http://peb.anu.edu.au/pdf/PEB22-1Standish.pdf PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN Policy dialogue

The dynamics of Papua New Guinea’s democracy: an essay

Bill Standish Visiting Fellow, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University

Some observers have taken the frenetic Papua New Guinea’s modern and participation by Papua New Guinea’s traditional subsistence economies and peoples in national elections and the country’s population concentrations, and in turn they constitutional and smooth changes of prime greatly influence political contestation. The ministers and transfers of governments to dispersed and unevenly developed economy, mean that the country has a robust and viable as well as social divisions rooted in the democracy.1 Yet, asserting their citizens’ rights people’s social structures and cultures, as consumers, many Papua New Guineans heighten developmental inequities and decry the performance of their political and hence political discontent. The effectiveness bureaucratic institutions of governance. For of Papua New Guinea’s political institutions, them, ‘the system’ is not delivering. In much both in the constitutional sense and in of the country the capacities of government recurrent patterns of political behaviour, is institutions are over-stretched: most urban also influenced by its colonial and post- and rural people suffer from collapsing roads, colonial history. Since independence in 1975, and declining schools, health and other basic conflict within the 20 provincial govern- services. The state cannot control crime and ments,2 and between provinces and the the public are intensely cynical about national parliamentarians, has fostered the politicians. As R.J. May argues,’policy-making growth of crude ‘money politics’ and tends to be short-term and capricious, weakened the quality of governance governments have difficulty implementing nationally. This paper does not explore the decisions’ (2001:323). Despite this, the history of provincial governments, although country’s democratic political institutions much of the analysis of the nature of Papua survive, with a frenzy of participation each New Guinea’s national politics presented five-year elections cycle. Once a new govern- below also applies to this level of government. ment is formed political participation declines Papua New Guinea’s political leaders and the country’s well-designed accountability resent any criticism of the quality of their processes often lose effectiveness. democracy, and point to regular, highly Topographic divisions and varied contested elections and the seven smooth ecological and resource bases underlie constitutional changes of government after

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general elections, resignations or the three The survivability of PNG successful votes of no confidence in the democracy 1980s. However, critics have queried the integrity of parliamentary elections, Life has been tough in Papua New Guinea especially after the turbulent and chaotically for much the last 10 years, with high rates of administered elections of June–July 2002 inflation until 2003 and declining govern- (Chin 2003; Gelu 2003; Standish 2003). The ment services; yet, except for the Sandline late Sir Anthony Siaguru, the distinguished mercenary affair of 1997,3 there has been no bureaucrat, lawyer and commentator, mass protest demanding the overthrow of the described those elections as ‘a debacle’, and government. In fact governments appear to said that the country needs to ask ‘whether be almost immune to public opinion, and the the electoral process has been so seriously fickleness, cynicism or forgetfulness of the compromised because of a combination of public allow elected governments to be disenfranchisement and manipulation that unresponsive to public sentiment. In formal democracy in Papua New Guinea has been terms, democratic rule survives in Papua put at risk’ (Post-Courier, 28 June 2003). New Guinea. Some would say it thrives, This essay seeks to suggest some answers despite poor performance and obvious to the deceptively simple question ‘How does institutional frailty. PNG politics tick?’ Here I examine some of Democracy means much more than the the factors and forces within Papua New regular holding of free and fair elections. To Guinea that influence the imperatives of PNG be an effective mode of governance democracy politics. The first of these is the shape of the also requires an executive which is responsible economy and its linkages with the state. The to the legislature, and representatives who next are the fundamental building blocks of are responsive to the electorate; ongoing the Melanesian societies in Papua New participation by citizens is essential. The Guinea. Sir Mekere Morauta (Prime Minister country’s first parliamentary elections were 1999–2002), initiated institutional reforms in held in 1964, 1968 and 1972, well before order to improve the functioning of Papua independence in 1975. Since then there have New Guinea’s constitution and ultimately been seven general elections and six prime the processes of politics and governing that ministers (three of whom have been recycled we call governance. This paper looks at the more than once). The performances of early impacts of these changes to voting successive parliaments and governments systems and the regulation of political have been identified by PNG commentators parties. It then explores whether the logic of as the cause of poor governance (Okole 2002). the PNG parliamentary game has really Often the strongest critics of Papua New changed. I briefly examine whether the vote Guinea’s politics have been government of no confidence mechanism enables the ministers, including the then Prime Minister legislature to control the executive, and the Sir Mekere Morauta (Standish 2000). There anti-corruption agenda. The essay concludes was widespread chaos and malpractice in that the interaction of highly localised the June–July 2002 national elections, which electoral politics and provincial power reduced their value as a test of public structures under the constitution has helped sentiment. Yet we can say that many people preclude the development of a national were able to express their disillusionment political agenda, and ultimately of with the109 parliamentarians. They were responsible and responsive government. challenged by 2,769 opponents seeking to

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replace them; and, in the 103 seats declared, rebadged Peoples Democratic Movement) led over 75 per cent of sitting Members of by Morauta saved the government in May Parliament (MPs) were rejected (Fraenkel 2004 by crossing the floor. Morauta’s 2004). particular concern appeared to be damage After the 2002 election, just as in 1997, which he expected a change of government several PNG leaders said that the electoral would cause to responsible economic system was not working effectively. In 2002 management. both national and foreign observers were unanimous in their concern about what was dubbed the ‘worst election ever’ (Chin 2003; The economy and state capacities Gelu 2003; May 2003), in which the capacity of the state to manage this complex process The intensity of political competition reflects was totally overwhelmed in the national the weakness of both the political and capital and in many rural areas. Some Papua administrative systems, but the logic of PNG New Guinean academics argue that the politics also derives from the structure of the country’s democracy system does not work society and its economic base. The state can and that there is widespread public only deliver what the economic base provides, disillusionment with the entire system of so the economy strongly influences politics elected governments. and government programs. The state in The National Alliance led by Sir Michael Papua New Guinea faces significant fiscal Somare (from 2005 Grand Chief Sir Michael) constraints, and since 1999 any fiscal emerged after the mid 2002 elections as the discipline imposed has lapsed in the run-up largest party, with 19 of the 103 MPs. to elections.5 Until recently, inflation has been According to the new rules, discussed below, high after a decade of deficit financing, real its leader was offered first chance at forming incomes have been declining, and formal a government on the floor of the National sector employment is almost static. People Parliament. Accordingly, Sir Michael, are struggling to make ends meet in urban although damaged by the Pelair scandal in areas. The country’s population has doubled the mid 1980s,4 and replaced as Pangu party since 1975. During that time the bureaucracy leader in May 1988, was re-elected for his and security forces have not grown much fourth term as Prime Minister in August (indeed the Defence Force has been halved 2002. At Kokopo town the coalition members since 2001). Despite claims the public service had gathered to make an ‘irrevocable is ‘bloated’, this relates more to the state’s agreement’ on policies and to stay together. capacity to pay, rather than the public’s need Somare’s government has survived, but with for state services. Public servants are often some changed composition, including four unable to perform their roles for lack of deputy prime ministers. Almost from its operating funds, combined with lack of inception, there were attempts by cabinet training, rather than because their members to replace the Treasurer, Bart designated roles are unnecessary. Philemon, who was resented because of his The allocations of personnel to provinces tight economic management, but he hung on still reflect the levels of development in the in government until April 2006. Within two late colonial era. Less-developed provinces years there were signs that several parties in the Highlands, for example, have had followed what appears to be a proportionately fewer health and teaching Melanesian cultural trait of political fission. staff, and lower per capita expenditures, than The Opposition New Guinea Party (the areas with smaller populations such as the

