Scientific-Technical Union of Mechanical Engineering "Industry-4.0" BULGARIAN HUB FOR UNITED BALKANS BULLETIN “SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: DIMENSIONS, CHALLENGES, PERSPECTIVES”

ISSN 2683-0574 1 / 2020, Sofia, Bulgaria

Partners: Center for International and Development Studies (Republic of North Macedonia) Civil Development Organization (Republic of Kosovo) EUROBALKAN, Association for Research and Development (Republic of Serbia) Group for Legal and Political Studies (Republic of Kosovo) Institute for Development and International Relations (Republic of Croatia) Pilot4Dev (Kingdom of Belgium) The Balkan Forum (Republic of Kosovo) Youth Alliance – Krusevo (Republic of North Macedonia)

Scientific Reviewers: Prof. Plamen Pantev, PhD (Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski", ISIS, BHUB) Prof. Hristo Bondzolov, PhD (Rector of "St. Cyril and St. Methodious" University of Veliko Turnovo) Prof. Sead Turcalo, PhD (University of Sarajevo) Prof. Slavenko Grgurevic, PhD (EUROBALKAN) Prof. Jana Kukeska, PhD (University of Tourism and Management) Prof. Dr. Sc. Kiril Topalov (Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski") Prof. Dr. Sc. Georgi Bahchevanov (New Bulgarian University) Prof. Ilin Savov, PhD (Higher School of Security and Economics) Assoc. Prof. Blagoj Conev, PhD (Center for International and Development Studies) Dr. Sandro Knezovic (Institute for Development and International Relations) Dr. Petyo Valkov (Counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, BHUB)

Compilation and editing of the bulletin: Asst. Prof. Dr. Michael Dimitrov (Special Coordinator of Bulgarian Hub for United Balkans) Petya Vladimirova (Member of the Management board of Bulgarian Hub for United Balkans)

BULGARIAN HUB FOR UNITED BALKANS 33B, “Bratya Buxton” Str., 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria Website: https://bhub-ngo.org/ Email: [email protected]

Publisher: Scientific Technical Union of Mechanical Engineering "Industry 4.0"

Contents

Post-Independence Identity, Politics and Society in North Macedonia 3 CONEV Blagoj, Assoc. Prof. PhD

Geopolitical implications of Small-Scale LNG: Fiction or Reality? 11 DIMITROV Michael, Asst. Prof. PhD

The EU and the Western Balkans: Visions and Horizons 21 GABORIT Pascaline, PhD

The Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation of SEE Countries 28 GUSHEV Tome, PhD Candidate

#Dīvide Et Īmpera 43 ILIEV Svetlin

The Contemporary Doctrinal Basis of the Albanian National Question 59 NINOV Marian, Assoc. Prof. PhD

The History and Historical Committees in the Context of the Restart of the 74 European Atlantic Perspective of Skopje STANEV Stanislav, PhD

The Euro-Atlantic Aspiration of the “Albanian Factor” 85 VALKOV Petyo, PhD POST-INDEPENDENCE IDENTITY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN NORTH MACEDONIA

Assoc. Prof. Blagoj CONEV, PhD

(Image source: https://plusinfo.mk/помирувањето-за-крвавиот-четврток/)

Summary: With (North) Macedonia's independence in 19911, there was no alternative for the name of the new state and the nation. Namely, although in Greece at that time the politicians and the policy makers developed a very complex political situation to affirm and prove the Hellenistic identity of ancient Macedonia, nevertheless, the name ―Macedonia‖ was engraved as an indissoluble element of the nation's identity that in 1991 stepped on the path of creation of its own nation-state - Macedonia. In fact, Macedonia from 1991 at that time, does not implied any kind of identity conflict with Hellenistic Macedonia, because in the way of defining of the historical identities, and especially the myths which were defining the nation, the Macedonians themselves chose to determine themselves as Slavs, or nation with South Slavic origins i.e. they did not identified the primordiality of their existence with the ancient Macedon, but with the medieval Slavic tribes that inhabit the Balkans, and later begin to identify with territory of Macedonia. Keywords: identity, nation-state, society, politics, history, memory, myths.

1 The official name of the state from 2019 is Republic of North Macedonia or simply North Macedonia.

3 The impact of the national identity on politics and society in North Macedonia ―Today, the culture is accepted, even emphasized, as a political instrument‖2. Frckoski‘s definition of culture as a political instrument has been normal since the post-Great French Revolution era, because culture, as Frckoski defines, it is: ―The most general definition of culture was: norms and rules, customs, and patterns of behavior common to one particular group of people. Therefore, culture was something that homogenized...‖3. And if Frckoski's definition would be compared to Anthony D. Smith‘s definition in the first chapter of the book National Identity, that nations are ―named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs‖4, then one come to the conclusion that mass or group culture is one of the pillars of the nation. Namely, if common myths and collective memory, mass culture and customs are the basis of a nation‘s identity, according to ethno-symbolic theory, and identity is a political instrument for determining the nation‘s individuality, then it is most natural for culture to be understood as a political instrument. The young Macedonian nation, its historical development from the Revival Period (late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century) to independence, or the establishment of a nation-state in 1991, has its identity core in the ideological layout of the nation's Slavic past. As a revival period organization, Macedonian Scientific- Literary Society, whose president is one of the ideological fathers of the Macedonian nation, Krste Misirkov, in a Memorandum sent to the Council of St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society, he points out that there is another Slavic nation that wants and needs to form its own state, and that, ―in Macedonia the majority of the entire population are Slavs‖5. Such a determination that the Slavic self-consciousness is embedded in the collective memory of the Macedonian population, i.e. the Macedonian nation connects with the other Slavic nations, signifies that the culture which is a mass of that Macedonian population is Slavic and closely related to the other South Slavic cultures. The very problem of identification or cultural determination in Macedonia started when political elites ―... began to develop activities and invest great energy in proving the connection of today's Macedonians with the ancient tradition of Philip II and Alexander the Great ...‖6.

2 Фрчкоски, Љ.Д. (2012). Преговарање во конфликти на идентитети. Скопје: Магор. 3 Ibid, pp. 57 4 Smith, A. (1991). National Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 5 Ристовски, Б. (1978). Димитрија Чуповски (1878-1940) и Македонското научно-литературно другарство. Скопје: Култура. pp. 180-189 6 Габер, В. (2009). Името Македонија. Историја, право, политика. Скопје: Југореклам. pp. 131

4 This was an attempt to link the modern Macedonian nation directly with the historical state form named as Macedon(ia), to secure the prenatality of the present- day Macedonian nation and its primordial existence. Namely, every connection of the nation with its past indicates a desire to prove the nation‘s eternity, but also its permanence, i.e. its existence since the time of history. But what is interesting is that the link to the historical past, that is, the change in the collective memory of the population in terms of understanding the ―eternity‖ of the nation, is to be shown as the fruit of mutatis mutandis in the historical cycle of some of the ancient nations in the region. Thus, as Steven Grosby determines, ethnic groups and nationalities justify their existence through traditional beliefs in the biological relevance of the group and its association with the territory it inhabits7. The biggest problem that arises with this perennial interpretation of the nation is its connection to the ancient past in order to engrave this past as an inalienable part of the collective memory of the group. This inalienable part of the nation‘s identity then becomes a threat to the neighboring nation (in this case the Greek) which already exists with its perennial relations to the cultural heritage of the antiquity, and has defined that cultural heritage as one of the basic elements of its cultural distinctiveness, i.e. as part of its own national identity. This situation leads into a process of conflict between identities and represented one of the biggest political problems in Macedonia before 2019 and in North Macedonia after 2019, as this conflict enables a slow democratic development of the state and the development of the specific and extreme ―Balkan‖ kind of nationalism in Macedonian society, but also in Greece. The inability of political elites to overcome the nation‘s identity conflict with neighboring nations, however, leads to conflict within a multi-ethnic Macedonian society itself, i.e. the Macedonian nation is not formed as a result of the homogenization of a group and its culture, but rather created as a mix of multiple culturally distinct identities. Victor Gaber says for the London Economist (22.11.2007) that: ―They share the unmistakable but absurd assumption that the achievements of an entity known as Macedonia in ancient history should be of decisive importance in modern ethnography or political geography - the fact that an ancient kingdom called Macedonia, only one entity could be entitled to that name. The region is still waiting for a statesman to reject that assumption‖8. Determining this way of linking modern identity with history, the London Economist writes that it is necessary to overcome these ways of defining the nation, that is, the perennial interpretation of the nation in a region where there is no opportunity to distinguish one identity from another.

7 Grosby, S. (1994). ―The verdict of history: the inexpugnable tie of primordiality – A reply to Eller and Coughlan in Ethnic and Racial Studies (Journal), vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 164-171. 8 Габер, В. (2009). Името Македонија. Историја, право, политика. Скопје: Југореклам. pp. 132

5 The need to form an identity, according to Geertz, is simply a reason for a particular group of people to show validity to the world that there is a legal basis for seeking to create a separate state9. Thus, the Macedonian nation, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, begins a process of unification and finding a separate identity. What is problematic is the fact that, in the process of reinforcing identity, the Macedonian elites are beginning to make primordial changes in the collective memory of the population that is to replace the primordial connection with the Slavic group of peoples with a perennial connection to ancient history, i.e. ancient Macedonia. In the process, it is normal for the new identity to enter into conflict with existing neighbors. But it is not normal to have a nationalist approach in the understanding of identity and the nation-state, as Denko Maleski says that the determination ―... we Macedonians have no problem with our political order and with our identity, and who has them they solve them‖10, that became a generally accepted way of understanding of the problems of the political elites and the masses in nowadays North Macedonia. This kind of behavior of the elites is to exploit the identity of the nation only to gain political points and create an even greater form of nationalism among the population that in future will prevent any resolution of identity conflicts with the neighboring nations. Namely, the creation of nationalism which is fed-up not by feelings of belonging to the group, but by hatred and intolerance towards other groups, makes the Macedonian society, nation and an identity, as Eric Hobsbawm explains, dependent on political elites and the state itself11 and thus keeps the ―national question‖ current in the political agenda of the state. Thus, as Denko Maleski explains in ―The Tar Baby‖ (Bebeto od katran), ―the insanity that is specific for the fanatical attachment to identity is creating ―rival nationalistic projects‖12. Dimitar Mirchev, on the other hand, clarifies that ethnic identities in Macedonia begin to be used for political purposes after the collapse of socialism, when, after the collapse of the Communist Party, the main pillar of the state is replaced by ethno political centrism and nationalism13. Namely, as Mirchev puts it ―... behind the natural and desired threshold of change in the direction of civil society, the proprietary and entrepreneurial economy and political democracy, the national economy, the ethnocentric state and the old communist elite, now ate emerging in the shape of a recycled ethno-elite‖14.

9 Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 10 Малески, Д. (2012). Бебето од катран. Скопје: Култура. pp. 103 11 Hobsbawn, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12 Малески, Д. (2012). Бебето од катран. Скопје: Култура. pp. 491 13 Мирчев, Д. (2012). Балканскиот мегаетникум. Скопје: БиГ Зеница. pp. 31 14 Mircev, D. (1993). ―Ethnocentrism and Strife among Political Elites: The End of Yugoslavia‖ in Governance. Oxford: Blackwell. vol.6, no.3.

6 With such actualization of the ethnic, i.e. the national identity in North Macedonia, the myths, memory and traditions create new challenges with every new generation. In this way young generations of nationalists are created, who by using the glorious historical past of their people, as well as culture and traditions, manage to transmit themselves in the process of creating nationalist doctrines and thereby open cultural-historical, political and economic issues with neighboring states, or nations. In fact, this way starts another phenomenon that Clifford Geertz defines as being characteristic of every newly formed nation-state, that is to enter into the exploration of matter called ―identity‖ and begin a search for that own (national) identity15. What emerges as a political or social problem in this whole situation of glorifying identity and creating nationalism is that such link to historical and cultural heritage is not only an emotional aspiration to understand the primordial values of one's own group, but also a fictional tool for manipulating the masses16. Namely, national sentiments and values are used as a ―weapon‖ to direct and control the mobilized mass of people in order to realize daily political interests by political elites. The greatest fear and the desire of political elites in North Macedonia after 1991 is to prove who is more Macedonian than the others. In that struggle started a contest of proving the diversity of the Macedonians as a nation or nationality. Namely, journalists and historians, as well as the academic elite in the country, started being recognized with their new social role as ―fighters for the national cause‖. These custodians of the ―nation‖ used to work and some of them are still working for the political elites in order not only to prove the nation‘s pereniality but also to magnify and glorify the culture and the uniqueness of the Macedonians, such as the myths and traditions, with special task to prove their individuality and eternity. These kind of social actors were, and still are, a necessity in order to justify the uniqueness of the ―Macedonism‖, which has developed into a political category. Thus, unconsciously the Macedonian elites made drastic changes in the theoretical interpretation of the idea of the nation‘s identity. Namely, they replaced the modernist interpretation with an ethno-symbolic one, thus changing the perception of the Macedonian nation (the masses), not only of their own identity, but also in the perception of the ordinary Macedonian on the identity of the neighboring nations. This leaded to one confusing process of changing the perceptions of identities, in turn to create an operation of forming new myths and symbols of the nation that were not previously part of identity traits. Consequently, the mentioned above process emerged an identity conflict, not only with other nations, but also within members of the Macedonian nation. Namely, this ―conflict of identities‖ has great opportunities to end

15 Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 16 Kedourie, E. (1960). Nationalism. London: Hutchinson.

7 up with enormous social stratification. The social stratification could happen, not as a result of the breakdown of the political system in the state, but as dissolution of the nation‘s identity. Best example for such process is the research of Anastasia Karakassidou in today‘s Central Macedonia in Greece. If, Anastasia Karakassidou states that through a successful state-administration apparatus, the Greek authorities succeeded in carrying out a complete implementation of Greek culture and its replacement with the local - Macedonian or Slavic, by changing the individual and local identity, in Central (Aegean) Macedonia17; then the opposite can happen in the North Macedonia. This means that if in Central (Aegean) Macedonia the process of unifying the hegemonic Greek identity is carried out through the transformation of the individual identity of individuals who due to some privileges or tax breaks or in order to protect themselves from terror by the authorities, gradually change their individual identity, which also contributes to the change of the local that gradually merges into the stronger, and in this case, the Greek; then in North Macedonia, ―violent‖ change in perceptions of national identity can make or made great differences between the national and the local and individual identities of the population, which may ultimately result in the Macedonians not being identified with the national identity.

Conclusion The President of the Republic of Macedonia - Gjorge Ivanov (2009-2019) and author dealing with socio-political problems, says that in (North) Macedonia there is a need to transform emotional identification with rational loyalty, i.e. that civic and constitutional patriotism have to replace nationalist one. This would mean that given the specificity of the Macedonian nation, nationalism, the national collective memory in terms of myths, traditions, and religious affiliation, should be replaced by a patriotic collective memory that would magnify the common state rather than the individuality of the nation18. On the other hand, the biggest problem today in North n socio- political development is the lack of understanding of the meaning of the terms: nation, identity, nationalism and patriotism. This makes North Macedonia a specific nation- state in which nationalism is set not as a unifying factor of the population, but as a destructive factor for the state. Namely, even patriotism in North Macedonia is with some nationalistic aspects - all those who are not ethnic Macedonians cannot love the state of the Republic of Macedonia before 2019, and Republic of North Macedonia after that. As a recommendation for overcoming, I will quote Denko Maleski who

17 Каракасиду, А. (2011). Полиња жито, ридишта крв. Скопје: Магор. 18 Ivanov, G. (2001). ―Power of Powerless: Democracy and Civil Society in Macedonia‖ in Democratic Reconstruction in the Balkans. London: University of Westminster. pp. 77

8 states in his ―Political essays‖: ―There is a difficult process of learning in front of us that there is a different interpretation of patriotism. Macedonian unity is plural and can only be preserved as a permanent equilibrium between ethnic groups, religions ... Macedonian unity can never be absolute, rigid, simple and must always be a balance of the multitude of interests we strive for in moderation and tolerance‖19. Maleski, quoting Walter Lippman in a 1935 essay on ―American unity‖, with understanding of the distortion in the interpretation of identity and nationalism in Macedonia, as well as its impact on politics and society, suggests that the nation‘s identity cannot be built solely on the basis of ethnicity. Namely, if we analyze the text quoted by Maleski, it can be concluded that homogenization of the Macedonian nation must be done only as a balance of cultures, not as ethnic or religious homogenization of the population. Thus, Maleski alludes to the necessity of a modernist view of the nation, that is, to reduce nationalist influences on the social processes in the state, because, as he puts it, one can achieve an equilibrium in society and reduce the state‘s influence on the state, the identities of the nation and of ethnic minority groups. Only in this way politics can not make influence on culture and vice versa, and the identity of the nation, although a political category, will not have an impact on the socio- political processes ina statesuch as Republic of North Macedonia.

Bibliography:

Cyrilic:

- Габер, В. (2003). Премрежјата на македонскиот интелектуалец. Скопје: Матица. - Габер, В. (2009). Името Македонија. Историја, право, политика. Скопје: Југореклам. - Каракасиду, А. (2011). Полиња жито, ридишта крв. Скопје: Магор.

- Малески, Д. (2012). Бебето од катран. Скопје: Култура.

- Малески, Д. (2000). Меѓународна политика. Скопје: Правен факултет. - Мирчев, Д. (2012). Балканскиот мегаетникум. Скопје: БиГ Зеница.

-Ристовски, Б. (1978). Димитрија Чуповски (1878-1940) и Македонското научно-литературно другарство. Скопје: Култура. - Ристовски, Б. (2011). Македонскиот преродбенски XIX век. Скопје: Три. - Фрчкоски, Љ.Д. (2012). Преговарање во конфликти на идентитети. Скопје: Магор.

- Цонев, Б. (2018). Македонија и Балканот: Либерален поглед на национализмот и идентитетите. Скопје: Арс Ламина Публикации

Latin:

19 Малески, Д. (2012). Бебето од катран. Скопје: Култура. pp. 21

9 - Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

- Arendt, H. (1958). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland: Meridian Books - The World Publishing Company

- Bhabha, H. (1994). The Location of Cultures. Routledge: London

- Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.

- Grosby, S. (1994). “The verdict of history: the inexpugnable tie of primordiality – A reply to Eller and Coughlan in Ethnic and Racial Studies (Journal), vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 164-171.

- Hobsbawn, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ivanov, G. (2001). “Power of Powerless: Democracy and Civil Society in Macedonia” in Democratic Reconstruction in the Balkans. London: University of Westminster.

- Kedourie, E. (1960). Nationalism. London: Hutchinson.

- Mircev, D. (1993). “Ethnocentrism and Strife among Political Elites: The End of Yugoslavia” in Governance. Oxford: Blackwell. vol.6, no.3.

- Smith, A. (1991). National Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

10 GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SMALL-SCALE LNG: FICTION OR REALITY?

Asst. Prof. Michael DIMITROV, PhD

(Image source: https://www.kallanishenergy.com/2019/09/10/north-america-to-drive-new-small-scale-lng- capacity-globaldata/)

Summary: The report focuses on the use of small-scale LNG infrastructure for the development of difficult to access natural gas fields and the opportunities that arise from this technology in regard of entering specific energy markets that remain out of the scope of the traditional gas transmission systems. The main directions of use and the economic viability of each is presented in the light of the upcoming transformation of the global energy needs. Keywords: ssLNG, ―blue corridors‖, LNG-driven vehicles.

