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Opacity in an Era of Transparency: the Politics of De Facto

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Opacity in an Era of Transparency: the Politics of De Facto OPACITY IN AN ERA OF TRANSPARENCY: THE POLITICS OF DE FACTO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES by KAREN PETERS-VAN ESSEN A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department ofPolitical Science and the Graduate School ofthe University ofOregon in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy December 2009 11 University of Oregon Graduate School Confirmation ofApproval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by: Karen Peters-Van Essen Title: "Opacity in an Era ofTransparency: The Politics ofDe Facto Nuclear Weapon States" This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the Doctor ofPhilosophy degree in the Department ofPolitical Science by: Lars Skalnes, Chairperson, Political Science Jane Kellett Cramer, Member, Political Science Ronald Mitchell, Member, Political Science Shaul Cohen, Outside Member, Geography and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies/Dean ofthe Graduate School for the University of Oregon. December 12, 2009 Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon Libraries. iii © 2009 Karen Peters-Van Essen iv An Abstract ofthe Dissertation of Karen Peters-Van Essen for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy in the Department ofPolitical Science to be taken December 2009 Title: OPACITY IN AN ERA OF TRANSPARENCY: THE POLITICS OF DE FACTO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES Approved: _ Dr. Lars S. Skc11nes Rational deterrence theory posits that deterrence is more likely to be successful when a state credibly communicates to its adversary that it has both the capability and intent to retaliate against threats. Yet, second-generation nuclear states, which often exist in severe security environments, have largely adopted postures ofnuclear ambiguity where they do not acknowledge their nuclear weapons capabilities or the circumstances under which they would use them. To date, research has been insufficiently comparative. While some existing research offers explanations for the ambiguous nuclear postures ofindividual countries, it does not permit us to draw inferences across cases and assess relative explanatory power. Through comparison, both within and across cases, this project develops a more general explanation ofwhy nuclear states choose ambiguity over a visible deterrence posture. To this end, this project analyzes the nuclear postures ofthree countries: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Using process tracing and the congruence procedure methodology, I v assess the relative validity ofexisting explanations for each case and then compare these findings across the three cases. This research suggests that regional security environments, characterized by disparities in power, create strong incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for deterrence as well as to retain an ambiguous posture. In particular, an ambiguous posture enables regional states to avoid the costs and dangers ofcompetitive nuclear development vis-a.-vis their adversaries. The three cases also suggest that patron state pressures for non-proliferation, which combine threats and incentives, are another important constraint on the nuclear posture ofsecond-generation nuclear states. Other variables~-such as the international non-proliferation regime, domestic political interests, and the personal moral reservations ofsome state leaders-play some role to varying degrees in individual cases. However, these effects are limited both within the broad history ofindividual cases as well as in cross-case comparison ofthe three states. Understanding these constraints is helpful for evaluating the efficacy ofpolicy tools designed to prevent the spread ofnuclear weapons as well as how to manage crises and conflicts between regional nuclear-armed states. VI CURRICULUM VITAE NAME OF AUTHOR: Karen Peters-Van Essen GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: University ofOregon University of Chicago University ofWyoming DEGREES AWARDED: Doctor ofPhilosophy in Political Science, 2009, University ofOregon Doctor ofJurisprudence in Law, 2008, University ofOregon Master ofScience in Political Science, 2004, University of Oregon Master ofArts in International Relations, 2000, University of Chicago Bachelor ofScience in Political Science, 1996, University ofWyoming AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: International Relations Security Studies Law Vll ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful for the efforts ofmy chair, Dr. Lars S. SkaInes. Not only did Lars spend substantial time reading and editing, he did so with a straightforward and practical manner that kept my considerable tendency towards panic in check. With patience and professionalism, he