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New Guinea Islands provinces. Average petroleum sector boom of the early 1990s was economic growth rates over the last three in decline for several years (Baxter 2001). decades have been low, less than population Then with tax incentives from 2004 growth rates, and in real terms budgetary exploration started to increase and the recent resources have declined. Physical infra- global commodities boom has led to structure has been allowed to run down for increased investment, but with major delays lack of maintenance. State services, particularly in the exploitation of natural gas. education, health and agricultural extension, Despite the growth of new sectors in the have declined markedly in most mainland economy development has not been broad- provinces, especially since the revenue based, and engaged many people or shocks and structural adjustments resulting electorates. In particular, potentially from the closure of the Bougainville copper renewable resources have not been well mine in 1989, and the 1994 currency managed, and indeed politicians who can devaluation and subsequent float. serve as gatekeepers to foreign operators Papua New Guinea had begun a have allegedly been bought off on many socioeconomic modernisation revolution in occasions. The logging industry boomed for the colonial era. Since then economic change ten years from the mid 1980s until the Asian has been uneven and spasmodic, leading to economic crises of 1997–98, but was never a disappointed expectations. In the 1960s the large employer of PNG nationals. Corrupt economy was dominated by plantation- relationships have been documented based commodities such as coffee, copra and between parts of the timber industry and cocoa, which employed many people but politicians and officials, with the former which in recent decades have lost value in appearing to influence not only the relevant the world market. Since independence the minister but at times the majority of rural economy has largely been ignored by parliamentarians. The industry has never both provincial and national governments been taxed effectively, despite the advice of (Baxter 2001). Production declined seriously international aid donors and the World Bank, in the 1990s, partly because of poor roads so this potential revenue stream has never and banditry. Similarly, high security costs been realised, and there been profligate loss in towns and cities have inhibited small scale of the resource and environmental damage. private sector foreign investment. Successive Timber exports are currently expanding governments have put all their efforts into again, mainly to feed booming demand from capturing benefits (rent) from the export of China. Interestingly, the industry sees the raw materials—logs, metal ores and need to run a constant public relations hydrocarbons. campaign asserting its contribution to the Large-scale mining had restarted national economy. Several PNG ministers for spectacularly with the Bougainville copper fishing have also been rather loose in issuing and gold mine in the early 1970s, followed fishing licences, and not adhered to the multi- by the Ok Tedi copper mine in 1985, and lateral Pacific Islands fishing regime. Papua Misima, Porgera and Lihir gold mines in the New Guinea’s manufacturing sector is 1990s. Mines are easy to tax and their minimal, sometimes heavily protected with revenues have funded the state for decades, sweetheart monopoly deals such as those for until recently roughly matching the real-term cement and sugar, and the urban economies decline in aid revenues since independence. are essentially confined to service industries Mining has never created large-scale and imported consumer durables and capital employment; however. The minerals and goods.

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Increasingly the political and inability to tax its own population is one sign bureaucratic élites have focussed their of a politically weak state. energies on the readily taxable, big money- State spending is a major driving force earning sectors such as mining, and have in the economy, and individuals seeking concentrated on the distribution of state personal advancement usually do so through funds and resources rather than growing the gaining a position in the state, or obtaining country’s income and employment base. In state funds through business or other means. summary, Papua New Guinea has become a The economic centrality of the state rentier state, surviving on income from politicises public employment, as educated resource projects, in particular large foreign people seek to gain advancement in the companies, and exports. These revenues are bureaucracy and resources through political collected by the central government, which means. Aside from the narrow surge in for most provinces is the source of about 90 minerals revenues from 2005 onwards, state per cent of revenues. Unless they have a rich revenues have declined in real terms and minerals or petroleum economy, provinces various other opportunities are shrinking. have little capacity to influence the national The political impacts of this history are government. There are few central profound. Paradoxically, despite its limited government controls over large royalty capacities and lack of resources, the under- revenues paid to the mining and petroleum developed state attracts intensified political provinces, and these are often dispersed competition, as was shown in the 2002 casually and wasted. Political action is election with its 21 per cent increase in the directed towards the central government number of candidates. MPs now have which may issue the licences, but the state is discretionary control of the limited funds also locked in through a shareholding. Except available to provinces, after public servant in the case of Bougainville, which shares and teachers’ salaries have been paid by the control over any mining proposals, national government, and so voters are provinces have little power over major desperate to elect their candidate in order to economic projects. control a slice of the shrinking available Given the small private sector, the state revenues. People see politics as the only way has had a considerable role in Papua New of obtaining benefits that they once obtained Guinea’s underdeveloped economy since the from the state in the form of services. colonial era. There is not a large domestic income tax base and the state has had difficulty collecting sales taxes and their Varied political styles replacement, the value-added tax, which is largely based on imported goods not Politics can become the quickest path to self- domestic production. Poll taxes, known as advancement for educated people, so many ‘head taxes’ and imposed by the colonial rural people and ambitious individuals seek regime, were minimal, but were abandoned to mobilise support among their small-scale by local government councils in the early Melanesian societies to get elected. For their 1970s because the administration no longer launching pads most use village, clan and had the capacity or will to collect them. tribal corporate groupings that rarely exceed Reinstituted local-level government head a few thousand people. These political bases taxes were authorised in the 2004 Budget should not be described as ‘ethnic groups’ although in almost all areas the state still (contra Reilly 2001); ethnic group is a term lacks the capacity to collect them. The best applied to new identities that are

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constantly evolving in urban areas. Often the community. Usually only about 45 per cent vote bases of many candidates share a of MPs are re-elected. As noted above, in 2002 common culture and language. Although the the success rate was nearer half that. Clearly peoples of Papua New Guinea do still speak the ‘slush’ funds available to MPs—with a 840 vernaculars, there are some languages whole calendar year’s allowance paid before whose speakers cover several electorates the mid-year election—do not necessarily each of 30,000 or more voters. In the create enough support to ensure re-election. Highlands, for instance, there are two The public’s demand is insatiable, and an languages spoken by over 100,000 people, MP’s unwise distribution of such funds or who share a culture but are also divided failure to distribute them frequently causes along administrative (district) lines. Their resentment among the electorate. Some MPs indigenous social structures are clans and agree that the system creates antagonism and tribes from 1,500 to 10,000 people. In the era provokes opposition, but argue that their of colonially imposed peace, it was believed electorates now expect these handouts. They that these local communities governed feel locked in to this wasteful system. These themselves by consensus, with leaders (then funds certainly increase the incentives for often called ‘big-men’) attracting followers challengers to oppose them. With an average and basing their influence and renown on of 26 candidates per seat in 2002 under the their linking role in the nexus between first-past-the-post voting system, only a small groups, and redistributing valued goods vote was needed to gain election. The majority produced within the local economy. of MPs won their seats with less than 17 per This model of Melanesian tradition has cent of the vote; 16 won with less than 10 per influenced the ideology of contemporary cent (Fraenkel 2004). politics, although today a clever politician It is possible to make some general- will show that he (usually ‘he’) knows how isations about styles of politics and to obtain and manipulate the distribution of electioneering in different regions of Papua resources from outside the community, and New Guinea.7 First of all, very few women preferably from the state. Generous are elected, four in 30 years, and only one of hospitality and gifts of money are common 62 women candidates won in 2002. Second, in election campaigns. In a few areas, campaigning is most intense in the Highlands, including Port Moresby, some candidates try where clan groups are much larger and to adapt this model using cash, or gifts to concentrated geographically than the churches and sporting teams or dance dispersed clans of coastal areas and islands, groups, claiming this is traditional and where candidate numbers per electorate behaviour, not bribery. In the Highlands, have often been double the numbers especially, some candidates spend up to a campaigning in lowland areas. million kina.6 Sometimes this rash spending In the central Highlands valleys, clan works and the candidate is elected, but solidarity and tribal voting was strong from mostly it fails. 1964 to 1987. There may have only been one What developed late in the colonial era candidate among several tribes in the 1970s, was the role of parliamentarians as local so they had a large base vote. Although it is ‘bosses’, with considerable patronage to inappropriate to claim that the number of distribute. Patron–client politics is played candidates is a proxy for the number of clans, with state resources across the country, but and each clan has a candidate,8 clan with varying degrees of subtlety and success members do often want a clan candidate. The in linking leadership aspirants with the women as much as the men take pride in

