have been black regressions. disproportionately represented at posi- As with studies of wage discrimination tions such as pitcher and catcher in for the labor force in general, the regres- baseball and quarterback in football. As sion approach to estimating discrimination noted below, authors disagree on the in sports may lead to biased estimates if extent to which this kind of segregation the researcher is not able to measure represents discrimination. To the extent performance accurately. If errors in mea- that it does, however, comparing the suring productivity are (partially) corre- salaries of blacks and whites who have lated with race, then biased estimates of performed equally well may understate discrimination will result. As noted, these discrimination. problems may be less severe in sports than Further, consideration of endorsement in other industries because we have much income also suggests that concentrating on better performance data for sports. None- salaries may understate discrimination. theless, the studies in Table 1 use different Specifically, surveys done by sports mar- explanatory variables and may still to keting firms found that in 1987, although some degree suffer from omitted variable eight of the top ten most popular athletes biases. in the United States were black, only one The direction of such biases is not at all of the top 10 sports endorsers (in terms of clear. From Table 2, we see that studies of income) was black (Lipman 1988:B1). baseball, basketball, and football generally find that blacks outperform whites on Salary Discrimination measured productivity characteristics. If Studies of salary discrimination in sports unmeasured productivity moves in the (see Table 1) have used a variety of meth- same direction as measured productivity, odologies to measure the extent of salary then the studies in Table 1 will understate discrimination. The most common method the extent of discrimination. On the other is to regress salary (or its log) on a list of hand, if unmeasured performance is neg- productivity indicators and a dummy vari- atively correlated with measured perfor- able for race.'0 Such a formulation yields mance, then discrimination against blacks an estimate of the market "discrimination will be overestimated.'3 coefficient" (Becker 1971)- the coefficient A final methodological issue in these on the race dummy variable."I It assumes, studies is the sample size. In general, earlier studies, particularly those in basketball, had much smaller sample sizes 10 In some of the studies in Table 1, race was than more recent studies. A larger sample broken down into three categories-white, black and Hispanic-necessitating the creation of two dummy size justifies more confidence that a study variables. has captured genuine trends and not 11 Information on all team salary offers, rather merely characteristics of the particular than merely those offers that were accepted, is sample analyzed. desirable, since an examination restricted to current players results in a truncated view of the salary offer distribution, which can produce biased estimates of 12 All of the studies in Table 1 on baseball, discrimination if the propensity to turn down offers football, and basketball deal with race; the studies of differs by race. In professional sports, however, most hockey deal with possible discrimination against players are likely to be earning much higher salaries French-Canadians. than they could obtain elsewhere. Thus, barring the 13 For further discussion of the issue of unmea- influence of injuries or voluntary retirement, trunca- sured productivity and discrimination, see Gold- tion is not likely to be an important problem here. berger (1984).

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The studies in Table 1 on baseball show performance advantage peaks at 6-7 years little evidence of salary discrimination of experience. Using more recent data against black players. For example, none and a larger sample, however, Christiano of the studies that computed discrimina- (1988) did not find consistent evidence of tion coefficients found a significant nega- a higher black wage return to experience. tive effect for blacks. In one case (Pascal It is possible that experienced black and Rapping 1972) there was a significant players in the late 1960s had faced greater Hispanic shortfall for nonpitchers; in entry barriers (in the 1950s) than experi- three cases (Christiano 1986, 1988; Pascal enced players in the 1980s; experienced and Rapping 1972) there was a significant black players (especially outfielders such white shortfall in salary, controlling for as Willie Mays and Hank Aaron) in 1968 measured productivity. In these instances may thus have had particularly high un- of white salary shortfall, should we con- measured ability. clude that there is discrimination against It is especially noteworthy that the whites, despite the fact that blacks were pattern of results for salary discrimination barred from major league baseball until for the period before free agency (1976) is 1947? A more likely explanation is omit- similar to the pattern after free agency. If ted variables. For example, Pascal and some employers discriminated while oth- Rapping (1972) found white salary short- ers did not, then, Cymrot (1985) has falls among pitchers for 1968-69; at that argued, free agency may reduce such time, there were so few black pitchers discrimination, as black players would (Table 2) that those blacks who did pitch move to nondiscriminatory teams. 14 A likely needed to be especially skilled. related hypothesis is that in the era of free Further, although Christiano (1986, 1988) agency, if some owners are prejudiced, found significant white salary shortfalls in there will be more salary discrimination regressions, Kahn (1989), using data simi- against black players not eligible for free lar to those Christiano used in his 1988 agency than against those eligible. This study but with a longer list of performance possibility was investigated by Cymrot measures, found small, statistically insig- (1985) and by Christiano (1988). nificant race differences. First, Cymrot (1985) estimated separate Of the baseball studies in Table 1 that log salary regressions by race and by compared black and white equations, free-agency eligibility status. Chow-tests some found significant differences in the confirmed that for ineligibles, the coeffi- coefficients, whereas others did not. Sev- cients for whites were significantly differ- eral of the early studies in Table 1 found ent from those for nonwhites; however, that black players in the 1968-71 period such tests accepted the null hypothesis had higher returns to experience than that for eligibles, there were no significant white players. Scully (1974a) interpreted differences between white and nonwhite that finding as suggesting that blacks coefficients (including intercept terms). faced retention barriers: black veterans Cymrot (1985) concluded that the compe- had to outperform whites in order to tition implied by free agency eliminated remain in baseball; to produce the higher the discrimination that presumably would black experience effect, such barriers have existed against eligible nonwhites would have to grow with experience. had they not been eligible. Although Under such conditions, experienced black Cymrot did not compute discrimination players would be a more select group than coefficients, his results are consistent with inexperienced black players, relative to the the competition hypothesis. Second, selection effect for white players. Some Christiano (1988) compared black and limited evidence for this view can be seen in Table 2: Scully (1974a) found that for 14 As is discussed below in the context of basket- outfielders, the black performance advan- ball, even free agency is not sufficient to eliminate tage over whites widens with experience; racial pay differentials based on customer discrimina- on the other hand, for infielders, the black tion.

