Africa Report 2019: Cross- in Working Hand in Hand with the Most Asilo Y La Seguridad Y Defensa En Una Europa Posbrexit

ISBN 978-84-947465-7-4

Fundación Alternativas ISBN 978-84-947465-7-4 Fundación Alternativas La Fundación Alternativas, fundada en 1997 con voluntad de Fundaciónconfigurarse Alternativas como cauce de incidencia y reflexión política, social Fundación Alternativas (in English, Alter- www.fundacionalternativas.org y cultural en España y su entorno europeo, es hoy un lugar indis- natives Foundation) was created in 1997 La Fundación Alternativas, fundada en 1997 con voluntad de cutible de encuentro y elaboración de ideas y propuestas. to serve as a channel for political, social configurarse como cauce de incidencia y reflexión política, social El presente informe opera con una perspectiva diferente a las anteriores, es la and cultural research and advocacy in www.fundacionalternativas.org Since the beginning of the 21st century, Africa has attracted growing interest from nu- y culturalLa enFundación España yconsta su entorno de varias europeo, áreas es de hoy trabajo: un lugar el indisLaboratorio- perspectiva desde los Estados. No es una opción casual. Asistimos a lo que podríamos Spain and Europe. Since its foundation, merous international actors, not only the BRICS but some Middle Eastern states as well, cutible dede Alternativas,encuentro y elaboración el Observatorio de ideas de yCultura propuestas. y Comunicación, llamar “resurgimiento de los poderes nacionales”, expresado en fenómenos como el we define ours as a progressive think El presente informe opera con una perspectiva diferente a las anteriores,including es la the Gulf countries and Turkey. The economic growth experienced by several Estudios de Progreso y el Observatorio de Política Exterior, que tank advocating an advanced democracy nacionalismo populista, el autoritarismo o el proteccionismo. La Fundación consta de varias áreas de trabajo: el Laboratorio perspectiva desde los Estados. No es una opción casual. Asistimos a lo que podríamos Africa centraR su eportanálisis en la política exterior y su seguimiento a nivel based on the values of freedom, equality states within the continent, as well as the growing presence of new counterparts, gener- de Alternativas, el Observatorio de Cultura y Comunicación, europeo e internacional. and solidarity, defending the general in- llamar “resurgimiento de los poderes nacionales”, expresado en fenómenosates como both el awareness and concern among the formerEL colonial ESTADO metropoles, other Western Estudios de Progreso y el Observatorio de Política Exterior, que Este conjunto de hechos alienta la enfermedad que más puede dañar a la Unión: la terest and leading the world in a progres- nacionalismo populista, el autoritarismo o el proteccionismo. centra Elsu objetivoanálisis centralen la política de los exteriorimpulsores y su de seguimiento este proyecto, a nivel en el que división entre los Estados miembros, la vuelta a la Europa de Westfalia.States and international financial institutions. Armed conflict in some areas, migration, sive direction. From the onset, we have europeoparticipan e internacional. los autores más dinámicos y avanzados de nuestra EL ESTADO Cross-border dynamics become a vital forum for the exchange Este conjunto de hechos alienta la enfermedad que más puede dañar a la andUnión: population la growth have also generated increasingDE attention LA towards Africa.UNIÓN Spain is EUROPEA sociedad, ha sido y sigue siendo el análisis y la definición de Es verdad que existe el otro lado de la moneda, que es innegable el deseo de los El objetivo central de los impulsores de este proyecto, en el que of ideas and policy development that of- división entre los Estados miembros, la vuelta a la Europa de Westfalia. no stranger to this trend, as reflected by the Spanish Government’s approval of the III Af- nuevas ideas en el marco de la mundialización creciente que vi- ciudadanos y ciudadanas europeas de permanecer en la Unión y su satisfacción por participan los autores más dinámicos y avanzados de nuestra fers insights for decision-makers in every rica Plan in March 2019. After seven years without a programmatic document in regard to in a globalisedvimos. Unascontext ideas que pretenden abarcar las políticas públicas www.fes.de formar parte del proyecto europeo (más del 70 % como media de la población). Pero DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA sociedad, ha sido y sigue siendo el análisis y la definición de sphere of society, from government lead- Es verdad que existe el otro lado de la moneda, que es innegable el deseo de los desde un enfoque nacional, así como europeo y global, y ser la UE necesita reformas para afrontar los retos de la globalización. the continent, Spain manifests a willingness to consolidateLos andEstados deepen its relations with europeos ante las nuevas ideas en el marco de la mundialización creciente que vi- ers and political parties to a wide and ex- ciudadanos y ciudadanas europeas de permanecer en la Unión y su satisfacción por incorporadas en la toma de decisiones de los gobiernos, partidos Africa. If Spain’s goal is to strengthen these links, it needs all-embracing knowledge and vimos. Unas ideas que pretenden abarcar las políticas públicas tensive network of other economic and www.fes.de formar parte del proyecto europeo (más del 70 % como media de la población). Pero políticos y otros actores económicos y sociales. social stakeholders. We pride ourselves ¿Qué reformas? Básicamente cuatro aspectos: el euro, la Europa social, la política de desde un enfoque nacional, así como europeo y global, y ser la UE necesita reformas para afrontar los retos de la globalización. a better understanding of what happens in the continent. This Africa Report 2019: Cross- in working hand in hand with the most asilo y la seguridad y defensa en una Europa posbrexit. Losreformas Estados de europeos la Unión ante las incorporadasEn definitiva, en la toma el conjuntode decisiones de profesionales de los gobiernos, y académicos partidos que in- border dynamics in a globalised context aims at contributing to this endeavour. innovative and forward-looking thinkers políticostegran y otros la Fundaciónactores económicos Alternativas y sociales.pretende contribuir al verdadero ¿Qué reformas? Básicamente cuatro aspectos: el euro, la Europa social, la política de in Spanish society. Para llegar en las mejores condiciones a las elecciones de 2019, los Estados de la desarrollo social, económico, cultural y político de la sociedad Coordinators: reformas de la Unión En definitiva, el conjunto de profesionales y académicos que in- asilo y la seguridad y defensa en una Europa posbrexit. española y europea. The think tank consists of various areas, Unión han de mirar hacia un horizonte de largo alcance y superar esta coyuntura tegran la Fundación Alternativas pretende contribuir al verdadero focusing on public policy, culture and con tantos componentes nacionalistas, proteccionistas e insolidarios. Precisamente la desarrollo social, económico, cultural y político de la sociedad Para llegar en las mejores condiciones a las elecciones de 2019, los EstadosElsa de Aimé la González and Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal communication, sustainability and for- alternativa a ello es el proyecto europeo. Unión han de mirar hacia un horizonte de largo alcance y superar esta coyuntura española y europea. eign policy. The Observatory on Foreign Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung • El estado de la Unión Europea 2011. con tantos componentes nacionalistas, proteccionistas e insolidarios. Precisamente la Policy (OPEX) has coordinated this report, in line with its long-standing commitment El año de la gran prueba alternativa a ello es el proyecto europeo. La Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) es una institución cultural privada

ross-border dynamics in a globalised context C ross-border towards the analysis and interpretation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftungsin fines de lucro. La Fundación fue creada en 1925 como lega- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2011. of international politics through its char- • El estado de la Unión Europea 2013. do político del socialdemócrata Friedrich Ebert, primer presidente La Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) es una institución cultural privada acteristic bifocal lenses, combining its El año de la gran prueba alemán elegido democráticamente. El fracaso de la austeridad sin fines de lucro. La Fundación fue creada en 1925 como lega- European spirit and its distinct Spanish • El estado de la Unión Europea 2013. do políticoLa FES del está socialdemócrata comprometida Friedrich con los principiosEbert, primer y valores presidente básicos de perspective. • El estado de la Unión Europea 2014. El fracaso de la austeridad alemánla elegido democracia democráticamente. social y su misión se puede resumir en cuatro La ciudadanía en tiempo de crisis conceptos fundamentales: cultura democrática, innovación y par- La FES está comprometida con los principios y valores básicos de

• El estado de la Unión Europea 2014. DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 2018 EL ESTADO ticipación, cohesión social y globalización solidaria. • El estado de la Unión Europea 2015. la democracia social y su misión se puede resumir en cuatro La ciudadanía en tiempo de crisis Nueva legislatura: 11 desafíos de Europa conceptosEstos fundamentales: principios y valores cultura orientan democrática, el trabajo innovación de la FES, y par tanto- en Alemania y en Europa occidental y oriental, como en el mundo

EL ESTADO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 2018 EL ESTADO ticipación, cohesión social y globalización solidaria. • El estado de la Unión Europea 2015. entero. Actualmente, la Fundación tiene más de 100 oficinas, • El estado de la Unión Europea 2016. Estos principios y valores orientan el trabajo de la FES, tanto en Nueva legislatura: 11 desafíos de Europa repartidas en África, América, Asia y Europa. La encrucijada política de Europa Afric a R eport 2019 Alemania y en Europa occidental y oriental, como en el mundo • El estado de la Unión Europea 2016. entero.La Actualmente, Fundación establecióla Fundación su delegacióntiene más de en 100 España oficinas, en 1975. • El estado de la Unión Europea 2017. La encrucijada política de Europa repartidasDurante en África, varias América,décadas, Asia su labor y Europa. en el país estaba dirigida prin- Relanzar Europa cipalmente a la consolidación de la democracia y del Estado de La Fundación estableció su delegación en España en 1975. Derecho. Hoy en día, el trabajo se centra en la promoción del • El estado de la Unión Europea 2017. Durante varias décadas, su labor en el país estaba dirigida prin- diálogo sobre política económica y social, y sobre política exte- Relanzar Europa cipalmente a la consolidación de la democracia y del Estado de rior y de seguridad, con énfasis en el contexto europeo e interna- Derecho. Hoy en día, el trabajo se centra en la promoción del cional. 2018 diálogo sobre política económica y social, y sobre política exterior y de seguridad, con énfasis en el contexto europeo e interna- 2018 cional.

2019 Cover photography: “Cairo, Egypt”, by Nina R. CC BY 2.0. License

cubierta_inf_africa_ingl.indd 1 23/5/19 16:33 inf_africa_ingles.indb 1 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 2 3/6/19 18:44 AFRICA REPORT 2019 Cross-border dynamics in a globalised context

Coordinators: Elsa Aimé González Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal

Assistant coordinators: Tram-Anh Nguyen Mateo Peyrouzet García-Siñeriz

FUNDACIÓN ALTERNATIVAS

inf_africa_ingles.indb 3 3/6/19 18:44 All rights reserved. According to the law, you may not copy, modify, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication. Any other uses require the prior written permission of Fundación Alternativas.

ISBN: 978-84-120248-1-4

Depósito legal: M-18613-2019 IBIC: JPHV

Translation by Jenni Lukac, Richard Preston and Andrew Healy Assistant editor: Daniel Jiménez López

Designed and printed by Lúa Ediciones 3.0, S. L. www.luaediciones.com

PUBLISHER: Fundación Alternativas Calle Zurbano 29, 3.º izq. 28010 Madrid. España. Tel: 34 913 199 860 | Fax: 34 913 192 298 | www.fundacionalternativas.org

inf_africa_ingles.indb 4 3/6/19 18:44 Table of contents

Introduction 7 Diego López Garrido

1. New social movements for a new democracy 11 Carlos Bajo Erro

2. Political and social transformations and processes in North Africa since 2011 23 Laurence Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi

3. African Continental Free Trade Area: a tool for economic transformation? 33 Artur Colom Jaén

4. Africa on the agenda of the new emerging partners: complementarity or alternative? 45 Mbuyi Kabunda Badi

5. Armed conflict and peacebuilding: current trends in Africa 55 Iván Navarro Milián

6. Western Sahel: A region marked by insecurity 65 David Nievas Bullejos

7. Exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals in Sub-Saharan Africa: the new struggle for resources and the paradox of plenty 75 Jesús García-Luengos

8. Africa and EU migratory policy: the current situation and challenges 85 Gema Serón Aires and Lorenzo Gabrielli

9. The European Union in Africa: development and security in the context of an unequal partnership 99 Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

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10. The European Neighbourhood Policy in the Maghreb: a global view through the cases of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco 111 Bosco Govantes

11. Is Morocco disengaging from the European Union? 123 Irene Fernández-Molina

12. Conclusions and recommendations. Strengthen horizontal relations between Spain and Africa 137 Elsa Aimé González, Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal

Biographies 143

Acronyms 147

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Fundacion Alternativas (in English, Alternatives Foundation) prepares and publishes six annual reports on the following topics: democracy, inequality (biennial), science and technology, sustainability, culture, and the Euro- pean Union. From 2019, there will be another, which I now have the plea- sure to present: the Africa Report, edited by Elsa Aime Gonzalez and Itxaso Dominguez de Olazabal. There are many reasons for including this new report on a continent that contains over a quarter of the UN›s member states, and whose population, according to the World Economic Forum, will increase from 1.1 billion today to 4.4 billion in 2100, mainly in urban areas. Africa is becoming an integral part of the global geopolitical landscape in the 21st century, and not only for demographic reasons, but also for its natural resources (Garcia-Luengos), its susceptibility to climate change, its migratory movements towards Europe (Seron and Gabrielli) and other continents, its social and armed conflicts (Navarro Milián), and its productive capacity (GDP has grown by 40 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa since the start of this century). There is clearly a deep connection between the economic, political and social phenomena of the African continent and those of other regions in the globalised world. It is not surprising that – as the Economist recently observed (9 March 2019) – governments and companies all around the world are focusing their attention on Africa, strengthening diplomatic, defensive, and commercial ties of strategic importance: between 2010 and 2016, more than 320 embassies and consulates opened in Africa (Turkey alone has opened 26), something never seen before in any other part of the world; the fight against jihadist terrorism, particularly in the Sahel, has led to an increased presence of US and European (France and Spain) military forces in the Sahel and other African regions such as the Horn of Africa (Japanese and US barracks, and the EU-led Operation Atalanta, advocated by Spain and other member states); and commercial activity is on the rise, with China, India and the US leading the way, gaining ground on Europe›s former dominance. Africa is being increasingly courted by the so-called emerging countries, especially the BRICS group (Kabunda); among them, China stands out, with Africa forming part of its ambitious economic project, the New Silk Road. Their

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strategy involves loans for infrastructure projects with the corresponding contracts for Chinese suppliers. Naturally, African states have different approaches and priorities when it comes to political alliances, choosing those that are most beneficial to their specific interests. These form part of the power struggles playing out in the area adjacent to the Middle East. Western countries, along with others, continue to make their presence felt through direct investments. This is the case of the US, the UK, France and Germany. Of course, the European Union is not only the leader in terms of trade; it is also the biggest contributor when it comes to development cooperation, the aim being to rid itself of its neocolonial tendencies and establish more balanced relationships, which should be the basis for the future EU-Africa agreement that is set to replace the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 (Iniguez de Heredia). There is still, however, much to be done with regard to the extraordinary and robust African cultures, which should receive more attention from European countries, the closest geographically speaking. This report examines the African continent not only from the standpoint of its relations with the outside world or of Western security concerns, but also in terms of its internal reality, which we consider to be of the utmost importance. To begin with, Africa is clearly not a homogeneous whole that can be studied easily. North Africa is distinctive and diverse (Thieux and Hernando de Larramendi), with marked differences from the rest of Africa and between each of the countries in the region: Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria (currently experiencing serious turmoil), Libya, and Morocco, analysed in relation to its connection (or disconnection) from the European Union (Fernandez- Molina), which has an intimate interest in the Alaouite Kingdom’s renewed Africa policy. The western Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), as I previously mentioned, is grappling with the serious problem of insecurity, a consequence of institutional insufficiencies, to which we devote a chapter (Nievas Bullejos). As for Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no doubt that it is undergoing an unprecedented process of transformation, and not only in terms of accelerating population growth, surging migration, or political power. Sub-Saharan Africa symbolises what has come to be called the paradox of abundance (Garcia- Luengos), in that natural resources, hydrocarbons and minerals bring out the best and the worst when it comes to economic relations and exploitation. Africa is as diverse as it is vast. But Africa can and must find a unified vision to engender socioeconomic and political progress. An encouraging step in this direction is the African Continental Free Trade Area, an attempt to open up the internal market, which has already been signed by most members of the African Union (Colom Jaen). In any case, whatever the future may hold for the African continent, it must not give up on democratic development or the fight against corruption, which is key to all social and economic development, and to the nonviolent

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resolution of the conflicts that plaque the continent. Its citizens have the most to gain in this respect, and those who live in Africa are aware of this and do not remain passive. There are social movements of unquestionable strength (examined in this report by Bajo Erro), which are the unavoida- ble basis for the pursuit of social justice, dignity, and democracy, and first among them was the inspiring/frustrating Arab Spring.

Diego Lopez Garrido Executive Vice President Fundacion Alternativas

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Carlos Bajo Erro

Introduction Society wakes up: the emergence of new social movements They refer themselves as ‘the International Broth- erhood of Troublemakers’ and they constitute The power outages that raised the consciousness the newest and most game-changing element of people in Senegal of the social movement landscape in Africa. The activist movements that have emerged across the Y’en a Marre (a slang expression in French mean- continent in less than a decade have a number ing ‘Enough is Enough’) took on a special sig- of things in common. Among the most notable nificance for the residents of Dakar in June 2011 are their departure from the dynamics that have when a group by that name spearheaded protests traditionally characterised civil society endeav- against a reform of the Senegalese constitution ours, the role that digital technology plays in their perceived to be a bid on the part of then presi- work, the unprecedented international media at- dent Abdoulaye Wade to prolong his grip on pow- tention they have received, their ability to sway er. Labour unions mobilised and human rights foreign public opinion and the decisive roles they groups and several opposition parties and civil have already played in historic events. society organisations cobbled together a more Although its rapid emergence is impressive, or less common front, but it was young people there is another aspect of this phenomenon also who made barricades and occupied streets and worth noting: the traction it has provided for squares in Dakar and other Senegalese cities the coalescence of a pan-African civil society. A chanting ‘Wade, dégage’ (Get out, Wade!) that continent-wide network has grown out of the made the biggest impression. The driving force connections established between likeminded behind these actions was a group of rappers with movements and the efforts these groups have a history of social activism that urban young peo- made to build relationships and generate a spirit ple in Senegal looked up to and admired. of collaboration, mutual support and solidarity. The Y’en a Marre movement grew out of an This is a framework with a natural propensity for encounter between several musicians – two of expansion that consolidates the individual integ- whom were Thiat and Kilifeu, founders of a rap rity of, and relationships between, social agents crew called Keur Gui whose song lyrics had previ- in different places that share at least one com- ously been subject to government censorship – mon objective, which is strengthening democ- and journalists such as Alioune Sané and Cheikh ratisation processes by putting citizens at the Fadel Barro, both of whom were held in high centre and promoting civic responsibility through respect for their investigations of government citizen consciousness-raising activities. corruption (Kupper, 2017). A power outage ironi-

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cally provided the spark for the movement. Y’en a The group still occasionally takes to the streets Marre was originally (and somewhat superficially) and mounts protests notable for their originality perceived as nothing more than a group of rap- and creativity. It has denounced the lack of op- pers fed up with the power cuts that had become portunities and worsening living conditions of a daily fact of life in the city of Dakar.1 the working poor and organised ‘problem fairs’ In reality, power outages were tangible proof to call attention to hardships suffered by average of a far deeper problem that the newly formed citizens. Y’en a Marre continue to denounce the collective sought to denounce, which was the fact that authorities still restrict human rights and poor management of public services in Senegal carry out activities that empower citizens to bring and the disconnection between the country’s po- about positive change at the local level. litical elite and its citizens. Their protests, which later addressed major issues such as government corruption and the need for greater transparency The long shadow of Sankara in Burkina Faso and accountability, called for more citizen input in governance and the end of special privileges The press photos of Burkina Faso’s National As- and social inequities (Touré, 2017). sembly going up in flames that drew international ‘Get out, Wade’ and ‘Ne touche pas à ma Con- attention to protests in that country have become stitution’ (Don’t touch my constitution) were two iconic images of the civil unrest that shook the of the earliest slogans associated with the move- country in 2014.3 This event was nevertheless ment, which remained on alert in light of Abdou- but one signal of a deeper indignation that been laye Wade’s intentions to seek a third presidential steadily percolating to the surface in ‘the land term.2 Tension flared higher when the incumbent of upright men’ for years and would eventually entered the race as a candidate and Y’en a Marre lead to the recuperation of democracy by uncon- provided leadership for civil resistance during the ventional means after three decades of political weeks leading up to the February 2012 election, turmoil. which were marked by constant confrontations In 2014, Burkina Faso’s incumbent president between citizens and police (Dimé, 2017). Wade Blaise Compaoré attempted to tinker with term was finally defeated at the polls in an electoral limits enshrined in Article 37 of the country’s con- process that for the most part was up to demo- stitution that prevented him from running for re- cratic standards. election. With this machination, the president, Although unrest has abated during the man- who had clung to power for 27 years by means date of Wade’s successor Macky Sall, Y’en a Marre of a series of questionable interpretations of remains as active as ever. Its current activities fo- Burkinabe law, sought to eliminate the only le- cus on its central mission, which is promoting a gal impediment to his continued rule. Although new civic consciousness that perceives citizens as timed to ensure that the opposition would have the nucleus and measure of democratic action. insufficient time to react, his announcement of the measure, made less than a month before electionday, provoked an unprecedented mobili- 1 ‘Le mouvement Y’en a marre, révolution née d’une sation of civil society forces in defence of consti- coupure d’électricité’, Le Monde, 12 December 2011. tutional principles. https://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2011/12/12/ le-mouvement-y-en-a-marre-revolution-nee-d-une- coupure-d-electricite_1617480_3246.html 3 ‘Burkina Faso: scènes d’émeutes dans les rues de Oua- 2 ‘A Dakar, les opposants et les partisans de Wade dans la gadougou’, Le Monde - Afrique, 30 October 2014. https:// rue’, RFI, 23 July 2011. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110723- www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2014/10/30/burkina- dakar-opposant-partisans-wade-sont-rue-senegal- faso-scenes-d-emeutes-dans-les-rues-de-ouagadougou constitution _4515317_3212.html

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Compaoré’s control over civil society in Burki- jacent to the National Assembly. Things took an na Faso had been steadily deteriorating for sev- unexpected turn early the next morning when eral years. He had already fended off an extended demonstrators who had flocked to the legislative student strike and faced down unrest within the building overpowered an armed forces security country’s armed and security forces in 2011. In detachment guarding the entrance that refused 2013, he began to plot a path to re-election, which to fire into the crowd. would require, as it had in the past, circumven- The National Assembly went up in flames dur- tion by one means or another of constitutionally ing the assault that followed. Protestors took over established limits to presidential mandates. His the streets of Ouagadougou, storming institu- political manoeuvring this time around revealed tions perceived as symbols of Compaoré‘s power, not only the existence of an indignant civil soci- the offices of the state television station, ruling ety, but also the emergence of a new civil move- party headquarters and the homes of certain poli- ment made of sterner stuff called Balai Citoyen ticians before massing strategically at the gates (Citizen’s Broom) (Hagberg et al., 2015) founded of the presidential palace. Compaoré announced to ‘clean up the political system in Burkina Faso measures he hoped would difuse the situation without dirtying our hands’ – in other words, to but demonstrators controlling the streets refused restore democratic process without resorting to to disband. The next day, October 31, 2014, the the underhanded tactics employed by those re- president announced his resignation via Twitter, sponsible for subverting the country’s political posting the message as he fled to Côte d’Ivoire.5 system and institutions (Touré, 2017). The transition process undertaken on the heels Protests against the creation of a senate de- of his departure would be severely tested eleven signed to consolidate and extend Compaoré’s rule months later on September 16, 2015 – a month confirmed Balai Citoyen’s ability to mobilise the before new elections were expected to take place public and provided an opportunity for the group – when several of Compaoré’s former security to convey a message that various segments of guards burst into a meeting of interim govern- Burkinabe society were receptive to. The two most ment officials and took them hostage. News of the recognisable members of the movement at this coup attempt, which spread rapidly via Facebook, point were Serge Bambara and Karim Sama two prompted immediate public reaction. The people musicians known respectively by fans as Smockey of Burkina Faso took to the streets once again to and Sams’K Le Jah who had a history of openly defend the democracy they had fought so hard to opposing Compaoré’s rule (Wirtz, 2017). In 2012 achieve lbarely a year before. the two began to organise ‘educational concerts’,4 Balai Citoyen mobilised its sympathisers and events combining music and efforts to raise public called upon citizens to bring things to a halt in Ua- awareness of the importance of civic engagement. gadugú and other cities, pursuing what they have The announcement of Compaoré’s intention since referred to as an ‘army ant’ strategy (Wirtz, to amend the constitution provoked a new round 2017). The human swarms that filled the streets of protests in October 2014 that intensified dur- of the country in response to this appeal lent new ing the days leading up to the October 30 vote credence to the movement’s motto ‘Our numbers on the matter. The president’s team appeared to are our strength’. The people were called upon to have everything under tight control on the 29th. prove once more the potent force of active citi- As an extra precaution, legislators were ordered zenship they had demonstrated in 2014. The im- to spend that night in a luxury hotel directly ad- mediacy of citizen response had a determinating

4 ‘Las mil hormigas que hicieron huir al elefante’, El Salto, 5 ‘Burkina Faso, la ‘revolución’ fue tuiteada’, El País - Pla- 21 April 2018. www.elsaltodiario.com/africa/burkina-faso- neta Futuro, 3 November 2014. https://elpais.com/elpais/ movimiento-balai-citoyen-mil-hormigas-huir-elefante 2014/11/03/planeta_futuro/1415017456_165475.html

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impact on the roles that a range of social agents non-violent action reflects its members’ collec- would play during the ensuing week. The ada- tive rejection of the armed conflict that marked mant stance taken by a large sector of civil society their childhoods and desire to transform Congo- from the beginning of the crisis, in effect, swayed lese society and political structures and dynam- the political opposition, the armed services and ics in the DRC in a meaningful and enduring way.7 even regional organisations to act and prevented The organisation, which focuses heavily on the coup from succeeding (Banégas, 2015). The consciousness-raising and promoting the devel- members of the armed forces behind the attempt opment of a deeper notion of the rights and re- were forced to abandon their objectives and were sponsibilities that citizenship entails, has based subsequently arrested. its identity on community work projects referred Just as it had done in the wake of actions lead- to in the Congo as salongo, which in the case of ing up to Compaoré’s exile, Balai Citoyen organ- LUCHA have been centred on day-long commu- ised a public effort to clean city streets following nal efforts to tidy up the streets of Goma. LUCHA the demonstrations that derailed the attempted denounces problems such as inaction on the part coup. This communal effort constituted yet an- of Congolese authorities and the poor manage- other demonstration of the movement’s civic ment of public resources endemic in a country commitment and its role as a constructive force. seriously debilitated by years of systematic cor- On the heels of two symbolic victories, it became ruption. It also encourages Congolese citizens a point of reference for young people across Afri- to stop complaining, assume more civic respon- ca (Bonnecase, 2015). Balai Citoyen enjoys a high sibility and actively contribute to the construc- level of prestige at home and abroad and a repu- tion of a better society. The group has engaged tation for being the torchbearer of concepts once in community work and direct forms of protest promoted by Thomas Sakara such as economic such as public sit-ins (Bangre, 2016) against the autonomy and social development. positions of various organisations including the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), which it has accused of hav- From salongo to elections in the Democratic Republic ing a passive attitude toward the continued proof the Congo liferation of armed groups and violations of basic human rights in the Congo. Goma is the capital of Kivu Norte, an eastern LUCHA limited its sphere of action to Goma province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for several years but took a change of tack that (DRC). It is also the home base of Lutte Pour Le became apparent on March 15, 2015 when it ap- Changement (‘struggle for change’ in French), an peared at a workshop on citizen activism held organisation founded there in 2012. LUCHA, as it in Kinshasa alongside a new organisation called is commonly referred to, started out as a small Filimbi. The event concluded with a press con- nucleus of intellectually restless, socially com- ference devoted to the launch of Filimbi (whose mitted young people whose long discussions of name means ‘whistle’ in Swahili) at which its society’s problems led to their engagement in leaders stood flanked by members of LUCHA and non-violent public activism.6 The first issue the representatives of Y’en a Marre and Balai Citoyen, group addressed was the rights of the unem- who had come from Senegal and Burkina Faso ployed. The movement’s strong commitment to expressly to participate in what was intended to

6 ‘LUCHA: jóvenes indignados se levantan en la RD del 7 ‘La apuesta más revolucionaria en la RD Congo: la Congo’, Periódico Diagonal, 1 November 2014. https:// no violencia’, El País - Planeta Futuro, 10 October 2016. www.diagonalperiodico.net/global/24451-lucha-grupo- https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/11/10/planeta_futuro/ jovenes-indignados-se-levanta-la-rd-del-congo.html 1478792164_983805.html

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be a public demonstration of continental unity horizon, Kabila, who was prohibited by the Con- and their common assessment of, and approach golese constitution from seeking another term, to solving, the continent’s problems. attempted to defuse the climate of tension by Congolese security police stormed the press making a series of carefully calculated gestures conference and arrested a rather mixed group of reconciliation. of forty people that included the visiting foreign LUCHA and Filimbi refused to rise to the bait, activists and the head of US Aid’s democracy and demanding an unequivocal promise that Kabila governance programme in the Congo (Martinot, would stand down and allow and free and trans- 2017). The activists from Senegal and Burkina parent elections to take place. They backed their Faso were accused of being terrorists attempt- stance on this issue with a series of public mo- ing to destabilise the DRC but released and de- bilisations and campaigns such as #ByeByeKabi- ported to their respective countries following an la.8 Launched in November 2016 to pressure for intensive international campaign in their sup- elections the entrenched president had continu- port. However, Fred Bauma, one of the founders ally promised but inevitably postponed under a and most popular members of LUCHA, and Yves variety of pretexts, the Bye-Bye Kabila campaign Makwambala, a young person associated with used a combination of physical interventions in Filimbi, were detained without charges for an major cities throughout the country and social additional eighteen months. Their tardy release media messages to convince Congolese citizens was one of a series of conciliatory gestures made and key international organisations of the need by Joseph Kabila during the final months of his for political change. presidential mandate. LUCHA also turned down Kabila’s invitation LUCHA and Filimbi changed their strategies in to participate in negotiations involving a range reaction to the mounting government repression of social actors, considering the proposal a delay- that followed the imprisonment of Bauma and ing tactic. Dissent began take on larger dimen- Makwambala. The leaders of Filimbi were forced sions. LUCHA and Filimbi continued to participate into exile, a circumstance that had an impact on in protests with other groups that enjoy a high the way in which that group would evolve. LUCHA level of prestige in the DR Congo such as Catholic underwent a more profound transformation. Its social organisations. The tension forced Kabila protests in the wake of the government crack- to announce that he would not present himself down in Kinshasa took on an increasingly politi- as a candidate in the next elections, which he cal edge and the group expanded beyond Goma, scheduled for December 30, 2018. Filimbi and forming cells in larger cities throughout the coun- LUCHA continued to demand conditions that try. Although they continued to maintain their re- would guarantee a clean, transparent and cred- spective identities, Filimbi and LUCHA began to ible electoral process and, with certain misgiv- carry out joint actions on a regular basis. LUCHA ings and renewed demands of transparency, activists reacted to the growing atmosphere of accepted Félix Tshisekedi, one of the opposition repression by upping the ante and expanding the candidates who entered the race, as the country’s scope of their protests. new president. Following these elections, both Disconcerted to a certain degree, Kabila ap- movements conducted internal analyses of the peared to make concessions to movements he actions they had carried out and the new political was unable to subdue with violent tactics. With landscape in the DRC. each new detention, LUCHA militants demonstrated a coherence of action that generated 8 ‘#ByeByeKabila: ultimátum en la República Democráti- admiration within the country and abroad. With ca del Congo’, El País - Planeta Futuro, 9 January 2017. elections scheduled for December 2016 and the https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/01/04/planeta_futuro/ end of his presidential mandate looming on the 1483542722_875375.html

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You will know them by their works Manuel Castells describes as a new type of social movement: networked movements that op- These grassroots movements that have sprung erates on the basis of membership, action and up across Africa have a number of characteristics organisational frameworks distinct from those in common. All operate on the basis of more or embraced by their more conventional coun- less similar political prognoses informed in vary- terparts. A key aspect of these new collectives ing extents by two major realities: a deep public that sets them apart from their predecessors is disaffection with institutional politics caused by their ability to mobilise street occupations and the erosion of the prestige and credibility of a po- dominate digital spaces of public discourse until litical class divorced from the needs and realities they manage to viralise their ideas and demands of average citizens and adverse social conditions (Castells, 2012). Y’en a Marre, Balai Citoyen, LU- that limit the prospects of citizens in general and CHA and Filimbi all share certain fundamental young people in particular such as high unem- characteristics (Touré, 2017). ployment rates, poor prospects for the future and In the context of what some scholars refer to ongoing hikes in the prices of everything from ba- as the third wave of democratisation in Africa, the sic necessities to university tuitions. new citizen movements of Africa are the torch- There is a clear and understandable link between bearers of earlier groups that helped bring about the overlapping negative circumstances many peo- decolonisation in the 1940s and tumbled numer- ple in Africa grapple with on a daily basis and their ous entrenched one-party regimes in the 1950s dissatisfaction and indignation with the status quo (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). that explains their demands for socioeconomic re- Although the tactics being employed in Africa form and democratic renewal. Issues such as cor- today vary from group to group, many are none- ruption, a lack of accountability, the entrenchment theless comparable. Y’en a Marre’s urban guerrilla of political leaders and parties in positions of power poetry and itinerant concerts in Senegal and Ba- and the paucity of roles for citizens in the sphere of lai Citoyen’s educational concerts in Burkina Faso governance are major drivers of protest movements are both examples of cultural activism. Cultural in this part of the world (Touré, 2017). initiatives can be used in tandem with street ac- The spirit behind the kind of protest move- tions and non-violent protests, the last of which ments emerging in Africa is in many ways akin has been an option frequently pursued by LUCHA to that of others that have surfaced periodically and Filimbi. In the same vein, the salongos (com- elsewhere in the world since 2010. The dynam- munity work sessions) organised by LUCHA in the ics that sparked them were similar in many re- Congo and the street cleaning initiatives led by spects to those that gave rise to the Arab Spring Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso have both served to uprisings, occupy movements from Wall Street strengthen group cohesion and demonstrate each to London, the indignados protests in Spain, movement’s commitment to the common good. the occupation of Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul, All of these methods are closely aligned to the umbrella movement in Hong Kong and the group objectives. The nature of these move- Yo Soy 132 student movement in Mexico. All of ments’ activities, which differs significantly from these phenomena and the possible connections that of the activities conventional political parties between the issues they have addressed have engage in, reflects their explicit rejection of insti- been studied in depth. This cartography of pro- tutional politics. Their coherence in this regard test has produced a map of citizen mobilisation is a characteristic trait that sets them apart from from Brazil to Taiwan that curiously omits civic other movements. The leaders of Balai Citoyen activism taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa. perceive themselves as public watchdogs who The majority of civil protest movements in monitor institutional politics from a critical dis- Sub-Saharan Africa fall into the category of what tance, a posture that has sometimes drawn criti-

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cism from segments of Burkinabe society unable have similar aspirations has created a synergy to understand their strategy of influencing the between movements that runs deeper than out- course of political events from the outside in. ward demonstrations of mutual support. While all of these movements call for action on specific socioeconomic problems and institutional reform leading to greater government The emergence of a Senegal-Burkina Faso-DR Congo transparency and accountability and wider op- triangle portunities for citizen participation in democratic governance, they also share another fundamen- The first example of how inter-group dynamics tal objective, which is raising the consciousness play out was the aforementioned March 2015 of their fellow citizens (Touré, 2017). The similari- workshop in Kinshasa at which Filimbi was pub- ties between their diagnoses of societal problems licly introduced. Present at the press conference underpin the commonality of their positions. held that day were members of Y’en a Marre, a The first group to specifically address the need movement that represented a new way of un- to re-educate society was Y’en a Marre, which has derstanding the role of civil society and how it made a point of calling upon fellow citizens to could be mobilised; representatives of Balai Ci- become a ‘new type of Senegalese” (NTS) with a toyen, the driving force behind protests that had keener sense of civic responsibility. Balai Citoyen toppled the regime of one of the continent’s most has similarly pushed for the emergence of a ‘new entrenched presidents; and members of LUCHA, type of Burkinabe’ who embodies the ideals of which had established a three-year track record Thomas Sankara. Sams’K le Jah advocates fol- of politically neutral non-violent protest. lowing the path marked out by Sankara decades The event constituted a clear signal of two ago, stressing that the new type of citizenry his landmark developments. The first was the inten- group strives to give rise to is exactly what the as- tion of Congolese activists to operate in a concert- sassinated former president ‘had dreamed of – an ed and coordinated way on a national rather than upright, honest, hardworking person who cares a regional scale. The second was the first public about his country, a nation that loves other na- manifestation of an embryonic triangular relations’ (Writz, 2017). Although the same idea has tionship being forged between activists working not been formally articulated by Congolese move- in Senegal, Burkina Faso and the DRC to create a ments, it is nevertheless inherent to the actions new civic consciousness in Africa. The joint ap- they undertake and their ongoing endeavours to pearance conveyed the implicit message that an create a more socially committed society. anti-democratic drift in any given African country was a matter of concern to activists throughout the continent. It was a gesture marking a transi- The evolution of a strong and dynamic phenomenon tion from aesthetic, symbolic postures and decla- rations to a collective implication and willingness One of the most surprising dynamics of the new to assume personal risks for a common cause. social movements in Africa goes beyond their The detention of foreign activists provided a per- unexpected emergence. The bonds and connec- fect illustration of what the dynamics of this new tions that have been forged between them have strategy implied. The only thing the government not only strengthened their potential to have an achieved by attempting to silence criticism was to impact but also fostered the revival of ideas such spotlight the lack of democratic safeguards in the as pan-Africanism and cross-border solidarity be- DRC. Campaigns in support of Y’en a Marre and Ba- tween civil societies in the face of transnational lai Citoyen members detained in the DRC fuelled problems. An awareness of the existence of coun- activism in Senegal and Burkina Faso. The growing terparts elsewhere who face similar threats and prestige of the groups involved prompted civil so-

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ciety organisations in other countries to take action The meeting in Dakar led to the creation of as well. Thanks to the existence of social networks, a pan-African platform called Afrikki Mwinda. half of Africa knew that activists had been detained Further proof of the spirit of solidarity of activ- in the DRC for participating in a press conference. ists involved in the pan-African initiative was the The strategy was effective to the extent that production of two videos in which activists from a Congolese authorities anxious to put an end to wide range of African states took a common pub- the controversy had no option other than to re- lic stand on crises simultaneously underway at lease and deport the foreign activists implicated. the time in Gambia10 and the DRC.11 The cases of Fred Bauma e Yves Makwambala, two Congolese citizens who remained in detention, had furthermore become a common cause. Building a pan-African movement

The ‘contagious’ dimension of the initiative Following the example: new movements in other countries has led Sams’k le Jah to jokingly refer to it as l’Internationale des fouteurs de merde (Wirtz, Another objective of the collaborative strategy 2017, p. 88), a moniker that would be more or less pursued by these groups was to pool the ener- the equivalent of ‘the international brotherhood gies of likeminded local civil society organisa- of troublemakers’ in English. Many African coun- tions. Relations between Y’en a Marre, Balai tries face similar challenges and the concerns Citoyen, Filimbi and LUCHA deepened following of social movements throughout the continent the experience in Kinshasa as members of the run along much the same lines. Some of these four movements crossed paths in the course of groups are eager to share their experience with events taking place in other countries. counterparts working on similar problems in In December 2016, a core group of activists other countries. Solidarity and the willingness of met in Ìle de Gorée, Dakar to develop strategies activist group across the continent to join forces for fostering civic action throughout the conti- is considered essential in light of the fact that the nent. Attendees included members of what had parameters of freedom of expression vary from been identified as ‘sister’ movements in Gambia, one African country to another. Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, The most recent milestone in the expansion Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Sen- and confluence of African activist movements egal. According to Floribert Anzuluni, the coor- and the broader dissemination of their ideals dinator of Filimbi, ‘The meeting in Dakar served and objectives was a new gathering organised in as a springboard for the “pan-Africanization” and Dakar in July 2018: the first edition of the Univer- sharing of the visions and values that drive these sité Populaire de l’Engagement Citoyen (UPEC). A movements. The majority of African countries face successor event to the earlier meeting held in Da- rather similar challenges and their people grapple kar that resulted in the launch of Afrikki Mwinda, with the same problems. The simplest thing was UPEC was conceived to provide an opportunity therefore to get together, share our particular ex- for activists from all over Africa to exchange ideas periences, lend each other strength and develop and learn from each other’s experiences. A UPEC a common vision that went beyond national cir- organiser affiliated with Y’en a Marre reported cumstances because we think African unity will help us cope with challenges more effectively and 10 African social movements to Yaya Jammeh: You must GO! facilitate the development of our countries’.9 (video) www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qhdLuCL4ws&t=94s 11 Message des mouvements citoyens africains à Joseph 9 Statements made by Floribert Anzuluni during a private Kabila: Quitte le pouvoir! (video) www.youtube.com/ conversation maintained on October 20, 2018. watch?v=jBT318j9sVY&t=1s

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that the event drew representatives of fifty-four ing number of people in Africa who do not con- movements based in 20 African states and three sider political passivity to be a viable option and diaspora communities.12 want to play leading roles in the construction of democratic systems that allow for greater citizen participation in political affairs. Cyberactivism networks In addition to those established in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea Conakry and Burkina Another phenomenon that has occurred in tan- Faso, some of the most dynamic communities of dem with the emergence of the aforementioned this type to have emerged in Africa over the last movements in many African countries is the for- eight years are located in West African countries mation of what can be considered ‘pure play’ cy- such as Nigeria and Eastern African countries such beractivist communities – groups of activists that as Kenya and Uganda. Blogger communities have depend almost exclusively on digital tools and worked with NGOs and civil society organisations only occasionally attempt to take their protests to develop a range of digital mechanisms de- to the streets (Castel and Bajo Erro, 2013). signed to boost citizen engagement that include Although these groups may have a lower ca- online campaigns and debate forums, electoral pacity for mobilising masses to take public ac- process monitoring systems, platforms that track tion than their more street-wise counterparts, the fulfilment of promises made during political they see the same clear need to denounce the campaigns and proposals for open government failure of institutional politics in their countries strategies (Dabo, 2018). and improve the living conditions of their fellow Beyond producing these tools, these com- citizens. They have offset their inexperience in munities have served as the nucleus of periodic public mobilisation with a command of digital online campaigns that have facilitated citizen re- technology and culture that has allowed them sponse to a range of more mundane problems to have an unprecedented impact on political af- (Bajo Erro, 2014). Although many of their cam- fairs at the highest level and demonstrate over paigns have called for the provision of better ba- the past eight years that it is possible to bring sic public services such as street cleaning, urban about positive change without organising mas- sanitation and water supply, online activists have sive demonstrations and that in certain instances also addressed consumer rights issues related to well-planned online campaigns can be equally or electric and telephone services and Internet ac- more effective. cess as well. Other campaigns of a more political nature have questioned or pushed for modifica- tions to legislation, tax systems and urban plan- Cyberactivism dynamics ning decisions.

These Web-based communities take advantage of the popularity of ICT to implicate citizens in Transnational connections public affairs on a massive scale. Like the other social movements examined earlier, they are an The individuals who make up the nucleus of expression of a new collective willingness to as- these collectives linked up with other online ac- sume a greater level of civic responsibility. The tivists early in the game. Following a logic inher- members of these groups form part of the grow- ent to the world of digital communications, they looked beyond their own national borders and 12 Data obtained during a personal conversation main- established contacts with counterparts in other tained on October 22, 2018 with a Y’en a Marre activist countries who had similar concerns, visions, as- who coordinates the activities of the UPEC. pirations and objectives (Bajo Erro, 2014).

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The movement began with contact between Adopting a pan-African strategy has allowed highly committed activists based in different activists to build a solid network of collectives French-speaking Western African countries who focused on promoting digital citizenship in their were interested in developing stronger ties. respective countries (Dabo, 2018). The practice of These pioneers had two primary objectives. First banding together to provide mutual protection, off, they wanted to learn from each other’s ex- which was key to the formation of the first African periences and expand their network of contacts networks, has made it easier for them to mount through online knowledge sharing. However, they group responses to threats or spread the word were also looking for a way to protect their backs. about specific issues and campaigns. Having been threatened in various ways for their activism, they were anxious to take advantage of the opportunities that cross-border digital com- The willingness of social and cyberactivist movements munications offered for creating an alert system to provide mutual support capable of generating international support when the going got rough on their home turf. Admira- The growth of Africtivistes and new social move- tion of the work being done by colleagues in other ments in Africa has been nourished by the fertile countries and a willingness to support fellow ac- combination of an increasing willingness on the tivists facing critical situations became the two part of practically every segment of society to main pillars of the first mutual support networks. play a greater role in political and social life and These initial bonds, which grew stronger in an institutional credibility crisis that has under- the course of a series of joint campaigns, were mined people’s faith in government and conven- consolidated further in 2014 with the creation tional civil society organisations and led them to of a network alliance called Africtivistes and a seek new solutions. These two activist currents homologous online reference and information- share certain key objectives, one of which is pro- clearing platform, both of which are sustained viding citizens with new and effective tools that through the interpersonal links that activists have offer an alternative to institutional politics and forged along the way. allow them to exercise control over public affairs. The Africtivistes alliance was reframed as an The relationship between the two becomes more international organisation at a November 2015 visible in instances in which activists maintain a meeting in Dakar in which activists from 25 Af- simultaneous presence in both types of groups or rican nations participated. The second meet- cyberactivist groups provide online support for ing of this pan-African league of activists, which social movement campaigns and causes. A no- took place in Ouagadougou in June 2018, was table example of the confluence between groups attended by people from over forty countries. was the leading role played by representatives of Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa, Y’en a Marre, Balai Citoyen, Filimbi and LUCHA the western, central, eastern, southern parts of during the first Africtivistes meeting in Dakar. the continent, and even North Africa were rep- Street activism and cyberactivism can, to a resented at the event. Africtivistes, which has large extent, be considered variations of the succeeded in overcoming national borders for same phenomenon in that they spring from some time now, has also attempted to transcend common origins and pursue common objectives. other hindrances to unified action in Africa such Their point of contact is the sphere of digital com- as traditional alliances, regional circles and cul- munication, which for cyberactivists constitutes tural affinities. The group’s prestige continues to an ecosystem and axis of operations and in the grow as bonds between the communities forming case of new social movements functions as a tool the backbone of the confederation deepen and and a key element of organisational and action achieve greater stability. strategies.

