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York: Dunellen, 1970); Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age

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York: Dunellen, 1970); Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age Notes INTRODUCTION 1. George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York: Dunellen, 1970); Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategic Arms Policy (Washington DC, Brookings Insti­ tute, 1975); Michael Howard, The Classic Strategists', in Alastair Buchan (ed.), Problems of Modern Strategy (London, Chatto & Windus, 1970). Professor James King has been engaged in an important study of the major works of nuclear strategy (under the title The New Strategy); this has not yet been published. 2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), p. 334. 3. Michael Howard, The Transformation of Strategy', in Major-General J. L. Moulton (ed.), Brassey's 1972 (London: William Clowes, 1972), p. 1. CHAPTER I l. The most notable exceptions to this statement are guerrilla leaders, for a war of attrition has appeal only to those who begin hostilities at a disadvantage but have grounds to believe that, given time and a chance to mobilize to their full potential, the balance of advantage will even­ tually work out in their favour. 2. Hansard, 10 November 1932, cols. 613-18. 3. Quoted in George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Influence of Airpower on Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 52. 4. Giulo Douhet, The Command of the Air, as translated by Dino Ferrari (New York; Coward-McCann Inc., 1942), pp. 220, 202. 5. Ibid, p. 128. 6. Ibid., p. 58. 7. Quoted in Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima, p. 56. 401 402 NOTES 8. The efforts to secure formal international agreement on restraint are described by Donald Cameron Watt in 'Restraints on war in the air before 1945', in Michael Howard (ed.), Restraints on War: Studies in the limitation of Armed Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1979). 9. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (London, Faber & Faber; 1946), p. 31. 10. David Irving, The Mare's Nest (London: William Kimber, 1964), pp. 181, 210, 291, 294. 11. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World 1939/46: vol. I of a history of the ASAEC (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1962); Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London Macmillan, 1964). 12. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (London: Hutchinson, 1948~ p. 361. 13. Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 87; Margaret Gowing, op. cit., p. 106. 14. Feis, op. cit., p. 38. 15. This is discussed in detail in Lawrence Freedman, 'The Strategy of Hiroshima', The Journal of Strategic Studies, I, 1 (May 1978). 16. Quoted by L. Giovannitti and F. Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (London: Methuen & Co., 1967), p. 35. 17. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper, 1962) p. 267. 18. Basil Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, p. 25. 19. Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp. 36, 369-70, 373. 20. Giovannitti and Freed, op. cit., p. 36. 21. Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 180. 22. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, pp. 30-2, 83. CHAPTER 2 1. Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1939-1945. (Balti­ more: John Hopkins Press, 1970~ p. 46, 17. 2. Quoted in David Maclsaacs, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland, 1976), p. 165. The survey was a thorough investigation, directed by civi­ lians, into the effects of the bombing campaigns on the economies and civilian morale of Germany and Japan. Maclsaacs has edited the reports in ten volumes, also published by Garland in 1976. 3. General H. H. Arnold, 'Air Force in the Atomic Age', in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (eds.), One World or None (New York: McGraw Hill, 1946), pp. 26-9. Arnold admitted that his calculations were 'rough'. The USSBS estimate for the number of B-29s needed to commit an Hirosh­ ima was 210, and 120 for Nagasaki. Their conclusion was that: 'The atomic bomb in its present state of development raises the destructive power of a single bomber by a factor of between 50 and 250 times, depending upon the nature and size of the target.' Summary Report, NOTES 403 Pacific War, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Ill, p. 29. This con­ clusion was not altogether popular with those airmen, such as General Curtis Le May, who looked forward to ever-expanding fleets of long-range bombers. 4. See Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Poli­ tics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 5. New York Times, 13 August 1945. 6. Major-General J. F. S. Fuller, The atomic bomb and warfare of the future', Army Ordnance (January-February 1946), p. 34. 7. Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training, A Programme for National Security, known as The Compton Report (Washington DC; USGPO, 1947), p. 12. 8. Bernard Brodie and Eilene Galloway, The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 (Washington DC: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, May 1947), pp. 30--l. 9. Arnold, in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 30. 10. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (London, Heinemann, 1950), pp. 90, 96-7. II. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 32; Bush, op. cit., p. 117; P. M. S. Black­ ett, The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London, Turnstile Press, 1948), p. 68. 12. Reprinted in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch (eds.) The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World Affairs (New York: Basic Books, 1963 ), p. 13. 13. Edward Condon, The new techniques of private war', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 41 ('We must no longer expect the special agent to be special'). On this concern see Roberta Wohlstetter, Terror on a grand scale', Survival, xvm:3 (May/June 1976), pp. 98-9. 14. In The Atomic Bomb and American Security (Yale University, Memoran­ dum No. 18, 1945), p. 5, he wrote of how a war of the future 'might take the form of a revelation by one nation to another that the latter's major cities had atomic bombs planted in them and that only immediate and abso­ lute submission to dictates would prevent them from going off'. 15. Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 49. 16. Blackett, op. cit., p. 50. 17. Bernard Brodie, Absolute Weapon, p. 41; idem., 'Compiler's critique on U.S. navy views', in Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., pp. 46-7. 18. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 68; The Compton Report, p. 12; New York Times, 3 October 1949. 19. William Fox, Atomic Energy and International Relations (Mimeo: Yale Institute of International Affairs, June 1948), p. 4. 20. Vannevar Bush, op. cit., pp. 104, 139. 21. Jacob Viner, The implications of the atomic bomb for international relations', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, xc: 1 (Janu­ ary 1946), p. 55. Fox (Atomic Energy, pp. 11-12) doubted that small countries would find bombs much use for 'blackmail' purposes, though he thought 'they might strengthen respect for neutrality'. Others were less certain of the advantages: 'Even small countries can make these bombs in 404 NOTES numbers if they are such utter fools as to engage in this lethal business. They will not because they know they would be completely destroyed if bombs were used', Harold Urey, 'How does it all add up?', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 55. 22. There was some wishful thinking on this score. In October 1949 Com­ mander Eugene Tatom of the US Navy still felt confident enough to assert that it would be possible to stand on the runway at Washington National Airport 'with no more than the clothes you now have on, and have an atom bomb explode at the other end of the runway without serious injury to you' Quoted by Albert Wohlstetter in unpublished letter to Michael Howard, 6 November 1968, p. 26. Professor Wohlstetter has kindly permitted quotation from this letter. 23. See Brodie, Absolute Weapon, pp. 28, 31. 24. Summary (Pacific War), United States Strategic Bombing Survey, IV; p. 29. 25. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 32. 26. Bush, op. cit., p. 59. 27. 'Very greatly increased bomber speeds will immensely increase the difficulties of providing adequate warning and effective interception, and indeed the fighter's superiority of speed over the bomber ... may well dwindle to almost nothing'. Lord Tedder, Air Power in the War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), p. 44. 28. Bush, op. cit., pp. 116-17. 29. Blackett, op. cit., p. 54. 30. Bush, op. cit., p. 100. 31. Louis Ridenour, 'There is no defense', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 37; idem., 'A US physicist's reply to Professor Blackett', Scientific American (March 1949), reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1973). CHAPTER 3 1. Quoted in Wohlstetter letter to Howard, p. 5. 2. 'In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggressor', the Franck Report, reprinted in Grodzins and Rabinowitch, op. cit., p. 21. 3. H. D. Smyth, A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes under the Auspices of the United States Government 1940-1945 (Washington DC, USGPO, August 1945), p. 134. 4. Caryl Haskins, 'Atomic energy and American foreign policy', Foreign Affairs, XXIV:4 (July 1946); The Eliot quote comes from The Atomic Age Opens, prepared by the editors of Pocket Books (New York, August 1945)- this is a useful compilation of immediate reactions to the bomb; Robert Oppenheimer, 'Atomic weapons', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, xc: 1 (January 1946), p.
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