guided me through this process, and his skills at collaboration and thoughtful attention have made all the difference. Dr. Jane K. Cramer deserves more gratitude than I have space to write. There are a select few individuals in one's lifetime that can influence professional and personal decisions simultaneously. I am grateful that Jane stands with a handful of few in my life that have contributed so substantially. Not only does she possess a deep and substantive knowledge in the field ofsecurity studies, but has also at every tum encouraged me to march forward with my life decisions. I am amazingly privileged to have had her input in both areas. And a most sincere thank to Dr. Shaul Cohen, for years ofpatience and willingness to see the end ofthis project through, even as I took a hiatus for law school. I am grateful for your candidness and considerable concern for students caught in the throes of academia. Thank you also to Dr. Ron Mitchell, who tells it likes he sees it, and always provide comments within a two-week period regardless ofwhatever else may be going on. His attention to structure and knowledge ofthe process has successfully guided many students. viii I would also like to express my gratitude to Judge Michael Mosman, the learned trial judge who understands that sometimes a change is better than a rest. Thank you for allowing me to make some changes that facilitated the end ofthe project. And to my large, opinionated, talented, beautiful, and wonderful family-Dad, Morn, Danielle, Ellen, Tracy, Marianne, Luke, Lisa, and Mariah-thank you. You have had many years ofhearing about how I am still working on my dissertation, and have always given steadfast encouragement and support. My friends have similarly suffered for my decisions, and I appreciated your patience in my absence, and the rather extensive editing provided by Michelle. Any errors or omissions, ofcourse, are mine alone. And Jason, thank you for always supporting my goals and decisions. I am fortunate to have such a partner in life. Thank you. IX To Jason. You know. Everlong. x TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 9 I. Literature on Nuclear Deterrence and Opacity 10 II. Possible Explanations 29 III. Methodology 56 III. ISRAEL 62 1. Description of Israeli Ambiguity 65 II. Patron State Pressures: U.S.-Israeli Partnership in Opacity 67 III. Regional Security Environment 108 IV. International Non-Proliferation Regime 127 V. Domestic Politics Factors 139 IV. INDIA 153 I. Explaining the 1974 Indian Nuclear Test.. 159 II. Explaining Indian Nuclear Ambiguity, 1974-1990 234 III. Explaining the 1998 Nuclear Tests 305 V. PAKISTAN 353 I. Explaining Pakistani Ambiguity, 1972-1998 355 II. Explaining the 1998 Pakistani Tests .466 VI. COMPARISON BETWEEN CASES AND FACTORS .493 I. Regional Security Environment.. 494 II. Patron State Incentives 508 III. International Non-Proliferation Regime 514 IV. Domestic Political Interests: Party/Interest Group Politics 518 V. Moral or Strategic Culture Explanations 522 VII. CONCLUSION 530 BIBLIOGRAPHY 537 Xl LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Hypotheses Related to Nuclear Opacity 54 2. Summary ofthe Presence ofExplanatory Factors in the Israel Case 152 3. Indian Nuclear Decisions by Political Party 342 4. Political and Moral Stance ofIndian Leadership Regarding Nuclear Decisions........347 5. Summary ofthe Presence ofExplanatory Factors in the Indian Case 352 6. Summary ofthe Presence ofExplanatory Factors in the Pakistan Case .492 7. Summary ofEvidentiary Support for Regional Security Environment Hypothesis and Predictions 508 8. Summary ofEvidentiary Support for Patron State Hypothesis and Predictions ........513 9. Summary ofEvidentiary Support for International Non-Proliferation Regime Hypothesis and Predictions 518 10. Summary ofEvidentiary Support for Domestic Politics Hypothesis and Predictions 522 11. Summary ofEvidentiary Support for Moral and Strategic Culture Hypothesis and Predictions '" 525 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Rational deterrence theory suggests that states, which are attempting to deter the actions of another state, increase the likelihood ofsuccess by having the necessary capabilities and intentions to retaliate and credibly communicating the same to the challenging state. Yet, second-generation nuclear states, despite being regionally situated in severe security environments marked by a series ofwars over the last half­ century, have not openly utilized their nuclear capability in a way consistent with deterrence theory. Instead, undeclared nuclear states have pursued policies ofopacity in which they largely deny the possession ofnuclear weapons and refrain from publicly issuing nuclear declarations or threats. Why do second-generation nuclear states pursue policies ofnuclear opacity, which may result in making deterrence less effective than declaring capabilities and intentions?
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