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The connections forged between activist Bonnecase, V.: “Sur la chute de Blaise Compaoré. movements operating in different countries Autorité et colère dans les derniers jours d’un have likewise only been possible within the régime”, Politique Africaine, n.º 137, 2015, context of the popularisation of ICT. The role pp. 151-168. Available at: www.cairn.info/ ICT plays in citizen activism extends far beyond revue-politique-africaine-2015-1-page-151. the ability it gives the members of individual htm groups to connect, communicate, discuss is- Branch, A., and Mampilly, Z.: Africa Uprising: Pop- sues, share experiences and even plan joint ac- ular Protest and Political Change, Zed Books, tions. ICT devices, social media platforms and London, 2015. digital messaging services do other things of Castel, A., and Bajo Erro, C.: Redes sociales para equal or greater importance as well such as gen- el cambio en África, Los Libros de la Catarata, erate a sensation of coordinated pan-African ac- Madrid, 2013. tion that helps builds community spirit while Castells, M.: Redes de indignación y esperanza, strengthening the cohesion of the movement Alianza Editorial, Barcelona, 2012. and making it attractive to new prospective Dabo, A.: “Internet como herramienta para los members. cambios sociopolíticos en África. La experi- encia de Africtivistes”, La Juventud en África. Impulsora del Cambio, Los Libros de la Cata- References rata, Madrid, 2018. Dimé, M.: “De bul faale à Y’en a marre: continui- Bajo Erro, C.: “Ciberactivista: una nueva iden- tés et dissonances dans les dynamiques de tidad en las ciudades africanas”, Revista de contestation sociopolitique et d’affirmation Estudios para el Desarrollo Social de la Comu- citoyenne chez les jeunes au Sénégal”, Africa nicación, n.º 9, 2014, pp. 47-68. Available at: Development, vol. 42, n.º 2, 2017, pp. 83-105. http://revista-redes.hospedagemdesites.ws/ Hagberg, S., Kibora, L., Ouattara, F., y Konkobo, index.php/revista-redes/article/view/294/335 A.: “Au coeur de la révolution burkinabè”, An- Bajo Erro, C.: “Resistencias 2.0: Creación de thropologie & Développement, n.º 42-43, 2015, redes virtuales transnacionales de trans- pp. 199-224. formación social en África occidental”, Re- Kupper, C.: “YAM: radioscopie d’un mouvement”, laciones Internacionales, n.º 26, 2014, pp. Une jeunesse africaine en quête de change- 33-52. Available at: https://repositorio.uam. ment, GRIP, Brussels, 2017. es/bitstream/handle/10486/677257/RI_26_3. Martinot, P.: “Filimbi: sifflets d’alerte”, Une jeu- pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y nesse africaine en quête de changement, Banégas, R.: “Putsch et politique de la rue au GRIP, Brussels, 2017. Burkina Faso. Quand les étudiants débat- Touré, I.: “Jeunesse, mobilisations sociales et tent du Régiment de sécurité présidentielle”, citoyenneté en Afrique de l’Ouest: étude Politique Africaine, n.º 139, 2015, pp. 147-170. comparée des mouvements de contestation Available at: www.cairn.info/revue-politique- ‘Y’en a marre’ au Sénégal et ‘Balai citoyen’ africaine-2015-3-page-147.htm au Burkina Faso”, Africa Development, vol. 42, Bangré, H.: “La nouvelle opposition en RDC: les n.º 2, 2017, pp. 57-82. mouvements citoyens de la jeunesse”, Notes Wirtz, M.: “Balai Citoyen: porte-parole de la con- de l’IFRI, 2016. Available at: www.ifri.org/sites/ testation au Burkina Faso”, Une jeunesse afric- default/files/atoms/files/habibou_bangre_ aine en quête de changement, GRIP, Brussels, opposition_rdc.pdf 2017.

inf_africa_ingles.indb 21 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 22 3/6/19 18:44 2. Political and social transformations and processes in North Africa since 2011

Laurence Thieux and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi

The anti-authoritarian protests that broke in vari- during this period, with the exception of Tunisia, ous North African countries in late 2010 and early has been marked by a reversion to authoritarian- 2011 stemmed from a variety of distinct processes ism under a variety of guises, each of which has of political, economic and social change. Where- been moulded by the characteristics of the par- as the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in ticular political system in question. Stability and Tunisia paved the way for a process of democra- security issues have become the main arguments tisation embarked upon under complex political these regimes have used (with the connivance of and economic circumstances, in countries such the international community) to postpone sine as Algeria and Morocco the introduction of re- die the adoption of democratic agendas and reforms and the implementation of social measures spect for human rights. The economic policies neutralised protest against ruling regimes for a countries such as Tunisia and Egypt have pursued certain period of time. The democratisation pro- under the tutelage of the International Monetary cess in Egypt was frustrated by a coup d’état that Fund have widened the economic and social gaps handed the presidency of that republic to then that fuelled the protests of 2011. It is therefore Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forc- not surprising that in all of these countries – in- es Abdelfatah Al-Sisi. Since the fall of Muammar cluding those like Morocco and Algeria in which Gaddafi in the wake a 2011 NATO intervention, the Arab spring prompted only minor reform – Libya has been embroiled in an internal conflict public protest has broken out again with force, complicated by the proliferation of armed groups particularly in outlying, less-developed regions. that has led to its fragmentation into zones under The unity between the diverse forces that had the control of different forces. Despite the hetero- banded together with the objective of tumbling geneity of their political, economic and social sit- entrenched regimes during the revolutionary uations, North African countries all grapple with fervour of 2011 dissolved and political and social permanent focal points of social protest in their differences roiled relations between them once outlying and marginalised regions. this moment was over. In the case of Libya, such This chapter provides an assessment of the differences even provoked civil conflict. political, economic and social evolution of North African countries since 2011 with a special emphasis on political and economic factors that are Tunisia: the challenges of a transition underway hindering the consolidation of democratisation processes in the region. The fall of president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tu- The public aspirations for dignity and democ- nisia paved the way for a process of democratic racy that underpinned the protests of 2011 in transition in that country. Various political crises North Africa led to a series of political changes that that at moments threatened to derail the process in the majority of cases have been frustrated. The underway there have been resolved through dia- political evolution of the countries in the region logue and consensus.

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The overthrow of Ben Ali and his political re- dialogue and consensus and accompanied by an gime was made possible by the confluence of alternance of government and the formation of two major segments of Tunisian society. The first coalition governments made up of ideologically comprised inhabitants of central and southern diverse political parties. Civil society played an regions that had languished in terms of devel- important role in this process, acting as a coun- opment and been forgotten since the suicide of terweight to political power, parliamentary and Muhammad Buazizi on December 17, 2010 who political watchdog and a mediating force that marched on the capital en masse demanding dig- constantly nudged politicians toward compro- nity, better socioeconomic conditions and social mise and consensus (Hernando de Larramendi justice and determined to bring an end to the re- and Govantes, 2018). gime. This group was quickly joined by middle The priority placed on the political and insti- class residents of Tunis and developed areas of tutional facets of transition was not accompanied the coast whose agenda, which was more politi- by a similar concern for responding effectively to cal than social, won out following the ouster of the demands for dignity, social justice and re- Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. gional inequities articulated by the revolution- Apart from their shared objective of bringing an aries of December 17. Unaddressed imbalances end to the Ben Ali regime, the priorities of the two between the country’s depressed central and groups differed significantly. The faction whose southern regions and its more developed capital agenda prevailed following the events of January and coastal areas have periodically stoked social 14 placed a primordial emphasis on the institution- and regional tensions and protests in a socioeco- al aspects of the process of political transition, ne- nomic climate marked by rising corruption and a glecting to address the social and economic issues deteriorating economic situation that has wors- that had provided the original impetus for the citi- ened in the wake of terrorists attacks on tourist zen revolt. The transition process has nevertheless resorts in 2015 and ongoing instability in Libya. generated a number of highly positive outcomes, With fall 2019 legislative and presidential among them the consolidation of an effective po- elections looming on the mid-term horizon, the litical pluralism, the highest level of freedom of ex- country now faces a new political crisis that has pression enjoyed in the Arab world, legislative and occurred amid growing public disillusionment presidential elections supervised by an indepen- with institutional politics. The rupture of an alli- dent election commission, and a consensual con- ance forged in 2014 between the leader of Nidaa stitution approved in 2014 following complicated Tounes Béji Caïd Essebsi, who assumed the presi- negotiations over its content and wording that has dency of the republic that year, and the leader of unfortunately sharpened the polarisation between the Islamist party Ennahda Rached Ghannouchi progressives and Islamists. Tunisia’s constitutional has meant the end of a pact that has provided process nevertheless remains incomplete pend- stability but never been well understood by the ing the creation of the Constitutional Court, a task followers of either party. The pact, which caused that had yet to be accomplished at the time this the implosion of Nidaa Tounes, a party that assessment was prepared. Delay on this issue is of had won legislation elections on the basis of a particular concern as it leaves the country in the forward-looking and anti-Islamist platform, and interim without an authority capable of interpret- the creation of a new party called Tahya Tounes ing ambiguities in the Constitution stemming from promoted by Youssef Chahed, who has served the compromises made by its authors to ensure the as head of government since 2016, has led to the document’s approval (Hernando de Larramendi further fragmentation of the progressive political and Planet, 2018). spectrum in Tunisia. The political crisis that preceded the approval This political panorama has unfolded in the ab- of the constitutional text was resolved through sence of positive economic indicators. Continued

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high levels of unemployment, rising inflation and ing human rights and mounting repression mainly pressure on the part of the International Monetary targeting, but not restricted to, the rank and file Fund (IMF) to reduce external debt have provoked of the illegalised Muslim Brotherhood, which had social conflict that has taken the form of fresh been categorised as a terrorist movement since waves of protests in central and southern regions December 2013. The crackdown extended to indi- that continue to lag economically and socially be- viduals who dared to criticise the regime, activists, hind the capital and coastal zones and a successful union members and civil society organisations, all general strike waged in January 2019 by the Union of whom have seen their margins of action drasti- Général Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). cally reduced by the tightening of legislation pertaining to associations (Azaola, 2018). This reversion to authoritarian rule – justified Egypt: the return of authoritarianism in the name of stability – has been legitimised by the acquiescence of foreign powers anxious to The hopes of democratisation in Egypt follow- ensure Egypt’s engagement in the fight against ing the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February terrorism and the Islamic state and its coopera- 2011 faded quickly. From the very beginning, tion in efforts to stop illegal immigration. the supreme command of the Egyptian armed Although this ‘security card’ has allowed the forces, which had facilitated the fall of the indi- regime to limit foreign pressure (particularly on vidual who had been their commander-in-chief the part of the European Union and the United for three decades, made no bones about its in- States) regarding its suppression of freedom and tentions to maintain control over any process of human rights, it has done nothing to reverse the political liberalisation that might ensue. The mili- deterioration of the economy, a pressing problem tary marked the pace of events and established in a country with a growing population that will the legal framework under which the legislative soon reach the 98 million mark. elections of November 2011 and the presidential The regime has attempted to consolidate its elections of June 2012 took place, both of which power by means of a recent amendment to the resulted in resounding victories for the Muslim constitution that will theoretically allow Al Sisi Brotherhood. The electoral victory of this Islamist to hold onto the presidency until 2034, a return movement, which resulted in the presidency of to square one in terms of political strategy that Mohamed Morsi, led to a temporary ‘asymmetri- has done nothing to improve the reeling Egyptian cal cohabitation’ between the Muslim Brother- economy. The lending conditions under which hood and the Egyptian armed forces that ended the IMF conceded a three-year $12 billion loan to with a coup d’état led by Commander-in-Chief of Egypt in 2016 have supposed the implementa- the Egyptian armed forces and Morsi-appointed tion of austerity measures, price hikes and social Minister of Defence Abdelfatah Al-Sisi. This event budget cutting that has mostly affected the poor- took place in the context of increasing social est strata of society. Growing social malaise has polarisation and violence, a lack of consensus been kept in check up to date thanks to financial among political factions and plummeting public support received from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and support for the Islamist president. the United Arab Emirates. As of early 2014, Egypt By the summer of 2013 the army had regained had received $12 billion in assistance from these direct control of the political system it had domi- three countries.11 Such generosity on their part nated since the early 1950s and was taking ad- has had much to do with Egypt’s alignment with vantage of the turbulent situation to bolster its the anti-Qatar bloc of countries led by Saudi Ara- position as the country’s foremost economic bloc with interests in every major sector. These moves were undertaken in an atmosphere of deteriorat- 1 http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=55230

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bia, which severed ties with Doha in June 2017 liamentary elections, from which the Islamist PJD and subsequently initiated a land, sea and air once again emerged victorious. Benkirane’s char- blockade against that state. ismatic leadership helped limit the political wear and tear his party had suffered for its willingness to maintain a relationship of ‘subordinate co- Morocco: reforms that have left the power habitation’ with the monarchy (Tomé, 2018). His structure intact margin of manoeuvrability as prime minister was nevertheless constrained by his decision not to Although its ostensible purpose was to establish a engage in open interpretations of the constitu- more equitable balance of power between the mon- tion, which had he opted to do, would have lim- archy and elected government, the 2011 reform of ited the powers of the king, albeit at the cost of the Moroccan constitution represents a lost op- Benkirane’s government having to take the heat portunity in many respects. The approval of a new for implementing unpopular reform measures constitutional text formed the lynchpin of a strategy such as such as phasing out consumer fuel sub- devised by Mohamed VI to quell protest movements sidies (Fernández-Molina, 2017). in Morocco, which unlike those in Tunisia, Egypt and Benkirane’s difficulties in forming a new gov- Libya, had demanded democratisation, an end to ernment gave the monarchy an excuse to replace corruption and higher living standards but not him as prime minister in spite of his status as sought to bring down the existing regime. leader of the winning party in the recent elec- One of the novelties introduced in the reform tions. His refusal to cave into demands made constitution was the stipulation that the king by Aziz Akhannouch, leader of the RNI and royal must appoint a head of government from the confidant, led to a political impasse that allowed political party winning the most votes in elec- Mohamed VI to hand over the responsibility for tions for the House of Representatives. It was forming a government to Saad Eddine, another on the basis of this new disposition that the member of the JPD, in March 2016. Less charis- king designated Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of matic than his predecessor, the new prime min- the moderate Islamist Parti de la Justice et du ister acceded to the demands Benkirane had Développement (PJD), which had won a plural- refused to contemplate and managed to form ity of seats in November 2011 election, as the a new coalition government. The PJD had less country’s prime minister. Following his appoint- weight in the new government, during which it ment, Benkirane formed a coalition government held only two ministerial portfolios of major im- between the PJD and three other parties that was portance, which were energy, mines and devel- constantly hampered by internal dissention. The opment and equipment, transport, logistics and balancing act that holding this quartet together water (Desrues, 2018). Ministerial portfolios of an supposed became more difficult in 2013 when economic nature and ‘ministries of sovereignty’ the Rassemblement National des Independents, remained beyond its control. a party closely aligned with the Majzen, replaced The neutralisation of Benkirane, who shortly the Parti de l’Istiqual as coalition partner. afterward was replaced as party leader by El Oth- Since that time, Mohamed VI has striven to mani, has added to the growing disaffection felt limit the impact of concessions he felt forced to by broad swathes of Moroccan society towards a make in 2011 as the February 20 movement took political class incapable of coming up with solu- over the streets of Moroccan cities, anti-author- tions that appears to wait for signals or guidelines itarian protests swept the region and regimes from the royal palace before moving a finger. In were being toppled in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. spite of his extended absences from the country, Attempts to strengthen the monarchy’s cen- Mohamed VI continues to set agendas at home tral role intensified in the wake of the 2016 par- and abroad, delivering speeches for national

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consumption about issues such as corruption, deepening rift between large segments of the accountability, the possibility of re-establishing population and the political elite. Evidence of the obligatory military service or the creation of a scope of this rupture is the success of several civil new rural middle class and embarking upon in- disobedience campaigns conducted via social me- ternational initiatives such as Morocco’s return dia networks. One example is a consumer boycott to the fold of the African Union. The king has also launched anonymously on Facebook in April 2018 attempted to mark a distance between him and a in protest of the inordinately high prices of certain discredited political class he blames for the fail- brands of milk, bottled water and petrol marketed ures and slow progress of development projects. by companies with close links to the economic es- Such criticism is often accompanied by actions tablishment and the monarchy. Disaffection has enshrined in the constitution as royal preroga- also prompted an increasing number of young tives. In November 2017 Mohamed VI ousted five people facing limited opportunities at home to ministers appointed during the mandate of El immigrate to Europe in search of a better life. Othmani and ordered the dismissal of two ministers and a secretary of state over delays in the implementation of a development plan for Al- Algeria: political immobilism in a region marked Hoceima, a city in the Rif region. by turbulence The scuttling of political parties’ role as mediators between civil society and decision-makers Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s February announcement has occurred in parallel to an uptick in protests that he would seek a fifth term as president in in outlying regions. Those that broke out in Al- Algeria’s April 2019 presidential elections, despite Hoceima in response to the macabre death of not having made a public appearance since 2012 fishmonger Mouhcine Fikri, who was mangled to and being confined to a wheelchair since suffer- death as he attempted to retrieve fish confiscated ing a stroke in 2013, was perceived as a collec- by police from a municipal garbage truck, sparked tive humiliation by large sectors of the Algerian the formation of an enduring protest movement population, sparking a succession of non-violent called Hirak. This group’s zeal in denouncing the protests in the streets, unprecedented in their hogra (deprivation of dignity) felt by people in the geographic reach and prolongation over time. Rif is a clear sign of the failure of the reconcili- The failure of the shadowy and frequently ation and development policy for northern Mo- conflictive clans that as a group have long deter- rocco pursued by Mohamed VI since his ascension mined the course of events in Algeria to forward a to the throne two decades ago. People have also viable alternative candidate for president in 2019 taken to the streets in other places in which living reflects the paralysis of a system determined to conditions lag behind those along the country’s perpetuate its existence at any cost (Addi, 2017). more developed and richer Atlantic coast. One of The resilience of the Algerian political system them is Jerada, a town near the Algerian border up to February 2019 stemmed from a confluence where protesters are demanding new econom- of factors. The first is recent Algerian history, ic opportunities following the closure of local which has been used by the ruling class to fend coalmines. Protests elsewhere have demanded off public demands for political change. Algeria improved management of natural resources such underwent a brief process of democratisation at as water, which has become scarce due to over- the end of the 1980s (considered by some to have exploitation by the agricultural sector in Zagora constituted an Arab Spring avant la lettre) that and the mining industry in Imlil (Hernando de ended badly in a decade of civil strife following a Larramendi and Thieux, 2018). military coup in 1992. Viewed within the context of a growing dis- Since that time, the powers that be have con- affection with politics, these protests reflect a tinually framed this conflict and the negative

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consequences it had for average Algerians as an of which is under the age of 25 and 54% of which object lesson on what any future rush toward falls into the 30 to 54 age bracket)22 and the im- democratisation might suppose. This message, possibility of moving up a social ladder jealously which was taken to heart during the Arab Spring controlled by previous generations have created by a citizenry still traumatised by the turmoil of a breeding ground for frustration that prompts the 1990s, which left 200,000 people dead and an- young people to dream of a better life elsewhere. other 15,000 missing, was driven home further by Harragas continue to leave the shores of Algeria the chaos and violence that subsequently swept in small rickety boats in search of better pros- countries such as Libya and Syria. pects in Europe.33 The mass demonstrations seen in March 2019, Reforms promised in 2011 at the height of the which have learnt from lessons of the past and in Arab Spring have not been carried out. The lifting which millenials have had a particularly impor- of a 19-year state of emergency in 2011 has not put tant presence, are proof that the regime’s mantra an end to police monitoring of political meetings of the risk of a descent into chaos and insecurity and protests – which continue to be prohibited in has lost its capacity to stop citizens from taking the nation’s capital. The new Law on Associations their outrage to the street. adopted in 2012 has constrained the radius of civil The regime’s capacity to redistribute wealth society action further by making it infinitely more generated by the country’s petroleum sector has difficult to legally register an association. allowed it to maintain civil unrest within controlla- The absence of significant political and military ble parameters and consolidate its hold on power. change in Algeria stands in sharp contrast to the A rise in oil prices that began in 2010 left the bal- profound transformation of its regional context ance of the country’s foreign exchange reserves and the security challenges it now faces due to at an estimated $182 billion in 2011. The flow of the destabilisation of neighbouring Libya and Mali. income from this resource is nevertheless subject The deterioration of its regional security situa- to variations in price controlled by a closely-knit tion, particularly in border areas, has forced Alge- cartel. Any downward oscillation in the price of pe- ria to devote a significant percentage of its overall troleum can constitute a wrench in the works that budget to defence spending and the deployment curtails the regime’s ability to buy ‘social peace’ of security detachments along its 6,000-km border (Mañé, Thieux, Hernando de Larramendi, 2016). (1,376 km with Mali, 1,559 km with Morocco, 982 Public frustration with the status quo in Alge- with Libya, 956 with Niger and 965 with Tunisia). ria has continued to grow over the past few years The upheaval and proliferation of armed despite the government’s ability to maintain this groups in Libya and Mali have also had a direct strategy. Since 2010, a year in which an astound- impact on security in the country’s interior. A ing 10,000 protests took place, the country has 2013 attack on a gas plant in In Amenas revealed been plagued by a continual wave of small pro- the vulnerability of a key industrial sector that tests focused on specific economic issues. These had never, even during the worst moments of the events occur more frequently in outlying parts civil war in the 1990s, suffered a terrorist attack. of the country where the regime’s incapacity to implement economic and social development projects addressing the needs of all strata of the 2 http://www.aps.dz/algerie/75645-la-population-algerienne- population despite the ample resources at its dis- a-42-2-millions-d-habitants-au-1er-janvier-2018 3 Harraga is an Arabic word used to describe an indi- posal has stoked the ire of local residents (Her- vidual who attempts to immigrate to Europe illegally by nando de Larramendi and Thieux, 2018). sea. Ministry of Defence statistics indicate that Algerian The failure of the regime to implement mea- coast guards have intercepted 2,519 people attempting sures ensuring the economic future of the coun- to emigrate illegally between September and December try’s demographically youthful population (45% 31, 2018, Monde Afrique, 24/01/2019.

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The solidity of the Algerian political system The first electoral process organised following rests above all on cohesion among the players the end of the Gaddafi regime were parliamentary who created it and have benefitted from it since elections held in July 2012 to determine the com- the country’s independence. Solidarity between position of the General National Congress (GNC). members of this clique has traditionally hinged Although the liberal National Forces Alliance party on controlling petroleum assets and using the won the greatest number of seats, it was the Is- profits to create and channel money to patronage lamist Justice and Construction party (the Libyan networks that keep broad sectors of the popula- branch of the Muslim Brothers) that ended up tion reasonably happy with the status quo. All of controlling the GNC with the support of various this is bathed in an aura of revolutionary legiti- independent candidates and Salafist groups. macy that the regime and its cronies established An anti-Islamist coalition led by army com- during the country’s struggle for independence mander Khalifa Belqasim Haftar reacted to this between 1954 and 1962. turn of events by mounting an unsuccessful coup The need for this group to preserve internal d’état in Tripoli in February 2014. Despite the fail- cohesion at any cost partially explains the bi- ure of this attempt, his coalition was able to con- zarre proposition of President Bouteflika run- solidate its position in the region of Cyrenaica. ning for a fifth term in office, a candidacy that was In May 2014 Haftar launched Operation Dignity, brought to an end in early April when Bouteflika a second attempt to put an end to the GNC and renounced in light of the popular outrage. Much defeat the Islamist militias. In response to this of- of the frustration contained up to this point out fensive, Islamist militias regrouped as a united of fear and concern over the chaos that a change force under the name Libya Dawn and formed the of regime could suppose stems from the ruling National Salvation Government in Tripoli, which elite’s disregard for citizens’ needs and demands. has since competed for legitimacy with a rival This year’s protests indicate that the barrier of government established under the leadership fear has fallen and that a determined Algerian of Abdullah Al Thani in Bayda. In June 14, in the population is weakening the fragile equilibria midst of this conflict, other elections were held to that have underpinned the regime’s continuity establish the Libyan House of Representatives, a and writing a new page in the country’s history. new parliament located in Tobruk whose elected members aligned themselves with the objectives of Operation Dignity. The members elected to the Libya: A possible return to stability on the far General National Congress in 2012 refused to re- horizon? nounce their seats following this process, claim- ing to be the country’s legitimate legislators and Almost eight years after the overthrow of Muam- declaring their support for the Islamist militias mar Gaddafi in October 2011, political -uncer in Tripoli and, to a lesser extent, armed groups tainties, security problems and a deteriorating allied with Libya Dawn in Benghazi. The Libyan economy continue to undermine the stability of House of Representatives in Tobruk established Libya and its transition to democracy. in the wake of the elections of July 2014 has been The fall of Gaddafi, which was accelerated by an recognised by the international community as international military intervention, precipitated an the legitimate parliament of Libya. institutional collapse and a resurgence of identities The international community also launched in Libya that has led to internecine conflict. In the a mediation process concluding in the signing of wake of a failed transition process, three centres of the Libyan Political Agreement in Skhirat, Moroc- power compete for political legitimacy against the co in 2015 that paved the way for the formation backdrop of ongoing armed skirmishes between of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and numerous militias over territory and resources. the Presidential Council chaired by Fayez Serraj.

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These bodies have a limited degree of legiti- control of oil installations and terminals (50% macy and territorial control that does not extend of the petroleum Libya exports exits the country beyond Tripoli, Misrata and a part of eastern Lib- via the six terminals located in the Gulf of Sirte) ya. In the east, both the parliament in Tobruk and have resulted in increased production costs and Haftar’s Libyan National Army have rejected the a reduction of the sector’s production and export Skhirat Agreement and the institutions associated capacity that have had a knock-on effect on the with it. Libyan economy. Prior to 2011, Libya produced From this point on, the conflict has taken the 1.65 million barrels of crude per day and oil and form of deeply entrenched, interwoven offen- natural gas sales accounted for up to 96% of to- sives between forces concentrated in the coun- tal government revenue and 65% of the country’s try’s three main regions: Tripolitania in the west, GDP. Oil revenues, which had formerly stood at Cyrenaica in the east of and Fezzan in the south. $40 billion, plunged to a mere $4.6 billion follow- The difficulty of establishing points of conver- ing a drop in production to 400,000 barrels a day gence between the two main opposing factions in 2016. has been closely linked to the nature of the mi- The political and institutional disarray in Libya litia movements that constitute the bulwark of has created the perfect environment for various the GNA. The political alliances between these forms of illicit commerce including human traf- groups have proved to be extremely volatile and ficking, which in the context of European coun- the motives underlying their support for, and loy- tries’ interest in migratory flows is a major issue. alty to, one camp or another run counter to the Libya’s status as a major magnet for terrorist logic of political accord (Toaldo, 2016). groups in search of new bases also constitutes The fragmentation of political institutions and a direct threat to the security of neighbouring territorial security has engendered chaos and a countries such as Algeria and Tunisia. power vacuum that have left the country vulner- Libya continues to be mired in a complex, able to the infiltration of radical factions affiliated conflictive transitional process marked by insti- with the Islamic State. The threat of ISIS estab- tutional and political fragmentation and con- lishing a permanent base in Libya has been held frontation between armed factions that foreign in check by militias from Misrata and air strikes intervention has complicated further. The lack carried out by the US with the support of British of legitimacy of institutions created through UN and Italian special forces. These actions should mediation and the proliferation of militias with a not, however, be taken as a sign that security propensity for forming ‘liquid’ alliances has pro- problems in the country have been resolved. voked a state of anarchy in which civilians are Competition for control of the petroleum the primary victims. The lack of national recon- sector has become one of the main factors feed- ciliation and the division of the country by coming the conflict.4 Skirmishes along the coast for peting factions focused on maintaining control territory and resources has dragged the country 4 Haftar announced in February 2019 that his forces had into a serious economic crisis. The deterioration seized control of the Al-Sharara oil field, which with a proof economic and social conditions has drastical- duction of 300,00 bpd ranks as one of the country’s largest ly reduced the employment prospects of young petroleum extraction operations. This offensive was re- people and increased their vulnerability to the pulsed by the Tuareg Brigade 30, which has controlled the appeals of militia recruiters. facility since 2017. Advances by LNA forces in the area have This situation has become especially dire in sparked a reconciliation between local Tuareg and Tebu the south of the country where economic and so- tribesmen and prompted the GNA to designate Tuareg Ali Kanna commander of security forces for the south, a move the government in Tripoli hopes will lead to the joint mo- the LNA. See: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/feud- bilisation of independent Tuareg and Tebu militias against ing-tribes-unite-new-civil-war-looms-libyas-south

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cial precariousness, the collapse of basic services Estrada, A.M., de Larramendi, M.H., y Thieux, L.: and a spike in terrorist and criminal activity have Argelia en la encrucijada: condicionantes, ten- created conditions that favour the incursion of dencias y escenarios, Fundación Alternativas, foreign armed groups.5 Madrid, 2016. The political, social and economic situations Fernández-Molina, I.: “The Limits of Morocco’s of North African countries vary and each country “Exceptional” Stability: Post-election Dead- has its own particularities and agenda. The dif- lock, Contestation on the Periphery and For- ferent ways in which these states have evolved eign Policy Dilemmas”, Iemed Mediterranean since 2011 has reinforced this heterogeneity. One Yearbook, 2017. Available at: www.iemed.org/ nevertheless can detect the existence of certain observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/ tendencies throughout the region such as the anuari/med.2017/IEMed_MedYearbook consolidation of authoritarian forms of govern- 2017_limits_morocco_stability_Molina.pdf/ ment (the exception being Tunisia, which is un- Hernando de Larramendi, M., y Govantes, B.: “Las dergoing a successful transition to democracy) elecciones municipales de Túnez de mayo de and a hardening of repression against dissent- 2018: contexto y lecturas”, Análisis del Real In- ers, pro-democracy activists and human rights stituto Elcano, n.º 77, 2018. Available at: www. groups. Another phenomenon that the majority realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielca- of these countries have in common is the resur- no_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ gence of social discontent, which has tended to elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari77-2018- erupt most virulently in outlying regions grap- hernandodelarramendi-govantes-elecciones- pling with economic and social problems that municipales-tunez-mayo-2018 particularly effect young people, a large and ever- Hernando de Larramendi, M., y Planet, A.: “Trans- growing segment of North African societies. formaciones políticas en el Norte de África tras las revueltas antiautoritarias de 2011: el caso de Túnez”, Voces, tramas y trayectorias: References transiciones críticas en el Medio Oriente y Norte de África, Editorial Universitaria Universidad Addi, L.: “Système politique et paix civile en Al- Autónoma de León, Mexico, 2018, pp. 33-64. gérie”, Confluences Méditerranée, n.º 1, 2017, Hernando de Larramendi, M., y Thieux, L.: pp. 27-39. (2018). Protestas en la periferia. Contestación Azaola, B.: The Consolidation of Authoritarian- y desequilibrios en el Magreb”, Notes Inter- ism in al-Sisi’s Egypt. IEMED Mediterranean nationals, n.º 203, CIDOB, 2018. Available at: Yearbook, 2018. Available at: www.iemed.org/ www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_ observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/ publicacion/notes_internacionals/n1_203/ anuari/med.2018/Authorianism_Egypt_Barbara protestas_en_la_periferia_contestacion_y_ _Azaola_Piazza_Medyearbook2018.pdf desequilibrios_en_el_magreb Desrues, T.: “Le Maroc en 2017 : Gouverner la Thieux, L.: “Sociedad civil y cambio político y so- Monarchie exécutive ou les logiques de l’autori- cial en Argelia: evolución de discursos y es- taris-me”, L’Année du Maghreb, n. º 19, 2018. Avail- trategias”, Revista de Estudios Internacionales able at: https://journals.openedition.org/ Mediterráneos, n.º 25, 2018, pp. 79-92. Available anneemaghreb/4289 at: http://dx.doi.org/10.15366/reim2018.25.005 Tomé-Alonso, B.: Party of justice and development: A strategy of differentiation, Issue Brief, 5 Attacks perpetrated by Isis in the town of al-Fuqaha were reported in October 2018 See: https://www.lemonde. 5, Baker Institute, 2018. Available at: www.bak- fr/afrique/article/2018/10/30/une-attaque-de-l-ei-fait- erinstitute.org/media/files/files/15d8882a/ 5-morts-dans-le-centre-de-la-libye_5376476_3212.html bi-brief-053018-cme-carnegie-morocco4.pdf

inf_africa_ingles.indb 31 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 32 3/6/19 18:44 3. African Continental Free Trade Area: a tool for economic transformation?

Artur Colom Jaén

Summary Introduction: the AfCFTA and regional integration in Africa After several years of negotiations, at the African Union summit in Kigali (Rwanda) from 17 to 21 After several years of negotiations, the - Afri March 2018, 44 out of its 55 members signed can Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was the agreement on the African Continental Free launched at the African Union (AU) summit that Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA is an ambi- took place in Kigali (Rwanda) in March 2018. The tious project that seeks the economic integra- AfCFTA is an ambitious project that seeks the eco- tion of the entire continent, including not only nomic integration of the entire continent, both trade, but also investment and the movement Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. If it goes of people. If it goes ahead, it will be the regional ahead, it will be the regional integration project integration project covering most countries in covering most countries in the world. To Febru- the world. ary 2019, 52 out of the 55 members of the AU had The dream of African unity is not a new one. signed the AfCFTA agreement and 18 of them In fact, Africa is the continent with the largest had ratified it, which is an indication of its high abundance of regional integration projects. The degree of consensus throughout the continent1 specific feature of the agreement launching the (Table 1). AfCFTA is that it comes at a time when there is Since the first president of Ghana Kwame Nk- a return to development strategies oriented to- rumah uttered the iconic words ‘We must unite wards economic transformation, with particular now or perish’ at the founding meeting of the emphasis on industrialisation. OAU in 1963, there has been a steady succession Thus, matters such as the creation of region- of regional integration initiatives2. Among others, al value chains by means of tariff reductions we could highlight the CFA franc monetary zone and trade facilitation that boost intra-African exchange, or the construction of infrastruc- 1 tures geared to fostering it, occupy a strategic As of February 2019, Benin, Eritrea and Nigeria had still to sign. Eighteen of the 52 signatory countries have ratified position. the agreement and it will enter into force with the ratifica- This study will analyse the content and con- tion of 22 countries. text of the AfCFTA launch agreement and its pos- 2 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in sible implications and limitations in terms of the 1963 and was the precursor of the current African Union continent’s economic transformation. (AU), established in 2002.

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Table 1. Selected indicators (2017)

GDP (billions of dollars GDP growth (%) Population (millions) GDP per capita (dollars at current prices) at current prices) Africa 2,25 3,7 1256 1849 European 17,28 2,4 512 33,715 Union China 12,24 6,9 1386 8827 United States 19,39 2,6 326 59,532

Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org), and African Development Bank (African Statistical Yearbook).

in West and Central Africa supported by France The examples would not end there, which and which dates from the colonial era. The West gives some idea of the unequivocal desire of most Africa CFA franc countries ended up integrat- postcolonial African governments to promote re- ing into the Union Économique et Monetaire de gional economic integration initiatives. There are l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UEMOA), which in turn forms two types of reason for this strategic commitment part of the Economic Community of West African and both have to do with the continent’s low level States (ECOWAS). The Central African CFA franc of development and its peripheral position in the countries, meanwhile make up the Communauté global economy. Firstly, there is the matter of eco- Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale nomic development. As the production structures (CEMAC), which forms part of the Economic Com- left from the colonial era were characterised by munity of Central African States (ECCAS)3. a high degree of specialisation in commodities In Southern Africa, the Southern African Cus- and oriented abroad – particularly to the former toms Union (SACU) is the doyen of integration colonial metropolises –, a process of regional in- initiatives in Africa. In fact, it is the oldest cus- tegration would mean boosting the scant existing toms union in the world. Established in 1910, it intra-African trade. That would reduce depen- is currently subsumed into the Southern African dence on the global markets, as well as promote Development Community (SADC). Additionally, a productive diversification. Meanwhile, the limited group of SADC countries have a monetary agree- economic infrastructures inherited from the colo- ment (Common Monetary Area) with the South nial era did not seek to boost national or regional African rand as the benchmark currency. Promi- markets, but to ensure commodities reached the nent in East Africa are the East African Commu- ports for their departure to the foreign market nity (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern with barely any processing. A process of integra- and Southern Africa (COMESA), which actually tion would contribute to the infrastructures be- also includes countries from North Africa4. ing designed for the purpose of truly integrating geographically contiguous markets. Secondly, a process of regional integration would alleviate 3 The UEMOA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte the limited relevance of African countries in politi- d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The CEMAC coun- cal terms in the international arena. The ideal of tries are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Con- pan-Africanism that the first integration projects go, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. For the ECOWAS and promoted contained these two ideas: economic ECCAS groups, see Figure 2 below development breaking the ties of dependence 4 The Common Monetary Area is made up of South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. The SACU comprises and international political presence. those countries plus Botswana. For the SADC, EAC and The degree of deployment of the different COMESA groups, see Figure 2 below. types of regional integration projects mentioned

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so far is uneven and the results are limited. For the African Economic Community, in some ways example, ECOWAS is a customs union in which in the image of the European Economic Com- there is also free movement of people, which munity. That treaty offered more precise details indicates a relatively high degree of integration, and an economic and monetary union across the and yet intraregional trade accounts for just 1.6 continent was scheduled for 2028. Agenda 2063 % of the region’s GDP, compared with nearly 5 replaces the Abuja Treaty, taking the achieve- % in the SADC, or 21 % in the European Union. ments already consolidated in matters of regional To cite another example, in ECCAS – a free trade integration as its starting point7. area –, intraregional trade barely reaches 0.5 % The launch of the AfCFTA is inseparable from of the region’s GDP5. the emerging debate on industrialisation in Af- To make things more complicated, there is rica. The Assembly of Heads of States and Gov- considerable overlapping. For instance, Tanzania ernment of the AU held in January 2012 approved belongs at the same time to the SADC and EAC; the creation of the AfCFTA at the same time as it Madagascar belongs to the SADC and COMESA; launched the Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Rwanda and Burundi belong to ECCAS and EAC; programme, which is another element of Agenda and Angola and the Democratic Republic of 2063. As most intra-African trade is manufactur- Congo are in ECCAS and SADC. Moreover, as we ing, the intensification of intra-African trade has a already said, there are monetary unions inside slant that favours industry and, therefore, fosters ECOWAS and ECCAS, the CFA franc zones. In a the diversification of production in economies graphic description, this succession of overlaps that are highly specialised in the exploitation of between areas of economic integration in Africa commodities. has been dubbed a ‘spaghetti bowl’. Nor can the launch of the AfCFTA be sepa- The persistent weakness of intra-African rated from the emergence in the last decade of trade and its potential as a tool for economic so-called megaregional trade agreements in the transformation have driven the bid for a process global economy. The Transatlantic Trade and In- of economic integration of a continental scope, vestment Partnership (TTIP) between the Europe- transcending the existing regional blocs. Cur- an Union and the United States, the Trans-Pacific rently, Africa only accounts for 3 % of global trade Partnership /TPP) – which originally grouped to- and its degree of regional integration is modest. gether 12 countries of the Pacific, including the Only 15 % of African exports go to other African United States and Japan – and the Regional Com- countries, while in Europe trade among the coun- prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – which tries of the same region amounts to 68%, in North gathers together China India and Japan, among America, 37 % and in Latin America, 20 %6. others, and is the biggest regional grouping in The AfCFTA is an element of the Agenda 2063, the world in terms of GDP –, make up major eco- a broader and longer-term strategy for socioeconomic blocs that threaten to further exclude the nomic transformation devised by the AU in 2012. African economies from global trade8. Agenda 2063 is not the first long-range continental strategy to be proposed in the framework of the AU. In 1980, the then OAU launched the Lagos 7 Officially, the Lagos Plan and the Abuja Treaty are Plan with its sights on the year 2000, which also called, respectively, the Lagos Plan of Action for the Eco- provided for a process of continental economic nomic Development of Africa, 1980-2000, and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. integration, though it was poorly defined. Sub- 8 After Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States sequently, the Abuja Treaty (1991) established from the TPP, the 11 remaining countries introduced the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- 5 Data from 2015 taken from UNECA (2018). Pacific Partnership, which came into force on 30 Decem- 6 Afreximbank: African Trade Report, 2018, p. 15. ber 2018.

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Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the Af- conditions of which are already established in CFTA is gathering momentum at a time when the agreement. The first of them is the Protocol serious doubts are being cast on multilateralism on Trade in Goods, which includes the traditional and international economic cooperation around provisions on removing tariffs, nontariff barriers the globe. The nationalistic drive seen in major and most favoured nation treatment, among oth- economies such as the United Kingdom (Brexit), ers9. The second of these protocols is the Protocol the United States (Trump), Brazil (Bolsonaro) or on Trade in Services, which covers agreements on Italy (Salvini), among others, call into question transparency in the regulation of services and the the framework of multilateral cooperation re- mutual recognition of standards and certification quired for the governance of globalisation. We of supplying services, among others. The third could be witnessing the start of a stage of ‘deglo- protocol is the Protocol on Rules and Procedures balisation’, in which international flows of trade on the Settlement of Disputes, that is to say, the and investment stagnate or even decline after deregulation of the disputes in the application of the cades of intense growth. The recent decisions by different protocols and which still remains quite US President Trump on raising tariffs on imports open. The second phase of the negotiations was from China have triggered a trade war of unpre- scheduled to begin in February 2019 – though it dictable consequences between the two biggest was initially planned for the end of 2018 – and in- economic powers on the planet. Along the same cludes a further three protocols: The Protocol on lines, the difficulties facing the European inte- Competition Policy, Protocol on Investment and gration project after Brexit and the appearance the Protocol on Intellectual property (Chart 1). of Eurosceptic governments like those of Italy According to the agreement signed in Kigali or Hungary, put another curb on the process of in March 2018, the institutions of governance of globalisation as we knew it. Thus, from a global the AfCFTA are going to be part of the AU, the As- viewpoint, it is noteworthy that the AU’s boost to sembly of Heads of State and Government being the AfCFTA bucks that trend of questioning mul- its highest decision-making body. Under the As- tilateralism. sembly, the Council of Ministers responsible for international trade of the countries also has the authority to take decisions and it will coordinate The content and deployment of the African with the AU and its institutions. The third level of Continental Freed Trade Agreement decision is the Committee of Senior Trade Offi- cials, which is responsible for taking technical de- As its name indicates, the AfCFTA pursues the cisions and implementing programs and action continent as a whole forming a free trade area plans relating to the AfCFTA. Lastly, a Secretariat in its entirety. In its traditional definition, a free with administrative functions will be established. trade area lays down that goods move freely in Additional to this central architecture, a series of the territory of the participating countries while sector-specific committees will be formed to dis- those countries maintain tariffs with third par- cuss and resolve more technical matters10. ties. As in the majority of free trade agreements in force, the AfCFTA is not limited to covering the mere liberalisation of trade in goods and services; 9 In an international trade agreement, the Most Favoured it also includes measures on investment among Nation clause establishes the automatic extension to all the participants in the agreement of any enhanced treat- countries, intellectual property, and protocols in ment that a country grants another. the event of conflict among others. 10 Committees on trade in services, trade in goods, cus- The agreement establishing the AfCFTA pro- toms, trade facilitation, rules of origin, technical barriers vides for two phases of negotiations. In the first to trade, non-tariff barriers, trade disputes, health and phase, three protocols are to be negotiated, the phytosanitary measures.

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Chart 1. Timeline of the AfCFTA

December March June Agreement Signing of Start of to deregulate the AfCFTA negotiations the importing in Kigali. End 2012 2015 2016 2017 of 90 % 2018 of 1st phase 2019 of products of negotiations

Launch of Staging of first Agreement for Start of 2nd the AfCFTA negotiating the Protocol on phase of initiative forum Trade in Services negotiations January February July February

Source: author’s own creation.

The strategy for building the AfCFTA consists blocs already form a customs union – ECOWAS of doing so on the foundations of a selection of and EAC –, which further complicates the initial regional groupings already existing on the conti- rollout of the agreement. nent, which, far from being considered obstacles In line with the traditional conception of a to the AfCFTA, become recognised as building process of integration, the third stage is a Com- blocks (Chart 2). In other words, the strategy is mon Market, which as well as a Customs Union not to deconstruct the existing regional groups, includes the free movement of factors, that is to but reinforce them to ultimately transcend them say, capital and workforce. In this stage, manage- and converge in the AfCFTA11. ment is even more complex, because it affects mi- The AfCFTA is the first step towards a deeper gration flows and financial systems, which means integration that aspires to culminate in a Con- the need for coordination among the member tinental Customs Union, which was actually countries is even greater. At present, ECOWAS already provided for in the Lagos Plan and in already allows the free movement of people in the Abuja Treaty and is now included in Agenda its territory and in parallel to the signing of the 2063. In its traditional form, a Customs Union agreement launching the AfCFTA in March 2018, is usually the second stage of a process of in- 27 countries signed a protocol on the free move- tegration, which implies the establishment of ment of people, the so-called Kigali Declaration. a Common Customs Tariff and an authority to The protocol is not part of AfCFTA, strictly speak- administer it, which means a greater degree of ing, but it does anticipate one of the most com- complexity and a certain relinquishment of sov- plex management issues in an area of integration: ereignty. At present, two of the AfCFTA building migration flows12. In short, in addition to the traditional conception of a free trade area as a territory through 11 There are eight of these regional groups: Economic which goods and services can flow freely, the Af- Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Econom- CFTA includes in its content and rollout certain ic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Eastern issues that go beyond that, such as investment African Community (EAC); Southern African Develop- and the free movement of people. ment Community (SADC); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); 12 Officially, Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Afri- and Intergovernmental Authority on Development can Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of (IGAD). Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment.

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Chart 2. Regional groups making up the AfCFTA

AMU Algeria Mauritania, Morocco Libya, Tunisia CEN-SAD* Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Burkina Egypt, Eritrea, Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Togo, Sudan, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Côte Ethiopia Somalia d’Ivoire, Niger, Nigeria Central African Republic, Chad IGAD Uganda, Cape Verde, Liberia Kenya South Cameroon, Sudan ECOWAS Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Burundi, EAC São Tomé and Rwanda Príncipe ECCAS Tanzania RDC Angola Malawi, Seychelles, Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Swaziland, Comoros South Africa, Lesotho SADC COMESA

*CEN-SAD also includes Comoros. Source: author’s own creation.

The deployment of the AfCFTA will also have reluctance of the African countries to accept a to take into account the changing environment reciprocal trade agreement with the EU, unlike of global trade. Besides the development of those with the EU existing until now. Brexit is go- the megaregional trade agreements that we ing to mean that for the African countries that mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom’s deci- do more intense trade with the United Kingdom, sion to leave the EU (Brexit) will condition the being in an EPA is no longer going to be so at- future trade relationship between the EU – Af- tractive. That means that the future of the EPAs rica’s main trading partner – and the AfCFTA. In – and by extension, Europe-Africa relations – in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, since the medium term may be in doubt if the AfCFTA 2000 negotiations have been underway on the finally goes ahead. establishment of different Economic Partnership To illustrate this point, we observe that, with Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and five Afri- data from 2014, 67 % of the EU’s meat imports can regional groups, which do not fully coincide from Africa went to the United Kingdom, as well with the building blocs of the AfCFTA. The EPAs as 41 % of the tea and other spices and 31 % of consist of interregional free trade areas, in the the wine. Meanwhile, in countries such as Ghana negotiation and implementation of which there or Kenya, exports to the United Kingdom account have been significant difficulties owing to the for 29 % and 15 %, respectively, of the exports to

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the European Union. The impact of Brexit, then, market and ensuring certain macroeconomic sta- might be relevant. bility, now the approach of the transformation of The deployment of the AfCFTA will also have productive capabilities is taking over. The Asian to take into consideration is the future of the Af- experience of economic change – in China par- rican Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This ticularly, though in South Korea and Japan too – scheme of nonreciprocal trade preferences es- has a clear influence on this emerging approach tablished by the United States in 2000 has been to development in Africa. instrumental in the promotion of the textile and In this return to heterodox approaches to de- footwear industries in countries such as Kenya, velopment that enjoyed certain prestige prior to Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland, Ghana, Ethiopia the era of structural adjustment, we must also and Mauritius. Despite those examples of diversi- include the idea of the developmental state. In fication, most African exports to the United States other words, the process of development must have consisted of oil and gas: 80 %. In a recent not be driven only by market forces; governments official report entitled Beyond AGOA (2016), the must be the ones who have to lead the process United States assumed that the nonreciprocal of development. In that respect, the AfCFTA as a preferences will end in 2025, which means that transformative commitment implies strong pub- the diversification of African exports via the AGOA lic leadership, leaving behind the more liberal is going to be more difficult. and less statist approach of the structural adjustment programmes. Beyond the scant economic growth generated The transforming potential of the AfCFTA in the framework of the structural adjustment programmes, another reason that explains the The AfCFTA is conceived as a tool at the service of change of approach is the demographic challenge a goal to promote the economic transformation in Africa. The United Nations projections for the of the continent, as defined in the AU’s Agenda continent as a whole show that the population 2063. In this context, by economic transformation will double from 1.256 billion people at present to we understand a process of change in the type 2.528 billion in 2050. The leap in scale is remark- of economic activities, shifting from low-produc- able and any development policy intended to be tivity activities to others of higher productivity. deployed in the continent must take those figures For example, shifting from subsistence farming to into consideration. If we focus on the population commercial farming, manufacturing or services of working age, from the current 663 million peo- such as tourism. The economic growth derived ple aged between 15 and 64 in Africa there will a from these more productive activities will have shift to 1.131 billion in 2035 and to 1.565 billion in more solid foundations that that which is merely 2050. In other words, in the course of a little over derived from an increase in the price of commodi- three decades the population of working age in ties, something that has been happening since Africa is going to increase by some 900 million the beginning of this century in many countries of people. The flow of young people who year after Africa with the so-called commodities super cycle year join the labour market is massive. Hence the (2000-2014), a period in which prices increased urgency of gearing public policies to the mobilisa- significantly. tion of resources and economic transformation, In the last decade, there has been a prolifera- fostering the creation of productive employment tion of official reports and academic studies on and an inclusive growth pattern. the issue of economic transformation in Africa. If we look over the economic history of the After two decades of structural adjustment pro- developed countries, and those developing grammes sponsored by the World Bank and the countries that have attained a certain degree of IMF, based on giving more prominence to the economic transformation too, industrialisation

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is central to the process of change. Hence pro- tion chain since the 1990s, relocating processes moting industry currently features in every one of (offshoring) or subcontracting the supply of cer- the continent’s long-term development propos- tain inputs to other companies located elsewhere als, following a long period of deindustrialisation. in the globe (outsourcing). Well managed, this is Taking data from the World Bank, in 1981 indus- an opportunity for the economic transformation try accounted for 49.7 % of the GDP of Sub-Saha- of developing countries. To a large extent, China’s ran Africa, while in 2017 it was just 23.3 %. Within export success has been based on its incorpora- the data for industry, if we look specifically at the tion into these global value chains. The degree of figures relative to manufacturing, in the same pe- participation of Africa in these global value chains riod it has gone from 24.6 % to 9.9 %. Decades of is limited, even in the agribusiness sector in coun- structural adjustment are certainly being felt in tries with some potential, as in the case of cocoa the process of deindustrialisation. in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria or Cameroon, so The AfCFTA is conceived as another tool of these countries continue essentially exporting support for the continent’s process of reindustri- raw cocoa with almost no further elaboration. alisation, as industrial exports are the ones that Although it may prove tricky for Africa to find can potentially benefit most from it, countering a way into global value chains, the construction the dependence on the export of commodities. of regional value chains could be a more realistic These, especially oil and gas, are Africa’s main option. In that respect, the AfCFTA is also con- export items: 76 % of African exports out of the ceived as an opportunity to foster the emergence continent consist of commodities (figures for of those regional value chains. In other words, as 2010-2014). However, as far as intra-African trade trade integration among African countries is go- is concerned, 61 % of African exports to other Afri- ing to favour exchange, that could be a boost to can countries consist of manufactured goods and ‘regionalise’ industrial production processes and other industrial products such as capital goods the emergence of regional value chains. Algeria, (2010-2014). As a result, if the AfCFTA is going to Angola, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa lead in- boost intra-African trade, it will be in favour of tra-African trade, yet their intra-African exports industrial exports, fostering productive diversi- barely incorporate added value from other Afri- fication. can countries. In Egypt, for example, only 0.8 % With that goal of diversification in mind, the of the added value of its exports to Africa comes approval of the start of the negotiations leading from other African countries. In other words, to the signing of the AfCFTA in 2012 was accom- there is scope for the expansion of these region- panied on the part of the AU by the launch of the al value chains in the framework of the AfCFTA, Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) programme. with the ultimate goal of orienting the economy Moreover, the Agenda 2063 too encompasses towards structural transformation13. productive transformation programmes such as Informal cross-border trade will be one of the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa the aspects where it is envisaged the AfCFTA can (AIDA), approved in 2008, and the Programme for have a specific impact on women. It is estimated Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), from that 70 % of the informal cross-border trade in 2012. Africa is carried out by women. The informal na- In the global economy’s current setup, most ture of this activity means that the women are international trade does not consist of finished particularly vulnerable to harassment, violence, products, but of intermediate products that are confiscation of goods and even imprisonment. incorporated into international value chains. The With the scheduled reduction in tariffs, it will be fragmentation of production is a feature of the current world economy. Numerous multinational 13 UNECA: Economic Report on Africa: Industrializing companies have been fragmenting their produc- Through Trade, 2015, pp. 102-110.

