Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
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Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science. -
The Short(Run and Long(Run Effects of Behavioral
The Short-Run and Long-Run E¤ects of Behavioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation Hunt Allcott and Todd Rogers October 7, 2012 Abstract Interventions to a¤ect repeated behaviors, such as smoking, exercise, or workplace e¤ort, can often have large short-run impacts but uncertain or disappointing long-term e¤ects. We study one part of a massive set of randomized control trials in which home energy reports containing personalized feedback, social comparisons, and energy conservation information are being repeatedly mailed to more than …ve million households across the United States. We show that treatment group households reduce energy use within days of receiving each of their …rst few reports, but these initial responses decay rapidly in the months between reports. This cyclical pattern of stimulus and response attenuates as reports are repeatedly delivered and households form a new "capital stock" of physical capital or consumption habits. When a randomly-selected group of households has reports discontinued after two years, the treatment e¤ects decay much more slowly than they had between the initial reports. We show how assumptions about long- run persistence can signi…cantly impact program adoption decisions, and we illustrate how program design that accounts for this capital stock formation process can signi…cantly improve cost e¤ectiveness. JEL Codes: D03, D11, L97, Q41. Keywords: Energy e¢ ciency, persistence, social comparisons. ———————————————————————————— We thank David Cesarini, Xavier Gabaix, and Sendhil Mullainathan for helpful conversa- tions. Thanks to Tyler Curtis, Lisa Danz, Rachel Gold, Arkadi Gerney, Marc Laitin, Laura Lewellyn, and many others at OPOWER for sharing data and insight with us. -
A Reduced-Form Approach to Behavioral Public Finance
A Reduced-Form Approach to Behavioral Public Finance Sendhil Mullainathan,1 Joshua Schwartzstein,2 and William J. Congdon3 1Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Washington, DC 20552; email: [email protected] 2Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755; email: [email protected] 3Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 20036; email: [email protected] Annu. Rev. Econ. 2012. 4:511–40 Keywords The Annual Review of Economics is online at behavioral economics, taxation, social insurance, externalities economics.annualreviews.org This article’s doi: Abstract 10.1146/annurev-economics-111809-125033 Research in behavioral public finance has blossomed in recent © Access provided by Harvard University on 06/15/21. For personal use only. Copyright 2012 by Annual Reviews. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2012.4:511-540. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org years, producing diverse empirical and theoretical insights. This All rights reserved article develops a single framework with which to understand JEL codes: B40, D01, D03, D04, D60, D61, H00, these advances. Rather than drawing out the consequences of H20, I10, I30, J65, Q50 specific psychological assumptions, the framework takes a reduced- 1941-1383/12/0904-0511$20.00 form approach to behavioral modeling. It emphasizes the differ- ence between decision and experienced utility that underlies most behavioral models. We use this framework to examine the behav- ioral implications for canonical public finance problems involving the provision of social insurance, commodity taxation, and correct- ing externalities. We show how deeper principles undergird much work in this area and that many insights are not specific to a single psychological assumption. -
C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics
Providence College DigitalCommons@Providence Community Scholar Publications Providence College Community Scholars 7-1996 C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics William Paul Haas Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/comm_scholar_pubs Haas, William Paul, "C.S. Peirce's Abduction from the Prior Analytics" (1996). Community Scholar Publications. 2. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/comm_scholar_pubs/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Providence College Community Scholars at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has been accepted for inclusion in Community Scholar Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WILLIAM PAUL HAAS July 1996 C.S. PEIRCE'S ABDUCTION FROM THE PRIOR ANALYTICS In his Ancient Formal Logic. Professor Joseph Bochenski finds Aristotle's description of syllogisms based upon hypotheses to be "difficult to understand." Noting that we do not have the treatise which Aristotle promised to write, Bochenski laments the fact that the Prior Analytics, where it is treated most explicitly, "is either corrupted or (which is more probable) was hastily written and contains logical errors." (1) Charles Sanders Peirce wrestled with the same difficult text when he attempted to establish the Aristotelian roots of his theory of abductive or hypothetical reasoning. However, Peirce opted for the explanation that the fault was with the corrupted text, not with Aristotle's exposition. Peirce interpreted the text of Book II, Chapter 25 thus: Accordingly, when he opens the next chapter with the word ' Ajray (¿y-q a word evidently chosen to form a pendant to 'Errctyuyrj, we feel sure that this is what he is coming to. -