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This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 402 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW white log salary coefficients by eligibility Sherer (1988) accepted the null hypothesis status and found no strong patterns.'5 of equal regression coefficients (other Christiano's results suggest that it may than the intercept) for black and white be premature to say that there is more players. discrimination against free agency ineligi- Unlike baseball or basketball, for many bles than against eligibles. Further, one positions in football and for defense in may question the logic behind Cymrot's hockey, detailed performance measures (1985) prediction. Specifically, even in the are not available. Perhaps not surprisingly, absence of free agency, one would expect I found only two studies of salary discrim- prejudiced owners to trade black players ination in football (see Table 1), both for to non-prejudiced teams, leading to an the 1970-71 period. In neither case was a allocation of players similar to what one discrimination coefficient calculated. would find under free agency. The pre- Mean salary differences by race, however, diction that free agency causes a reduction were not large (0.1% to 4% in favor of in racial salary differentials rests on the whites, with no significance tests); further, assumption that free agency allows more Chow tests did not find significant differ- player mobility (or potential mobility, ences between black and white salary through the offer-matching process) than equations (Mogull 1981). With the advent would have occurred through trades of better salary data and improved per- alone-a question on which there is no formance measures, estimating the extent evidence. 16 of discrimination in football salaries is In contrast to the studies of baseball, clearly on the research agenda. But for research on professional basketball play- the 1970-71 period, there is little evi- ers' salaries indicates significant black dence of salary discrimination against salary shortfalls in the 1980s. Table 1 black players. shows this result for each study that used Whereas studies of discrimination in the sample sizes large enough to comprise all major American sports have focused on or most of the NBA's experienced players. race, several studies of North American These studies, using data from either the professional hockey have investigated dis- 1984-85 or 1985-86 seasons, found sig- crimination against French-Canadians.'9 nificant discrimination coefficients rang- Some observers have alleged that French- ing from 11% to 25% against black Canadian players are plagued by negative players.'7 Such results are noteworthy stereotypes, such as the supposition that since basketball, like baseball, has had free they are reluctant to fight (evidently a agency since the 1970s (Staudohar 1989: major component of "good" hockey), are 120).18 On the other hand, Kahn and too offense-oriented, and do not work hard enough (Lavoie 1989:20). Such ste-

15 Christiano did not perform significance testsreotypes for can be overcome by observing differences in these coefficients. 16 In some conditions, Nash bargaining under the reserve clause can lead to apparently discriminatory omitted variable problems. One technique for deal- pay gaps that would disappear under free agency. ing with such problems, suggested by Conway and Specifically, if blacks have lower "status quo" income Roberts (1983), is to regress qualifications on (log) than whites (for example, from endorsements), then salary and race-the "reverse regression" technique. Nash bargaining will leave blacks with lower salaries Goldberger (1984), however, has argued that such a than equally performing whites, even if owners are technique is no less likely to give a biased estimate of not prejudiced (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky discrimination than the usual ("direct") salary regres- 1986). If we control for status quo income, however, sion. Nonetheless, when the reverse regression there should be no race effect. Under free agency, technique was used by Kahn and Sherer (1988) as an players get their marginal revenue products regard- additional check on their basic results, the implied less of their status quo incomes. discrimination coefficients were still significant and 17 Earlier studies surveyed in Table 1 on basketball actually larger in magnitude than those obtained by were inconclusive but used samples of only 26-28 the direct regression. players. 19 Roughly 80% of National Hockey League 18 Although these studies all used a long list of (NHL) players in 1984 were Canadian (Lavoie, explanatory variables, they may still suffer from Grenier, and Coulombe 1987:417).