11 There is a continuing trend of change in the mix of primary energy sources, both as a result of the drive to combat climate change and as a desire of states to reduce their dependency. In this context, natural gas [NG] is becoming an increasingly preferred alternative raw material, with global consumption of this energy source increasing by 5% in 2018, reaching almost 4 trillion cubic meters1. Despite projections to limit the global average annual consumption growth of NG to 1.6% in the period to 2024, China's policy on the transition from coal to NG (contributing to an impressive 14.5% growth in 2017 and 18.1% in 2018 in the consumption of this hydrocarbon) and the increase of the US NG market by 11.5% in 2018, set the overall dynamics of the global energy mix, in which NG already accounts for a 23% share2. A known exception to this trend is the NG consumption by EU member states. It decreased by 2.4% in 2018, but the level of dependency on external sources during the same year reached record levels – 77.9%3. Failing to guarantee a secure access for the European consumers to the Middle East's deposits, declining domestic production and the Russian Federation's undisguised desire to use foreign energy supplies as a political tool, the EU is facing a difficult choice, aimed at seeking an acceptable compromise between security of supply, economic logic and the occurrence of foreign levers for influence on its own territory. This text will not address the aspirations of the Russian political leadership to limit dependence on third countries for the export of pipeline NG and the implementation of the key projects in this respect: ―Nord Stream 2‖ and ―Turk Stream‖. The constructed liquefaction capacities are of certain interest. The first liquefied natural gas [LNG] plant in the Russian Federation was built in Prigorodnoye (Sakhalin-2) and started production in 2009, while the second in Sabetta (Yamal LNG) was completed in 2017-2018 (by the end of 2019 the fourth production line with lower capacity is expected to start operation4). For the implementation of both projects, the technological support of the Dutch company ―Shell‖ and the French ―Total‖, respectively, is important. The experience gained allows the Russian Federation to pursue high ambitions for its role in the global LNG market and to seek

1 Enerdata. 2019. Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2019. Statistic data available at https://yearbook.enerdata.net/natural-gas/gas-consumption-data.html [27.08.2019] 2 DiChristopher, T. 2019. The global boom in natural gas demand is about to slow, the International Energy Agency says. Article available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/07/the-global-boom-in- natural-gas-demand-is-about-to-slow-iea-says.html [27.08.2019] 3 Eurostat. 2019. Natural gas supply statistics. Statistic data available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php?title=Natural_gas_consumption_statistics&oldid=88292 [27.08.2019] 4 SeaNews. 2019. Fourth Train for Yamal LNG. Article available at http://seanews.ru/2019/04/10/en- fourth-line-for-yamal-lng/ [27.08.2019]

12 the construction of a number of other large-scale projects such as ―Arctic LNG 2‖, ―Shtokman LNG‖, ―Far Eastern LNG‖, ―Pechora LNG‖ and ―Baltic LNG‖5. All these projects demonstrate Russia's desire to establish itself as the world's leading LNG producer. In addition, the built capacity has some relevance at national level. A good example is the deployment of ―Marshal Vasilevskiy‖ floating storage and regasification unit about 5 kilometers off the coast near Priboy, Kaliningrad, with an annual capacity of 2.7 billion cubic meters6. This allows the Russian side to suspend the use of the Minsk-Vilnius-Kaunas-Kaliningrad gas pipeline. More importantly, through the implementation of these projects, the Russian Federation has gained opportunities to further develop its NG liquefaction capacity. There is no technological dependence of the Russian side in the construction of small-scale liquefied natural gas [ssLNG] production infrastructure. Its necessary equipment can be procured from a number of suppliers, making it difficult to restrict this sector by imposing sanctions. This is a significant positive factor, given the difficulties in the practical implementation of the ―import substitution‖ policy. In the production of ssLNG, technologies identical to those used in large tonnage plants are applied:

 throttle cooling cycles;  expansion refrigeration cycles;  cascade refrigeration cycles with pure refrigerant;  single-stage cascade refrigeration cycles with refrigerant representing a multicomponent mixture of hydrocarbons and nitrogen7. The first of the above technologies is highly reliable, capable of delivering capacities of 0.3 to 4 tonnes of LNG/h per production line and requires equipment entirely available from Russian companies. A leading position in this regard is occupied by PJSC ―Cryogenmash‖, which is providing technology for 20% of all ssLNG plants in China8. Another important factor in the rise of ssLNG is the cost of building such infrastructure. With the development of NG liquefaction capacity on a small scale, it is possible to achieve a capital cost of $ 600-1000/tonne of production output of LNG per year, while for large plants the cost is $ 1500/tonne of LNG per

5 PwC. 2019. Overview of the Russian LNG Projects. Article available at https://www.pwc.ru/en/publications/russian-lng-projects.html [27.08.2019] 6 LNG World News. 2019. Gazprom‘s Kaliningrad FSRU starts up. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/gazproms-kaliningrad-fsru-starts-up/ [28.08.2019] 7 Markov, B. Chapter „Технологии малотоннажного сжижения― in „Возможности и перспективы развития малотоннажного СПГ в России―. Москва. Сколково. 2018. pp. 86 8 Cryogenmash. Integrated Solution, Proven Reliability, Real Efficiency. Balashikha. United Heavy Machinery Plants. 2019. pp. 5

13 year9. This also explains the expectation for a significant increase in the production capacity of ssLNG globally. At the end of 2018, it amounts to 25 million tonnes/year, in 2020 is expected to reach 30 million tonnes/year and 80 million tonnes/year in 203010. In order to direct the research interest to the main areas of use and the consequences that arise for economic and foreign policy relations and dependencies, it is necessary to define precisely the concept of ssLNG. In the Russian Federation a legal definition is given in ГОСТ Р 55892-2013 ―Installations for small-scale production and consumption of liquefied natural gas. General technical requirements‖11, effective since 01.06.2014. In this document, the production limit for ssLNG is set very low – 10 tonnes of LNG/h (no more than 87658 t/y). The content of this concept, according to the International Gas Union, is also related to the liquefaction capacity, but the limit set is much higher – from 0.05 million tonnes/year up to 1 million tonnes/year of LNG production12. The definition given by PricewaterhouseCoopers also deserves attention. It focuses on the use of LNG rather than the scale of production. As ssLNG is considered the direct use of NG in a liquefied form, without regasification and subsequent introduction into the gas transmission network13. This article uses the second definition regarding the volume of installed capacity, while the third is being put into the focus when the aim is to assess the potential impact of the implemented projects on the interstate relations. When looking for the place of ssLNG in the Russian energy strategy, it is necessary to present the specificities of its domestic NG market. At present, it remains subject to state regulations that distinguish two groups of consumers (population and industry), in addition setting price zones, depending on the transmission distance from the producer regions14. Currently prices for industrial consumers range from 2489

9 Markov, B. Chapter „Технологии малотоннажного сжижения― in „Возможности и перспективы развития малотоннажного СПГ в России―. Москва. Сколково. 2018. pp. 85 10 Martin, E. Small-scale LNG to see rapid growth to 2030. Article available at https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/news-content-hub/small-scale-lng-to-see-rapid-growth- to-2030-22619 [28.08.2019] 11 Национальный Стандарт Российской Федерации. ГОСТ Р 55892-2013 Объекты малотоннажного производства и потребления сжиженного природного газа. Общие технические требования. Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200107788 [28.08.2019] 12 International Gas Union. 2015. 2012-2015 Triennium Work Report: Small Scale LNG. Program Committee D3. pp. 11. Report available at www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page- field_file/SmallScaleLNG.pdf [28.08.2019] 13 Biscardini, G., R. Schmill, A. Maestro. 2017. Small going big: Why small-scale LNG may be the next big wave. pp. 4. Report available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/utilities/publications/assets/small- going-big.pdf [30.08.2019] 14 Gazprom. Russian gas market. Article available at http://www.gazprom.com/about/marketing/russia/ [30.08.2019]

14 rubles/1000 cubic meters in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District [YNAD], up to 4634 rubles/1000 cubic meters in the North Caucasian Federal District15. Prices for the population, on the other hand, according to 2018 data, are ranging from 2395 rubles/1000 cubic meters in YNAD, to 4354 rubles/1000 cubic meters in the Altai region16. The legislative framework for state regulations is set out in Federal Law No. 147 ―On Natural Monopolies‖17, Federal Law No. 69 ―On Gas Supply in the Russian Federation‖18 and Decree No. 618 ―On State Competition Policy Guidelines‖19. On November 30, 2018, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 144220, which is repealing the state regulation of the price of LNG used for commercial purposes (i.e. not for the needs of the population)21. This creates conditions for further development of the ssLNG sector in Russia as it allows the price of this energy source in liquified form to exceed the price of pipeline gas. On the one hand, this limits the number of potential consumers, as the price of LNG is about 3 times higher than the pipeline NG in the Russian Federation's internal market, but at the same time the ssLNG infrastructure becomes economically viable. This reveals that ssLNG and pipeline NG in Russia form separate markets, and the significant difference in price makes it impossible for the former to compete with the latter if suitable gas transmission infrastructure already exists. However, there are areas in which ssLNG may be the only possible alternative or the use of this raw material in liquefied form to be able to compete with other hydrocarbons.

15 Mitrova, T., S. Kapitonov, D. Henderson. Основные элементы и возможные сценарии дерегулирования цен на газ в России и реформирования газового рынка. Сколково. 2019, pp. 12. Report available at https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_RU_research_ 01022019.pdf [30.08.2019] 16 Ibid. 17 Russian Federation. Федеральный закон „О естественных монополиях― (с изменениями на 29 июля 2017 года). Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/9012860 [30.08.2019] 18 Russian Federation. Федеральный закон „О газоснабжении в Российской Федерации― (с изменениями на 26 июля 2019 года). Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901729900 [30.08.2019] 19 Russian Federation. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 21.12.2017 г. №618 „Об основных направлениях государственной политики по развитию конкуренции―. Full text available at http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42622 [30.08.2019] 20 Russian Federation. Постановление от 30 ноября 2018 г. № 1442 „Об изменении и признании утратившими силу некоторых актов Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросам государственного регулирования цен на газ. Full text available at http://static.government.ru/media/files/5znXYbRVklkOnCRQlXLuc8k8pni7rhfF.pdf [30.08.2019] 21 Vozdvizhenskaya, A. 2018. Правительство отменило госрегулирование цен на сжиженный газ "Газпрома". Article available at https://rg.ru/2018/12/10/pravitelstvo-otmenilo-gosregulirovanie-cen- na-szhizhennyj-gaz-gazproma.html [30.08.2019]

15 In this respect, it should be noted, first of all, that ssLNG can be used as a fuel for motor transport. Leading companies in the production of trucks are focusing on the development of internal combustion engines, which use LNG22 23 24. Not only the use of LNG as a fuel is successful, it also provides greater maximum mileage and up to 40% lower transport costs compared to diesel engines25. In addition, there is no difference in fuel loading time, 20% less carbon emissions are released, the overall weight of the auto-composition is reduced, and the payload is increased. In the Russian Federation, the first tests on LNG-driven heavy-duty trucks are conducted by KAMAZ. Two KAMAZ-65117-37 and one KAMAZ-65116-37 have been modified for this purpose26. Also, the cost of building an automobile gas filling compressor station able to work with LNG varies between 580000 and 1150000 euros27. All of this makes the outlined direction for the use of ssLNG very promising. The situation is very similar with the use of ssLNG as marine fuel. With the increasingly stringent requirements of the International Maritime Organization on the levels of sulfur content of certain liquid fuels28, especially in the emission control areas, the ssLNG is acquiring a new niche in which it is a very strong competitor to fuel oil. A significant weakness arises from the fact that the construction of the infrastructure for the storage and loading of ships with LNG requires investments in the order of EUR 60-100 million29. It is very likely that in the medium term, LNG will start to play a more significant role in rail transport as well. Another opportunity for ssLNG to enter the energy market is the prospect of use for electricity generation. This refers to the direct use of LNG, although the

22 Iveco. CNG and LNG Trucks for Long-Haulage. Article available at https://www.iveco.com/uk/products/pages/gas-powered-for-long-haulage-new-stralis.aspx [04.09.2019] 23 Volvo. The New Gas-Powered Volvo FH LNG. Article available at https://www.volvotrucks.com/en- en/trucks/volvo-fh-series/volvo-fh-lng.html [04.09.2019] 24 Scania. Scania trials first CNG truck in Lithuania. Article available at https://www.scania.com/group/en/scania-trials-first-cng-truck-in-lithuania/ [04.09.2019] 25 LNG World News. Iveco LNG-fueled truck sets distance record. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/iveco-lng-fueled-truck-sets-distance-record/ [04.09.2019] 26 Kamaz. First LNG Kamaz Trucks. Article available at https://kamaz.ru/en/press/news/first_lng_kamaz_trucks/ [04.09.2019] 27 Mariani, F. Cost analysis of LNG refueling stations. pp. 43. Report available at lngbc.eu/system/files/deliverable_attachments/LNG_BC_D%203%208%20Cost%20analysis%20of%2 0LNG%20refuelling%20stations.pdf [04.09.2019] 28 EC. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and compliance with the sulphur standards for marine fuels set out in Directive (EU) 2016/802 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-188-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF [04.09.2019] 29 Biscardini, G., R. Schmill, A. Maestro. 2017. Small going big: Why small-scale LNG may be the next big wave. pp. 12. Report available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/utilities/publications/assets/small-going-big.pdf [04.09.2019]

16 possibility at large regasification terminals of using expanding vapors to produce electricity during the process of heating LNG to 0 degrees Celsius is particularly interesting30. Provision of power supply, if unable to connect to the electricity grid due to remoteness from large settlements (e.g. in Australia) or geographical features (islands in Southeast Asia), can be achieved through the construction of small LNG power plants. This is justified by the already presented advantages of this energy resource over diesel. The aforementioned directions of use highlight ssLNG as a profitable business with good prospects, which is also characterized by lower capital costs than the traditional LNG sector. In the Russian Federation ssLNG projects are implemented mainly by three companies: ―Gazprom‖, ―NOVATEK‖ and ―Cryogas‖. The latter is owned by ―Gazprombank‖31. The name of ―NOVATEK‖ remains linked to large-scale projects in the Arctic, but good contacts between its owners (especially Gennady Timchenko) and the Russian political leadership guarantee good opportunities for an entry into the small-scale sector. At present, the main Russian ssLNG projects are as follow:  Pskov: The liquefaction plant started operation in May 2016, with a capacity of 21300 tonnes/year32.  Kaliningrad: in 2013, the small production complex with a capacity of 21000 tons/year was renovated33. At the end of 2018, GRS-2 Kaliningrad was opened with a capacity of 150000 tonnes/year34.  Vysotsk: Started operation in 2019 with a capacity of 660000 tonnes/year35. The necessary technology for the implementation of the project is provided by the Korean company ―Daelim Industrial‖.  Petrozavodsk: It is expected to start operation by the end of 2020 and to supply the consumers in the Karelian and Murmansk regions. Expected capacity – 150000 tonnes/year36.

30 Chiyoda Corporation. LNG Cryogenic Power Generation. Article available at https://www.chiyodacorp.com/en/service/receive/power-generation/ [04.09.2019] 31 Kobzeva, O. Газпромбанк ищет пути сбыта своего СПГ в России из-за рисков санкций по расчетам в валюте. Article available at https://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=10891860 [04.09.2019] 32 CryoGas. Малотоннажные комплексы по сжижению газа. Article available at http://www.cryogas.ru/complex/malotonn/ [16.09.2019] 33 NGV Global. Gazprom Kaliningrad Prepares Way for Cryogenic Gas Station Network. Article available at https://www.ngvglobal.com/blog/gazprom-kaliningrad-prepares-way-for-cryogenic-gas- station-network-1130 [16.09.2019] 34 CryoGas. ГРС-2 Калининград. Article available at www.cryogas.ru/complex/projects/grs-2- kaliningrad.html [16.09.2019] 35 LNG World News. Novatek hits full-scale production at Cryogas-Vysotsk LNG plant. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/novatek-hits-full-scale-production-at-cryogas-vysotsk-lng- plant/ [16.09.2019]

17  Kingisepp: The liquefaction plant was completed in 2008 and has a capacity of 7000 tonnes/year37.  Peterhof: started operating in 1997 with a capacity of 8100 tonnes/year38.  Portovaya: Initially, ―Gazprom‖ expected production to start by the end of 2018, but due to delays in construction, the commissioning is now scheduled for the end of 201939.

Based on the above, the following conclusions can be formulated: The ssLNG infrastructure can be used to develop gas fields that are difficult to access and there is no pipeline network connected to them. Small-scale liquefaction plants create an opportunity for economically viable entry into markets where traditional gas transmission installations cannot be built. LNG has the potential to become the fuel that will “propel” Russia's Eurasian geo-economic axes, and small-scale infrastructure – the technology that will make this possible. In the development of ssLNG infrastructure, the risks to investors are much lower than those associated with large-scale liquefaction plants and also a high target result is guaranteed with the resources available.

Sources:

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36 Respublika. Завод по производству сжиженного природного газа может появиться в Карелии. Article available at rk.karelia.ru/ekonomika/zavod-po-proizvodstvu-szhizhennogo-prirodnogo-gaza- mozhet-poyavitsya-v-karelii/ [16.09.2019] 37 Cockerill, R. JSC Cryogas sees output begin at LNG plant. Article available at https://www.gasworld.com/jsc-cryogas-sees-output-begin-at-lng-plant/3736.article [16.09.2019] 38 Konoplyanik, A., A. Sergaeva. Перспективы и целевые рынки для экспорта малотоннажного спг из РФ в Европу. Presentation available at http://www.konoplyanik.ru/speeches/180607-Конопляник- Сергаева-Восток%20Капитал_СПГ2018.pdf [16.09.2019] 39 Wood Mackenzie. Portovaya LNG – LNG Plant. Article available at https://www.woodmac.com/reports/lng-portovaya-lng-lng-plant-50423034 [16.09.2019]

18 4. CryoGas. ГРС-2 Калининград. Article available at www.cryogas.ru/complex/projects/grs-2- kaliningrad.html [16.09.2019] 5. CryoGas. Малотоннажные комплексы по сжижению газа. Article available at http://www.cryogas.ru/complex/malotonn/ [16.09.2019] 6. Cryogenmash. Integrated Solution, Proven Reliability, Real Efficiency. Balashikha. United Heavy Machinery Plants. 2019. 7. DiChristopher, T. 2019. The global boom in natural gas demand is about to slow, the International Energy Agency says. Article available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/07/the- global-boom-in-natural-gas-demand-is-about-to-slow-iea-says.html [27.08.2019] 8. EC. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and compliance with the sulphur standards for marine fuels set out in Directive (EU) 2016/802 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-188-F1-EN- MAIN-PART-1.PDF [04.09.2019] 9. Enerdata. 2019. Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2019. Statistic data available at https://yearbook.enerdata.net/natural-gas/gas-consumption-data.html [27.08.2019] 10. Eurostat. 2019. Natural gas supply statistics. Statistic data available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php?title=Natural_gas_consumption_statistics&oldid=88292 [27.08.2019] 11. Gazprom. Russian gas market. Article available at http://www.gazprom.com/about/marketing/russia/ [30.08.2019] 12. International Gas Union. 2015. 2012-2015 Triennium Work Report: Small Scale LNG. Program Committee D3. Report available at www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page- field_file/SmallScaleLNG.pdf [28.08.2019] 13. Iveco. CNG and LNG Trucks for Long-Haulage. Article available at https://www.iveco.com/uk/products/pages/gas-powered-for-long-haulage-new-stralis.aspx [04.09.2019] 14. Kamaz. First LNG Kamaz Trucks. Article available at https://kamaz.ru/en/press/news/first_lng_kamaz_trucks/ [04.09.2019] 15. Kobzeva, O. Газпромбанк ищет пути сбыта своего СПГ в России из-за рисков санкций по расчетам в валюте. Article available at https://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=10891860 [04.09.2019] 16. Konoplyanik, A., A. Sergaeva. Перспективы и целевые рынки для экспорта малотоннажного спг из РФ в Европу. Presentation available at http://www.konoplyanik.ru/speeches/180607-Конопляник-Сергаева- Восток%20Капитал_СПГ2018.pdf [16.09.2019] 17. LNG World News. 2019. Gazprom‟s Kaliningrad FSRU starts up. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/gazproms-kaliningrad-fsru-starts-up/ [28.08.2019] 18. LNG World News. Iveco LNG-fueled truck sets distance record. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/iveco-lng-fueled-truck-sets-distance-record/ [04.09.2019] 19. LNG World News. Novatek hits full-scale production at Cryogas-Vysotsk LNG plant. Article available at https://www.lngworldnews.com/novatek-hits-full-scale-production-at-cryogas- vysotsk-lng-plant/ [16.09.2019] 20. Mariani, F. Cost analysis of LNG refueling stations. Report available at lngbc.eu/system/files/deliverable_attachments/LNG_BC_D%203%208%20Cost%20analysis% 20of%20LNG%20refuelling%20stations.pdf [04.09.2019]

19 21. Markov, B. Chapter „Технологии малотоннажного сжижения“ in „Возможности и перспективы развития малотоннажного СПГ в России“. Москва. Сколково. 2018. 22. Martin, E. Small-scale LNG to see rapid growth to 2030. Article available at https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/news-content-hub/small-scale-lng-to-see-rapid- growth-to-2030-22619 [28.08.2019] 23. Mitrova, T., S. Kapitonov, D. Henderson. Основные элементы и возможные сценарии дерегулирования цен на газ в России и реформирования газового рынка. Сколково. 2019. Report available at https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_RU_re search_01022019.pdf [30.08.2019] 24. NGV Global. Gazprom Kaliningrad Prepares Way for Cryogenic Gas Station Network. Article available at https://www.ngvglobal.com/blog/gazprom-kaliningrad-prepares-way-for- cryogenic-gas-station-network-1130 [16.09.2019] 25. PwC. 2019. Overview of the Russian LNG Projects. Article available at https://www.pwc.ru/en/publications/russian-lng-projects.html [27.08.2019] 26. Respublika. Завод по производству сжиженного природного газа может появиться в Карелии. Article available at rk.karelia.ru/ekonomika/zavod-po-proizvodstvu-szhizhennogo- prirodnogo-gaza-mozhet-poyavitsya-v-karelii/ [16.09.2019] 27. Russian Federation. Постановление от 30 ноября 2018 г. № 1442 „Об изменении и признании утратившими силу некоторых актов Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросам государственного регулирования цен на газ. Full text available at http://static.government.ru/media/files/5znXYbRVklkOnCRQlXLuc8k8pni7rhfF.pdf [30.08.2019] 28. Russian Federation. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 21.12.2017 г. №618 „Об основных направлениях государственной политики по развитию конкуренции“. Full text available at http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42622 [30.08.2019] 29. Russian Federation. Федеральный закон „О газоснабжении в Российской Федерации“ (с изменениями на 26 июля 2019 года). Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901729900 [30.08.2019] 30. Russian Federation. Федеральный закон „О естественных монополиях“ (с изменениями на 29 июля 2017 года). Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/9012860 [30.08.2019] 31. Scania. Scania trials first CNG truck in Lithuania. Article available at https://www.scania.com/group/en/scania-trials-first-cng-truck-in-lithuania/ [04.09.2019] 32. SeaNews. 2019. Fourth Train for Yamal LNG. Article available at http://seanews.ru/2019/04/10/en-fourth-line-for-yamal-lng/ [27.08.2019] 33. Volvo. The New Gas-Powered Volvo FH LNG. Article available at https://www.volvotrucks.com/en-en/trucks/volvo-fh-series/volvo-fh-lng.html [04.09.2019] 34. Vozdvizhenskaya, A. 2018. Правительство отменило госрегулирование цен на сжиженный газ "Газпрома". Article available at https://rg.ru/2018/12/10/pravitelstvo- otmenilo-gosregulirovanie-cen-na-szhizhennyj-gaz-gazproma.html [30.08.2019] 35. Wood Mackenzie. Portovaya LNG – LNG Plant. Article available at https://www.woodmac.com/reports/lng-portovaya-lng-lng-plant-50423034 [16.09.2019] 36. Национальный Стандарт Российской Федерации. ГОСТ Р 55892-2013 Объекты малотоннажного производства и потребления сжиженного природного газа. Общие технические требования. Full text available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200107788 [28.08.2019]

20 THE EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS: VISIONS AND HORIZONS

Pascaline GABORIT, PhD

(Image source: https://theglobepost.com/2019/09/16/balkans-eu-enlargement/)

Summary: The European Union and the Western Balkans are intertwined territories bound together by history, culture, the economy and increasing joint security and climate challenges. The future decisions related to the regional integration and enlargement will deeply impact the lives of the populations in the different countries and redesign the context by offering new visions and perspectives. The history of the European Union is punctuated by strong cohesive momentums during the different historic waves of enlargement. With the current challenges created by the Brexit, the new starting EU political mandate, and the geopolitical growing uncertainties, the question of any future enlargement towards the Western Balkans has been further postponed and appeared to be, at least during the last mandate of the EU Commission, tacitly unprioritized. By entering a too long status quo on effective enlargement horizons, there is a risk for Europe to restrict boundaries, horizons, and even to consider the Western Balkans as an unstable neighbourhood, rather than as a strategic asset for the territory. This article will try, with a distance, to analyse the different visions and horizons of the enlargement towards the Western Balkans through different scenarios. Keywords: EU enlargement policy, Western Balkans, scenario planning.