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more attractive to operate through formal chan- The rules of origin are another of the difficul- nels and, therefore, with greater protection. If ties that arise when it comes to implementing a we also factor in the scheduled simplification of free trade area. These rules seek to ensure that customs procedures, the final result may have a the origin of the goods circulating inside a free positive gender bias14. trade area really is in one of the countries that make up the area, with the aim of preventing the phenomenon of trade diversion16. However, Difficulties implementing the AfCFTA the AfCFTA will have to be careful and avoid too complex rules of origin, which could be used as As we said earlier, the AfCFTA agreement does not protectionist measures among member coun- consist solely of setting tariff reductions, but, like tries of the area. What’s more, complex rules any process of establishing a free trade area, it may be an obstacle for small and medium-sized implies more measures. The average tariff on in- businesses and small traders and farmers. Tak- tra-African trade is just 6 %, a moderate amount, ing into account the fact that the AfCFTA is for but which hides numerous tariff spikes in sectors the moment an aggregation of different regional that could promote productive diversification groupings, the harmonisation of the different based on trade. rules of origin in force in each of them would In fact, the difficulties in intra-African trade appear to be a vital and, at the same time, often have little to do with tariffs. If we look at complex task to facilitate the consolidation of what happens with nontariff barriers, they can regional value chains on an African level, one be costly and obstructive for small and medium- of the pillars of the industrialising vision of the sized businesses, as well as for informal cross- AfCFTA. border trade, conducted chiefly by women. The In the face of mass and sudden imports of administrative procedures at customs posts are products, or trade dumping, that can harm lo- often not clear, they are subject to arbitrary acts cal industries, governments can activate trade by the authorities that frequently lead to petty defence mechanisms to limit imports. In fact, corruption and significant waste of time. That they are already provided for at the World Trade affects not only goods, but also the procedures Organisation (WTO). Another difficulty arises for the passage of people and the inspection of here in the framework of the AfCFTA, as only the containers and trucks. Once past customs, nor do more economically advanced countries in the the constant police checkpoints on roads help continent have trade defence mechanisms cur- trade and the movement of people. While the rently in force (Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and AfCFTA includes provisions on nontariff barriers Tunisia). There is another group of 11 of signatory relating to technical, sanitary and phytosanitary countries of the AfCFTA that does not form part standards, the functioning of customs is often a of the WTO and therefore does not have that le- bigger barrier15. gal cover17. The trade defence mechanism in the

14 In both COMESA and in the EAC, simplified trade re- cludes a complaints support service for individual people gimes frameworks were introduced in 2007, aimed a (http://tradebarriers.org). facilitating small-scale cross-border trade, with positive 16 By “trade diversion” we mean that goods from a third results in terms of greater regularisation, increased activ- country are reexported through a member country of the ity and greater security for the women engaged in this free trade area to illegitimately obtain better tariff treat- type of trade. ment in the country of final destination of the goods. 15 The Tripartite Free Trade Area –which encompasses 17 Algeria, Comoros, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, COMESA, EAC and SADC—, has introduced a mechanism Libya, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, South Sudan, Su- for the supervision and removal of nontariff barriers. It in- dan and Western Sahara.

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framework of the AfCFTA is not clearly defined, Conclusions which makes it necessary to do so, particularly for the weaker countries with fewer resources to Different factors explain the signing of the Af- apply that type of measure. CFTA agreement in March 2018: the need to The lack of economic infrastructures is one of rationalise the current accumulation and over- the most important bottlenecks for the deploy- lapping of numerous regional agreements in ment of the AfCFTA. Transport and communica- Africa; the scant figures for intra-African trade; tion infrastructure such as ports, bridges, roads, the emergence of megaregional trade agree- railways and telecommunications, conceived ments that might marginalise Africa still further from a regional viewpoint, appear essential. Ac- in international trade; and the desire to imple- cording to a study by the African Development ment policies oriented towards the economic Bank, the funding requirements for infrastructure transformation of the continent in the face of in Africa are calculated in a range of 130 billion the challenge of employment. to 170 billion dollars a year, of which 62 billion The transforming potential of the AfCFTA is are currently covered. In other words, there is not limited to that derived from the expansion a shortfall of between 68 billion and 108 billion of trade. Behind it there is a whole vision of long- dollars18. term structural change that forms part of the Afri- Lastly, three African countries have not yet can Union’s Agenda 2063. Therefore, we will have joined the AfCFTA, which prompts one to wonder to be alert to whether the AfCFTA will really be a about the reasons for that voluntary exclusion. tool for mobilising resources and the long-term As in any process of economic integration, there development of Africa’s productive capabilities are winners and losers, so if the benefits or the – especially in job creation – or whether a more compensation mechanisms for the sectors poten- market-oriented vision of fostering economic ex- tially harmed are not clearly seen, doubts may changes based on comparative advantages will arise among the possible participating countries. ultimately prevail. The case of Nigeria is the most striking, as it is the The optimism with which the AfCFTA is pre- continent’s most populous country (191 million) sented must be toned down, as its success is not and its GDP is the biggest in Africa (17 % of the going to depend solely on the specific mecha- total). Nigeria has a major domestic market and nisms put in place in the framework of the agree- the complex political economy of the country has ment. The consolidation of a true industrial policy made it a rather protectionist country, open only in the national and sub-regional spaces, as well to ECOWAS. The official reason the government as maintaining a constant flow of public and pri- gives not to join the AfCFTA is that the round of vate investment in the productive sectors and in consultations with the different economic play- infrastructure, may determine things as much or ers (employers and unions) in the different states more than tariff reduction or a regulatory frame- comprising the country’s federal structure has work for investments. still to be completed. The underlying reasons Lastly, it must be taken into account that, as in have rather more to do with the fear of opening any process of integration, there are winners and up an economy with a significant protectionist losers. So, if the compensation mechanisms are dimension until now19. not clear and the adjustments in the productive structure in some countries prove painful, the AfCFTA will lose its original meaning as a tool at the service of economic transformation and the 18 African Development Bank: African Economic Outlook 2018, 2018, pp. 70. creation of long-term productive capabilities in 19 Berahab; Dadush: Will the African Free Trade Agree- Africa. ment Succeed?, OCP Policy Brief, PB-18/10, 2018.

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References rican Continental Free Trade Area Agreement, African Export-Import Bank, Cairo, 2018. African Development Bank: African Economic Out- Berahab, R., and Dadush, U.: Will the African Free look 2018, 2018. Trade Agreement Succeed?, OCP Policy Brief, African Union: Agreement Establishing the African PB-18/10, 2018. Continental Free Trade Area, African Union, Ki- UNECA: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa gali, 2018. VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area Afreximbank: African Trade Report 2018. Boost- About, United Nations Economic Commission ing Intra-African Trade: Implications for the Af- for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2017.

inf_africa_ingles.indb 43 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 44 3/6/19 18:44 4. Africa on the agenda of the new emerging partners: complementarity or alternative?

Mbuyi Kabunda Badi

In view of the limited results delivered by North- system (suppression of the preferential agree- South bilateral and multilateral cooperation ments or comprehensive multilateralisation of (which allocates more funds to combating ter- trade, according to World Trade Organisation rorism than it does to the eradication of poverty [WTO] rules) and Structural Adjustment Pro- in Africa), the African countries have sought – in grammes (macroeconomic measures essentially a complementary manner, not as an alterna- based on the theory of comparative advantages, tive – inter-African cooperation, on the one hand, the reduction of the public sector and privatisa- and,on the other, South-South cooperation with tions in line with the Washington Consensus). the Asian and Latin American countries, and now The lack of democratisation of the international with the emerging countries, particularly Brazil, institutions, particularly the WTO, impedes the Russia, China and South Africa (BRICS)1. countries of the South from using international The yield from 60 years of development coop- trade for their development by defending the eration is disheartening. The wealthy countries monopoly and interests of the companies or the have not met their pledge to allocate 0.7% of their multinationals and not of the people by impos- GDP to public development assistance. Africa is ing the same rules on all (in the framework of still last on the list in terms of foreign direct in- the total liberalisation of trade), without taking vestment (FDI), which was what gave rise to the into account the asymmetries existing between rapid development of Asia. There have been no them. In short, the primary goal of assistance, major changes in the world economic rules, par- broadly tied or conditioned, has rarely been to ticularly in the fields of trade and debt. Commod- combat poverty. On the contrary, it has served ity prices, which fell by 65% between 1975 and the political, trade and geostrategic interests of 2001, have blocked the African states’ own de- the donors. velopment projects. The Stabex and the Sysmin We must also mention, on the part of the ben- schemes, established by the Lomé conventions eficiaries, or the Southern countries (African in (a generalised system of preferences for the less this case), the lack of institutional capabilities, advanced countries through the stabilisation of the squandering of the funds received, along revenues from selected agricultural and mining with widespread corruption and the use of the products), have been replaced by the Cotonou funds received for other goals than development, or mismanagement (funding the swollen public administration and patronage or neo-patrimonial 1 The acronym was coined in 2003 by Jim O’Neill, from the consultancy firm Goldman Sachs International, to il- networks, and so on). Essentially, the failure is lustrate the economic potential of these countries. South down to the maintenance of counterproductive Africa was included in 2011, in Sanya (China). macroeconomic policies.

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All those internal and external problems have South-South cooperation strategies through stimulated South-South cooperation, which we regional integration and common fronts shall analyse below. In the face of the domination of trade or of the world economy by the Western Europe-North South-South cooperation: historic and doctrinal America-Japan trio, the persistence of asymme- origins tries of all kinds and the current international economic and financial crisis, the Southern coun- South-South cooperation began in the 1950s, tries are looking to bolster the interdependence during the Cold War, to bolster the indepen- and complementarities among them to secure dence and security and the economic and so- international recognition. Making the most of cial development of third-world countries by the weakened neoliberal paradigm and the emer- means of the transformation of the international gence of new players in the world economy, they system and the elimination of the asymmetries seek to form a front in multilateral trade negotia- with the North. It is underpinned by the basic tions or talks with the North through regionalisa- principle of horizontality, championed at the tion and strategic alliances. Bandung Conference of 1955 by the Movement Through regional agreements based on geo- of Non-Aligned Countries created in 1961, or by graphical proximity, they seek to strengthen the the Group of 77 (now 134) developing countries community of interests, joining forces with coun- created in 1964. These projects defended the tries at the same level of development, creating unity of the third world, denounced the North- trade areas and responding to specific regional South divide and called for a new international needs. The commitment to regionalism in the economic order. South is explained by the lack of prospects of With the end of the Cold War, the concept of small countries and the failure of national de- third world became, in the words of Philippe velopment policies. In Africa’s case, regionalism Hugon, an ‘empty shell’. While it is still used, the is an opportunity to transcend the arbitrary and notion of third world today covers an eclectic artificial borders inherited from colonisation and group of countries among which it is possible insignificant domestic markets with the creation to distinguish: the emerging countries or the of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of new industrialised countries, incorporated into interstate cooperation, considered the pillars of or on the road to integration into globalisation; the African Economic Community (AEC) created the oil-producing countries or those with rentier in Abuja on 3 June 1991 and whose taking effect economies; the poor or least developed countries is scheduled for 2028: the ECOWAS, the COMESA, (LDCs), which are marginalised and condemned the SADC, the AMU and the ECCAS, all of which to poverty, and the fragile or ‘failed’ states (where have a regional purpose and were created out- the state is incapable of controlling its territory side the colonial legacy. These RECs should be and providing basic public services to the popula- harmonised, coordinated and gradually merged, tion). It would be more accurate to speak of ‘third avoiding duplication, to achieve the previously worlds’, ‘souths’ or ‘peripheries’ (in plural) to re- mentioned goal of the AEC. flect their geographical, historical and economic Through the strengthening of common fronts diversity, their diversity of economic, political or unionisation (commodities exporters’ cartels and cultural strategies, as well as their degree of and strategies of confrontation), over the last two integration in the world economy. It is true, how- decades the countries of the South have succeed- ever, that all these countries face major difficul- ed in creating new alliances, such as: ties in satisfying the economic, political and civil •• The G20 developing nations (21 countries in rights of their people. 2005): a group created in 2003 on the initiative

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of Brazil and made up of Argentina, South Af- port their own industrialisation and internal de- rica, India and China, among others, to oppose velopment. the trade policy of the EU and the United States. Furthermore, the fifth BRICS summit in Durban •• The G33: a group of 42 Southern countries, 33 in March 2013 established a new common develop- at first, to oppose the total liberalisation of the ment bank with initial capital of 50 billion dollars agricultural markets. allocated to funding infrastructures and strategic •• The G90: a group of 90 developing countries – development projects in Africa, thus placing the which brings together the African, Caribbean continent at the heart of their geopolitical and and Pacific (ACP) countries, the African Union geo-economic strategies. In their cooperation in countries and the rest of the least developed Africa, these countries give priority to agriculture countries –, 64 of which are members of the to achieve food security and food self-sufficiency WTO, to defend the South’s interests in that and to reduce the negative effects of the EU’s Com- organisation. mon Agricultural Policy on the continent. The yield from these strategies is not very en- In general, the African countries prefer this couraging. Barring certain Latin American experi- South-South cooperation to North-South coop- ences (Mercosur or the ALBA, for example, geared eration because it respects their national sover- to strengthening internal markets), regionalism eignties, treats them as equals, carries no political in the South is mediocre on the whole because of conditionalities and refrains from giving them the persistence of economic, trade and political lessons in democracy, good government and obstacles, particularly the following: the major human rights. If the emerging countries, which differences and inequalities among the countries have the advantage of nocolonial past, have set of the South, with very open or outgoing and not themselves the primary goal of combating pov- very diversified economies, which weakens them erty on the African continent and the promotion from within and in their relations with the North, of human and social development, the evalua- or the adoption of the unsuitable approach of pro- tion that can be made today is highly contentious free trade integration (mimicking the EU) without for the reasons already mentioned. having prior production capacities and internal markets. Many of these groups have failed to go beyond mere rhetoric and good intentions. The Case studies of the emerging countries’ cooperation countries of the South are essentially character- in Africa ised by dependence on the fluctuation in com- modity prices on the international market, the Africa receives significant assistance from sev- weaknesses of the nation-state and the prolifera- eral countries of the South and engages in trade tion of armed conflicts inside and between states. with countries such as China, India, Korea, Indo- However, we can underscore that trade and nesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, Turkey, Saudi financial relations between Africa and the BRICS Arabia or Israel. We shall limit ourselves here to have significantly improved the average rate of the BRICS, given the lack of sufficient informa- growth of the African countries in the last decade. tion and available or reliable statistics on Africa’s Between 2000 and 2015, the emerging countries cooperation with other partners. contributed 25% of the FDI benefiting Africa in the period, thanks to their interest in African natural resources, particularly the mining and energy China and Africa sectors, in the purchase of land to produce food and for biofuel (ethanol) and in infrastructure and During the Cold War, the African countries reconstruction. In other words, these new partners ceived the support of China against both US and are interested in Africa’s natural resources to sup- Soviet imperialism in favour of the Maoist ‘third

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way’. Today we see two complementary partners na’s imports; and Angola, in 14th place, with 23.2 who need each other. In this relentless global billion euros, or 1.6% of China’s imports). The oil- economic war, China is thirsty for hydrocarbons producing countries – Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, or oil to support its industrialisation and internal Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Chad – and mining development and has a surplus of capital2; Africa countries – DRC and Zambia – are the only ones has a distinct lack of capital and infrastructures that run a trade surplus with China; the rest have and enormous amounts of natural resources. a trade deficit. The two have decided to cooperate, since 2006, Therefore, the criticism according to which through the FOCAC, the Forum on China-Africa China practises neo-colonialism in Africa and fa- Cooperation. vours the mining sector or plundering appears Chinese companies have taken hold of 40% of exaggerated and has no objective foundation, as the biggest infrastructure contracts on the conti- the figures demonstrate the opposite. nent. And according to the contract signed with True, China is chiefly interested in African cop- the African Union at its ultramodern headquar- per, iron and manganese, but as well as mining ters in Addis Ababa (built by China) in January it invests in the transport, energy, construction, 2015, China pledged to carry out mammoth proj- agriculture, financial and technology sectors. It is ects aimed at connecting all 55 African countries one of the main foreign investors in Africa. It in- through transport infrastructure, with roads, air- vests in all African countries, both rich and poor, ports and high-speed railways, thus contributing both sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, and it to regional integration in Africa. Over 2,000 Chi- wants to accompany Africa on the path towards nese companies work in 50 African countries and industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisa- they have carried out over 1,000 projects, built tion3. 22,000 kilometres of railways and 3,530 kilome- However, as Thierry Sanjuan says, the Asian tres of roads. It must also be said that nearly 1 country has serious internal problems arising million Chinese work in Africa. from its disparities: the prosperous, urban China However, and despite these feats, the invest- on the coast, with a level of development on a par ment in the continent only accounts for 3.1% of with the Asian dragons and tigers; inland China, the total Chinese investment abroad. Asia and with an intermediate standard of living, and the the United States remain priority partners of Chi- western part of China that is rural and poor, con- nese trade and investment ahead of Africa. One signed to Third World conditions4, as well as fac- of China’s maingoals is to lead the zone to which ing a rise in Islamist terrorism. it naturally belongs and in which it wishes to ex- In short, China, which overtook the United tend its influence: Asia. The Asian giant exports States as the African countries’ main trading part- twice the goods to Korea that it does to the Afri- ner in 2010 – with trade estimated today at some can continent. It is reliant on US high tech for its 222 billion dollars –, bases its cooperation in the economic development and exports a third of its continent on the so-called Beijing Consensus, goods or products to that country. resting on three principles: non-interference in Only two African countries featured among China’s main suppliers in 2013 (South Africa, in 11th place, with 35.1 billion euros, or 2.5% of Chi- 3 In the sixth FOCAC summit in Johannesburg in Decem- ber 2015, President Xi Jinping presented a programme of future Chinese cooperation in Africa that covers nearly ev- 2 This surplus of capital is illustrated by the New Silk ery aspect of the continent’s future economic and social Road, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, an im- development: industry, agriculture, infrastructure, the mense land and maritime trade route project involving environment, trade, combating poverty, public health. over 60 countries with estimated investment of some 1 4 The centre and west of the country are extensively un- billion dollars. derdeveloped.

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internal affairs (absence of conditionalities, ex- Africa and China must move beyond the mind- cept for acceptance of ‘One China’, with just one set of commodities or natural resources, which African country that recognises Taiwan remain- account for 56.5% of China’s imports from Africa, ing: Swaziland), mutual respect and benefits, or to engage in a new form of economic coopera- the ‘exchange economy’. We must also point out tion. The slowdown of the Chinese economy – as the cancelation or forgiveness of the debt of all a result of the international economic and finan- the African countries, participation in peacekeep- cial crisis starting in 2008, dropping to a growth ing operations, support for Africa’s demand for a rate of around 6% in the third quarter of 2018, seat on the United Nations Security Council and the lowest since 2009 – has lowered the demand participation in human capital formation, receiv- for natural resources from the Asian giant, with ing some 10,000 African students on scholarships. imports from Africa plummeting by nearly 40% China is selling the African countries its devel- in 2015. According to the Chinese economist opment model to lift the population out of pover- Xiang Songzuo in an interview in Le Monde on 22 ty, a model based on economic pragmatism and January 2019, the Chinese economy is in crisis, the combination of outward economic liberalism illustrated by deepening social disparities and with the dictatorship of the single party at home. corruption, despite continuing to have a signifi- In other words, economic realism in place of the cant middle class and a considerable number of ideological goals of the Cold War. Its main goals nouveaux riches. are the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and the conquest of the African markets. However, the following criticism can be made India and Africa of China’s cooperation in Africa: the Asian country ignores human rights, democratic principles and After a long period of lethargy, relations between environmental issues; it uses Africa as a market to India and Africa a currently quite dynamic. Afri- test its cheap goods (on needy and less demand- can exports to the country went from 3 billion ing customers); it engages in unfair competition, dollars in 2002 to 26 billion in 2013 and African resulting in the suffocation or destruction of the imports from India grew from 1.9 billion dollars African textile industry and popular economy, to 19.5 billion over the same period. India imports which are the future of the continent; it does coal, uranium and, above all, oil from the African not respect the trade union rights of what little continent and has a very significant presence African labour it uses for the construction of the in the sectors of infrastructures, telephony, the infrastructure, and it poses a foreseeable threat pharmaceutical industry (antiretrovirals) and hy- to African land through export agriculture that giene and beauty products, along with transport, would harm the African people’s crops for home as Tata buses and motorcycles are present and consumption, as well as arms sales, acting like a much used in many African cities. ‘pyromaniac fireman’. As in the case of China, India’s assistance to China is in a trade war with the United States, Africa does not lay down political conditionali- the country with which it is battling to be the ties and it favours the education and agricultural world’s major power; it has managed to extend sectors to set it apart from Western cooperation its soft power in the continent with the expansion and that of its rival, China. India contributes to of its cultural influence through the creation of the training of 15,000 African students and fosters Confucius Institutes in some 20 African countries, telemedicine and telelearning with the African along with conversion of the continent’s coun- countries. In 2015, trade between the two was es- tries into a genuine reserve of young diplomatic timated at some 75 billion dollars, making India talent in the international forums, particularly Africa’s fourth-biggest trading partner, with FDI the United Nations. valued at some 34 billion dollars (21% of India’s

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FDI in the world), which makes it the fifth-biggest products or industrial services, mainly linked to foreign investor in Africa. computing, pharmaceuticals and construction Initially geared towards the countries of East and transport. Africa, the Indian Ocean and South Africa, where India is still a developing country with major there are significant diasporas, estimated at 2.6 structural restrictions and problems and limited million people (or 12% of the total Indian diaspo- resources6. As in the case of China, there are ra), today India extends its cooperation to other two Indias: the urban India, made up of English African countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Su- speakers and people trained in the country’s ma- dan, countries from which it imports a substantial jor schools (the minority), and rural India (the part of its oil. The India-Africa Forum Summit has majority), which is excluded, as well as facing existed since 2008. It is held every three years and serious problems of electrification(250 million is equipped with an estimated budget of some people do not have access to electricity and 350 380 billion dollars to fund telecommunications, million are illiterate) and of agricultural neglect, road and electricity infrastructures. The aim is to of social infrastructure and human development use the assistance as a tool for political influence, internally7, problems to which it gives priority. to secure a seat on an expanded United Nations This does not allow it to cooperate with Africa Security Council. adequately. India’s current prime minister, Narendra Modi5, Given that it is impossible to compete with is trying to develop soft power in Africa through the Asian giant, as it does not have sufficient an increase in public development assistance, the economic and political means, India is trying to gradual creation of a broad diplomatic network support the process of regional integration in and the setting up of Indian banks and a line of Africa (collaborating with the African Union, the credit in preferential conditions for the African NEPAD and Africa’s regional groups) and put the countries. Between 2015 and 2020, India will have emphasis on projects with high ecological value granted 10 billion dollars in financial assistance and content, such as the Solar Alliance or the to Africa, so the India-Africa summit of 2015 an- Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which stresses hu- nounced, with the condition of allocating 85 % of man and ecologically sustainable development. that aid to the purchase of Indian companies’ In short, India, with a surplus of qualified products. labour, will be world’s third-biggest economic Like China, India is interested in Africa in or- power in 2050, after the United States and China der to gain access to hydrocarbons (Africa ac- and ahead of Europe. It bases its African policy counts for 20% of Indian oil imports) and export on three core areas: involvement in peacekeep- its manufactured goods to Africa’s markets, as ing operations, non-alignment (this time through well as taking part in peacekeeping operations ‘strategic autonomy’) or the updated version of in countries such as DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea the philosophy inherited from Nehru, on a sense and Liberia. of equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co- Indian cooperation in Africa pursues two existence. main goals: securing access to African natural resources to meet its energy needs (oil and coal) and its need for economic growth, and securing 6 Yet trade between India and Africa went from 5.49 bil- access to the African market for the export of its lion dollars to 68.58 billion dollars between 2001 and 2011/12. 7 Compared with China, India lags behind somewhat 5 In the Davos World Economic Forum on 23 January in terms of infrastructures, standing 66th in the world 2018, he championed the lifting of trade barriers, com- ranking in the field (backwardness in the construction of paring protectionism to the threat of terrorism and the roads, railways, ports and in the distribution of electricity consequences of climate change. in its territory).

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Brazil and Africa gramme was established, or a triangular cooperation initiative – involving the Brazilian Brazil has important historical, cultural and lin- government in association with governmental guistic ties with Africa – it is the second-biggest and multilateral agencies, or the Brazilian Coop- country with a significant black population, af- eration Agency (ABC) with the governments of ter Nigeria –, with relations that date back to the five African countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozam- 1960s. Initially, they were limited to the Portu- bique, Niger and Senegal) with the collaboration guese-speaking countries and were low-profile of the United Kingdom’s Department for Interna- owing to the little interest shown by the military tional Development, the World Food Programme dictatorships, which were more interested in re- (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation lations with the North, particularly the United of the United Nations (FAO) –, with the goal of States. contributing to food security and boosting family Starting in 2003, under President Luiz Inácio farming, along with food assistance. Additionally, Lula da Silva (2002-2010), new impetus was given given the geographical and climatic similarities to relations with the staging of the Brazil-Africa between certain regions of Brazil and the African Forum in Fortaleza. Africa was considered a prior- continent, Brazil has used that comparative ad- ity, allocating major resources to the sub-Saharan vantage in its cooperation with Africa to foster countries because of the supposed debt owed to rural development through tropical agriculture the continent for slavery, from which Brazil great- and the exploitation of natural resources and in- ly benefitted. Afro-Brazilians comprise over half dustrial development. of the population of 180 million people (Africa However, Brazil faces serious limitations exists in Brazil). In 2003, trilateral South-South linked to its poor banking and education sys- cooperation was established among India, Brazil tems, as well as being the BRICS country report- and South Africa to give African people access to ing least growth. There is a Brazil that is growing generic medicines to fight the HIV virus and AIDS and integrated into globalisation and a Brazil of and to seek a seat in the United Nations on behalf the excluded, who live in favelas, mostly made up of their respective continents. of the Afro-Brazilian population, which comprises Brazilian cooperation in Africa during the most of the prison population. The triumph of the terms of Lula and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) ultraconservative and neoliberal Jair Bolsonaro revolved around three core topics: strengthen- heralds an era of uncertainty, with his rhetoric ing diplomatic relations with Africa with the goal against what he calls ‘the ideologies of gender of extending its international influence and se- and of the Marxists’, and may mean major set- curing African support for holding a seat on the backs in Brazilian cooperation with Africa. United Nations Security Council; developing trade and investment relations between the two sides, particularly access to oil in countries such Russia and Africa as Angola, Nigeria and Algeria through the state- owned company Petrobras, and fostering solid Despite a major presence in Africa during the development cooperation focusing on agricul- Cold War, after the disappearance of the USSR, ture, energy, education and health. Russia adopted a very low profile. Today, how- Lula made 33 trips to Africa and visited 23 Af- ever, it competes with the Western powers and rican countries in his two terms of office, sign- the emerging countries in the mining and hy- ing several cooperation agreements, with the drocarbons fields, where there is an increasingly emphasis food and agricultural cooperation to noticeable presence of Russian companies, par- attack Africa’s biggest problem: hunger. In 2012, ticularly in South Africa, Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, the Purchase from Africans for Africa (PPA) Pro- Ghana and DRC.

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President Vladimir Putin is determined to re- because of its internal and external structural gain ground and increase his country’s influence weaknesses, particularly its faded military pow- on the continent. For Russia, Africa is a market er, the fragility of its economic potential, its lack for military materiel and weapons8; for telecom- of command of new technologies, separatist munications (as in Angola); for diamonds; for risks or serious secessionist threats (Chechnya) supplying nuclear technology (Egypt, Zambia and the rise of Islamist terrorism. It is trying to and Rwanda), the latter field being dominated restore its presence in many countries of the until recently by the French multinational Areva South, African countries in particular, relying on (which built the only nuclear power plant in the its old networks of cooperation and solidarity in continent, in Koeberg, South Africa); for agricul- the Soviet era, in this case on the African elites tural projects (Senegal); for oil and gas explora- educated in the USSR. Medvedev, who succeed- tion (Mozambique and Gabon) or for accessing ed Putin (between 2008 and 2012) in this first pe- natural resources such as cobalt, coltan, gold and riod, increased trade relations with the African diamonds from DRC, and so on. countries, particularly with Egypt, Algeria and Moscow’s Africa agenda also consists of secur- Morocco9. ing the support of the 55 African states in interna- In its commitment to a multipolar world and tional forums, building on the traditional Soviet diplomatic multilateralism, Russia uses the BRICS alliances with countries such as South Africa, to counter the influence and hegemony of the Angola, Egypt, Zimbabwe and Sudan, and on United States and demands respect for interna- new strategies of seduction such as cancelling tional law, prompting it to protest the offensive the debt of several African countries, estimated activities of NATO, which directly contributed to at some 20 billion dollars, and the adoption of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi when the United Na- a system of preferential access to its markets tions resolution had limited its mission to pro- for African products, along with participation in tecting the population. peacekeeping operations. To sum up, Moscow – which has lost its su- However, like South Africa, Russia has a min- perpower status, becoming a medium power ing economy (it is the world’s second-biggest with aspirations that are more continental than producer of gas and oil), which places it in a situ- global – is conducting an unprecedented diplo- ation of rivalry with the African countries in the matic offensive with important initiatives and international markets. investments in Africa, with a view to recover- We are no longer in the era of the Soviet ing its status as a power in the continent and Union, where 100,000 African students trained making significant returns on its investments, at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, which are concentrated in the hydrocarbons which is now closed. It operated in Africa dur- (gas and oil) sectors or civilian nuclear energy. ing the Cold War through Cuba and the Eastern However, it is limited by its economic fragilities countries. Today, it has become a ‘reemerging and internal politics and by the fierce competi- power’ that seeks its ‘reemergence’ in the new tion from the traditional and emerging powers multipolar world order. It has sufficient means in a continent with which it maintained, in 2007, to make its voice heard, but not to assert itself, trade relations estimated at some 4.45 billion dollars.

8 Russia is currently the world’s second-biggest arms exporter and the main exporter to the continent, particu- 9 In sub-Saharan Africa, Moscow has focused its relations larly to Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and on countries such as Angola, Guinea Conakry, Namibia, Sudan – countries in which 90% of the military materiel Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa, with cooperation comes from Russia –, and to the countries under United projects with countries such as DRC, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Nations arms embargo. Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar and Mali.

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South Africa and Africa can be no development without peace and vice versa, and the role of representing Africa on Lying at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and Latin an international level with its accession to the America, post-apartheid, democratic South Africa BRICS. has adopted a policy of cooperation towards the It has equipped itself with a democratic con- continent since the African National Congress stitution that is one of the most progressive in came to power in 1994. In 2007, it created the the world (political-administrative decentralisa- South African Development Partnership Agency tion and proper representation of the minorities) (SADPA), with a budget valued at some 50 million and has become a genuine ‘replacement mother- dollars and which allocates between 0.7% and land’, since African immigrants head more for that 1% of its GDP to bilateral and multilateral devel- country than they do towards the North, com- opment cooperation with the African countries10. prising 33% of the South African population. It This cooperation is triangular, between two part- lends assistance to neighbouring countries, even ners from the South and another from the North, cancelling the debt of countries such as Swazi- which provides technical or financial assistance, land, Mozambique and Namibia. It also tries to and makes South Africa a development partner turn geographical proximity into a comparative rather than a net donor. That approach to part- advantage over other emerging powers and West- nership emphasises the dimension of equality ern donors. This priority towards Africa and the between partners and the national appropriation surrounding countries is because, according to of the project by the recipient country, with South Mandela, ‘the future of South Africa is in Africa’. Africa distancing itself in that respect from tradi- South Africa cannot afford to be an island of pros- tional cooperation, based on a donor-recipient perity in an ocean of poverty. relationship, thus deploying its soft power in the To sum up, South Africa is an African econom- continent. ic, political and military power and the primary South Africa’s policy on Africa revolves around African investor, along with Morocco. South Af- the following points: the African renaissance (or rican private and public investment in the SADC the priority of the African agenda) against Afro- countries in the second half of the 1990s exceed- pessimism and the international marginalisa- ed that of Great Britain and the United States tion of Africa; the conquest of the continent’s combined. However, the country faces signifi- markets – starting with its natural area of in- cant limitations, such as the persistence of the fluence, southern Africa – for its manufactured economic and social inequalities inherited from goods and for the commodities required for its apartheid, the maintenance of structural unem- industrialisation; leadership in the process of ployment (38%) that particularly affects the black regional integration, with the transformation of population12, the expansion of the AIDS pandem- the OAU into the AU and the creation of the NE- ic and lack of safety, or the rivalry of other African PAD, along with participation in peacekeeping countries for continental or regional hegemony missions11, working on the principle that there (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Angola, Zimbabwe). Moreover, its economy continues to be based on mineral resources, like other African countries, 10 Chiefly the following countries: Botswana, Burkina with which it competes in this field in the inter- Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mo- national markets. zambique, Namibia, DRC, Uganda, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia. 11 It has mediated in some conflicts and has participated 12 That situation, with the resulting economic and social in peacekeeping missions in countries such as Burundi, problems it entails on the domestic front, leads to the DRC, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan (Dar- questioning of South Africa’s role as a donor of develop- fur), Liberia and Comoros. ment assistance

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Conclusion The long-term risk, as Julien Wagner warned, is that they will leave a devastated continent with The cooperation of the emerging countries allows impoverished populations, despite the major Africa to diversify its external partners. The goal is investments in infrastructures. China is increas- not to depend exclusively on the countries of the ingly being asked to provide fewer roads and North, have room for manoeuvre in international more jobs. That is why, while much appreciated negotiations and benefit from inflows of capital by African governments, Chinese cooperation is and technology, as well as improve its economic much criticised by the population. growth thanks to the strong demand for com- We are witnessing once again an ‘unequal modities from the Asian countries. The African exchange’ so decried in the past and which is countries express a clear preference for this new considered responsible for the logjam in the cooperation, which has significant advantages development of the continent. In other words, over North-South cooperation as it is not subject Africa continues to be a commodities or natu- to conditionalities and red tape and, above all, ral resources reserve, with the resulting ‘curse’13 because it diversifies the external partners. that implies, and a market for their manufactured However, the cooperation of the new part- goods. ners in no way favours the continent’s industrialisation, the transfer of technologies and job creation. What’s more, it contributes to the de- 13 Instead of contributing to the development of the Afri- struction of Africa’s tropical rainforests and the can people, commodities have brought them misfortune: exploitation of its subsoil, which contains many corruption, coups and wars. In other words, blood and of the minerals that the emerging countries need. tears.

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Iván Navarro Milián

Introduction conflict in Africa that lowered the intensity and impact of wars on that continent, which began Wars do end! In 2010, a year that marked the 50th to be fought along state peripheries and across anniversary of the independence of many African the territory of multiple countries by insurgency countries, Scott Strauss penned an article under groups too weak and factionalised to seize politi- this title1 in which he expressed optimism about cal power or hold significant territory. the decline of armed violence in Sub-Saharan Af- When Strauss’s article was published in African rica. He reported at that time that armed violence Affairs in March 2012 coinciding with the outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa was becoming less frequent of war in the north of Mali, the author was obliged and intense. There were half as many wars being to add a footnote acknowledging the presence fought in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 2000s of a conflict there triggered by the fall of Muam- than there had been a decade before, a period mar Gaddafi in Libya. The Arab-Tuareg rebellion marked by the end of the Cold War and the pro- in northern Mali quickly evolved into an armed liferation of particularly bloody wars in countries conflict of greater dimensions that led to a coup such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Ruanda, d’état against the government in Bamako by mili- the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Su- tary personnel unhappy with its handling of the dan and Uganda. The reduction of armed violence hostilities in the north, the proliferation of armed in the region was due to a number of factors that radical Islamic groups that managed to capture the included the waning of external support supposed country’s main northern cities (Kidal, Timbuktu by the end of the Cold War, the progressive emer- and Gao) and the emergence of numerous pro-gov- gence of multi-party systems that broadened the ernment Arab-Tuareg militias. Mali constituted the political arena and provided non-military chan- first significant consequence of the fall of Gaddafi nels for effecting change, the implementation of a in Libya in the context of the Arab Spring revolts – wider range of regional and international conflict the initial spark of a larger geopolitical firestorm resolution mechanisms such as UN peacekeep- soon to sweep across the Sahel,2 unleashing a new ing missions and other programmes developed by wave of violence that would dampen the optimism the African Union and organisations at a more re- about Africa’s future Strauss and others had ex- gional level and the strengthening of international pressed a decade earlier. In the wake of unrest in justice mechanisms, particularly following the Mali, serious armed conflicts broke out or escalated creation of the International Criminal Court. An- in three different regions: Boko Haram expanded other factor was a shift in the dynamics of armed its radius of action beyond northern Nigeria to the Lake Chad region (a vast area that includes parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon), flaunting 1 This article was republished in 2012 in African Affairs. Straus, S.: ‘Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa”, African Affairs, 2012, 2 Ping, J.: Eclipse sur l’Afrique, fallait-il tuer Kadhafi?, 111/443, pp. 179-201. Ediciones Michalon, 2014, pp. 145-146.

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its control of those territories as a sign of identity; Barcelona’s School for a Culture of Peace and numerous armed jihadist groups, most of which published in the 2018 edition of the school’s an- were linked to the al-Qaeda network in the Islamic nual Alerta! report on conflicts, human rights and Maghreb (AQIM), spread out through the north of peacebuilding, of the various armed conflicts ac- Mali and became active in Burkina Faso, Niger and tive around the world in 2017, 14 (40%) were lo- Côte d’Ivoire as well; in December 2013, the fledg- cated in Africa.5 This was 4 more than had been ling state of South Sudan was plunged into a new taking place on the continent in 2010. Generally civil war; ongoing conflicts in the Central African speaking, these conflicts can be broken down Republic (CAR), Burundi and the DRC escalated in into two categories: the first characterised by a the volatile region of Central Africa; in the Horn of proliferation of self-proclaimed Islamist and ji- Africa, Al-Shabaab insurgents ramped up their at- hadist militias active primarily in northern Africa, tacks against African Union peacekeeping forces in the Western Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and the Somalia, and the list goes on. second concentrated in Central Africa involving The tipping point occurred in 2014, a convul- secular armed groups. Violence in both cases has sive year from a global perspective marked not been variably driven by the exclusion of certain only by the aggravation of armed conflicts raging groups from national politics and demands for a in Syria and Iraq but also the escalation of wars greater voice in political affairs, democratisation, in African countries such as Libya, Nigeria, South an end to political persecution and repression, Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and the CAR. More wars and greater self-government. were underway throughout the world in 2014 Of the fourteen armed conflicts currently un- than in any other year since 2000,3 and the death derway in Africa, six (in Libya, Algeria, Mali, Lake toll related to organised violence that year was Chad, Somalia and eastern DRC, where the ADF well over 100,000 – a figure unsurpassed since has gained a foothold)6 involve jihadist groups. 1994, the year of the Rwandan genocide.4 The other eight are concentrated mainly in Cen- This new wave of violence, which lowered op- tral African countries: Sudan (Darfur, South Ko- timism over the immediate future of the conti- rofan and the Blue Nile), South Sudan, the CAR, nent, has prompted initiatives to contain regional Burundi, the DRC (eastern provinces such as instability that have ranged from the deployment Kasai) and Ethiopia (Ogaden region). Generally of military missions to negotiations and in some speaking, the situation has been steadily deterio- cases a combination of the two. rating and violence has escalated in most of the conflict areas documented in 2017. Fighting has only abated to a notable degree in three places: The current situation Burundi, Darfur and the Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces of Sudan. The worst levels of violence According to data compiled by researchers af- at the time this report was being prepared were filiated with the Conflict and Peacebuilding Pro- in Libya, Lake Chad, Somalia, the Kasai region of gramme run by the Autonomous University of the DRC and South Sudan. Of these focal points of violence, the most recent to become embroiled in armed conflict is the Kasai province of 3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and In ternational Security’, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 6. 5 The School for a Culture of Peace. Alerta 2018! https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/YB-15- Informe sobre conflicto sarmados, derechos humanos Summary-EN.pdf y construcción de paz, Editorial Icaria, Barcelona, 2018. 4 Melander, E.: ‘Organized Violence in the World 2015. An 6 The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) originated in assessment by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’, UCDP, Uganda but has managed to establish a foothold in the Paper no. 9, Uppsala, Sweden, 2015. DRC as well.