This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS 403 individual playing performance; but per- Hiring Discrimination formance, according to Grenier and La- voie (1988), is more easily observable for Because black athletes were virtually the positions of goaltender and forward, barred from participation in major profes- for which the individual's outputs are sional sports until after World War II, it is shots stopped and goals (or assists), re- not surprising that many researchers have spectively, than for the position of de- examined the issue of hiring discrimina- fenseman. Those who have studied salary tion (see Table 2). One plausible definition discrimination in the NHL have found of hiring discrimination is unequal job significant discrimination coefficients offer probabilities facing different appli- against French-Canadians only at the cants with the same ability.2' position of defense (Grenier and Lavoie To evaluate the extent of hiring dis- 1988; Jones and Walsh 1988), and Grenier crimination in professional sports, we and Lavoie argue that such a finding of need information on players in the hiring discrimination is due to the inherent pool. That is, we need to know if black difficulties in measuring performance of players at the margin of acceptance or defensemen. Specifically, one would ex- rejection by the sport face tougher admis- pect employer prejudice to have a greater sion standards than whites. Several studies role in salary determination for defense- examine this issue. men than for players in positions for First, Kahn and Sherer (1988), using which good, objective measures of perfor- 1985-86 data, found no significant racial mance are available. differentials in the order in which NBA In fact, though Grenier and Lavoie players were drafted, controlling for col- (1988) and Jones and Walsh (1988) do not lege performance. In fact, all else equal, mention this connection, their results are black players were drafted slightly (and, as consistent with Aigner and Cain's (1977) noted, insignificantly) earlier than whites. model of statistical discrimination. In that Although this study did not look at those model, employers pay workers according rejected from the NBA, it does not to productivity predictions that are based provide any evidence of hiring barriers. in part on observed qualifications and in Second, Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1988) part on the employer's prior beliefs. compared the performance in the 1984- Groups for which performance is less 85 season of black and white "benchwarm- reliably predicted or for which the em- ers" in the NBA. The authors found ployer has negative prior beliefs will get generally insignificant performance dif- lower pay for a given level of qualifica- ferences for these groups, although for tions. French-Canadian defensemen may the league as a whole, blacks outperformed suffer from either type of discrimination. whites.22 These results again suggest the The statistical discrimination model is less absence of hiring barriers at the margin of relevant for goaltenders and forwards, entry into the league, although joint tests since their performance can be easily measured; employers need not rely so 21 Overlooked by this definition is the possibility heavily on prior beliefs to evaluate and that some black workers (for example) are discour- reward such players.20 aged from applying for employment by anticipated discrimination. Courts in discrimination cases have taken account of this phenomenon by requiring firms to hire minorities (or women) in proportion to 20 Although there may be other explanations of their availability in the relevant labor market (Flana- the French-Canadian salary shortfall (such as lan- gan, Kahn, Smith, and Ehrenberg 1989). Research- guage barriers or differing reservation wages), these ers investigating discrimination in professional sports other hypotheses do not explain why the shortfall is do not even have data on rejected applicants, much concentrated among defensemen (Lavoie 1989). The less on the relevant hiring pool (which would statistical discrimination argument and the assump- presumably include discouraged applicants). tion that performance is harder to measure for 22 As can be seen from Table 2, other studies of defensemen together can explain the observed the NBA also found that, overall, blacks outper- results. formed whites.