21 The European Union and the Western Balkans economies are deeply related. EU-Balkans trade doubled in the 10 years. EU accounts for majority of imports and exports of the Western Balkans1. Nearly all exports can enter the EU without custom duties or limits on quantities since 2000. In addition, EU companies are by far the largest investors in the Western Balkans where EU companies invested over 10 billion in the past 5 years. Most of the countries (but not all) have a visa free travel to the EU. There is a long history of cooperation on security and joint efforts in peacebuilding and stabilization, which have known ups and downs, difficulties and echoed different visions in the different EU member states (not all EU member states have recognized Kosovo‘s independence). Some of the Western Balkans‘ countries (including Albania), have already joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO, or will join in the near future for North Macedonia. The EU has an official development a policy to support the gradual integration of the Western Balkan countries with the Union. On 1 July 2013, Croatia became the first of the seven countries to join. Montenegro, Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia and Albania are official candidates. Accession chapters have been opened with Montenegro and Serbia, whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries2. Comprehensive tools such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the Regional Cooperation Council have been set up as a framework for the regionals between the EU and countries in the region. It is based on bilateral contractual relations, financial assistance, political dialogue, trade relations and regional cooperation. As a matter of fact, however, the key decision makers from the European Commission‘s president Jean-Claude Juncker and most of the EU heads of states, had made clear so far that there would not be new enlargements in the short term. The advanced reasons, apart from the insufficient progress from the candidate countries have been the necessity to reform EU institutions first, and the growing concern that opening borders, would mean more migrations into Europe (the question of the arrival of refugees through the Balkans‘ route has indeed been often advanced). With the new EU Commission‘s mandate, expectations may grow as to clarify if the future enlargements will take place and when they could be expected to be completed. Nothing is absolutely granted in the area, even if the EU has already opened chapters of negotiations with both Serbia and Montenegro for future membership. Therefore, to simplify the reading I suggest below different likely scenarios for the short-term evolution of the EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, while highlighting what would be the constraints, and consequences of each scenario.

1 Council of the EU 2019 2 Source the European Parliament fact sheet 2019

22 Case Scenario 1: The enlargement process is blocked for the next EU Mandate. This scenario would not be an unknown one. It would in any case not be presented as such, but rather be introduced as a temporary phase towards future negotiations. 2018, was indeed already supposed to lead to a renewed interest of the EU in the Western Balkans, with several key events such as the settling of the dispute on the name ―North Macedonia‖ with Greece, and the dialogue created by the Bulgarian presidency3. However, following this renewed interest, the question has shifted away from the priorities. The consequences of this scenario are decisive. Indeed, as the EU may consider it as a status quo, territories and regional dynamics are too important to ignore the effects of a ―No real Membership‖ policy on the candidate countries. The first consequence and impact of this scenario would be an increased security challenge: this security challenge being already acknowledged as a decisive element by the EU leaders. Indeed, the fact to lock out the candidate countries outside of the Union, would make it more difficult to reach agreements and cooperation with each individual country on the control of migrations, human trafficking, and the fight against radicalization. The second important impact of a postponed/blocked enlargement process would be the negative perceptions created among the population, a possible outburst of tensions, and the weakening of the public institutions and leaders in the countries which may appeared to have ―failed‖ the membership negotiation process. Indeed, polls show that although most than half of the population in the Western Balkans is strongly in favour of the EU accession, the population in the Western Balkans has partly lost hope in a forthcoming enlargement despite a renewed interest (Source Balkan Opinion Barometer 2018 and 2019). A blocked or postponed enlargement process may create tensions, frictions and even resentment towards EU leaders. In countries which have experienced violence (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania), tensions, or conflicts, the instability factor is also a concern, as the countries may witness waves of radicalization, renewed nationalism and/or conflicts. It is additionally interesting to highlight the question of ―shrinking territories‖. While I was doing research on the post conflict in Bosnia4, some of the interviewees mentioned this ―shrinking space‖ created by the split of the former Yugoslavia. They experienced it as a loss of freedom and horizons.

3 Anna Nadibaidze, Can EU enlargement in the western Balkans revive? 4 2004-2009

23 A third important anticipated impact or consequence, which may be underestimated by the EU leaders, is the current geopolitical battles for influence. It goes without doubts that countries like Serbia and Montenegro have developed strong relationships with Russia, in a tensed context. In a medium-term future, these countries may be considered as important ―strategic places‖ to gain influence. Even China has started a cooperation influence with the 16+1 initiative: The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People‘s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries5 (in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, education, infrastructure, high technologies, and green technologies)6. Although the EU may remain an important trade partner, it is not to be excluded that the former candidate countries would turn towards other strategic partners.

Case Scenario 2: Differentiated enlargement creates a gap between the acceding members and the left out countries. The differentiated scenario is the one which has been adopted for the previous enlargements and is the one induced by the opening of membership chapters‘ negotiations with both Serbia and Montenegro. Indeed, until now, the European successive enlargements occurred by bilateral negotiations with the candidate countries. In addition, there is a set of conditions, known as the ―Copenhagen criteria‖ which sets up conditions in terms of politics, economy and rule of law. In most of the cases, the EU decision-makers have to picked up the most stable and performant economic country (Croatia in 2013). And it would be logical that Montenegro would naturally follow, while the membership process with Serbia had known difficulties until recently. One negative impact of the differentiated scenario is however that it is strongly divisive for the countries which would remain outside of the Union. In particular, some countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo experienced conflicts, which resulted in ethnic cleansing, partition and borders‘ disputes. In the case of Bosnia- Herzegovina, the logic tells that after the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the country would experience problems in governance. These governance problems were a direct consequence of the peace agreement, which imposed on them a system where the different communities (and former belligerents) needed to cooperate to reach agreements. This represented from the start, a clear obstacle to reach the necessary conditions to join the EU.

5 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia) 6 http://ceec-china-latvia.org/about

24 It would be logical that a real differentiated scenario considers not only the performances and results but also the needs and difficulties of each candidate country. While I was doing research to Bosnia7, you could already sense a feeling of disappointment, that despite the resilience of a city like Sarajevo to the conflict/war seat, other former neighbouring Yugoslavian territories has already joined the EU, whereas this would be difficult to achieve for Bosnia. The enlargement to Croatia, had indeed direct impacts on the Croatian community in Bosnia as there had been movements across the border. In the same idea, we can foresee that an accession of Serbia would probably be beneficial to the population in the Republika Srpska (part of Bosnia-Herzegovina), but would further lock in the Bosnian Muslim community, without paying tribute to the peace efforts and achievements. Bosnia may be an easy example, but a differentiated enlargement would surely lead equally to negative perceptions in Kosovo, and in the Republic of North Macedonia if the country does not join, whereas the efforts to reach an agreement on the name (with Greece) could have relaunched the process. Therefore, above all scenarios, the differentiated scenario is not exempted from negative consequences. Indeed, as stated in the introduction, the enlargement decisions of the EU have impacts on the lives but also on the perceptions of the local populations. Letting outside of the Union, the countries experiencing the most challenges may bring wrong signals to the Youth in this country, and lead to negative perceptions of democracy, and even of the values promoted by the EU.

Case Scenario 3: The Western Balkans join the EU in a new wave of enlargement. Despite remaining theoretical, this scenario would undeniably have positive impacts on the stabilization of the region, and for the dialogue with the civil societies in the Western Balkans. According to the 2019 barometer, more than half of the population in the Western Balkans, is explicitly in favour of EU membership. The belonging to the EU has had positive impacts in the stabilization of other former territories (Cyprus, Northern Ireland…) by opening up the borders, territories, horizons and by replacing the local concerned areas in a larger stable territory. This scenario would equally be relevant by renewing with the values of fraternity and peace which are underpinning the European Union. This may also be a timely scenario after the Brexit (expected to occur at the end of October 2019), and in

7 2004-2009

25 a time of growing geopolitical tensions with several regional powers. A swift enlargement to the Balkans could be a new opportunity for the EU, a ―revenge on back luck‖. It would help the EU bicycle to keep going‘. However, this scenario may remain very unlikely and this for several reasons: firstly, the public opinion in the different EU member states seems reluctant to open new borders. What has been called the refugee crisis, has stigmatized the ―Balkans route‖, by which refugees were entering to Europe. The current leaders and head of states seem to respect the opinion of their population very much in this area. Even the decision makers in Germany would struggle internally to promote a new EU enlargement within the German population. Other head of states mentioned the necessity to first reform the EU institutions, before any new enlargement could effectively take place. These concerns about the reform of EU institution are strengthened by the difficulties to reach consensus among the 28 and soon 27 member states. The idea to have complex rotating presidencies with 34 member states, as much as the adaptation of the EU Commission and Parliament will hamper a swift decision. But as we could not have imagined that a simple referendum in the UK would have led to the Brexit, we could as well imagine that referendums in the Western Balkans could lead to secured accessions. The question of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans seems like an intractable situation. Whatever will happen in the future, the Western Balkans should become neither a relegated periphery, nor a simple recipient of aid, in the view of an enlargement which would be continuously postponed. The decisions to be inclusive for the Western Balkans, or further divisive will be extremely strategic and will have impacts on the future of the populations as well as on the future shape of Europe. Whatever decision will be taken, it should consider the different impacts induced by these decisions, including the ones on the perceptions of the countries‘ populations. The opinions of the young generation need to be reflected and taken into account, while any decision should be relayed by positive communication and media strategies. Future decisions should also enhance trust-building in the larger region, as well as confidence in a more global context. This means, that for instance an absence of enlargement would strongly benefit from a recognition that the decision does not lay ―only‖ in the fact that the candidate country did not reach enough progress. On the contrary decisions for future enlargement should make sure that this is not interpreted by global actors ―de facto, as a strategy to extend the strategic area of the core countries of the European Union…― but rather an opportunity for cohesion, stability and prosperity in the larger region.

26 Main Sources:

1. Bekemans L. 2012 Intercultural Dialogue and Multi-level Governance in Europe, Peter Lang 2. Braithwaite V and Levi M. 1992 Trust and Governance, Russel Sage Foundation 3. Cattaruzza A. and Sintès P. 2016 Atlas Géopolitique des Balkans, Voir autrement 4. Council of the European Union: Infographics and Fact Sheets on the Western Balkans 5. European Parliament: Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2019 6. Fraenkel E. March 2016 “The EU and the Western Balkans: Do they Share a Future” Notes, Internacionals CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs 7. Gaborit P. 2009 La confiance après un conflit Civil : Cambodge Mozambique et Bosnie- Herzégovine, L‟Harmattan 8. Gaborit P. 2012 The Strength of Culture in Development: Why Culture Matters in International Cooperation, Peter Lang International 9. Gellner E. 2006, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing 10. Lloyd J, Marconi C. 2014 Reporting the EU: News, Media and the European Institutions, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 11. Nadibaidze A, 30 Jan. 2019, “Can EU enlargement in the western Balkans revive?” Social Europe.eu 12. The Financial times, 19 June 2019 “The EU is repeating past mistakes in the Balkans” 13. Tonkiss and Passey 2000 Trust in Civil Society, Mac Millan Press

27 THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF SEE COUNTRIES Tome GUSHEV, PhD Candidate

(Image source: http://www.shareyouressays.com/knowledge/3-important-typologies-of-political-culture/112500)

Summary: Southeastern European states may have completed transition process, but still are stuck in democratic consolidation process. Unfortunately, democracy is "not the only game in town". The purpose of this paper is to prove that the development of a stable democracy depends not only on the structure of the state and its legislation but also on the subjective orientations of the citizens towards the political system, i.e. political culture. In this paper we demonstrate the importance of a democratic political culture for a stable and efficient functioning of the democratic political government. The concept of political culture, that often eludes us, due to our preoccupation with the political/institutional reformism, plays a major role in the democratic consolidation of our political community. Keywords: democracy, political culture, typology of political culture, civic political culture.

28 Introduction At the very beginning of the 21st century, liberal democracy is almost without a serious ideological competitor in the political world. Although there was some alternative to liberal democracy by the end of the 1980s, today, anticipating the outcome of the Cold War and accepting its results, most states in the world have embraced liberal democracy as their "creed". The establishment of democratic governments in the former authoritarian socialist societies marked major social, political, cultural, economic and academic changes in them and emphasized the importance and vitality of democracy. The general acceptance of democracy in different post – socialist societies, but also the large differences in their democratic achievements, raise questions about the preconditions of democracy itself, as well as of the societies that seek to implement and develop it.1 Many transitional societies are marked by social changes that do not correspond to the declared democratic transformation. The experiences of transitional societies indicate that normative-institutional democratic constitution is not sufficient for a political system to be democratic. They confirm understanding of political science from the mid-twentieth century that only politically institutionalized and socio-economic factors are not enough to explain the conditions for the emergence and development of different types of political systems.2 Certainly, the democratic normative-institutional constitution is a minimum which the democratic order is not possible without. The purpose of this paper is to prove that the development of a stable democracy depends not only on the structure of the state and its legislation but also on the subjective orientations of the citizens towards the political system, i.e. political culture. The very notion of political culture came from trying to explain why formally the same institutional - legislative models in different societies do not produce the same results.3 According to Andrew Haywood, in spite of the fact that interest in political culture waned during the 1970s and 1980s, the debate resurfaced in the 1990s because of the needs of Southeastern Europe countries to establish democracy on the ruins of communism, but also because of increased concerns about democracy in established democracies such as the United States, for allegedly diminishing social capital and civic engagement.4 So, regardless of the general declarative acceptance of democracy, mistrust in democratic institutions is present in both established and emerging

1 Pero Maldini, " Političko – kulturalni preduvjeti demokratizacije ", Politička misao. 3 (2006), p. 88 2 Димитар Бајалџиев, Политологија, Скопје, Правен факултет, 2000, p. 453 3 Irena Ristič, "Religija kao faktor političke kulture i ekonomskog razvoja ", Filozofija I društvo. XXVIII (2005), p. 145 4 Endru Hejvud, Politika, Beograd, Clio, 2004, p. 381

29 democracies. It can be hypothetically concluded that this crisis of legitimacy is not an exception or a temporary anomaly. It is about de-legitimizing the existing political institutions, that is, the increased conviction of the citizens that these institutions are inadequately expressing their public interests.5 It should be noted here that the "crisis of democracy" does not mean the deficiency or weakness of the institutions we call democratic, but rather a crisis of the legitimacy of these institutions expressed through the diminished confidence of the citizens in the just outcome of their functioning. As Haywood says, much of politics is happen in our heads. It is influenced by our ideas, values and assumptions about how society should be organized, as well as expectations, hopes and fears of government. Perception can not only be more important than reality, it can be reality. Consequently, the key role of what we call political culture is emphasized. People's beliefs, symbols and values simultaneously shape their relationship to the political process and most importantly to the regime in which they live, whether they regard their regime as legitimate. Legitimacy is essential for political stability and is the source of the regime's survival and success.6

1. Political culture Political thinkers have always recognized the importance of attitudes, values and beliefs. In the past, however, they did not view it as part of the "political culture". For example, Edmund Burke wrote about customs and tradition7, Karl Marx on ideology, and Herder on national spirit.8 The development of the term also flowed through terms such as Durkheim's "collective consciousness", Weber's concept of "meanings of individual actions", Parson's "frame of reference"9. According to Vojislav Stanovcic, there is not even little doubt that Montesquieu has paid considerable attention to political and cultural actors in analyzing the many factors that determine the spirit of the laws10 of one type of system. In many instances these factors are decisive for the nature and the way a type of system operates. The same author then he wonders: Does Alexis de Tocqueville in volume two of his capital work on Democracy in America11, who, as Montesquieu follows, fail to examine the

5 Michal Sladaček, " Problem legitimnosti demokratije ", Filozofija i društvo. XXX (2006), p. 123-124 6 Endru Hejvud, op. cit., p. 379 7 For more information see Edmund Burke, Reflections on the revolution in France, London: Oxford University Press. 1999 8 Endru Hejvud, op. cit., p. 380 9 Vladimir Vujčič, "Pojam političke kulture ", Politička misao,4 (1997), p. 111 10 See Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The spirit of laws. New York: Prometheus books. 2002 11 See Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Trans. Henry Reeve. London: Wordsworth. 1998

30 influence of the elements of political culture on democratic institutions and vice versa?12 However, it should be noted here that more attention to political culture by scholars has been devoted only to the second half of the 20th century. The interest in the idea of political culture among political scientists emerges in the fifties and sixties, when new techniques of behavioral analysis replaced the traditional institutional approach to the problem.13 Although many papers have been written lately, many seem to use the classic work about "political culture" by the authors Almond and Verba - The Civic Culture14, first published in 1963. In their most famous work, authors Almond and Verba emphasize the importance of civic (democratic) political culture for the development of stable and efficient democratic governance. Their main thesis is: ―The development of a stable and efficient democratic government depends not only on the structure of the state and on politics: it depends on the orientation that people have on the political process – on political culture. If political culture is unable to support democratic system the chances of success of that system are poor‖15 Many efforts have been made to show how democratic political institutions are not in themselves sufficient for the stable and efficient functioning of democracy, i.e. on process of peaceful changes in society. Although there are still some uncertainties, it can still be safely asserted today that "the political culture of a nation is a very important variable in explaining the very dependent variables of politics and governance in society".16 If this is the case, then we should work on the elaboration of the term political culture. As we mentioned above, the collaborative work of the authors Almond and Verba - Civic Culture is a grandiose work for elaborating of democratic political culture. In addition to the types of political culture that mark the five surveyed nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Mexico), a complete theory of political culture can be found,17 and shortly after its release ―this study in

12 Vojislav Stanovčič, Političke ideje i religija t.2, Beograd: Udruženje za političke nauke i Čigoja štampa, 2003, p. 162-163 13 Endru Hejvud, op. cit., p. 380 14 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,"The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations", Princeton University, 1963 15 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, op. cit., p.488 16 Vladimir Vujčič, "Pojam političke kulture", op.cit., p. 115-116 17 Ibid.

31 political science will impose itself as a classic for a whole generation of political scientists‖.18 We will therefore dwell on the results of this book that are important for understanding the term itself. The aforementioned authors give a definition of political culture. For them "political culture represents specific political orientations - attitudes towards the political system and its parts, as well as attitudes towards the role of the individual in society".19This new term highlights "the orientations towards politics and the role of the person in that phenomenon" or the subjective relationship of people to politics. After all, political culture represents exactly the subjective side of politics. There are three types of orientations: cognitive, affective and evaluative. Cognitive orientations encompass knowledge of politics (political system, political role and outcomes of a particular government), affective orientations contain feelings about the political system, political authorities and roles, and evaluative orientations signify judgments and opinions about various political objects knowledge and feelings for them.20 So, on the question of what political culture is, perhaps the shortest definition of this problematic and difficult tangible category would be that it is "a model of individual attitudes and orientations shared by people in a society that relate to politics".21 So, the political culture reflects the values and attitudes of the citizens of a country that relate to politically relevant issues, i.e. issues that concern everyone equally. The term political culture also reveals the additional, most complex characteristic and proportion of the subjective side of politics, namely the categories of political knowledge, political literacy, ideology, psychology, and so on. In this way, there are fundamental changes in the representation of the role of man in the political world.22. According to Dimitar Bajaldzhiev, "political culture is a system of historically created proportionally permanent institutions, beliefs, representations, patterns of behavior, manifested in the immediate activity of the subjects of the political process." It is method of people's actions based on certain values, beliefs, representations.23

18 Димитар Мирчев и Лидија Христова, Модерната политологија - темелите на проучувањето на политичкиот живот, Скопје: Универзитет ФОН и Култура, 2008, p. 200 19 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, op. cit., p.13 20 Vladimir Vujčič, "Pojam političke kulture", op.cit., p. 116-117, also see Билјана Ванковска, Политички систем, Скопје, Бомат графикс, 2007 p. 66, and Димитар Бајалџиев, op. cit., p. 456- 457 21 Л. Христова, „Политичка култура, социјализација и јавно мислење“, in : Л. Христова (прир.), Наука за политиката, Зборник на текстови, Скопје, p.6 22 Димитар Бајалџиев, op. cit., p. 454 23 Ibid. p. 457

32 Simply put, political culture expresses the psychology of a nation in relation to politics.24

2. Typology of political culture The problem of determining the types of political culture arises from the different criteria used by different authors. Thus, for example, Almond and Verba first define the types of political culture from the position of the individual's role in politics, i.e. from the position of the individual towards the various objects of politics, and in their perception of their own role and the possibility of influencing political processes. Others use the term ideology to determine the types of political culture, some use the term political style, the fourth use the term value, the fifth combine values with the organization of power, etc.25 According to Vladimir Vujcic, these different classifications are not contradictory but complementary. Each criterion allows the same occurrence to be approached from a different recursion. According to him, political culture is such a complex phenomenon that it is determined by various factors (tradition, religion, education, organization of power, etc.), that it is impossible to determine its typology by a single criterion.26 2.1. A typology of political culture according to Almond and Verba Almond and Verba elaborate their typology of political culture in accordance with their definition of political culture as separate political orientations towards different policy objects. They have tried to determine which political culture most effectively supports democratic politics.27 These authors outlined three basic (pure) types of political culture based on level and type of political participation and the nature of people‘s attitudes towards politics: parochial, subject and participatory. They are largely derived from the individual's attitude towards political objects. Almond and Verba describe in detail the pure types of political culture but also identify the possibility of the mixed types of this phenomenon. Mixed types include "The Parochial-Subject Culture", "The Subject-Participatory Culture", "The Parochial-Participatory Culture" and Civic Culture (which is a mixture of the three basic types). For each of these basic types, fundamental features should be mentioned. Parochial – Basic characteristics of this type of political culture is that individuals have not developed attitudes towards different political objects. This type

24 M. Roskin., et al. Political Science. New York: Prentice Hall, 1994, p. 122, quoted by Димитар Мирчев и Лидија Христова, op. cit., с. 203 25 Vladimir Vujčič," Tipologija političke kulture", Politička misao, 4 (1998), p. 99 26 Ibid. 27 Endru Hejvud, op. cit., p. 381