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nominating one of their number, benefit PNG politics has often been described directly from campaign generosity and enjoy in ethnic terms, and around 25 years ago the excitement in specially constructed researchers tested out class analysis. Only campaign houses (McLeod 2002). In the last rarely can large internal sectors of a province decade the previous large scale group or electorate share a degree of ethnic identity cohesion has been breaking down as more that can be mobilised effectively, sometimes and more candidates stand, sometimes with a degree of coercion. This was the case splitting the tribe or even the clan base vote. in the 2004 Chimbu by-election when there In Chimbu in 2002 such splits led to was only one candidate from Chuave assassination, and serious gun fighting and District. It also happened in the Chimbu scorched earth tactics. election of 1982. After a series of killings by Local issues and identities are extremely men from then Deputy Prime Minister important, far more so than party member- Okuk’s tribe, southerners calling themselves ship, policies or even money. As Joe Ketan Bomai united behind a single Gumine (2004) argues, group pride is of supreme candidate, John Nilkare; and at the same time importance in Mount Hagen society, and over 11 fellow northerners together split Okuk’s the years inter-group relations are carefully base areas, thereby enabling Nilkare to hold managed for use in elections. He calls this the lead under the first-past-the-post system. the Hagen mega-cycle. Local loyalties are Interestingly, there are elements of ethnic reinforced by gifting within clans and tribes mobilisation among immigrant communities and beyond as candidates seek to lock in a in the big cities, Port Moresby and Lae. Some large base vote. Electoral alliances are created of these people from the Highlands are large through warfare, marriages, funerals and enough to win or and definitely influence other exchanges of wealth. It is often argued results in urban seats. Port Moresby city has that these are traditional units, but they need seen rough-house politics in the last 15 years, to be reinforced. They can be fragmented if a with commentators saying Highlands-style rival seeks support among the same politics has come to town. In mid 2002 some communities and obligates people by supporters of a Highlander had their house competitive gifting. People accept election and business burnt, and tactics such as sweeteners from more than one candidate stealing ballot boxes and papers has and then have to chose between them, or they occurred in the national capital since 1992. vote more than once for different candidates Competition is intensifying in Lae, with an (Lakane and Gibbs 2003). This is one reason attempt to unite a Morobe province resistance why over the past 20 years some candidates to outsiders. have used firearms as a stick to enforce their In the coastal and island regions, carrots, and ensure that they receive votes in societies are comprised of much smaller clan return for their campaign inducements. and village units, and some villages Firearms are displayed before elections to comprise several clans. In these regions pressure voters, and sometimes on voting day candidates must mobilise numerous small to intimidate polling teams and ensure that social units, sometimes across several local every available ballot paper is used. These vernacular languages (or ethnic groups), to weapons may not be fired in anger until after have a chance of winning an election. the election, when in the cold light of defeat Candidacy and campaigning are reportedly bad losers too often take out their anger on far more individualistic, based very much on people who had clearly failed to deliver the the personal qualities and family promised or expected votes. relationships of the individual. These

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qualities may include training and skills, but even all their own personnel. Policemen often include factors such as church member- destroyed ballot boxes at Henganofi in the ship and perceived piety, as well as personal Eastern Highlands. A policeman was killed generosity and capacity for dedication and and a candidate and policeman kidnapped hard work. Campaigning may include before the polling in the Southern Highlands. cosmopolitan modern men sponsoring Polling officials were attacked in the Eastern traditional funerals, compensation payments and Western Highlands; a young girl was and dance groups, but what has come to be shot dead during the count in Chimbu. called ‘money politics’ and extravagant Serious post-election fighting spread across campaign generosity is far less prominent, most of the Highlands region and in Enga and less successful than in the Highlands. continued for more than six months after the Across the entire country, intense election. Precise figures have never been localism is an essential component of announced, but I estimate that over one electoral success, along with personal style. hundred people were killed in election- National issues are not especially salient in related violence (Standish 2003b). the 89 Open electorates, or even in the 20 seats As had been widely predicted, firearms covering entire provinces. As discussed were used throughout the polling in the below, this means that MPs do not owe their Southern Highlands, where serious warfare election to membership in national political had been under way since late 2001. In a July parties, although close relationships with a 2002 reference to the Supreme Court to national party leader may increase the determine whether the elections in the stature of candidates and their perceived Southern Highlands Province could be chances of being able to attract resources into deemed to have ‘failed’, the Attorney- the electorate. General, Francis Damen, cited …violence, intimidation, threats, The 2002 elections destruction of ballot [boxes] and/or ballot papers, riots, sacking of polling The last general election vividly booths, holding hostage people demonstrated the varied political styles in entitled to vote, spoiling of papers, different regions, provinces and cities. As so tampering with ballot papers, forging often occurs, electoral administration and of signatures, giving of false names and public behaviour were much better in the addresses [and] the prevention of Islands region. On the mainland, however, voting of people entitled to vote (The the limited capacities of the PNG state were Australian, 22 July 2002). strikingly obvious. Everything that could go Such actions were undertaken by wrong in administrative terms did go wrong ordinary villagers at the behest of educated in these elections, especially in the Highlands and wealthy candidates. The fact that people (Standish 2002) and Port Moresby city, where went to such extremes over an election political competition is usually at its most reflects their desperate desire to gain some intense. There was fraudulent use of the over- control over state resources and services. At large electoral roll in many provinces, times people voted en masse in a bloc vote, apparently led by local political figures. Not and officials were coerced to allow the poll only did basic administrative procedures fail, to be taken over by strong arm supporters of but in the Highlands the security forces were candidates. Sometimes this was done in the unable to maintain control of the public or name of group consensus, but several