Human Visual Motion Perception Shows Hallmarks of Bayesian Structural Inference Sichao Yang1,2,6*, Johannes Bill3,4,6*, Jan Drugowitsch3,5,7 & Samuel J
www.nature.com/scientificreports OPEN Human visual motion perception shows hallmarks of Bayesian structural inference Sichao Yang1,2,6*, Johannes Bill3,4,6*, Jan Drugowitsch3,5,7 & Samuel J. Gershman4,5,7 Motion relations in visual scenes carry an abundance of behaviorally relevant information, but little is known about how humans identify the structure underlying a scene’s motion in the frst place. We studied the computations governing human motion structure identifcation in two psychophysics experiments and found that perception of motion relations showed hallmarks of Bayesian structural inference. At the heart of our research lies a tractable task design that enabled us to reveal the signatures of probabilistic reasoning about latent structure. We found that a choice model based on the task’s Bayesian ideal observer accurately matched many facets of human structural inference, including task performance, perceptual error patterns, single-trial responses, participant-specifc diferences, and subjective decision confdence—especially, when motion scenes were ambiguous and when object motion was hierarchically nested within other moving reference frames. Our work can guide future neuroscience experiments to reveal the neural mechanisms underlying higher-level visual motion perception. Motion relations in visual scenes are a rich source of information for our brains to make sense of our environ- ment. We group coherently fying birds together to form a fock, predict the future trajectory of cars from the trafc fow, and infer our own velocity from a high-dimensional stream of retinal input by decomposing self- motion and object motion in the scene. We refer to these relations between velocities as motion structure. -
Introduction Meta-Ethical Speculations About Rights and Obligations
NON-NATURALISM REVISITED; RIGHTS/OBLIGA TIONS AS EMERGENT ENTITIES Eike-Henner W. KLUGE University of Victoria Introduction Meta-ethical speculations about rights and obligations. as indeed meta-ethical speculations in general, are characterized by profound disagreement over the nature of the relevant terms. I Broadly spea king, we can distinguish three general types of approaches: realism, nominalism and non-cognitivism.2 Each of these occurs in several variations. For instance, realism may be naturalistic - which is to say, it may attempt to reduce the relevant expressions to claims dealing with ordinary properties; or it may be non-naturalistic - which is to say, it may claim that wh at ultimately grounds such expressions are properties sui generis: distinct from ordinary ones but ontologically on a par with them. 3 Nominalism, in turn, may analyze right/obligation locutions as statements about (explicit or implicit) contractual agreements, or as reportive of custom, convention or habit - but in any case will view their meanings as a matter of pure convention.4 Non-cognitivism, finally, may be either emotive, attitudinal or performative in focus - or any combination of these- 1. Cf. W.K. Frankena, Ethies (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963) pp. 4 ff. and "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in H.-N. Castaöeda and George Nakhnikian, eds. Morality and the Language 0/ Conduet (Wayne State U. Press, Detroit, 1965) pp. 1-24, and R.ß. Brandt, Ethieal Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1959) pp. 7-10 et passim. Brandt also refers to it as "critical ethics". 2. This nomenclature is not quite that currently in vogue. -
Pre-Lecture Notes I.4 – Measuring the Unobservable Think About All of The