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the DRC, where fighting broke out in 2017 and nisia and Libya) with links to ISIS, those with links has been particularly brutal due to fierce clashes to AQIM and those in the Sinai Peninsula linked between government troops and the Kamwina either to ISIS or Al-Qaeda).9 Nsapu militia and confrontations between vari- Such a situation has arisen in Mali, where various armed ethnic groups. The 2018 outbreak of ous jihadist factions linked to one or other of these armed violence in the region of Amabazonia in networks banded together to form a coalition. In western Cameroon caused by the deterioration of March 2017, Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoune, Katiba the security situation in that Anglophone region Macina and AQIM announced their merger into is the newest addition to the continent’s long list a new organisation aligned with Al-Qaeda they of ongoing conflicts. named Group for the Support of Islam and Mus- One of the most notable aspects of the current lims (GSIM).10 This fusion came in response to the violence in Africa apart from the fragmentation of ever-greater presence of ISIS in the region in the warring groups, is the transnational expansion of guise of organisations such as the Islamic State in terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS)7 the Great Sahara (ISGS), a splinter group originally and Al-Qaeda, both of which have created havoc part of Al Mourabitoune led by Adnan Abu Walid al- in countries such Iraq and Syria. The emergence Sahrawi that operates mainly in Liptako-Gourma and proliferation of smaller militias with agendas (a region comprising parts of Mali, Burkina Faso based on a nominal loyalty to one or the other and Niger) and the Islamic State in West Africa (the major group has vastly expanded the territorial name currently assumed by Boko Haram), which is radius of influence of both. ISIS and Al-Qaeda currently entrenched in the Lake Chad basin. have taken advantage of the disorder provoked Another important aspect of armed conflict by the Arab Spring revolts to expand the area un- in Africa is its increasing tendency to be transna- der their control and forge new alliances aligned tional and proliferate by means of complex cross- with their objective of inciting worldwide jihad. border networks that operate simultaneously in Africa is an important piece of this puzzle.8 Ac- various countries. For example, violence initially cording to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, concentrated in Mali has expanded and engulfed all of the active militant Islamist groups in Africa the Sahel region as well. The same has occurred maintain ties with either Boko Haram (ISIS) or in the case of Boko Haram, which started out in Al-Shabaab (Al-Qaeda) and can be classified into the north of Nigeria, but is now wreaking havoc three categories: those in the north of Africa (Tu- throughout the entire Lake Chad region. Violence instigated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia has likewise fostered insurgencies in Kenya and more recently 7 There has been no consensus regarding the name of the in the north of Mozambique. Armed conflicts in group led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which is most cases Central African countries such as the CAR, Sudan, framed as the Islam State (IS) but also referred to as the South Sudan and Burundi and the after effects of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or as Daesh, an acronym of its violence in Uganda and Rwanda have added to name in Arabic al-Dawla al-Islamyia fil Iraq wa’al Sham. the fragility and destabilisation of the zone. The term ISIS will be used in this chapter to refer to this movement. For further information on this subject, see: ‘Islamic State, Daesh or Isis: the dilemma of naming the 9 Africa Center for Strategic Studies: ‘Militant Islamist militants’, The Week UK, 13 July 2015. Available at: http:// Groups in 2017’, 2018. Available at: https://africacenter. www.theweek.co.uk/isis/62422/islamic-state-daesh-or- org/spotlight/activity-fewer-fatalities-linked-african- isis-the-dilemma-of-naming-the-militants militant-islamistgroups-2017/ 8 International Crisis Group: ‘Exploiting Disorder: Al- 10 ‘Jihadist Groups In The Sahel Region Formalize Qaeda and the Islamic State’, Crisis Group Special Report, Merger’, Jihadology, 27 March 2017. Available at: http:// 2016; Cilliers, J.: “Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in jihadology.net/2017/03/27/guest-post-jihadist-groups- Africa”, Institute for Security Studies, 286, 2015. in-the-sahel-region-formalize-merger/

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Impacts within Boko Haram that have led to internal leadership struggles and fractures. While the number of wars in Africa may have in- Although the violent deaths they cause are creased from ten in 2010 to the fourteen being lamentable, armed conflicts are responsible for waged today, conflicts on the continent are not other problems that lead to the destabilisation of only now more numerous than they were almost countries as well such forced human displacement a decade ago; their transnational nature makes and humanitarian crises. Statistics indicate that the them significantly more intense, a factor that number of people fleeing their homes and commu- supposes greater suffering on the part of civil- nities due to violence has increased dramatically ian populations in the regions affected. Inten- over the past few years. According to the UN Refu- sification of conflicts in Africa peaked in 2014, gee Agency (UNHCR), the number of people around a period of major Boko Haram activity, which the world uprooted from their homes by violence, accounted for the better part of conflict-related wars and persecution stood at a record 68.5 million fatalities reported for the continent that year.11 as of the end of 2017 and 16.2 million were forc- The 2015 Global Terrorism Index published by the ibly displaced in 2017 alone – a figure that works Institute for Economics and Peace qualified Boko out to an average of one person being displaced Haram as ‘the most deadly terrorist group in the every two seconds that year. Of this total, 25.4 mil- world’, noting that the group had been respon- lion were refugees who had fled their countries, 40 sible for 6,644 deaths in 2014, a figure substan- million were internally displaced persons14 and 3.1 tially above the 6,073 attributed to ISIS the same million were asylum-seekers.15 year.12 The Council of Foreign Relation’s Nigeria Statistics indicate that Africa is currently Security Tracker reported that despite the efforts home to 6.3 million refugees and 12.6 million of the African-led Multinational Joint Task Force internally displaced persons. The African states (MNJTF) deployed to the Lake Chad region for that have produced the greatest numbers of refu- the express purpose of reigning in Boko Haram gees to date are Sudan (2.4 million) and Somalia violence, fatalities attributed to the insurgency (986,400), both of which rank among the world’s group rose in 2015, with 7,492 deaths document- top five refugee origin countries. Most people ed in the four northern Nigerian states of Borno, fleeing South Sudan seek refuge in Uganda and Adamawa, Yobe and Gombe alone.13 The strategy Sudan, which are currently among the world’s employed by the MNJTF yielded more positive top ten asylum countries. Uganda has a refu- outcomes in 2016. The force has taken several gee population of 1.4 million and Sudan hosts important areas formerly under Boko Haram 906,000. The case of Sudan is particularly com- control, weakening the insurgents and limiting pelling in that it is both a major country of ori- their operational capacity. Meanwhile, the insur- gin (2.7 million Sudanese have fled the country gents have switched tactics, organising suicide due to conflicts in the Darfur, Kordofan and Blue attacks that continue to cause civilian deaths. Nile) and a major host country. While it may seem The MNJTF has succeeded in creating divisions paradoxical that a country embroiled innumer- able conflicts that are forcing record numbers of its citizens to flee elsewhere is also home to 11 ACLED: ‘Trends in violence by country in 2014’, 2015. a large population of refugees from other states, Available at: www.acleddata.com/trends-in-violence-by- country-in-2014/ 12 The Institute for Economics and Peace: ‘2015 Global 14 For detailed statistics on global internal displacement, Terrorism Index’, November 2015. see IDMC: www.internal-displacement.org 13 Council on Foreign Relations: The Nigeria Security 15 ACNUR, UNHCR: ‘Global Trends Forced Displacement Tracker. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria- in 2017’. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/ security-tracker/p29483 unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html

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this situation has become the norm in much of and the contention of violence. Regional and in- Central Africa. South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR ternational anti-terrorism strategies carried out by also play this dual role. People in this region are different types of military coalitions have been em- continually fleeing violence in one place only to ployed to repel jihadist insurgencies. A totally dif- end up another beset by the same problem. ferent two-track approach combining other types If we view the continent from the angle of inter- of missions led by the UN or regional peacekeep- nal displacement, the DRC ranks first with around ing organisations and peace negotiations involving 4.4 million displaced persons, most of whom international mediators has been applied in other have been forced to leave their homes due to the situations. Table 1 below provides a breakdown of violence that erupted in Kasai region in 2017 and approaches applied in specific cases. caused the size of the country’s displaced population to double within the short span of the last twelve months. Other countries with a major dis- Origen and evolution of peacekeeping missions placement problem are Sudan, South Sudan, Ni- geria and Somalia, all of which have more than one With the end of the Cold War and the emergence million displaced persons within their borders.16 of a new geopolitical landscape in the 1990s, the The instability caused by armed conflict in Af- international community – under the leadership rica is provoking and aggravating humanitarian of the UN – began to play a far greater role in the crises in areas where the violence is taking place. resolution of internal armed conflicts. Since that For example, more than 7.7 million people in the time the number of international peace missions DRC suffered serious food insecurity in 2017 – 30% has grown and the form they have taken has con- more than the previous year. It is estimated that tinually evolved. This progression can be broken another 4.8 million in South Sudan are currently down into three stages or generations. The first facing severe food shortages. The ongoing war was peacekeeping, in which troops deployed were against Boko Haram has also created humani- expected to supervise cease-fires and only use tarian crises in the north of Nigeria and Diffa, an force in self-defence. Second-generation missions urban commune on the southern border of Niger. tended to be multidimensional and have civilian Desperately needed aid is not reaching communi- as well as military and civilian components focus- ties in the Kordofan and Blue Nile regions of Sudan ing on peacebuilding activities such as reconstruc- due to the inability of the Sudanese government to tion and rehabilitation. The third involved peace negotiate a humanitarian corridor with the Sudan enforcement missions organised by the UN Secu- People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) rity Council on the basis of Chapter seven of the and an escalation of the violence in Jebel Marra, UN Charter, which allows for the use military force Darfur has caused a dire emergency there as well. in exceptional circumstances.17 In addition to missions focusing purely on armed conflicts, the UN also has a number of missions currently underway Responses in Africa that address political tensions and post- conflict issues, examples being MINUSCA in the Response to the extreme instability sweeping the CAR, MONUSCO in the DRC, UNAMID in Sudan (Dar- continent has involved the implementation of fur), UNMISS in South Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali. various mechanisms facilitating conflict resolution

17 Ruiz-Giménez, I.: ‘Conflictos armados en África y 16 For more details, seethe IDMC publication ‘Africa report mecanismos de resolución’, in África en el horizonte. on internal displacement 2017’. Available at: https:// Introducción a la realidad socioeconómica en el África reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20171206- subsahariana’, Ediciones La Catarata, Madrid, 2006, Africa-report-2017-web.pdf pp. 128-129.

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Table 1. Principal armed conflicts and response initiatives

Armed conflict Mission deployed Type of mission Open peace process Mali MINUSMA (UN) Peacekeeping Algiers Peace Agreement (June 2015) Operation Barkhane (France) Anti-terrorist No negotiations with jihadist groups EUTM (EU) Peacekeeping Western Sahel Sahel G5 (Mali, Burkina Faso, Anti-terrorist No negotiations Niger, Chad and Mauritania) Anti-terrorist LGA Joint Task Force (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) Lake Chad (Boko MNJTF (Nigeria, Chad, Burkina Anti-terrorist Minor negotiations with Boko Haram Haram) Faso, Benin, Cameroon and faction Niger) CAR MINUSCA (UN) Peacekeeping Peace accord (2015) Ceasefire (June 2017) Central Africa (LRA) AU RCI-LRA (AU) Anti-terrorist No negotiations currently underway DRC MONUSCO (UN) Peacekeeping National peace accord (2016) South Sudan UNMISS (UN + IGAD) Peacekeeping Peace accord (2015, ratified in 2018) Cease-fire agreement (2017) Sudan UNAMID (UN) (Darfur) Peacekeeping Roadmap Agreement (2016) Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006) Somalia AMISOM (AU) Peacekeeping/ No negotiations EUNAVFOR (UE) Anti-terrorist Piracy Ethiopia (Ogaden) No mission deployed - Peace negotiations underway

Beginning in 1994, following the failure of type are currently underway in conflict zones in peacekeeping missions to resolve crises in So- Somalia, South Sudan, Central Africa, the Sahel malia and Rwanda and parallel to the ongoing and the Lake Chad Basin. efforts of the UN, African nations and regional Similar missions are being carried out on the organisations began to take a new ‘African solu- continent by third countries and other interna- tions to African problems’ approach to the vio- tional organisations. The United States (by means lence plaguing the continent and play a greater of AFRICOM missions), France and the EU (the ef- role in peacekeeping. The AU developed the Afri- forts of both of which are currently focused on can Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the conflicts in the Sahel region, Central Africa and two most important instruments of which, the the Horn of Africa) are heavily involved in the pro- Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African motion of peace in Africa. Standby Force (ASF), have been playing an active role in peace and security missions. Under this new framework, AU support for peace has taken The deployment of anti-terrorist strategies in Africa the form of military offensives against armed militias, counter-terrorism operations, stabilisa- As noted previously, the growing presence and tion activities, the reform of security forces and expansion of militant jihadist groups in Africa, post-conflict transition efforts.18 Missions of this the third wave of which was provoked by the

18 Leijenaar, A.; Lotze, W.: ‘The African Standby Force Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african- beyond 2015: ideals versus realities’, ISS Today; 2015. standby-force-beyond-2015-ideals-versus-realities

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destabilisation of Libya following the ouster of as the EUCOM–led20 2002–2004 Pan-Sahel Initia- Gaddafi in 2011,1919 has prompted the strength- tive, which was launched in response to the jihad- ening of regional and international counter-ter- ist insurgence in the Sahel and was subsequently rorist strategies, for which the U.S., France and superseded by the Trans-Saharan Counterterror- the AU have provided leadership but in which ism Partnership (TSCTI).21 The first mission of AFRI- other international actors such as the EU have COM, a unified military command for Africa created also played a part. These strategies have primar- in 2003, focused on strengthening the defence ca- ily focused on military counter-terrorism actions pacity of East African countries through the Com- against armed groups with the potential to de- bined Join Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).22 stabilise zones in which they have gained a foot- According to investigative reporter Nick Turse, al- hold: AQIM and other militant Islamic factions though the U.S. officially recognises only its base in the Sahel region; Boko Haram; armed groups in Djibouti, it has created numerous military bases linked to Al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Is- in other parts of Africa and intervened militarily in lamic State in post-Gaddafi Libya; the Lord’s situations beyond its official remit.23 Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa; Al-Sha- In terms of EU security initiatives forming part baab insurgents in the Horn of Africa and Al-Qa- of its counter-terrorism strategies for Africa, in eda-affiliated groups in the Arabian Peninsula December 2008 the Union launched Operation operating in the Gulf of Aden and Yemen close Atalanta, a counter-piracy mission being carried to Somali territory. These kinds of operations, out by the EU Naval Force (EU-NAVFOR) along the which are becoming more common in Africa, dif- Somali coast in the Gulf of Aden (Indian Ocean). fer in various ways from earlier missions con- France has conducted more counter-terrorism ducted in Africa and reflect a shift in emphasis operations in Africa than any other the EU Mem- towards the objectives of the worldwide fight ber State and has been especially active in Mali, against terror organisations. where it conducted Operation Serval, a counter- The United States has engaged in various types insurgency mission eventually superseded by Op- of military-related activities in Africa for over two eration Barkhane. EU and US military personnel decades, initially focusing on training African have provided training to national and regional armed forces personnel to perform peacekeep- forces deployed during the African-led Interna- ing duties. Its Africa policy changed in the wake tional Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), which of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, after which it began was organised to check the advance of jihadist to be involved in counter-terrorist missions such insurgents in the northern part of the country. Operation Barkhanenow spans five countries in the region: Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. France also deployed troops to the CAR 19 There have been three clearly distinguishable waves of for Operation Sangaris. jihadist activity that have had an impact on the continent and, most particularly, on North Africa. The first, which is related to the return of veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1990s, mainly affected Algeria and Egypt. The 20 EUCOM is a Europe-based command centre responsible second was a consequence of the 2013 US invasion of for US military operations in Europe and most of Africa. Iraq, which led to the recruitment of fighters throughout 21 Harmon, S.: ‘Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara- the region and strengthened Al-Qaeda and paved the way Sahel Region in the Twenty-first Century’,African Security, for the emergence of ISIS. The third, linked to upheaval in 2015, 8, 4, p. 230. Turse, N.: Tomorrow’s Battlefield. US the Maghreb surrounding the Arab Spring (which began Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa. Haymarket Books, in Tunisia in 2010), was primarily triggered by the war in Chicago, 2015, p. 22. Libya, the fall of Gaddafi and the impact of these events 22 US naval force deployed to combat piracy along the on countries in the region. See: Cilliers (2015, p. 24) and Somali coast. International Crisis Group (2016). 23 Turse, 2015, pp. 12-13.

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Last but not least, in addition to participating the G5 Joint Military Task Force, which carried in various peacekeeping missions, the AU and out its first mission (Hawbi) in the border zone other African organisations and alliances have between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in late Oc- carried out a number of operations focusing on tober 2017.27 counter-terrorism.24 Some of their most notewor- Liptako-Gourma Region: Another recent re- thy missions have been: gional counter-terrorism initiative is the Lipta- Somalia: Although the initial objective of Afri- ko-Gourma Region Joint Task Force created by can Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which began in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger by decision of the January 2017, was to establish a transition gov- Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako- ernment, its mandate in this country has evolved Gourma Region28 on 24 January 2017. Conceived over time to include counter-terrorism military to function along the same lines as the Multi- offensives against armed groups in general and national Joint Task Force, the Liptako-Gourma Al Shabbab in particular.25 initiative is intended to lower the risk of the re- Central Africa: The AU-Regional Cooperation gion being destabilised by the ongoing presence Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resis- of militant jihadist groups, many of which have tance Army (AU RCI-LRA), which involved military close links to either ISIS or AQIM. personnel from Uganda, the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan, was launched at the end of 2013 to put an end to an insurgency led by Joseph Kony Peace negotiations that had created a humanitarian crisis and threatened regional security and stability.26 In addition to the peace-keeping and counter- Lake Chad Basin: The incursion of Boko Ha- terrorism missions deployed in Africa, there ram into the Lake Chad Basin region prompted have also been numerous peace processes and a joint military response in which regional coun- negotiations focused on achieving peace through tries (Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon) and non-violent means. The School for a Culture of Benin participated. The Multinational Joint Task Peace estimates that there are at least twenty Force (MNJTF), created in 1998, was reactivated peace processes currently being conducted in by the Lake Chad Basin Commission in April 2012 Africa – over half of the forty-three peace pro- to carry out this mission. cesses underway throughout the world. Of these Western Sahel: Following the wrap-up of the twenty, a dozen are related to armed conflicts French counter-terrorism operation Serval in and eight to socio-political tensions or crises.29 Mali in 2013, France promoted the creation of G5, an institutional framework for the coordi- 27 Peace and Security Council: 679th Meeting, Addis nation of security and development coopera- Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 April 2017. Available at: http://www. tion between Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad peaceau.org/uploads/679th-com-g5sahel-13-04-2017. and Mauritania. With an eye to expanding the pdf [Last consulted 18 April 2017] scope of their cooperation on regional security, 28 The Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako- in February 2017 the leaders of the G5 created Gourma Region (ALG) was created on 3 December1970 to promote the harmonious, integrated development of the Liptako-Gourma region. Its members are Burkina Faso, 24 Leijenaar and Lotze (2015). Mali and Niger. The Liptako-Gourma region comprises 25 For more information regarding AMISOM, consult its a 370,000 km² area that includes, all or part of 19 of official website: http://amisom-au.org/ Burkina Faso’s provinces, four administrative regions in 26 African Union: ‘The African Union-Led Regional Task Mali and two departments and an urban commune in Force for the elimination of the LRA’, African Union Peace Niger and contains 45% of the total population of these and Security, last updated 23 November 2015. Available three states. at: http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1 29 School for the Culture of Peace (2018).

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Some of the most notable peace processes con- Conclusions ducted in Africa in recent years are: those leading to the peace agreement brokered in Mali in Parting from the supposition that armed con- July 2015; the agreement on the resolution of the flicts are complex phenomena driven by a wide conflict in South Sudan mediated by the Inter- range of historical, social, cultural, economic and governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) political factors and further complicated by the in August 2015 and subsequent negotiations in fact that they often take on transnational dimen- 2017 and 2018 to make that pact effective; ne- sions and extend across borders, affecting more gotiations currently underway between the rul- than one country having an impact on the secu- ing FRELIMO party and the opposition RENAMO rity of various populations, it stands to reason party in Mozambique; the peace talks progressing that the mechanisms for their resolution must favourably in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and be devised on the basis of thorough analyses of negotiations leading to the cease-fire in the CAR the causes and dynamics of each particular situ- in June 2017. Whereas some of these processes ation. The increasing fragmentation of the mili- and agreements have restored peace for at least tant groups involved in many of today’s armed a certain period or continue to be effective (Oga- conflicts supposes the additional challenge of den and Mozambique), others have not brought factoring a wide range of frequently contradic- violence to a definitive halt. Peace agreements to tory agendas into resolution strategies. Given end hostilities in northern Mali, South Sudan and the complexity of political violence, its resolution the CAR, for example, have proved very difficult requires a holistic response that does not make to implement. military action and security the sole priorities and Processes of national dialogue opened in the provides channels for dialogue and negotiation hope of generating a consensus on the need to centred on the civilian populations whose wel- restore stability in other places such as Darfur, fare is affected by the hostilities. Peace cannot South Kordofan and the Blue Nile in Sudan, Bu- be sustained indefinitely by means of exterior rundi, the DRC and Libya have made little prog- military force. However, a cease-fire agreement ress to date. is not the same as a peace agreement. As we have In zones in which jihadist insurgencies have seen in Mali and South Sudan, in certain cases taken place and especially in areas where vio- even a peace agreement is not enough to bring lence has been particularly rampant such as the armed violence to a definitive end. Even in cases western part of the Sahel region, Lake Chad and that a signed agreement has been negotiated, Somalia, conflict resolution efforts have consist- real peace can only be achieved if all interested ed mainly of counter-terrorism operations and parties want it to happen. External missions play few channels of dialogue have been pursued due a crucial role in peace building by creating and to the nature of the actors involved, the prevail- maintaining an atmosphere in which reconcili- ing doctrine of war against terrorism and poli- ation can take place. However, in order for such cies ruling out negotiations with organisations processes to succeed, all actors involved in the classified as terrorist groups. One example is resolution of violence, from the AU, the UN, re- northern Mali, where the Algiers Process leading gional and community entities and international to the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation human rights organisations to rebel groups, must in Mali signed in June 2015 did not include rep- articulate a common agenda, and as underscored resentatives of jihadist militias. The agreement in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, women has brought a fragile and unstable peace to the must also be afforded a greater role in peace and region given that armed groups continue to oper- reconstruction processes. The only effective way ate in the zone and threaten security in contigu- of resolving armed conflicts, guaranteeing an en- ous border areas. during peace and avoiding new outbreaks of ten-

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sion and violence is to make dialogue between ‘Islamic State, Daesh or Isis: the dilemma of nam- all actors involved a high priority and address ing the militants’, The Week UK, 13th July 2015. the underlying factors that made these conflicts ‘Jihadist Groups in the Sahel Region Formalize possible. Merger’, Jihadology, 27th March 2017. Leijenaar, A., y Lotze, W.: ‘The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities’, References ISS Today, 2015. Melander, E.: ‘Organized Violence in the World ACLED: Trends in violence by country in 2014, 2015. 2015. An assessment by the Uppsala Conflict ACNUR/UNHCR: Tendencias Globales 2017, 2017. Data Program’, UCDP, Paper n.º 9, Uppsala, Africa Center for Strategic Studies: Militant Is Sweden, 2015. lamist Groups in 2017, 2018. Peace and Security Council: 679th Meeting, Ad- African Union: ‘The African Union-Led Regional dis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13th April 2017. Task Force for the elimination of the LRA’, Af Ping, J.: Eclipse sur l’Afrique, fallait-il tuer Kad rican Union Peace and Security, 2015. hafi?Ediciones Michalon, 2014. Cilliers, J.: ‘Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror Ruiz-Giménez, I.: (2006) ‘Conflictos armadas en in Africa’, Institute for Security Studies, n.º 286, África y mecanismo de resolución’, África en 2015. el horizonte. Introducción a la realidad socio- Council on Foreign Relations: The Nigeria Secu económica en el África subsahariana, Edicio- rity Tracker. nes La Catarata, Madrid, 2006. Escola de Cultura de Pau: Alerta 2018! Informe Stockholm International Peace Research Insti sobre conflictos armados, derechos humanos tute: ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disar y construcción de paz, Editorial Icaria, Barce mament and International Security’, Oxford lona, 2018. University Press, 2015. Harmon, S.: ‘Securitization Initiatives in the Straus, S.: ‘Wars do end! Changing patterns of po- Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-first Cen litical violence in Sub-Saharan Africa’, African tury’, African Security, vol. 8, n.º 4, 2015. Affairs, vol. 111, n.º 443, 2012, pp. 179-201. IDMC: Africa report on internal displacement 2017, The Institute for Economics and Peace: 2015 2017. Global Terrorism Index, November 2015. International Crisis Group: ‘Exploiting Disorder: Turse, N.: Tomorrow’s Battlefield. US Proxy Wars Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State’, Crisis Group and Secret Ops in Africa, Haymarket Books, Special Report, 2016. Chicago, 2015.

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David Nievas Bullejos

Introduction instability and posing a threat to the state itself, to the local communities, and to international In recent years, the western Sahel region has re- partners. The Sahel region contains countries ceived increasing media attention due to the pres- with some of the lowest levels of human devel- ence of jihadist terrorism. This chapter aims to opment according to the UNDP (UNDP, 2018), and review and analyse the causes and consequences major structural weaknesses. These states also of the emergence of jihadism in the region. Bear- have questionable democratic credentials and ing in mind that jihadism is not in itself the cause increasingly disaffected youth. of instability in the area, it also examines the various failings of the states involved and their link to the rise of this multifaceted phenomenon. The persistent phenomenon of jihadist terrorism: These aspects cannot be disassociated from the from the global to the local transformations experienced by Sahelian societies, which increasingly require improvements in At present, the Sahel region is a hotbed of jihad- state governance and a more concerted effort to ist activity. The outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion address youth concerns. in Mali in 2012 galvanised the jihadist groups that were already operating in the north of the country. Over the last four years, jihadist groups The ‘problem’ of the Sahel in Mali have posed a serious threat to the security of local populations, not only in Mali, but also in The Sahel has occupied international attention Niger and Burkina Faso. With the violence perpe- since 2012, mainly because of the terrorist threat trated by Boko Haram brought under control by in the region, illegal trafficking, and immigration the combined military actions of Niger, Chad and towards Europe. The international response has Nigeria, it is the jihadist activity in the western primarily focused on military, police, and eco- Sahel that is the most alarming. nomic interventions, with the short-sighted goal Since 2012, self-proclaimed jihadist groups of curbing these threats and helping repair the have flourished in Mali, which is considered to be state of Mali, the epicentre of regional instability. at the centre of the jihadist threat in the Sahel. However, it is necessary to stop and analyse the These groups have demonstrated their ability to role occupied by the state, its legitimacy among adapt to unfavourable circumstances, allowing local populations, and its link to the existence of them to remain a significant threat. One of the jihadism. Mali will serve as an example of how questions that hovers over the analysis of the a lack of legitimacy affects the aforementioned region is the persistence of jihadist terrorism de- phenomenon. Armed groups, including self-pro- spite considerable international intervention in claimed jihadist groups, have usurped the role the area since 2013. This intervention is not lim- of the state in large parts of its territory, causing ited to Mali, with more than 12,000 Blue Helmets,

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various European training and advisory missions legiance to Osama Bin Laden’s network. In a post- for military, police, and judicial personnel (EUTM conflict context in Algeria, the Sahel served as a Mali, EUCAP Sahel in Mali and Niger), and a num- safe haven for the Maghrebi branch of al-Qaeda, ber of military and police cooperation projects. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (previously, There has also been a wider military intervention the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, or in the Sahel region in the form of the French-led GSPC). Specifically, northern Mali was the base Operation Barkhane and the US military presence from which attacks in Mauritania and kidnap- in Niger. However, figures show that security has pings of Westerners in the Sahel were planned, deteriorated dramatically since 2015, and that the but in general, Sahelian countries appeared to destructiveness and reach of the groups has only be free of jihadist attacks. For years, the Sahel re- increased (ACLED, 2019). While in 2012, insecurity gion seemed immune to jihadist currents, and for was mostly confined to the northern regions of some, this may be because the region is mostly Mali, seven years later, it had spread to the central populated by sub-Saharan Africans who practice regions of the country, western Niger, and north- a ‘moderate’ form of Islam, supposedly steeped ern, eastern, and southern Burkina Faso. And it is in Sufism, which would act as a barrier to conta- not unreasonable to predict it spreading to other gion. However, this reading has been proved to be neighbouring territories. essentialist, erroneously identifying the religious One wonders why the Sahel has become one factor as the driving force behind jihadism. Today, of the focal points in the so-called ‘fight against there are many members (and even leaders) of Sa- terrorism’. It is necessary to analyse the causes helian jihadism who were born in the region, and, and origin of jihadism in Mali in order to draw as previously mentioned, it is where the criminal conclusions, focusing not only on the jihadist activities of these groups are most prevalent. phenomenon itself, but also on the fighting on Despite international intervention in 2013 the ground. The most plausible explanation is and the military and police efforts to eradicate that the jihadist phenomenon fed off one of the it, jihadism has managed to survive, adopting unresolved conflicts in the Arab-Islamic world: strategies to embed itself in local communities. the Arab-Tuareg conflict with the Malian state. Its resilience stems from its ability to adapt to Jihadism itself is not the cause of the conflict, changing circumstances, as well as its appeal to but rather the symptom of serious deficiencies those who feel abandoned and/or aggrieved by in the Sahelian state and unresolved tensions. the state, primarily in rural areas. Its persistence These groups exploit the conflict to establish is also due in part to its highly decentralised or- themselves and achieve their criminal goals, as ganisational structure, which has enabled it to has happened in other turbulent areas such as adapt to attempts by local and international Somalia and Afghanistan. forces to stamp it out. The most recent develop- Sub-Saharan Africa was one of the first places ment has been the response of jihadist militias to be hit by the international terrorism of al Qa- to the establishment in 2014 of a joint military eda1. However, the focus shifted away from the force of the G5 Sahel nations (Mauritania, Burkina region after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad), reorganising them- The sub-Saharan region appeared to be immune selves under a single umbrella – Jama’at Nusrat to jihadist violence and radicalisation, particularly al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) – in March 2017, in comparison to North Africa and the Middle East, confirming what was already clear: the collabora- where jihadist groups emerged who pledged al- tion between decentralised jihadist forces in Mali and Niger. 1 The attacks against the US embassies in Dar es Salaam Its contagion to new areas beyond northern (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenia) in August 1998 were at- Mali shows jihadism’s capacity to connect with tributed to al-Qaeda. local grievances and demands. In theory, these

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claims have little in common with international nities such as the Fulani (or Peul) in central Mali jihadism, but jihadism can serve as an impetus and Burkina Faso, has, since 2012, resulted in in- to local communities and their demands by pro- dividuals from local communities taking an active viding weapons, tactics, and recruits for a spe- interest in jihadism, and an increasingly delegiti- cific cause. This model of connecting with local mised state (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2018). The fact concerns seems to have taken root after jihadism that the construction of the state has prioritised began to spread to central Mali and northern, sedentary populations and certain ethnic com- eastern and southern Burkina Faso in 2015. Its munities has generated a growing feeling of dis- contagion across the borders of Ghana and Ivory crimination. This has encouraged aggrieved and Coast is a real possibility that could follow a simi- subaltern communities to join non-state armed lar pattern. groups that can offer them tools to overturn an established order underpinned by traditional power relations and a state that undermines their Violence at various levels and delegitimisation of aspirations (Thiam, 2017). the state Sahelian jihadism has found special acceptance in the rural world (ICG, 2017). Here it has An in-depth analysis of terrorist violence in cen- targeted civilians and state agents, including tral Mali reveals elements that can help us un- mayors, forest rangers, imams and marabouts, derstand the way in which Sahelian jihadism civilians suspected of collaborating with Malian feeds off local conflicts, as well as the appeal of and international forces, school teachers, and this option for communities that feel abandoned Malian security forces. The offensive is focused or aggrieved by the state. Several authors have on destabilising the presence of the state in ru- identified environmental factors, demographic ral areas and delegitimising it, which entails the pressure, lack of opportunities, and insufficient contestation of traditional power relations. Thus, land for agriculture and grazing as important this phenomenon displays worrying signs of in- challenges for the region, which have been ex- surgency – rather than jihadist terrorism – in the acerbated by the Malian conflict (Tobie & Chau- Sahel region. And related to this violence is the zal, 2018). The inability of the state to exercise its inter-communal violence that jihadist groups of- control beyond the main cities, corruption, and ten exploit for their own benefit. the impossibility of implementing the rule of law Another level of jihadist violence is that di- for all ethnic communities lying within the state’s rected at international security forces deployed administrative boundaries have led to a growing in Mali. In this respect, jihadist groups have had detachment from the state, which has lost legiti- a major impact and have shown a tremendous macy among the population (De Bruijin & Both, ability to adapt to international military efforts 2017). The long-running Arab-Tuareg conflict, the to eliminate them. With these attacks, the self- need to forge a new path and find a new legiti- proclaimed jihadists have managed to rekindle macy in northern Mali (as the case of Ansar Dine2 mistrust among the signatories of the 2015 peace demonstrates), and the need to protect commu- agreements reached between the Malian government and rebel groups. This has delayed the implementation of the agreements3 and repre- 2 The self-proclaimed jihadist group Ansar Dine was born after some of the Tuareg elites rejected the attempts of Iyad Ag Ghali, ex-leader of previous Tuareg rebellions, to 3 In January 2018, an attack on the mixed military unit lead an uprising against the Malian state in 2011. Accord- established under the peace agreements fuelled distrust ing to security experts, this group is still closely linked between rebel groups and pro-Bamako groups that were to some circles of the Tuareg community, and Ag Ghali supposed to incorporate mixed patrols, delaying the im- maintains a certain prestige within it. plementation of the peace agreement.

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sents a threat to the security of the MINUSMA and presence in the area has stoked tensions. The Barkhane missions, as they are unable to defend potential for conflict has increased because their own forces4. In June 2018, the headquar- traditional groups of hunters known as Dozo (a ters of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Severé was at- spiritual fraternity responsible for community tacked, forcing its relocation to Bamako5. defence) have armed themselves with automatic A third level of violence is that directed at weapons of unknown origin. The opposing fac- Western interests. Attacks against tourist targets tions have supposedly been backed by jihadist have attracted international attention and have groups linked to the Fulani (or Peul), a traditional helped undermine the sense of security, as evi- nomadic pastoral community. Dogon communi- denced by the attacks on the Radisson hotel in ties have also created their own self-defence mi- Bamako in 2015 and on the Cappuccino Café in litia. The violence has escalated because of the Ouagadougou in 2016. Jihadist groups aspire to widespread belief that all Fulani are jihadists or repeat these types of attention-grabbing attacks harbour jihadist sympathisers. This stems from in the region in order to increase their visibility in the fact that some Fulani joined jihadist ranks the macabre spectacle that is international jihad- when jihadis took control of northern Mali in ism. In December 2018, Malian security forces dis- 2012. From the Fulani perspective, the state has mantled a suspected terrorist cell composed of abandoned them and positioned itself against Malians, Burkinabes and Ivorians who intended them, with military abuses against Fulani indi- to carry out attacks in various West African capi- viduals and the adoption of measures such as tals on New Year’s Eve. its alleged support for the rearming of the Dozo Inter-communal violence in central Mali has and Dogon, which has apparently contributed to taken a worrying turn since 2015 (Carayol, Geel them seeking the backing of jihadist groups for & Rabecq, 2018). A spike in victims in 2018 has their own protection. set off alarm bells. More than 200 civilians have Intra- and inter-communal conflict has sown lost their lives in Koro, Mopti, and Douentza in the seeds of hate and revenge into relations be- central Mali, where long-standing inter- and intra- tween communities and between groups within communal tensions have turned violent (HRW, the same community, with reports of murders 2018). Disputes over lands, which herders have and score-settling on the increase. Murders, at- seen depleted by increased crop cultivation and tacks, and indiscriminate killings of civilians in more sedentary farmers shifting to herding, have villages, armed community checkpoints, the exacerbated existing tensions and led to armed burning of villages and markets, theft of livestock, conflict. and the murder of herders and farmers, are just While in the past these tensions existed, they some of the forms of violence perpetrated in this were resolved by traditional means, or the level area since 2015, whose dramatic upsurge over of violence was held in check by the existence the past year has forced thousands of displaced of only low-impact firearms. However, the avail- people to flee to safer areas. ability of automatic weapons and the jihadist The spread of violence to Burkina Faso also poses an increasingly alarming threat. The presence of a jihadist cell in the northern regions – 4 The attacks on the MINUSMA and Barkhane camps in Ansaroul Islam, linked to the Ansar Din Macina June 2018 and January 2019 illustrate the sophistication of Amadou Kouffa in central Mali – extended into of jihadist attacks. the eastern and southern regions of the country 5 In June 2018, the attack against the headquarters of the in 2018. Some of the attacks appear to be direct- G5 Sahel Joint Force in Sevaré (central Mali) forced its relocation to Bamako and the replacement of the force’s ed at mining sites and state agents, which once leader, Malian General Didier Dacko, by Mauritanian Gen- again indicates an interrelationship with local eral Hanena Ould Sidi. dynamics, displaying certain similarities with the

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progression of the jihadist insurgency in central ning in the 1990s, or the continuation of illiberal and northern Mali (Nsaibia & Weiss, 2018). The regimes, has not led to the development of states key drivers behind recruitment by these groups with adequate standards in terms of the rotation are dysfunctions of the state and existing power of power and social development, upon which relations. The difficulties of subsistence in the the stability of the states and their populations face of environmental irregularities, land issues, depends (Bergamaschi, 2014). and conflicts among communities due to power The weakness of the state, as well as its ab- relations established and sponsored by the state sence in many rural areas, has favoured the es- (which are exacerbated by the existence of au- tablishment of armed groups, in some cases, tomatic weapons) are more decisive factors in jihadist groups. This weakness is evident in its in- the ‘radicalisation’ of individuals than ideologi- ability to resolve the conflict and form a pact with cal recruitment by these self-proclaimed jihad- all its peoples. In many cases, the state is seen ist groups (Théroux-Bénoni & Assanvo, 2016). as favouring certain communities, and as preda- Focusing on local conflicts and on the various tory and abusive to others. Its supposed role of difficulties people face in rural areas, as well as protecting communities and helping them cope on the state’s response to and stance towards with the challenges they face, such as climate these conflicts, would be more effective than any irregularities, subsistence, and inter-communal military or police measures for the ‘prevention of conflicts, has generated frustration and a sense of radicalisation’ detachment from the state, pushing certain communities towards non-state groups. In addition, economic dependence on other countries in the Fragile states, bad government and sham democracies form of large injections of foreign aid has not resulted in the strengthening of the state. In fact, it The western Sahel region contains some of the has contributed to its weakness, to the inability of most fragile countries on the African continent. communities to take ownership of development On the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), programs, and to the impossibility of a strong, these countries rank near the bottom6, and ac- unified state that can address the concerns of its cording to the Ibrahim Index of African Gover- citizens (Brown, 2017). nance (IIAG), the quality of democracy and the The level of democracy in most countries of provision of social and public goods in Sahelian the western Sahel is low. According to the organ- states is also problematic7. Over the past decades, isation Freedom house, Chad and Mauritania are international bodies have considered the coun- not free countries; Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali tries in the region to be receptive to economic are partially free; and Senegal – if we include it and fiscal cooperation (Pringle, 2006), subject as in this group – is the only free country. Most of they were to structural adjustments in the 1980s these countries adhere to the principles of po- and 1990s. However, economic corrections and litical pluralism and freedom of association, with the arrival of democracy to some countries begin- ostensibly free elections. However, elections in themselves do not seem to reinforce the pact between the political class and the people. While 6 Niger occupies the last position, 189; Mali, 182; Burkina the existence of clean elections is to be applaud- Faso, 183; and Chad, 186 (UNDP, 2018). ed, this seems to be due more to the state’s inabil- 7 The Ibrahim Index measures safety and the rule of law, ity to tamper with electoral processes than the participation and human rights, sustainable economic will to implement a genuine electoral democracy opportunity, and human development of African countries using 102 indicators. Mali occupies position 28 (of leading to an improvement in the living condi- 54), Niger, 24; Burkina Faso, 16; Mauritania, 40; and Chad, tions of the people. Furthermore, distrust of the 46 (IIAG, 2018). state is widespread due to the popular perception

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of corruption not only in the highest spheres, but of the presidential elections that handed a fifth also in the actions of state agents at street level, consecutive term to Idriss Déby, were a signal of judicial manipulation, and the lack of transpar- popular discontent and frustration. In Mali, mass ency in the exercise of power, all of which cast demonstrations in 2017 forced President Keita to a shadow over democratic processes (Bleck & backtrack on a constitutional amendment grant- Logvinenko, 2018). Where voting takes place, po- ing more power to the head of state. litical competition is not entirely open because of The protests were carried out by an emerging financial irregularities and pre-established power and diverse civil society that has been organis- relations. And the needs of the population are of- ing itself in Sahelian countries for some time ten ignored. The possibilities for regeneration are (Tall, Pommerolle & Cahen, 2015) and that has limited at a time when more than 60 percent of recently turned to social media to enhance its im- the population is under 25 years of age, leading to pact. For the leaders in the region, these spaces a sense of frustration and a growing gulf between have become an unwelcome tool for denouncing the people and an ageing political class. abuses and monitoring government actions. De- spite relatively low access to the Internet in these countries, governments have attempted to block The awakening of societies? social networks, while mobile phone companies are hindering its democratisation by raising their Directly related to the governance problems rates, making it impossible for various segments in Sahelian states are the political transforma- of the population to connect to the Internet on a tions witnessed by these societies since 2012. regular basis. Reflecting on the democratisation (or not) of the Notwithstanding these obstacles, activists continent following the ‘third wave of democra- have used social networks to connect with young tisation’ that arrived in the 1990s (Mateos, 2018), people who are unwilling to tolerate the abuses countries in the western Sahel are worthy of at- of politicians, and who are eager to express their tention. Some of the most important events on discontent regarding their work and life pros- the continent concerning political participation pects. and the relationship between civil society and Bearing in mind that the situation in each state state leaders have occurred in this region. is different, and mindful of avoiding generalisa- The cases of Senegal and Burkina Faso, in 2012 tions, a young man in the Sahel who has finished and 2014 respectively, are worthy of mention. his studies, or who is on the verge of adulthood, State leaders have found themselves at odds with faces numerous obstacles to the achievement of a civil society that has challenged their attempts certain milestones, (such as forming a family, or to keep themselves in power via changes to the securing a job and an income) in societies that constitution or questionable elections and refer- are generally very hierarchical in terms of gen- endums. Civil society organisations took to the erational expectations (Arnaud, 2016). Young Sa- streets, organising mass demonstrations against helians, deprived of opportunities, have become such decisions, and defying the whims of a ruling involved in different kinds of activism and various class bent on staying in power by circumventing vital projects. Some of them – widely studied by constitutional limitations. Western collaboration several authors (Siméant, 2014) – include Islam- with these leaders on controlling immigration to ic activism (not necessarily radical), emigration Europe (Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal) or fighting within the region or outside the continent, and terrorism (Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso), political activism in the form of social demands could not prevent change (be it nominal change) and in opposition to the generational status quo. in the upper echelons of powers. In Chad, calls The quality of democracy in each country is for protest in 2015 and 2016, around the time different, but what states in the region have in

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common is an increasingly better-informed so- suggest that what exists in the Muslim Sahel is a ciety. Considering the experiences of Burkina political Islam; rather, it is a growth of Islam in the Faso, Senegal, and Mali, these communities are political sphere, which has an effect on politics, not willing to lose what has been gained in terms a phenomenon that some authors have labelled of the multi-party system, democracy, and public ‘Muslim politics’ (Eickelman & Piscatori, 2009). freedoms. The Internet and social networks are The fight for a greater presence in the public useful tools for social activism, which is why they sphere has taken place on the streets of Mali, Ni- are often subject to state interference in the form ger (Sounaye, 2011) and other places in the Sahel of Internet blackouts (Internet Sans Frontières, (Vitale, 2012) since 2009, with mass demonstra- 2019). With the help of social networks, Sahelian tions and marches against political decisions and youth is able to express a mood of nonconformity global events ‘at odds with religious and societal and the political malaise underlying societies as values’. The phenomenon is broader still: in the a whole. However, it remains to be seen whether last decade, religious leaders have introduced is- digital mobilisation can be translated into a mass sues beyond religion into the debate on the future mobilisation that can impact political change, of the state, issues in line with the concerns of the given the multitude of factors that generally ac- people. The voice of Islamic leaders is subject to company the processes of civil protest and regime increasing attention from the political class and change, as in the case of Burkina Faso in 2014. society as a whole, although, as previously mentioned, it seems that neither the circumstances nor the will exists for religious leaders to step into The growing role of Islam formal politics. Instead, they appear to position themselves as influential guides for society. The countries of the western Sahel are, except for A wide range of Islamic leaders and associa- Mauritania, secular in constitutional terms, but tions have emerged in recent years, resulting in predominantly Muslim, with animist and Chris- a very heterogeneous Islamic landscape. A di- tian minorities, or, in the case of Burkina Faso, chotomous reading of Islam – a Sufi Islam ver- a large proportion of Christians. Islamic leaders sus a reformist or Salafi Islam – is not accurate. and associations have been more present in the While these two currents are important, espe- public sphere since liberalisation in the 1990s in cially Sufism in Senegal, other currents such as most countries (Holder, 2009). These leaders have neo-Sufism, Ahmadiyya Islam, and Shia Islam are incorporated into their discourse relevant issues on the rise, as is the way of being an ‘ordinary that go beyond spiritual matters, such as the fight Muslim’, which does not necessarily fit into any against corruption, public freedoms, and access of the currents. to basic services, greatly increasing their visibility With the fall from grace of political parties and and capacity to influence others (Soares, 2005). a lack of political and social references, social le- The general weakening of the state over the gitimacy has been transferred to religiosity, un- past decades has meant that large sections of derstood as the guarantor of certain values such the population are less likely to have their needs as incorruptibility, honesty, and good works, as satisfied, a power vacuum that Islamic leaders can be seen, for example, in the Islamic appear- have stepped in to fill. Depending on the con- ance that is increasingly adopted in Sahelian text and the organisation of the state, religious countries (Soares, 2005), or in the political and leaders have, in varying degrees, become natural electoral spheres in Senegal, Niger and Mali (Nie- mediators between citizens and the state, seizing vas, 2017). The main candidates for the last elec- an important role that political parties have been tions in these countries courted Islamic leaders unable to assume, and that the emerging civil and associations in order to win over distrustful society dispute. However, it would be wrong to voters.

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Thus, the rise of influential Islamic figures in Brown, S.: ‘Foreign Aid and National Ownership politics, and the increasing visibility in society of in Mali and Ghana’, Forum for Development Islamic leaders and associations that seek the ac- Studies, vol. 44, n.º 3, 2017, pp. 335-356. ceptance of the secular state (Elisher, 2018), has Campana, A.: Entre déstabilisation et enracine- more to do with a valuing of the Islamic element ment local. Les groupes djihadistes dans le in the public sphere (with some carry-over into conflit malien depuis 2015. Centre FrancoPaix the political sphere) than with the possibility of a en résolution des confits et missions de paix. swing towards political Islamism and the remak- Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études straté- ing of states in the Sahel as Islamic states. giques et diplomatiques , Université du Qué- bec, Montreal, 2018. Carayol, R., Geel F., y Rabecq, A.: In Central Mali, Ci- Conclusion vilian Populations Are Caught Between Terror- ism and Counterterrorism. Fact-finding Mission In conclusion, the western Sahel is living through Report, FIDH & AMDH, Paris, Bamako, 2018. a period of great uncertainty, whose outcome is De Bruijn, M., y Both, J.: “Youth Between State difficult to predict. While Islam has emerged as an and Rebel (Dis)Orders: Contesting Legitimacy increasingly influential and wide-ranging force in from Below in Sub-Sahara Africa’, Small Wars & societies and politics due to the absence of other Insurgencies, vol. 28, n.º 4-5, 2017, pp. 779-798. points of reference, Sahelian jihadism has been Eickelman, D. F., y Piscatori, J. P.: Muslim Politics. able to embed itself where the state has major Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009. structural weaknesses and lacks legitimacy, pri- Elischer, S.: ‘Governing the Faithful: State Man- marily in the rural world, and it poses a serious agement of Salafi Activity in the Francophone threat to both the state and international interests Sahel’, Comparative Politics, vol. 51, n.º 2, 2018, in this African region. In addition, Sahelian youth pp. 199-218. are using the Internet and social media to express Holder, G. (ed.): L’islam, nouvel espace public en their non-conformity with a political class and Afrique. Karthala, Paris, 2009. state that barely meet minimum expectations, Human Rights Watch. ‘We Used to Be Brothers’. despite the fact that, for the most part, elections Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali, 2018. are held that appear to be free and clean. International Crisis Group: Forced out of Towns in the Sahel, Africa’s Jihadists Go Rural. Com- mentary, 2017. Bibliography Mateos, Ó.: África subsahariana: democra- tización, a pesar de todo. Anuario Internacio- Arnaud, C.: ‘Les jeunes ruraux sahéliens, entre nal CIDOB, CIDOB, 2018. exclusion et insertion’, Afrique contempo- Nievas, D.: Islam y política en Mali: islamización raine, vol. 259, n.º 3, 2016, pp. 133-136. y participación política. Unpublished thesis. Benjaminsen, T. A., y Ba, B.: ‘Why do pastoralists Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2017. in Mali join jihadist groups? A political eco- Nsaibia, H., y Weiss, C.: Ansaroul Islam and the logical explanation’, The Journal of Peasant Growing Terrorist Insurgency in Burkina Faso. Studies, 2018. CTC Sentinel, vol. 11, n.º 3, 2018. Bergamaschi, I.: ‘The fall of a donor darling: the Pringle, R.: Democratization in Mali: Putting His- role of aid in Mali’s crisis’, The Journal of Modern tory to Work. United States Institute of Peace, African Studies, vol. 52, n.º 3, 2014, pp. 347-378. Peaceworks, 58, 2006. Bleck, J., and Logvinenko, I.: ‘Weak states and Siméant, J.: Contester au Mali. Formes de la mo- uneven pluralism: lessons from Mali and Kyr- bilisation et de la critique à Bamako, Editions gyzstan’, Democratization, 2018. Karthala, Les Afriques, Paris, 2014.