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This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 406 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW of differences in individual performance hiring barriers. If, say, the best black indicators would have provided a perhaps outfielder is better than the best white fairer test. On the other hand, Johnson outfielder, can we say that the former and Marple (1973) found for the 1960-71 faced entry barriers?24 There usually are period that marginal white pro players many more marginal players than stars, had longer careers than marginal black suggesting that teams do have substitution players, suggesting that the latter faced possibilities at the margin. An implication retention barriers.23 of the presence of barriers is that teams In hockey, researchers claim to have are hiring lower-quality whites even uncovered evidence of hiring discrimina- though there are more highly qualified tion against French-Canadians (Table 2). blacks who are attempting to gain entry. For example, Lavoie, Grenier, and Cou- Despite this methodological difficulty with lombe (1987) found that at the same draft using overall performance comparisons, number, Francophones significantly out- such studies have yielded some interesting performed Anglophones in the NHL in insights. the 1982-84 seasons. This result suggests As noted, in all the major U.S. profes- that French-Canadians need to be better sional sports, there were racial barriers to qualified than English-Canadians in order entry until after World War II. The to be selected as early in the draft. purpose of many of the studies in Table 2 Further, the authors (and Grenier and was to determine the degree to which Lavoie 1988, a related paper) also found these barriers had eroded. The early that Francophones outperformed Anglo- studies of baseball, based on data from the phones at forward and defense. The 1950s and 1960s, indicated important French-Canadian performance advantage performance differentials in favor of by position is inversely correlated with the blacks. French-Canadian representation by posi- One interesting pattern shown by those tion. This pattern suggests particular studies, however (noticed by Medoff barriers to French-Canadian access to the [1975]), was that although black National defensive position, where Francophones' Leaguers significantly outperformed representation is the least and their per- whites, in the American League there formance advantage is the greatest. (Recall were no significant racial performance from Table 1 that defense was the only differences. Since the National League position in which there was a significant integrated before the American League in French-Canadian salary shortfall.) Confi- the 1940s and 1950s and took advantage dence in such a test would be strength- of the accumulated black playing talent ened by examining draft-performance previously barred from the major leagues, relationships by position as well as by Medoff (1975) argued that the American studying players rejected by the NHL. League was the appropriate setting in Unlike these studies, which examine the which to examine barriers in the 1960s.25 selection process, most research on hiring The lack of a performance differential in discrimination in professional sports the American League indicated to him a merely compares black and white perfor- lack of hiring barriers. One must use mance levels (Table 2). A finding that caution in interpreting his findings, since blacks outperform whites is taken to be there were only 26 nonwhites in his evidence of hiring barriers. Since many American League sample. players are likely to be inframarginal with respect to playing ability, however, such 24 Of course, other information could indicate studies do not provide direct evidence on hiring discrimination against such a player; here, however, we are concerned with the interpretation of performance differentials. 23 Mobility may be voluntary (in the case of some 25 That is, the black performance differential in retirements), but considering the high incomes the 1960s reflected the talents of the black players earned by professional athletes, it seems likely that brought in during the early period of integration, much turnover among them is involuntary. not the hiring standards current at the time.

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By 1976, racial performance differen- evidence is less strong, although in the tials were less noticeable in baseball, as Hill 1980s blacks appear to have been slightly and Spellman (1984) found that blacks overrepresented at guard. In football, outperformed whites in four of six posi- blacks in the 1960s and 1970s were tions but that these differences were underrepresented at quarterback, kicker, generally not significant. A joint signifi- and linebacker positions; evidence for cance test of such differences, however, more recent years is not available. Finally, would have been informative. in hockey, French-Canadians in the 1970s Whereas these studies were concerned and 1980s were underrepresented at with entry barriers in baseball,Jiobu (1988) defense and overrepresented at goalie. studied retention barriers. Using a sample Although researchers do not question of 1,113 players from 1971 to 1985, he the existence of positional segregation in found that, given the same performance baseball and football, its explanation has level, position, and age at entry, blacks had been the subject of some debate. On the a significantly higher exit rate from base- one hand, some have argued that in these ball than whites-a result similar to sports, blacks are kept out of positions Johnson and Marple's (1973) finding for involving leadership and critical think- benchwarmers in basketball (see above). ing.27 This exclusion is, according to this Hispanic-white differences were small and argument, based on negative stereotypes insignificant. Jiobu, reasoning that baseball about black players' intelligence or leader- players' high salaries should make them un- ship abilities. It is also consistent with the likely to quit (unless injured), argued that existence of co-worker discrimination: the racial difference in exit was tanta- white players may resist taking orders mount to a higher discharge rate for blacks, from black players. Baseball managers and all else equal. Further, since whites are likely coaches, when they were players, more to have better non-baseball opportunities often played infield than other positions; than blacks, one might expect, absent sal- if black players are excluded from these ary discrimination, to find earlier retire- positions, then they will receive less "train- ment rates among white players. Although ing" for managerial jobs than white play- Jiobu's finding assumes no differences in ers. Thus, even if positional segregation injuries, it does suggest that teams are more did not lead to any salary differentials, it likely to retain an aging white player than could still adversely affect the careers of an aging black player. If players' skills de- black players. teriorate near the end of their careers On the other hand, it has also been (Kahn 1989), then the racial difference in suggested that black underrepresentation exit rates could, by itself, yield an average in central positions is the result of discrim- performance advantage in favor of black ination in training opportunities available players. Again, one must use caution in in- to young athletes (that is, "pre-labor terpreting performance differentials. market" discrimination).28 According to such an argument, positions such as pitcher, catcher, and infielder in baseball Positional Segregation and quarterback, linebacker, and kicker in football require more training and equip- Related to entry barriers is segregation ment than other positions. Inequality in by position. Table 3 summarizes the training resources provided by schools can results found in studies of positional lead blacks to choose non-central posi- segregation. In baseball, there is evidence tions. that blacks are underrepresented at pitcher, catcher, and infield positions sentation at second base and shortstop for 1976 (other than first base).26 In basketball the (Table 3). 27 See, for example, Scully (1974a), Curtis and Loy (1978), Eitzen and Sanford (1975), or Yetman 26 One exception to this generalization is Hill and (1987). Spellman (1984), who found slight black overrepre- 28 See Medoff (1986).