33 occurs in societies where specific political roles have not yet been developed. We find it in societies where economic, political, and religious roles are not differentiated. Therefore, individuals of this type have not developed political orientations towards these roles that would differ from their social and religious orientations. The parochial individual is tied to the head of the family, the tribe. He is not aware of the broad forms of political organization, does not observe the system as a whole, does not observe the roles of central government structures, does not seek and expect anything from the higher state structures.28 They perceive power as a tax-only force. There is a belief that politics is for the elites only and there is no desire for political participation.29 Subject - This type is characterized by attitudes towards the political system as a whole and towards the outputs of politics, but in terms of inputs and perceptions of the role of the "self" in politics there are no such attitudes. The subject is a person who is aware of the system as a whole, notices the role of the central government, has political expectations from the central government but is in fact very politically passive, not ready for political participation and any challenge to the existing state structures, form government or established political authorities.30 Such a culture is incapable of producing democratic stability because citizens lack awareness of their own democratic potential.31 Participatory - This type of political culture marks the existence of developed political orientations towards all policy objects. Compared to the subject type here we have developed attitudes towards both input-objects and the role of each individual in the political process. A participatory individual is present in a society where there are differentiated social and political structures and roles. He is aware of the system as a whole, of centralized authorities, is politically interested, ready for political communication, for criticizing the government, sets certain political requirements and most importantly is ready for political action to achieve his political goals.32 2.1.2. Civic political culture This type of political culture corresponds to the type of democratic political culture and the democratic political regime and therefore will be given more attention. As a reference point we use the teaching of Almond and Verba again. In civic political culture the emphasis is on political participation. High levels of political awareness, readiness for communication, political organization and

28 Vladimir Vujčič, " Tipologija političke kulture ", op.cit. p. 101 29 Билјана Ванковска, op. cit., p. 66-67 30 Vladimir Vujčič, " Tipologija političke kulture ", op.cit. p. 101 31 Билјана Ванковска, op. cit., p. 67 32 Vladimir Vujčič, " Tipologija političke kulture ", op.cit. p. 101-102

34 political action can be found in it. But along with those activist elements, there's something more to it. Civic culture, for example, is a loyal participatory culture. There is only one political order to it, and that is democratic. In civic political culture, therefore, participatory political orientations are combined with subject and parochial ones. Individuals become participants in the political process but they do not abandon their orientations and roles as subjects or parishioners. And not only are parochial and subject orientations held together with participatory, but they are compatible with participatory political orientation. After all, these subordinate orientations influence the restriction of individuals' political activism in politics. Without these subordinate orientations, there would be no moderate political action by individuals - their activism would often grow into a revolution and various other forms of extremism, and the current political government could not rule steadily. It would be under constant pressure from the energized public and its justified and unjustified demands. It can be said that civic political culture is not as participatory as a potential participatory culture. The citizen is more potential than a real activist. He acts when he needs to, but not when he should. Thus, it enables efficiency of the government in the state, but also control of the government.33 2.2. Other typologies of political culture One of the most interesting typologies of political culture is elaborated by American political scientist Daniel Elazar. This author believes that there are three basic types of political culture in the United States, representing three different orientations for people's political action. He uses the value-ideological criterion for elaborating its typology, which consists of: traditionalist, individualistic and moralistic type of political culture.34 Elazar defines political culture as a belief in the goals of power, the common good and the limits of political activity. In the traditionalist type of political culture, the primary task of the government is to maintain order. Society is perceived as hierarchical and paternalistic. Political competition is reserved for elites dominated by family and social ties. Politics is largely one-party. The maintenance of the status quo is considered the highest political objective. In the individualistic type of political culture, the emphasis is on political competition. It must be free, and the role of government is reduced to that of a judge. Political parties exist to organize different interests in society, to articulate political demands and competitions for power. Politics is a profession for professionals. Its

33 Ibid p. 102-107 34 Ibid p. 113

35 main purpose is to maintain a balance between different interests and between the public and private sectors. In the moralistic type of political culture, government is treated as a means of achieving just social order and moral improvement in society. Politics is a means of achieving private and public goals. The political objective is egalitarian, amateurish and non-partisan and is always in favor of good government. Political participation is a civic duty of all good citizens. The main political objective is to improve the community, i.e. the use of political action to promote the common good. Politics is a positive tool for social good. Non-partisan political action is more often the rule than the exception.35 So, we can conclude that while traditionalist political culture is essentially elitist and serves the function of maintaining social order, individualist political culture is also elitist but elitism is formed through free political choices. In contrast to these two, moralistic political culture is non-elitist. It is a participatory political culture of all citizens, and its main purpose is the creation of a government as an administration that will govern society in accordance with the principles of social justice, respect and fairness. Apart from Elazar, other authors use the value-ideological criterion, but they also add the organizational aspect of power to society. Such a criterion could be called ideological-organizational, and it is used by A. Wildavsky and other political scientists. These authors speak of individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, and fatalism as types of political culture. Some authors use a purely ideological criterion, and that criterion applies when political culture is classified as liberal, conservative and radical, or simply as liberal and communitarian.36

3. Democratic political culture as a sine qua non for democratic transition and consolidation As we noted in the introduction, the establishment of a democratic order in authoritarian socialist societies signifies major social, political and cultural changes in them. The general acceptance of democracy in different societies but also the great differences in their democratic achievements, raise questions about the cultural prerequisites of democracy itself, as well as the societies that implement and develop it.

35 Ibid p. 113-114 36 Ibid p. 129

36 Although, according to Gjorgje Ivanov, "there are indeed differences in transitions from one country to another"37, yet the common bond that links transitional societies (which are different one from another) is the process of democratization that takes place in each individual society differently and with varying success. Numerous transitional societies are marked by social changes that do not correspond to their proclaimed democratic transformation. Their experience suggests that the normative- institutional democratic constitution is not enough to make the political system democratic. These facts show us that transition is not a one-way and predictable process of social development that necessarily leads to the establishment of a democratic order.38 One of the facts that requires an explanation that cannot be given by a normative-institutional approach is the failure of certain political institutions when for whatever reason are made attempt to transplant into another environment or to graft on local institutions and relations. There are examples of how such nonsuccesses can be explained by stakeholders that are largely related to political culture. There is no doubt that attempts at transplanting North American political institutions such as federalism and the presidential system in Latin American countries have failed. Institutions that have brought endurance, stability, separation of power and many other favorable effects in North America have become just an empty form in South America, a lifelong copy of many vital models. Attempts of implementation of the values and institutions of Western European parliamentarianism to individual developing countries have been unsuccessful, because of lacking the political and cultural climate without which presence and activity they do not bear the fruits they provided in the social "environment" where they sprouted. When we consider political systems with similar underlying structures, goals and mechanisms we can notice that in East Germany yields one result, while in Poland quite other (results are missing in number of areas), and there is no more doubt in mind how different conditions affecting them such as tradition, attitude to certain values, religion and other elements of political culture.39 That's why American political scientist Ronald Inglehart rightly asks the question, "What comes first - Democratic political culture or democratic institutions?"40, and Macedonian political scientist Nenad Markovic the question: "How do citizens expect to achieve full democratic capacity in the absence of institutions which can operate democratically because they are made up of people who

37 Ѓорѓе Иванов. " Транзитологија ". Политичка мисла. 1 Март (2003), p. 59 38 Pero Maldini, " Političko – kulturalni preduvjeti demokratizacije ", op. cit., p. 88 39 Vojislav Stanovčič,Političke ideje i religija t. 2, op. cit., p. 163-164 40 Ronald Inglehart, "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure It?", PS Online (2003), p. 56 < http://home.sandiego.edu/~mb5/inglehart.pdf>, accessed on 15. 9. 2019

37 are marked by the political culture of the society in which they live. On the other hand, how will a civic (democratic) culture and trust in the institutions necessary for the democratic functioning of order be achieved if the institutions do not act democratically? The solution to this ―circulus vitiosus” is posed as one of the central issues of the democratic consolidation of transitional societies. The political culture of democracy can be defined on two levels. At the first level are the structurally relevant values that are codified by social norms (laws). The other level is the conviction of society to apply those values. When we talk about transitional societies we are talking about societies with a developmental discontinuity, which mark them as normative-institutional on the one hand and cultural change on the other. Each of these changes has its own dynamics that often do not correspond to the other. Culture and structure do not change in parallel. When one institutional composition changes with another, the old cultural patterns remain for a long time, as a rule not corresponding to the changes and demands of the new system. The new structure cannot be consolidated as citizen acts in accordance with the old cultural patterns. The mismatch of culture and structure appears to be a major problem for transitional societies as it calls into question legitimacy of success of democratic consolidation, in some cases even the existence of a democratic order.41 Every society, no matter how developed or underdeveloped, has a certain political culture. Its content and development or underdevelopment affect social development and progress and modify political institutions and relationships. The importance of democratic culture in modern societies is enormous. That is why it is easy to get used to thinking that where there is no democratic political culture it does not exist at all.42 But is that really so? According to Vojislav Kostunica43, slow movement towards democracy in post-socialist countries is conditioned by several factors. One such factor is the authoritarian political culture of communism whose core values have shaped entire generations, created a new type of man who values certainty in authoritarianism more than uncertainty in freedom. In Communist societies, thanks to the central government and the party, life becomes very simple. People get used to a system in which they do not have to take care of themselves, nor be responsible for themselves or for anyone else. The democratic changes in these societies are slowed down by the "remnants of the old."

41 Pero Maldini, " Političko – kulturalni preduvjeti demokratizacije ", op. cit., p. 90 42 Vojislav Stanovčič, Političke ideje I religija t.2, op. cit. p.167 43 Voislav Koštunica," Postkomunizam i problem demokratije ", Filozofija i društvo. IX-X (1996).

38 This kind of authoritarian political culture can be explained by winning of the elections by the Communist Party in many Southeastern European states. It must be noted that the return of these parties is not the return of communism. It is about reformed Communist parties that must abide by the democratic rules of the game. According to Vojislav Stanovcic, the Balkan region is littered with authoritarian political culture because of a series of historical circumstances under which independent state creations and political movements were formed and due to the long-standing dominance of foreign powers. It stamps all political events and relationships. Centuries of authoritarianism and the role of force have found expression in folk sayings that tend to teach people and create patterns of behavior that make up part of political wits or political culture. Famous proverbs such as "lowered head, can't be cut by sward ", "Patience - salvation", the conviction that "Every power brings benefits," that is, " a gram of power is more worth than a tone of mind," or the famous "Power does not beg God," certainly form part of political understandings and traditions, as well as political culture and influence the formation of patterns of behavior. This authoritarian component is also present in folk poetry that has educated many generations over the centuries. When history reminds us of the eastern influences and marks left by Byzantine, Tatar-Mongolian, Ottoman, Austro- Hungarian, and even domestic despotism, then it becomes clear how much the political culture in these areas was poor and subdued by the techniques of domination on one hand and from the struggle for a bare life on the other hand.44 The field of political culture, like all modern social processes and phenomena, has always been a field of conflicts and tendencies of traditionalism and the modernization process, a clash of traditional and democratic political culture.45 It is important to point out the parallel existence of elements of authoritarian and democratic political culture. According to Stanovcic, "a mix of authoritarian, democratic, patriarchal and other types of political cultures can be applied to countless everyday cases, some of which are of wider social significance, and others have only the form of a delayed folk revival or reaction. Certain ethnographic studies reveal how mentality is changes more slowly than external circumstances.46 Political as well as general culture is something that must be nurtured, developed, promoted, and it progresses slowly and hardly, just as changing the inherited or over time acquired political culture of a society. "This process today also proceeds as a collision of

44 Vojislav Stanovčič, Političke ideje i religija t.2, op. cit., p. 166-167 45 Dragica Vujadinovič, " Civilno društvo i politička kultura ". Filozofska istrazivanja. 109 God. 28 Sv. 1 (2008), p. 31 46 Vojislav Stanovčič, Političke ideje i religija t.2, op. cit., p. 168

39 authoritarian and patriarchal-tribal political consciousness with elements of participatory and liberal democratic political culture. On a larger scale, this conflict also has a basis in the conflict between the authoritarian state and society, and it is a conflict that is felt on a world scale.47"

Conclusion The collapse of "communist" societies has not only brought about major changes, but also major problems, both within societies themselves and globally. The great difficulty of these changes is on the one hand the still strong Communist legacy, on the other hand the change of the state regime of communism with the western liberal democratic model. The idea of democracy is one of the most widespread political ideas. The process of political and economic renewal in the former "Communist" states during the nineties of the twentieth century has once again stimulated interest in political culture. According to Anthony Giddens, "democracy can be portrayed as something that springs only on particularly fertile soil, cultivated for a long time. In societies that have little democratic history, it seems as if they have shallow roots that are easily torn apart. Instead of looking at democracy as a fragile flower that anyone can trample on, we should see it as a stinging herb capable of growing in a very meager country."48 But the experiences of farmers tell us that even the most fertile soil can be neglected and not yielding well. Therefore, the land should be cultivated jointly, i.e. cultivate, especially where it is still scarce." Etymologically the word culture itself comes from the Latin word ―cultura‖ which primarily means cultivating the land, and then everything that can be grown and improved, especially in the field of education."49 Democratic political culture, by its nature and content, cannot be successfully developed within a narrow and authoritarian state framework, as it is more in the sphere of society than in the state. Political culture is one of the constituents of every society and significantly influences the nature and functioning of all political and legal institutions and the behavior of members of society. That impact was often underestimated or overlooked.50

47 Vojislav Stanovčič, Politička teorija t. 1., Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2006, p.696 48 Ентони Гиденс, Забеган свет, Скопје, Филозофски факултет, 2003, p.75 49 Ljubomir Tadič, Politikološki leksikon, Beograd, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1996, p. 111 50 Vojislav Stanovčič, Politička teorija t. 1., op. cit., p. 697

40 Therefore, in our work, we have devoted our due attention to the elaboration of the term political culture, the types of political culture, and the importance of democratic political culture for the process of democratic consolidation.

References: 1. Almond, Gabriel. The Civic Culture: Prehistory, Retrospect, and Prospect. Center for the Study of Democracy. 1996 2. Almond, Gabriel. and Verba Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University, 1963. 3. Бајалџиев, Димитар. Политологија. Скопје: Правен факултет, 2000. 4. Ванковска, Билјана. Политички систем. Скопје: Бомат графикс, 2007. 5. Vasič, Radmila. " Pravna država i tranzicija ". Anali. 1-4 (2001): 59-78. < www.ius.bg.ac.yu/Anali/...1.../Anali%202001_1-4%20059-078.pdf-> 6. Vujadinovič, Dragica. " Civilno društvo i politička kultura ". Filozofska istrazivanja. 109 God. 28 Sv. 1 (2008): 21-33. 7. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Pojam političke kulture ". Politička misao. 4 (1997): 109-128. 8. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Dimenzije političke kulture ". Politička misao. 1 (1998): 119-137. 9. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Politička kultura i meĎunacionalni odnosi u demokracii ". Politička misao. 2 (1998): 25-49. 10. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Tipologija političke kulture ". Politička misao. 4 (1998): 98-131. 11. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Politička kultura i politička struktura: odnos političke kulture, strukture i demokracije (1. dio) ". Politička misao. 1 (1999): 113-139. 12. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Politička kultura i politička struktura: odnos politčike kulture, strukture i demokracije (2. dio) ". Politička misao. 2 (1999): 144-157. 13. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Politička kultura: politička potpora (legitimacija, povjerenje, identitet) ". Politička misao. 3 (1999): 101-120. 14. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Globalizacija i problem političke legitimacije ". Politička misao. 4 (2002): 87-109. 15. Vujčič, Vladimir. " Političke obveze graĎana u demokraciji i političko obrazovanje ". Politička misao. 4 (2007): 17-34. 16. Гиденс, Ентони. Забеган свет - како глобализацијата ги преобликува нашите животи. 2 изд. Прев. Ило Трајковски. Скопје: Филозофски факултет, 2003. 17. Đurič, Jelena. " Zadnje dvorište tranzicije ". Filozofija i društvo. XXV (2004): 261-270. 18. Иванов, Ѓорѓе. " Транзитологија ". Политичка мисла. 1 Март (2003): 53-60. 19. Иванов, Ѓорѓе. " Burgerliche Gesellschaft V.V. Civil Society " Годишник на правниот факултет во Скопје. Том 39 книга 2/3 (2001): 35-48. 20. Koštunica, Voislav. " Postkomunizam i problem demokratije ". Filozofija i društvo.. IX-X (1996). 21. Maldini, Pero. " Političko – kulturalni preduvjeti demokratizacije ". Politička misao. 3 (2006): 87-108. 22. Maldini, Pero. " Političko povjerenje i demokratska konsolidacija ". Politička misao. 1 (2008): 179-199.

41 23. Марковиќ, Ненад. " Лидерството, легитимитетот и транзицијата ". Политичка мисла. 11 Септември (2005): 37-44. 24. Мирчев, Димитар. и Христова, Лидија. Модерната политологија – темелите на проучувањето на политичкиот живот. Скопје: Универзитет ФОН и Култура, 2008. 25. Muller, Edward N. and Seligson, Michell A. "Civic culture and democracy: The question of causal relationship". The American Political Science Rewiew. Vol. 88 No. 3 September (1994): 635-652 26. Myers, Sondra, ed. The Democracy Reader. New York: IDEA, 2002. 27. Pavlovič, Dušan. " Kako nastaju demokratske ustanove ". 28. 12 2008 < www.web.mac.com/dusan.pavlovic/Works/...files/Kako_nastaju_2.pdf > 28. Radovanovič, Nataša. " Tradicionalizam kao prepreka ili podsticaj razvoja demokratske кulture u SCG ". Security Policy Group Working Papers 5 November (2005) < www.cbs-css.org/spgwp_no.5.pdf >. 29. Ristič, Irena. " Religija kao faktor političke kulture i ekonomskog razvoja ". Filozofija i društvo. XXVIII (2005): 145-161. 30. Rodin, Davor. " Novi putevi legitimacije političke zajednice ". Politička misao. 2 (2000): 56- 68. 31. Савевски, Здравко "Критичка анализа на концептуализацијата на политичката култура на Г. Алмонд и С. Верба" Годишник за 2007 година на Институтот за социолошки и политичко-правни истражувања“, ИСППИ, Скопје, 2008. 32. Schwan, Gesine. " Kako se konstituiše demokratski politički identitet ". Filozofija i društvo. XIII (1998). 33. Sladaček, Michal. " Problem legitimnosti demokratije ". Filozofija i društvo. XXX (2006): 123-134. 34. Stanovčič, Vojislav. Političke ideje i religija t.2. 2 izd. Beograd: Udruženje za političke nauke i Čigoja štampa, 2003. 35. Stanovčič, Vojislav. Politička teorija t.1. , Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2006. 36. Tadič, Ljubomir. Politikološki leksikon-osnovni pojmovi nauke o politici. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1996. 37. Фукујама, Френсис. Крајот на историјата и последниот човек. Прев. Драган Јакимовски. Скопје: Култура, 1994. 38. Hejvud, Endru. Politika. Prev. Jovan Jovanovic. Beograd: Clio, 2004. 39. Хелд, Дејвид. Модели на демократијата. 3 изд. Прев. Трајкоска Мимоза. Скопје: Академски печат, 2008. 40. Христова, Л. " Политичка култура, социјализација и јавно мислење ". во : Л. Христова (прир.), Наука за политиката, Зборник на текстови, Скопје, стр. 1 – 34.

42 #DĪVIDE ET ĪMPERA Svetlin ILIEV

(Image source: https://empr.media/opinion/analytics/hybrid-war-theory-unfolding-limits-gerasimov-doctrine/)

Summary: The article examines the essence of hybrid warfare through the prism of the weaponization of social media. Emphasis is put on the possibilities for manipulation of the public opinion as a tool to weaken a society's will and to gain geopolitical dividends. The ―snowball effect‖ of disinformation and misinformation attacks through the social media is presented. Keywords: hybrid warfare, social media, manipulation, geopolitics. “Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities.” Voltaire1

*Title: Latin proverb. In politics and sociology is gaining and maintaining power by breaking up larger concentrations of power into pieces that individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy. In English: Divide and rule

43 The separatist and nationalist movements in Europe are on a rise. From Brexit, the Scottish independence referendum, and Crimea secession to the 2017 Catalan referendum, Europe is the most evident case of such a trend. Regions claim either for independence or for autonomy. Foreign powers allegedly try to enhance those movements through hybrid war interventions2; thus, they aim to destabilize their adversaries and gain international influence. On the contrary, the disintegrated state would lose billions of euros, an immense share of its human capital, part of its territory, and become a fertile setting for a future kinetic conflict. Key moments in history, such as referendums or elections, give a fruitful soil for the usage of information warfare tactics. The immense development of the Internet and social media made the world more interconnected than at any other moment in the history of the world. However, the cyberspace gives the state and non-state actors the capabilities to influence and deceive the populations of countries, regardless of their geographical remoteness, with inexpensive and, in most of the cases, sophisticated para-military maneuvers.

Fig. 1 The map depicts regions with active nationalism movements aim to gain either independence or autonomy3

1 Voltaire, Miracles and Idolatry, August 25th 2005, London. Original in French: Questions sur les Miracles à M. Claparede, Professeur de Théologie à Genève, par un Proposant: Ou Extrait de Diverses Lettres de M. de Voltaire 2 Mirovalev, Mansur, What is behind Russian support for word‘s separatist movements?, NBC NEWS, 23 July 2016 accessed on 15 December 2017 on https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/what-s-behind- russian-support-world-s-separatist-movements-n614196 3 Geopolitical Futures, Areas with Strong Nationalist Tendencies, accessed on 14 December 2017 available on https://geopoliticalfutures.com/areas-with-strong-nationalist-tendencies/

44 This paper aims to demonstrate that social media could and are used as a dimension of hybrid warfare in a geopolitical context. It analyzes today‘s highly complex internet environment and the importance of social media. Furthermore, it presents strategies by which the power of Twitter could be utilized into key space and time moments to achieve maximum effect. In addition, it discusses a case study that exemplifies how Twitter had been used to promote disintegration of a nation-state and suggests prospect targets of such offensive strategies.

Highly complex environment Accessibility, speed, anonymity, non-geographic borders and high volumes of information. These are the main characteristics of today‘s information environment. The rise of social media gave individuals an immense role in creating, distributing and spreading content outside of one‘s geographical realms. Hence, the role of media and governments in creating and enhancing strategic narratives has diminished. This technological phenomenon could be perceived as a tool that gives power in the hands of the people; some even argue that it has a positive spillover in the democratization of societies4. However, it should not be forgotten that throughout history states have weaponized and used to achieve their national interests, each technology that has the potential to enhance the state power. Social media are not an exception. The Russian Federation, China, Iran, North Korea, ISIS have all integrated the new possibilities which social media offers into their military strategies and doctrines. Shaping people‘s opinions has always been seen as a powerful tool to unite or disintegrate the state‘s population. This has never been truer than for our high-tech societies in the XXI century. Nowadays, most the world‘s population gets its news from online-based platforms. As it could be seen in figure 2, 33% of people between 18 and 24 years state that their leading source of information is social media. This is also true for 25% of the people between 25 and 34 years. These numbers quantify a fact that is easily observable in one‘s everyday life – social media have become a prominent part of one‘s life.