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inf_africa_ingles.indb 73 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 74 3/6/19 18:44 7. Exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals in Sub-Saharan Africa: the new struggle for resources and the paradox of plenty

Jesús García-Luengos

Introduction Since the end of the 20th century, the country has been developing a multidimensional strat- There was a time not long ago when the econom- egy to secure natural resources (mainly oil and ic prospects of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa minerals) in Sub-Saharan Africa that has altered were highly promising. The long commodities the region’s economic and political parameters boom (2000-2014 for hydrocarbons and 2000- and has triggered fierce competition with West- 2011/12 for minerals) was largely responsible ern multinationals and governments. This new for regional GDP growing at an average annual struggle for natural resources (often considered a rate of 5 %, according to World Bank estimates. new dividing up of Africa) has been compared to Improved macroeconomic management and the one that took place during colonisation. How- foreign investment conditions facilitated that ever, the regional and global context is different growth too, both in countries rich in natural re- and the mechanisms of exploitation and revenue sources and in those that are not. grabbing have acquired a broader dimension and The percentage of commodities exports went new features. from 57 % (between 1990 and 1999) to 76 % (be- Nevertheless, what has persisted over time is tween 2010 and 2014). As in previous periods, hy- the so-called natural resource curse, or paradox of drocarbons and minerals played a leading role, plenty, by which in the vast majority of countries accounting for around 65 % of those exports rich in those resources there is a high percentage (Bank for International Settlements, 2016). of the population that lives in extreme poverty, That situation caused considerable optimism the health systems are fragile (with a high rate of among the international financial agencies and infant mortality) and their levels of education are investment funds. Sub-Saharan Africa became very low (Karl, 2007). That is coupled with high the new El Dorado and extractive fever gripped levels of corruption and misgovernment and, the region. Hundreds of exploration licences in many cases, violent conflicts in which oil and were granted and a new front of hydrocarbon- minerals play a very significant role and contrib- rich countries was opened up in East Africa (with ute to aggravating and prolonging them. Mozambique as the potential third-biggest gas Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to hold 8 % of producer in the world). the world’s oil reserves and 30 % of its minerals, The huge demand for commodities from Chi- over 40 % in the case of gold, diamonds, cobalt na was one of the main reasons for the boom. and a manganese, and 80 % of the platinum and

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coltan (UNECA, 2015). What’s more, according to nascent and their scope very limited in compari- the geologists, it is very likely that in the subsoil son with the scale of the challenges and interests there are many high-quality deposits and re- at play in this sphere. serves yet to be discovered. These resources, on the other hand, are still finite; and environmental protection remains the big outstanding issue. The The new struggle for natural resources region also has abundant farmland (subjected to an intensive process of grabbing over the last two The backdrop to the current situation is a pro- decades) and extensive forestry, fishing and re- cess of colonisation that marked out with a ruling newable energies resources. pen both the infrastructures to export commodi- Based on the volume that these resources ties to the mother countries and the borders represent in terms of exports and state revenues, of the new states. After independence (in the over half of the 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa early 1960s in most countries), the new govern- are estimated to possess very significant wealth ments, under one-party regimes – and backed in mineral and hydrocarbons. Botswana remains by the principle of state sovereignty –, in many the sole exception to the curse, despite being one cases established agreements with foreign pri- of the most unequal countries in the world. vate companies against the interests of the state The inhabitants of these countries and their itself and its inhabitants. In the case of France, local communities remain entirely excluded from a whole framework of political and business re- this matter, despite being the legitimate owners lations was put together with the new leaders of these resources, which, in theory, should be (called Françafrique), which is still in place. Its oil exploited ‘in the exclusive interest of the people’ company Elf-Aquitaine acted as an extension of (Article 21.1 of the African Charter on Human its foreign policy, supporting dictatorial govern- and Peoples’ Rights of 1981). Moreover, it is they, ments. The multiparty political scene established primarily children and women, who suffer the in the 1990s and the ‘democratic conditionality’ negative impacts of all kinds arising from their laid down by the Western powers failed to alter exploitation. the dynamics of exploitation and its impacts. The end of the boom has had serious eco- The current stage – characterised by the new nomic consequences for the vast majority of the struggle for natural resources – began at the end Sub-Saharan countries rich in hydrocarbons and of the 20th century with the rollout by China of a minerals, starting with the region’s three biggest strategy involving opening its chequebook, chief- economies: Nigeria (around 200 million inhabit- ly in search of commodities and markets, along ants and the principal oil producer), South Africa with the arrival (or reappearance) of emerging (57 million and the world’s first platinum produc- countries such as India, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, er) and Angola (30 million and the second-biggest Malaysia or South Korea, as well as Japan. oil producer). The current economic debacle is The huge demand for commodities from Chi- having a drastic effect on the most vulnerable na was a key factor in the previously mentioned sectors of their populations. In several countries, super cycle. Between 2000 and 2011, its global such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, social protests are consumption of base metal minerals went from on the rise, as is the repression. 12 % to 41 %; its share in the world demand for In a bid to create more transparency on this copper, aluminium and zinc doubled; and that of matter and steer exploitation towards equitable iron, nickel and lead tripled (APP, 2013). and sustainable socioeconomic development, In its agreements with African governments, various regulations have been approved and China usually ties its multimillion-dollar loans several international and regional initiatives have (at very low interest) and the construction of been launched. However, their application is still numerous infrastructures –which are key to the

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socioeconomic development of Sub-Sahara Af- ticularly the Europeans, have openly criticised rica and built by Chinese firms that have come the competition from China and, especially, its in for considerable criticism over their deficient state-owned companies, which get broad sup- execution—to the signing of contracts to supply port. However, the credibility of that criticism oil and minerals. Its policy of non-interference is compromised by the way in which the natural in the internal affairs of the African countries is resources have been exploited on the part of the another factor that explains the warm welcome West. A clear example is the hydrocarbons sector, that China has received from all kinds of govern- in which the maxim of energy security has meant ments, including repressive regimes (to which that the principles of democracy, good govern- China has provided arms and training for their ment and human rights have always taken a back security forces). seat in countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Equato- China completes its policy with other aspects, rial Guinea, DRC and Gabon, among others. such as the export of goods (very affordable In the political sphere, the previously men- for African pockets, but which have triggered a tioned competition between China and the West- great deal of protest from local businesspeople); ern powers may be contributing to the excessive farming projects; thousands of grants to study appeasement of regimes that are the object of in China for African students; and a presence strong social protest in countries where there are on peacekeeping missions. The robustness of strategic economic interests. By way of example, China’s strategy is underpinned, among other the timid criticism from the EU and the United reasons, by the need to maintain a high rate of States in the face of what has been denounced economic growth (10 % for nearly three decades, by observers as a clear electoral fraud in the re- but falling since 2012), which allows it to dampen cent vote in DRC could be down to the desire not social tensions in its own country. to worsen relations with a government that is As far as the European economies are con- receiving unconditional support from China and cerned, the level of energy dependence is very Russia (Africa Confidential, 2019). high. The EU countries import over 70 % of the With regard to other countries, such as DRC fossil fuels they consume (in Spain’s case, 98 or Zimbabwe, it is worth noting that at the same %). The dependence on oil from West Africa of time as new NGOs that address the issue of the a country such as France and its oil firm Total natural resource curse and social movements is very high. In Spain’s case, a third of the oil it have arisen – with an increasingly large involve- imports comes from Sub-Saharan Africa, particu- ment of women in both cases –, the space of larly Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Angola and fundamental freedoms is being reduced and the other countries. social and political conflicts associated with the The EU’s dependence with regard to metallic exploitation of natural resources and their im- minerals is also very significant, bearing in mind pacts are on the rise. We could point to the work that it only produces around 3 % of the world’s being done on the issues of gender and extractive supply. It is not only a matter of coltan for mobile industries by the African Gender and Extractive phones and computers, but of many other key Alliance (WoMIN), which works in a network with minerals for the technological industries (such various national and regional organisations. as platinum and its use in catalytic converters on There is also growing militarisation of zones cars; or cobalt, for electric cars) and for funda- where there is an abundance of strategic hy- mental industrial economic sectors (such as tita- drocarbons and minerals. The most illustrative nium or bauxite, with which aluminum, copper case is that of the Sahel, where, in addition to and iron are made). the uranium of Niger (protected by France and In the new struggle for African commodities, its military forces) and the United States’ mili- Western governments and multinationals, par- tary drones, there are huge deposits of oil in the

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Taoudeni Basin (located chiefly in Mali and Mau- At the same time, various international agen- ritania), where several foreign companies are car- cies highlighted the extraordinary potential of rying out exploration. the revenues generated, and anticipated, to The picture described is completed by highly improve the living standards of local people. porous interstate borders, which allow the move- The IMF estimated that the annual revenues of ment of minerals, oil and other commodities via Guinea Conakry, Liberia and Mozambique could international networks of traffickers, foreign contribute to eradicating extreme poverty; in the intermediaries, traders and local technocrats, case of Ghana, it could be reduced by three quar- leaving broad swathes of international economic ters, and in that of Tanzania, it could cut it by relations in Africa in the shade (Mbembe, 2011). half. UNESCO said that if export taxes in line with international standards were levied and 20 % of the receipts obtained were allocated, it would The boom and its results more than double the official development assistance (ODA) and millions of children in several As of 2000, with the prices of oil and minerals on natural resource-rich African countries could be the rise, the opportunities for investment and re- put in school. turns for foreign multinationals, which have the However, on the ground the revenues yield- financial resources and technology to carry out ed still failed to result in an improvement in the exploration and exploit the resources, increased human development index (HDI), as the UNDP exponentially. African governments granted hun- ranking reflected throughout the super cycle dreds of licences in countries such as Mali (Afri- and continues to show to this day. The bottom 10 ca’s third-biggest gold producer); Mauritania and countries on the UNDP HDI published in 2018 are Liberia (iron) or Niger (the world’s fourth-biggest in Sub-Saharan Africa and nine of them are rich uranium producer). What’s more, in countries in natural resources. The bottom country on the such as Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozam- list is Niger, whose uranium was exploited from bique considerable hydrocarbons reserves were the 1960s and until the arrival of China in 2007 discovered. by the French multinational Areva (with a major- Many others, such as Guinea Conakry (the ity public stake) under a monopoly and in total country with the biggest reserves of bauxite in the opacity. It is estimated that between a third and world), Zambia (one of the world’s major copper a quarter of the electricity production in France producers) and DRC (a country considered to be depends on Nigerien uranium. The devastating a ‘geological scandal’), stepped up production. impact of its exploitation on the Tuareg people China, for its part, also chose to penetrate coun- was at the origin of an armed conflict between tries considered too unsafe for the Western pow- 2007 and 2009. ers, such as Chad. Other significant cases are those of Sierra In late 2011, The Economist published a cover Leone and Chad, countries with indexes at rock titled Africa Rising that had considerable impact bottom, despite the fact that their average an- and which stood in contrast with another fa- nual GDP growth between 2000 and 2011 was 82 mous front cover, a little less than a decade ear- % and 79 %, respectively. In the case of Zambia, lier, which had described Africa as ‘the hopeless the percentage of the population living below the continent’. The following year, in 2012, the GDP poverty line (60 %) remained the same through- rate of many countries rich in natural resources out the 2000-2010 period, in spite of having dou- reflected that optimism, as in Sierra Leone (20 % bled the production of copper. GDP increase); Niger (11 %); Angola (8.1 %) and On the other side of the scale, according to Ghana (7.5 %), as well as others that are not re- World Bank estimates, there was indeed some source-rich, such as Ethiopia (7.8 %). progress in health and education in the Sub-Sa-

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haran region as a whole; and between 1996 and Keys to explaining the paradox of plenty 2010 the percentage of its population in a situation of extreme poverty went down (from 57 % to The paradox pointed out by the World Bank actu- 43 %), though because of demographic growth ally refers to several (hard to manage) economic the actual number increased by over 100 million. aspects and political phenomena, which consti- Meanwhile, the World Bank itself observed tute the so-called natural resource curse. While that in very natural resource-rich countries there each country should be analysed case by case – was the paradox that the non-monetary wellbe- and according to the characteristics of its natural ing indicators were systematically lower than in resources and its historical, economic, political the rest of the countries (Beegle et al., 2016). and social context –, there is a series of common Nor did the issue of social equality fare much features that should be incorporated into any better. In 2011, six out 10 of the most unequal analysis of the issue. countries in the world were in the region (AfDB, The economic component of the paradox of 2012), with South Africa at the head. Currently, plenty, the so-called Dutch disease, was the first there are seven of the most unequal, five of issue to be addressed by the experts, through the which are rich in natural resources: South Africa analysis of the impacts caused by the export of is followed by Namibia (the world’s fifth-biggest large volumes of gas and oil: an increase in foreign uranium producer), Botswana (diamonds), Zam- exchange earnings and the monetary mass; in- bia (copper) and DRC (various minerals). That flation and currency appreciation, with negative inequality – directly linked to the lack of life op- impacts on the export of other products; financial portunities for the vast majority of the popula- dependence and dependency on the fluctuation tion, and which triggers ever more social tension of international prices, scant diversification of – is characteristic of many countries rich in oil investment – concentrated in capital-intensive and minerals and one of the main keys to why extractive sectors that create very few jobs – and the wealth has not resulted in wellbeing for the of the economy. The political and institutional people as a whole (APP, 2013). component, however, plays a crucial role. Some of the countries with the greatest in- In the case of African countries rich in oil, their equalities are major oil producers, like Nigeria, rentier nature is coupled with a web of laws and Angola or Equatorial Guinea. Because of the high state institutions geared to its exploitation to the prices of crude until 2014, most of these countries benefit of a minority. Oil revenues enable lighten- were among the ones that reported the highest ing direct taxation and subsidising fuel and ba- rates of growth and, at the same time, the worst sic foodstuffs, thus defusing social tension (until poverty reduction figures, with cases such as Ga- they are forced to raise prices), and strengthen- bon and Equatorial Guinea, where there was even ing their security forces. On an international level, a growth in extreme poverty. they have the backing of foreign governments The case of the latter country and Angola (in and multinationals with interests in the energy which oil accounts for around 75 % of the state’s sector. Domestically, the financial resources allo- income) is very illustrative. In the period 2000- cated to basic social services are pitiful compared 2011, their average annual GDP growth was 16.9 to the revenues generated and their management % and 10 %, respectively. However, the ratio is inefficient. By way of example, two oil-produc- between the increase in income per capita (272 ing countries, Cameroon and Nigeria, spend less % and 111 %, respectively) and their human de- than 1 % of GDP on health (World Bank, 2017). velopment indicators was among the lowest in The expression ‘sustainable failed states’ (Soares the world: Equatorial Guinea should have been Oliveira, 2007) fits the profile of these states well. 91 places higher in the UNDP HDI and Angola, 38 In Nigeria, oil – which accounts for 90 % of (APP, 2013). its exports and around 70 % of state revenues

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– comes from the Niger Delta region, where the nual loss for the African continent between 2008 burning of gas and spillage of crude (the Shell and 2010 of 38.4 billion dollars (a figure that ex- multinational being the chief culprit) have made ceeded the ODA received in the same period by it one of the zones of greatest ecological devas- nearly 9 billion dollars), as well as a further 25 bil- tation on the planet. The environmental impact lion evaded through other illicit financial flows. and effects on health, along with poverty and Another major financial loss stems from the the grievances caused, have moulded an armed regulatory frameworks and tax exemptions in fa- conflict (currently low intensity) and have turned vour of the multinationals, and whose origin is in the zone into the epicentre of piracy and lack of World Bank directives to attract foreign investors security that extends across the Gulf of Guinea in the 1980s (when commodities prices were very (ICG, 2012). low). According to many experts, there is a huge Another characteristic feature of the countries imbalance in favour of the multinationals in the stricken by the previously mentioned curse is the sector. Cases such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guin- huge deficits of the state-owned companies and ea Conakry and Zambia (whose copper exports the opacity in the contracts and budget informa- in 2011 came to 10 billion, while the revenues of tion, as organisations such as the International their governments were just 240 million) are very Budget Partnership and Revenue Watch Institute telling. indicate. Over the last few years, many African coun- The sovereign funds and those intended for tries have reformed their mining and investment future generations, which are key instruments for codes to raise more taxes and better protect the tying the revenues to sustainable development, local communities and the environment. The have also been the object of poor management, challenge is to implement these regulations, with several cases of corruption. The son of the among other reasons because of the existing former Angolan president is currently charged institutional shortcomings. Meanwhile, the cur- over a case of massive corruption related to his rent economic fragility and falling results of the management of the sovereign fund created with extractive sector in many countries are prompt- oil money in 2012 and endowed with 5 billion US ing the foreign multinationals to press for more dollars. advantageous contracts and tax concessions On the other hand, African coffers lose huge (Third World Network Africa, 2016). volumes of funds through tax havens, to which Likewise, Illicit financial flows (IFF) that are the multinationals of the sector turn to avoid transferred abroad need to be tackled with much paying tax. One method is the issuing of invoices greater determination. The African Development by a company domiciled in a tax haven to an- Bank and the Global Financial Integrity organisa- other from the same group, which is the one tion have estimated that between 1980 and 2009 that exploits the natural resources in situ. The as much as 1.4 trillion dollars (1.4 billion on the first invoice is issued for totally overvalued or European numerical scale) may have been trans- nonexistence services (technical assistance, sale ferred illicitly from Africa. That shows that that of technology, patents) and the second deducts the matter requires a radical change of the per- the amount from the tax bill that it has to pay. ception of Africa as a unilateral recipient of huge Another method is the sale of oil and minerals to amounts of donations (via ODA above all) and tax havens (for these to sell them to the end cus- investment. tomer), which allows transferring the payment For its part, the Mbeki report (UNECA, 2015) – of taxes to countries where the tax rate is tiny or backed by the heads of state of the African Union very low. The Global Financial Integrity organisa- – estimates the volume of IFF from Africa at 50 bil- tion estimated that these illegal practices – called lion dollars a year, chiefly from the oil and mining ‘transfer mispricing’ – were responsible for an an- sector, whose main destinations are the banks

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and tax havens under the sovereignty of OECD been cut significantly, while the pocket of the lo- countries and other countries that are trading cal population suffers due to currency deprecia- partners of Africa. tion and high inflation. There is also a high risk of The rampant corruption in African countries a reversal of what little progress has been made was the object of a special warning in the latest in some of these countries (AfDB, 2017). report by the Transparency International organ- In addition, there is the heavy indebtedness isation (2019). This corruption is often generated that affects most of the countries of the region, through hidden deals between the African elites with 18 of them at high-risk levels. China has be- and the foreign multinationals and via tax ha- come the main creditor, with 14 % of the total vens, as was seen in the legal action against the debt (Coulibaly, 2018), as a result of making mas- oil firms ENI and Shell and Nigerian state agents sive loans since 2000 (at a rate of 10 billion dollars over a corruption affair amounting to over 1 bil- a year between 2012 and 2017). In 2018, China lion dollars. Progress has also been made in the announced the granting of 60 billion euros to proceedings against African leaders and their the African countries, mainly in loans and credit relatives with property abroad, over matters of lines. For its part, the EU – the primary donor in embezzlement. the region and which allocates huge amounts of The Panama Papers revealed that the elites of funds to trying to tackle the causes that encour- 44 African countries hid funds and assets, a good age migration – intends to implement a mainly part of which came from the extractive sector. As private investment plan worth 44 billion euros. several African leaders and former leaders point- Once again, the case of Nigeria reflects the ed out, the main blame for the mismanagement scale of the current challenges. The present gov- of natural resources lies with the governments ernment is trying to raise taxes, secure loans from themselves (Tana High Level Forum on Security China, combat corruption (with results that are far in Africa, 2017). cry from the projected expectations) and recover the funds transferred illegally to foreign banks, at the same time as it is drawing up privatisation The end of the super cycle: consequences and challenges plans that include energy and oil corporations. Moreover, there is a crucial need to activate The fall in the price of minerals in 2011 and 2012 strategic economic diversification plans that low- and the slump in oil prices in 2014 (influenced, er the dependence on commodities and commit among other factors, by the production of shale to sustainable development. The interest of the gas in the United States) caught the vast major- multinationals in the extractive sector in main- ity of the countries rich in these resources unpre- taining the current exploitation dynamics does pared. Regional GDP growth was 2.5 % between not work in their favour. Nor do the economic ex- 2015 and 2017 and 2.7 % in 2018, being largely pansion plans of the African countries contribute responsible for the poor results of Nigeria (which to the sustainable management of their natural went into recession in 2016 for the first time in resources. two decades), South Africa and Angola. The eco- The development of the manufacturing sector nomic slowdown in China played a significant is equally decisive. The Sub-Saharan countries role in the fall (AfDB, 2017). The forecasts of sig- continue to export unprocessed commodities. nificant growth in 2019 are concentrated in coun- The amount of crude refined locally is tiny and tries that are not rich in natural resources. most of the minerals are exported with no prior The vast majority of the countries rich in oil processing of the respective metals. By way of and minerals are in a very difficult situation, with example, DRC exports the vast majority of its co- soaring budget deficits and in need of a large balt unprocessed, added value being provided amount of cash injection. State budgets have through smelting in China and other countries.

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Nigeria and Angola import oil in the form of fuel governments in the extractive sector and, in com- and oil products (plastics, fertilisers). Developing panies linked to its value chains, on licences and the manufacturing sector not only creates jobs; it the identity of shareholders (who in many cases also reduces vulnerability to the high volatility of are hidden through firms in tax havens). There commodities prices on the international markets. are eight African countries that are openly back- The economic slowdown, in turn, means ing the public nature of all information on the that the challenges in terms of job creation are contracts in the sector. However, while the EITI increasingly difficult to address. Rates of demo- has obtained important international recogni- graphic growth are very high in a region where tion, it is still not possible to attribute concrete the average age is 19 (and that of their presi- progress in terms of improvement in basic social dents is 70); where 50 % of young people are out services or socioeconomic development to the of work (AfDB, 2017) and with an estimated 30 initiative, as can be gathered from a review of 50 million young people joining the labour market evaluations conducted (Lujala et al., 2017). every year between 2015 and 2030. The Africa Mining Vision (AMV 2009), meanwhile, forms part of the so-called African Re- naissance, with the aim of establishing a new Initiatives regarding the ‘curse’ paradigm of African development and transcending an extractive model based on the current ma- In the light of all this, it seems clear that the fun- jor dependence on the international markets. Its damental issue continues to be how to tackle the goal is for mineral resources to contribute to gen- paradox of plenty around hydrocarbons and min- erating equitable socioeconomic development erals. Over the last few years, certain regulations through the involvement of local communities on transparency and traceability (to certify that and the protection of the environment. certain minerals are not linked to conflicts) have While 24 African countries have joined the ini- been approved, but they are still nascent. The tiative, an assessment of its application reveals United States passed the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), several shortcomings, such as the slow pace of its but its effective application has been under huge implementation and the lack of adequate aware- pressure from the oil lobby. The EU, for its part, ness of its significance on the part of the key play- approved directives on transparency and ac- ers involved. It also has major shortcomings in countability in 2013 and provisions on traceabili- terms of gender (because of the failure to include ty. Countries such as Norway, the United Kingdom gender equality in the regulatory frameworks), and Canada have also passed legislation on the the environment and impacts on livelihoods. An- subject. Experience shows that it is essential to other key issue is that for the development of the establish regulations of a prescriptive nature. industrialisation policies that the AMV envisages In terms of initiatives on transparency and im- the African countries require greater freedom of proving the management of natural resources, it action, which is directly conditioned by the eco- worth highlighting the Extractive Industries Trans- nomic and commercial liberalisation agreements parency Initiative (EITI, 2003) and the Africa Min- signed (Oxfam, 2017). ing Vision (AMV 2009). Joining both is voluntary. Other social organisations have criticised the The EITI is an international initiative that has fact that the AMV focuses on the maximisation been endorsed by 24 countries in Sub-Saharan of resources and their links to the local economy Africa (though four of them have been suspended and the distribution of the revenues more fairly, or their progress is inadequate). The initiative has but it does not prioritise the protection of the gradually broadened its field of action with a view rights of the local communities and need to se- to generating more information on payments to cure their prior, free and informed consent (Ac- companies and the revenues of the respective tion Aid, 2017). That right – laid down in the UN

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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples gimes –are bolstered thanks to China’s policy in of 2007 – is claimed by the communities them- the region (at the price of high-risk debt), while, selves, in some cases through legal action. in turn, the economic and strategic interests of the Western powers work in favour of regimes that lack proper social and democratic legiti- Conclusion macy. The economic situation and the growing grievances are prompting intense protests in Despite its huge potential, the commodities super several countries, which are repressed without cycle has not contributed to improving the living quarter. standards of the people of the countries rich in The legal standards and international and re- hydrocarbons and minerals. On the contrary, it gional initiatives in this sphere are still nascent has caused greater inequality. This cycle, largely and their application and results fall well short of triggered by demand from China (both at its start meeting the current challenges. The most visible and at its end), has also coincided with the ar- face of these challenges are the very serious im- rival of China (and several emerging countries) in pacts deriving, day by day, from the exploitation Sub-Saharan Africa, through a multidimensional of these resources, whose most hidden side are strategy geared to capturing hydrocarbons and the huge amounts of funds grabbed. minerals that has sparked fierce competition with It is not a matter of being pessimistic or op- the Western powers, particularly those of Europe. timistic about Sub-Saharan Africa, or of taking The dependence of both China and the Euro- its GDP or the potential of its natural resources pean powers on those resources (and their trans- as the benchmark for that. It is a matter of tack- fer, at affordable prices, to the final consumer) is ling the priority issues rigorously and with politi- the ground zero of an issue of huge importance, cal will. Financial and economic crises, the fair which inextricably links the importing countries and equitable exploitation of natural resources, with the countries in whose subsoil the wealth human rights, climate change, peacebuilding, lies. Taking centre stage, on one side, are the quality education systems, migration flows and African ruling and business elites and, on the other issues of prime importance are increasingly other, the foreign governments and energy and interconnected. Not only sustainable develop- extractive sector multinationals. They are the ment goals, but also welfare and global stability main players and main culprits of the so-called depend on their proper coordination and the put- paradox of plenty, and the keys to explaining it ting into practice of the resulting policies. must be incorporated into any policy that means to tackle the issue in its different dimensions with due consistency. References Among other issues, tax havens, illicit financial flows, opacity of the international banks, fun- Action Aid: The African Mining Vision: Are we re- damental freedoms, regulatory frameworks that packaging a colonial Paradigm?, Position Pa- are excessively favourable to investors, interests per for the African Extractives Working Group geared to ensure commodities are exported un- Regional Policy Conference, 2017. processed are all variables in the same equation, AfDB and African Development Bank: Income In- whose solution is vital for the wellbeing of a large equality in Africa, Briefing Note, 2012. part of the 1 billion-plus people who live in Sub- AfDB, African Development Bank, OECD and Saharan Africa, who see how their fundamental UNDP: African Economic Outlook, Entrepre- rights are systematically violated. neurship and Industrialization, 2017. In the framework of this new struggle, the Africa Confidential:Africa in 2019: The youngest con- African leaders – including several autocratic re- tinent fights back, vol. 60, n.º 2, January 2019.

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Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stew- Mbembe, A.: Necropolítica, Melusina, Barcelona, arding Africa´s natural resources for all, Africa 2011. Progress Report, 2013. Oxfam: ‘From Aspiration to Reality, Unpack- Beegle, K., Christiaens, L., Dabalen, A., Gaddis, I.: ing the Africa Mining Vision’, Briefing Paper, Poverty in a Rising Africa, World Bank, Wash- March 2017. ington DC, 2016. Soares de Oliveira, R.: Oil and Politics in the Gulf Coulibaly, B. S. (ed.): Forsight Africa. 10 Top Prior- of Guinea, Hurst, London, 2007. ities for the continent in 2018, The Brookings Third World Network Africa: ‘Ghana Govern- Institution, 2018. ment’s Development Agreements with Gold- International Crisis Group: ‘The Gulf of Guinea: fields Illegal’, 2016. the new danger zone’, Africa Report n.º 195, Transparency International: ‘Corruption Percep- 2012. tion Index 2018’, 2019. Karl, T. L.: ‘Oil-Led Development, Social, Political UNECA: Economic Report on Africa: Industrializ- and Economic Consequences’, Center on De- ing through Trade, Addis Ababa, 2015. mocracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, UNECA: Illicit financial flows: report of the High Standford University, CDDRL Working Papers Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa, n.º 80, January 2007. Addis Ababa, 2015. Lujala, P., Rustad, S. A., and Le Billon, P.: ‘Has the Vibe Christensen, B.: Challenges of low commod- EITI been successful? Reviewing evaluations ity prices for Africa, BIS Papers n.º 87, Bank for of the Extractive Industries Transparency Ini- International Settlements, 2016. tiative’, CMI - Chr. Michelsen Institute, U4Brief, n.º 5, 2017.

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Gema Serón Aires and Lorenzo Gabrielli

The increasing number of people seeking to Member State. Numerous African countries were reach the European Mediterranean coast from included in the first such list elaborated in 1995.1 Africa since 2015 has supposed the greatest mi- Spain and Italy’s obligation to establish visa re- gratory challenge the European Union (EU) has quirements for nationals of Maghreb countries faced since the Second World War. This situa- (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) following their tion, which has been perceived and framed po- accession to the Schengen Agreement convert- litically as a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’, has revealed ed these two Mediterranean Member States into the limitations of European migration policy and border control zones for North African migra- also brought the tensions between the disparate tion to the EU. The visa requirement, along with interests and agendas of Member States (MS) re- other measures such as the institution of finan- garding the issue into sharp relief. To understand cial penalties for carriers transporting irregular the current state of affairs and tackle the pending migrants,2 began to restrict channels of mobility challenges of EU policy on migration towards Af- between Africa and Europe from that point on. rica, we must first examine the genesis and evo- From the times of the Schengen Agreement and lution of EU policy in this area and identify the the Maastricht Treaty questions regarding migra- elements and dynamics that have had a signifi- tion have been thrown into the same sack as is- cant impact on the ways in which it has changed sues related to illegal acts and organised crime over time and determined its present focus. with the justification that migration must be controlled in order to guarantee the internal security of Schengen territory. The evolution and structural framework of EU The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) marked migration policy towards Africa a turning point in the evolution of European migratory policy in that it established new EU EU interest in collaborating with key African competences in areas such as immigration, states on migratory issues dates back to the mid- asylum and the crossing of external borders 1990s, when the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 put an end to internal border 1 checkpoints and shifted the focus of border con- Council Regulation (EC) No 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining the third countries whose nationals trol to the Union’s external periphery. The Maas- must be in possession of visas when crossing the exter- tricht Treaty (1992) vested the European Council nal borders of the Member States. with the authority to establish a list of third coun- 2 Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing tries whose nationals must be in possession of a the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention imple- visa when crossing the external borders of a EU menting the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.

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as a central pillar of EU policy and made these The Tampere agenda received further impe- issues community concerns. The demand for tus at the 21-22 June 2002 European Council in migration management at the community level Seville, where it was asserted that clauses on was also patent in the conclusions at the Tam- the management of migration flows should be pere European summit meeting (1999), which included in all future cooperation, association strengthened the concept of collaboration with or equivalent agreements the EU concluded with countries of origin in the fight against irregular third countries. The same year the Commission migration, set out the basic elements3 of a EU released a communication containing guidelines common policy on migration and asylum and for the integration of migration issues into rela- underscored the importance of external action tions with third countries5 in which it recognised in this area. While the Tampere conclusions con- that migration had become a major EU strategic stitute the first official EU document to speak priority. This document noted somewhat ironi- of the need to develop ‘common policies on cally that ‘the majority of economic migrants in asylum and immigration’, its heavy emphasis the EU do not originate from poor countries but on the fight against ‘illegal immigration’ and rather from middle income countries and coun- calls for measures promoting voluntary return tries in transition’ and underscored the high and readmission (one of which was the inclu- volume of South-South migration in Africa.6 In sion of readmission clauses in EU agreements consonance with the prevailing international with third countries) and capacity-building as- climate,7 many of the policy measures adopted sistance enabling countries of origin and transit in Europe at that time (a number of which were to cope more effectively with their obligations articulated in the Hague Programme)8 focused regarding these issues, is striking. heavily on security. Extensive media coverage The EU’s interest in establishing more struc- of the arrival of migrants in Lampedusa and at- tured relations with Africa grew in tandem with tempts by migrants to storm barrier fences in the development of its fledgling migration policy Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 as well as fresh waves and geopolitical shifts taking place during the of migrants reaching the Canary Islands in make- 1990s. The first EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo on 3 April 2000 provided a basic framework for of States of the one part, and the European Commu- the EU-Africa Partnership adopted at a second nity and its Member States, of the other part, signed in summit convened seven years later. On 23 June Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols – Final Act - Dec- of the same year the EU and African, Caribbean larations. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ and Pacific (ACP) countries signed the Cotonou ALL/?uri=celex:22000A1215(01) 5 Agreement on political, economic and develop- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Integrating migration is- ment cooperation. In line with the reasoning ar- sues in the European Union’s relations with third coun- ticulated at the Tampere meeting, Article 13 of tries, COM (2002), 703, final. this document stipulated that ACP countries ac- 6 These observations are in line with the migration hump cept the return and readmission of their nationals theory defended by academic authors such as Hein de and other third country nationals illegally present Haas that later disappeared from institutional discours- on EU territory.4 es. See: de Haas, H. (2008). 7 In large part in reaction to 2001 ‘9/11’ terrorist attack in the United States and the 2004 train bombings in Madrid. 3 These were: 1) partnership with countries of origin; 2) 8 Communication from the Commission to the Council a common European asylum system; 3) fair treatment of and the European Parliament of 10 May 2005, The Hague third-country nationals and 4) management of migration Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The flows. Partnership for European Renewal in the field of Free- 4 2000/483/EC: Partnership agreement between the dom, Security and Justice. COM (2005) 184 final – Official members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group Journal C 236 of 24 September 2005.

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shift boats in 2006 also contributed to the in- EU Strategy and first joint Action Plan for 2008- tensification of EU-Africa political dialogue. The 2010 were adopted. informal summit of heads of state and govern- The next major step in the evolution of EU mi- ment convened at Hampton Court on 27 October gration policy came in the wake of the Arab Spring 2005 was devoted entirely to migration issues. of 2011, a moment at which political and socio- Leaders attending this meeting adopted a ‘com- economic instability in the region and the fall of prehensive approach’ to migration issues and regimes that had collaborated with the EU in mi- defined a set of priority actions that included gration management such as those of Gaddafi in making migration – framed as a ‘problem’ – ‘an Libya and Ben Ali in Tunisia prompted greater mi- integral part of the political dialogue between gration flows towards Europe. The EU responded the EU, the African Union and other regional or- to this situation by adopting the Global Approach ganisations’9 and combating illegal immigration to Migration Management (GAMM, 2011), under and working with third countries to optimise the which the framework set out in 2005 was updated benefits of ‘legal’ migration10. Fine words not and two new policy tools for collaboration with withstanding, in practice, priority is placed on third countries were introduced: non-binding Mo- actions related to aspects of migration control bility Partnerships with neighbouring countries such as readmission and entry conditions. At this and Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility meeting the Council approved a EU–Africa strat- (CAMM). egy subsequently laid out in The EU and Africa: The ouster of Gaddafi and the ensuring chaos towards a strategic partnership, a document that in Libya, together with ongoing instability in the places a heavy emphasis on security issues and Horn of Africa, made mobility between East- portrays Africa as a continent fraught with insta- ern Africa and the EU a priority issue. Another bility and insecurity. traumatic event receiving massive media cov- EU-Africa relations regarding migration issues erage would give further impulse to the politi- took on new dimensions in 2006 with the Euro- cal agenda: the drowning of 366 migrants from African Ministerial Conference in Rabat, a Span- Somalia bound for Europe off the coast of the ish-Moroccan initiative that took place against Italian island of Lampedusa in October 2013. the backdrop of the incidents of 2005 and 2006 Although there had been no previous plan to in- mentioned earlier. This event marked the launch clude the fight against ‘irregular immigration’ on of the Rabat Action Plan, which established three the agenda of the EU-Africa Summit scheduled pillars of mutual endeavour going forward: the to take place in Brussels in April 2014, the topic organisation of legal migration, the fight against was taken up as a priority issue at that meeting. irregular migration and human trafficking and de- The Khartoum Process, launched at a ministe- velopment in countries of origin. Several other rial conference held in Rome in November 2014, meetings along the same lines have since been applied the Rabat formula of externalising mi- held, among them the EU–Africa Ministerial Con- gration control to countries along the migration ference on Migration and Development held in route between the Horn of Africa and Europe. Tripoli in 2006, and the 2nd EU–Africa Summit EU–Africa cooperation on migration issues was held in Lisbon in 2007, at which the Joint Africa- structured to take place at three levels: 1) the continental level through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy; 2) the regional level through the politi- 9 COM (2005) 621 Final. Communication from the Com- cal dialogues of the Rabat Process (focused on mission to the Council and the European Parliament the western migration route) and the Khartoum – Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration – First follow-up to Hampton Court. Process (focused on the eastern migration route) 10 15914/1/05 REV 1. Presidency conclusions. Brussels and 3) the bilateral level through EU political dia- European Council, 15 / 16 December 2005. logues with third countries.

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EU migration policy towards Africa since the external borders; 3) a strong common asylum Valletta Summit policy and 4) a new policy on legal migration. From this moment on and in line with the new The migration crisis of 2015 had a tremendous agenda, migration would become a major con- impact on EU migration policy towards Africa. cern of the EU Common Security and Defence During the months of January and February Policy (CSDP), a policy shift that marked a defini- 2015 at least one million people, half of whom tive step towards the securitisation13 and milita- were fleeing the war in Syria, entered Europe via risation of EU migration policy. EU-third country various routes criss-crossing the Mediterranean cooperation on migration issues, security and the region.11 As we will see going forward, the EU’s use of development as a policy tool for control- response to these events was essentially reactive ling migration also figure heavily in documents and centred on security issues. Overwhelmed by such as Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger the dimensions of the situation, the Union fo- Europe - Global Strategy for the European Union’s cused on initiatives and actions contemplated Foreign and Security Policy (2016) and The Euro- in the 2015 European Agenda for Migration and pean Consensus on Development (2017). mapped out at the EU-Africa Valletta Summit Of the four pillars of the European Agenda on held in November 2015 such as the approval of Migration, greater emphasis has been placed on the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the the first two: reducing incentives for irregular mi- new migration partnership for cooperation with gration and securing external borders. The first third countries scheme introduced in 2016. pillar of the agenda purports to address ‘ the root causes of irregular and forced displacement’ (an effort to be financed primarily through the EU The 2015 European Agenda for Migration Emergency Trust Fund for Africa), improve the ef- ficiency of mechanisms in place for the return of On 13 May 2015, the European Commission re- immigrants to countries of origin and transit, (to leased COM (2015) 240, A European Agenda on be accomplished through third-country partner- Migration,12 a document that announced a series ship agreements) and ‘crack down on traffickers of imminent actions that included a significant and smugglers’. This last item is closely related to increase in the budget of the European Border the second pillar of the agenda, which deals with and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), the agen- the security of external borders – an area that has cy charged with monitoring the EU’s maritime received an increasing amount of funding, as can borders, and established ‘four pillars to manage be observed in Chart 1, which tracks the evolu- migration better’: 1) reducing the incentives for tion of budget allotments for Frontex from 2005 irregular migration; 2) saving lives and securing to 2018. The better part of actions taken on both pil- 11 At this time, the International Organization for Migra- lars have had a quasi-military focus: boosting tions (OIM) reported ‘total arrivals to Europe at roughly the capacities and assets for Frontex joint opera- 1,005,504, with just 3% coming by land’, furthermore tions, the gathering and pooling of information, noting, ‘The total is the highest migration flow since the detection and destruction of boats used to World War II’. See: https://www.iom.int/es/news/más- transport migrants and support for border man- de-un-millon-de-migrantes-y-refugiados-han-llegado- agement in transit countries. In contrast, little europa-en-2015-informo-la-oim 12 European Commission: Communication. A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13 By securitisation, we are referring to the gradual re- 13 May 2015. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti- framing of migration as an internal and external security trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communica-tion_ issue. For more information on this topic, see: D. Bigo on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (2002), J. Huysmans (2006) and L. Gabrielli (2014).

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Chart 1. Evolution of Frontex budget 2005-2008 (in euros)

350,000,000

300,000,000

250,000,000

200,000,000

150,000,000

100,000,000

50,000,000

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Figures above have been based on Frontex and EU Comission data.

attention has been paid, or resources allotted to, and the Horn of Africa. The ostensible aim of the the other two pillars of the agenda, ‘strengthen- fund, described in general terms, was ‘promoting the European Common Asylum Policy’ and ing resilience, economic and equal opportuni- ‘defining a new policy on legal immigration’. ties, security and development’.14 The Trust Fund was presented as a mechanism for providing a swift and flexible response to emergency and The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa post-emergency situations – an objective far removed from the structural factors underpin- The Valletta Summit on migration held in Malta ning migration in the Mediterranean basin and on 12 November 2015 marked a key moment in between Africa and Europe. The fact that many EU–African relations pertaining to migratory is- of the projects financed by means of this mecha- sues. European and African heads of state and nism have focused more on the readmission of government met on this occasion with the objec- irregular migrants, border control, and mobil- tive of strengthening Euro-African relations and ity than programmes fostering development in discussing measures needed to address mutual countries of origin or democratic governance15, challenges that were subsequently communi- raises the issue of the extent to which a heavy cated in a declaration and action plan that more emphasis of short-term interests such as migra- or less reiterated ideas expressed at previous tion control may be damaging the prospects of meetings. They did, however, officially announce achieving long-term objectives such as develop- the creation of a €1.8 billion EU Emergency Trust ment, stability, the eradication of poverty and the Fund for Africa, the purpose of which was to protection of human rights. generate ‘stability and address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in 14 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ Africa’ and was to focus primarily on programmes commission-decision-2015-7293-20151020_en.pdf benefitting twenty-three countries in the Sahel 15 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu- region and Lake Chad area, the North of Africa emergency-trust-fund-africa_en.pdf

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Other criticism of the Fund has focused more side drug trafficking routes and the locations of on the lack of transparency in processes related armed jihadist groups.18 to the adoption of projects, their implementation The externalisation of EU security concerns and consultation with, and the participation of, has supposed the diversion of funds intended local stakeholders. According to some authors (E. for development to projects focusing exclusively Kervyn and R. Shilhav, 2017), 22% of the fund’s on security, border control and mobility and a budget is devoted to projects directly related distortion of the original objectives established to migration management. Of these, the major- for European-African cooperation in this area.19 ity focus on migration containment and control The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has (55%), readmission (25%) or determining African served as a mechanism for channelling a €140 migrants’ country of origin (13%). Only 3% of the million funding package to Morocco recently ap- budget is devoted to the development of ‘safe, proved by the European Commission in response regular routes’. Other sources estimate that as to appeals made by the Spanish government in much as 39.1% of the fund’s budget goes to proj- 2018, a year in which a sharp increase in arrivals ects directly related to migration management of migrants and refugees to the Mediterranean and border control.16 coast became an issue of domestic importance The fund is financing at least two multina- with national elections scheduled for 2019 loom- tional projects devoted entirely to police and ing on the political horizon. As fifty per cent of military cooperation on security issues: GAR-SI this package (€70 million) goes directly into the Sahel (Groupes d’Action Rapides – Sureveillance Moroccan national budget, it is very dificult to et Intervention au Sahel) and WAPIS (West Afri- perform oversight of implementation or know can Police Information System). GAR- SI Sahel precisely how these funds are spent.20 is managed by the Spanish International and Libya, another beneficiary of EU externalisation Ibero-American Foundation for Administration policy, has recently received an additional €45M and Public Policies (Fundación Internacional y for border and migrant management through the para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa earmarked for Públicas or FIIAPP) and implemented on site by ‘supporting capacity development and institution the Spanish Guardia Civil.17 The angle from which building of the Libyan coast guards, contributing GAR-SI Sahel approaches the issue of migration is to the establishment of the Maritime Rescue Co- made patently clear in maps of threats to Europe- ordination Centre and fostering the development an security contained in documents concerning the project that depict migration routes along- 18 “Annexe IV à l’Accord Instituant le Fond Fiduciaire ‘Europe- an Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing 16 See Jona, L.: ‘La UE usa fondos de la lucha contra la pobre- root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in za para frenar la llegada de migrantes’, El Diario, 23 May 2017. Africa’, et ses règles internes”, T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-04 GAR-SI Available at: http://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/controlar- SAHEL, p. 5. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ migraciones-UE-fondos-pobreza_0_646736351.html sites/devco/files/t05-eutf-sah-reg-2016_fr.pdf 17 See Paone, M.: ‘España lidera dos proyectos de control 19 The 2018 EU Trust Fund Report released by CONCORD de fronteras financiados con fondos europeos de coop- underscores the growing risk of the EUTF favouring proj- eración’, El Diario, 24 May 2017. Available at: http://www. ects linked to EU migration management objectives to eldiario.es/desalambre/Espana-proyectos-inmigrantes- the detriment of projects exclusively devoted to African dinero-cooperacion_0_647085542.html. It should be development. remembered that the International and Ibero-American 20 Morocco received €35M in 2016 related to government Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FI- migration policies through the European Neighbourhood IAPP) is a public foundation that manages cooperation Policy and €6.5M earmarked for ‘assistance to vulnerable mi- projects for the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and grants’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/ Cooperation. sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ma-03.pdf

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of the integrated border management in southern Providing voluntary return assistance to mi- Libya’21 as a follow-up to the EU Border Assistance grants in Niger is another key endeavour. The IOM Mission (EUBAM) in Libya. has established six transit centres in the country26 While official documents speak much about (in Arlit, Dirkou, Agadez and an additional three ongoing human rights training in Libya, authori- in Niamey) from which migrants can make plans ties in that country are failing to meet even the to return home27. IOM statistics28 indicate that most basic standards in that area. As the reports these centres have assisted over 42,000 people of various international organisations and NGOs between 2016 and 2018. The IOM also manages continue to stress,22 migrants trapped in Libya fund-financed projects focusing on sustainable continue to be exposed to abuse at the hands return from Niger and improving Niger’s ability to of armed factions and human traffickers in the respond to complex migration flows.29 Concerned form of murder, torture, arbitrary detention, rape, that certain returns from Niger under IOM man- slavery, forced work and extorsion23 – violations agement may not have been truly voluntary, the of human rights that often take place with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human complicity of Libyan authorities. Rights has called upon donors, including the EU, Niger is another country considered of key to provide more support for strengthening in- importance by the EU for its status as a major stitutions in Niger, improving transparency and staging point for migrant flows, its uranium re- human rights there and to facilitate channels for serves and its vulnerability to jihadist insurgen- safe, legal migration.30 cies. Of the various projects financed by the Trust Fund there,24 Reconstruction of the State of Niger / Support for Justice, Security and Border Man- A Migration Partnership Framework for cooperation agement25 stands out for the manner in which with third countries funding is being channelled: of the €90M allotted to this initiative, €70M has been classified as In terms of policy focus, the first major change national budgetary support, despite the greater in the context of this new wave of initiatives was risk of diversion of funds such a modus operandi laid out in a Commission Fact Sheet issued on 7 supposes. June 2016 under the title Towards a new Part- nership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda, in which the EU introduced 21 EU Trust Fund for Africa: new actions adopted to sup- ‘negative incentives’ by which third countries port vulnerable migrants, foster socio-economic development and improve border management in North of Africa. Commission press release Brussels, 14 December 26 The IOM has received support from the EU Trust Fund 2018. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ and other donors for this project. Available at: https://www. IP-18-6793_en.htm iom.int/news/iom-nigers-voluntary-return-assistance- 22 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ migrants-eclipses-2017-totals MDE1993912018ENGLISH.pdf and https://www.ohchr. 27 https://www.iom.int/countries/niger org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf 28 http://www.nigermigrationresponse.org/en/Our- 23 UN News (in Spanish): ‘Los migrantes y refugiados en Libia work/iom-transit-centers sufren “horrores inimaginables”’, 20 December 2018. Avail- 29 ’Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des able at: https://news.un.org/es/story/2018/12/1448331/ migrations et le retour durable au Niger (Sustainable Re- 24 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel- turn from Niger – SURENI)’, €15M ‘Mécanisme de Réponse lake-chad/niger/contrat-relatif-la-reconstruction-de- et de Ressources pour les Migrants’ €7M. For further in- letat-au-niger-en-complement-du_en formation, see: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/ 25 ‘Reconstruction de l’Etat au Niger en complément du region/sahel-lake-chad/niger_en SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la 30 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display Gestion des Frontières au Niger’. News.aspx?NewsID=23709&LangID=E

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that do not collaborate with the EU in migrant gration issues and quite possibly have damaged flow management and readmission efforts could relations between the EU and certain third coun- be penalised by means of a reduction or suspen- try partners such as Ethiopia (C. Castillejo, 2017) sion of EU development funds. Up to this point and Mali (E. Cuny, 2018). the Union had relied on ‘positive incentives’ to In brief, the weaknesses of the EU Emergency achieve these goals. This new policy was to be im- Trust Fund for Africa and the Migration Partner- plemented by means of Partnership Agreements ship Framework lead one to the logical con- focusing on migration issues to be negotiated on clusion the EU would be wise to adopt a more a country-by-country basis – a measure previous- coherent and truly sustainable policy on migra- ly contemplated in the 2015 agenda that would tion issues guided by a mid- to long-term vision if allow the EU to exert more pressure on individual it wishes to avoid poor outcomes in other equally third countries regarding these issues and make important areas such as development and hu- it more difficult for them to negotiate as a bloc.31 man rights.35 This model for joint cooperation has been presented as ‘a political framework for continued and operation [sic] cooperation’ that draws upon Other policy initiatives various instruments to facilitate the development of ‘a comprehensive partnership’, which the Com- The policies described above are being imple- mission describes as a ‘fluid process’.32 By adopt- mented in tandem with other measures. To gain ing this more flexible and informal approach, the a deeper understanding of European externali- Union hoped to avoid the types of problems that sation of border management in Africa and the it had come up against when negotiating Mobility ideologies and mindsets driving this trend one Partnerships with countries such as Senegal, Mali must also consider European initiatives in Africa Ethiopia, Nigeria and Niger.33 Progress reports is- launched at the national level such as those car- sued to date34 nevertheless indicate this approach ried out by Italy in Libya and Niger and those by has not been as effective as hoped, especially on Spain in Morocco and Senegal36 as well as decla- the issue of readmission. Migration Partnerships rations and proposals issued by the Commission, have failed to foster deeper collaboration on mi- high-level EU authorities and the governments of Member States. European politicians have made a point of 31 The dynamics of this shift in policy are reminiscent of publically thanking African countries for their col- the shift that occurred from the multilateral framework laboration on migration issues and highlighting model for relations with third Mediterranean countries employed in the Barcelona Process (Euromed) to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) model, by which 35 For further information, see: Concord (2018). individual agreements are struck between the EU and 36 In October 2018, Spain announced the shipment of third countries, a strategy that makes it less likely for equipment (vehicles and software worth €3.2M) to be third countries to take common stances counter to EU used for border control purposes in three key countries interests. along the eastern African migration route to Europe: 32 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_ Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. Morocco received format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2. the lion’s share of this aid (75 all-terrain vehicles worth pdf €2.5M). Interior Ministry officials described the initiative 33 For a detailed study of failed negotiations with Sen- as being consistent with the lines of collaboration estab- egal, see: M. Chou and M. Gibert (2012). lished with African countries following the ‘cayuco crisis’ 34 European Commission: Fifth Progress Report on the of 2006. ‘Interior dona 75 vehículos a Rabat para frenar la Partnership Framework with third countries under the inmigración irregular, El País, 31 October 2018. Available European Agenda on Migration, COM (2017) 471 final, at: https://elpais.com/politica/2018/10/30/actualidad/ 6.9.2017. 1540922785_819764.html