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candidates in Chimbu acknowledged it was included a large number of talented new MPs coerced (Standish 2002). Voters were not with a wide range of experience. A constrained by electoral laws and procedures government was formed of 10 parties and a intended to ensure free and fair elections. new ministry appointed. There was, These elections strengthen the argument of however, scepticism about the integrity of PNG political scientist Alphonse Gelu that several of the new ministers and MPs. The the colonially-introduced liberal democratic ministers took over their portfolios, senior political culture never took root, and that officials were replaced, a mini-budget was authoritarian styles of ‘non-liberal’ politics passed to deal with the inherited deficit crisis better reflect indigenous political mores (Gelu and a few parliamentary committees started 2000). working after a gap of nearly a decade. In In Papua New Guinea there is often a late 2002 there was some hope for the new wave of relief at the removal of a government, government, and anger at the debt they had and a rush of optimism after each new inherited from their predecessors. government is formed. That was particularly Nonetheless, the government that took office marked after the government of Bill Skate was derived from a parliament that had been imploded in July 1999, to be replaced by that elected by a tainted process. According to one led by Sir Mekere Morauta which the PNG academic, instead of being locked up National Parliament voted in by 99 votes to in jail, ‘corrupt politicians have taken up 5 (Standish 1999:24). Faced with poor seats in parliament, which could be economic conditions, a massive debt burden described as a house of thieves’. and ongoing fiscal shortages, as well as its Village people sometimes say their own internal divisions, the Morauta election activities are pointless. All too often, government was unable to make much new MPs are heavily in debt once elected, improvement in government services in the and even reformists are vulnerable to offers provinces (Standish 2001). People want their of rewards and incentives by wealthy party government to be responsive to public leaders. They often stay in the capital and opinion, but unfortunately this only seems lose touch with their electorates, unable to to happen at election time. Although the meet their constituents’ unrealistically high People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) expectations for development. In the members had access to many millions of kina Highlands some members find they cannot from government resources, and gave away return to their electorates without being numerous 4WD vehicles during the 2002 harassed in parts of their electorate. The election campaign, the failure of 30 of PDM’s desire to widen their electoral support and 42 government MPs and ministers in mid hence increase the representativeness of MPs 2002 displays negative accountability in is what led to the reintroduction of operation. By contrast, the MPs in the preferential voting which had been dropped National Alliance party had been effective in the 1975 constitution. critics of government and most were re- elected, even though some of them had been denied the ‘slush fund’ patronage resources Preferential voting that benefited government MPs. Following the June-July elections, at the The legislation for ‘limited preferential national level and on the surface, state voting’ (LPV) has been applied since 2003, institutions appeared to function properly with ten by-elections completed using this in late 2002. The new parliament met, and system by August 2006, five in the

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Highlands, and all closely monitored.9 The However very local issues and alliances hope is that that all candidates will be forced are identified in detailed analyses of voting.10 to appeal to wide sections of their electorate Some observers say the achievement of an in order to gain preferences, and overcome ‘absolute majority’ is a major achievement the intense localism highlighted under first- (Reilly 2006), but the mathematics makes that past-the-post. However many candidates inevitable. With over 20 candidates, up to 66 have been unremittingly parochial in their per cent of votes have dropped out of the appeals. Some set up three candidates within count at the last stage, deemed exhausted. their tribal catchment, so as not to preference Note that the winners do receive increased any rival groups. Others, for similar reasons, mandates when primary votes and prefer- have urged their voters not to channel support ences are combined, as a percentage of valid towards worthy candidates. Instead, they first count primary votes, usually 10–20 per have asked their supporters to preference weak cent higher than in 2002. However the overall candidates which will prevent any drift of mandate received in most instances was only preferences towards prominent rivals. The 25-30 per cent of valid votes lodged. This will votes are usually wasted on candidates not change unless the number of candidates already eliminated. Such votes are deemed is reduced greatly, but there is no incentive for exhausted and drop out of the count, with that to happen with LPV, and in fact candidate up to 90 per cent of votes exhausted in each numbers are likely to increase. of the final eliminations. Even when there Once again, poor electoral admin- are over 20 candidates, which is common, istration of this complex system—and in one eventually someone will gain an ‘absolute case a fraudulent count (Standish 2006)— majority’ (50 per cent plus1) of the remaining has illustrated the weak capacities of the active votes, but that may only be a third of PNG state in rural areas. One major the original total. It is hoped that once elected underlying problem is that electoral rolls of MPs will work for their entire electorate, but ‘eligible voters’ have been cumulatively it is unusual for candidates to gain inflated over the decades, with up to three preferences widely. times as many names as adult persons. This In general, we can say that under LPV so situation is intentional, organised by far campaigning has been more relaxed and intending candidates who stand to gain. It accommodative, and that candidates have facilitates multiple voting and provides an mostly been able to move freely, and indeed incentive for ‘controlled’ or intimidated bloc distribute largesse more freely, but not in voting. In the 2004 Yangoru-Saussia by every instance. These by-elections elections election, as in the Highlands’ by-elections, have been peaceful in comparison to recent multiple voting occurred on a large scale, but general elections—though there have been a was monitored (and prevented) few cases of polling day violence, some post- haphazardly by the police security force. The election fighting and deaths and serious Highlands’ polls, even by-elections, involved destruction of property in some instances. major electoral fraud in the form of multiple Several candidates have spent six or seven voting. Since 2005 the Electoral Commission figure sums in their campaigns and two of has been trying to create new rolls and these were successful in the National Capital eliminate excessive names from the roll, with District and Koroba-Lake Kopiago. In two some success, but acknowledges that cases the support of a powerful political Highlands electorates still contain more patron—the Enga Governor and the Prime names than adult citizens, and there are Minister—assisted winners. signs many people have not (re-)enrolled.

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A major concern is that as Highlands divisions and structures of Melanesian candidates have become aware of the value societies, along with the divided topography of preferences, which are the same vote and economy, and the related spread of transferred to another candidate, they are powers between the provincial and district now saying that in 2007 they will control government structures. Candidates usually their voters’ allocation of all preferences. The do not win elections on the basis of party ballot is not secret in the Highlands, and bloc policies and membership, but because voting is common in the name of the group. enough local people want them to be elected. This is sometimes described as consensus, At most elections the majority of new MPs but if it is voluntary then there should be no are Independents when elected, but soon join need to enforce it. parties. During the campaign clever parties pick up likely winners, and in these cases the party owes more to the candidate’s base Political parties and the integrity votes and resources than the reverse. Only law about a quarter of candidates have taken party endorsement in the recent by-elections. The consequences of intense localism in Fluid party loyalties have been identified electioneering are profound. Successful by Okole (2005). These arise from the small candidates owe little to political parties, and polities of Melanesian society and are central hence parties have limited hold over or to explaining many of Papua New Guinea’s capacity to sanction MPs. In industrial problems with executive governance and countries the loss of party endorsement instability in the legislature. Localism and usually means political death, whereas in speaking on behalf of the ‘grassroots’ provide Papua New Guinea it matters little. Indeed, alternate ideological bases for politicians, it was an attempt to overcome the weakness rather than national party allegiances. of political parties that led to the ‘integrity Although modern political parties law’, formally known as the Organic commenced from 1967–70 with fairly strong [constitutional] Law on the Integrity of regional identities and distinctive policy Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) differences about the timing of independence, (Baker 2005; Gelu 2005; PacLii 2006). After political parties in Papua New Guinea lost the crucial initial vote for the Prime Minister much of their regional identity after 1977. following the election, individual MPs who Party loyalty and voter identification with change that vote or leave their party of first party leaders reached its peak in the 1982 choice should face serious penalties, election. It became cheaper to recruit winners potentially losing their seat, unless they can after the election, but under OLIPPAC parties justify their action during formal inquiries now have a strong incentive to increase their by the Ombudsman and Leadership endorsed winners, namely the chance to form tribunal. The aim is to lock MPs into parties, government. Party activism appeared to rise and hence create some stability in both the in 2002 with Somare’s National Alliance, and legislature and executive, and ultimately could do so again in the 2007 election with more consistent policymaking and better the emergence of the New Generation Party. governance. Since the 1980s, national politics OLIPPAC is designed to strengthen increasingly has been about gaining and parties, both in parliament and in the allocating the spoils of office, especially when electorate. However the near irrelevance of in hard economic times the chances for major parties to the electorate is based in the development projects are minimal. Papua