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At present, there is insufficient evidence employer or co-worker prejudice, compe- to allow us to reject one of these explana- tition will not eliminate this form of tions in favor of the other. On the one discrimination within an industry. To the hand, in basketball in the 1970s there was extent that customer prejudice exists, no evidence of segregation (Curtis and market forces cannot be relied upon to Loy 1978), and in the 1980s blacks were eliminate unequal treatment of black and disproportionately represented at guard, white athletes. the leadership position (Kahn and Sherer As Table 4 shows, studies of customer 1988). Such evidence is not consistent with prejudice in sports have been confined to the "negative stereotypes" argument. On baseball and basketball. In baseball in the the other hand, Madison and Landers 1950s, black players actually raised home (1976) found that in the transition from attendance, all else equal. Gwartney and college to professional football, black Haworth (1974) attributed this finding to players were more likely than whites to the presence of black superstars in the switch from central to non-central posi- incoming cohort of black players and new tions. This finding suggests some tracking black customers attracted by the integra- on the part of professional football teams, tion of baseball. By the 1960s, there was although it could also be explained by the evidence that black players significantly training costs hypothesis. In any event, in lowered team revenue, all else equal the 1980s, black representation at posi- (Scully 1974a, 1974b). Presumably these tions such as pitcher in baseball (Medoff latter findings reflected white fan prefer- 1986) and quarterback in football appears ences. By 1976-77, however, these was no to have been on the increase, although evidence that the racial composition of blacks were still underrepresented at these baseball teams had any impact on reve- positions as the decade closed.29 nues (Sommers and Quinton 1982). Nar- In hockey, the underrepresentation of dinelli and Simon's (1989) finding that in Francophones at defense has been taken 1989 white players' baseball cards sold for as additional evidence that team manage- higher prices than cards for equally ment is unwilling to hire players from this qualified blacks is suggestive of racial group at a position for which it is difficult prejudice among fans. The market for to evaluate performance (Lavoie, Grenier, baseball cards, however, may well be and Coulombe 1987; Grenier and Lavoie different from that for baseball games. As 1988). On the other hand, as noted yet, there is no evidence on the impact in earlier, it is apparently easy to evaluate the 1980s or 1990s of black baseball goalies' performance, and this is precisely players on team revenues or attendance.30 the position in which French-Canadians In contrast to baseball, in basketball are overrepresented (Table 3). An addi- there appears to be evidence of customer tional explanation of such findings is that discrimination in the 1980s. Although defensemen must communicate more fre- studies based on data for the years quently with other players, whereas goal- 1978-81 and the years 1969-82 did not ies can be loners. It is questionable, find evidence that black players lowered however, whether a defenseman must revenues or attendance, studies of 1980- know very much English (Lavoie 1989). 86 data did find that attendance was negatively affected by the black players, all else equal (see Table 4). Further, there is Customer Discrimination

Testing for the existence of customer 30 As noted in Table 4, Noll (1974) found that in discrimination is important since, unlike both baseball and basketball, the higher the percentage of the area's population that was black, the lower the attendance, all else equal. He concluded, how- 29 Recently, three starting quarterbacks in ever, the that this variable was really a proxy for the NFL were black (Randall Cunningham, Warren quality of the neighborhood in which the team's Moon, and Doug Williams), in marked contrast to stadium was located rather than evidence of an earlier years (Eitzen and Sanford 1975). aversion of white fans to the presence of black fans.