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actions being carried out in this area. The decla- clear40 and by October the proposal had disap- ration by then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs peared from the European agenda.41 Paolo Gentiloni during a November 2016 trip to Other, more off-the-cuff and neo-colonialist Senegal, Niger and Mali with European Commis- ideas for ‘stemming migration to Europe’ have in- sioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizen- cluded the one shared by Germany’s Africa Com- ship Dimitris Avramopoulos, that he supported missioner Gunter Nooke during an interview with ‘helping authorities to strengthen border control, the BBC, during which Nooke suggested that ‘the adapt their equipment and, of course, in humani- European Union or a body like the World Bank tarian assistance management’,37 was shortly fol- should build and run cities in Africa to boost job lowed by a Council decision not only to renew the creation and development on the continent’.42 mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali (a EU civil mission The African Union roundly rejected any possible focused on training police and security forces) version of this proposal as well. but also extend the mission’s remit to training Cooperation between the EU and other part- related to border management and combating ners in Africa such as Eygpt – a key country in irregular migration.38 terms of curbing migratory flow – has been lower During the summer of 2018, Austria, which profile,43 although Ausrian Chancellor Sebastian had just assumed the presidency of the Council Kurz and European Council President Donald for the second half of 2018, proposed setting up Tusk have recently singled out Eygpt for being regional ‘disembarkation platforms’ in certain an exemplary partner for its assistance in reduc- North African countries where EU border agents ing maritime arrivals of migrants to the coasts would determine the eligibility of migrants in- of Europe.44 Such praise is indicative of the EU’s tercepted in the Mediterranean to enter Europe. willingness to achieve its questionable migration European Commissioner for Migration, Home objectives at any cost, even when the price is col- Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos laborating with states such as Eygpt enmeshed in cold-shouldered the idea, stressing the need for serious human rights crises45 that endanger the Member States to develop a common position safety and well-being of migrants and nationals before considering such a plan.39 African leaders alike. in general, and especially those of the countries targeted, made their opposition to the notion 40 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/ news/african-leaders-set-up-migration-body-reject-eu- migrant-platforms/ 37 On 18 July 2016, the European Council extended the 41 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants- mandate of EUCAP-Sahel Niger (a mission launched un- africa/juncker-says-north-africa-migrant-camps-not-on- der the Common Security and Defence Policy) until July eu-agenda-idUSKCN1N01TU 2018, approved a €26.3M budget for the operation for this 42 ‘Can ‘voluntary colonialism’ stop migration from Af- period and extended the scope of its mandate to include rica to Europe?’, BBC, 26 November 2018. Available at: assistance to national and local authorities in Niger related https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46017551 to the ‘fight against irregular migration’.See: ‘lucha contra 43 EU–Egypt partnership priorities for 2017–2020 include la migración irregular. Il risultato del viaggio di Gentiloni in cooperation of migration issues (especially combating Africa; contro i migranti finanziamo governi corrotti, Africa irregular migration) and ‘exploring’ cooperation on vol- ExPress, 19 November 2016. Available at: http://www.africa- untary return. See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ express.info/2016/11/20/nigermalisenegalgentilonielue- media/23942/eu-egypt.pdf firmano-assegni-per-fermare-il-flusso-dei-migranti/ 44 ‘Egypt - EU partnership: oppressors and their friends’, 38 https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/ Euronews, 19 December 2018. Available at: https://www. eucap-sahel-mali/40878/%C3%A0-propos_fr euronews.com/2018/12/19/egypt-eu-partnership- 39 http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20180914/paises-del- oppressors-and-their-friends norte-africa-no-aceptan-propuesta-austria-crear-plata- 45 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east- formas-para-devolucion-migrantes/1798761.shtml and-north-africa/egypt/report-egypt/

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There have been moments of tension between reaction to external events and by means of ad Member States regarding migration, a lack of in- hoc measures implemented without a long-term tra-European solidarity regarding burden sharing vision. The nostalgic colonialist mindset that and a failure to develop a common vision of how has coloured all related decision making has im- best to resolve the issue. One example has been peded African partners from participating in the the controversy related to rescue work being car- design of what could have otherwise been truly ried out in the Mediterranean by European NGOs, common policies and measures and that has which has been criminalised, particularly by Italy, fostered anti-migration perspectives that have whose Interior Minister Matteo Salvini closed Ital- further conditioned the ways in which policy has ian ports to these vessels in June 2018 – an action been focused. immediately imitated by Malta. As the absence of Recent moves to outsource EU migration NGOs in these waters implies more fatalities at management to Africa are the logical outcome sea, more violations of human rights and fewer of earlier lines of action – attempts to tighten the witnesses to these abuses, in spite of growing conditions and broaden the geographic scope of obstacles, uncertainties and a lack of support, certain aspects of border control by negotiating NGOs have repeatedly sent their boats back to return and readmission agreements and linking the zone,46 operating as best as they can under migration with other facets of international rela- international and maritime law. As the EU contin- tions such as security issues, trade agreements ues to be unable to build a consensus and come and development aid (L. Gabrielli, 2016). The up with coherent long-term proposals for dealing ‘negative incentives’ the EU has espoused stand with the issue,47 for the moment, burden sharing in contradiction to the principles of, and legal hinges on the willingness of Member States to do basis for, EU development aid, the objectives of their part.48 which are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, respect for human rights and gender equality – concepts that form a part of almost Reflections on the weaknesses and inconsistencies every policy and implementation instrument re- of outsourcing European migration and border lated to EU–African relations. management to Africa The practice of hitching development aid to migration policy objectives not only runs coun- As we have seen, the European migration policy ter to the conceptual basis of such assistance. It towards Africa has evolved in fits and starts in also threatens to delay or distort development in partner states and creates the risk of funding being used for dubious activities in these countries 46 https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/ONG-seguiran- if programmes are not adequately monitored (D. Mediterraneo-Aquarius-permitir_0_781472012.html Davitti and A. La Chimia, 2017). 47 Somewhat surprisingly, EU Commission spokesper- son Natasha Bertaud has admitted Libya is not a ‘safe As for the frameworks and instruments pre- haven’ for migrants while simultaneously asserting that viously mentioned, neither the EU Emergency the EU is ‘not competent’ to seek alternative solutions for Trust Fund for Africa nor the EU’s Partnership migrants rescued by NGOs at sea and refused entry by Agreements with African states have delivered Italy and Malta. See: http://www.addresslibya.com/en/ expected results, especially in the area of return archives/37217http://www.addresslibya.com/en/archives and readmission. Furthermore, they have led to 48 According to the conclusion issued by most recent Coun- deeper collaboration between the EU and re- cil convened in June 2018. See: http://www.europarl. gimes with questionable records on the issue of europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635542/EPRS_ BRI(2019)635542_EN.pdf and https://www.consilium. human rights and in some instances harmed the europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628- EU’s relationships with partner countries (CEAR, euco-conclusions-final/ 2015; HRW, 2009 y 2014; UNSML/OHCHR, 2016).

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Stakeholders such as the European Parliament neo-liberal policies (D. Bigo, 2012). The presence and a diverse range of NGOs have expressed of an ongoing border drama also allows govern- preoccupation regarding the lack of transpar- ments to focus national political debate on an ex- ency and accountability of initiatives funded as ternal enemy and distract public attention from development projects that actually pursue other other issues they would prefer not to address (L. goals and the possibility that funding is being Gabrielli, 2015; N. de Genova, 2013). Moreover, channelled in certain cases to countries less in Africa stands in the collective imagination of Eu- need of development aid than others. rope as a place of poverty and misery – an image Another question worth asking is what sort of forged during centuries of colonial exploitation data and information analysis is guiding the for- and slavery – and the somatic characteristics of mulation of EU migration policy towards Africa its people provide fodder for spurious racialisa- or even if policy in this area may simply be the tion (L. Vives, 2011; N. de Genova, 2018). outcome of skirmishes between Member States The time has come to realign EU migration anxious to impose their own particular visions, policy with a long-term sustainable agenda that agendas and interests. If we view migratory flow ensures migration flows are managed in a holistic from Africa to Europe from a broad perspective fashion and offers alternatives to the repressive that takes into account the physical proximity of tactics currently being employed. African states the two continents, the economic gap between will not become full, willing partners in migra- them, the effect of European soft power on Afri- tion management until the EU proves willing to can perceptions of Europe and the conflicts that negotiate with them on a level playing ground, have made life nearly impossible in certain African consider what are truly common interests and countries, the number of people attempting to en- work hand-in-hand with African leaders to deter Europe from Africa is actually quite low. Migra- velop policies that benefit both parties. The EU tory flows from Africa to Europe are not only low in must find a way to overcome the conflicting -in general terms but also in direct comparison with terests of individual Member States and forge a those from other places. If, in fact, the migratory more coherent common, human-rights-centred flow from Africa is not numerically relevant, why framework for migration policy that reduces the is it constantly portrayed as a concern meriting threat of violence and death migrants face in at- top political priority and overblown as some sort tempting to reach European shores (Amnesty of exceptional phenomenon? The motives lie at International, 2014). In taking such a step, the another more strategic and symbolic levels. Union will gain moral legitimacy and enhance its First is the strategic geopolitical interest that profile as a leader in world affairs. certain points of Africa hold for the EU and its Changing course will require a radical shift in Member States, which view the ‘emergency’ as- perspective in Europe regarding migration that pect of migration originating in Africa as an op- will entail abandoning the emergency scenario portunity to gain stronger military, diplomatic on which policy is now based and recognising the and economic footholds on the continent. Sec- structural factors underpinning the movement of ond is the fact that Africa–Europe migration ‘cri- people from Africa to Europe (L. Gabrielli, 2017). ses’ and the policies European states develop in Adopting a more positive approach to this issue response to them serve a symbolic legitimising will facilitate the gradual separation of migration function for governments in power in that they and security policy and, by extension, deprive far- provide an opportunity to portray themselves as right movements throughout Europe of a topic effectively controlling an emergency situation – they have used to great advantage in recent elec- a handy tactic for recuperating as least some of toral campaigns. ‘De-securitisation’ will pave the the legitimacy they lost as a result of deep cuts in way for both the articulation of more pragmatic social spending and the implementation of other migration policies that reflect geographic reali-

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ties and Europe’s manpower needs and formal www.cear.es/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ channels for foreign workers and refugees to find informe_marruecos_cear_2015_definitivo.pdf their way to Europe. Chou, M., and Gibert, M.: “The EU-Senegal mo- The death toll of Fortress Europe over the past bility partnership: from launch to suspension two decades, whether related to Mediterranean and negotiation failure”, Journal of Contem- crossings (which stood at over 350,000 at the time porary European Research, vol. 8, n.º 4, 2012, of this chapter was written)49 or other transit routes pp. 408-427. such as those through the Sahara or in the Atlantic Concord: ¿Asociación o condicionalidad? Super- Ocean (for which it is much more difficult to make visión de los Pactos sobre Migración y el Fondo estimates) underscores the moral imperative for Fiduciario de la UE para África, 2018. Available Europe to rectify its current misguided course on at: https://coordinadoraongd.org/wp-content/ migration policy and border control. The fatal uploads/2018/04/EUTFReport2018_-espa% consequences of criminalising migration and the C3%B1ol.pdf growing number of obstacles now impeding NGOs Cuny, E.: “The EU’s New Migration Partnership with from saving lives in the Mediterranean constitute Mali: Shifting towards a Risk Security-Migra- visible proof of Europe’s tragic drift away from the tion-Development Nexus”, EU Diplomacy pa- tenets of human rights and solidarity. pers 1/2018, College of Europe, 2018. Available at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/ uploads/2018/08/diplomacy-paper_.pdf References Davitti, D., and La Chimia, A.: “A Lesser Evil? The European Agenda on Migration and the Use Amnesty International: The Human Cost of For- of Aid Funding for Migration Control”, UCD tress Europe: Human rights Violations Against Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio- Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders, Am- Legal Studies Research Paper n.º 07/17, 2017, nesty International, London, 2014. Available pp. 44-45. Available at: https://ssrn.com/ab- at: www.amnesty.ch/de/themen/asyl-und- stract=2966042 migration/festung-europa/dok/2015/die- De Genova, N.: “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: kampagne-sos-europa/bericht-the-human- the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclu- cost-of-fortress-Europe sion”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 36, n.º 7, Bigo, D.: “Security and Immigration: Towards a 2012, pp. 1180-1198. Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, De Genova, N.: “The “migrant crisis” as racial crisis: Alternatives, n.º 27, 2002, pp. 63-92. do Black Lives Matter in Europe?”, Ethnic and Ra- Castillejo, C.: “The EU Migration Partnership cial Studies, vol. 41, n.º 19, 2018, pp. 1765-1782. Framework. Time for a rethink?”, Discussion De Hass, H.: “Migration and Development: a the- paper 28/2017, German Development Insti- oretical perspective”, International Migration tute, 2017. Institute, n.º 9, Oxford, 2008. CEAR: Marruecos: Desprotección y vulneración de Gabrielli, L.: “La externalización europea del con- derechos de las personas migrantes y refugia- trol migratorio: ¿La acción española como mod- das a las puertas de Europa, 2015. Available at: elo?”, Anuario CIDOB de la inmigración, 2017, pp. 126-152. Available at: doi.org/10.24241/ AnuarioCIDOBInmi.2017.126 49 United for Intercultural Action, a European network Gabrielli, L.: “Multilevel inter-regional governance against nationalism, racism, and fascism and in support of of mobility between Africa and Europe: To- refugees provides a constantly updated tally of deaths oc- curring along migration routes since 1993. See: http://www. wards a deeper and broader externalization”, unitedagainstracism.org/campaigns/refugee-campaign/ GRITIM Working Paper n.º 30, Winter, 2016. Avail- fortress-europe/ able at: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/33599

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Gabrielli, L.: “Récurrence de la crise frontalière: Huysmans, J.: The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, mi- l’exception permanente en Espagne”, Cul- gration and asylum in the EU, Routledge, 2006. tures & Conflits, 99/100, 2015, pp. 101-124. Kervyn, E., and Shilhav, R.: An emergency for Gabrielli, L.: “Securitization of migration and hu- whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Afri- man rights: frictions at the Southern EU bor- ca – migratory routes and development aid in ders and beyond”, Urban People, vol. 14, n.º 2, Africa, OXFAM Briefing Note, November 2017, 2014, pp. 307-318. Available at: lidemesta. 32 pp. Available at: https://oxf.am/2zG8aau cz/assets/media/files/16,%202014,%202/ UNSML/OHCHR: (2016) “Detained and Dehuman- Gabrielli.pdf ised”. Report on Human Right Abuses against Human Rights Watch: Abused and Expelled: Ill- Migrants in Libya, 13 December 2016. Available Treatment of Sub-Saharan African Migrants in at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/ Morocco, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2014. DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf Human Rights Watch: Pushed Back, Pushed Vives, L.: “White Europe: an alternative reading of Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants the Southern EU border”, Geopolíticas(s), Vol. 2, and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of n.º 1, 2011, pp. 51-70. Available at: http://dx.doi. Migrants and Asylum Seekers. New York: Hu- org/10.5209/rev_GEOP.2011.v2.n1.37897 man Rights Watch, New York, 2009.

inf_africa_ingles.indb 97 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 98 3/6/19 18:44 9. The European Union in Africa: development and security in the context of an unequal partnership

Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

The European Union (EU) has acquired signifi- conflicts have made security a priority in rela- cant stature in Africa as a major aid donor, key tions between the two continents. actor in peace building processes and influence One particular aspect of relations between the upon the security and defence policies of indi- EU and Africa especially worth noting is that they vidual African states and the African Union (AU). continue to be shepherded by Member States Although EU foreign policy continues to merge with a colonial history in Africa and those shar- Africa with the Caribbean and the Pacific region, ing a maritime border with the continent. Rela- Africa is becoming ever more important to the tions between the two are therefore shaped as EU from the perspective of security. In fact, 76 % much by old patterns of power and inequality of the military and 75% of the civilian missions as by political, sociodemographic and economic undertaken by the EU to date have been in Africa, challenges they face. This reality not only runs where it has conducted operations of this nature counter to the idea of Africa as a partner so often in as many as 12 different countries.1 Develop- evoked at summit meetings and in official document assistance and security have been the ma- ments; it is also one of the factors that undermine jor focal points of EU African foreign policy. The progress towards development and security ob- predominance of one over the other has been jectives. While these contradictions may be glar- conditioned by the context of world affairs, the ingly visible in the unequal relationship between ideas prevailing at a given moment and the in- Europeans and Africans, they are also palpable ternal situation of each continent. Since about in the lack of commitment to follow through on 2010, an increase of terrorism in Africa and Eu- issues of mutual interest that has caused many rope, uprisings leading to violent conflicts at the projects to end up being not only ineffective but gates of Europe and other old and new armed counterproductive as well. This chapter will analyse the various phases that EU–African relations have gone through to date, examining the rela- * Some of the data used in this chapter was generated tive balance between development and security during a project funded by the European Union’s Horizon at each moment as well as the documents and 2020 research and innovation programme under Marie instruments that have served as frameworks Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement Nº 660933 - PARA- and tools for policy and implementation in each DOXGREATLAKES. area. These include the Lomé Conventions, the 1 Iñiguez de Heredia, M.: ‘EU’s Peacebuilding between the Cotonou Agreement, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, military capable and the good governed state’, EISA 11th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions, Barcelona, 13-16 September 2017. Available at: https:// the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Instru- zenodo.org/record/2556594#.XMMOK6aYNE4 ment contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

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The chapter will conclude with a reflection on First phase, 1957-1990: a strong emphasis on how unequal relations impede the realisation of development the much-vaunted collaboration inter pares between Europeans and Africans and perpetuate European foreign policy under the EEC was fo- the structural factors underlying insecurity and cused on development assistance. This emphasis underdevelopment in Africa. did not stem from an absence of European security interests in Africa at that time, but rather the fact that community members had yet to develop Phases of EU-Africa relations: from development a common security policy and security was still to security an area of exclusive national sovereignty. This phase comprised two sub-periods, a comparison EU-Africa relations have evolved within the con- of which affords a clearer understanding of the text of the EU’s and Africa’s growing interdepen- changes and continuities in EU-Africa relations dence on security and development matters. The between 1957 and 1990. The first, which began course of this relationship can be broken down with the effective launch of the EEC and extended into three phases during which one of these areas to the signing of Lomé I Convention in 1975, took of mutual interest prevailed over the other. Dur- place against a backdrop of post-war colonialism ing the first, which began with the founding of the and cold war ideology. During this time frame, European Economic Community (EEC) under the most African countries were colonial dependen- Treaty of Rome in 1957 and concluded with the cies struggling for independence and develop- signing of the Lomé Convention in 1990, development and military aid was given on the basis of ment was clearly the highest priority. The second, ideological affinities with a given bloc. Although which spanned most of the 1990s and 2000s, be- the Union of African States (founded in 1958) and gan with the end of the cold war, included the its successor organisation the Organisation of founding of the EU in the early 1990s and cul- African Unity (founded in 1963) emerged during minated with the forging of the Joint Africa-EU this period, inter-organisational cooperation at Strategy in 2007. It was during this phase, which that time was minor in comparison to the coop- was marked by the signing of the Cotonou Agree- eration that would later take place between the ment and the consolidation of the CSDP, that se- EU and the AU. This is not surprising given the curity and development became intertwined in importance African organisations in the immedi- the name of liberal peace and what academics ate post-colonial era placed on limiting Western refer to as ‘the securitisation of development’2 and Russian influence in African affairs, assert- began to gain traction. During the final phase, ing African independence and promoting the which covers slightly more than the last decade, ‘third way’ approach advocated by leaders such granting military aid and focusing on military as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Gamal objectives have been considered the most effec- Abdel Nasser. tive ways to achieve security. Over the span of The efforts of African countries to extricate these three periods, security has gone from being themselves from the shadow of former colonial a separate issue subordinate to development to rulers during this period fell short on three impor- being a priority issue tightly enmeshed with de- tant points. First and foremost, although certain velopment objectives. new actors gained greater input, former colonial powers continued to steer EU relations with, policies towards, and strategies for Africa. A prime 2 Stephan Keukeleire, S., and Raube, K.: ‘The security– development nexus and securitization in the EU’s poli- example of the continued European influence on cies towards developing countries’, Cambridge Review African affairs was France’s decision in 1960 to of International Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3, 2013, pp. 556-572. maintain a pre-independence currency that con-

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tinues to be used in Western and Central Africa. for development. The Lomé Convention, which The CFA franc, as this currency is known, has been was conceived to provide a new framework for successively been pegged to the French franc and cooperation between the EEC and former Bel- the Euro. The 14 African countries that use the CFA gian, French and British colonies in Africa, the must store a portion of their foreign exchange re- Caribbean and the Pacific (referred to collective- serves (65% up to 2005 and 50% ever since) in the ly as ACP countries), reduced customs duties on Bank of France, an arrangement that benefits the agricultural and mineral products exported by French economy, drastically limits their control these states to the EEC. Despite these preferen- over these resources, prevents them from devel- tial trade conditions, the ACP share of world ex- oping their own monetary policies and leaves ports fell from 3.4% in 1976 to 1.9% in 2000.5 The them exposed to foreign currency fluctuations.3 reason for this plunge, as Gerrit Faber points out, This is not, however, the only manner in which is that trade concessions made to ACP countries France has continued to exert hegemony over were sometime outmatched by those offered to these countries. It has also served as an interloc- countries in other categories such as candidates utor between African countries and the EU and for EEC membership, competition in the world led civil and military missions in states such as market was stiff for the products being exported, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. and the liberalisation of global trade under the Such posturing has prompted African countries General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to routinely demand fairer treatment as partners eroded the preferential margins for ACP exports.6 and greater respect for their national sovereignty. Particularly worrisome beyond its disappointing Practically all of the formal agreements negoti- outcome is the fact that despite of its stated pre- ated between the EU and Africa contain specific tension of having been negotiated between equal references to respect for national sovereignty and partners, the agreement had been framed from a are worded so as to underscore the status of both perspective that clearly reinforced the respective parties as partners.4 colonial legacies of the parties involved.7 Throughout the second period of this phase, The limitations of the Lomé Conventions one of the high points of which was the signing of are not the only cause of Africa’s high index of the Lomé Convention in 1975, development as- poverty, which is also a result of other more sistance was the overriding focus of EEC-African complex dynamics and older structural factors. relations and security (at least in a multilateral These conventions do, however, illustrate the context) was not a major issue. The five-year cy- effect development assistance can have on the cle adopted in the Lomé Convention of 1975 was manner in which local economies get integrated repeated under the Lomé II Convention of 1979, into the global economy and the ways in which it the Lomé III Convention of 1984 and the Lomé IV can replicate and perpetuate unequal relations. Convention, the last of which was in effect for a Generally speaking, the Lomé Conventions did ten-year period that ran from 1990 to 2000, the not give ACP countries the tools they needed to year in which, as we will examine in the second compete more successfully in the world market section of this chapter, security would be refor- in that they contained no provisions for the trans- mulated as the guarantor of conditions necessary

5 Faber G.: ‘The Lomé Conventions and the Causes of 3 Bouamama, S.: ‘La obra negativa del colonialismo francés Economic Growth’, European Governance and European y europeo en África’, 2018. Available at: www.rebelion.org/ Opinions on Trade and Sustainable Development, IFRI, noticia.php?id=245472 Paris, 3-4 June 2004. 4 Such language appears in the Lomé Conventions I, II 6 Ibid. and III, the Cotonou Agreement, the Joint Africa-EU Strat- 7 The Lomé Convention, 1975. Available at: www.acp.int/ egy and the African Peace Facility. content/lome-convention

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fer of technology that could have boosted their that the 1980s is considered a lost decade dur- productivity or for the transfer of knowledge and ing which third-world debt rose to unprecedent- techniques that would have helped them adapt ed levels and the GDP of developing countries to the new parameters of the global economy – plunged precipitously, a situation that the EU, particularly new international organisations such the UN and donor countries considered, along as the GATT and the WTO. They also did nothing with the violence that escalated dramatically in to impose limits on the debt these nations could the third world and particularly in African coun- assume or the interest rates charged on this debt: tries during the 1990s, the responsibility of cor- Africa’s collective debt burden rose from slightly rupt, authoritarian regimes.9 The problem with more than $10bn in 1970 to $270bn in 1990.8 The this narrative is that it ignored structural causes first phase of EU-Africa relations placed a prior- of these conflicts such as the unequal distribu- ity on African development – ostensibly in terms tion of global wealth and doggedly insisted on of cooperation and under conditions of equality the need for African states to adopt more ‘Euro- – but ended up perpetuating the colonial legacy pean’ approach to governance without properly of European political and economic hegemony analysing why African approaches to governance over Africa and failed to significantly change the had ‘failed’. This position also led to the de facto role of African economies within the larger global extension of the colonial perspective that Europe economy: exporters of low-cost prime materials constituted a model that Africa should emulate. and consumers of goods produced elsewhere It was in the context of these events and de- and foreign development aid. bates that the Cotonou Agreement was negotiated in 2000. This agreement represented a change of tack in that it paved the way for the participation Second phase, 1990-2007: the security- of non-state actors in policy making and imple- development nexus mentation and permitted policies to be tailored on a case-by-case basis to the specific needs of The end of the Cold War and the founding of the each region. The emergence in 2000 of the AU, EU in 1993 led to significant changes in EU-African which would increasingly aspire to represent relations. One of the most important drivers of and defend the interests of African countries as a these changes was policy-makers’ fixation on the bloc, also contributed to the recalibration of the liberalism paradigm, which would not only guide dynamics of multilateral relations. The AU broke intervention policies related to economic, politi- new ground by setting up the Peace and Security cal and security and other matters going forward, Council, the first inner-African body to actively but also serve as the basis for forging a nexus be- engage in the ‘promotion of democratic practic- tween security and development. The connection es, good governance, the rule of law, protection of between these areas is clearly articulated in the human rights and fundamental freedoms’.10 This Lomé IV Convention, which made favourable tar- organisation provided the springboard for the iff policies and development aid contingent upon creation of the African Peace and Security Archi- respect for human rights, good governance and adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law. Crafting policy from this perspective came 9 For a critical analysis of the perception of, and discourse to be viewed as the key to development and last- on, failed states in Africa see: Wai, Z.: ‘International Rela- tions and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa’, in M. ing peace in the 1990s. It should be kept in mind Iñiguez de Heredia and Z. Wai (ed.) Recentering Africa in International Relations - Beyond Lack, Peripherality, and 8 UNCTAD and World Bank figures provided in ‘Debt relief Failure, Palgrave, New York, 2018, pp. 31-58. hopes bring out the critics’, BBC, 29 June 2005. Available 10 African Union: Peace and Security Council (PSC), 2013. at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4619189.stm Available at: https://au.int/en/organs/psc

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tecture (APSA), which provides a framework for to the concept of liberal peace are forcing the EU conflict prevention, peace-building, post-conflict and the UN to rethink their policies.14 It has be- reconstruction and development, the promotion come clear that the boundaries between peace- of democratic practices, good governance and re- building and military operations have become spect for human rights, humanitarian action and increasingly blurred, that the external imposi- disaster management.11 tion of policies having nothing to do with the real Some of the EU’s most highly funded missions needs of societies immersed in conflicts has been in Africa have been conceived from a security-de- counterproductive (economic liberalisation, for velopment nexus/liberal peace perspective, two example, has often put governance in the hands examples being its 2003 intervention in the Dem- of private foreign firms but not supposed a more ocratic Republic of the Congo and the Union’s ex- equal distribution of wealth) and that structural penditure of over 600 million euros in support of factors leading to insecurity and poverty have democratic elections in that country. been perpetuated rather than corrected.15 More- Nevertheless, as Mark Duffield notes, the over, the security-development nexus has led to upshot of the widespread acceptance of the a tendency to frame problems as linked to en- security-development nexus paradigm has been dogenous structural factors discussed previous- that development policies now follow the same ly such as fragility or poor governance without logic as peace and security policies and that the considering the impact of equally harmful global two have become practically indistinguishable.12 structural factors. Stephan Keukeleire and Kolja Raube assert that the securitisation of EU development strategy is not visible at the level of discourse, which tends Third phase, 2007-2019: security as a priority to be well balanced, but rather in implementation.13 Whereas the Cotonou Agreement is tightly The prioritisation of security has slowly but surely focused on development and cooperation ob- made other objectives such as democratisation jectives, operative instruments such as the APF, and good governance secondary considerations CSDP operations and peace-building instruments and led to an overriding emphasis on strength- that facilitate many aspects of mission imple- ening the capacity of African military and police mentation attest to the increasing emphasis be- forces. In other words, there has been a shift from ing placed on security concerns. a perceptual link between international order, se- The shift towards the prioritisation of security curity and peace and liberal-minded government gained further traction following the 9/11 attacks reform to a conviction that what states need – in- in the U.S. and the onset of the war against ter- cluding those under authoritarian governments ror. The second phase of EU-Africa relations ran parallel to this trend and the end of the liberal 14 Chandler, D.: Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, peace agenda. Although the academic debate 1997-2017, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2017; Karlsrud, continues regarding its demise, as we will see in J.: ‘Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?’, Third the following section, the contradictions inherent World Quarterly, vol. 38, n.º 6, 2017, pp. 1215-1231; Lew- is, D., Heathershaw, J., and Megoran, N.: ‘Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management’, Coopera- 11 The African Peace and Security Architecture, AU, 2012. tion and Conflict, vol. 53, n.º 4, 2018, pp. 486-506; Pugh, Available at: http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african- M.: ‘Lineages of aggressive peace’, The Politics of Inter- peace-and-security-architecture-apsa national Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace, Routledge, 12 Duffield, M.:Development, Security and Unending War: London, 2015, pp. 77-93. Governing the World of Peoples, Polity, Cambridge, 2007. 15 Sabaratnam, M.: Decolonising Intervention: Interna- 13 Keukeleire, S., and Raube, K.: The security–develop- tional Statebuilding in Mozambique, Rowman & Little- ment nexus and securitization in the EU’s policies, 2013. field International, London, 2017.

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that do not respect human rights – is the military AU-EU summit, the same objective was reformu- and police force required to check challenges lated as ‘strengthening resilience, peace, security to their authority. The adoption of the Joint Af- and governance’ and second after ‘investing in rica-EU Strategy marked a pivotal point in this people’.20 Despite of the change in wording, which transition and the beginning of a new phase in was prompted by criticism of the securitisation EU-African relations. of aid and development assistance on the part Postures adopted during EU-AU summit meet- of academics and civil society organisations, the ings during this period constitute a good indica- instruments and practices being employed give tor of a change in this respect. The first held in the impression that, in practice, security contin- 2000, which established the framework for EU- ues to be the highest priority. AU relations and highlighted the importance of What the Joint Strategy does is consolidate regional cooperation and the integration of Af- the shift towards security and pave the way for rica into the world economy, human rights and what has served as an escape valve during the good governance, ranked peace-building, conflict economic, political, social, and perhaps even prevention, management and resolution (not ‘se- ‘identity’ crisis the EU has been facing for the bet- curity’) fifth on its list of priorities.16 The second ter part of a decade.21 The evolution of EU-Africa summit held in 2007 marked the launch of the policy, marked by change but not entirely bereft Joint Africa-EU Strategy. This agreement posi- of continuity, provides insight into how legisla- tioned ‘peace and security’ as a top priority to tors and experts have responded to the economic be pursued in conjunction with ‘conflict resolu- crisis of 2008, new international security chal- tion and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to lenges and terrorism and migration to Europe in governance and sustainable development, with a the contradiction-ridden context of liberal peace. view to addressing the roots causes of conflicts’.17 These issues have signified the end of many de- The same priority was restated in even stronger velopment projects and a policy shift away from terms at the third and fourth AU-EU summit liberal political reform. Spain, for instance, has meetings.18 As Cristina Barrios and Alex Vines reduced its development aid budget by 70% since have observed,19 of the five priority areas for 2008, maintaining funding for North Africa but EU-AU cooperation noted above, the ‘peace and cutting back aid to Sub-Saharan countries drasti- security partnership’ is the one which ‘has seen cally, and now ranks as one of the OECD countries the most progress’. At the fifth and most recent devoting the lowest percentage of their gross national incomes to official development aid.22 For John Ikenberry, the crisis of the liberal inter- 16 Africa-Europe Summit: ‘Cairo Declaration: Under the national order has been underpinned by liberal- Aegis of the OAU and the EU’, Cairo, 2000. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9538-1993_ ahg_res_218-227_xxix_e.pdf 20 AU-EU Summit: Declaration: Investing in Youth for Accelerated 17 Africa-EU Strategy: The Africa-EU Partnership: A Joint Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, 2017. Available Africa-EU Strategy, EU Council, Brussels, 12 September at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454-pr- 2007, pp. 5-7. final_declaration_au_eu_summit.pdf 18 Africa-EU Partnership: The Africa-European Union Stra- 21 Guzzini, S.: ‘Introduction: the argument: geopolitics tegic Partnership: Meeting Current and Future Challenges for fixing the coordinates of foreign policy identity’, The Together, QC-31-11-092-EN-C, Africa-EU Partnership, Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Brussels, 2011, p. 58; AU-EU: Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Foreign Policy Identity Crises, Cambridge University Press, 2014. Available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ Cambridge, 2013, pp. 1-7. 19 Barrios, C., and A. de Vines: ‘Why Africa Matters’, Issue 22 Agudo, A.: ‘España, el país de la OCDE que más re- Alert, n.º 26, EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2014. cortó en ayuda al desarrollo’, El País, 2015. Available at: Available at: Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/ https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/04/08/planeta_futuro/ default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_26_EU_Africa_Summit.pdf 1428509093_127822.html

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ism’s and liberal states’ ‘crisis of governance and capacity to neutralise conflicts, they more often authority and a crisis of crisis of social purpose’.23 than not end up strengthening the dynamics and For Europe, the election of a U.S. president who actors that give rise to conflicts in the first place. is ‘actively hostile to liberal internationalism’, the The mere fact that 75% of EU military and loss of military and economic hegemony, Brexit, civilian missions to date have taken place in Af- and the emergence of anti-liberal political move- rica reveals much about the nature of EU–Africa ments have supposed ‘an end to the long post- relations in the area of peace and security. The war project of building a greater union’ and its concept of CSDP missions took shape under the role as ‘the quiet bulwark of the wider liberal in- shadow of the rupture of Yugoslavia and in con- ternational order’.24 On the other hand, for many cert with the rise of a new liberal agenda. In con- African states all of these factors have meant a sonance with this context, the prime objective of relief from external pressure to undertake politi- EU foreign policy became promoting liberal no- cal reform and an opportunity to enhance the ca- tions of governance abroad. Artemis was the EU’s pacity of their military, police and security forces. first autonomous military operation. Undertaken A new consensus has emerged to build peace and in 2003 under the mandate of the UN, the mis- maintain order and security while gearing up to sion entailed not only restoring peace and order face new international challenges. While the fi- in Ituri, a volatile region in which UN blue helmets nal results are yet to be seen, evidence to date lacked the resources to handle the situation, but reveals this approach to be problematic. also peacekeeping efforts aimed at restoring government authority and rule of law and enabling democratisation and development programmes. A shift to a military focus and a step back for the EU While the framework of understanding under which these operations where conducted was This final section will provide a deeper analysis compatible with a liberal framework and the of what has been a definitive shift in emphasis to- security-development nexus, the actual mission wards security and examine specific programmes was riddled with incoherencies. Stability and se- and instruments related to security such as CSDP curity objectives had clear priority over democra- missions, the APF and Capacity Building for Se- tisation and development goals. The DRC serves a curity and Development (CBSD), a new regulation casebook example of how intervention outcomes meant to facilitate the provision of non-lethal mil- can run counter to objectives. The operation was itary assistance to third countries through one the declared a success, even though democratisa- EU’s principal peace-building instruments, the tion was limited to presidential elections and IcSP. As signalled previously, although they have the winner Joseph Kabila failed to deliver true been gradual, these changes have set contradic- democracy or lasting peace. The significant role tory dynamics in motion. On the one hand, they the EU has played through military and civilian are causing the EU to walk away from its long- peacekeeping operations in conflicts that were standing role as a major guarantor of security and subsequently rekindled (those in the Central Af- promoter of liberal order and, on the other hand, rican Republic, Chad, Somalia and the DRC being they are entrenching regimes with dubious hu- prime examples) casts doubt on both the effec- man rights records in power. The problem with tiveness of these missions and the liberal action these policies is that in strengthening the security framework under which they were planned and apparatuses of states with an eye to building their carried out. Since approximately 2010, EU operations in 23 Ikenberry, G. J.: ‘The end of liberal international order?’, Africa have focused on strengthening national International Affairs, vol. 94, n.º 1, 2018, p. 18. military and security apparatuses. Over the last 24 Ibid., p. 7. nine years, operations supporting the rule of law

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have disappeared, and whereas operations de- be considered in many ways as being the precur- voted to the reform of security forces accounted sor of a strategy that has placed a high priority on 50% of all operations carried out prior to 2009, military and security capacity to the detriment of only 8% of EU operations undertaken since 2010 other considerations. The APF’s stated objectives have been related to this purpose. During the make it clear that the impetus for the prioritisa- same periods military and police training mis- tion of security has not come solely from Europe sions have taken on greater weight, increas- but from Africa as well. Beyond the context of EU ing from 8% of the total to 69%.25 All of the EU’s policy, arms sales on the part of Member States military and civilian missions in Africa since 2010 to African countries and anti-terrorist operations have centred on equipping, training and advising and programmes in countries such as France and national security corps and forces and most have Spain make it clear that the current overriding focused primarily on conflict and border manage- emphasis being placed on security is a matter of ment. The EU and African countries alike perceive mutual accord albeit in the face of strong criti- this strategy as a vehicle for tackling mutual secu- cism from certain sectors on both continents.26 rity issues more effectively. For the EU, missions The CBSD regulation has facilitated EU budget- facilitating the delegation of responsibilities to ary support for ‘capacity-building programmes in African countries have served as a means of ad- third countries aimed at training and mentoring, dressing its security concerns at a relatively low the provision of non-lethal equipment and as- cost and with a minimum physical presence. De- sistance with infrastructure improvements, and ployment figures for Africa have fallen according. help with strengthening the capacity of military Whereas 2,5000 soldiers were sent to the DRC in actors’.27 Although it is still too early to pass judge- 2003 and 4,300 were involved in the 2008 EUFOR ment on capacity-building efforts funded by Chad/RCA mission, operations conducted over means of this measure, they appear to be having the last ten years have required a more discreet an effect similar to that of like instruments pre- number. EUTM Somalia required 193, EUFOR RCA viously examined in this chapter. The use of the 700, EUTM Mali 581, EUMAM RCA 60, and EUTM IcSP, one of the EU’s main peace-building instru- RCA 170. For Africa, this has meant enhanced se- ments, as a channel for funding CBSD operations curity capacity and greater autonomy regarding raises a number of questions. The IcSP, which was security issues. Viewed from another perspective, approved in 2014, provides an underpinning for this strategy has supposed an abandonment of objectives articulated in the 2016 EU Security liberal values on both sides of the Mediterranean Strategy related to crisis management, conflict and, on various occasions, the capacitation of po- prevention, peace-building and threats to peace, lice and armed forces and governments with little security and internal order.28 This instrument has or no national legitimacy. primarily been used to provide direct support for The APF and the Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD) strategy 26 ECP: Comercio de armas y conflictos. Análisis de las reflect the same line of thinking. The APF was exportaciones europeas a países en tensión, Escola de created in 2003 with the objective of capacitat- Cultura de Pau y Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau, Bar- ing the AU to carry out conflict and humanitarian celona May 2018. Available at: http://www.centredelas. crisis prevention and management tasks through org/images/INFORMES_i_altres_PDF/Informe_RE_ the African Peace and Security Architecture. Al- Comer%C3%A7ArmesTensio_web_CAST.pdf 27 EPRS: Briefing - The EU’s new approach to funding peace though, as noted previously, the EU and AU oper- and security, European Parliamentary Research Service, ate within a liberal peace framework, the APF can 2017, p. 1. 28 EU Commission: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European 25 Iñiguez de Heredia, M.: op. cit., p. 9 Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, para. 4, 2016.

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migration management, counter-radicalisation throughout the first three decades of European– efforts and the capacitation of military, police African relations before the EEC became the EC and security forces in third countries. Police in and subsequently the EU, became increasingly Niger have received equipment and logistical entwined with security during the 1990s and and advisory support related to migration and 2000s and security has emerged as the undis- border management through this mechanism. puted priority since 2010. These shifts occurred Niger is of great strategic importance in the EU in the context of a changing international land- – firstly, because the country’s Agadez region is scape and changing ideas. Europe and Africa situated on a major African migration route, and have developed a relationship of mutual depen- secondly, because Niger is a major focal point of dence in the areas of development and security. the war against terrorism. Despite EU assistance, Although Europe and the European project are civil society organisations there have accused presently more affected by situations along its police of suppressing dissidence and using secu- eastern borders, the rise of far right-wing political rity concerns as an excuse for restricting rights parties and Brexit, it is nevertheless difficult to and freedoms. Cameroon has also received aid analyse EU foreign policy and European security through various types of police capacitation pro- without acknowledging Africa’s key position on grammes even though its president Paul Biya is the global chessboard. one of Africa’s most entrenched political leaders The gradual prioritisation of security over the and the country’s police and military forces have past few decades should not be taken as a sign committed human rights abuses against activists that development is not an important issue in and government critics. relations between the EU and Africa. Develop- African governments view this EU shift as a ment continues to be one of the central pillars of positive response to their longstanding assertion EU-Africa relations. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy that they should be the ones steering the direction includes a development and cooperation proof aid programmes carried out on African soil and gramme (The Pan-African Programme) with a a liberation in the sense that it supposes a depar- budget of €845 million for the period 2014-2020; ture from the EU’s longstanding practice of mak- the EU and its Member States provided Africa €21 ing aid contingent upon the fulfilment of European billion in development aid in 2016 and EU invest- agendas that have often had nothing to do with ment represents one third of the total foreign di- Africa’s actual needs. These perceptions notwith- rect investment in Africa.2929 The monetary value standing, capacity-building assistance for African of this aid stands in sharp contrast to, for exam- military and police forces would appear to have ple, the €100 million 2017–2020 budget allotted come at the cost of a lesser focus on other unmet for CBSD or the budget of a major mission such needs. The conflicts that have arisen in the wake as EUTM Somalia, which is €22.9 million for the of the Afro-Arab Spring, ongoing civil unrest, the period 2019–2020. The problem lies in the current emergence of new social movements and a wide prevailing conviction in both Europe and Africa range of environmental health and development that African needs and European cooperation ob- issues all suggest a failure to set the right priorities. jectives on that continent must be viewed from a security perspective. At first glance the present situation could be Conclusion construed as a step forward for Africa and a step back on the part of Europe in terms of security UE-Africa relations have been defined in terms of the interaction between security and devel- 29 EU: ‘Africa-EU continental cooperation’, European Com- opment, the dynamics of which have changed mission, 2018. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europe- over time. Development was clearly the priority aid/regions/africa/africa-eu-continental-cooperation_en

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matters and, by extension, a shift towards a more able at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/04/08/ equal political partnership between the two. How- planeta_futuro/1428509093_127822.html ever, while it is true that Europe is stepping back AU-EU Summit: Declaration: Investing in Youth for and becoming more willing to delegate its security Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable to African countries, inequality continues to colour Development, 2017. Available at: https://www. objectives and implementation. Development and consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454- security in Africa continue to be conditioned by the pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit.pdf hegemony exerted by its former metropoles. Multi- AU-EU: Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2014. Retrieved lateral and bilateral negotiations alike are still con- from: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ ducted on an unlevel playing field where Europe Barrios, C., y A. de Vines: ‘Why Africa Matters’, is the player with means and Africa the player in Issue Alert, n.º 26, EU Institute for Security need. While Europe may have become dependent Studies, April 2014. upon a major beneficiary of its development aid Bouamama, S.: ‘La obra negativa del colonialismo programmes and point of origin of what it per- francés y europeo en África’, 2018. Available ceives as threats to its security, such dependen- at: www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=245472 cy is relative in light of the context of a lopsided Chandler, D.: Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ partnership in which Europe has the means and Crisis, 1997-2017. New York: Palgrave Macmil- Africa has the needs. The gradual reorientation lan, New York, 2017. of the framework within which relations between Duffield, M.: Development, Security and Unend- the two continents are conducted and recently ing War: Governing the World of Peoples, Pol- introduced related instruments have exacerbated ity, Cambridge, 2007. rather than addressed this imbalance. It is there- ECP: Comercio de armas y conflictos. Análisis de fore very likely that any further shifts in EU-Africa las exportaciones europeas a países en ten- policy will perpetuate this problem until EU-Africa sión, Escola de Cultura de Pau y Centre Delàs relations undergo the structural changes needed d’Estudis per la Pau, Barcelona, May 2018. to put the two continents on a truly equal footing. Available at: http://www.centredelas.org/images/INFORMES_i_altres_PDF/Informe_RE_ Comer%C3%A7ArmesTensio_web_CAST.pdf References EPRS: Briefing - The EU’s new approach to funding peace and security, European Parliamen- Africa-EU Partnership: The Africa-European Union tary Research Service, 2017, p. 1. Strategic Partnership: Meeting Current and Fu- EU Commission: Shared Vision, Common Action: ture Challenges Together, QC-31-11-092-EN-C, A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the Africa-EU Partnership, Brussels, 2011, p. 58. European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Africa-EU Strategy: The Africa-EU Partnership: A para. 4, 2016. Joint Africa-EU Strategy, EU Council, Brussels, EU: ‘Africa-EU continental cooperation’, Euro- 12th September 2007, pp. 5-7. pean Commission, 2018. Available at: https:// Africa-Europe Summit: ‘Cairo Declaration: Un- ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/afri- der the Aegis of the OAU and the EU’, Cairo, ca-eu-continental-cooperation_en 2000. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/ Faber G.: ‘The Lomé Conventions and the Causes files/decisions/9538-1993_ahg_res_218-227_ of Economic Growth’, European Governance xxix_e.pdf and European Opinions on Trade and Sustain- African Union: Peace and Security Council (PSC), able Development, IFRI, Paris, 3-4 June 2004. 2013. Available at: https://au.int/en/organs/psc Guzzini, S.: ‘Introduction: the argument: geo- Agudo, A.: ‘España, el país de la OCDE que más re- politics for fixing the coordinates of foreign cortó en ayuda al desarrollo’, El País, 2015. Avail- policy identity’, The Return of Geopolitics in

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Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Sabaratnam, M.: Decolonising Intervention: Inter- Identity Crises, Cambridge University Press, national Statebuilding in Mozambique, Row- Cambridge, 2013, pp. 1-7. man & Littlefield International, London, 2017. Ikenberry, G. J.: ‘The end of liberal internation- Stephan Keukeleire, S., y Raube, K.: ‘The secu- al order?’, International Affairs, vol. 94, n.º 1, rity–development nexus and securitization 2018, p. 18. in the EU’s policies towards developing coun- Iñiguez de Heredia, M.: ‘EU’s Peacebuilding be- tries’, Cambridge Review of International Af- tween the military capable and the good fairs, vol. 26, n.º 3, 2013, pp. 556-572. governed state’, EISA 11th Pan-European The African Peace and Security Architecture, AU, Conference on International Relations, Bar- 2012. Available at: http://www.peaceau.org/ celona, 13-16 September 2017. Available at: en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-ar- https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/ze- chitecture-apsa nodo.1463036.svg The Lomé Convention, 1975 Available at: www. Karlsrud, J.: ‘Towards UN counter-terrorism op- acp.int/content/lome-convention erations?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 38, n.º 6, UNTACD y World Bank: ‘Africa’s Burden Debt’, 2017, pp. 1215-1231. Debt relief hopes bring out the critics, BBC, Keukeleire, S., y Raube, K.: The security–develop- 29th June 2005. Available at: http://news.bbc. ment nexus and securitization in the EU’s poli- co.uk/2/hi/business/4619189.stm cies, 2013. Wai, Z.: ‘International Relations and the Dis- Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J., y Megoran, N.: ‘Illib- course of State Failure in Africa’, Recentering eral peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict Africa in International Relations - Beyond Lack, management’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. Peripherality, and Failure, Palgrave, New York, 53, n.º 4, 2018, pp. 486-506. 2018, pp. 31-58. Pugh, M.: ‘Lineages of aggressive peace’, The Pol- itics of International Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace, Routledge, London, 2015, pp. 77-93.