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New Guinea’s parties remain personalised possible deal for their local voter base in the vehicles for gaining and sharing power, with first instance, rather than their entire minimal policy differences. As mentioned, electorate. This means joining the strongest they are essentially factions within the team; and until OLIPPAC commenced that National Parliament, centred upon a leader; could mean shedding their initial party. even leaders who may have lost their seats Elected Independent MPs almost invariably such as the wealthy founders of two parties, join parties, and in the past the wealthy former Prime Ministers Sir Julius Chan parties like Peoples Progress Party have (Peoples Progress Party, whose term ended recruited well between elections, especially in 1997) and Paias Wingti (who was out of when in power. Nothing succeeds like parliament between 1997 and 2002). success. Opposition is not a fruitful stance Papua New Guinea’s parties only for MPs, except for core faction members attempt to link with the wider electorate at buoyed by the hope of regaining executive election times, bursting into flower. Some 43 power. Two recent prime ministers held back parties were registered before 2002 elections electoral development funds or district (an increase from about 15), and 22 parties support grants (the notorious ‘slush funds’) were represented in the House. After elections, budgeted for MPs in the Opposition. The however, many parties wilt, and even those public’s expectation of large-scale patronage represented in the legislature remain dormant places huge pressures on MPs, and several in the electorate. By 2006 there were only 29 MPs, including Sir Julius Chan have often parties registered, with 15 in Parliament. stated that such demands drive corruption. Several small parties have voted to be absorbed But the system also increases the leverage of by larger ones. Under OLIPPAC parties are the executive over the legislature. expected to strengthen their organization in Until OLIPPAC, it was easy for order to elect MPs with formal party endorse- Opposition members or government ment, but most parties only establish provincial backbenchers to swap parties and overthrow branches at election time, and they still lack a prime minister, or increase their chances of mass memberships. Candidates in 2002 a ministry or other additional lucrative shopped around asking parties for endorse- appointment carrying ministerial privileges. ment and financial support. The successful Hence, there is usually a drift by MPs ones received only minimal help at the time of towards government parties, until the last nomination, very late in their campaigns few months before a vote of no confidence which last for years. The winner in the 2004 became possible. Such party-hopping, Chimbu by-election had approached three known as ‘yo-yo politics’, is what OLIPPAC political parties before finally being endorsed was intended to prevent. In theory, the law by one faction of the United Resources Party makes it impossible for individual MPs to on the second last day of nominations. MPs swap parties, although Sir William Skate was primarily owe their election to their own allowed to leave his Peoples National efforts, which can cost many thousands of Congress in 2005 and join the government. kina. Parties are largely irrelevant to the By contrast, Independents can move into decisions made by voters (Saffu 1996). parties at the time of their choice. And, by a If they hope for re-election, MPs are caucus vote, whole parties can decide to obliged to benefit their own small local change sides, as occurred in May 2004, or constituency while in office. Aside from they may collectively change their vote on recouping their own expenses, sometimes major constitutional issues, a vote of no from state coffers, they must seek the best confidence or on the Budget.

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In 2003 Prime Minister Somare obviously slush funds. Annual national budgets often felt vulnerable because he tried unsuccess- contain ‘sweeteners’ for MPs, and allegedly fully to persuade the parliament to amend cheques for discretionary funds are issued the constitution and double the period of to ensure the budget or major laws are immunity from a vote of no-confidence to 36 passed without delay. months. In a drawn out struggle he sacked Scrutiny of governance is assisted most several ministers who opposed this move. by the Ombudsman Commission and the For two years four parties were split on Courts, rather more than by the National factional lines behind rival leaders. It took Parliament (Ghai 1997). Legislative committees court cases and years before OLIPPAC was and parliamentary scrutiny declined applied to enforce parties to meet and resolve markedly throughout the 1990s (Okole et al. their leadership disputes. Indeed, political 2003). Bill Skate as Speaker in 2002 pledged movement has continued under the to strengthen the role of parliament and its OLIPPAC. The Prime Minister has used his committees. Indeed, the Public Accounts power to choose ministers, over-riding the Committee restarted its constitutional role of nominal leadership of other parties, and by intense scrutiny of government financial constant reshuffling of his ministry playing operations, and took an activist role and divide and rule tactics. One of his senior identified some bureaucratic scalps for ministers in May 2004 described this as investigation by the police and Ombudsman. ‘cutting off their heads, enabling us to destroy Other committees, however, exist solely on them politically’. It was a tactic regularly used paper. The legislature rarely uses its routine by PM Skate, as well.11 accountability powers to create a responsible government, although it retains the ultimate power to dismiss a government, some of the Parliament and the Executive time.

Throughout the 1990s, the principal role of parliaments has been merely to determine Votes of no-confidence which team wins executive power and controls the spoils of office. MPs have not A vote of no-confidence should be the concentrated on monitoring the executive, or legislature’s main chance to overthrow an providing detailed advice and consent on incompetent or corrupt executive, and as legislative matters. Major legislation is such is an essential sanction in a country passed rapidly, without significant debate, where the gentlemanly conventions of and with huge majorities. Generally the Westminster are not entrenched. Under the executive is dominant; it can buy support national Constitution, governments cannot and ignore parliament. Support for the be challenged by a vote of no confidence executive appears to get stronger and stronger during their first 18 months in office. Then until an election, but can collapse if a vote of in the fifth and last year of each parliament a no confidence is possible or imminent. Papua vote of no-confidence would precipitate an New Guinea’s annual budget has regularly early election. That is unthinkable, not only been passed without serious scrutiny or because the Electoral Commission’s debate, aside from set piece speeches by party preparations take years but all MPs fear of leaders. The granting of supply has not been losing their seat. During these periods of used to discipline governments, although it immunity or ‘grace’ the National Parliament has been used to pressure early payment of is denied its strongest power over the