4 Brian D. Loader & Dan Mercea (2011) NETWORKING DEMOCRACY?, Information, Communication & Society, 14:6, 757-769, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2011.592648

45

Fig. 2 Main sources of information by type and age5 Spreading disinformation through social media is an integral part of hybrid warfare that aims to introduce chaos into a society. Thus, its goal is not to defeat a state but rather it is to weaken a society‘s will, to polarize opinions, and to raise doubts into alliances. If it is timely targeted it could lead to tangible results, which often are impossible to be achieved due to the international power distribution. Furthermore, attacks, performed in such manner, have proven themselves to be a very efficient, inexpensive, and untraceable tool in the hands of state and non-state actors. Its subtle ingeniousness comes from its strategic targeting. As creating a new narrative in a foreign target would be a daunting task, initiators of social media attacks put emphasis on already existing narratives, which promote their interests. Thus, they ―spread the fire‖ of long-lasting conflicts through enhancing or diminishing strategic narratives; this is extremely efficient and vivid in regions with ―frozen conflicts‖ or long-lasting disputes e.g. Western Balkans. The geopolitical implications of a well-designed and executed social media attack could be colossal. From the 2017 German6 and French7 elections to the election

5 Reuters institute digital news report 2017 6 Ebner, Julia, How Germany‘s far right took over Twitter – and tilted the election, The Guardian accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/26/germany- far-right-election-afd-trolls 7 Scott, Mark, U.S. Far-Right Activists Promote Hacking Attack Against Mac, New York Times, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/world/europe/emmanuel- macron-hack-french-election-marine-le-pen.html

46 of the most powerful man in the world8, social media has allegedly been used to manipulate, misinform, and direct the societal perceptions. These foreign interventions in elections could not only reshape the internal order in a nation-state but also the world order as well.

Concepts of hybrid warfare Hybrid, or asymmetric, warfare as a term was first used in 2002 in a paper by William J. Nemeth. It gained momentum among senior military staff and politicians in 2005 describing The Hezbollah strategy in Lebanon. Russia‘s strategy taught the world a lesson in hybrid warfare through its stratagem in Ukraine. Russia‘s hybrid warfare was not concentrated solely on the battlespace or in the theatre of operations; instead, the main emphasis has been on non-military methods that mitigated the necessity for armed confrontation.9 However, some argue that the sole existence of ―hybrid warfare‖ is questionable. The professor of Security studies Daniel Van Puyveld argues that ―any threat can be hybrid as long as it is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare. When any threat or use of force is defined as hybrid, the term loses its value and causes confusion instead of clarifying the „reality‟ of modern warfare‖.10 Nonetheless, throughout the history of mankind, every military commander has been aiming to exploit its opponent's strategic and defense imperfections. Sun Tzu wrote that ―the outcome of a battle depends on the usage or misusage of information‖11. Any new fundamental invention from the first car, ship, and airplane, or satellite gave a new dimension of warfare. As the world entered the information era, thus becoming vastly interconnected, it could be seen as the moment the information dimension gained a prominent role in modern warfare; and the fifth domain of warfare was created12. Hence, hybrid warfare should not be perceived as a new strategy or distinct echelon of war stratagems; but rather as a logical adaptation of modern military doctrines to the newly created battlefield arena – the Internet.

8 Guilbeault and Woolley, How Twitter Bots Are Shaping the Election, The Atlantic, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/election-bots/506072/ 9 Racz, Andras, ‗Russia‘s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking Enemy‘s Ability to Resist‘, FIIA Report 43, 2015, p.43 10 Van Puyvelde, Daniel, ―Hybrid war – does it even exist?‖, NATO Review magazine, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future- warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/ 11 Tzu, Sun, The art of war, Trud, Bulgaria, 2005 12 Kevin Benedict. Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare. December 11, 2012.

47 What is the role of social media in hybrid warfare? Social media are used within the realms of hybrid warfare as an environment for information operations. The aspects of the XXI century information warfare are the high accessibility and the advanced infrastructure of the global network. In contrast to the kinetic warfare, misinformation attacks‘ targets are not only military but rather the civilian population is seen as the prime target. Therefore, every single individual who uses social media is a potential target. Moreover, in case of disinformation and misinformation attacks the individual itself could become a facilitator, a channel and an instrument of the attack through its friend's list and followers; often information that has been shared by friends is more trustworthy than one published by the media. Furthermore, the social networks are a great environment for a ―snowball effect‖; a change in the perceptions and behavior of one would eventually lead to the change in many. It should be kept in mind that these attacks do not target trained professionals and military personnel but rather the civilian population.

The weaponization of the Social media The two most prominent strategies that could be used to enhance nationalism movements through social media are: increasing the visibility of the message and targeting and distracting the opponent. Performed at the right time and space they could substantially misinform and spread doubts in the population. The first strategy utilizes Twitter‘s capabilities to spam through code generated content of fake profiles with the purpose to overtake the communication channel with the adversary‘s narrative. In addition, narrative-driven content could be created and be shared by activists, influencers and bots. The distraction of the opponent (the population) is achieved by creating and distributing misinformation and deception. Misleading information is publicized to expose enemy‘s (usually the central power or the political entity which is seen as a rival) alleged crimes. The aim is to intensify the polarization between different societal or political groups; turn peaceful protests into alleged cases of violations of human rights eventually escalating and turning the situation into unstable one. Hence, it would not matter what happens on the ground but rather how and what is presented and perceived by the audience. Prominent cases in which this tactic has been used include the Russian-Ukrainian conflict13 and the Catalan independence referendum14.

13 Soshnikov, Andrei, Inside a pro-Russian propaganda machine in Ukraine, BBC Trending, 12 November 2017, accessed on 14 December 2017 on http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending- 41915295

48 It should not be forgotten that these attacks have a synergetic effect, provided, they are used in the appropriate time and space. States in which force majeure circumstances are present are an ideal battlespace; for example, the European migrant crisis, nationalist movements, referendums, or elections create time for informational warfare. Although hybrid warfare might not be something novel for the military strategists, with the development of social media, the volume of damages it could cause has dramatically risen. Nowadays, a victory on the battlefield might not be so effective and resource-wise as a triumph in the cyberspace. In a highly interconnected world in which news spreads in seconds, an individual sharing the ―right‖ content could do the same harm as a battalion on the field. Furthermore, if an opponent introduces instability in a region it could cause an immense loss of resources. It is highly likely that the conflict region would be vastly unattractive to investors, tourists, and companies with a damaged business climate; moreover, most certainly the country‘s brand and status in the international community would be diminished. Consequently, causing uncertainty and chaos in cyberspace could have real-world implications in terms of capital, infrastructure, investments, and international prestige. Additionally, in a case scenario of a crisis, it could present a tangible risk to the state‘s national security and sovereignty; causing a civil war or disintegration of regions from the state.

A Referendum story: the case of Catalonia The Catalonian region had been an independent political entity for 3 centuries before being integrated into Spain in the 16th century. Catalan region distinguishes itself from the rest of the country by its language, traditions, and culture. Catalan population has maintained a very strong feeling of identity throughout the centuries, although it was severely oppressed during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. At the present moment, Catalonia presents 6,3% of the territory of Spain and 16% of the total population. Its highly developed economy is responsible for 20,1% of the Spanish GDP and 25.6% of the total exports. The impressive tempo with which the Catalan economy is developing is one of the main grounds on which the separatist‘ activists build their independence arguments. On 1st October, the Catalonian government organized a referendum asking one question – ―Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a

14 Nimmo, Ben, #ElectionWatch: Fake Photos in Catalonia?, Atlantic Council‘s Digital Forensic Research Lab, 23 October 2017 accessed on 14 December 2017 on https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-fake-photos-in-catalonia-fe3f045df171

49 republic?‖. Although the referendum has been condemned as illegal by the Spanish government, 2 286 217 people voted, 2 044 038 of which answered with ―Yes‖.15 Had the Catalonian secession been successful it would have had devastating consequences to Spain, in terms of human and financial capital; furthermore, it would have given a precedent on which many more Spain regions might later claim secession.

Fig. 3 Catalonia’s major significance for Spain16

Fig. 4 Catalonia as a percentage of Spain’s GDP and exports

15 "Catalan referendum results". Government of Catalonia, 2 October 2017, available on http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/303541/govern-trasllada-resultats-definitius- referendum-l1-doctubre-parlament-catalunya.html, Retrieved 3 October 2017 16 Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d‘Estadistica de Catalunya, accssessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245

50 An eventual disintegration of the state would not only have negative consequences for Spain but also for Catalonia. After only two weeks of the referendum over 1 501 companies declared their intentions of relocating their businesses and capitals from the region. Their main motivation is to protect their ―clients, shareholders and employees, given the current political and social situation‖.17 Furthermore, provided the secession had been successful, the future Catalonian republic would have been left outside of the EU common market. Thus, it would have suffered billions of euros lost. The protests before, during, and after the referendum day had given an abundant material for disinformation attacks to be conducted. Hoax articles, pictures, and posts have occurred on various websites and twitter accounts allegedly connected with the Russian government.18 The proliferation of social media as the main source of news for the Spanish population, figure 4, gives the right environment of an information attack to be conducted. The ―EU vs Disinformation‖ website, run by European External Action Service East StratCom Task Force, has recorded numerous cases of disinformation attacks incorporating video, images, Facebook posts, Twitter posts, and misleading articles19 in the pre and post period of the referendum. Most of the attacks have been linked with Russian supported news outlets, Russian affiliated Facebook and Twitter accounts, or to bot increased visibility of the message.20 These cyber-social attacks had to target and distract the Catalonian population: through increasing the distinguishability of certain messages promoting foreign-based narrative. Although all used techniques deserve attention and investigation, due to the scope of the paper, only Twitter-based methods could be discussed. The website securingthedemocracy.org, which main activity is to track Russian influence operations on Twitter, reported that there had been a dramatic increase of the hashtag ―Catalonia‖ by Russian affiliated media. From 24th September to the day of the vote, over 2000% increase in the tagging has been observed.

17 Petroff, Alana, These banks and businesses are leaving Catalonia, CNN Money International, accessed on 18 December, available on http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/09/investing/spain-catalonia- banks-companies-independence/index.html 18 Arostegui, Martin, ―Russian meddling in Catalonia‘s secession vote seen as part of plot against NATO‖, The Washington post, November 22, 2017 accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/22/russia-meddling-catalonia-vote-seen-plot- against-n/ 19 Disinformation cases, EU vs Disinformation database accessed on 15 December available on https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=catalonia&disinfo_issue=&date= 20 Alandete, Alan, Russian meddling machine sets sights on Catalonia, El Pais, 28 September 2017, accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/26/inenglish/1506413477_994601.html?id_externo_rsoc=TW_CM_E N

51

Fig. 5 The charts demonstrate an increase in the use of the hashtag 'Catalan' on Twitter accounts identified as having a relationship with Russia. An increase of 2,000% in the mentions of that hashtag has been seen in the last 48 hours, in the chart on the left. The chart on the right shows the use of the hashtag tracked since September 24 according to securingdemocracy.org21 One of the most noticeable roles, in raising the tension among different Catalonian groups, was played by Julian Assange. As a prominent anti-globalization activist and founder of WikiLeaks, his messages spread like fire in September 2017. Assange‘s most influential tweet went viral in matters of hours. On 15 September, his tweet urging everyone to support Catalonian secession, got 2000 retweets in an hour. It gained its maximum number of retweets, 12 000, in a day. However, the pattern by which the tweet gained popularity is highly unusual. Typically, tweets become viral over the course of days or weeks, depending on the number of followers and their geographic proximity. A speed traffic analysis of Assange‘s tweet gives further clarification.

21 Alandete, David, Pro-Russian networks see 2,000% increase in activity in favor of Catalan referendum, El pais, accessed on 18 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/01/inenglish/1506854868_900501.html

52

Fig.6 Assange’s twitter account22

Fig. 7 Assange’s tweet urging for Catalonian support traffic analysis It could be seen in the graph that the tweet got its most retweets in the first minute of its publication; over one retweet per second. It could be observed that after its peak in the first hour there has been a steady decline in the numbers of shares. Ben Nimmo, a senior fellow for the Atlantic Council, suggests that tweets usually follow a different pattern; as the one depicted in figure 8. The unusual pattern of Assange‘s post implies that bot amplification is a possible explanation of the traffic movement. Bot‘s aim is to increase the visibility of the message in its first hours of ―life‖, so it could reach a wider audience.

22 Available on https://twitter.com/JulianAssange/status/908733891137146882?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https% 3A%2F%2Felpais.com%2Felpais%2F2017%2F09%2F26%2Finenglish%2F1506413477_994601.html

53 Furthermore, a detailed analysis of a sample of Assange‘s followers reveals that 59% or his followers are fake profiles.23

Fig. 8 Traffic analysis of the separatist’s hashtag #FreePiolin In conclusion, the inherent tension between the regional government and the central power in Madrid escalated into a referendum, which was influenced by foreign actors to enhance their own interests. An eventual disintegration of the Catalonian region from Spain would have had dramatic consequences for both sides. Furthermore, social media, most notably Twitter, have been used to misinform and deceive the Spanish population. The Catalonian referendum was a demonstration of how a tool, which is supposed to bring people together, had been weaponized in order to disintegrate and promote separation.

Western Balkans: Undermining the Positive Momentum For the third time in 16 months, EU ministers failed on 15.10.2019 to agree on whether to start talks that could lead to Albania and North Macedonia joining the bloc24 — chiefly because of the French president Emmanuel Macron. This is seen by some as a strategic miscalculation in the efforts of securing a peaceful future of the West Balkans region. The importance of the integration of the Western Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic alliance is seen by many governments as part of their grand strategies.

23 Arostegui, Martin, ―Russian meddling in Catalonia‘s secession vote seen as part of plot against NATO‖, The Washington post, November 22, 2017 accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/26/inenglish/1506413477_994601.html?id_externo_rsoc=TW_CM_E N 24 Jacopo Barigazzi, EU ministers once again fail to reach deal on North Macedonia and Albania, Politico, 15 October 2019, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ministers-once-again-fail-to-reach-deal-on-north-macedonia-and- albania/

54 For this reason, the Bulgarian Presidency of the European Council included the topic of Western Balkans integration as one of its priorities during its mandate; Croatia also stated its willingness to embrace the topic as a priority one25. The appetite for influence in the region demonstrated by the East powers is well known and it been summarized by the North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in Brussels to warn that China and Russia would ―fill in the vacuum‖ left by the Europeans and urged EU leaders ―not to fade out the bright stars‖ of the European Union flag. The denial of furthering the accession process of Albania and North Macedonia is very likely to be integrated into misinformation campaigns considering the unpopular reforms which they had to introduce. Historically, such events had been used in propaganda narratives and it could be a resourceful precursor for a disinformation campaign. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Alphabet, and Instagram could be instrumentalized by turning them into dual-use tools. First, they will be used to capture the ―pulse‖ of political discourse and gauge the content spectrum of conversations surrounding certain topics or groups /the political, religious and ethnic diversity of both countries should be kept in mind/. Then social media is used as a joiner tool, bringing together like-minded individuals under the banner of a shared interest or idea.26 This scenario is further reinforced by Jelena Milic, director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies in Serbia according to whom the ―Western Balkans have been hit by this new wave of disinformation being much less prepared or resilient than Western societies‖27. Laura Brown, a public affairs officer, and spokesperson for the US Embassy in North Macedonia explained that the lack of trust in political institutions is what makes the region such fertile ground for disinformation. ―A lot of disinformation that we see plays on those narratives [of untrustworthy institutions] and tries to erode trust further in the country‖.28 As a consequence of the failed process, Mr. Zaev declared on 19.10.2019 in a televised address his de facto resignation and called for early elections. the North Macedonian leader stated that “We are victims of the EU‟s historic mistake”, echoing

25 Croatia's to Focus Its EU Presidency on Western Balkans, Total Croatia News, 1 July 2018, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/29686-croatia-s-to- focus-its-eu-presidency-on-western-balkans 26 Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, Arthur Nelson, Why Putin targets minorities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2018, accessed on 22 October 2019, available on https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-putin-targets- minorities?fbclid=IwAR1cT7MioG0tR4nifBiiQlp_WzrRckv2Q-IvQaPef_9eVjHmk0S19AL0lhk 27 David A. Wemer, The Western Balkans: A growing disinformation battleground, The Atlantic Council, 7 March 2019, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-western-balkans-a-growing-disinformation- battleground/ 28 Ibid.

55 the comment of EU Council President Tusk.29 Political tensions are further expected in Albania as well. In conclusion, considering the recent decisions of the EU leaders and the geopolitical landscape of the continent, the Western Balkans should be seen as a potential target of various international opponents. The political environment in the region is currently highly fertile for waging information warfare. The region is seen as of strategic importance, and as it has been observed throughout history, and often had been a target of exerted influence by exogenous factors. The leaders of the Balkan countries and the EU ought to put emphasize on accelerating the process of integration into the Union in order to mitigate any possible escalation.

Bibliography: 1. Voltaire, Miracles and Idolatry, August 25th 2005, London. Original in French: Questions sur les Miracles à M. Claparede, Professeur de Théologie à Genève, par un Proposant: Ou Extrait de Diverses Lettres de M. de Voltaire 2. Mirovalev, Mansur, What is behind Russian support for word‟s separatist movements?, NBC NEWS, 23 July 2016 accessed on 15 December 2017 on https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/what-s-behind-russian-support-world-s-separatist- movements-n614196 3. Geopolitical Futures, Areas with Strong Nationalist Tendencies, accessed on 14 December 2017 available on https://geopoliticalfutures.com/areas-with-strong-nationalist-tendencies/ 4. Brian D. Loader & Dan Mercea (2011) NETWORKING DEMOCRACY?, Information, Communication & Society, 14:6, 757-769, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2011.592648 5. Reuters institute digital news report 2017 6. Ebner, Julia, How Germany‟s far right took over Twitter – and tilted the election, The Guardian accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/26/germany-far-right-election-afd- trolls 7. Scott, Mark, U.S. Far-Right Activists Promote Hacking Attack Against Mac, New York Times, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-hack-french-election- marine-le-pen.html 8. Guilbeault and Woolley, How Twitter Bots Are Shaping the Election, The Atlantic, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/election- bots/506072/

29 Kole Casule, North Macedonian leaders agree to hold snap election on April 12, Reuters, October 20 2019, accessed on 21 October 2019, available on https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-macedonia- politics/north-macedonian-leaders-agree-to-hold-snap-election-on-april-12-idUSKBN1WZ0OB

56 9. Racz, Andras, „Russia‟s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking Enemy‟s Ability to Resist‟, FIIA Report 43, 2015, p.43 10. Van Puyvelde, Daniel, “Hybrid war – does it even exist?”, NATO Review magazine, accessed on 13 December 2017 on https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid- modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/ 11. Tzu, Sun, The art of war, Trud, Bulgaria, 2005 12. Kevin Benedict. Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare. December 11, 2012. 13. Soshnikov, Andrei, Inside a pro-Russian propaganda machine in Ukraine, BBC Trending, 12 November 2017, accessed on 14 December 2017 on http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending- 41915295 14. Nimmo, Ben, #ElectionWatch: Fake Photos in Catalonia?, Atlantic Council‟s Digital Forensic Research Lab, 23 October 2017 accessed on 14 December 2017 on https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-fake-photos-in-catalonia-fe3f045df171 15. "Catalan referendum results". Government of Catalonia, 2 October 2017, available on http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/303541/govern-trasllada-resultats- definitius-referendum-l1-doctubre-parlament-catalunya.html, Retrieved 3 October 2017 16. Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d‟Estadistica de Catalunya, accssessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245 17. Petroff, Alana, These banks and businesses are leaving Catalonia, CNN Money International, accessed on 18 December, available on http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/09/investing/spain- catalonia-banks-companies-independence/index.html 18. Arostegui, Martin, “Russian meddling in Catalonia‟s secession vote seen as part of plot against NATO”, The 19. Washington post, November 22, 2017 accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/22/russia-meddling-catalonia-vote-seen- plot-against-n/ 20. Disinformation cases, EU vs Disinformation database accessed on 15 December available on https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=catalonia&disinfo_issue=&date= 21. Alandete, Alan, Russian meddling machine sets sights on Catalonia, El Pais, 28 September 2017, accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/26/inenglish/1506413477_994601.html?id_externo_rsoc=T W_CM_EN 22. Alandete, David, Pro-Russian networks see 2,000% increase in activity in favor of Catalan referendum, El pais, accessed on 18 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/01/inenglish/1506854868_900501.html 23. Arostegui, Martin, “Russian meddling in Catalonia‟s secession vote seen as part of plot against NATO”, The Washington post, November 22, 2017 accessed on 15 December 2017, available on https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/26/inenglish/1506413477_994601.html?id_externo_rsoc=T W_CM_EN

57 24. Jacopo Barigazzi, EU ministers once again fail to reach deal on North Macedonia and Albania, Politico, 15 October 2019, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ministers-once-again-fail-to-reach-deal-on-north- macedonia-and-albania/ 25. Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, Arthur Nelson, Why Putin targets minorities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2018, accessed on 22 October 2019, available on https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-putin-targets- minorities?fbclid=IwAR1cT7MioG0tR4nifBiiQlp_WzrRckv2Q-IvQaPef_9eVjHmk0S19AL0lhk 26. Croatia's to Focus Its EU Presidency on Western Balkans, Total Croatia News, 1 July 2018, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.total-croatia- news.com/politics/29686-croatia-s-to-focus-its-eu-presidency-on-western-balkans 27. David A. Wemer, The Western Balkans: A growing disinformation battleground, The Atlantic Council, 7 March 2019, accessed on 18 October 2019, available on https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-western-balkans-a-growing- disinformation-battleground/ 28. Kole Casule, North Macedonian leaders agree to hold snap election on April 12, Reuters, October 20 2019, accessed on 21 October 2019, available on https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-macedonia-politics/north-macedonian-leaders- agree-to-hold-snap-election-on-april-12-idUSKBN1WZ0OB

58 THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINAL BASIS OF THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL QUESTION Assoc. Prof. Marian NINOV, PhD

(Image source: www.muturzikin.com/carteseurope/europe.htm)

Summary: The main thesis in the contemporary Albanian national doctrine, the so-called ―Platform for the Solution of the Albanian National Question‖, as well as its updated upgrading referring the Republic of Northern Macedonia - the Common Platform of the Albanian Parties in the Republic of Macedonia, have been presented and analyzed. An assessment has been made of what has been done so far and what would be possible in the future based on the laid down in these national doctrinal documents on the settlement of the Albanian National Question in Kosovo and the Republic of Northern Macedonia. Keywords: national doctrine, Albanian National Question, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia.