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This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 412 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW evidence from the 1980s (as well as Gender Discrimination in 1964-77) that the racial composition of Professional Sports: NBA teams was significantly affected by The Case of Tennis the racial composition of the areas in Unlike black and white athletes, male which they were located. These latter and female athletes seldom work for the results suggest the presence of customer same employer in professional sports. prejudice and a response by NBA teams to Thus, there are few opportunities in such prejudice. In addition, the closeness sports to study the issue of gender of the racial match between the team and discrimination.3' The one notable excep- the area positively affects attendance tion is tennis. (Burdekin and Idson 1988). For most of the year, male and female The share of NBA players who are professional tennis players compete in black rose from roughly 58% in 1970-71 separate events on their own tours, as in (Johnson and Marple 1973:11) to about golf and bowling. These tournaments have their own sponsors, and players are 74% in 1985-86 (Kahn and Sherer 1988: paid prize money that presumably reflects 49). As white players became more scarce, the revenue raised by the event. Although it is possible that white fans grew more data on such revenues would be of interest responsive to the presence of additional in assessing the extent of customer prefer- white players. That is, prejudiced white ences for men's and women's tennis, they fans' utility may depend on both winning would tell us nothing about the treatment and the presence of white players; further, of male and female tennis players by the the existence of diminishing marginal same employer.32 At the Grand Slam returns in such utility functions would tournaments (Australian Open, French explain the greater evidence of customer Open, Wimbledon, and U.S. Open), how- discrimination in the 1980s than in the ever, men's and women's draws are part of 1970s. the same overall event; further, men and women are paid by the same employer in Although Jones and Walsh (1988:602) these championships.33 These tourna- did not perform a direct test of customer ments accept the same number of male discrimination, their examination of the and female players into each draw (128). salaries of French-Canadian defensemen Some indication of the treatment of in hockey has some implications for the female tennis players can be obtained by issue. In particular, they found a signifi- examining the evolution of prize money cant salary shortfall for Francophone allocation. defensemen playing outside of Quebec, The era of open tennis began in 1968, ceteris paribus; for those in Quebec, the when professionals were first allowed to effect of French-Canadian extraction on salary was positive and insignificant. A 31 There are no major women's professional sports plausible explanation of these results is the leagues on the scale of the major men's U.S. sports. greater fan identification with French- On the collegiate level, it has been alleged that female Canadians in Quebec than in other prov- athletics budgets have been shortchanged, although there have been no systematic studies of this issue inces. Further, it seems likely that French- (Eitzen and Sage 1978). Canadians might, in the absence of 32 Below, I review some limited data on the customer discrimination, require a com- television ratings of men's and women's tennis. I take "employer" to mean the body that sets prize money pensating differential to play outside for a given tournament in which there are both Quebec; if they do, then the above men's and women's events. interpretation of Jones and Walsh's (1988) 33 The Lipton tournament, a less prestigious finding is strengthened. Unfortunately, event, has the same format as the Grand Slam championships. In addition, World Team Tennis the authors do not conduct such tests for involves team competition in which men and women other positions. play for each team.

This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS 413 compete at the major tournaments.34 For (three out of five sets as opposed to two the first several years of open tennis, there out of three sets), the relevant concept for was a well-developed men's tour (World measuring equal work is the entertain- Championship of Tennis) but no corre- ment value provided by the players.37 sponding organization for women. In Although there are no systematic data on addition, the total prize money available to revenue produced by tennis players, some men was about ten times that for women indications of their market value can be (Koster 1976:16). In 1971, women created obtained by examining television ratings. their own tour (Virginia Slims), which In the mid-1970s, a CBS television greatly increased the prize money avail- producer associated with tennis events able to women. As of 1972, however, the claimed that women's tennis drew better winner's prize money for the U.S. Open television ratings than men's, in part was $25,000 for men and only $10,000 for because the women's tour was better women (World Tennis, November 1972, p. organized than the men's tour (Koster 98).35 Billie Jean King, the women's U.S. 1976:190). Obtaining evidence of relative Open champion for 1972, threatened to ratings at a given event is difficult because lead a boycott of the tournament in 1973 men's and women's rounds are often unless prize money was equalized for men televised on the same day, and the ratings and women. This threat was evidently are not broken down for times within a successful, as men's and women's prizes given broadcast. In 1988, however, the for the U.S. Open have been equal since Wimbledon men's and women's finals 1973 (World Tennis, November 1973, p. were televised on consecutive days over 22). the July 4th weekend. According to a Table 5 shows men's and women's representative of the A.C. Nielsen Com- winners' prize money figures for selected pany (a firm that computes television major championships for 1987-90. There ratings), the women's final drew 4.4% of was approximate earnings parity for the households with televisions, whereas the Australian Open and, as mentioned, par- men's final drew 3.2%. ity for the U.S. Open; for Wimbledon, It is possible that other factors, such as however, there was an 1 % pay gap in rain delays or audience differences be- favor of men, and for the French Open tween Saturday and Sunday, may have there was a 10-26% gap for 1987 and accounted for this difference in ratings; 1989-90, with parity in 1988. Taken however, this piece of evidence and the together, these figures provide some evi- observations of the CBS producer in the dence of a gender-related pay gap.36 1970s certainly do not suggest that wom- To interpret these data as evidence of en's tennis at the top level produces any discrimination, however, we need to know less revenue than men's tennis. We thus whether the numbers in Table 5 show cannot rule out discrimination as a cause unequal pay for equal work. Although of the prize money differentials in Table men's matches take longer than women's 5. Further, if women generate more revenue than men, then pay equality will