Pre-lecture Notes I.4 – Measuring the Unobservable Think about all of the issues that psychologists are interested in – these include depression, anxiety, attention, memory, problem-solving abilities, interpersonal attribution, etc. Notice how many of these cannot be directly observed; they are characteristics of the mind, not behavior, and, as of now, we don’t have a way of reading people’s minds. Given that psychology is an empirical science and, therefore, relies upon objective and replicable data, this is a problem. One option, of course, is to disallow any discussion of anything that cannot be directly observed. Under this approach, you would never talk about something like depression, since it cannot be observed. Instead, you would only talk about the behavioral manifestations (or symptoms) of depression, because these can be observed. This is the approach taken by behaviorists and some neo-behaviorists. The other approach, which is taken by a large majority of psychologists, is to create ways to convert or translate unobservable constructs, such as depression, into observable behaviors, such as responses on a questionnaire. In some cases, this translation is almost too obvious to discuss, such as defining the amount of time that it takes a person to mentally solve a problem as the lag or delay between the moment when they were given the problem and the moment when they give the (correct) answer. In other cases, however, which includes the definition of depression as the condensed score on a specific questionnaire, quite a bit of discussion and background research is needed. This brings us to the first of the four types of validity that determine the value or quality of psychological research. -
On Entanglement of Fact and Value in the Views of Hilary Putnam , "Kultura I Wartości" 2018, No
Rosiak-Zi ęba, E., On Entanglement of Fact and Value in the Views of Hilary Putnam , "Kultura i Wartości" 2018, No. 25, pp. 69-84; 31 July 2018 (ISSN 2299-7806). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2018.25.69. Available at: <https://journals.umcs.pl/kw/article/download/6389/5425>. Retrieved: 01 August 2018. On Entanglement of Fact and Value in the Views of Hilary Putnam Ewa Rosiak-Zi ęba https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9090-7308 Pobrane z czasopisma http://kulturaiwartosci.journals.umcs.pl Data: 01/08/2018 10:06:27 Kultura i Wartości ISSN 2299-7806 Nr 25/2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2018.25.69 On Entanglement of Fact and Value in the Views of Hilary Putnam Ewa Rosiak-Zięba https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9090-7308 The subject of this paper is the analysis of Hilary Putnam’s thesis on the fact/value entanglement along with some of his arguments meant to corroborate this stance. One of his main objectives of putting forward this thesis is reconciliation of science and values, bringing an end to the picture of the former as a ‘value-free zone’. While Putnam’s polemics with standpoints conflicted with his own one are carried out in quite a comprehensive way, the way he formulates some of his constructive arguments meant to augment his own stance are a bit enigmatic. The goal of this paper is to clarify some of them. The first part of this paper briefly outlines Putnam’s arguments aiming to undermine the fact/value dichotomy, which is contradictory to the thesis title. -
AFRREV STECH, Vol
AFRREV STECH, Vol. 1 (2) April-July, 2012 AFRREV STECH An International Journal of Science and Technology Bahir Dar, Ethiopia Vol.1 (2) April-July, 2012:32-44 ISSN 2225-8612 (Print) ISSN 2227-5444 (Online) The Woes of Scientific Realism Okeke, Jonathan C. Department of Philosophy University of Calabar, Calabar, Cross Rivers State, Nigeria [email protected] & Kanu, Ikechukwu Anthony Department of Philosophy University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria [email protected] Phone: +2348036345466 Abstract This paper investigated the disagreement between Realists and Anti-realists on the observable and unobservable distinction in scientific practice. While 32 Copyright © IAARR 2012: www.afrrevjo.net/stech AFRREV STECH, Vol. 1 (2) April-July, 2012 the realists maintain that machines and gadgets can simulate the human act of perception there-by making all realities under the screen of science observable, the anti-realists or the instrumentalists insist that what cannot be observed with the human senses even if detected with gadgets are not observable. This paper contended against the realist position which says that machines can simulate the human activity of perception. Hence the distinction between what is observable and unobservable is shown to be indisputable. Introduction In metaphysics there is a long standing argument between followers of realism (the view that the physical world exists independently of human thought and perception) and the apologists of idealism (the view that the existence of the physical world is dependent on human perception) (Ozumba, 2001). Realism is further broken down to three different types: ultra or transcendental realism which Plato represents, and which holds that the real things exist in a realm other than this physical one (Copleston, 1985). -
Scientific Realism and Phenomenology Through the Case Study of Autism