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Bosco Govantes

This chapter addresses the implementation of Prodi (2002): ‘everything but institutions’. The the European Neighbourhood Policy in North Af- EU proposed stepping up its relations with the rica, in the region of the Maghreb to be precise, Eastern neighbourhood on the basis of positive in the period before and after the Arab Spring. conditionality, based on the harmonisation of The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the partner countries with the political and legal is particularly important as it provides a new ap- framework of the EU. The declared goal was to proach to community policies in the region, based grant more benefits and funding to the countries on bilateralism and conditionality in the relations that collaborated most, but ruling out in advance between each of the partner countries and the EU. that the collaboration could lead to possible ac- The Maghreb region is considered to be of spe- cession to the EU. cial interest by the EU and Spain because of the Despite the initial intentions, the ENP was intensity of their political and trade relations. In finally applied in two parallel spheres: the east- that respect, the only two countries to have been ern neighbourhood, in Eastern Europe, and the singled out for privileged relations status within southern neighbourhood, with the countries of the ENP to date, on both its southern and east- North Africa and the Middle East. The extension ern flanks, are Maghrebi: Morocco in 2008 with to the southern rim was couched as an incentive Advanced Status (COM, 2008) and Tunisia in 2012 for the countries of the southern Mediterranean, with the Privileged Partnership (CON, 2012). This amid the institutional crisis of the Barcelona is a significant indication of the importance of this Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean North African region for European external action. Partnership (EMP), over its inability to effect the projected progress (Youngs, 2005; Schumacher, 2004) and as a result of the region’s loss of politi- Introduction cal weight on the community agenda. Despite the watchword ‘everything but institutions’, the pos- The ENP arose as a response from the EU aimed sibility of accession has always acted as an incen- at fostering convergence in its relations with the tive to the countries of Eastern Europe. However, countries of Eastern Europe, its new neighbours the incentives of the programme for the countries following the great enlargement of 2004. of the southern rim were not so clear, given the The ENP, then, was a framework designed for geographical impossibility of accession. implementation within the European continent The southern flank of ENP partners consists in the light of the impossibility of a permanent of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, enlargement of the EU, following the premise of Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tu- former European Commission President Romano nisia. This framework brings a new logic to the

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EU’s relations with the countries of the southern values, principles and rules with the declared in- Mediterranean. Among the new developments, tention of setting itself up as the stabilising agent we could highlight the following: it is a bilater- (Khader, 2009) and providing the solution to the al framework – compared with the multilateral existing conflicts. framework applied in the Barcelona Process –; it The proposed framework, then, gives the is based on positive political conditionality1 and, countries of the south a subordinate role, with unlike the EMP, it allows for variable geometry in incentives of dubious appeal to these countries each country’s relations with the EU. and low economic investment relative to the This chapter focuses on the Maghreb region scale of the goals proposed. With a budget of and on the cases of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 15.4 billion euros for the eastern and southern in particular, which are especially significant be- dimensions for the period 2014-2020, it seems cause of their relations with the EU and with Spain. clear that financial gain is not the main appeal for the countries that decide to collaborate to a greater degree. The biggest incentive offered to The European Neighbourhood Policy before the Arab the southern countries is the possibility of ac- Spring cessing the community market, whose appeal, however, varies according to the country. The ENP establishes its political conditionality In the first three years of the ENP, seven of through action plans that the EU signs with each the 10 countries of the southern neighbourhood of the attached states based on a series of short signed action plans. The relative bilateral nature and medium-term goals agreed by the two sides of the framework enables establishing a pace of as a roadmap. In principle, the intensity of rela- progress a la carte, according to the real capacity tions is directly linked to the fulfilment of these for convergence with the proposed goals. bilateral action plans. Among those countries, it is worth highlight- However, while the framework of relations is ing Tunisia and Morocco, which signed action supposed to be symmetrical, it is no such thing. plans in December 2004 and July 2005. The case Several causes make the bond asymmetrical: the of Algeria is unique, as it refused to sign an action initiative comes from the EU, the convergence is plan throughout (it is the only country to do so) with the economic and legislative framework of and very particularly to submit to the condition- the EU, the first act of the relationship is a report ality that the ENP implies. Libya or Syria, for their on the partner country drawn up by the Euro- part, decided to wait, without opposing signing pean Commission, the collaboration revolves such documents. Their stances were determined around topics preset by the EU2 and, finally, it is the lack of ratification of the Partnership Agree- the Union that assesses, does the monitoring and ment in the framework of the Barcelona Process decides on the possible reward. In short, the EU in Syria’s case and, in the case of Libya, by the leads the initiative throughout: it proposes the crisis with the EU over the sentencing to death of five Bulgarian nurses accused of taking part in a mass HIV infection at a hospital in Bengasi 1 In the EMP, officially there was a democracy clause (neg- (Emerson et al., 2007). ative conditionality) that allowed the EU not to apply the agreements with a country that failed to make progress on the democratic goals. However, as it has never been Morocco applied under any circumstances to any country, the clause can be considered legally nonbinding. 2 Security, justice and home affairs, legislative standardi- Morocco is comfortable in a framework that al- sation with the EU, infrastructures and environment and lows it to bilateralise its relations, something education. that it had desired from the outset of its rela-

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tions with the European Communities (Hernando areas proposed, but maintaining a series of red de Larramendi, 1997; Fernández Molina, 2015), lines: no discussing the status of Western Sahara, including its proposals for accession to the Eu- not allowing interference in internal institutional ropean Community in 1984 and 1987 under the affairs and no signing a global agreement on the reign of Hassan II. Moroccan enthusiasm for the readmission of immigrants, which would under- ENP was explicitly expressed when the initiative mine its bargaining power with the EU. Morocco’s was presented by Foreign Affairs Minister Taieb collaboration with the EU would focus particular- Fassi Fihri, who at the time referred to a speech ly on the areas of security and migration control. made by King Mohammed VI in 2000 in which he The success of Morocco’s strategy became ap- championed the need to introduce bilateralism parent when it obtained an advanced status of into the EMP (Fernández Molina, 2015). Morocco relations in 2008. With the advanced status, the is probably the southern rim country least trou- EU recognised the quality and importance of the bled by the concept of Europeanisation, since its relations, expressly highlighting Morocco’s Euro- European leanings have come to form an integral pean drive and its progress on democracy and part of its narrative. In 1992, Hassan II compared modernisation. An in-depth analysis of the moni- Morocco to a tree whose roots sank into African toring reports, and of the political relations as a soil but whose leaves breathed the wind of Eu- whole, shows significant progress of the collabo- rope. (op. cited by Ayachi, 1992). ration in migration and security policy (despite Prior to the signing of the action plan, the not having signed the readmission agreement), European Commission drew up an independent including the participation of Moroccan troops report on the country in question. The country in Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How- report on Morocco (COM, 2004) flagged serious ever, there was no comparable positive progress democratic deficiencies, linked to the excessive in the case of the advances inside the country concentration of power in the hands of the King, related to democracy, human rights and public who appointed the most important government freedoms. positions. The report also highlighted the virtual For Morocco, obtaining advanced status meant political irrelevance of the parties and the parlia- recognition of the singularity of its relations with ment, as well as the serious shortcomings of the the Union, with which it aspired to build an ex- human rights and public freedoms situation. clusive bilateral relationship, not conditioned by The action plan, drawn up with Morocco, third countries in multilateral frameworks. While meanwhile, focused more on non-structural ele- advanced status did not bring about a significant ments of the political system. The document did change in EU-Morocco relations in the framework not anticipate a political reform that favoured of the ENP, it is indisputable that obtaining it was democratic development or changes in the in- a major achievement for Moroccan diplomacy, stitutional system. Noteworthy, however, is a probably the biggest since independence. The battery of measures related to migration policy excellence of the relationship was recognised by and collaboration on security matters. Prominent former European Council President Herman Van among them were Morocco’s legislative assimila- Rompuy in 2010 (CON, 2010) during the European tion to the EU on matters of refuge and asylum, Union-Morocco bilateral summit held in Granada combatting illegal immigration and the signing of in 2010. a readmission agreement. The EU’s economic cooperation with Morocco During the implementation of the ENP, Moroc- through the European Neighbourhood and Part- co decided to pursue a policy of full collaboration nership Instrument (ENPI) for the period 2007- with the EU. The country sought to consolidate 2010 came to 654 million euros, making Rabat privileged dialogue through this new framework. the biggest recipient of funds. This investment It decided to collaborate with the EU in all the basically focused on the social and economic

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spheres: 45.3 % of the funds went to programmes riod 2007-2010. The funding was exclusively allo- related to education and health and 36.7 % to cated to business development and employment, business-related programmes. Only 4.3 % of the devoting 60 % of the assistance to improving the funds were allocated to governance and human competitiveness of businesses, 22 % to promoting rights, in programmes for the improvement of employment among graduates and 18 % to sus- the judicial system and for the advancement of tainable development. It should be noted that no women (ENPI, 2010). funds were projected for programmes related to governance or human rights (ENPI, 2010).

Tunisia Algeria In the case of Tunisia, the country agreed to negotiate future relations within the new framework In the case of Algeria, the principles of condition- as soon as possible. The Commission’s country ality and Europeanisation that form the backbone report (COM, 2004) proved very demanding in re- of the ENP were treated with suspicion, essential- lation to democratic deficiencies. That querying ly as neo-colonial-type interference. Those reser- diminished considerably by the time the action vations intensified as the ENP was perceived as plan was drafted, following the footsteps of the a European initiative that had not been agreed Moroccan case. The country report underscored with the Mediterranean countries, on the basis the high concentration of power in the presidency of the risk that its policy of conditionality could of the republic. In the EU’s view, it fully controlled be applied to the domestic policy of the partner the executive and legislative powers and had a countries on such sensitive matters for Algeria as major influence over the judiciary. The report the model of democracy (Boumghar, 2013). Other also highlighted an iron grip on associations and elements that compounded the rejection were the difficulties for both domestic and foreign hu- the scant added value that access to the commu- man rights organisations to operate. nity market offered Algeria – with little weight in Despite the fact that, as in the Moroccan case, the agricultural sector – and the revitalisation of the action plan did not propose structural reforms its foreign policy since Abdelaziz Bouteflika had to combat the previously mentioned concentra- come to power in 1999. tion of power, it did highlight certain significant Algeria, then, chose a model of relations be- elements for democratic progress, such as the tween equals with the EU, similar to the one that need to strengthen the political parties, as well the EU has with Russia. For that reason, it pre- as civil society and the freedoms of expression, ferred to build its relations in the framework of assembly and association. the Partnership Agreement signed in 2005, after The ENP monitoring reports for the five-year years of laborious negotiations. In relation to its period, while positive, were more demanding in foreign policy, Algeria was seeking symmetrical the case of Tunisia than in that of Morocco. The relations on the principle of firmness and a stub- restrictions on public freedoms were evident, as born defence of its so-called ‘autochthonous were the difficulties for human rights organisa- democratic model’, which, despite its shortcom- tions to act. In 2009, the report explicitly empha- ings, managed to place the country on a path of sised the inequality existing between contenders relative stability and reconciliation. Meanwhile, in the election campaign, the difficulties the op- when the ENP was launched, Algeria’s foreign position parties had in campaigning and the bias policy line had just been reaffirmed by the EU: of the press during the elections. the EMP agenda was incorporating the issues The EU’s economic contribution to Tunisia of security and counterterrorism, which Algeria through the ENPI was 300 million euros for the pe- had often called for and had been ignored until

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then. That incorporation took place after the at- cessing the European energy market, to which tacks in New York and Washington (2001), Casa- Algeria supplies over 20 % of the gas that the blanca (2003) and Madrid (2004), after which the EU countries consume. Algeria’s interests have Mediterranean was declared a ‘strategic interest to combine with those of the continent’s major zone’ (International Institute for Strategic Stud- energy firms. Algeria exercises energy diplomacy ies, 2004). with an EU that longs to limit its dependence on A series of peculiarities explains Algeria’s re- Russian gas. In that vein, during the first decade fusal to accept a subordinate role. Prominent of the 21st century new gas pipeline construction among them are, first, its economic situation, as projects began that connected Algeria to Spain it is a rentier state where extreme poverty does and Italy under the sea. The MEDGAZ subsea gas not exist; then its social situation, with a high lev- pipeline began supplying gas to Spain in 2011. el of literacy; or, lastly, the state of its economy, Algerian energy diplomacy also provides for with a low level of debt and a considerable cur- the possibility of penalising countries through rent account surplus (Escribano, 2009). For that the price of supply. This instrument of pressure reason, the situation differs substantially from brought to bear in 2007, with a 20 % rise in the that of the other countries around it, which are price of gas coinciding with a visit by the King of significantly more vulnerable. Spain to Morocco, where Algeria perceived de fac- However, while the country was not for- to support for Morocco’s autonomy plan for West- mally linked to the ENP, it was indeed linked to ern Sahara (Darbouch and Zoubir, 2008). In any the strategy indirectly. The replacement of the event, given the importance of the energy sector, Euro-Mediterranean partnership’s financing and with both sides aware of the interdependent instrument MEDA3 by the ENPI, which was sub- relations existing in the sector, the establishment sequently replaced by the European Neighbour- of a Strategic Partnership on Energy between the hood Instrument (ENI) – both linked to the ENP EU and Algeria was raised, with negotiations be- – meant that bilateral relations between the EU ginning in 2006. and Algeria were ultimately structured through that financial framework. With regard to the funding received, Algeria The ENP and the Arab Spring: immediate reactions was a minor recipient in the southern Mediter- ranean region, reaching an average of 40 million The period called the Arab Spring is a revolu- euros a year during the MEDA I and MEDA II pro- tionary period that brought about the political grammes, an amount that rose to 55 million for opening up of a region with a strong authoritar- the period 2007-2010 under the ENPI. The ENPI ian tradition. The revolutionary process started in financing basically concentrated on the econom- one of the countries that are the object of study ic sector: support for small and medium-sized in this chapter: Tunisia. The country was not only businesses, economic diversification and assis- the initiator; it is also the only one that has man- tance in the management of employment offices. aged to keep up the democratic process under Other sectors that received funding were those of way since 2011. health, education and justice (COM, 2013). The Tunisian uprising began as a local so- In any case, in the period 2005-2010, bilateral cial conflict when the fruit vendor Mohamed relations focused basically on energy policy, and Bouazizi killed himself by setting himself on fire very particularly on Algeria’s conditions for ac- in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid. The protests, which were initially spontaneous, took on 3 The MEDA financial instrument owes its name to the a greater political dimension as a result of the re- contraction of the concept of ‘measures of accompani- pression from President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. ment’, in French, mesures d’accompagnement. The disturbances reached their peak when the

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main civil society organisations, including the In the case of Algeria, the scale of the protests powerful Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), was not very significant. The demonstrations did joined the protests. Popular pressure prompted not succeed in posing a real risk to the stability of the flight and forced exile of President Ben Ali and the government in Algiers. One of the frequent his family to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011. justifications is that Algeria had already experi- The success of the so-called Jasmine Revolution enced an early spring during the bloody uprisings had a snowball effect on the region. After Tunisia of 1988 (Bustos, 2012: Mañé et al., 2016). In that came others: Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. vein, the authorities repeatedly used the memory The effect of this movement was felt in Mo- of the Black Decade of the 1990s, as the violence rocco and Algeria, but on a lesser scale than in spread across Libya, Syria and Egypt, with a view other countries. The regimes managed to chan- to promoting progressive reforms. The regime, nel the situations without collapsing (Bustos, then, turned to four strategies to prevent the risk 2012; Desrues, 2013). In Morocco’s case, the of contagion: the introduction of cosmetic re- protests were called over the Internet in Rabat, forms, selective repression, the neutralisation of Casablanca and other cities on 20 February 2011, civil society and, particularly, the buying of social under the slogan ‘Justice, freedom and dignity’. peace with aid and subsidies (Mañé et al., 2016). The movement, which was dubbed the 20 Feb- Among the reforms announced, the one that ruary Movement after that first event, called for promised most impact was the reform of the con- political reforms towards a true democracy and stitution, which was announced in 2011, but was demanded that the monarchy evolve towards a not brought to a conclusion until 2016. One of the parliamentary model in which it did not have real key elements of the constitutional reform is limit- power. It should be pointed out that the major- ing presidential terms to a maximum of two, which ity of the organisations that formed part of the was openly flouted by Abdelaziz Bouteflika when movement neither questioned the monarchy nor he decided to run for a fifth term in the presiden- its incumbent (Fernández Molina, 2011). tial elections. That has triggered a robust popular The Moroccan monarchy managed to neutral- response with the biggest wave of protests seen ise the demands of the movement by resorting since independence in February and March 2019. to a classic carrot and stick strategy, combining repression, threats against the leaders or pressure on the parties with populist measures such The ENP in the aftermath of the Arab Spring as the subsidising of basic products, raising the wages of public employees and providing access The Arab uprisings caught the EU unawares. to public jobs to certain groups of unemployed However, it was capable of reacting swiftly and of graduates. The strategy succeeded in fragment- adapting to the new scenario, accepting a certain ing the movement, which was offered the possi- degree of self-criticism. bility of taking part in a constitutional reform that To some extent, the Arab Spring exposed the would divide it still further. Finally, the constitu- limited effectiveness of the democracy-promotion was approved in a referendum in July that tion policies on the part of the ENP. Some of the year, against a backdrop of public disapproval of countries involved in the uprisings, such as Egypt the main organisations of the 20 February Move- and Tunisia, were highly authoritarian regimes ment. The constitution maintained the royal pre- and, at the same time, major recipients of funds rogatives practically intact, though it made some through the ENP’s supposed conditionality. Like- minor changes, such as the loss of the monarch’s wise, the relations between the government of holy nature or the requirement that the prime France and that of Tunisia in the authoritarian pe- minister come from the party with the largest riod were particularly significant. That was clear number of deputies-elect. when, in a parliamentary session on 12 January

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2011, Foreign Affairs Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie With regard to Tunisia, the arrival of the rev- offered France’s assistance to the dictator Ben Ali olution impelled a change of priorities and the to deal with the uprisings (Le Monde, 2011). amount of funding the country receives through In 2011, the European Commission took a the ENPI. Thus, the budget for the three-year pe- stance on the events taking place in the Arab riod 2011-2013 went from being focused on the world: it recognised the historic dimension of economic management sector and private sector the process of change, supporting the democratic (70 % of the funding) to focusing on the reforms processes under way, even offering to guide them that have to be introduced in the economy (73 %), (COM & HR, 2011). Its approach, couched from allocating 7 % to the promotion of democracy. then on as more for more, prioritises democratic That percentage would increase to 18 % in the progress, built on the foundations of organised two-year period 2014-2015. civil society as the backbone of the new condi- ENP relations and monitoring largely focus tionality. Prominent among the new features of on aspects related to democracy in all its dimen- the more for more approach are the possibility sions. The monitoring reports note the major of sanctioning the countries that do not make progress made in the transition process, in spite progress in their democratic development, the of the political and institutional crises. The EU streamlining of the action plans into a smaller praises the role of organised civil society led by number of goals with a greater level of precision, the UGTT, the employers’ organisation Tunisian or the creation of new financial instruments Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), geared to organised civil society. A significant de- the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and velopment was the clarification of the concept of the bar association in re-establishing national democracy. The new input goes beyond the call- dialogue that enabled the passing of the new ing and staging of elections, adding as necessary constitution in 2014 and the holding of legisla- factors freedom of association, speech and as- tive and presidential elections that same year. sembly; freedom of the press; judicial safeguards; The mediation carried out by these agencies was absence of corruption and the democratic control recognised internationally with the Nobel Peace of the armed forces (Govantes, 2018). Finally, in Prize in 2015. In the EU’s view, the following years the framework of the new ENP bilateral relations have enabled a consolidation of the institutions with Tunisia were afforded the status of privi- of government, transitional justice, the develop- leged partnership (PP), equating it to the one ment of civil society and the freedom of the press. already enjoyed by Morocco. In 2013, the action Another area of collaboration between Tunisia plans for Tunisia and Morocco were renewed un- and the EU is the financial sector, with negotia- der the more for more formula. tions to open up airspace, the Open Skies project, or the establishment of a Deep and Comprehen- sive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). This latter Tunisia agreement has been challenged by broad sectors of civil society, which see the deal and the In Tunisia’s case, the action plan is conceived as EU’s economic deregulation demands as a path a roadmap linked the political transition process of little benefit to the country and far removed and as a framework for the development of a from the immediate needs of a society gripped new status of relations with the EU. We should by poverty and inequality and young people who note that the Tunisian transition is incipient, with are participating in the biggest brain drain in its bodies still to be consolidated, for which reason history. a deepening of their development is proposed Likewise, we would like to highlight the start around the central themes of democracy, human of negotiations in 2016 between the EU and Tu- rights, rule of law, security and migration policy. nisia to sign an agreement on the readmission of

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immigrants by which Tunisia would have to take way of example, the second section mixes in the back the migrants who try to make into Europe same budget item elements linked to democracy across its border. In the deal, the Commission is (reform of the justice system or governance) with offering to facilitate visas for Tunisian nationals other quite unrelated policies (modernisation of in return for these measures (COM, 2016). This the prisons, migration and mobility). Similarly, type of agreement is highly asymmetrical and section four covers items in support of organised frequently protested because of the pressure ex- civil society with others for the development of erted on countries in a situation of dependence the DCFTA (Govantes, 2018). and because of the lack of human rights guaran- Morocco’s limited democratic progress is no tees for the people who cross the borders of the impediment to it remaining the EU’s main partner third country (Charles, 2007; Govantes, 2018). in the southern neighbourhood of the ENP. The Finally, the EU, which says that it is escorting monitoring reports continue to shine a light on Tunisia in its democratic process, is still aware of the profound shortcomings of the functioning of the fragility of the country, especially as a result parliament, the judiciary or regarding freedom of of the economic stagnation and the erosion of the association and the press, which has been await- credibility of its political actors. Because of that, ing a promised reform of the press code, decrimi- the EU recognised the consolidation of Tunisian nalising crimes of opinion, since 2005 (Govantes, democracy as a priority goal in 2016 (COM, 2016). 2018). With regard to individual freedoms, they In view of these risks, the EU decided to up fund- emphasise the need to go further in combating ing to 300 million a year for the period 2017-2020 gender inequality and Morocco has been re- (COM & HR, 2017) from a projected investment of proached for having tried a group of 25 Sahrawi between 120 and 148 million euros a year. civilians in military courts (COM & HR, 2014). In any event, the monitoring reports remain very positive for Morocco and they explicitly Morocco highlight the privileged bilateral relations. On the economic plane, they point to the advances In the Moroccan action plan, the commitments in Morocco’s gradual integration into the Euro- relating to democracy were found to be laxer than pean internal market, as well as progress in its those seen for Tunisia, in spite of the new central macroeconomic stability, underscoring the ad- importance for this policy with the more for more vances in the talks for a DCFTA between the two programme. parties. They also emphasise the collaboration In Morocco’s case, the ENPI financing instru- in the business sector, where they are starting to ment for the period 2011-2013 focused on the see economic growth favourable to job creation. economic sector, though the amount allocated With regard to migration policy, there is complete to support for the democratic transition grew to cooperation, though the EU persists with its tradi- 7.2 %, which was a considerable increase over the tional insistence on the approval of a readmission previous period. For the period 2014-2020, the agreement rejected by Morocco since 1995. budget is divided evenly into four broadly generic In recent months, bilateral relations have suf- sections: basic services (30 %), democratic gover- fered certain setbacks as a result of judgments nance, rule of law and mobility (25 %), employ- by the EU courts of justice on Morocco’s lack of ment and sustainable growth (25 %) and support jurisdiction over the territorial waters of Western for the comprehensive free trade agreement and Sahara, which has an effect on the agreement civil society (20 %) (ENPI, 2014). However, the and has also had an impact on the negotiations categories for this latter period are very broad, over the DCFTA (El Houdaigui, 2018). Despite the which means that, in principle, it is difficult to European courts’ stance, on 12 January 2019 the measure their impact on specific policies. By European Parliament defied its own courts by

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passing a new fisheries agreement with Morocco as equality policy or the development of civil that includes the waters off Western Sahara Le( society, and so on. In that respect, the EU noted Monde, 2019). the approval in 2016 of the constitutional reform scheduled since 2011, which includes limiting terms of office to a maximum of two, the official Algeria recognition of the Berber language or the review of the electoral law. However, the application In Algeria’s case, a certain rapprochement with of these reforms is entirely implausible follow- the ENP can be perceived after the Arab Spring. It ing the announcement that President Abdelaziz should be noted that, while Algeria is not formally Bouteflika, with considerably diminished capaci- in the ENP, it is linked financially to it through the ties, is to stand for a fifth term. Among the major ENP’s financial instruments. This engagement reforms still pending, the EU points to the reform can be seen in three dimensions: appropriation of the press, which is frequently pressured and – the EU takes Algeria and other southern coun- persecuted, as one of the most important (COM tries into consideration when devising the new & HR, 2017), as could clearly be seen in the pro- ENP, countering the image of unilaterality of the tests over Bouteflika’s fifth term, which were not original approach; the EU’s pledge to take into covered by the domestic media. considering the characteristics of the country’s In any case, there appears to be great interest single-export economy and, finally, Algeria’s de- from both sides in agreement in the energy sec- sire to appear more open from the political point tor, where there is significant interdependence. of view. (Boumghar, 2013). Algeria is the EU’s third-biggest natural gas pro- As far as Algeria is concerned, no action plan vider, trade that represents 86 % of its exports has been signed, but officially, it has been under of the product. In the last four years, numerous negotiation since 2014. However, in the EU’s view, meetings at the highest level have been organ- there has been a notable rapprochement between ised to facilitate that agreement. the sides since 2015, as Algeria participated in the review of the ENP conducted that year, with an enhanced political framework being agreed for the Conclusions three-year period 2018-2020. (COM, 2017). An important fulcrum of collaboration has In conclusion, it could be said that the Arab been economic: the EU is Algeria’s main trading Spring has had a lesser impact on the ENP than partner. It accounts for 46.9 % of its imports and what might have been expected from the docu- 65 % of its exports. Its economy’s excessive de- ments defining the newmore for more approach. pendence on the energy sector means that price The central important of democratising policy fluctuations have an enormous impact on its and the promises of negative conditionality have economic system. That has even led to the oc- not applied to any of the countries and relations casional introduction of restrictions on free trade with the different countries have been based in certain products included in the Partnership more on interests than on objective progress. Agreement of 2016 (COM & HR, 2017). In that We might point out in this respect that the in- respect, the EU has supported programmes to terests of the EU relative to Morocco are very close- favour the country’s industrial diversification, as ly related to security policy and border control, well as other measures to improve the function- policies in which Morocco’s cooperation with the ing of the labour market and the modernisation EU has been exemplary for two decades. The lack of the agricultural sector. of objective progress on democracy and human In the framework of the policy of opening up, rights that the monitoring reports highlight have collaboration has been established in areas such no consequences whatsoever for the country.

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As far as the Tunisian case is concerned, there stalemate’, The International Spectator, vol. has indeed been very significant progress in the XLIII, n.º 1, 2008, pp. 91-105. areas of democracy and public freedoms. Howev- Desrues, T.: ‘Mobilizations in a hybrid regime: er, its transition does not follow a model of Euro- The 20th February Movement and the Moroc- peanisation, but is a genuinely national political can regime’, Current Sociology, vol. 61, n.º 4, process. It is indisputable that the EU is monitor- 2013, pp. 409-423. ing the process, aware of the important risk to El Houdaigui, R.: ‘La política exterior de Marrue- security, both in the region and in Europe, that cos, desafíos y ajustes’, CIDOB Yearbook 2018, the country’s destabilisation could pose against CIDOB, Barcelona, 2018. a backdrop of very high regional instability given Emerson, M., Noutcheva, G., and Popescu, N.: the situation in Libya and Egypt. ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years As for Algeria, the Arab Spring has brought on: Time indeed for an ‘ENP Plus’’, CEPS Poli- about a process of rapprochement between the cy Brief, n.º 126, 2007. sides and an improvement in cooperation, which Escribano, G.: ‘La UE y la promoción de las refor- is particularly necessary in the energy sphere, mas económicas en Argelia’, Información Co- given the relations of mutual dependence. Alge- mercial Española, n.º 846, 2009, pp. 101-115. ria, for its part, has succeeded in participating in Fernández Molina, I.: Moroccan Foreign Policy the design and execution of the ENP, decoupling Under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014, Routledge, it to a large extent from the EU’s moralistic lectur- London, 2015. ing over its domestic policy. Fernández Molina, I.: ‘The Monarchy vs. the 20 Lastly, the ENP has not been effective in its February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of declared goal of resolving its territorial conflicts. Political Change in Morocco?’, Mediterranean In that respect, it has had no impact on solving Politics, vol. 16, n.º 3, 2011, pp. 435-441. the Western Sahara conflict. Moreover, the situ- Govantes, B.: ‘La construcción del discurso de ation of human rights and public freedoms has promoción de la democracia de la política deteriorated considerably, as the EU itself says europea de vecindad en la post-primavera in its monitoring reports on Morocco. árabe: los casos de Túnez y Marruecos’, Unisci Journal, n.º 47, 2018, pp. 147-176. Govantes, B.: ‘Morocco at the European Neigh- References bourhood Policy the settlement of a privileged relationship’, Revista de Estudios Internaciona- Ayachi, M.: ‘La política exterior de Marruecos’, les Mediterráneos, n.º 25, 2018, pp. 139-161. speech given at the Universidad de los An- Hernando de Larramendi Martínez, M.: La política des as Ambassador of Morocco in Colombia, exterior de Marruecos, Mapfre, Madrid, 1997. 1992. International Institute for Strategic Studies: Stra- Boumghar, L.: ‘The Algerian position in the Euro- tegic survey 2003/4, 2004. pean Neighbourhood Policy’, IEMED yearbook Khader, B.: L’Europe pour la Méditerranée : De Bar- 2013, IEMED, Barcelona, 2013. celone à Barcelone (1995-2008), L’Harmattan, Bustos, R.: ‘Argelia frente a las urnas: la ‘primav- Paris, 2009. era’ pasa de largo’, Politica exterior, vol. 26, n.º ‘Le Parlement européen inclut le Sahara occi- 148, 2012, pp. 28-34. dental dans son accord commercial avec le Darbouche, H.: ‘Decoding Algeria’s ENP Policy: Maroc’, Le Monde, 17 January 2019. Differentiation by Other Means?’, Mediterra- Mañé, A., Thieux, L., y Hernando de Larramendi, nean Politics, vol. 13, n.º 2, 2008, pp. 371-389. M.: ‘Argelia en la encrucijada: condicionantes, Darbouche, H., and Zoubir, H. D.: ‘Conflicting in- tendencias y escenarios’, OPEX Working paper, ternational policies and the Western Sahara 82/2016, Fundación Alternativas, Madrid, 2016.

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Prodi, R.: ‘A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as COM: European Neighbourhood Policy - Country the Key to Stability’, Sixth ECSA-World Confer- Report Tunisia, COM(2004)373 final, 2004. ence, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 2002. COM & HR: Rapport sur l’état des relations UE- ‘Tunisie : les propos ‘effrayants’ d’Alliot-Marie Tunisie dans le cadre de la Politique europée- suscitent la polémique’, Le Monde, 13 Janu- nne de voisinage révisée, SWD(2017)152 final, ary 2011. 2017. Schumacher, T.: ‘Riding on the winds of change: COM & HR: Rapport sur l’état des relations UE- The future of Euro-Mediterranean Partner- Algérie dans le cadre de la PEV rénovée, ship’, The International Spectator, vol. 39, n.º SWD(2017) 109 final, 2017. 2, 2004, pp. 89-102. COM & HR: Mise en oeuvre de la politique euro- Youngs, R.: ‘Ten years of the Barcelona process: péen ne de voisinage au Maroc - progrès ré- A model for the Arab reform?’, FRIDE Working alisés en 2013 et actions à mettre en oeuvre, paper, n.º 2, 2005. SWD(2014)94 final, 2014. COM & HR: A new response to a changing neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303 final, 2011. Official EU Documents4 CON: Remarques de Herman Van Rompuy, Pré- sident du Conseil Européen, au Sommet UE-Maroc, COM: Communiqué de Presse, L’UE et la Tunisie PCE 47/10, Granada, 7 March 2010. commencent des négociations en vue de faciliter ENPI: Instrument européen de voisinage et de la délivrance de visas et la réadmission, 2016. partenariat, apercu de resultats, 2014. COM: Document de travail des services de la Com- ENPI: Programmation de l’Instrument euro- mission – Politique Européene de voisinage: péen de voisinage – Cadre Unique d’Appui pour Rapport sur le Maroc, COM(2004)373 final, 2004. l’apui de l’UE au Maroc, 2014. ENPI: Programme indicative National Maroc, 4 The following codes are used for official references: 2007-2010, 2010. COM for Commission documents, COM & HR for docu- ENPI: Programme indicative National Tunisie, ments from the European Commission and the office of 2007-2010, 2010. the High Representative for Common Foreign and Secu- rity Policy, CON for the European Council and ENPI for the documents of the European Neighbourhood and Partner- ship Instrument.

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inf_africa_ingles.indb 121 3/6/19 18:44 inf_africa_ingles.indb 122 3/6/19 18:44 11. Is Morocco disengaging from the European Union?

Irene Fernández-Molina

For decades, Morocco has acted and been treated with the maintenance of economic dependence like the most ‘advanced’ partner of the EU in North and security interdependence that mark bilateral Africa and the southern neighbourhood as a whole. relations from a structural point of view. The preservation and continuous strengthening of privileged relations with the EU has been one of the three topmost priorities of its foreign policy since An extreme case of the EU’s influence in the the 1990s. That has made the Maghrebi country southern Mediterranean an extreme case of the influence and power of ‘socialisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ of the EU (and The ties between Morocco and the EU have not its member states) among the southern Mediterra- evolved in the manner of just any bilateral rela- nean countries, which are not candidates for acces- tions. The reason why this association merits sion. However, the reduction of its dependence on attention and may be an indication of a more the EU through the diversification of political and general trend in the EU’s relations with its pe- economic ties has become a recurrent theme of the riphery is that, for decades, Morocco has stood official discourse and public debate around Moroc- out as an extreme case of European influence and can foreign policy since 2016. This is the new trend Europeanisation among third countries that are conveyed by the Moroccan authorities with the (re) not candidates for accession, especially those launch of King Mohammed VI’s so-called ‘new Afri- on the southern rim of the Mediterranean. Un- can policy’, along with gestures of rapprochement like other states in the region where there was a to Russia and China. How seriously should we take more deeply felt presence of global powers such the strategic reorientation on everybody’s lips? as the United States or the Soviet Union during The purpose of this chapter is to explore the the Cold War, in post-colonial Morocco, Europe extent to which Morocco is really disengaging – in the shape of the European Economic Com- from the EU; in other words, whether the coun- munity (EEC) or EU, plus its member states – has try has been experiencing or actively seeking a always had a quasi-monopoly on foreign influ- substantial reduction in the EU’s influence on its ence, by virtue of a combination of structural eco- politics, economy and society in recent years. nomic dependence, feedback between structural That question requires examining whether a dis- constraints and national identity, socialisation of connection is taking place in specific areas (of- the elites, administrative training and learning, ficial discourse, trade flows, aid and investment, and rhetorical action at the highest political level. public opinion) and, if so, how and why. The con- The ongoing preservation and strengthening clusion is that Morocco is undergoing a process of privileged bilateral relationswith the EU has of dissociated de-Europeanisation whereby the become one of the three topmost priorities of disengagement from the EU acted out in the po- Moroccan foreign policy since the 1990s, along litical discourse and at normative level coexists with the promotion of the discourse of ‘demo-

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cratic transition’ and the ‘Moroccan exception’ (Fernández-Molina, 2018). For example, as Moroc- – in comparison with the greater degree of au- co’s main trading partner, the EU absorbed or gave thoritarianism and political instability of the rise to 59.4% of the country’s total foreign trade neighbouring countries –and the search for in- in 2017, while Morocco accounted for just 1% of ternational recognition and legalisation of the de the EU’s global exports and imports. In the field of facto annexation of Western Sahara. foreign direct investment (FDI) too, since the eco- Without prejudice to the role of ‘champion nomic opening-up (infitah) of the 1980s Morocco’s of national territorial integrity’, the other central main goal has been to attract European capital and role that has formed the backbone of Moroccan businesses with a view to becoming the ‘Mexico of foreign policy in the reign of Mohammed VI since Europe’. To do that, it has competed with neigh- 1999 has been that of ‘model student of the EU’ bouring Tunisia to project an image of internal sta- (Fernández-Molina, 2016). Recently ascended bility (White, 2001). The conclusion, from the point to the throne and as soon as the EU-Morocco of view of international political economy, is that Association Agreement signed in 1996 entered the Morocco-EU relationship is one of structural into force, the monarch enshrined his maximal- dependence of a centre-periphery type or, at least, ist aspirations of rapprochement with the EU in of ‘high asymmetrical interdependence’ (Aghrout, the phrase ‘less than accession and more than 2000), if we take into account the costs that break- simple association’, or literally ‘a partnership that ing the ties would entail for the two parties – not would at the same time be more and better than primarily economic in the case of the EU. the revised and corrected association in which we On the other hand, in parallel and perhaps have engaged and, perhaps still for a time, a little largely because of those economic structural less than the accession dictated to us, however, constraints, in the field of ideas and discourse by reason, geography and the everyday realities a large part of Morocco’s post-colonial (inter) of the economic, social and cultural life in our national identity has been shaped around the country’ (speech by Mohammed VI at the dinner role of ‘model student of the EU’. On the whole, offered by President of the Republic of France this central role of Moroccan foreign policy has Jacques Chirac in Paris, 20 March 2000). Convert- coexisted with that of ‘champion of national terri- ed into the leitmotiv of the official discourse in torial integrity’ with barely any hiccups or dilem- the following years, the pro-European ambition mas, despite a deep structural tension arising of the young Mohammed VI continued down the between two diverging visions of the national path of his predecessor, Hassan II, who went as interest, which we might define as realist/geopo- far as seeking accession to the EEC in 1987. litical/territorial, with the Western Sahara issue The structural roots of the pro-European orien- as the priority, and liberal/pragmatic/economis- tation of Moroccan foreign policy lie in a national tic, putting relations with the EU first. For years, political economy geared to exports and insertion Morocco’s role as ‘model student of the EU’ has into the global system that French colonialism had five defining characteristics: a considerable moulded in a markedly vertical way. That stamp national consensus and low level of contestation, has been reflected in the continued predomi- both horizontally (among elites) and vertically nance of trade and capital flows with the former (elites-public opinion); reciprocity and mutual coloniser and other European states over horizon- reinforcement between Morocco’s self-definition tal trade with the neighbouring countries of the and European expectations; its position at the Maghreb and other regions of the Global South. heart of a broader set of roles – ‘stabiliser’, ‘bal- This is coupled with the marked asymmetry be- ancing point’, ‘bridge’ or ‘nexus’ between Europe tween the weight of EU-Morocco bilateral trade and Africa, between the West and the Arab and for each of the parties, with percentages that have Muslim world, as well as religious moderator –; remained practically constant down the decades its strategic use by the country’s ruling elites to

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achieve specific foreign policy goals and obtain bilateral relations. If it had any effect at first, it was privileged treatment from the EU; and the com- to reinforce this trend. The Moroccan monarchy’s bination of bilateral and multilateral elements in superficial reformist response to the antiauthori- putting it into practice (Fernández-Molina, 2016). tarian protests organised by the 20 February Move- The clearest case of the strategic use of the role ment – the national version of the so-called Arab of ‘model student of the EU’ was the process that Spring – received unequivocal backing from the led in 2008 to Morocco’s distinction by the EU as EU, particularly after Mohammed VI announced a strategic partner worthy of what was dubbed a process of swift constitutional reform to satisfy ‘Advanced Status’. That was the name coined in people at home and abroad (Fernández-Molina, the Joint Document of the seventh EU-Morocco 2016). The rapid defusing of the discontent on the Association Council (October 2008) to formalise streets allowed the Moroccan regime to emerge what was supposed to be a special bilateral rela- unscathed from the predicament and maintain tionship, different from those that the EU had with business as usual, or failing that, privileged treat- other neighbours in the southern Mediterranean, ment, in its relations with the EU. which was an unprecedented achievement for Despite the absence of substantial political Morocco’s foreign policy. It is true that in practice changes like those seen in Tunisia or Egypt, the the new framework, made possible by the path EU chose Morocco as one of the four recipients of differentiated and asymmetrical bilateralism of the three new policies that it presented as a that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) strategic response to the uprisings of 2011 and had opened up in 2004-2005, lacked a clear added rewards/incentives for the Arab countries on the value. It was nothing more than a political docu- path of democratic transformation in the Joint ment in the shape of a ‘roadmap’, with a long list Communication ‘A Partnership for Democracy of measures for convergence and integration with and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Medi- the structures of the EU that the EU-Morocco ENP terranean’, known as the ‘3Ms’ (money, market, Action Plan of 2005 had already largely envisaged, mobility). Morocco, then, began to receive addi- and with few specific commitments beyond the tional financial support from the Support to Part- possibility of ‘potentially’ creating a new ‘con- nership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) tractual bond’ that would replace the Associa- programme and to prepare to negotiate a Mobility tion Agreement in the future. In other words, the Partnership and a Deep and Comprehensive Free symbolic dimension of Morocco’s Advanced Sta- Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. Some of those bi- tus was much more important than its tangible lateral advances would materialise in 2013, when content. In any case, Morocco’s audacity and de- the Mobility Partnership was concluded and the termination in its effort to attain Advanced Status DCFTA negotiations officially got underway, while gives some idea of the utmost importance of the a second EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan (which was pro-European orientation of its foreign policy dur- to replace the one from 2005) was also adopted. ing the first decade of the 20th century. Against However, 2011 and the years after were also to that backdrop, the signs of disengagement from hold some unexpected shocks in store for those the EU that would begin to be perceived in the fol- smooth Morocco-EU relations. All of them have lowing decade would be all the more surprising. stemmed from the new international strategy of low politics undertaken by the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi nationalists, focused on the de- Signs and mechanisms of disengagement from the EU nunciation of the human rights violations and illegal exploitation of annexed Western Sahara’s The regional wave of political transformations trig- natural resources imputed to Morocco, through gered by the Arab uprisings of 2011 did not initially both parliamentary and judicial channels. The alter the trajectory of strengthening EU-Morocco first fruits of that strategy in Brussels was the re-

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jection by the European Parliament in December the two top priorities of Moroccan foreign policy 2011 of the protocol extending the EU-Morocco – the ‘national question’ of Western Sahara and fisheries agreement of 2006, owing, among oth- privileged relations with the EU – and faced with er reasons, to the legal doubts about its de facto a binary decision, the authorities in Rabat were application to the non-self-governing territory of to give precedence to the former. Western Sahara, which has a different legal status As of 2016, there was no interruption in every- in international law. While received with alarm day Euro-Moroccan cooperation in fields such as and incomprehension in Morocco, as a setback economics, security and migration control, where they had never imagined, the parliamentary vote member states such as France and Spain, which ultimately had no lasting importance. A revised support Moroccan positions in Brussels, have fisheries protocol began to be negotiated imme- a central role, but there was indeed a brake on diately, which did get the European Parliament’s political dialogue with the EU institutions. Proof consent in 2013 with little difficulty. The EU-Mo- of that is the slowdown of the DCFTA negotia- rocco agricultural trade agreement of 2010 also tions and failure to adopt EU-Morocco Partner- got parliamentary approval in February 2012, de- ship Priorities. Partnership Priorities are the new spite posing similar legal problems related to its bilateral political instrument introduced by the applicability to products from Western Sahara. revision of the ENP in 2015 to replace the old Ac- The major bilateral crisis in this field would tion Plans and they have already been adopted break out in 2015-2016 as a result of the Polisa- by other countries of the Maghreb such as Algeria rio Front’s action through judicial channels. In (March 2017) and Tunisia (November 2018), in- two consecutive rulings on the same case, the verting the usual order of interest and speed of Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) annulled first response to European initiatives. the application of the EU-Morocco agricultural It is in this context where signs of disengage- trade agreement to Western Sahara (General ment from the EU have been observed in Mo- Court judgment, December 2015) and ultimately roccan behaviour through three mechanisms: ruled that Western Sahara does not legally form rhetorical action and normative contestation; part of Moroccan territory, for which reason no the display of diversification of international ties Euro-Moroccan agreement can be applied there and partners; and tactical issue linkage, includ- (final appeal ruling of the Grand Chamber, De- ing threats of reducing cooperation on particu- cember 2016). The EU-Morocco fisheries agree- larly sensitive issues such as migration control. ment would be the object of a ruling with similar To start with, the rhetorical action and normative reasoning that declared it nonapplicable to the contestation by the Moroccan authorities have waters of Western Sahara in July 2018. been based on the questioning of the norms and The refutation of Moroccan sovereignty over values proclaimed by the EU –and other Western Western Sahara in the courts of the EU was a crisis players—as the basis of their international action, of such importance for Rabat that, as of February on the one hand, and, on the other, of the Europe- 2016, the country’s government announced the an moral authority to boast of them. Some of the official suspension of all contacts with the EU in- speeches of King Mohammed VI in recent years stitutions over its ‘total rejection’ of the first CJEU have displayed an anticolonial tone unusual in judgment. According to the statement issued to Moroccan foreign policy: ‘Morocco is free to make that effect: ‘The government has denounced its decisions and choices and is not the private the highly political nature of the decision, its reserve (chasse gardée) of any country’ (Moham- unfounded arguments, its biased logic and its med VI’s speech at the Morocco-Gulf Cooperation conclusions contrary to international law and at Council [GCC] summit in Riyadh, 20 April 2016). variance with the resolutions of the UN Security This critical attitude has extended to the prin- Council’. For the first time, there was a clash of ciple of conditionality that guides a good part of

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the EU’s cooperation and foreign aid policies, also on common adherence to the same values starting with the ENP, as well as the support of and principles, and the same constructive ap- international financial institutions: ‘Debt condi- proaches’. Among those shared principles, he tionality must be revised. Western countries, in highlights sovereignty: ‘We respect the sover- fact, expect some African countries – which have eignty of states and we respect their choices and been independent for less than half a century – to approaches to establishing and developing their have the same positive and important political relations with the partners they desire’ (speech and economic behaviour as they do, and they by Mohammed VI at the Morocco-GCC summit in place conditions on them that are impossible to Riyadh, 20 April 2016). meet. This aberration is even more acute when Secondly, Mohammed VI has illustrated the de- these same European countries are sometimes sire to diversify Morocco’s international ties and in major financial and political difficulties them- partnerships with a succession of very significant selves’ (Mohammed VI’s speech at the AU-EU state visits, chief among which are his trips to Rus- summit in Abidjan, 29 November 2017). sia and China in March and May 2016, respectively. Another supposed European/Western attitude For the second visit to Moscow of his reign, 14 years disputed by Mohammed VI has been the positive after the first one, the monarch surrounded him- interpretation of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the inter- self with a delegation of nine ministers, with spe- ventionist responses to its consequences: ‘After cial prominence for those in charge of the energy what was portrayed as an Arab spring, which has and agriculture portfolios. The two countries con- caused so much havoc, desolation and human cluded a fisheries agreement that allowed Russian drama, today we are living through a calamitous vessels to fish in the territorial waters of Western autumn, with the purpose of seizing control of Sahara, which were becoming so problematic in the resources of other Arab countries and of shat- the cooperation with the EU. In Beijing, where the tering the successful experiences of other states, King had also not visited since 2002, the agenda such as Morocco, undermining the original na- was fundamentally economic and gave rise to the tional model that sets it apart’ (Mohammed VI’s signing of 15 conventions or contracts between speech at the Morocco-GCC in Riyadh, 20 April Moroccan and Chinese companies. Those trips 2016). The most glaring example of the inconsis- have been accompanied by an ambitious series of tency between the behaviour of the EU and its royal tours around Africa between 2016 and 2018, members states and the norms and values that which sought to relaunch the ‘new African policy’ they themselves trumpet is to be found in mat- proclaimed as a watchword at the start of Moham- ters of migration: ‘Little capable or little willing med VI’s reign. While African tours had been a con- to understand the causes of the migration phe- stant of royal diplomacy since 1999, the noveltyin nomenon, they simplify it and make generalisa- this new phase is that they fell within the context of tions with stereotypical representations, through Morocco’s (re)integration into the AU, completed in images of floods of people with no work and no January 2017, and they moved out of the comfort resources, sometimes with suspicious profiles’ zone of French-speaking West and Central Africa (Mohammed VI’s speech at the AU-EU summit in and the countries that do not recognise the Sah- Abidjan, 29 November 2017). rawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Morocco’s The questioning of the superiority of EU stan- second ‘return’ to Africa has also been promoted dards has been accompanied by an emphasis with an extensive public diplomacy campaign and on alternative reference points, such as the GCC a new narrative spread by a wave of publications countries: ‘Despite the geographical distances from quasi-official think tanks funded directly or separating our countries, we remain united, indirectly by the palace. thanks be to God, by strong ties that are based The third mechanism of disengagement from not only on language, religion or civilisation, but the EU used by the Moroccan authorities over the

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last few years has been tactical issue linkage, a On examining the main indicators of bilateral negotiating strategy that deliberately establishes economic (inter)dependence between Morocco an artificial link – often conditional – between and the EU, the first thing that leaps out is that issues that in principle bear no direct logical or the annual volume of trade has grown at quite a substantial relation. That is the case of the con- steady rate over the course of the last decade, after nection, tenuous by any reckoning, between registering a brief dip in 2009 that could be associ- the CJEU judgments on the inclusion/exclusion ated with the global economic and financial crisis of Western Sahara in the EU-Morocco trade and of 2008. Neither the Arab uprisings of 2011 nor the cooperation agreements, on the one hand, and diplomatic crisis announced by Morocco in 2015- Morocco’s cooperation in the control of migration 2016 over the CJEU judgments appear to have had flows to Europe, on the other. The issue linkage any direct impact on bilateral trade. That upward created by Morocco in early 2017 was spelt out by trend, along with the negative balance of trade for Aziz Akhannouch, the minister of Agriculture and Morocco, may be interpreted as a sign of ongoing Maritime Fisheries and a man close to the King, dependence on the EU in that field. On the other and bordered on a threat: ‘Any obstacle to the ap- hand, as far as FDI is concerned, there was a slight plication of this [agricultural trade] agreement is reduction of Moroccan dependence on the EU in a direct attack on thousands of jobs on one side 2013-2016, continuing a downward trend seen and another in highly sensitive sectors and poses since 2010 (Charts 1 and 2, Table 1). a real risk of a resumption of the migration flows Another indicator of bilateral economic (inter) that, thanks to a sustained effort, Morocco has dependence that has remained constant is the EU’s succeeded in managing and containing’ (state- financial assistance to Morocco.Since the 1990s, the ment by the Ministry of Agriculture and Maritime country has stood out as the main beneficiary of the Fisheries, 6 February 2017). ‘How do you [Euro- funds from the MEDA programme of the Euro-Medi- peans] want us to do the work of blocking African terranean Partnership (1996-2006), as well as of the emigration if today Europe does not want to work European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru- with us?... Why are we going to continue acting ment (ENPI) (2007-2013) and the European Neigh- as gendarmes and giving them employment [to bourhood Instrument (ENI) (2014 onwards) of the the African migrants settled in Morocco]?’ (EFE in- ENP. In a similar vein, the EU’s official development terview with Aziz Akhannouch, 6 February 2017). assistance (ODA) to Morocco has been growing steadily since 2010, with just one fall in 2014-2015 and a fresh upturn in 2016 (Charts 3 and 4). The supposed disengagement beyond the rhetoric Apart from the bilateral (inter)dependence between Morocco and the EU, it is also important to The Ministry of Agriculture then warned that ‘in- consider the relationship between the presence conveniences’ like the CJEU rulings ‘jeopardise of the EU and other competing economic powers an edifice of cooperation built over many years in the country’s foreign trade and FDIstructures. and leave Morocco no option but to depart [from Comparing its commercial structure in 2010 and cooperation with the EU] towards an accelera- 2017, we can see that in both cases the percent- tion of the partnerships undertaken with various age of foreign trade that went to the EU exceeds countries and regions, particularly Russia, China, 50% and has grown both in exports (from 59% India, Japan and the Gulf states, as well as our to 64%) and in imports (from 50% to 57%). The African neighbours’ (statement from the Ministry EU is well ahead of the second trading partner in of Agriculture and Maritime Fisheries, 6 February overall terms, China, which only accounted for 2017). To what extent is this disengagement from 6.4% of Moroccan foreign tradein 2017 and whose the EU taking place in the economic field, beyond weight is considerably greater in terms of im- the rhetoric? ports than in exports. The three most important

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Chart 1. EU trade flows and balance with Morocco (goods), 2008-2018 (millions of euros)

24,000 23,000 22,000 21,000 20,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Imports Exports Balance

Source: European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade, with data from Eurostat Comext.