59 Introduction The National Doctrine by definition1 2 was a theoretically justified system of officially accepted views and principles for the historical aspirations, perspectives and goals of the nation that pointed the way for the achievement of the national ideal. Each national doctrine had formulated a national ideal and the national interests that pursued it3. The national ideal is the supreme goal of the nation‘s aspirations, and just because of its nature of an ―ideal‖, it had been difficult to be attained and practically impossible to be fully fulfill. It brought out precise and specific national interests, the implementation of which should ensure its attainment4. For the implementation of the national interests, the required forces and resources should be determined in the national doctrine. Due to the nature of their content (the formulation of current national interests and the means to achieve them), the original national doctrines of each emerging nation were logically related to the issues of the cultural and educational awareness of the particular population as such, and subsequently to the establishment and upholding of a nation-state expanding to cover all the population self-identifying with that nation. In the classical case of the nation-state, the national interests were also the state interests. Senior government, through various national structures – most often parliaments, but also national-state institutions of academic character – expressed the national interests by formulating and ranking them by priority, and it should not set non-existent ones. With a view of the scientific nature of contemporary national doctrines, based on the theoretical achievements of various scientific disciplines in the fields of international relations, history, sociology, economics, military affairs, etc., they were quite often drawn up in different scientific centers. Once developed, the national doctrines would have a long-term effect on their implementation with a horizon of at least 25-30 years. The Albanian nation did not differ significantly from the above, although it had its own specifics. For example, the development of the Albanian National Question (ANQ) had generally legged far behind those of the neighboring peoples – Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians. That was due to various objective reasons and

1 Gotsev, Lyuben, Encyclopedia of Diplomacy (in Bulgarian), ―Paisius of Hilendar‖ University Press, Sofia, 2014. 2 Traykov, Veselin, National Doctrines of the Balkan Countries (in Bulgarian), ―Znanie‖ Press, Sofia, 2000. 3 Gotsev, Lyuben, Encyclopedia of Diplomacy (in Bulgarian), ―Paisius of Hilendar‖ University Press, Sofia, 2014. 4 Traykov, Veselin, National Doctrines of the Balkan Countries (in Bulgarian), ―Znanie‖ Press, Sofia, 2000.

60 circumstances. Most researchers had pointed out the religious division of Albanians, and mainly the prevailing Muslim religion among them, as a significant cause for the Albanian ―national delay‖ resulting in the later start and slower development of the Albanian Revival and national liberation struggles5. The ―History of the Albanian People‖6 published in 2002 by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, dated the initial processes of the Albanian Revival and the national liberation struggles to the 1830s, as the Albanian historians had indicated some delay compared to the neighboring peoples from Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. However, a number of foreign researchers7 8 9 10 of the history of Albanians believed that delay was even more serious and in fact the national liberation processes occurred in the last quarter of the 19th century with the establishment in June 1878 of the League of Prizren, also known as the Albanian League. The League of Prizren Programme was assumed11 12 as the first Albanian national doctrine whose national ideal was to achieve the unification of the lands in the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Albanians in a united autonomous administrative unit. Actually, the Albanian population was not properly nationally aware, thus after the failure of the League of Prizren, a thirty-year period of cultural and educational formation of the Albanian nation followed at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Second Albanian National Doctrine was related as a goal and national ideal13 to the Albanian National State proclaimed on November 28, 1912 in Vlorë. That proclamation of independence ended with the constitution of an internationally recognized state, Albania, in accordance with the resolutions of the London Conference (1913) and the Treaty of Versailles (1920) after the World War I. By the end of the 20th century, the Albanian nation had led a relatively fruitless struggle to integrate the Albanian population living in the neighboring countries into Albania

5 Ninov, M., "People's Character as a Prerequisite for the Albanian ―National Delay‖, International E- Journal of Advanced in Social Sciences, e-ISSN: 2411-183X, vol.IV, Issue: 11, August, 2018, pages: 339-346. 6 Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Historia e populit shqiptar, Botimet Toena, Tiranë, 2002. 7 Manchev, Krustyo, The National Question on the Balkans (in Bulgarian), Academic Press ―Marin Drinov‖, Sofia, 1999. 8 Traykov, Veselin, National Doctrines of the Balkan Countries (in Bulgarian), ―Znanie‖ Press, Sofia, 2000. 9 Castellan, Georges, „Histoire des Balkans (ХІVe–ХХe siecle), Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1991. 10 Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 11 Gotsev, Lyuben, Encyclopedia of Diplomacy (in Bulgarian), ―Paisius of Hilendar‖ University Press, Sofia, 2014. 12 Traykov, Veselin, National Doctrines of the Balkan Countries (in Bulgarian), ―Znanie‖ Press, Sofia, 2000. 13 Ibid.

61 with virtually only one formal and temporary uniting of the Albanian population in a single administrative area during the World War II. Actually, Albania‘s internationally recognized borders had remained virtually unchanged except for minor border adjustments by 1925. The perspectives for the Albanian nation to finally resolve its national question (i.e. to unite in one country the Albanian population living in the Western Balkans) had grown significantly since the thorough socio-political changes throughout Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, and especially with the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, not by chance, at the end of the 20th century and early 21st century, the Albanian political elite had developed doctrinal documents aimed at formulating the current national interests and outlining ways, tools and forms for solving the Albanian National Question (ANQ).

Platform for the Solution of the Albanian National Question During 1998, a turning point, for the Albanian National Question, a ―Platform for the Solution of the Albanian National Question‖ (PSANQ), worked out by the Academy of Sciences of Albania (ASA) emerged in Tirana, the capital of the Republic of Albania. It was first discussed at the Assembly of the Academy of Sciences of Albania, and then the opinions and suggestions of Albanian intellectuals from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia who had worked on the Albanian National Question (ANQ) were taken into account. The platform was completed by October 20, 1998 and published in its original14 consisting of 51 pages. Its structure included an introduction, six sections and a conclusion. Its content in short and to some extent analytically was as follows15: INTRODUCTION: According to the ASA, Albanian is the most territorially fragmented of all European peoples, and by 1998 it has been living in five countries – Albania, the Republic of Serbia (Kosovo and neighboring Serbian counties Bujanovac, Medvedja and Preševo), the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Montenegro and Greece. The ASA had stated its concerns in the introduction not only about the status of Kosovo, but also about the future of the entire Albanian nation, arguing for the creation of a platform for a overall solution to the Albanian National Question. According to the original16: ―The platform had set out the historical, political, diplomatic and legal arguments of the Albanian national drama, as well as the thesis for its gradual resolving, in line with the current international situation and

14 Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Platformë për zgidhjen e çështjes kombëtare shqiptare, Shtëpia Botuese ―Shkenca‖, Tiranë, Tetor 1998. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

62 political processes leading the Balkans to their integration into the European community.‖ SECTION ONE – “History of the National Question”: At the beginning of the section, the ANQ was formulated as ―a movement for the liberation of Albanian lands from foreign oppression and for unification into one nation state‖. An evaluation was made that ever since its initial steps, that movement had been confronted not only with the centuries-old Ottoman rule, but also with the ambitions of the nationalist circles in the neighboring countries, as well as with the disparaging attitude of the Great Powers. A special attention was paid to the aggressive Serbian and Greek plans, including the jointly agreed ones for taking over Albanian-populated territories. The role of Russia in supporting the Serbian plans was emphasized. Historical arguments for the insolvency of these plans were presented, and major actions of the Albanian resistance against the Ottoman power were enumerated until the independence of the Albanian state declared in November 1912. SECTION TWO – “Ethnical Lands Fragmentation”: This section traced the process of fragmentation of the Albanian lands by the London Conference (1913) to the end of World War II. It was highlighted that as a result of the London Conference ―less than half of the Albanian ethnic lands‖ were included in the territory of the Independent State of Albania, and the rest was distributed among the three neighboring Balkan monarchies: Serbia received ―the historic Kosovo with its main center Skopje‖; Greece annexed the areas around Florina and Kostur, as well as Chamaria; Montenegro got Plav, Gusine, Hoti and Gruda. The text referring to the World War II did not deny the fact that ―... the Albanian regions that were administratively annexed to Tirana, although under Italian occupation, had some gains in the sphere of the national rights‖. On the other hand, it was emphasized that out of six districts of ―historic Kosovo‖, only four were administratively annexed to Albania, while two of them remained to belong to Serbia. It was mentioned that ―the Albanian regions of Skopje, Kacanik, Preševo, Kumanovo and Prespa were given to Bulgaria‖. It was concluded that ―the Albanian ethnic lands in the former Yugoslavia, though in other dimensions, had remained fragmented, that time between Italy, Germany and Bulgaria‖. In the end of the section the number of the Albanian guerrillas in Albania and Kosovo was pointed and their contribution to the victory over the fascist aggressors, as well as the expectation that, after the end of World War II, the principle of self- determination and respect for peoples‘ national rights would be respected by the winning Allies.

63 SECTION THREE – “Denial of the Right to Self-Determination”: This section set out the main issues of the 1946 Paris Peace Conference concerning the ANQ. At first, attention was paid to Greece‘s aggressive positions to Albania and the Albanians‘ rights in Chamaria. Subsequently, much more attention was paid to the issue of the Albanian ethnic lands in Yugoslavia, where, in the course of the anti- fascist resistance, it was promised the right of self-government, and after the victory Belgrade denied that right to Kosovo Albanians. It was stated the fact that the six Slavic communities in the SFRY were granted the right to define themselves as a nation and to have their own republic, while the Albanians were qualified as nationality and were deprived of an independent republic within the federation. The ASA considered that an ―arbitrary act‖ and discrimination in view of the fact that ethnic groups with a significantly smaller population, such as Macedonian or Montenegrin, were entitled to a republican status. The ASA put forward a number of arguments against both theses of the Yugoslav rulers that justified their act not to grant the right of nationality and republic to the Albanians in Kosovo, namely that the Albanians were not indigenous people there, as well as the fact that there was already an Albanian state outside the federation. SECTION FOUR – “Further Fragmentation of the Ethnic Lands”: The section examined the fragmentation of the ―historic Kosovo‖. The ASA believed that the third in a row fragmentation of the Albanian lands (the first one happened after the 1878 Berlin Congress and the second one after the 1913 London Conference) was being implemented in the administrative designation from the ―superiors‖ of the borders of the republics within the Yugoslav Federation after 1945. According to this section, the ASA stated that the ―historical Kosovo‖ included: ―narrow Kosovo‖, i.e. the autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohija, which was part of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the counties of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja, also located in the Republic of Serbia; the southern part of the historic Kosovo – the counties of Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo and Kumanovo in the Republic of Macedonia (ASA did not include the counties of Debar and Struga in Kosovo); the northwestern part of Kosovo – Plav, Gusine and Rozaje. The separation of the Albanians in the SFRY after 1945, according to the ASA, had most significantly violated their territorial unity. That separation was considered to be in moral and political contradiction with the international law, where historical, legal and political arguments in support of that claim were argued. The Kosovo Albanians‘ struggles to achieve a fairer status were traced, taking into account the progress in their rights through the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY until their withdrawal in 1989 (described at the end of the section).

64 SECTION FIVE – “Proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo”: The milestones in the development of the ANQ on the territory of Kosovo were traced from the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo in Kacanik on September 7, 1990, to the intense armed clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian security forces in 1989. According to the ASA, the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo as an equal subject of the SFRY, although it did not include all Albanian ethnic lands ―suffering under the oppression of Yugoslavia‖, was a ―significant step towards the implementation of the major programme of the Albanian National Revival‖. The importance of this act was particularly emphasized for launching the breakup of the SFRY, as well as for the democratic changes in Eastern Europe in general, thereby ―... Kosovo Albanians had one more advantage for the recognition of the republic proclaimed in Kacanik‖. Furthermore, the exposition repeatedly underlined the unfair treatment of the international factors to the problems of Kosovo Albanians – from Badinter‘s principles, through the vain attempts to resolve the issue through peace negotiations (which ―Kosovo Albanians patiently accepted‖) to the support that the aggressive, Milosevic nationalist regime received from ―... certain circles of the Great Powers‖. The section concluded by stating that the ANQ was ―... not only the spiritual pursuit of an ancient nation unfairly torn apart by the High Diplomacy‖, but it was also ―... an imperative demand of a mutilated nation, one half of which had been endangered by physical destruction, while the other, that had its own state, continued to experience economically, socially, culturally and demographically the consequences of the territorial division‖. SECTION SIX – “The Outcome”: The section outlined what had to be done for resolving the ANQ. It was noted that all Albanians, no matter where they lived, wanted ―... a more rapid unification of their lands in a single Albanian state ...‖. It was recognized that task was much more difficult nowadays than during the National Revival, when all Albanians were in one empire rather than fragmented in the territory of five countries which borders would have to be changed and that would require the international factor support. However, it was emphasized that ―... today there has been an internationally-recognized, independent Albanian state that was given the priority of keeping the flag of the national question waving‖. An analysis of the international situation with regard to resolving the ANQ was then made, highlighting the role of the international organizations – ―the UN, the OSCE, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, etc.‖, and especially the role of the USA and NATO in regulating the situation on the Balkans. The ASA believed that ―... if only the ethnic problems on the Balkans, including the issue of the ethnic Albanian lands was resolved by the application of the principle of self-determination, only then the Peninsula of Hemus would find peace‖. Subsequently, it outlined the solutions to be made for the ANQ in the different countries where Albanians were living:

65 А) The Kosovo Question It had been assessed as the most critical and urgent solution for the situation of Kosovo Albanians. The ASA believed that the ―only possible solution‖ to this issue was the international factor to force Belgrade to ―... recognize the removal of the Kosovo Republic from Serbian tutelage, giving its people the right to establish the status of a republic‖. B) The question of Albanians in Macedonia It was based on, according to the ASA, the significant number of Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia (35% as per its estimate), and that ―... Macedonians make up only 55% of the population, including those who considered themselves to be Bulgarians (the rest were Serbs, Turks, Gypsies). Therefore, ―... Albanians could not in any case be considered a minority and, on a par with the Macedonians, members of their common state‖. The Republic of Macedonia was assumed to be a fragile republic and, in order to prevent the deepening internal crisis it was experiencing due to the Albanian national rights being downtrodden, there were two options for resolving it: ―... a) either the Albanians to be treated as Macedonians for equal citizens and therefore Macedonia to be considered as their common state following the famous example of the Austro-Hungarian state and ―b) or the Albanians to be granted the right of an autonomous region within the Republic of Macedonia‖. C) Albanians in Montenegro According to PSANQ, given the number of Albanians in Montenegro (8% of its population), they were a typical minority. Although the Montenegrin Constitution had guaranteed the civil rights of minorities, Albanians ―... did not fully enjoy their national and civil rights‖. Therefore, in the area of Ulcinj, where the Albanians were a compact majority, they should enjoy ―territorial local autonomy as envisaged in universally recognized international instruments‖. The only way to gain this territorial administrative and cultural autonomy would be ―the efforts by democratic means, without armed clashes with the state‖. D) Albanians in Greece According to the ASA, the presence of Albanians in Greece was ―as ancient as new‖, i.e. there had not been a particularly large autochthonous Albanian population in Chamaria and in the vicinity of Kostur and Florina, as well as a large number of new Albanian economic emigrants. The former were denied the status of an ethno- linguistic minority with the right to study their native Albanian language and history, and because of a grave fear, they did not dare to claim these rights. Therefore, ―... the Albanian government in Tirana must take this initiative. It must also tackle the task of

66 solving the still outstanding problem of Albanian property in Chamaria, who were expelled in 1945‖. E) Albanian Cultural-Linguistic Minorities Throughout its millennial history, Albanians had for various reasons left their ethnic lands and created their diaspora communities in ―Bulgaria, Thrace, Bessarabia, Ukraine, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Sanjak, Egypt and elsewhere‖, but according to the ASA, only the residents of some areas of the Albanian diaspora in Greece and Italy had retained their ethno-linguistic identity. The Albanian Academy of Sciences believed that the Greek and Italian states would lose nothing if the Albanians were given the right to read and write in their mother tongue even that would ―... strengthen the bridges of friendship between Albanians and these two neighboring peoples‖. It however is noteworthy that among the countries listed by PSANQ for the presence of the Albanian diaspora, the Republic of Turkey was not included, where, although unofficially, the citizens of Albanian ethnic origin were about one million. CONCLUSION: There, the ASA concluded that, despite the problems of the Balkan Peninsula, the history of Southeast Europe (SEE) had led to European integration. In this sense, the great aim of the National Revival ―... would be achieved gradually, step by step, in the process of integrating the Balkan Peninsula into the European Community‖. In the light of the situation in 1998, the ASA had summarized the demands for the ANQ solutions, as followed: ―a joint intervention by the Albanian democratic forces and the influential international factors to recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to respect the rights of Albanians in Macedonia as equal citizens alongside the Macedonians, i.e. to give them the right of a state-forming nation, to support Albanians in Montenegro to form their own autonomous region and to secure the right of Albanians in Greece to study in public schools and in their mother tongue‖. All these rights, according to the ASA, were legal, universally recognized and did not violate the political boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula. The main conclusions that could be drawn from the analysis of PSANQ were the following: - Tirana‘s more active leadership role in the overall solution of the ANQ had been demanded; - the main threats to the Albanian national cause stemmed mainly from the aggressive and nationalistic plans of Greece and Serbia, but also from other neighboring Slavic states, with all Slavic countries receiving the support of Russia. In retrospect, the Great Powers were hypocritical and unfair to the Albanians, but now the US and NATO gave hopes for a fair solution of the ANQ;

67 - the ultimate goal of the Albanians, in terms of the process of realizing their national cause, had been an independent nation-state where to live united, but their integration within the political structure of the European Union (EU) was also an acceptable solution.

A joint platform of the Albanian parties in the Republic of Macedonia The developed in January 2017 in the Albanian capital, Tirana, joint platform of the Albanian parties in Republic of Macedonia (RM), under the active participation of Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama17, outlines the claims of the Albanian parties to transform Macedonia into a binational state, in line with one of the two options, defined in the PSANQ. The Tirana platform, as it is often called, is formulated almost 20 years after PSANQ, but in fact it‘s a continuation of the latter in the very same direction. This is why the Tirana platform omits a number of historical and diplomatic justifications that characterized PSANQ and is rather a highly politicized document. This is evident from the content of its introduction, which underlines that the authors of this platform – ―the representatives of the Albanian political parties in RM, ―Democratic Union for Integration‖, Coalition ―Revival by Faith‖ and Alliance for Albanians‖ proceed from the specific domestic political situation, considering ―the free and democratic will of Albanian voters, expressed at the snap parliamentary elections in the RM, held on 11 December 2016…‖. Thereafter, however, in line with PSANQ is noted ―in the spirit of the Ohrid Agreement‖ and the without alternative ―integration into NATO and the European Union‖. The introductory sentence of the document ends with the expressed consent of these Albanian political entities in RM ―for mutual support of the joint political program, which envisages the achievement of the following objectives in the coming governmental term and/or in each successive other term‖, which is a clear sign of the will and intentions for setting a longer horizon to achieve the goals of the document, from the period of the ―upcoming governmental term‖. This gives a more doctrinal character to the Tirana platform and takes it out of the frame of a mere political declaration. The joint platform of the Albanian parties in the Republic of Macedonia sets specific goals which have to be achieved, that are furthermore grouped into 7 sections: 1. Achieving full equality in accordance with the Ohrid Agreement and the Constitution, which practically aims at the transformation of the RM into a two-nation state (enshrined in the PSANQ as a solution of the Albanian national question in RM). This section envisages:

17 Article available at https://geopolitica.eu/more/drugi-statii/2610-tiranskata-platforma-kato-element- ot-proekta-za-velika-albaniya [03.12.2019]

68 - recognition of the Albanians as a state-building population, i.e. achieving ethnic equality; - complete linguistic equality such as the Macedonian language in Cyrillic alphabet and the Albanian language with its alphabet to become official languages in RM; - the national flag, anthem and coat of arms of RM to be changed as to reflect the multiethnic character of the society and the ethnic equality. 2. Achieving economic equality and public well-being, notably through equitable regional development. This section aims at a more favorable to the Albanians distribution of public finances and requires: - making fairer decisions about government subsidies for the benefit of municipalities; - promoting the economic and social development of the neglected areas; - fair representation in the security, military, intelligence and justice bodies, as well in all levels of central government, public agencies or publicly owned enterprises. 3. Strengthening the rule of law as a condition for advancing the process of European integration (enshrined in the PSANQ as a general solution of the ANQ). In this section the focus is on: - the urgent recommendations of the European Commission, as well as the Recommendations of the High-Level Accession Dialogue with the European Union; - the impartial work of the Special Prosecutor's Office, without ethnic or political prejudice. 4. Forming a spirit of trust in the name of the good interethnic relations as an essential element of the country's political stability. This section outlines the interest of the Albanian factor in maintaining the integrity of the state, despite its bi- nationality and the vision for the establishment of a central institution aimed at the development of the languages of the communities, which will provide training for interpreters, editors and lecturers. 5. Addressing the name dispute in accordance with European values and the principles of international law. This section is related to the issue of the country's integration into the EU, seen as a possible solution to the ANQ and that requires the inclusion of Albanians in the working group for direct negotiations with Greece. 6. Good relations with its neighbors: a section that is also important for the EU integration, on the one hand, and on the other provides for ―opening up‖ to Albanian

69 communities in Albania and Kosovo. According to this section the following should be implemented: - inclusion of Albanians in the working group for direct negotiations with Bulgaria; - cooperation with Kosovo and Albania on integrated border management and the opening of new border crossing points. 7. Rapid integration into NATO and the European Union, which in practice, as stated in the document, means fulfilling the foregoing in order to unblock the path to these two organizations. The conclusion of the Tirana platform envisages the establishment of a Roundtable of Albanian parliamentary-represented parties as a tool to achieve the above goals.

