Psychological Dimensions of Socratic Protreptic By Roberto Bradizza A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston Ontario, Canada April, 2012 Copyright © Roberto Bradizza, 2012 Abstract My goal in the present work is to add to our understanding of Socratic protreptic. I do so by focussing on psychological traits and qualities of character in Socrates’ young associates. There are a number of candidates throughout the dialogues whose colourful depiction and careful psychological rendering offer us ample material for study. In this study, I focus on two characters in particular. First, I look at the presentation of Alcibiades in the final scene of Symposium. Here I explore how Plato uses hubris and shame to explain the failure of protreptic in this gifted Socratic associate. Next, I look at Theaetetus as presented in the eponymously named dialogue. His characterization as an able, intelligent and model candidate for philosophy gives us a penetrating insight into the Socratic ideal. Finally, I offer a reading of Eros in Phaedrus that examines the psychological dynamic between the lover and his beloved. While a number of types of lovers are envisioned in this dialogue, I argue that if a beloved is to succeed in turning toward philosophy his lover must be a philosophical lover motivated by other- regarding care for his beloved’s soul. ii Acknowledgements I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Jon Miller for his supervision of this dissertation. I have benefitted from his sage advice and criticism at every stage. But for his support, this work likely would not have come to fruition. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge too, Prof. Stephen Leighton both for his personal support and in his capacity as second reader. It was his input and early suggestions that helped bring focus to this project. Thanks also to the members of the examination committee, Dr. Philip Mitsis, Dr. George Bevan and Dr. Henry Laycock for their questions, comments and suggestions. I am pleased too, to acknowledge Dr. Joseph Novak of the University of Waterloo for his role in fostering my early interest in Socratic Studies, and for his crucial contribution at the start of this dissertation process—Grazie Professore! My sincere thanks to all of my friends and colleagues at the Queen’s Philosophy Department, especially to Dr. David Bakhurst; Dr. Paul Fairfield; Dr. Nancy Salay; Dr. Mark C.R. Smith and Dr. Rahul Kumar. Thanks also to departmental assistants Judy Vanhooser and Marilyn Lavoie for their expertise and care. Without the friends and family who have stood by me, this long road would have been a much more taxing journey. It is with affection that I acknowledge their many years of moral support. To my very good friend Chris Barr, to my brother, Dr. Lou Bradizza and my sister Dr. Clara Bradizza, I offer a special note of thanks. With deep gratitude, I wish to recognize the efforts of my mother Maria and my late father Giuseppe for their life-long devotion to the education of their children. Hvala vam za sve što ste učinili za mene. Finally, to my wife Dr. Arawn Therrien, words can hardly convey my gratitude for her patience and singular support. She has been my biggest champion; her faith in me gave me confidence when it was most needed. Her love has strengthened and sustained me throughout. To my children Dylan and Sofia, who by their love have taught me more things than were dreamt of in my philosophy, I humbly offer this dissertation as an example of getting one’s homework done. And yes, I can come and play now. iii For Arawn, Dylan and Sofia iv Chapter One: Protreptic and Psyche Overview 1 I Dialogue and Psyche A. Introduction 4 B. The Relevance of Character 5 C. Clitophon’s Weakness: Dialectical Determination 10 D. Euthydemus 13 E. Embracing ‘Ruin’ 15 II Republic Considered A. Philosophic Nature and Corruption of Character 16 B. Adeimantus and Callicles Compared 20 C. Philosophical Nature and the Psyche 23 D. Conclusion 24 Chapter Two: Hybris and Shame as Impediments to Protreptic I The Nature of Hybris A. Legal Social and Cultural Perspectives 27 i) Acts of Violence 28 ii) Sexual Offences 29 iii) Graphe Hybreos 29 iv) Alcibiades’ Graphe Hybreos 30 II. Four Accusations of Socrates’ Hybris A. Socrates as Marsyas: Persuasion as Hybris 35 B. Socrates’ Self-control as Hybris 38 C. Socrates’ Deceptive Argumentative Style as Hybris 41 D. Socrates’ Disingenuous Eros as Hybris 44 i) The Symposiast-Jury Responds 45 III. Alcibiades’ Hybris A. The Dramatic Context of Alcibiades’ Hybris 47 i) Alcibiades’ Drunken Truth 48 ii) Drunkenness Reveals Character 50 iii) Alcibiades Hybristes 52 B. Physical Violence 54 C. Sexual Impropriety 57 i) Misguided Eros 61 IV. The Moral and Social Dimensions of Shame A. Honour-Groups and