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executive, except voting on the budget or Even on occasions when attempts to have adverse publicity. Some governments have a vote of no-confidence were unsuccessful, been at the apex of their power, and pushed as occurred eight times during the first three through major reforms in this phase, years of Namaliu’s government, the threat of including those of Morauta and Sir Rabbie a vote of no-confidence damaged the quality Namaliu. There is a tendency for govern- of governance. Political instability causes ments to make reckless decisions in their last political paralysis and leads to attempts to year. It was in its last six months in early pay off political waverers. Threatened votes 1997 that the Chan government hired the of no-confidence can also make it impossible infamous Sandline mercenaries in an attempt for the Prime Minister to remove politicians to solve the Bougainville secession conflict. who are proven to have been corrupt. This That plan was tripped up not by parliament happened in the case of the former Forests but by a rebellion by sections of the Defence and Foreign Minister, and army General, Ted Force and mass public demonstrations in the Diro. After his corrupt behaviour was capital (Dinnen et al. 1997; Dorney 1998; exposed in 1987, Diro survived a further four O’Callaghan 1999). years, mostly as Deputy Prime Minister. Between the two ‘periods of grace’, Eventually, he was removed following a 1991 between 18 and 48 months, there are windows Leadership Tribunal inquiry, but after when the executive is vulnerable and in theory spending three years in the ‘sin bin’ he was parliament is at its highest potential power. eligible to stand in 1997 and was re-elected Yet parliament often abdicates its oversight by a forgiving public. role during these periods, and the quality of Old habits died hard. The vote of no- governance declines as a result. Since 1988 it confidence attempted in 2004 had been has become standard practice for govern- predicted as early as 2002. It bore no ments to sway MPs to give up their power relationship to the state of governance at the and allow the adjournment of parliament time, merely that it was legally possible during much of the time when a vote of no- because the Somare government had been in confidence is possible. MPs are able to spend office 18 months, was out of ‘grace’ and had more time in their electorates, if they wish, antagonised a number of its previous and often seem happy as long as they have ministers and supporters. However the some funds to distribute. In 1998 and 2000, government-controlled Private Business parliaments agreed to adjourn for over six Committee disallowed the motion, which months thereby avoiding the chance of a vote drew strong legal criticism (Nonggorr 2004). of no-confidence. In early 2004 parliament Whether OLIPPAC will be able to commenced a five-month adjournment, fundamentally shift existing patterns of which was broken only by the need to elect a political behaviour and create a genuinely new Governor-General. The admission of strong parliamentary base for continuity in insecurity implied by a long adjournment also executive government remains to be seen, but can increase the chance of a vote of no- on present indications that seems unlikely. confidence when Parliament eventually The weak party system results from the reconvenes. In 1999, once the period of interaction of local groupings with the immunity expired and it became constitution- electorate system and provincial patronage ally possible to change the guard, backbenchers structures, and encourages poor parliament- from all sides and even ministers colluded ary performance and executive instability. and enforced a change of Prime Minister; the This in turn leads to the constant reshuffling ministry remained very similar. of ministers and the sacking of political

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appointees to departmental headships and provincial governments. Until 1995 statutory authorities. It all contributes to provincial assemblies were directly elected policy inconsistency and the weakens the with a mandate separate from MPs, and 14 state capacities. had been suspended at some stage for maladministration. The provincial assemblies and their executives undercut the status and Patronage and provinces local roles of MPs. During the decades after 1980 provincial governments were Following lessons learnt in the colonial era, progressively starved of capital works and politics in Papua New Guinea has mostly recurrent operating funds, while between been about the distribution of patronage: 1984 and 1999 MPs’ annual discretionary resources (jobs and funds) and pork-barrel funds grew from K10,000 each to K1.5 million projects. Politics is perceived as a zero sum per annum. game, in which the winner takes all, at the The 1995 Organic Law on Provincial electorate level as well as in the National and Local Level Governments was pushed Parliament. Hence, electoral competition is through parliament by PM Chan on the intense. Until recently, MPs have controlled pretext of further decentralising power to huge discretionary grants, known as ‘slush local-level governments. Usually three LLGs funds’, but as Sir Mekere Morauta pointed replaced each of the largely moribund out in 1996 they lack the planning and district-level local government councils, administrative capacity needed to utilise which had mostly been starved of resources these resources effectively. Parliamentarians by the provinces. Few of the new LLGs have may have gained access to state resources, the resources or skills to operate effectively. but have not been able to ensure transparency In part, the ‘1995 reforms’ served to or executive responsiveness to public needs. recentralise power over the bureaucracy, Meanwhile, indifference of central govern- while giving MPs virtually untrammelled ment has led to the near collapse in mainland control over district operating funds and provinces of rural health and education strong influence over staffing matters in their services, and road networks. Anguished electorates. National politicians are now able statements from church and non-government to grab resources that properly should be organisation leaders and letters to the editors allocated to provincial governments and on such topics appear to fall on deaf ears. districts that are charged with providing Since the 1995 provincial government essential services. They have almost total ‘reforms’, backbench MPs have undertaken control and so can readily lobby for the strong executive roles in the allocation of removal of unsympathetic local-level council District Support grants within their presidents; in that way the MPs influence electorates and in the provincial the composition of each Provincial governments. The Provincial (‘regional’) MP Assembly. In 2006 there were proposals to is usually the Governor and hence the further entrench MPs’ powers within their executive head. In their local roles the MPs districts, including the selection of public actions are largely unchecked, although servants. This would only serve to intensify many eventually face Ombudsman local political competition. Note that there Commission investigations and Leadership are a few exceptions, such as East New Code cases for misappropriation. Most basic Britain, where MPs sensibly transfer their services, such as minor roads, schools and funds to local-level governments and medical facilities, are the responsibility of provincial and district administrators,

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leaving local government to local leaders and service distribution, have served to foster the avoiding the inevitable political backlash. politics of money. The dreadful logic of failing government services is that in this situation people grab what they can, where they can. The anti-corruption agenda They expect little from government, but lack the means to effectively utilise whatever PNG political discourse is dominated by talk resources they do obtain. of corruption, a ‘big C’ issue that is constantly Clearly the rhetorical chorus against being raised in the media. At the mention of corruption has not worked. The incentives politics, a hotel receptionist volunteers as remain and the sanctions only hit a few. The simple fact: ‘The ministers are all corrupt’. electorates want their MPs to gain them MPs and even ministers use parliamentary resources, and only complain if they miss grievance debates to loudly assert the out. Personal misappropriation is fairly well persistence of corruption. Bribery and hidden from the electorate. Heroically, the misappropriation allegations have been Ombudsman Commission had succeeded in major election issues since 1982. Every time raising over 67 cases of violations of the MPs have driven to Parliament House since Leadership Code by leaders by late 2003 1996, they have passed a huge billboard (Gomez 2004:16–18), and more since. This proclaiming highlights the primary cause of concern about institutional decay, patronage politics WHEN THE RIGHTEOUS ARE IN AUTHORITY and the (mis)use of state resources(Ketan The People Rejoice 2000; Okole 2002). As in 1997, several MPs were (re-)elected in 2002 who had previously WHEN THE WICKED RULE breached the Leadership Code. Other The People Suffer (Proverbs 29) individuals elected in July 2002 were later targetted in the recent commissions of KAIKAI BIILONG TINGTING inquiry into the collapse of the super- [Food for thought] annuation scheme (the National Provident Fund, NPF) and the privatisation of the state- Corruption was frequently alleged in the last owned commercial bank PNG Banking parliament and criticised in the media, and Corporation. Some of those criticised in the during 2002 was a major concern for civil NPF report have influence in the present society groups, especially churches, which government, and very few of the well- backed a media-led community campaign publicised recommendations of the inquiry against corruption. Nevertheless, Morauta have been followed through with attempted government candidates spent huge sums prosecutions. (one estimate is K300 million) in the run-up The regulatory and accountability to the elections. The small groups of supporters procedures appear to need strengthening, but of government members may have benefited, the reverse has occurred. PNG governments but the wider public was not convinced. for years have faced fiscal crises and have However, most of the anti-corruption not provided sufficient funds for crucial campaigning remains at the level of accountability institutions such as the moralising rhetoric. The causes of corruption, Ombudsman Commission and the courts. In such as the weak economy and the 2006 the House passed a law restricting the breakdown of resource allocation according Leadership Tribunals which handle cases to need, and the widespread collapse of brought forward by the Ombudsman

