Notes
Introduction
1. Stephen Schwartz, (ed.) Atomie Audit: The Costs and Consequenees o( U.S. Nuclear Weapons sinee 1940 (Washington, OC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 2. George Quester, Nuclear Diplomaey: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York: Dunellen. 1970); Ierome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategie Arms Poliey (Washington, OC, Brookings Institution, 1975); Michael Howard, 'The Classic strategists', in Alastair Buchan, ed., Problems o( Modern Strategy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970). The late jarnes King was engaged in an important study of the major works of nuclear strategy (under the title The New Strategy); this was never published. 3. The two key institutions facilitating the study of nuclear policy and the cold war have been the Cold War International History project (http://cwihp.sLedu/) and the National Security Archive (http://www.gwu. edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.htmI); both are based in Washington, Oe. 4. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choiees About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988); Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushehev and the U-2 Af(air (New York: Harper, 1986); David Dunn, The Polities o( Threat (London: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Edward Reiss, The Strategie Defense Initiative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End o( the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Marc Trachtenberg. A Construeted Peaee: The Making o( a European Settlement 1945-1963; Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making o(US Nuclear Strategy, 1995 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 5. Both by Richard Rhodes. The Making o( the Atomie Bomb (London: Touchstone Books, 1995) and Dark Sun: The Making o( the Hydrogen Bomb (London: Touchstone Bocks, 1996). 6. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomie Bomb in the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). 7. john Gaddis, The Long Peaee: Inquiries into the History o( the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 8. Oavid Rosenberg. 'Arnerican atomic strategy and the hydrogen bomb decision', Journal o(Ameriean History. LXVI (Summer 1985). 9. David Rosenberg. The ortgins of overkill: nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960', International Secutity, 7, 4 (Spring 1983). See also the documents edited by Rosenberg in 'A smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours': documents on American plans for nuclear war with the Soviet Union, 1954-1955', International Seeurity (Winter 1981/82). 10. Ernest R. May and Philip O. Zelikow. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
465 466 Notes
11. Michael Charlton, From Detetrence to Detense: The InsideStoryofStrategiePoliey (Harvard University Press, 1987). 12. Steven Rearden, The Evolution ofAmerican Strategie Doctrine: PaulH. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge, SAIS papers in International Affairs, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1984). 13. Glenn Seaborg, Kennedv, Khrushchev arid the Test Ban (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); Herbert York, Making weapons, Talking Peaee: a Physicist's Odyssey [rom Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 14. See lan Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, British Origins of Nuc!ear Strategy, 1945-55 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); lohn Baylis, Ambiguity and Detetrence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 15. David Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part I, Capabitities and Doctrine, Part II, Strategie and Arms-Contra! lmplications, Adelphi Papers 194 and 195 (Winter 1984/85); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuc!ear Strategies and Fotces tor Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan• now Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 16. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Vladislav Zubok, and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside tne Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khtushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Pavel Podvig, (ed.), Russian Strategie Nuclear Potces (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999); john Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 17. Avner Cohen, Israel and thc Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); George Perkovich, lndia's Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). 18. Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuc!ear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 19. David Skaggs, 'Michael Howard and strategie policy', Armed Fotces and Society (Summer 1985); Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations uf American Nuclear Strategy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991); lohn Baylis and john Garnett. (eds.), Makers uf Nuc!ear Strategy (London: Pinter, 1991); Philip Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman and Greg Treverton, (eds.), US Nuc!earStrategy: AReader (London: Macmillan - now Palgrave Macmillan, 1989). 20. I have examined the development of the concept of escalation in Lawrence Freedman, 'On the tiger's back: the development of the concept of escalation', in Roman Kolkowicz, (ed.), The Logic of Nuc!ear Ter.ror (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 21. Gregg Herken, Counsels ot War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Fred Kaplan, The wizards orArmageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). See also lohn Newhouse, The Nuc!earAge:Ftom Hiroshima to Star Wars (London: Michael joseph, 1989). 22. As is evident in my discussion of the early 1960s per iod in Lawrence Freedrnan, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 23. B. H. LiddelI Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), p. 334. Elsewhere I have argued for a definition of strategy as 'the art Notes 467