Chart 2. FDI flows from the EU to Morocco (millions of US$)

4000 3500 3000 2500

2000 1500 1000 500

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Source: UNCTAD/Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014

Table 1. FDI from the EU to Morocco, 2013-2016 (billions of euros)

Indicator 2013 2014 2015 2016 Annual average growth Stocks: inward 0.7 1 1 0.6 -6.7 Stocks: outward 17.5 14.2 15 15.7 -3.5 Stocks: balance 16.8 13.2 14 15.1 Flows: in 0 0.2 0 -0.3 Flows: out 0.9 -3.5 0.8 0.6 -9.4 Flows: balance 0.9 -3.7 0.7 0.9

Source: European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade.

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Chart 3. Annual ENPI and ENI commitments for Morocco, 2007-2017 (millions of euros)

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Sources: ENPI, Morocco: 2007-2010. National Indicative Programme; European Commission.

Chart 4. ODA disbursements from the EU institutions to Morocco, 2008-2016 (millions of US$, constant prices of 2016)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: OECD.Stat.

markets for Moroccan exports after the EU –the the top 10 with only Saudi Arabia in eighth place United States, Brazil and India— combined only (1.4%) (Table 2, Chart 5). account for between 13% (2010) and 11% (2017). Compared with the structure of foreign trade, The volume of imports into the Moroccan market Morocco’s FDI structure is more diversified and from outside the EU is more significant, but even less dominated by investors from the EU. Even so none of the EU’s competitors reached the 10% so, in 2017, the sum of FDI flows from EU mem- threshold either in 2010 –China (8%), the United ber states came to 42.2% of the total, while the States (7%), Saudi Arabia (6%), Russia (4%)—or in United States accounted for 21.4% and the GCC 2017 –China (9%), the United States (7%), Turkey states, 19.3% (Chart 6). (5%). Apart from that, Russia occupies a modest In short, the trade and FDI data show that the place as Morocco’s seventh-biggest trading part- presence of emerging powers in the economy ner (1.7% of foreign trade). The best-placed re- of Morocco is limited at the moment, compared gional power is Turkey, which is fourth on the list with the EU, and it varies according to the area (3.8%). The GCC countries are practically out of and the indicator. The country’s trade structure is

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Table 2. Morocco’ top trading partners (goods), 2017

Imports Export Total trade Partner Value % World Partner Value % World Partner Value % Mio € Mio € Mio € World World 39,451 100 World 21,763 100 World 61,213 100 1. EU 28 22,283 56.5 1. EU 28 14,062 64.4 1. EU 28 36,344 59.4 2. China 3618 9.2 2. USA 903 4.1 2. China 3888 6.4 3. USA 2740 6.9 3. Brazil 804 3.7 3. USA 3643 6.0 4. Turkey 1768 4.5 4. India 611 2.8 4. Turkey 2356 3.8 5. Russia 857 2.2 5. Turkey 588 2.7 5. Brazil 1441 2.4 6. Saudi 769 1.9 6. China 271 1.2 6. India 1157 1.9 Arabia 7. Brazil 637 1.6 7. Singapore 240 1.1 7. Russia 1025 1.7 8. India 545 1.4 8. Ethiopia 218 1.0 8. Saudi 866 1.4 Arabia 9. Argentina 514 1.3 9. Pakistan 182 0.8 9. Algeria 653 1.1 10. Algeria 478 1.2 10. Algeria 175 0.8 10. Argentina 583 1.0

Source: European Commission/Directorate-General for Trade, with data from the IMF.

Chart 5. Morocco’s main trading partners for exports, 2010 vs. 2017

2010 2017

19 % 17 % 1 %

1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 2 % 3 % 64 % 2 % 59 % 3 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 4 % 4 %

6 %

EU India USA Brazil EU USA Brazil India Switzerland Turkey Singapore Pakistan Turkey China Singapore Ethiopia China Russia Others Pakistan Algeria Ohters

Source: IMF/Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).

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Chart 6. Main investment partners for Morocco, 2017 (% FDI inflows)

14 %

3 % 31 % 3 %

5 %

6 %

7 %

10 % 21 %

France USA UAE Netherlands Saudi Arabia UK China QatarOthers

Source: Santander Trade Portal, with data from the Office des Changes of Morocco.

still dominated by exchanges with the EU, while that Morocco is embarking on a process of dis- there is a relatively larger non-Western presence sociated de-Europeanisation, by which the dis- in the FDI field, particularly from the GCC states. engagement from the EU portrayed in the official One may ask, on the other hand, whether the political discourse and at the normative level sits emerging non-Western powers could be having alongside the maintenance of the economic de- a bigger influence on Morocco in the norma- pendence characterising this bilateral relation- tive and political identity sphere, rather than in ship from a structural point of view, as well as the strictly material terms. On a social level, howev- interdependence in security matters. Among the er, the data from available surveys suggest that factors of change to have influenced the recent the majority view among the Moroccan public relative reorientation of foreign policy towards does not support the disengagement from the the EU, rational choice and the tensions related EU conveyed in recent official discourse. A broad to Morocco’s national identity appear to have car- majority of those surveyed still hold the positive ried considerably more weight than global struc- view of the EU customary in the surveys carried tural changes. The latter have included material out in the country for years, which also extends factors and factors related to international po- to the EU’s relations with Morocco and its ef- litical economy such as the global economic and fects on the stability of Morocco (Charts 7 and 8, financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Eurozone crisis Table 3). and the specific crisis of the southern EU countries, as well as the redistribution of global power derived from the economic rise of the emerging Conclusions powers, especially China. This has combined, on a political-institutional level, with the crisis of the The conclusion one might draw from the global European integration project and, in normative comparison of the samples of discourse and eco- terms, with the global context of the crisis of the nomic data analysed in the previous sections is Western liberal international order.

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Chart 7. Moroccan perceptions of the EU, 2017

Do you have a positive, neutral How would you describe relations or negative image of the EU? between the EU and your country?

6 % 7 % 3 % 5 % 1 %

19 %

72 %

87 %

Good The EU does not have any relation with our country Bad Positive Neutral Negative Don’t know Don’t know

Source: EU Neighbours, Morocco Opinion Poll 2017.

Chart 8. Perceptions on effects of other countries on the stability of Morocco

Israel 10,5 % –65,4 %

USA 49,9 % –37,5 %

Iran 11,9 % –37,0 %

EU 64,3 % –20,8 %

Russia 25,4 % –18,4 %

China 33,8 % –18,2 %

Arab League 50,5 % –14,7 %

Turkey 42,1% –8,2 %

Factor of stability Factor of instability

Source: ArabTrans.

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Table 3. Moroccan perceptions of the EU, 2012-2014 (%)

Spring 2012 Autumn 2012 Spring 2013 Autumn 2013 Spring 2014 Positive 54 69 59 76 77 Neutral 26 20 22 14 15 Negative 8 4 10 3 1 Do not know 12 7 9 7 7

Source: Fernández-Molina (2016, 98), with data from the EU Neighbourhood Barometers.

On the part of Morocco, the logic of rational and recognition on the part of the EU –because choice has operated against a backdrop of di- of competition from Tunisia as of 2011—and the minishing effectiveness of the conditionality conflict of roles between that of the ‘model stu- that in theory characterises the ENP. The incen- dent of the EU’ and the ‘champion of national tives related to differentiation lost their effect territorial integrity’ that the CJEU rulings have for the country as of 2011, when the authorities stirred. in Rabat began to complain of being treated un- Is Morocco’s dissociated de-Europeanisation fairly in the ENP progress reports and obtaining an unsolvable dilemma? Not necessarily. The ‘less for more’ from the EU in comparison with emerging contradiction between normative dis- other states of the region where there had been engagement and economic dependence plus regime changes. Other possible incentives that security interdependence does not make future could motivate Morocco to carry out some of the EU-Morocco relations unviable. What it does is political and economic reforms desired by the make Moroccan foreign policy towards the EU EU, such as visa facilitation or a comprehensive more like that of other countries such as Alge- liberalisation of agricultural trade, are virtually ria or Egypt, refocusing it on rational choice and unthinkable in the current European political and overshadowing the identity and normative di- economic climate. mension that has been its distinguishing feature Meanwhile, the negative conditionality of the throughout the postcolonial period. EU, which has always been conspicuously absent, has been more exposed than ever in three recent critical moments: the 20 February Move- References ment protests and the constitutional reform of 2011; the favourable outcome for Morocco of Aghrout, A.: From Preferential Status to Partner- the bilateral crisis with France of legal origin ship: The Euro-Maghreb Relationship, Pal- (the Hammouchi affair) of 2014-2016; and the re- grave, New York, 2000. sponse to the new peripheral protests and social Aydın-Düzgit, S., and Kaliber, A.: ‘Encounters with movements, such as the Hirak of the Rif, starting Europe in an Era of Domestic and Internation- in 2016. Taken to the field of national territorial al Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Can- integrity, the logic of rational choice explains Mo- didate Country?’, South European Society and rocco’s turning to tactical issue linkage vis-à-vis Politics, vol. 21, n.º 1, 2016, pp. 1-14. the EU over the crisis triggered by the CJEU judg- Colombo, S., and Voltolini, B.: ‘“Business as Usual” ments on the inclusion of Western Sahara in the in EU Democracy Promotion towards Moroc- EU-Morocco economic cooperation agreements. co? Assessing the Limits of the EU’s Approach Apart from rational choice, Morocco’s change of towards the Mediterranean after the Arab Up- attitude is also down to factors related to iden- risings’, L’Europe en Formation, n.º 371, 2014, tity, such as frustration in the search for status pp. 41-57.

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El Qadim, N.: Le gouvernement asymétrique des hood Policy towards Morocco’, Mediterranean migrations: Maroc/Maroc/Union européenne, Politics, vol. 21, n.º 3, 2016, pp. 343-363. Dalloz, Paris, 2015. Hernando de Larramendi, M., and Tomé-Alon- Fernández-Molina, I.: ‘EU and EU Member States’ so, B.: ‘The Return of Morocco to the African Responses to the Arab Spring’, Political Change Union’, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017, in the Middle East and North Africa, Edinburgh Barcelona: IEMed, Barcelona, 2017, pp. 229- University Press, Edinburgh, 2017, pp. 301-325. 232. Fernández-Molina, I.: ‘The EU, the ENP and the Mouhib, L.: ‘EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia Western Sahara Conflict: Executive Continu- and Morocco: Between Contextual Changes ity and Parliamentary Detours’, The Revised and Structural Continuity’, Mediterranean European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity Politics, vol. 19, n.º 3, 2014, pp. 351-372. and Change in EU Foreign Policy, Palgrave Tsourapas, G.: ‘How Migration Deals Lead to Macmillan, New York, 2017, pp. 219-238. Refugee Commodification’, Refugees Deep- Fernández-Molina, I.: ‘The European Neighbour- ly, 13 February 2019. Available at: https:// hood Policy and EU-Maghreb Relations’, The www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/communi- Routledge Handbook on the European Neigh- ty/2019/02/13/how-migration-deals-lead-to- bourhood Policy. Oxon/New York: Routledge, refugee-commodification. Oxon, New York, 2018, pp. 324-335. White, G.: Comparative Political Economy of Tu- Fernández-Molina, I.: Moroccan Foreign Policy nisia and Morocco: On the Outside of Europe under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014, Routledge, Looking in, State University of New York Press, Oxon, New York, 2016. New York, 2001. Großklaus, M., and Remmert, D.: ‘Political Steering: How the EU Employs Power in its Neighbour-

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Elsa Aimé González and Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal

Africa has attracted growing interest from numer- omitting the role that African governments and ous international players since the beginning of societies are already playing in this process. the 21st century, not only from the BRICS, but also These concepts, such as ‘emerging’ or ‘rising’, from many states in the Middle East, including the and the recommendations offered, are examples Gulf countries and Turkey. The economic growth of how Western ideas about Africa are still based experienced by various countries on the continent, around an understanding of the processes taking as well as the growing presence of new partners, place on the continent in terms of backwardness, has generated interest and concern in the former treating the West as the benchmark by which to colonial metropoles, other Western states, and in- measure progress in Africa as a whole, overlook- ternational financial institutions. Armed conflict ing its diversity and complexity. Thus, although in some areas, migration, and population growth the intention is to abandon Afro-pessimistic nar- have also brought increasing attention to Africa. ratives that persisted until the end of the Cold Spain is no stranger to this trend, as the Spanish War, as well as the clichés of an Africa in agony government’s approval of its third ‘Africa Plan’ (cover of Time on 7 September 1992) or without demonstrates. After seven years without any spe- hope (cover of The Economist on 11 May 2000), cific plan concerning the continent, Spain shows and replace it with an Afro-optimistic narrative, signs of wanting to consolidate and expand its re- many analysts still view Africa through the lens lations with Africa. Undoubtedly, if Spain wants not of its inequality, but of its inferiority. to strengthen these links, it is necessary to have The authors who have contributed to this greater knowledge and a better understanding of report offer a critique of these narratives and what occurs in Africa. This is precisely the aim of distance themselves from this type of binary the Africa Report 2019. thinking. What every chapter in this report re- For twenty years, the front pages of various veals is the deep interconnection, both spatial English language magazines have spoken of an and temporal, of the processes currently un- ‘emerging’ or ‘rising’ Africa (cover of Time on 30 derway in Africa; the ties that exist, not only be- March 1998 and 3 December 2012 and The Econ- tween the different regions of the continent, but omist on 3 December 2011), and of a continent also between the continent and other regions of with ‘aspirations’ (cover of The Economist on 2 the planet; and the clear link between today’s March 2013). In its edition on 7 March 2019, The challenges and processes and historical trajec- Economist spoke of the new scramble for Africa tories. Hence the title of this report: Cross-border – with all the colonial connotations this expres- dynamics in a globalised context. And this also sion carries – and unabashedly offered a series of explains why we discuss both North Africa and recommendations on how Africans can benefit, sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, although the third

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‘Africa Plan’ focuses on the latter, we believe it unmet after the Arab Spring, point to an uncertain is necessary and enriching to consider Africa in future for countries that are extremely different its entirety. from each other, but increasingly aware of their The countless interconnections between the interdependence. countries, societies, and communities in the The stability of the mentioned regions contin- Maghreb and those in Sub-Saharan Africa have ues to be one of the top priorities – if not obses- enabled the countries on the continent to set sions– on the international agenda. This concept about ridding themselves of the unfair ‘subaltern’ of stability – and stabilisation – is elusive, how- image, and to develop mechanisms to achieve ever, which makes the selection of strategies and greater autonomy as true postcolonial powers. mechanisms difficult. It is upheld as a common These reconfigurations are an example of how goal of various actors, but it represents divergent the centres of gravity in the region are shifting. interests among them, at the local, national, re- Both shores of the Mediterranean have been gional and international level. It is essential to exposed to the same currents for centuries, dur- devise new goals that allow us to move beyond ing which the respective societies have been the securitisation of Spanish and European poli- taking shape, without ever losing sight of their cies towards the continent, separate security more or less immediate neighbours. Today, mu- goals from development goals, and design and tual ties and a shared future are an established implement more effective policies adapted to reality, and for this reason, an in-depth analysis of the needs of our African partners. The European the current situation in the Maghreb is required. Union (EU) cannot afford to keep exporting out- North Africa is gaining increasing prominence, of- dated models that do not consider the local con- ten by its own will, but sometimes without pursu- text or local dynamics. ing that goal, as has occurred in recent years with Understanding how these dynamics – beyond the so-called refugee crisis, the now familiar issue their specificities – connect the different regions of migratory flows, and sporadic instability on a of the continent and the world is essential if we southern shore that Europe – and Spain – thought wish to establish mutually beneficial relations was relatively stable. The reaction on the streets with African societies. Africa does not occupy of Algeria to the decision of its aging president to a subordinate place in international relations, seek re-election for a fifth term, and the surprise since life in the Global North depends deeply on and concern that so many have expressed, is a the Global South, and influences it considerably. clear example of the worrying gulf between the This is one of the central elements of the debate. image of a country and its internal realities. The interest shown by the Spanish state and the The inclusion in this report of the two regions EU towards our southern neighbours must be –sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa– into which based on respect and the acknowledgment of our the continent is usually divided, underlines the equality, and African countries and institutions fact that these are not separate, isolated realities. such as the African Union must be recognised as In numerous areas, there are more and more con- equal partners with their own needs, interests, nections between countries in the Maghreb and and agendas. sub-Saharan Africa. This is true of integration Although surprising, we continue to witness processes, the increasing of trade and investment clear manifestations of racism in Spain and Eu- flows, religious and cultural diplomacy, and the rope, which fully justifies mentioning and defend- future of the Sahel. Cross-border trends and reali- ing the importance of equality as a foundational ties, such as (among many others) urbanisation, value of our society. Achieving more equal societ- ICT and its multidimensional effects on societies ies requires both greater and better knowledge still in the process of (different levels) of devel- and education on the part of Spanish society con- opment, and particularly the demands that went cerning African societies, and more research that

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helps us to better understand the political and migratory flows. It is essential to develop poli- economic reality of the continent. It also requires cies that address the opening of safe routes and a closer and more constant exchange between formal channels for labour migration and for decision-making bodies and experts on the con- refugees, and to promote the necessary mea- tinent. These issues – education, research, and sures on the continent to facilitate the sustain- exchange – are essential prerequisites for achiev- able return of forcibly displaced persons. At the ing more coherence in Spanish and EU policies same time, transit and host countries must not be on Africa. provided with any incentive to engage in rentier The different versions of the European Neigh- behaviour, treating migrants like merchandise. bourhood Policy (ENP) that the EU has put to- A change of perspective would eliminate unnec- gether are the best example of the asymmetric, essary tensions generated by the application of and certainly elitist, approach that was adopted repressive approaches characteristic of European from the outset, not to mention the discrepan- migration policy, and would make it possible to cies between the preferences of certain mem- consider the socio-economic, environmental, ber states and the supranational policies that and demographic realities of both parties from mark the EU’s foreign policy. It is vital to articu- a medium- to long-term perspective, building a late an agenda, both multilateral and bilateral, strong Euro-African partnership based on true that avoids terms such as ‘Europeanisation’ and horizontal cooperation for mutual benefit. ‘convergence’, and considers the real needs of Furthermore, on the economic side, it is nec- coastal partners. The positive conditionality of essary to crack down on tax havens and illicit more for more has clearly been insufficient and financial flows, with greater control of receiving short-sighted: the EU must be able to articulate banks and more accountability, the goal being to incentives – such as a more generous visa policy stop the draining of Africa’s wealth. The experi- – that affect all layers of society and contribute to ence over the past decades illustrates the need to all-inclusive socio-economic development. adopt regulations forcing companies to report on Any reform of the ENP should also aim to the social, environmental, and human rights im- make policies in the southern countries sustain- pact of their activities, with monitoring by inter- able, without worsening the imbalances within national experts and the affected communities, these societies, and which are therefore inclusive and, in the case of non-compliance, to establish – in both social and territorial terms – and far re- where responsibility lies. This means strength- moved from the neoliberal paradigm of austerity ening both the monitoring and inspection ca- and the eroding role of the state. Faced with some pabilities of independent authorities, and the transnational phenomena, it will be necessary to competent courts specialised in the fight against rethink existing multilateral mechanisms, such as corruption and serious human rights violations the Union for the Mediterranean. On other occa- committed by national companies. sions, Spain and the EU will need to promote or Along with the reinforcement of prescriptive reinforce the prescriptive frameworks required to frameworks, the role played by the national ju- bring about a strong, coherent, and fair foreign risdictions of European states is crucial in order policy. In this sense, the EU must recover its role that both public and private actors scrupulously as a normative power, and become a bastion of respect legal frameworks. This may require, for respect for international law and the promotion example, fighting against embezzlement by po- of human rights, without forgetting uncomfort- litical leaders and economic elites, or, in contexts able, but not less important, issues such as West- of conflict, demanding that those implicated in ern Sahara. the violence respect the Geneva Convention and An area in which this would be vital, and which its Optional Protocols. In addition, Spain can play requires urgent attention, is the management of a key role in the implementation of existing mea-

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sures, such as the Extractive Industries Transpar- trial policy, which means substantial public and ency Initiative. private investment in production sectors and in- Spain’s foreign policy should not be guided frastructures. solely by goals such as economic growth, secu- European companies, and Spanish companies rity, and the fight against migration, but should in particular, can play a key role in the develop- rather be aligned with fundamental principles ment of the continent, in its industrialisation, such as the promotion of good governance and in the construction of infrastructures, and in its human rights, and be committed to transpar- economic diversification. However, their growing ency and accountability. In other words, Spain presence must have a positive social impact, and must pursue a foreign policy that contributes to contribute to, among other things, improving em- the development of the continent, employing a ployability and salaries, balanced urban growth, human rights-based approach that prioritises and respect for the environment. To this end, the African societies and social justice, and paying monitoring and analysis of Spanish companies’ special attention to the gender dimension of the business activities would be necessary, a role goals pursued, and to the measures adopted to that could be performed by the Economic and this end. Commercial Offices of Spain Abroad, collecting This goal is clearly a priority that should guide and systematising the information, and making it the implementation of the new ‘Africa Plan’, the available to the public through the ICEX website. development and reform of the ENP Action Plans, The adaptation of Spanish business activities to and any other strategies concerning the con- the continent could also be encouraged via the tinent. As several chapters in this report make Sustainable Development Goals. This recommen- clear – addressing, for example, issues related to dation is based on the idea that economic growth armed conflict, migration, and the exploitation does not in itself guarantee the redistribution of of natural resources – international public and wealth and the reduction of inequalities. private actors have a direct impact on the devel- If the effort required to make changes in the opment of these phenomena. For this reason, it production structure, such as those promoted is necessary, for example, that European states through the AfCFTA, falls on the most impover- refrain from providing any type of military sup- ished sectors, the real gains achieved through port to countries that violate human rights, which the economic transformation of the continent means, more specifically, taking appropriate will be limited. In this regard, and beyond the measures to prevent any country with an active economic integration of Africa, Spanish and Eu- armed conflict from accessing the international ropean foreign policy can also contribute to the arms market in order to stop the violence. strengthening of the continent’s economies and In economic terms, there is clear potential for the protection of the environment by fostering economic growth and the development of agree- local production and trade, both in Africa and in ments such as the African Continental Free Trade Europe. Area (AfCFTA). The economic integration of the In the field of extractive industries, Spain can continent is a priority for African states, which contribute to the promotion of sustainable en- would result in a substantive change to the ex- ergy security and invest in renewable energies on isting economic structures that are still heavily the African continent, due to the high technologi- influenced by the colonial past. The transforma- cal level of several Spanish companies in the solar tive potential of the AfCFTA is not limited to the and wind energy sectors. Redistributive efforts expansion of trade; rather, it stems from the very with a view to true sustainability (energetic, eco- vision of long-term structural change that is part nomic, human) – currently absent in any of the of the African Union’s Agenda 2063. However, the cases studied – will also be vital in this field. A success of the AfCFTA depends on a real indus- joint strategy by the various Spanish ministries is

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required to promote this type of investment, and in the political structures of their countries or in to develop electricity supply projects that benefit traditional social organisations such as unions. the most impoverished communities. The reality on the ground shows how impor- Greater sustainability, greater redistribution, tant it is to address the demands of the societ- and greater transparency are needed in order to ies themselves. The deterioration of conditions move towards greater social justice. This cause and structures preceding the uprisings that be- must be central to Spanish and European policy gan in 2011, and that have spread throughout towards the continent, especially because these the continent, explains the continuation – and goals are not incompatible with strengthening sometimes the escalation – of social protest. The the role of Spain and the EU in the world; in fact, disconnection between regimes and populations the opposite is true. Placing social justice at the is growing, both in terms of a resurgence of au- centre of foreign policy would mean support- thoritarian tendencies – or an equally pernicious ing the demands of African societies and their political stagnation –, and the ever-present so- governments, something equally or even more cio-economic demands that the regimes ignore important if we consider population growth on (and often repress), as well as the systematic and the continent, and increasingly widespread dis- barefaced violations of human rights, such as the satisfaction and disaffection. practice of push-backs. To this must be added To the extent possible, a bottom-up approach the disgraceful instrumentalisation of religious should be favoured, granting a prominent role as and ethnic identities – misnamed ‘sectarianism’ interlocutors to different actors of civil society, –, which only deepens fear (and creates antago- sometimes the only ones able to promote reforms nisms where none existed) in order to progres- that respect human rights and the principle of so- sively erode the concepts of individual rights, cial justice. It is therefore imperative to keep rais- citizenship, and res publica. ing our voice against any regression of the rule of Urban youth are a significant social force in law or fundamental freedoms, beyond short-term most African countries, and they demand better considerations of realpolitik, and to be aware of governance. Thus, they are essential partners for our importance as partners. An added difficulty, improving democratic quality. A major strength especially with respect to North Africa, is the is that their transformative power arises from lo- presence of opposition groups that are often ex- cal social structures, without being imposed by tremely diffuse and lack any clear leadership, a external influences, and with a bottom-up ap- consequence of years of repression. It is neces- proach that favours the sustainability of chang- sary to mention here the key role that Spanish es achieved. This implies that the forms, criteria, civil society as a whole – but more specifically, and mechanisms for relating to and collaborating some of its key organisations and sectors such as with these social movements must be flexible in the Afro-descendent and Maghrebi populations order to reinforce their transformative potential. – can play in strengthening ties and exchanges These actors do not necessarily reproduce the between Spain and Africa, and in building more formal structures of conventional organisations, just and equal societies. forcing partners or institutions that seek their As described in several chapters of the re- collaboration to approach relations in a creative port, there is a social dynamism on the African manner. continent that demands this type of reaching Applied to the area of conflict resolution, ad- out, and is very critical of the support that some dressing the demands and needs of societies leaders receive from abroad. These new social entails, for example, contributing to the opening movements have the capacity for mobilisation, of inclusive peace processes based on political and they represent the opinions and concerns dialogue, using diplomacy as an important tool of groups of people that are underrepresented for resolving conflicts. This must go hand in hand

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with the participation of third party mediators to to achieve the goal of 0.7% of GNP dedicated to avoid stalemates and ensure that participation Official Development Assistance (ODA), and con- in peace processes (ongoing or future) does not tribute significantly to the implementation of the fall exclusively (or mainly) on representatives of Sustainable Development Goals. To ensure the the government and rebels, but includes civil so- effectiveness of ODA and avoid negative impacts, ciety representatives from the country or region it must be based on the needs identified by the affected by the violence. In this regard, it is im- beneficiaries themselves, and be separated from portant to stress that this inclusive process must goals (such as migration control or business in- guarantee the participation of women, making terests) that divert funds and distort the aims of effective the implementation of the UN’s women, development policy by subordinating them to peace, and security agenda (Resolution 1325). other priorities. Reneging on this commitment In cases of armed conflict – in its different forms can cause negative effects in the medium to long and manifestations – such as that in Libya or the term, both in the partner countries on the African Sahel, there will be no demobilisation of jihadist- continent, and in Euro-African relations them- inspired groups or militias unless their members selves, affected by the European insistence on – particularly their young members – are aware setting goals that are unrealistic and unaccept- that there are alternative ways to earn a decent able for African states. living. Access to these alternatives, the solutions It is important to stress that these recom- that seek to put an end to the population’s deep mendations must be implemented both directly dissatisfaction, is both urgent and critical. The Sa- on the continent through our bilateral relations, hel provides a clear example of the need to move and within the framework of European policies. beyond an overly ‘securitised’ framework and em- Furthermore, they are policies that need to be brace the idea of the construction and legitimacy put into practice not only in collaboration with of the state – a kind of renewed social contract African governments and institutions, but also in – that addresses the structural causes – a non- conjunction with the respective civil societies. In inclusive society, insufficient good governance, summary, we offer a reflection on the intercon- socio-economic inequalities, insufficient provi- nections and mutual dependence that exist be- sion of basic services – of any type of instability. tween Spain, Europe, and Africa, and we make In addition, Spain must make a firm com- proposals for strengthening these ties to the mu- mitment in terms of development cooperation tual benefit of all.

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Elsa Aimé González between the academic sphere and society, lectur- Coordinator of the Sub-Saharan Africa Panel of ing in postgraduate programmes and publishing the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy (OPEX) both in academic journals and mainstream meat Fundación Alternativas. International Rela- dia. Moreover, he has participated as consultant tions Lecturer at Comillas Pontifical University for projects that link not-for-profit work with dig- and researcher of the Group of African Studies ital activism and local cyber-activists from par- at Autonomous University of Madrid (GEA-UAM). ticular African communities. He is cofounder of PhD in International Relations and African Stud- Wiriko, an association that spreads awareness on ies; BA in History, both at UAM. Has previously contemporary cultural and artistic expressions worked as consultant in the third sector and as from the African continent. secretary of the Group of African Studies, coor- dinating research, teaching and consultancies Artur Colom Jaén activities. Her research is linked to International PhD in Economics at University of Barcelona, lec- Relations and African studies, as much from a turer at the department of Applied Economics at historical perspective as on current issues, and University of Valencia. Member of both the Group centered more specifically on the study of Ethio- of African Studies of Madrid and the Center for pia and the Horn of Africa. African Studies of Barcelona, he teaches regu- larly in masters programs related to economic Carlos Bajo Erro development and African studies (at Autono- Journalist specialized in the use of information mous University of Madrid, University of Valencia and communication technologies (ICT) by so- and Blanquerna University-Ramon Llull in Bar- cial movements in Africa. BA in Journalism at celona). His research is focused on the political University of Navarra; PgD in Peace and Conflict economy of development in Africa, from a broad Communication at Autonomous University of point of view, with particular interest in natural Barcelona, and a MAS in Culture and Develop- resources and South-South cooperation on the ment in Africa at Rovira i Virgili University. He continent. He has undertaken field work in Chad combines his work as a journalist in different and Senegal, and research at the School of Orien- media (such as El País, Mundo Negro or El Salto) tal and African Studies (London), Beijing Univer- with his work in communication for social orga- sity and Groupe pour l’Étude et l’Enseignment de nizations and his research on the use of ICTs as la Population (Senegal). Finally, he has published a tool for social transformation in Africa. He has in journals such as the Journal of Modern African coauthored the award-winning book ‘Redes so- Studies, the European Journal of Development ciales para el cambio en África’ (Social networks Research and the Canadian Journal of Develop- for change in Africa). His aim is to build bridges ment Studies.

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Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal Lorenzo Gabrielli Coordinator of the Middle East and Maghreb PhD in Political Science at LAM-Sciences Po Bor- Panel for the Observatory of Spanish Foreign deaux (France), he is senior researcher at GRITIM- Policy (OPEX) at Fundación Alternativas. She UPF, associate researcher at the Centre Emile was a Researcher and Programme Coordinator Durkheim Sciences Po Bordeaux and lecturer at at the U.S./Middle East Project (London) and Pompeu Fabra University, Faculty of Political Sci- previously worked, amongst others, as a foreign ence. He has recently been a visiting researcher policy advisor and at the European Delegation at the United Nations University – Institute on to the Arab Republic of Egypt and the European Globalization, Culture and Mobility (UNU-GCM) Parliament. She is a member of the International and senior visiting researcher at the European Mediterranean Studies Workshop (TEIM), at the Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). His re- Autonomous University of Madrid. Her research search areas cover, among others issues, multi- focuses mainly on Gulf and Mediterranean affairs level governance of international migration in the and the Middle East Peace Process, with a partic- Euro-African area, the geopolitics of mobility in ular focus on democratic transitions and political the Mediterranean, borders and border creation, geography. as well as the external dimension of European migratory policies and the nexus between migration Irene Fernández-Molina and development. He has participated in various Lecturer in International Relations at the Uni- European research projects (Vakeripen, Diaspo- versity of Exeter. Her research deals with the raLink, INTERACT, GARNET, Medimurs, MI-PMUE) international relations of the Global South, and is a reviewer for several journals specialized subalternity and southern agency, foreign poli- in the social sciences. cies of dependent and/or authoritarian states, conflicts (frozen conflicts, contested/unrecog- Jesús García-Luengos nised states) and constructivism (international Researcher at the Group of African Studies at UAM socialisation, recognition), with a regional focus (GEA-UAM), cofounder of the Center for Research on North Africa, as well as EU foreign policy and on Security and Transnational Governance and Euro-Mediterranean relations. Additionally, she freelance consultant. His specialization lies at the is the programme coordinator of the MA Politics crossroads of the areas of human rights, civil so- and International Relations of the Middle East at ciety, rule of law and institutional reinforcement. the University of Exeter and a visiting professor He has undertaken several research projects on at the College of Europe, Bruges campus. She the exploitation of natural resources in Sub-Sa- was previously a research fellow at the Europe- haran Africa and has evaluated several interna- an Neighbourhood Policy Chair (Natolin campus, tional development aid programs in more than Warsaw), a Schuman fellow at the Directorate twenty African countries, working for the Euro- General for External Policies of the European Par- pean Union and other international organizations liament (Brussels) and a PhD research fellow at (IOM, ILO, UNDP, UNODC) and non-governmental Complutense University of Madrid. Her research organizations, as well as national agencies for de- has been published in journals such as Review of velopment aid (AECID, GIZ). International Studies, International Political Soci- ology and Mediterranean Politics. Furthermore, Bosco Govantes she has authored a book titled Moroccan Foreign Lecturer in Political Science at Universidad Pablo Policy under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014 (Routledge, de Olavide de Sevilla, specializing in Northern 2016) and has coedited the volume Global, Re- Africa and Euro-Mediterranean relations. He has gional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s published in academic journals such as The Brit- Protracted Decolonisation (Palgrave, 2017). ish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Revista de

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Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos, Real In- lies at the intersection of peace and conflict stud- stituto Elcano and UNISCI. His papers have been ies, African studies and historical sociology. She presented in dozens of national and international is the author of Everyday Resistance, Peacebuild- conferences, including BRISMES and WOCMES. ing and State-Making and coeditor of Recenter- He is currently a member of the research proj- ing Africa in International Relations. Currently, her ect ‘Crises and processes of regional change in research is centered on the growing militarization Northern Africa: Implications for Spain’. Addition- of peace-building processes and changes in Eu- ally, in his condition as expert in Tunisian affairs, ropean peace-building policies. he is a member of the Forum for Research on the Arab and Islamic World (FIMAM), of the Study Mbuyi Kabunda Badi Group on Arab and Muslim Societies (GRESAM) PhD in Political Science at Complutense Uni- and the Political and Electoral Observatory of the versity of Madrid, BA in Political Science and In- Arab and Muslim World (OPEMAM). ternational Relations at Lubumbashi University (Democratic Republic of the Congo). Researcher Miguel Hernando de Larramendi of the Group of African Studies at Autonomous Professor at Castilla-La Mancha University, University of Madrid (GEA-UAM), he is honorary where he leads the Study Group on Arab and lecturer at UAM, where he lectures for the masters Muslim Societies (GRESAM). His research fo- in International Relations and African Studies. Ad- cuses on the analysis of political systems in the ditionally, since 2015 he is the president of the Maghreb, on the study of these countries’ for- Spanish Association of Africanists. He has pub- eign relations, as well as the analysis of Spain’s lished more than a hundred articles in specialized foreign policy towards the Mediterranean and journals and collective works. Among his publica- the Arab World. He has authored more than a tions, worth highlighting are Africa and coopera- hundred articles and journals on these matters, tion with the South from the South (2011), Africa in and among his most prominent publications motion: internal and external migrations (2012, as are: Mohamed VI. Regime and social change in coordinator), Myths and realities of Sub-Saharan Morocco (with Thierry Desrues, 2011); Spain’s for- Africa, with Antonio Santamaría (2009), and Hu- eign policy in the Maghreb: actors and interests man Rights in Africa (2000). (with Aurelia Mañé, 2009) and Morocco’s foreign policy (1997, translated to Arabic in 2005). His Diego López Garrido most recent works include ‘Doomed Regional- Executive vice-president of Fundación Alternati- ism in a Redrawn Maghreb? The Changing Shape vas and president of its Council of European Af- of the Rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in fairs. Economist, professor of Constitutional Law the Post-2011 Era’, published in The Journal of and legal adviser to the Spanish legislative cham- North African Studies. bers. Secretary of State to the European Union between April 2008 and December 2011, coordi- Marta Iñiguez de Heredia nated in 2010 the Spanish presidency of the EU. PhD in International Relations at the London Spokesman of the Socialist Group in Congress School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), (2006-2008) and has served six terms as repre- and lecturer at Autonomous University of Madrid sentative in Congress. Participated in the conven- (UAM). Previously, she was a Marie Sklodowska- tion that elaborated the European Constitutional Curie fellow at the Institute for International Treaty, the precursor of the Lisbon Treaty, repre- Studies of Barcelona (IBEI) and taught at the uni- senting Spain’s legislative chambers (2002-2003). versities of Cambridge, LSE, Queen Mary (Lon- He has written numerous books on human rights, don), Neoma Business School (France), Deakin economics, politics, contemporary history and (Australia) and La Trobe (Australia). Her research European law. Frequent collaborator of El País.

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Among his most recent publications are: The Ice Gema Serón Aires Age. Bailing out the Welfare State in the Era of Researcher at the Group of African Studies - Au- Austerity (London Publishing Partnership, 2015) tonomous University of Madrid (GEA-UAM). MAS and Tax Havens: Twenty Proposals to end the great in International Relations and African Studies evasion (La Catarata, 2016). (UAM); BA in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Complutense University of Madrid); and PdGs in Ivan Navarro Milián Social Economy Organizations Management and BA in Sociology, MAS in International Relations in Rural Development Management (University of and African Studies (UAM), and PhD candidate Zaragoza). She has worked as a consultant for de- at the same program, researching the dynamics velopment aid projects and in the field of social of armed political violence in Uganda. Addition- intervention (tackling African migration, among ally, has a PgD in Community Development at other issues). Her main research areas are inter- Autonomous University of Queretaro (Mexico). national development cooperation (especially Researcher on armed conflict and peace-building Spain-Africa and EU-Africa cooperation), regional at the Group of African Studies at Autonomous integration, migration trends in and from Africa, University of Madrid (GEA-UAM) and the School human security and other topics related to an- of Culture and Peace at Autonomous University thropology and development. Her regional area of Barcelona (ECP-UAB). Member of Africaye and of specialization is Western Africa-Sahel. the PolePole Association. Laurence Thieux David Nievas Bullejos Professor at Complutense University of Madrid, spe- Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Studies at Autono- cializes in Arab and Islamic studies. Ph.D. in Inter- mous University of Madrid, where he previously national Mediterranean Studies at UAM, wrote her obtained his BA in Arabic philology and a mas- thesis on ‘The Algerian Civil War and its impact on the ter’s degree in Contemporary Arab and Islamic foreign policy of France and the United States (1991- Studies. Thanks to the predoctoral FPU contract 1999)’. She is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Study (Spanish Ministry of Education) he has been Group on Arab and Muslim Societies (GRESAM) and on doctoral stays at the African Studies Center the International Mediterranean Studies Workshop (Leiden, Netherlands) and the Institute of African (TEIM). Over the last years she has directed, coordi- Studies (Bayreuth, Germany). He is a member of nated and implemented various research projects the International Mediterranean Studies Work- on civil society in the MENA region, with a special shop (TEIM), where he is in charge of research on emphasis on the analysis of social movements and the Sahel region. He is also a member of the Po- civil society organizations. She has authored several litical and Electoral Observatory of the Arab and reports, papers and books, such as Islamism and de- Muslim World (OPEMAM). His main research areas mocracy in Algeria: United States and France facing are Islam and political participation, Islamic re- the 90’s conflict(2008) and has coordinated the pub- formism and violent extremism in Mali and the lication Civil Society and Transitions in Northern Africa Sahel. for the Euromed Civil Forum.

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ABC: Agência Brasileira de Cooperação CJEU: Court of Justice of the EU ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific CJTF-HOA: Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of ADF: Allied Democratic Forces Africa AEC: African Economic Community COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and South- AfCFTA: African Continental Free Trade Area ern Africa AfDB: African Development Bank CSDP: EU Common Security and Defence Policy AFISMA: African-led International Support Mis- DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade sion in Mali Agreement AFRICOM: United States Africa Command DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act EAC: East African Community AIDA: Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African ALBA: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de States Nuestra América ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African ALECA: Accord de Libre Échange Complet et Ap- States profondi EEC: European Economic Community AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia EITI: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative AMU: Arab Maghreb Union EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership AMV: Africa Mining Vision ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument APF: African Peace Facility ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership AQIM: Al-Qaeda network in the Islamic Maghreb Instrument ASF: African Standby Force EU NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force AU RCI-LRA: African Union Regional Co-opera- EUBAM: EU Border Assistance Mission tion Initiative for the elimination of the Lord’s EUCAP: European Union Capacity Building Mission Resistance Army EUCOM: United States European Command AU: African Union EUTF: European Union Emergency Trust Fund for BIAT: Boosting Intra-African Trade Africa BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa EUTM: European Union Training Mission CAMM: Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation CAR: Central African Republic FDI: Foreign Direct Investment CBSD: Capacity Building for Security and Development FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States FRELIMO: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique CEMAC: Communauté Économique et Monétaire FRONTEX: European Border and Coast Guard de l’Afrique Centrale Agency

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FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation ODA: Official Development Assistance GAMM: Global Approach to Migration Manage- OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation ment and Development GAR-SI Sahel: Groupes d’Action Rapides – Surev- PAA: Purchase from Africans for Africa eillance et Intervention au Sahel PIDA: Program Infrastructure Development for GATT: General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade Africa GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council PJD: Parti de la Justice et du Développement GDP: Gross Domestic Product PSC: Peace and Security Council GNA: Government of National Accord (Lybia) RCEP: Regional Comprehensive Economic Part- GNC: General National Congress (Lybia) nership GSIm: Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims RECs: Regional Economic Communities GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le RENAMO: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana Combat RNI: Rassemblement National des Indépendants HDI: Human Development Index SACD: Southern African Development Community HOA: Horn of Africa SACU: Southern African Customs Union IcSP: Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace SADC: Southern African Development Community ICT: Information and Communications Technology SADPA: South African Development Partnership IFF: Illicit financial flows Agency IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop- SADR: Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic ment SPLM-N: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- IIAG: Ibrahim Index of African Governance North IMF: International Monetary Fund SPRING: Support to Partnership, Reforms and IOM: International Organization for Migration Inclusive Growth ISGS: Islamic State in the Great Sahara TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria TSCTI: Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership JNIM: Jama’at nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part- LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army nership LTDH: Tunisian Human Rights League UEMOA: Union Économique et Monetaire de l’Afrique LUCHA: Lutte pour le Changement de l’Ouest MEDA: Mesures d’Accompagnement UGTT: Union Général Tunisienne du Travail MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional In- UN: United Nations tegrated Stabilization Mission in the Central UNAMID: United Nations – African Union Hybrid African Republic Operation in Darfur MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional In- UNDP: United Nations Development Programme tegrated Stabilization Mission in Mali UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force Refugees MONUSCO: Mission de l’Organisation des Na- UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan tions unies pour la stabilisation en République UPEC: Université Populaire de l’Engagement Citoyen Democratique du Congo UTICA: Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Hand- MS: Member States icrafts NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization WAPIS: West African Police Information System NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development WFP: World Food Programme NGO: Non-governmental organization WoMIN: African Gender and Extractive Alliance OAU: Organisation of African Unity WTO: World Trade Organisation

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2019 Cover photography: “Cairo, Egypt”, by Nina R. CC BY 2.0. License

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