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Commission. These are administrative the streets was crime. In the last 15 years, the tribunals but are now required to apply full regular diet of Australian Rugby League legal rules of evidence. Executive football in the media has provided a major governments are often unwilling to face distraction from domestic events in Papua strong scrutiny from the legislature, and it is New Guinea. not surprising that legislators who are also Yet the public is not entirely quiescent, subject to independent oversight may reject and can be quite volatile at times, even when attempts to strengthen the institutions of it is likely to attract heavy-handed state accountability. repression. In mid 1995, student activists helped stir up demonstrations across the country when it was alleged that the World National mobilisation Bank planned to register and privatise communally owned land. It is easy to inflame As argued above, contemporary PNG the public about land matters, and five people politics is usually about local loyalties and died in these demonstrations. In June 2001 the local distribution of resources rather than in Port Moresby students and people from models of development, ideological or even settlements rallied against privatisation national issues. This is clear to any observer plans and the reduction in the size of the of parliamentary discussions. As a military, but the protests ended when the concomitant, it can be argued that the PNG police shot and killed three students on the people lack a sense of shared history and University of Papua New Guinea campus. national identity which can be the basis of This incident damaged Prime Minister citizenship and democratic accommodation. Morauta and nearly cost him his seat in 2002. Related points were made by Sir Anthony There have been some large-scale Siaguru. nationalist responses to issues, and It is something we lack in my country. occasionally politicians choose to appeal to It is not a matter of governance as such. national pride and sovereignty. This was It is the basic identity of the people with done by both supporters and opponents of the national interest that we lack, or the South African-based Sandline rather, a political system that affects mercenaries brought in by former PM Sir that identity, and it is its absence Julius Chan in early 1997 in a desperate which, by my reckoning, makes it attempt to resolve the Bougainville conflict difficult to have good governance in (Dinnen et al. 1997; Dorney 1998; O’Callaghan Papua New Guinea…The electorate 1999). Chan still seeks to justify that action. grumbles…but the electorate is held Bill Skate MP opposed Sandline on nationalist captive (2001:11–12). grounds, arguments echoing Defence Force In the 1960s and 1970s there was no officers, but he was less successful in the last sustained anti-colonial nationalist move- days of his leadership in mid1999 when he ment, although there was prolonged tried to arouse nationalist resentment of the discussion about the constitutional World Bank and to blame Australia for his distribution of state power. The strongest political demise. While initially effective political campaigns in recent decades have smokescreens, his allegations appear not to come from non-government organisations have resonated with the wider public. The concerned about human rights, especially nationalist rejection among some politicians women’s rights, and the environment. In the of Australia’s Enhanced Cooperation 1980s the major issue drawing people onto Package (ECP) with its 250 police and

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regulatory officials in 2004–05 appeared not balance of the top posts in the bureaucracy to be widespread; apparently most of the between people from the Southern Region political public hoped the ECP would bring (coastal Papua), the Highlands, Momase (the some improvement to policing and public north coast provinces, Morobe, Madang and order. the Sepiks, East and West) and the New Occasionally, resentment of capitalist Guinea Islands. Since 2002 the term ‘Sepik development is expressed in ideological Tsunami’ has been used to describe the terms by local movements, which have numbers of senior officials appointed under sometimes been wrongly labelled as cargo the Somare government. Such geographic cults. The most radical attacks on symbols of divisions incorporate stereotypes inherited modern development came from the from the colonial era, but still have political undereducated and unemployed youth of potency. Nevertheless there is also jealousy Bougainville who attacked the Panguna and lack of trust within these broadly copper mine and also destroyed state brushed regions. People from areas with the infrastructure such as schools and hospitals. best education in the colonial era, who These Bougainville Revolutionary Army foot previously held all the best jobs, sometimes soldiers can be interpreted as the deprived express resentment and even fear of the recent victims of large-scale development, and aside arrivals from the Highlands. from conflicts between local groups the Pragmatic alliances can override such rebellion incorporated aspects of class regional sentiments. In 1997 Bill Skate was resentment. Similar resentments are chosen as prime minister partly because a sometimes heard in the Highlands, and may coastal Papuan was wanted, but his lie behind the occasional destruction of candidacy was promoted by former prime essential public infrastructure by people ministers from the Highlands and Islands, who have missed out on the benefits of Paias Wingti and Sir Julius Chan. Skate, who development, or who have lost political died as Sir William Skate in early 2006, was power. Although usually manipulated by able to appeal to second generation migrants elite political interests, aspects of class from several ethnic groups in Port Moresby, conflict can also be identified in the especially immigrant Highlanders, which occasionally anarchic eruptions of crowd indicates how ethnic divisions can be violence and looting in Port Moresby, Lae and mobilised and also overcome. Similar fusion Madang. In the Highlands, such conflicts are politics is also reported to occur in suburban usually seen through the lenses of tribe and raskol criminal gangs (Harris 1988), but I clan. know of strong contrary examples. The peoples of Papua New Guinea are Most governments make sure they have ethnically divided. By itself, this has limited representation in the ministry from all explanatory value in the country’s politics, provinces, and these people work well because conflict is rarely about identity together. Individual ministers engage in the alone. People often place each other by region worst nepotistic patronage. It is individuals or province of origin, but within those who build up teams of bodyguards to provinces the labels used apply to ever promote or enforce their interests in smaller districts or tribal groups. Large government service and business. Although regional identities are rarely mobilised,12 expected, nepotism causes considerable despite the attempts of some politicians to resentment and feeds cynicism about the do so in the mid 1970s. At the national level political system. There is widespread belief there is often concern about the regional in both provinces and the capital that the