Scientific Realism and Phenomenology Through the Case Study of Autism Themistoklis Pantazakos UCL Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2019 1 Declaration I, Themistoklis Pantazakos, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Acknowledgements Acknowledgements is the graceful place within a philosophy doctorate where one does not have to provide sustained argument for absolutely anything. I will then take it for granted that we live in a culture celebrating individual achievement while displaying profound illiteracy on the topic of relating collectively. Ironically, it is also true that no achievement has one owner, especially so in the case of intellectual achievement. If anything of value is to be found in the following dissertation, it should be attributed to many authors. First, to pretty much everyone within the STS department at UCL for creating such a collaborative and accommodating atmosphere to work in. Especially so to Julia Sánchez- Dorado, who kept showing me the ropes from my first day until her graduation, and who repeatedly provided company in times of inevitable academic awkwardness. Moreover, to my intellectual centre in Athens, the pop culture and critical studies magazine SKRA- punk, for providing both a stimulating and cosy space to work in, the invaluable companionship of its members, and a sense of belonging in times when the fear of being constantly left out of an elusive ‘we’ is at its social highest. This dissertation should also be attributed to my friends, double so to those doubling as commenters and editors. -
The Short(Run and Long(Run Effects of Behavioral Interventions
The Short-Run and Long-Run E¤ects of Behavioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation Hunt Allcott and Todd Rogers October 16, 2012 Abstract Interventions to a¤ect repeated behaviors, such as smoking, exercise, or workplace e¤ort, can often have large short-run impacts but uncertain or disappointing long-run e¤ects. We study one part of a large program designed to induce energy conservation, in which home energy reports containing personalized feedback, social comparisons, and energy conservation information are being repeatedly mailed to more than …ve million households across the United States. We show that treatment group households reduce electricity use within days of receiving each of their initial few reports, but these immediate responses decay rapidly in the months between reports. As more reports are delivered, the average treatment e¤ect grows but the high-frequency pattern of action and backsliding attenuates. When a randomly-selected group of households has reports discontinued after two years, the e¤ects are much more persistent than they had been between the initial reports, implying that households have formed a new "capital stock" of physical capital or consumption habits. We show how assumptions about long-run persistence can be important enough to change program adoption decisions, and we illustrate how program design that accounts for the capital stock formation process can signi…cantly improve cost e¤ectiveness. JEL Codes: D03, D11, L97, Q41. Keywords: Energy e¢ ciency, habit formation, persistence, social comparisons. ———————————————————————————— We thank Ken Agnew, David Cesarini, Gary Charness, Xavier Gabaix, Francesca Gino, Uri Gneezy, Sendhil Mullainathan, and the senior evaluation analyst at the utility for feedback and helpful conversations. -
Daniel J. Benjamin (As of 10/4/2019)
Daniel J. Benjamin (as of 10/4/2019) Contact Information University of Southern California Center for Economic and Social Research Dauterive Hall 635 Downey Way, Suite 301 Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332 Phone: 617-548-8948 Professional Experience: Professor (Research) of Economics, CESR, USC, 2019-present Associate Professor (Research) of Economics, CESR, USC, 2015-2019 Visiting Associate Professor (Research) of Economics, CESR, USC, 2014-2015 Associate Professor (with tenure), Economics Department, Cornell University, 2013-2015 Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Cornell University, 2007-2013 Visiting Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 2011-2012 Research Associate, NBER, 2013-present Faculty Research Fellow, NBER, 2009-2013 Research Fellow, Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, 2006-2017 Research Fellow, Population Studies Center, Institute for Social Research, 2006-2007 Graduate Studies: Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University, 2006 M.Sc., Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics, 2000 A.M., Statistics, Harvard University, 1999 Undergraduate Studies: A.B., Economics, Harvard University, summa cum laude, prize for best economics student, 1999 Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2013 Norwegian School of Economics Sandmo Junior Fellowship (prize for a “promising young economist”) 2012-2013 Cornell’s Institute for Social Science (ISS) Faculty Fellowship 2009-2012 ISS Theme Project Member: Judgment, Decision Making, and Social Behavior 2011-2012 NBER Visiting Fellowship