34 This description of the development of open still mean discrimination against women. tennis is based on Koster (1976). On the other hand, the ratings figures 35 Prize money in tennis for making it to the finals cited above are for the top-rated players. or to earlier rounds is generally roughly proportional We have no direct information on the to the winner's share. Thus, the 1972 gender market value of the "average" tennis differential for winners' shares is likely to be a good approximation for the differential in overall prize professional. In 1989, 85 men and 34 money for the tournament. women each earned over $100,000 in 36 The Italian Open, another important tourna- prize money (U.S. Tennis Association ment, schedules its men's and women's champion- 1990:71). Since the men's and women's ships one week apart. The winner's share in 1989 for men was $179,200, whereas the winner of the women's draw earned only $60,000 (World Tennis, 37 In fact, the length of some men's matches may August 1989, pp. 70-71). detract from their entertainment value.

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Table 5. Winner's Prize Money, Selected Grand Slam Tennis Tournaments, 1987-1990.

First Prize Year and First Prize First Prize Ratio Tournament for Men for Women (Men/Women)

1990 Australian Open $200,000 $190,000 1.053 French Open 370,000 293,000 1.263 Wimbledon 411,240 370,116 1.111 U.S. Open 350,000 350,000 1.000

1989 Australian Open 140,000 135,000 1.037 French Open 291,752 257,379 1.134 Wimbledon 330,624 298,000 1.109 U.S. Open 300,000 300,000 1.000

1988 Australian Open 105,000 110,000 0.955 French Open 246,750 246,361 1.002 Wimbledon 272,500 245,025 1.112 U.S. Open 275,000 275,000 1.000

1987 French Open 198,665 179,700 1.106 Wimbledon 252,650 227,385 1.111 U.S. Open 250,000 250,000 1.000

Sources: 1990 Australian Open-Sports Illustrated, February 5, 1990, p. 86; 1990 French Open-Sports Illustrated, June 18, 1990, p. 88; 1990 Wimbledon-Sports Illustrated, July 16, 1990, p. 97; 1990 U.S. Open-Martz (1990:54) and Bonk (1990:C18); 1989 Wimbledon and U.S. Open-U.S. Tennis Association (1990:87); 1989 Australian Open-Sports Illustrated, February 6, 1989, p. 69; 1989 French Open-World Tennis, August 1989, pp. 70-71; 1988 Australian Open-Sports Illustrated, February 1, 1988, p. 77; 1988 French Open, 1987-88 Wimbledon, and U.S. Open-U.S. Tennis Association (1989), p. 81; 1987 French Open-U.S. Tennis Association (1988), p. 77. tours are separate, the overall difference persistent, though slowly falling, segrega- in aggregate prize money is likely to tion by position. Both of these phenomena reflect the relative sizes of the markets for help explain the low incidence of black men's and women's tennis rather than managers, although the evidence is not unequal treatment by the same employer. clear on whether positional segregation Although there may be some discrimina- reflects team discrimination, pre-labor tion against the top-rated female players, market discrimination, or occupational it is not yet possible to say whether there is choice. discrimination against average players. In contrast to baseball, in basketball there is consistent evidence of salary discrimination as well as customer preju- Conclusions dice, and it is likely that the two are linked: This review has uncovered varying because of fans' preference for white patterns of evidence on discrimination in players, the percentage of white players professional sports. Currently, there is on a team positively affects the team's little evidence of salary or hiring discrimi- ticket sales, and white players may conse- nation by major league baseball. Consis- quently be paid more than black players tent with these findings for baseball with the same record of performance. The salaries, there is no evidence that customer fact that black athletes make up a higher discrimination has affected team revenues proportion of the NBA's players than of since the introduction of free agency, the players in other professional sports although it has affected baseball card may explain the large impact on NBA prices. Finally, there are unexplained game attendance of additional white play- racial differences in career length and ers.