Shame 66 B. Alcibiades’ Public and Private Shame 69 C. Shame and Self-Sufficiency 71 D. Alcibiades’ Shame Rooted in Slavish Subjection 74 i) Alcibiades as Slave 74 ii) Weakness of Belief 76 E. Conclusion 77 v Chapter Three: Character and Philosophical Success I Theaetetus as Model Interlocutor A. Introduction 79 B. Theaetetus’ Ability 79 C. From Ability to Character 82 II Character and Dialectic A. Character and ‘Savage’ Interlocutors 85 B. The Encomium Reveals Character 86 C. Republic on Character 87 D. Theodorus’ Dialectical Reticence 89 III Character and Protreptic A. Wonder [yauma;zw] 90 B. Discontent 93 i) Diotima on Discontent 95 C. Courage [a]ndrei;a] and Confidence [ya;rsov] 96 i) a]ndrei;a 96 ii) ya;rsov 99 D. ‘Noble Nature’ [gennai;on] 103 i) Nobility and Liberality 103 ii) Responding Nobly 106 iii) Noble Character versus Noble Ancestry 109 iv) Nobility, Freedom and Leisure 112 E. Nobility and Moral Beauty 115 i) Emergence of kalo;n te kai' a]gayo;n 115 ii) From Physical to Moral Beauty 117 Chapter Four: Eros, Psyche and the Turn Toward Philosophy I The Masks of Eros A. Introduction 120 B. Self-Regarding Eros 121 i) Lysias’ Speech: The Non-Lover 121 ii) Socrates’ First Speech: The Wily-Lover 123 iii) Socrates’ First Speech: The Lover 127 C. Other-Regarding Eros: The Philosophical Lover 130 II The Faces of Eros A. Introduction 132 B. Rational Eros 132 C. Acquisitive Eros: Cultivating Defects in the Beloved 134 i) Acquiring a Beloved 135 ii) The Lover’s Paradox 137 vi D. Seductive Eros 141 i) Introduction 142 ii) Lysis 137 iii) Lysis’ Lesson in Love 146 iv) Cultivating the Mind 148 E. Philosophical Eros 150 i) Introduction 150 ii) Honouring the Gods 151 iii) Socrates ‘Purified’ 153 iv) Beauty, Madness and the Beloved 156 v) Beholding Beauty and Sōphrosunē 160 vi) Sōphrosunē Thanatos: Human Self-Control 162 vii) Sōphrosunē and the Non-Lover 163 viii) Sōphrosunē and the Lover 163 ix) Sōphrosunē and the Wily Lover 164 x) Divine Sōphrosuē: The Philosophical Lover 165 xi) Does Zeus Seek Another Zeus or Ganymede? 167 xii) Philosophical Victory 171 xiii) Engendering Illiberality 173 xiv) Engendering Philosophy: Other-Regarding Eros 174 Chapter Five: Conduct, Character and Protreptic I Dramatic Characterization and Protreptic A. Introduction 180 B. Protreptic and Persuasion 180 C. Character and Dialectic 184 D. Diversity of Protreptic Models 185 II Dialectical Ethics A. Philosophical Beloved 189 B. Saying the Same Things 191 C. Harmony 193 Bibliography 197 vii List of Figures Figure 1: Page 157 Figure 2: Page 182 viii Chapter One: Protreptic and the Philosophical Psyche Overview This dissertation deals with Socratic protreptic, but not in the usual sense. It is not a work devoted to analyzing protreptic arguments themselves, but instead is concerned with understanding how an interlocutor’s character traits contribute to the success or failure of protreptic. After all, if philosophical protreptic were capable of achieving its aim solely through the force of rational persuasion, we should rightly suppose that any well-conceived and logically sound exhortation ought to handily accomplish its task. Take for instance, an argument attributed to Aristotle from Protrepticus: “If you should philosophize, you should philosophize, and if you shouldn’t philosophize, then you should philosophize. Therefore in all cases you should philosophize” (Westerink 1962, xx). Success in coming-to-philosophy certainly depends on the persuasiveness of such protreptic arguments, but from a Socratic perspective it requires something more: it demands (as I shall argue), a sympathetic philosophical psyche endowed with the intellect, ability and nature necessary for protreptic to take firm root. Rather than survey a large number of dialogues in an attempt to divine a set of psychological qualities that either draw one toward or away from philosophy, I have chosen to focus closely on three dialogues: Theaetetus, Symposium and Phaedrus. Indeed, in each case my treatment centres on specific sections of text. In looking at Symposium, I have limited the larger part of my analysis to the Alcibiades’ Symposium speech. Though it has been the subject of much commentary, the viewpoint argued-for here is that shame and hubris are at the root of Alcibiades’ spectacular failure in turning toward philosophy. My analysis of Theaetetus deals 1 with aspects of the dialogue that illuminate the psyche of the young man at the centre of the drama. In the Platonic corpus there is no more complete example of a young interlocutor who, by his character and qualities of mind, is held out as an ideal candidate for the philosophical life. Finally, I look at Phaedrus. Here I examine how a beloved’s success in turning toward philosophy is dependent on his lover’s conception of eros.