An overview of what has been achieved The balance of implementation of the outlined within the doctrinal documents on the ANQ since the declaration of PSANQ in 1998 and Tirana platform in 2017 leads to the following main conclusions along their most significant areas – Kosovo and Macedonia: 1. With respect to Kosovo may be considered that PSANQ has been ―overachieved‖ as the Republic of Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and even with fluctuations, moves towards full statehood in terms of its international legal status. Eleven years later, Kosovo fulfills the traditional criteria of statehood, which are based on the principle of effectiveness, as well as the declaration of independence and the effective separation can be perceived to be in accordance with the international law, insofar as they are not in violation of its imperative rules18. At the same time, however, Kosovo's international legal status remains unclear, especially in view of the indisputable fact that Kosovo is a state. The latter would be finally affirmed under one of the following three circumstances: - if Serbia recognizes the separation and establishes official diplomatic relations with Kosovo, which is a rather problematic circumstance, although it has had some chance to become reality through the currently blocked idea of territorial exchange;

18 Memtsov, St., Kosovo. The problem of Its International Legal Status (in Bulgarian), ―Makros‖ Press, Plovdiv, 2019.

70 - if Kosovo succeeds in becoming a member of the UN (or, even with not such clear implications for its status – a member of the EU, NATO and/or the Council of Europe), but given the negative positions of such members of the Security Council such as Russia and China, as well as the members of the Council of Europe, the EU or NATO – Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus, this circumstance is also difficult to achieve; - if Kosovo achieves universal or near universal recognition, i.e. when all or almost all sovereign states declare such recognition, but this recognition process does not move at a pace and scale that is in favor of achieving a definite Kosovo status – by November 2015, it has been recognized by 111 countries19, but afterwards several withdrawals followed and currently the number of countries recognizing Kosovo is only 10220. 2. With respect to the rights and status of Albanians in the Republic of North Macedonia, it can be estimated that a significant part of the objectives of the PSANQ and its further development – the Tirana platform – have been achieved, albeit not fully. They are as follows: - Although the Republic of North Macedonia is not yet a member of the EU, a significant progress has been made during the last two years. As a result of the pressure arising from the Albanian political parties, the course of Euro-Atlantic isolation, previously led by official Skopje, was overthrown and after the signed treaties with the Republic of Bulgaria and the Hellenic Republic, the country (already with a changed name) has almost achieved a full NATO membership and is about to begin accession negotiations with the EU; - even with the Ohrid Agreement of August 2001 and the subsequent constitutional and legal changes, the status of the Albanian minority in the Republic of North Macedonia has become much more satisfactory, which, however, is not exactly as it is enshrined in the PSANQ i.e. of a state-forming people – this was not implemented even in the last constitutional changes in January 2019 and according to the current Constitution, the Albanian population is put on an equal ground with other minorities described as parts of ―...Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serb people, Roma people, Bosniak people and others ...‖; - at the fullest was achieved the goal of the Tirana platform about the ―full linguistic equality‖ of the Macedonian and Albanian languages as a result of the adoption of the Law on the Use of Languages, which in practice granted the Albanian

19 Data available at http://www.kosovothanksyou.com [03.12.2019] 20 Memtsov, St., Kosovo. The problem of Its International Legal Status (in Bulgarian), ―Makros‖ Press, Plovdiv, 2019.

71 language the status of an official one, i.e. as the Macedonian, but not quite categorically because of: 1) some controversial qualifications of the status of the Albanian language, whether it is considered official or officiary21; 2) arguing with the notorious ―20% of the population‖ framework imposed by the Ohrid Agreement, and 3) highlighting the need to align Macedonian with European law.

Conclusion The Albanian national question is undoubtedly one of the challenges to the regional security in Southeast Europe. It directly affects the national security of six countries – Albania, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and indirectly, to one degree or another, affects Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Moldova, Romania and Croatia. The ANQ is one of the two major problems (the other being Bosnia and Herzagovina's integrity, which is also tied to the ANQ in a specific way) in overcoming divisions between the Balkan countries and their unification in a way that minimizes the role of borders and allows fuller economic and cultural integration between themselves and the region as a whole in the EU. In fact, the integration of the Balkan countries into the EU is both a goal and a means that can solve in the painless way possible the historic problems between them. Overall, it can be concluded that the process of implementing the ASA's ANQ suggestions enshrined in PSANQ is pursued by the Albanian political elite in the Balkans consistently over the long term, but also in accordance with the specific political situation, an example of which is its further development in the Tirana platform concerning ANQ in the Republic of North Macedonia. In this regard, the consideration of the doctrinal basis of the ANQ in the formulation of a policy on the Albanian factor in the Balkans by the interested countries and international organizations is not only necessary but also a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the steps towards a peaceful and integrated Balkans.

Sources: 1. Dimitrov, M., The Macedonian Geopolitical Knot and the Future of the Balkans (in Bulgarian), magazine „Geopolitics”, Issue №5, Sofia, 2019. 2. Gotsev, Lyuben, Encyclopedia of Diplomacy (in Bulgarian), “Paisius of Hilendar” University Press, Sofia, 2014. 3. Manchev, Krustyo, The National Question on the Balkans (in Bulgarian), Academic Press “Marin Drinov”, Sofia, 1999.

21 Dimitrov, M., The Macedonian Geopolitical Knot and the Future of the Balkans (in Bulgarian), magazine „Geopolitics‖, Issue №5, Sofia, 2019.

72 4. Memtsov, St., Kosovo. The problem of Its International Legal Status (in Bulgarian), “Makros” Press, Plovdiv, 2019. 5. Traykov, Veselin, National Doctrines of the Balkan Countries (in Bulgarian), “Znanie” Press, Sofia, 2000. 6. Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Historia e populit shqiptar, Botimet Toena, Tiranë, 2002. 7. Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Platformë për zgidhjen e çështjes kombëtare shqiptare, Shtëpia Botuese “Shkenca”, Tiranë, Tetor 1998. 8. Castellan, Georges, „Histoire des Balkans (ХІVe–ХХe siecle), Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1991. 9. Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 10. Ninov, M., "People's Character as a Prerequisite for the Albanian “National Delay”, International E-Journal of Advanced in Social Sciences, e-ISSN: 2411-183X, vol.IV, Issue: 11, August, 2018, pages: 339-346. 11. Skendi, Stavro, „Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912”, Princeton University Press, 1967. 12. https://geopolitica.eu/more/drugi-statii/2610-tiranskata-platforma-kato-element-ot-proekta- za-velika-albaniya 13. http://www.kosovothanksyou.com.

73 THE HISTORY AND HISTORICAL COMMITTEES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RESTART OF THE EUROPEAN ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE OF SKOPJE Stanislav STANEV, PhD

(Image source: https://www.vocaleurope.eu/generational-decision-will-macedonias-citizens-accept-agreement-with-greece/)

Summary: The disputes of the Former Yugoslavia, now the Republic of Northern Macedonia with its neighbors Greece and Bulgaria, begin almost immediately after the declaration of independence of the state and its recognition. Although they are in different directions (with Bulgaria - the language dispute, and with Greece - the name dispute), in practice they basically have disputes regarding the history and its interpretation in Skopje. The persistence of the authorities in the young country, on the one hand, and the firm position of Sofia and Athens, on the other, has as a result a number of disputes, which have led to a kind of isolation of Macedonia - mainly as a result of Greece's firm position. The change of government in Skopje has led to a change in the country's foreign policy. The first steps taken in this direction were the preparation and conclusion of contracts with Bulgaria and Greece. In both - the Neighborhood, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (with Bulgaria), and so-called The Prespa Treaty (with Greece) contains clauses concerning history and interstate disputes in this regard. Keywords: Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, Prespa agreement, Historical disputes, language dispute, name dispute.

74 Introduction The Republic of (now Northern) Macedonia1 has begun its independent existence in the field of international relations as part of the processes of disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It is the only former Yugoslav Republic that has not to wage war in this process (it should be noted here that Montenegro also does not wage war for its independence, but its forces, within the Yugoslav People's Army, participated in the wars). One of the reasons for Macedonia's bloodless separation was due to the persistent diplomatic support it received from Sofia. This is expressed not only in the recognition of the state (which Bulgaria first did on January 15, 1991 (less than two months after the independence of the Assembly). Bulgaria, represented by its President, Prime minister and diplomats succeeded in convincing Turkey, a regional factor in the Balkans and the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to do the same. In the coming decades, the young country faces many problems. Some of them are due to contradictions with Bulgaria and Greece. The same, though with different genesis (with Bulgaria - a language dispute, and with Greece - for the name), have a serious historical genesis. These disputes were partially resolved by the 1995 interim agreement concluded with Greece and the 1999 Declaration signed with Bulgaria. Although they have given impetus to relations between Skopje and Athens and Skopje and Sofia, the problems are far from being resolved. And the policy that Skopje has been pursuing since 2006 has made relations with Bulgaria and Greece more complicated, because of the history. This is the reason for Macedonia's "stalling" in its stated foreign policy priorities - NATO and EU membership. The situation gets resolved in 2017, when Skopje changes its foreign policy towards its neighbors. The Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation Agreements with Bulgaria were concluded - on August 01, 2017 and the so-called Prespa Agreement - signed on June 17, 2018 in the village of Nivici (Psarades), located on the shore of the Great Prespa Lake. Both international documents highlight the history and the way it is perceived by the former Yugoslav Republic. Thus, history is a key moment for relations in the dynamic region of the Western Balkans.

Historical overview of Vardar Macedonia after the First World War The historical and geographical area of Macedonia is divided into three parts:

1 The constitutional name of the country, until the amendments that followed the Prespa Treaty, is the Republic of Macedonia. The name former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was used in international relations. At present, the name is the Republic of Northern Macedonia. For the sake of exposition, it uses the abbreviated term Macedonia. When it comes to the broader historical-geographical concept or its elements, this is explicitly noted.

75 Vardar, which constitutes the state territory of the Republic of Northern Macedonia2; Aegean, which is part of Greece; Pirin - part of Bulgaria. This is, to a large extent, the situation after the end of World War I, when the treaties of the Versailles system (and in particular the Neuilly one) delineated the borders of the Balkans. It should be made clear that at that time Vardar Macedonia became part of the so-called Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed in 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - within the administrative-territorial unit - Vardar Banovina. Within this country the population is perceived not as Macedonians (in the modern sense) but as "straight" or "southern" Serbs. During the Second World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia initially allied with the Third Reich, but subsequently withdrew. This was the reason for the military intervention by the Wehrmacht (Nazi Germany's military forces) leading to the capitulation of Yugoslavia. As a result, the so-called Independent Croatian State was created, separating itself from the former Kingdom. Vardar Macedonia was handed over to the Kingdom of Bulgaria for administration and management. The issue of belonging to this territory was left to be resolved after the end of the war. An interesting point is that after the collapse of Yugoslavia and before the advent of the Bulgarian civilian and military administration, so-called "Bulgarian Action Committees"3 are set up in Vardar Macedonia, which commit themselves to the administration and avoidance of the chaos that can result in the result of leaving the current administration. After the arrival of the Bulgarian troops, their power was surrendered and the action committees dissolved. At the beginning of September 1944, the Kingdom of Bulgaria changed its current foreign policy and declared war on the Third Reich. The main part of the ensuing battles with the Wehrmacht were fought on the territory of pre-war Yugoslavia (including in Vardar Macedonia) and the bulk of the fighting was carried out by the Bulgarian army. Meanwhile, following the example of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (also known as the AVNOJ) organized by the guerrilla leader Joseph Tito, on August 2, 1944, the "Anti-fascist Assembly for the People's Liberation" convened at the Prokhor Pchinski Monastery (ACNOM)4 that self-nominates as a legitimate representative of the people of Macedonia and begins to act as a full body. This was the beginning of the People's Republic of Macedonia, which became part of the newly formed Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia

2 More for the Geography of Macedonia – Georgiev, Georgi, Бивша Югославска република Македония. Информационно и справочно издание, Geya libris, Sofia, 2016, 3 More for the Bulgarian Action Commitees – Minchev, Dimiter, Българските акционни комитети в Македония – 1941 г., Macedonian scientific institute, Sofia, 1995 4 More for ACNOM - see Paleshutski, Kostadin. Югославската комунистическа партия и македонският въпрос, 1919 – 1945, issue of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1985

76 (FPRY). In the coming decades, the federal unit of Macedonia has a new line of development. At the same time, the vision of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, about the Serbian character of the population, was abandoned, and the philosophy of the Serbian politician of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century - Stojan Novakovic - was adopted. He created the doctrine of Macedonianism, which aims to distance Macedonia's population from its Bulgarian roots, forming a new and different - Macedonian national consciousness - as a transitional stage of Serbian assimilation.5 In carrying out this line, Bulgaria is viewed in a negative light. It should be noted that at the beginning of these processes, the People's Republic of Bulgaria under pressure from Moscos holds (or more precisely enforces) cultural autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, which in practice is a forced de-Bulgarization (through Macedonianisation) of the population.6

Bulgaria and Macedonia after the end of Yugoslavia As stated above, after declaring its independence, Macedonia received the most serious support from Bulgaria. The first official recognition of the country came from Bulgaria on January 15, 1991.As stated above, after declaring its independence, Macedonia received the most serious support from Bulgaria. The first official recognition of the country came from Bulgaria on January 15, 1991.7 This act is preceded by intense diplomatic preparation, in which official Sofia not only organizes recognition, but makes serious efforts to garner international support for Macedonia's independence. Within these processes, the Sofia government faces a number of challenges, some of which are purely internal. This is a warning from the head of Bulgarian intelligence, who says extremely disturbing things - that parts of the Yugoslav People's Army are stationed along the border with Bulgaria and are ready to intervene if Sofia decides to recognize Macedonia's independence.8 This information turns out to be incorrect, but it is an indication that this act has both external and internal opposition. Another important point is the Greek president's attempt to organize a trilateral meeting with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which will obviously comment on Macedonia's future.9 The meeting failed because of

5 Дипломатски архив – Дубровник, ПП одель, Ф. 1. ISBN 954-8475-08-1, 1888 6 More for the Culture Autonomy of the Pirin region see Архивите говорят. БКП, Коминтернът и македонския въпрос (1917-1945), second volume issue ot the Head of archives at the Council of Ministers, Sofia, 1999 7 Banchev Biser. България и Югославската криза (1989-1995), University publishing house St. Kliment Ohridski, 2009 p. 99 8 Article available at https://www.vesti.bg/bulgaria/politika/filip-dimitrov-kak-priznah-makedoniia- 2836071 [03.12.2019] 9 Banchev Biser, p. 73-74

77 the categorical stance of the Bulgarian president, who stated that he was firmly in the position of unchanging borders and that he was aware that the opposite would lead to a military conflict with serious consequences for the region. Following the recognition by Sofia, it is the Bulgarian President who has made numerous contacts with his colleagues. As a result, Macedonia receives recognition from Turkey, a NATO member state and regional factor in the Balkans. A little while later, during a visit to Sofia, the president of the Russian Federation (a state, a permanent member of the UN Security Council) accepts the arguments of his Bulgarian colleague and Moscow also recognizes Macedonia's independence.10 In this way, the latter receives a firm guarantee for its independent existence. Meanwhile, despite the firm and unconditional support from Sofia, relations with Skopje are not getting the right direction. The reason for this is the language dispute. This is a discussion of whether the Macedonian language is independent. Skopje's position is that the Macedonian language is independent, while in Sofia the position is maintained that the language standard used in Macedonia is one of the three literary norms in the Bulgarian language. Although language is not subject to recognition under international law, this dispute is becoming a serious cross-national problem as it is an obstacle to the conclusion of bilateral treaties. In practice, until 1999, Bulgaria and Macedonia sign an international agreement (for the transmission of electricity), which is signed in English.11 It should be noted here that despite the disputes discussed, Sofia continues to support Skopje. In this regard, when Greece suspends Macedonia's access to the port of Thessaloniki, Bulgaria provides the opportunity to use the port of Burgas (Albania also expresses its readiness to help - with the Drach / Durres port).12 A step towards resolving the issue was made in 1999, when the prime ministers of Bulgaria and Macedonia signed a Declaration, according to which each of the countries uses its constitutional language. This gives impetus to interstate relations. Despite ongoing disputes about language and historical issues, a considerable number of international treaties have been signed in a short period of time. Relations between the two countries have been strained since 2006, when the current opposition came to power. The new government in Skopje adopts an aggressive approach to its neighbors, which is particularly clear in the direction of history and the way it is taught and perceived. Criticism of Bulgaria, inherited from Yugoslavia, has increased dramatically, with actions provoking tensions became common. All of this is forcing Bulgaria, a member of NATO and the EU, to

10 Zhelev, Zhelyu. В голямата политика, Trud publishing house, 1998, p. 164 11 Pudin K., Българско-македонските отношения в сферата на сигурността и отбраната, 1999 – 2009 г. Икономически алтернативи, 2009, №5, 90-99. 12 Shea, J. Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to define a new Balkan Nation, McFarland Company Inc. Publishers.

78 say that it supports and will continue to support Macedonia, but the support is not unconditional, but is presumed by the abandonment of the hate speech in Skopje. Sofia says it is necessary to conclude a bilateral agreement to regulate the issues at stake and to set clear criteria for co-operation. Although there were initially positive signals for the conclusion of such a contract, the Macedonian Foreign Minister later stated that it was not necessary. The bilateral relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria are boosted in 2017. The newly formed government in Skopje strongly states that its main foreign policy priorities are NATO and EU membership. And as far as their implementation goes before solving the problems with Greece and Bulgaria, concrete steps are being taken. Intensive preparation is underway for the conclusion of a contract with Bulgaria, for which Sofia (as indicated above) insists. The announcement of this is perceived with mixed feelings on both sides of the border. A huge part of the society in Bulgaria and Macedonia sees the possibility of relaunching the relations and developing them in a positive direction. However, there are also groups that perceive the conclusion of such a contract as a threat. In Macedonia, the widely discussed concerns are that it would constitute a cruel blow to "identity" and, in an essence, a capitulation to Bulgarian claims. In Bulgaria, however, opinions are being circulated that this will make an unacceptable compromise, as Macedonian will be "recognized". The above objections, albeit with a strong social focus, are devoid of validity. Identity cannot be given or withdrawn by an international treaty, and language (as noted above) is not recognized under international law. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the circles in Macedonia that have circulated the aforementioned ones are close to Eurosceptic governance in the period 2006-2016, and those in Bulgaria also exhibit Eurosceptic positions. The Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation Agreement between Bulgaria and Macedonia was signed on 01 August 2017 in Skopje. The date is symbolic - Ilinden, the date on which the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising which is honored on the both sides of the border. The treaty itself consists of a preamble and 14 articles. Of relevance to this exposition is Art. 8, items 2 and 3. It provides for the establishment of a joint multidisciplinary expert committee. It should be on a parity basis - an equal number of representatives on both sides, with two co-chairs. The terms of reference of the Commission under the terms of the Treaty are historical and educational matters. The members of the committee, who are scholars, should look into controversial historical issues that have different interpretations in the two countries. The same (issues) should be discussed and, through the use of historical sources, a scientific analysis of the historical issues at stake. The results of the committee's work presuppose the

79 fulfillment of point three of the same article - the organization of joint celebrations of historical events and personalities. It is a common respect for events and personalities that are common to both countries and are respected by people on both sides of the border. The treaty has been ratified by both countries, approved in the Macedonian Parliament on 15 January 2018 and in the Bulgarian Parliament on 18 January 201813. It enters into force on 14 February 2018. It should be noted that both Parliaments have no votes against, but in Macedonian there is one specificity. Opposition MPs (until recently the ruling party) are boycotting the vote, with only 61 votes in the 120-seat parliament. In this way, another, though indirect confirmation, is obtained that good relations with Bulgaria is not a priority of their foreign policy vision. And given the participation of their representatives in the public discussions that accompanied the discussion of the text of the treaty, it can be stated that a considerable part of their skepticism is rooted in the unwillingness to raise historical discussions. The Joint Multidisciplinary Committee consists of a total of 14 scientists - seven from Bulgaria and Macedonia. It is chaired by two co-chairs. These are Prof. Angel Dimitrov, Bulgarian scholar and diplomat, former ambassador to Skopje, and Prof. Dragi Georgiev, director of the Institute of National History at Skopje University of Sofia. Cyril and Methodius". The analysis of the commissioners reveals an interesting fact - the lack of ethnic Albanians from Macedonia. This is important given the fact that the Albanian community in Macedonia, significant in size, has its own rights guaranteed by the Ohrid Agreement to participate in governing the country.14 In addition, during the political crisis that led to change, Albanians demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the fact that the foreign policy of the government since 2006 does not take into account the sentiments of ethnic Albanians, who are markedly pro- European. In this regard, as one of the measures to overcome the isolation, the Albanians asked their representatives to participate in the working groups with Bulgaria and Greece. The lack of ethnic Albanians on this committee (given the fact that they are part of the coalition government) may mean that a historic discussion with Bulgaria is not among their priorities.

