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Notes Introduction 1. Stephen Schwartz, (ed.) Atomie Audit: The Costs and Consequenees o( U.S. Nuclear Weapons sinee 1940 (Washington, OC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 2. George Quester, Nuclear Diplomaey: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York: Dunellen. 1970); Ierome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategie Arms Poliey (Washington, OC, Brookings Institution, 1975); Michael Howard, 'The Classic strategists', in Alastair Buchan, ed., Problems o( Modern Strategy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970). The late jarnes King was engaged in an important study of the major works of nuclear strategy (under the title The New Strategy); this was never published. 3. The two key institutions facilitating the study of nuclear policy and the cold war have been the Cold War International History project (http://cwihp.sLedu/) and the National Security Archive (http://www.gwu. edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.htmI); both are based in Washington, Oe. 4. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choiees About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988); Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushehev and the U-2 Af(air (New York: Harper, 1986); David Dunn, The Polities o( Threat (London: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Edward Reiss, The Strategie Defense Initiative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End o( the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Marc Trachtenberg. A Construeted Peaee: The Making o( a European Settlement 1945-1963; Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making o(US Nuclear Strategy, 1995 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 5. Both by Richard Rhodes. The Making o( the Atomie Bomb (London: Touchstone Books, 1995) and Dark Sun: The Making o( the Hydrogen Bomb (London: Touchstone Bocks, 1996). 6. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomie Bomb in the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). 7. john Gaddis, The Long Peaee: Inquiries into the History o( the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 8. Oavid Rosenberg. 'Arnerican atomic strategy and the hydrogen bomb decision', Journal o(Ameriean History. LXVI (Summer 1985). 9. David Rosenberg. The ortgins of overkill: nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960', International Secutity, 7, 4 (Spring 1983). See also the documents edited by Rosenberg in 'A smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours': documents on American plans for nuclear war with the Soviet Union, 1954-1955', International Seeurity (Winter 1981/82). 10. Ernest R. May and Philip O. Zelikow. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 465 466 Notes 11. Michael Charlton, From Detetrence to Detense: The InsideStoryofStrategiePoliey (Harvard University Press, 1987). 12. Steven Rearden, The Evolution ofAmerican Strategie Doctrine: PaulH. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge, SAIS papers in International Affairs, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1984). 13. Glenn Seaborg, Kennedv, Khrushchev arid the Test Ban (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); Herbert York, Making weapons, Talking Peaee: a Physicist's Odyssey [rom Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 14. See lan Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, British Origins of Nuc!ear Strategy, 1945-55 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); lohn Baylis, Ambiguity and Detetrence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 15. David Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part I, Capabitities and Doctrine, Part II, Strategie and Arms-Contra! lmplications, Adelphi Papers 194 and 195 (Winter 1984/85); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuc!ear Strategies and Fotces tor Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan­ now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 16. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Vladislav Zubok, and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside tne Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khtushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Pavel Podvig, (ed.), Russian Strategie Nuclear Potces (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999); john Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 17. Avner Cohen, Israel and thc Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); George Perkovich, lndia's Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). 18. Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuc!ear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 19. David Skaggs, 'Michael Howard and strategie policy', Armed Fotces and Society (Summer 1985); Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations uf American Nuclear Strategy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991); lohn Baylis and john Garnett. (eds.), Makers uf Nuc!ear Strategy (London: Pinter, 1991); Philip Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman and Greg Treverton, (eds.), US Nuc!earStrategy: AReader (London: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan, 1989). 20. I have examined the development of the concept of escalation in Lawrence Freedman, 'On the tiger's back: the development of the concept of escalation', in Roman Kolkowicz, (ed.), The Logic of Nuc!ear Ter.ror (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 21. Gregg Herken, Counsels ot War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Fred Kaplan, The wizards orArmageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). See also lohn Newhouse, The Nuc!earAge:Ftom Hiroshima to Star Wars (London: Michael joseph, 1989). 22. As is evident in my discussion of the early 1960s per iod in Lawrence Freedrnan, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 23. B. H. LiddelI Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), p. 334. Elsewhere I have argued for a definition of strategy as 'the art Notes 467 of creating power'. Lawrence Freedman, 'Strategie studies and the problem of power', in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and Robert O'Neill, (eds.), War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour ot' Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 24. Michael Howard, 'The transformation of strategy', in Major-General j. L. Moulton, (ed.), Brassey's 1972 (London: William Clowes, 1972), p. 1. 25. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic or War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990); Colin Gray, ModernStrategy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Williamson Murray, McGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, (eds.), The Making or Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 1 The Arrival of the Bomb 1. The most notable exceptions to this statement are guerrilla leaders, for a war of attrition has appeal only to those who begin hostilities at a disadvantage but have grounds to believe that, given time and a chance to mobilize to their full potential, the balance of advantage will eventually work out in their favour. 2. Hansard, 10 November 1932, cols. 613-18. 3. Quoted in George Quester, Deterrence Be[ore Hiroshima: The Influence or Airpoweron ModernStrategy(New York:john Wiley, 1966), p. 52. 4. Giulio Douhet, The Command or the Air, as translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann lne., 1942), pp. 220, 202. 5. Ibid., p. 128. 6. Ibid., p. 58. 7. Quoted in Quester, Deterrence betore Hiroshima, p. 56. 8. The efforts to seeure formal international agreement on restraint are described by Donald Cameron Watt in 'Restraints on war in the air before 1945', in Michael Howard (ed.), Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation or Armed Conftict (London: Oxford University Press, 1979). 9. B. H. LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warrare (London: Faber & Faber; 1946), p.31. 10. David lrving, The Mare's Nest (London: William Kimber, 1964), pp. 181,210, 291,294. 11. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World 1939/46: vol. I of a history of the ASAEC (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1962); Margaret Gowing, Britainand Atomic Energv, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964). 12. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (London: Hutehinson, 1948), p. 361. 13. Herbert Peis, The Atomic Bomb and the End or World War II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 87; Margaret Gowing, op. cit., p. 106. 14. Feis, op. cit., p. 38. 15. This is discussed in detail in Lawrence Freedman, 'The strategy of Hiroshirna', The JournalofStrategic Studies, I, I (May 1978). 16. Quoted by L. Giovannitti and F. Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (London: Methuen & Co., 1967), p. 35. 468 Notes 17. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Projeet (New York: Harper, 1962) p. 267. 18. Basil LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, p. 25. 19. Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp. 36, 369-70, 373. 20. Giovannitti and Freed, op. cit., p. 36. 21. Robert ]. C. Butow, lapan'sDecision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 180. 22. LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, pp. 30-2, 83. 2 Offence and Defence 1. Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans [orPeaee 1939-1945 (Baltimore: [ohn Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 46, 17. 2. Quoted in David Maclsaacs, Strategie Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategie Bombing Survey (New York: Garland, 1976), p. 165. The survey was a thorough investigation, directed by civlllans, into the effects of the bombing campaigns on the economies and civilian morale of Germany and Japan. Maclsaacs has edited the reports in ten volumes, also published by Gariand in 1976. 3. General H. H. Arnold, 'Air force in the atomic age', in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (eds.), One World or None (New York: McGraw Hill, 1946), pp. 26-9. Arnold admitted that his calculations were 'rough'. The USSBS esti­ mate for the number of B-29s needed to commit an Hiroshima was 210, and 120 for Nagasaki. Their conclusion was that: 'The atomic bomb in its present state of development raises the destructive power of a single bomber by a fac­ tor of between 50 and 250 times, depending upon the nature and size of the target.' Summary Report, Pacific War, United States Strategie Bombing Survey, 1II, p.
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