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political system and government is have not differentiated themselves on policy permeated by localism and cronyism, known platforms, or made binding links with the as wantokism, using the word for people of wider public to mobilise support. Elections one language (talk). Finally, it can be argued are highly localised and have become either that Papua New Guinea’s democratic individualised contests, as in many Islands institutions have not (yet) created a shared areas, or inter-group contests, as in the sense of identity as a nation. Highlands region. In the Highlands elections were increasingly violent until 2002 when malpractice was seen as being essential for Concluding discussion success. Parliamentary grievance debates can be The analysis above describes state-society lively, but democratic accountability has not interactions that are not producing worked either in the legislature and its accountable and effective governance. The relationship with the executive, or between lives of rural people are seen as economically elections at the electoral level. The net impact irrelevant to the survival of the state, unless of an ineffective parliament is to weaken the they start to rebel around major money state, and reduce the capacities and earners like mineral or petroleum projects. legitimacy of government. The state and its Viewed from the provinces, Waigani, the élites have become withdrawn and isolated headquarters of government, is seen as a from the people they are meant to serve. This foreign country. Although there are many is an inherently unstable situation, but most dedicated officials, the political class is people still seek to gain power in the state. widely believed to turn its back on the bush This is illustrated most starkly by the fact people and the urban settlers. that many people in the Highlands were The failure to have an executive prepared to attack electoral officials and responsible to the parliament, and a police conducting the election in June and parliament responsible to the electorate, has July 2002. A PNG newspaper editorial contributed to the lack of government concern argued that Papua New Guinea is a for national problems. Four dramatic ‘struggling democracy’ (The National, 19 July examples show the lack of focus by national 2002). Another PNG observer, Joe Ketan, governments, which stated, ‘democracy itself is at risk in this • largely ignored bloody warfare in the administratively weak state’.13 Highlands for over 30 years There has been a major attempt through • have not halted the spread of high- the integrity law to strengthen political powered firearms and ignored the Guns parties in Papua New Guinea in an attempt Summit report of 2005 to create stability in government. Yet OLIPPAC is mainly tinkering with the rules • allowed the Bougainville secession crisis of Parliament, and has been circumvented. It to drag on for eight years until 1997; and cannot teach parties to mobilise popular • largely ignored HIV/AIDS issues for 10 support, or to improve the links between years. legislators and their electorates. The first Despite regular elections, the logic of social election under OLIPPAC showed little groupings within the country and their strengthening of political parties. However, political mobilisation has meant that MPs one observer argued (in a closed seminar) have not had to serve their entire electorates, that the new law has removed the real power or the nation as a whole. Political parties struggle from parliament and eventually

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would lead to intensified political House has allowed itself to be used, under competition and conflict at the electoral level. ruthless control by the Speaker and the It remains to be seen what the long-term effect Leader of Government Business, and with a of OLIPPAC will be in the next parliament, tiny Opposition not able to assert its but from 2004 signs were that MPs had found autonomy, let alone control the executive. ways of avoiding its attempts to solidify Unfortunately, given the desperate political parties. Nonetheless in early 2007 shortage of resources in Papua New Guinea, parties were increasing their efforts in the any reform programmes are thought to run up to the June-July elections, so the law require outside funding. Foreign assistance may have greater impact in the next to promote democracy in Papua New Guinea parliament. is quite likely, given the aid donors’ recent The second major reform is the adoption focus on ‘good governance’, but it also of limited preferential voting (LPV) in all involves major political sensitivities. The elections. The recent by-elections have been work of accountability bodies such as the both local and personalised contests. They Ombudsman Commission is clearly resented showed that under preferential voting the by politicians seeking to avoid close scrutiny. possibility exists for considerable widening The critics of the state, such as civil society of candidates’ support bases, and that a leaders, are perceived by politicians as likely peaceful election can be held where massive future rivals. State leaders sometimes fear the state resources are applied. The new system younger generation of politically active will soon be tested in a general election when citizens, such as university students, which the pressures are far greater and state may be one reason why universities are resources such as police spread more thinly. starved of resources. The weakening of most To be effective, LPV will require a substantial of the country’s universities in recent shift in Papua New Guinea’s political decades will have long-term costs. The fact culture. It will take the lifetime of the that Papua New Guinea has its own acute parliament elected in the 2007 general critics of its political system remains a real election before we can say whether LPV has indigenous strength, however. significantly improved the quality of MPs The media hopefully will be able to and the functioning of PNG democracy at continue to act as fairly effective democratic the national level. watchdogs. The sole (commercial) television The parliament in Papua New Guinea station is fairly bland. Unfortunately, the includes many idealistic and talented provincial network of radio stations has been individuals, only some of whom are in the allowed to run down badly since 1995, a ministry. Some started to make themselves wasted opportunity for nation-building and heard, as indicated by the revival of a few leadership. Papua New Guinea has a fairly committees. Fourteen years ago there was a vibrant if small and largely foreign-owned review of the effectiveness of the PNG press (not forgetting the special pleading by parliament, with suggestions for strengthen- The National on behalf of its owners in the ing the institution (Lindley 1993). The logging industry). Constitution specifies that there should be a It is clear that the people of Papua New full set of standing committees, but very few Guinea want political participation, and in are operative. In attempts to lock MPs behind that sense are democrats. As argued above, the government, some committee chairs are however, many of the problems of democracy allocated as paid perquisites, but the in Papua New Guinea are historic and committees rarely if ever meet. The current systemic. They are rooted in Papua New

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Guinea’s political cultures and admin- the 2002 election (Standish 2003a). Abstracts istrative structures, as well as in the pattern of the papers on electorates are available of the national economy. These deeper issues from State, Society and Governance in are not readily amenable to institutional Melanesia Project (2003). 8 As suggested by Reilly and Phillpot 2002:918– engineering. To strengthen democracy, 19. Papua New Guineans will need to find ways 9 Six of these are analysed in Standish 2006. to engage the active support of both the 10 See Gibbs 2006 and similar unpublished government and civil society. Public servants research by Nick Kuman and Ben Tomba on often find it difficult to work together with Anglimp-South Wahgi. community groups, but such cooperation is 11 Personal communication Henry Okole, slowly starting to spread beyond the services December 2004. 12 delivered by churches. In the last few years The late Margaret Mead in 1971 argued at of the Somare government, there have been the University of Papua New Guinea that the country’s ethnic diversity was its best signs that civil society activism is spreading guarantee of sticking together, because no in Papua New Guinea, and that community single group would be large enough to groups are gaining confidence. Therein lies dominate the others. a great hope for the future of Papua New 13 Personal communication, November 2002. Guinea’s democracy. References Notes Baker, L., 2005. ‘Political integrity laws in This essay is a sketch for a larger project; and Papua New Guinea and the search for was first drafted during fieldwork with no access stability’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, to a library. It was presented to the University of 20(1):100–17. South Pacific Conference on Political Culture, Representation and Electoral Systems in the Baxter, M., 2001. Enclaves or Equity: the rural Pacific in Port Vila, Vanuatu, July 2004. crisis and development choice in Papua New Guinea, Australian Agency for 1 Such arguments have been made by Lipset International Development, Canberra. 1989; Reilly 2001. 2 Strictly speaking there are now 18 provincial Chin, J., 2003. ‘The worst election ever? governments, which since 1995 have been Papua New Guinea at the polls’, dominated by national parliamentarians Catalyst, 33(1):48–61. including the provincial governors, plus the Dinnen, S., May, R.J. and Regan, A.J. (eds), Autonomous Government of Bougainville 1997. Challenging the State: the Sandline and the National Capital Commission. Affair in Papua New Guinea, Regime 3 This complex history is summarised in Dinnen et al (eds) 1997, and detailed in Dorney 1998 Change/Regime Maintenance and O’Callaghan 1999. Discussion Paper No. 21, National 4 For some of this history see Moore and Centre for Development Studies and Kooyman 1998:405–6, 410. Department of Political and Social 5 The same is alleged in 2007. ‘K52m for MPs’ Change, Research School of Pacific and poll funds: Bart’, The National 20 March 2007. Asian Studies, The Australian National 6 PGK 1.00 = AUD 0.44 approximately. University, Canberra. 7 See, for example, my summary of the October 2002 University of Papua New Guinea/ Dorney, S., 1998. The Sandline Affair: Politics Australian National University Workshop on and the mercenaries and the Bougainville crisis, ABC Books, Sydney.

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