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The limited evidence on football shows discrimination in these sports. Further, for persistent segregation by position. This baseball there is no evidence of salary segregation may well have salary conse- discrimination and no strong evidence of quences, but it is not yet clear to what customer discrimination as it affects team degree it is a demand-side or a supply-side revenues. Again, a circumstantial case can factor. be made for the importance of fan In hockey, there is evidence that prejudice as an explanation for salary French-Canadians are subject to salary differentials when they occur in team discrimination at the defense position, sports. hiring discrimination, and positional seg- In contrast to baseball, basketball, foot- regation. Further, this evidence supports ball, and soccer teams, the major tennis models of statistical discrimination in tournaments have no immediate competi- which employers use preconceptions to tors. Thus, if Wimbledon, for example, assess the productivity of various groups discriminates against women, its directors' in jobs for which performance is hard to monopsony power can allow employer measure. The salaries of French-Canadian prejudice to persist for a long time.38 defensemen appear to be higher (relative The findings cited here on salary dis- to others' salaries) inside Quebec than crimination in team sports have for the outside it, a finding that supports the most part been obtained using far more notion of customer discrimination. On the detailed performance or productivity data other hand, the lack of good performance than are typically available for the labor measures at the defense position could force in general. They are thus likely to be also mean that the French-Canadian salary much freer of omitted variable biases than shortfall there is due to omitted variables. estimates of discrimination using standard Finally, top-rated female professional data bases such as the Current Population tennis players at some of the major Survey. For that reason alone, the studies tournaments are faced with a slight pay surveyed here would be of interest to shortfall that seems to reflect discrimina- labor economists. In addition, the evi- tory treatment. Because of the uniqueness dence reviewed here yields some substan- of these tournaments, one might not tive lessons for those interested in issues of expect market forces alone to eliminate race or gender differentials in labor- this shortfall. market outcomes. Most economic analyses predict an end First, the consistent evidence of cus- to discriminatory pay differentials that are tomer preferences for white basketball based on employer or co-worker preju- players has been obtained in the most dice, as long as there are some non- recent studies of the issue. These racial prejudiced employers either in the market attitudes among white consumers in the or free to enter the market. Such differen- 1980s, as reflected in these studies, may tials can persist, however, if all employers well carry over into other parts of the are prejudiced, or if some have a positive labor force in which there is contact preference for whites (Goldberg 1982), or between producers and customers, such as if there is customer discrimination. law, medicine, and a variety of other The strongest evidence for the existence services. Given the rapid growth of the of salary discrimination in team sports in service sector, there may be ample scope recent years is that for hockey and basketball. There is also evidence of customer prejudice in those two sports. In the absence of information on the degree 38 Again taking the example of Wimbledon, the of positive preference for white players tournament committee's need to attract a sufficient (or, in the case of hockey, French- or number of female players might constrain the degree to which it underpays women. Judging by the English-Canadian players) among team competition to get into the tournament, however, it owners, customer discrimination seems to seems unlikely that Wimbledon has driven away its be the most likely cause of the salary female "applicants."

This content downloaded from 69.43.75.70 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 06:55:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 416 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW for such attitudes to adversely affect black and nonwhite fans to the race of the workers in the future.39 players providing entertainment. Second, Second, the continued, albeit slowly as yet, little discrimination research has declining, positional segregation in base- focused on football, due in part to the lack ball and football suggests the persistence of good performance measures. Such of negative stereotypes of blacks or un- measures should be constructed, and equal access to training facilities. If the analyses similar to those done for other latter phenomenon is the explanation, it sports should be attempted. As a setting in reminds us that pre-labor market discrim- which free agency is effectively restricted, ination can still be a powerful force football presents an interesting contrast to creating racial income differentials, even if baseball and basketball (Staudohar 1989; there is no evidence of employer discrimi- Flanagan 1989). Player mobility under nation. such a system is due to trades, and it Third, the presence of retention barri- would be interesting to know if, as ers facing black athletes in baseball and predicted by economic theory, such mobil- basketball is reminiscent of the major ity is sufficient to eliminate discrimination. cause of high unemployment rates for Third, co-worker discrimination in nonwhite men in the United States: a high sports is a little-explored subject that probability of leaving employment (volun- deserves further study. Fourth, although tarily and involuntarily) to become unem- there are some gender differences in prize ployed.40 Thus, several of the findings money in professional tennis, a systematic reported in this review are consistent with study of discrimination in tennis is research on the labor force as a whole. needed. Such a study could yield interest- I conclude with some suggestions for ing international comparisons, since the further research on discrimination in same players' pay and performance would sports. First, customer discrimination can be evaluated in different countries. Fifth, be investigated in more detail using the low representation of blacks among methods that survey the racial composi- managers and coaches has not yet been tion of fans. With such information, one subjected to close scrutiny. could examine the responses of white fans Finally, the relationship between collective bargaining and discrimination in

39 For some evidence that customer discrimination sports has not yet been explored. Collec- has noticeable effects on the economy, see Borjas and tive bargaining is undoubtedly responsible Bronars (1989). for the advent of free agency. On the 40 See Ehrenberg (1980). There is evidence that other hand, we have no evidence on the among young workers, blacks' quit rates are no impact, if any, of collective bargaining different from whites'; blacks' permanent layoff rates, however, are substantially higher than whites'. institutions such as salary arbitration or See Blau and Kahn (1981 a, 1981 b). salary caps on racial salary differentials.

REFERENCES

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