Macedonia and Greece after the end of Yugoslavia Unlike Bulgaria, which has consistently supported Macedonia from the very

13 Article available at http://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=123506 [03.12.2019] 14 Ninov, Marian. Преглед на развитието на албанския национален въпрос в периода 1998-2005, published in Югоизточна Европа: новите заплахи пред регионалната сигурност. Volume 3, New Bylgarian University, 2015 p. 175-182

80 beginning, the situation with Greece is different. An issue popularly known as the "name dispute" raised between Athens and Skopje. In its Constitution, the young country is called "the Republic of Macedonia", its language is "Macedonian" and its citizens are "Macedonians". Athens states that this is unacceptable to her because on the one hand it is encroaching on Greek historical and cultural heritage and on the other it is a prerequisite for territorial claims. Thus, the story is a major dispute with Macedonia with another neighbor. It should be borne in mind that the fears of territorial claims, which Greece has emphasized, can't be shared. Greece is a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as such, in the event of a threat, can rely on assistance from its other partners. Apart from the newly declared independence, Macedonia has no real opportunity to endanger the territorial integrity of Greece. Among other things, when the units of the Yugoslav People's Army are withdrawn to the north, they take with them practically all the weapons available on the territory of the republic. Until the beginning of the military co-operation between Bulgaria and Macedonia, under which the latter receives gratuitously tanks and artillery and their accompanying ammunition, the latter has no practical defense capabilities. The above leads to the obvious conclusion that Skopje's fears of territorial claims are insolvent. Some authors explain Greece's behavior towards Macedonia by the fact that a significant community lives on its territory, which speaks almost the same language used in its northern neighbor.15 Macedonia's next steps on its own way of existence are accompanied by Greece's negative attitude. This is the reason why Macedonia was admitted to the UN, not under its constitutional name, but under the "temporary" name - the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The escalation of tensions in the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia is the cause of active US policy. With their mediation in 1995, Athens and Skopje signed the so-called "Interim Accord"16, which resolved a number of controversial issues. Macedonia agrees to stop using a number of symbols that Greece perceives as national, as well as to compromise on the name, to use the provisional one accepted by the UN. For its part, Athens agrees not to interfere with its northern neighbor in its efforts to become a member of international organizations, subject to the above conditions. Many attempts have been made in the coming decades to resolve the dispute, including through the mediation of the European Union, but they remain in vain. Despite numerous recommendations by the European Commission, and despite its commitment in 1995, Greece has pursued a permanent policy of blocking Macedonia

15 Ihlau, Olaf, Mayr, Walter, Der unruhige Hinterhof Europas, Siedler Verlag, 2009. 16 Article available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between %20the%20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf [03.12.2019]

81 in launching EU accession negotiations. The government that came to power in Skopje in 2006 has begun a process of so-called. ―Antiquisation‖. With quasi-scientific approaches, a historical (or rather political) myth begins to emerge, which aims to justify the connection between ancient Macedonians and present-day Macedonia. As part of this process is the Skopje 2014 project,17 in which many monuments, symbolizing personalities and events that relate to both Bulgarian and Greek history, have been built in the Macedonian capital. The huge monument of Alexander the Great, centrally located in Skopje, occupies a special place. The same is a cause for diplomatic tensions, resulting in the monument being called a "warrior on horseback." This political-historical line gives its concrete result. In 2008, a NATO membership summit in Bucharest is expected to be invited to Macedonia. However, this does not happen, and official reports say the reason lies in the unresolved dispute with Greece, and that once this issue is clarified, Macedonia will receive an invitation to join. Skopje views the above as a violation of the 1995 Interim Accord and brings the matter before the International Court of Justice. The case was admitted to trial and the court found Greece had breached the Accord. Although pleased, Macedonia has not got a real result. The International Court of Justice rejects the Macedonian request to oblige Athens to suspend obstruction. Macedonia-Greece relations have been boosted after the current opposition in Skopje formed a government in 2017 in coalition with the Albanian parties.18 This government states as its priority, among other things, the resolution of the name dispute. The talks are intense and the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU Council requests that the dispute be resolved definitively. The Macedonian PM offers an alternative to the options discussed so far for the name of the state - Republic of Ilinden Macedonia.19 In this way, all the Greek objections raised so far are overcome and a reference is made to a historical event to which Athens has no claim - the Ilinden- Preobrazhenie (or as popular in Macedonia - the Ilinden) uprising. However, this option was not accepted by the Albanian parties as the event is not Albanian related.20 In the end, Skopje and Athens agree to use one of the options discussed - the

17 Article available at https://www.economist.com/europe/2010/08/26/a-macedonian-makeover [03.12.2019] 18 Article available at https://fokus.mk/zaednichkata-platforma-na-albanskite-partii/ [03.12.2019] 19 Article available at https://www.novinite.com/articles/190168/Athens+and+Skopje+Discuss+the+Name+%22Republic+of +Ilinden+Macedonia%22 [03.12.2019] 20 More for the Аlbanian character see Ninov, Marian, Националният характер на албанците: фактор в съвременното развитие на националния им въпрос, published in Geopolitika, , Sofia, volume 1, 2016, p. 15-28.

82 Republic of Northern Macedonia. This agreement is objectified in the so-called "Prespa agreement", signed on June 17, 2018.21 Despite sharp opposition from in the Greek parliament, the government manages to gather the necessary majority to ratify the agreement, and Athens says it will no longer put an obstacle to Macedonia's NATO membership. In Greece, too, the agreement was not reached unanimously. It causes one of the coalition partners in the government to leave the government22, but the Greek parliament ratifies the agreement. In this way, Macedonia overcomes the main obstacle to the realization of its main foreign policy goal - NATO membership. The Accession Protocol was signed on 06 February 2019 and, after the ratification process in the national parliaments has passed, Macedonia will become a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Agreement itself consists of a preamble and two chapters, of which there are a total of twenty articles. Historical issues are addressed in Chapter One, Articles one to nine. With the Prespa agreement, Macedonia has made much more specific commitments comparing to Treaty with Bulgaria. What will be the name of the country, what will be the official name of the citizens, what will be the insignia of the license plates? After that, the first one describes the algorithm for ratifying the agreement and the follow-up. The second article reaffirms the commitment of the 1995 Interim Agreement - that, subject to the terms of the agreement, Athens will not interfere with Skopje when applying for membership in international organizations. Specific text has been set aside for NATO and EU accession, as well as the actions Greece will take to fulfill its commitments. Article 3 concerns the borders of States and commitments for lack of territorial claims. Article four is a continuation of the third - the parties declare that nothing in its constitution can be interpreted as territorial claims or grounds for interference with the interior. Article Five binds the philosophy of the agreement to a number of international instruments, some of which are explicitly mentioned: the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Helsinki Final Act, Copenhagen Document Meeting of the Human Dimension Conference of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and Paris art for a new Europe. Article six obliges both the parties not only to refrain from a language of hostility, but provides for an obligation to take specific action, where available. The name "Macedonia" and its components for the purpose of the Agreement are defined in Art.

21 Article available at https://s.kathimerini.gr/resources/article-files/symfwnia-aggliko-keimeno.pdf [03.12.2019] 22 Article available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/greek-defence-minister-quits- over-macedonia-name-deal-panos-kammenos [03.12.2019]

83 Seventh. Special attention should be paid to Art. eighth. It addresses the issue of symbols that are part of cultural and historical heritage; the issue of the status of monuments, public buildings and infrastructure; forbidding Skopje to use the flag that depicts the Star of Vergina. Here again (as in the treaty with Bulgaria) it is envisaged the establishment of a joint multidisciplinary committee to consider and discuss the controversial historical and archeological issues. The issue of the committee is again regulated in much greater detail. It is empowered, including to review all school textbooks and school support materials such as maps, historical atlases, etc. It is noteworthy that this is not unilateral and can be applied to either party. The work of this committee is accompanied by much less emotion and controversy than Bulgaria. The reasons for this are complex, but one of the main reasons is that Macedonia's attitude towards Greece has a much lower level of criticality than Bulgaria, and lacks the tradition of Yugoslavia. Conclusion The history and its interpretation in neighboring countries is a serious issue in the Balkans. And it is especially sensitive in the dynamic period of the Western Balkans - the countries aspiring to join the European Union. Specifically, with respect to the Republic of Northern Macedonia, history, its interpretation in the country, and disputes form an important part of its foreign policy relations. The story has caused so much controversy that it is in fact the cause of Skopje's problems with neighbors for decades to come. For this reason, international treaties, which are the reason for Skopje's isolation, have given serious attention to historical issues and have set up committees to investigate the issues at hand and seek solutions.

84 THE EURO-ATLANTIC ASPIRATION OF THE “ALBANIAN FACTOR”

Petyo VALKOV, PhD

(Image source: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2015/10/02/albanian-national-convention-on-european-integration/)

Summary: The article outlines the specificities of the geopolitical positioning of the Albanian ethnic group in the Balkans. The implications of the behavior of the latter to the Euro-Atlantic integration processes in the countries in which it resides is further analyzed. The correlation between the pace of the integration efforts and the axiological perspective of the ―Albanian factor‖ is examined. The reasons behind the markedly pro-EU and pro-NATO orientation of the Albanians are presented. Keywords: integration, stability, Western Balkans, ―Albanian factor‖.

85 During the last couple of decades, there is an ongoing process of conscious democratization of the Albanian political elite in the Western Balkans; in every country in which representatives of this ethnic group reside. This trend has been established and channelized through the policies which, the prime center of power in the international arena, the United States of America have been enacting in the region: particularly targeting the Albanians as they are seen as the main instrument for achieving Washington‘s interests in the region. The immanent orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic values of the Albanian factor is evident from the writings of Naim Frasheri, one of the main figures of the Albanian national renascence in the 19th century, that ―for the Albanians the Sun rises from the West‖. This quote has been used by Albanian minority-political leaders in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, this message has been used by Ali Ahmeti, chairman of the biggest Albanian political party in the Republic of North Macedonia – Democratic Union for Integration, during his meeting with Deputy General-Secretary of NATO Alexander Vershbow in Tetovo on 18th of July 2012. At the meeting, Ahmeti, citing Frasheri, once again reaffirmed the Albanian strategic commitment. He restated before the US diplomat that for his ethnicity, NATO membership equals a lasting peace, stability, security, economic development, and social prosperity. Nonetheless, he sends a warning that if his country does not become a member of the Alliance, great unrest and disappointment will occur in the Albanian society. NATO membership is, furthermore, seen as a ―door‖ for commencing negotiations for EU membership. He highlights that for Republic North Macedonia and the Albanians in the region, that there is no alternative to integration.1 Strong aspiration and considerable efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration in the Western Balkans could be observed in the enacted policies by the governments of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Kosovo. Precisely, in those two ―small states‖2 in the international relations, the Albanian ethnicity is a leading factor, which generates a clear, conscious disposition and positive attitude toward the Euro- Atlantic integration processes, which require important reforms to take place in both countries. Nonetheless, the priority pillar in the Albanian foreign policy is the NATO

1 Ahmeti: „Сонцето на Албанците изгрева на Запад‖, official website of NSI, 18.07.2012, accessed on 13.09.2019 at: http://www.bdi.mk/mk/lajmi.php?id=753 2 Volker Krause and J. David Singer in their comparative study of small states and the Great powers point out other quantitative difference: military personnel 12:1; military expenses 23:1; energy consumption 16:1; Steel and metal manufacturing 14:1; population 6:1; urban population 8:1. The definition of small states which Krause and Singer use – ―minor powers as states whose diplomatic and material resources are so limited that they have to concentrate their efforts on safeguarding territorial integrity rather than pursuing more far-reaching goals‖ is fully valid for Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Kosovo.

86 membership, which is predicated on the closeness of the ethnicity with the USA. The next echelon of the strategic objectives is the EU membership, which is seen as an opportunity for economic prosperity and free access to goods and markets. A common speculative topic in the countries in the Western Balkans is the so- called – Great Albania; usually, this is party politics aiming at gaining dividends based on nationalistic rhetoric. According to Veton Latifi, of utmost importance is plans, which envision the idea of ―Great Albania‖ not only in Albania itself but also in the region, not to exist.3 The sense of belonging to an ethnic group exists which is evident from the fact that the anniversary of the establishment of the Albanian state is celebrated not only in Albania but in everyplace where Albanians reside. Latifi, nonetheless, is a firm believer that the political agenda is set in stone – Western Balkans integration in the EU. Thus, there is a general understanding among some of the most influential Albanian politicians that through NATO and EU integration the dream of all Albanians living within the territory of one state would be fulfilled.4 Even after a number of appeals, mainly related to the nationalistic ideology, made during the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Albanian independence in the Macedonian capital, the leaders of Albania and Kosovo promised to achieve unity of the ethnic Albanians in the Balkans. They stated that this should be achieved ―within the borders of the European Union‖. In his speech, in front of about 10 000 people in Skopje, Albanian Prime Minister Sally Berisha pointed out something significant: ―Through the EU we will implement the project for our national unity‖.5 Although the crowd had been cheering appeals for ―Great Albania‖, the majority of the Albanian elite realizes that one of the most painless alternatives for the unification of Albanians is the abolition of the borders in the Balkans; namely the integration of all the countries of the region into the EU. The EU is constantly urging the Balkan countries to improve regional cooperation and to carry out reforms. EU officials unite behind the idea that it is time for a change and, therefore, proposed to create a cooperation structure similar to the BENELUX, which will bring closer and support the path of Albania, Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia and Montenegro toward their European integration.6

3 „Мечтата за Велика Албания все още е жива―, News agency „Dnes―, 28.11.2012, accessed on 09.09.2019 accessible at http://www.dnes.bg/world/2012/11/28/mechtata-za-velika-albaniia-vse-oshte- e-jiva.174121,. 4 Ibid. 5 ―Албанците се обединяват на Балканите чрез ЕС―, News agency „Actualno― 26.11.2012, accessed on. 08.09.2019, accessible at http://analysis.actualno.com/Albancite-se-obedinjavat-na-Balkanite- chrez-ES--news_408070.html, 6 Ibid.

87 The main purpose of creating the new structure should be primarily:

- Trade; - Liberalization of the customs and borders; - The fight against organized crime; - Regional development and the infrastructure; - The development of the regional financial market.7 Such a structure would give new impetus to the preparation for EU membership and would help these countries to be competitive in the European economy when they join the common market. At the same time, it should be noted that it is of utmost importance to convince the global community that these efforts do not represent an attempt to create ―Great Albania‖ through the ―back door‖.8 As a result, a market of more than 8 million consumers would be created with free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor force. Thus, instead of waiting for an EU accession, these countries will be benefiting by implementing the EU trade values. The plan is ambitious, however, there is no time to lose. The Albanians in the region need reasons and clear arguments in order to believe and stay in their countries rather than fleeing abroad looking for a brighter future.9 Considered the leader of the Albanians in the Republic of North Macedonia and the former leader of the para-military NLA - Ali Ahmeti, whose DUI party in 2012 organized the celebrations for Centennial of the Independence of Albania, also called for respecting the rights of others, because ―People who fight for their rights cannot fail to respect the rights of others.‖10 In this respect, the coalition partner in the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia and chairman of the DUI - Ahmeti pointed out that the Albanians ―live together with Macedonians who respect them as their fellow citizens. And this is what we expect from them - to be respected. In this manner stability in the Balkans is being built. Thus, there can be peace and together we could join the EU and NATO. We are doing our best to overcome historical feuds. Nonetheless, if France and Germany did it, the Balkans could also do it.‖11

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 „Бериша: Албанският национализъм е европейски―, News agency „ТЕМА daily―, 26.11.2012, accessed on 13.09.2019, accessible at http://temadaily.bg/publication/5606%d0%91%d0%b5%d1%80%d0%b8%d1%88%d0%b0:%d0%90% d0%bb%d0%b1%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d1%8f%d1%82%d0%bd%d0%b0%d1 %86%d0%b8%d0%be%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%bb%d0%b8%d0%b7%d1%8a%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%b 5%d0%b2%d1%80%d0%be%d0%bf%d0%b5%d0%b9%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d1%81%d0%bd% d0%b8%d0%bc%d0%ba%d0%b8/ 11 Ibid.

88 In April 2009, Albania formally submitted an application for EU membership. On this occasion, the Financial Times published an article titled ―Albania in the EU - so there could be peace in the Balkans‖.12 This was a clear sign of Europe's plans and intentions to integrate the other ―small states‖ from the Balkans into its family. According to the text of the article, the East enlargement of the EU is among its greatest successes, and it must be continued with the accession of the "fragile" countries of the Western Balkans. Essential for the preservation of peace in the region is the accession of Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia to the European system of values. A very important act, demonstrating the willingness of both Albania and Albanians to join the EU is the call and the firm position stated during the visit of the President of the Republic of Albania – Jozefina Topali in February 2013 in Sofia. In a press statement, she emphasized that ―there is a postponement of the process of European integration, which is not good for the Balkans. But there is a solution for South-Eastern Europe, and it is the European Community - a community based on values in which we firmly believe‖.13 In her address to journalists, Topali stressed that ―Albanians have been living in this part of the world for thousands of years, and this is very special and a unique place because Albanians in Albania are surrounded by Albanians.‖ She has repeatedly explained that ―Albanians live in Albania, Albanians live in Kosovo, Albanians live in the Republic of Macedonia, Albanians live in Montenegro. So, the Albanians are divided into four or five countries and this is a unique case‖.14 Topali gave advice to Brussels - to understand the depth of the situation, the development and the future of this region. ―Europe must not forget that in this part of the world the First World War began, only ten years ago in this region was the last war in Europe. Hence Brussels should accelerate the process of integration of this region. It is not good for the Albanians to remain last in the process of European integration because they are a factor in the region and have a very constructive role in it.‖15 She added that ―Albanians live in five countries. The multi- religious countries are an added value and Brussels needs to understand this. Living in a multireligious country is difficult, but at the same time, when you preserve this cohabitation in peace, it is a clear sign that you bring the democratic into yourself.

12 „Файненшъл таймс: Албания в ЕС, за да има мир на Балканите―, „e-vestnik―, 30.04.2009 , accessed on 14.09.2019, accessible at http://e-vestnik.bg/6117 13 „Топали: ЕС да ускори интеграцията на Западните Балкани―, News agency „БГНЕС―, 05.02.2013, accessed on 06.09.2019, accessible on http://video.bgnes.com/view/39232 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

89 There is no other greater value than a civilization that lives in harmony between religions. Europe must perceive this as a model for itself.‖16 When asked whether she believed that the borders in the Balkans were final, Topali pointed out that in Europe the borders were no longer meaningful. ―I would like the same for my region – people having full freedom of movement as it is in Europe‖.17 Given the connectedness of Albanian political parties from the Balkans and their shared strategic objectives, this statement by Topali demonstrates that Albanian political elites in the countries of the region are very well aware of the importance of the EU membership. This would secure a practical realization of one of their imperative objectives related to the unification of all Albanians in a democratic manner, without jeopardizing the ethnic tolerance and peace in the region. Strong messages about the European future of the ―Albanian factor‖ come from the historic EU-Western Balkans Summit, held on 17 May 2018 in Sofia. As a result, a joint declaration was adopted with an annex to the ―Priority program from Sofia‖18. During the forum, Albania's Prime Minister Edi Rama stated in an interview for Euronews that he was against the idea of ―Great Albania‖. He stressed that his country had a duty to protect Albanians living abroad and that the ethnic group has never been in a better position in the Balkans. ―Kosovo - they have their own country. Macedonia - they are part of a real revolution with a change in their approach to Albanian language and population. In Southern Serbia, I hope that their conditions will improve, based on the fact that the attitude towards Serbs in Kosovo is much better.‖19 Immanently positive notes could be found in the context of the European perspective of the Western Balkans in his words: ―I have always stated that I dream to unite under the skies of the European Union, I never dreamed of Great Albania because I have dreams of a great Europe, in which the Albanians are.‖20 The Albanian Prime Minister had firmly confirmed the desire of the Albanian ethnicity for EU membership and in the visit on June 4, 2018, of the Bulgarian Prime Minister in Tirana. The meeting itself and the words of Rama during it are indicative of both the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Albanians and their attitudes, in regional

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Declaration from the EU summit – ―West Balkans― and an annex „Priority program from Sofia―, Ministry of the Bulgarian presidency of the European Council, 17.05.2018, Sofia, accessed on 12.09.2019 , accessible at https://eu2018bg.bg 19 „Албанският премиер се обяви против идеята за Велика Албания―, News agency „news.bg―, 17.05.2018, accessed on 13.09.2019 , accessible at https://news.bg/world/albanskiyat-premier-se- obyavi-protiv-ideyata-za-velika-albaniya.html 20 Ibid.

90 plan, towards Bulgaria. According to Rama, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov has made monumental efforts the Western Balkans to be included as a main topic during the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU.21 In support of the above, it should be stressed that four out of the seven points (p.3 - Strengthening the rule of law as a prerequisite for the development of the Euro- Atlantic integration process; p.5 - Resolving the name dispute, in accordance with European values and the principles of international law; p.6 - Good relations with the neighbors; p.7 - Rapid integration in NATO and the EU)22 in the signed on 7 January 2017 ―Common platform of Albanian parties in the Republic of Macedonia‖ between DUI, "Besa movement" and the ―Union for Albanians‖, cover in particular issues related to the Euro-Atlantic integration of what is known today as Republic of North Macedonia. This, in turn, is definite proof of the positive position of the ―Albanian factor‖ in terms of EU and NATO membership. The approval of the Euro-Atlantic integration by the Albanian ethnicity in the Western Balkans retains its constant values over the past years and even notes a positive trend. This comes in accordance with the general strategy of all Albanians in the region for unification in the common Euro-Atlantic family. The gradual abolishing of the formal borders, existing at this stage between the Balkan countries with significant Albanian communities, as well as ensuring free access to labor markets in Western Europe, is an extremely strong motivating factor for the representatives of this ethnicity. It should also be emphasized, that the integration of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Kosovo into NATO, as well as that of Tirana, Pristina, Podgorica and Skopje in the EU, are priority objectives in the programs of the leading Albanian political parties in the region as they firmly advocate for it over the years; which is an additional argument for the real existing sentiments regarding these issues among the ethnicity. In this context, it is important to note the role and policy of Albania and the strong support of the United States in the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of this ethnic group. In conclusion, it should be noted that the efforts of the “Albanian factor” in the RNM for NATO and EU membership have a positive “domino effect” on the other countries in the region, which have realized the need for Euro-Atlantic integration and it has been recognized as a vital national interest. This Albanian policy has a positive spillover on the completion of the regional security community.

21 „Борисов получи медал за признателност от албанския премиер―, News agency „dariknews―, 04.06.2018, accessed on 13.09.2019 , accessible at https://dariknews.bg/novini/sviat/borisov-poluchi- medal-za-priznatelnost-ot-albanskiia-premier-snimki-2101342 22 „Общата платформа на албанските партии в Р Македония―, „Geopolitica― 07.01.2017 г., accessed on 15.09.2019 , accessible at https://geopolitica.eu/more/drugi-statii/2610-tiranskata- platforma-kato-element-ot-proekta-za-velika-albaniya

91 Particularly important for all Western Balkan countries, and especially those with an active Albanian community, is their incorporation into such collaboration. This should be drawn as an option before them without an alternative in the context of the current geopolitical situation. It is through participation in regional initiatives that the countries of this region can decide a number of long-standing and highly complex open disputes with their neighbors in a democratic and peaceful manner. It is within the realms of this theoretical framework to address the open aspects of the Albanian national question on a regional level. The USA, as a power center in international relations, has positioned itself as a major proponent of the integration policy adopted by the “Albanian factor”. This support largely acts as an argument for the relatively fast pace of integration in Albania, RNM, Kosovo, and Montenegro, nonetheless, these countries experience serious difficulties in implementing meaningful reforms in the different policy domains.

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93