of creating power'. Lawrence Freedman, 'Strategie studies and the problem of power', in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and Robert O'Neill, (eds.), War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour ot' Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 24. Michael Howard, 'The transformation of strategy', in Major-General j. L. Moulton, (ed.), Brassey's 1972 (London: William Clowes, 1972), p. 1. 25. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic or War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990); Colin Gray, ModernStrategy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Williamson Murray, McGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, (eds.), The Making or Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
1 The Arrival of the Bomb
1. The most notable exceptions to this statement are guerrilla leaders, for a war of attrition has appeal only to those who begin hostilities at a disadvantage but have grounds to believe that, given time and a chance to mobilize to their full potential, the balance of advantage will eventually work out in their favour. 2. Hansard, 10 November 1932, cols. 613-18. 3. Quoted in George Quester, Deterrence Be[ore Hiroshima: The Influence or Airpoweron ModernStrategy(New York:john Wiley, 1966), p. 52. 4. Giulio Douhet, The Command or the Air, as translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann lne., 1942), pp. 220, 202. 5. Ibid., p. 128. 6. Ibid., p. 58. 7. Quoted in Quester, Deterrence betore Hiroshima, p. 56. 8. The efforts to seeure formal international agreement on restraint are described by Donald Cameron Watt in 'Restraints on war in the air before 1945', in Michael Howard (ed.), Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation or Armed Conftict (London: Oxford University Press, 1979). 9. B. H. LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warrare (London: Faber & Faber; 1946), p.31. 10. David lrving, The Mare's Nest (London: William Kimber, 1964), pp. 181,210, 291,294. 11. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World 1939/46: vol. I of a history of the ASAEC (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1962); Margaret Gowing, Britainand Atomic Energv, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964). 12. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (London: Hutehinson, 1948), p. 361. 13. Herbert Peis, The Atomic Bomb and the End or World War II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 87; Margaret Gowing, op. cit., p. 106. 14. Feis, op. cit., p. 38. 15. This is discussed in detail in Lawrence Freedman, 'The strategy of Hiroshirna', The JournalofStrategic Studies, I, I (May 1978). 16. Quoted by L. Giovannitti and F. Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (London: Methuen & Co., 1967), p. 35. 468 Notes
17. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Projeet (New York: Harper, 1962) p. 267. 18. Basil LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, p. 25. 19. Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp. 36, 369-70, 373. 20. Giovannitti and Freed, op. cit., p. 36. 21. Robert ]. C. Butow, lapan'sDecision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 180. 22. LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, pp. 30-2, 83.
2 Offence and Defence
1. Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans [orPeaee 1939-1945 (Baltimore: [ohn Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 46, 17. 2. Quoted in David Maclsaacs, Strategie Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategie Bombing Survey (New York: Garland, 1976), p. 165. The survey was a thorough investigation, directed by civlllans, into the effects of the bombing campaigns on the economies and civilian morale of Germany and Japan. Maclsaacs has edited the reports in ten volumes, also published by Gariand in 1976. 3. General H. H. Arnold, 'Air force in the atomic age', in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (eds.), One World or None (New York: McGraw Hill, 1946), pp. 26-9. Arnold admitted that his calculations were 'rough'. The USSBS esti• mate for the number of B-29s needed to commit an Hiroshima was 210, and 120 for Nagasaki. Their conclusion was that: 'The atomic bomb in its present state of development raises the destructive power of a single bomber by a fac• tor of between 50 and 250 times, depending upon the nature and size of the target.' Summary Report, Pacific War, United States Strategie Bombing Survey, 1II, p. 29. This conclusion was not altogether popular with those airmen, such as General Curtis Le May, who looked forward to ever-expanding fleets of long• range bombers. 4. See Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratie PolWes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 5. New York Times, 13 August 1945. 6. Major-General J. F. S. Fuller, 'The atomic bomb and warfare of the future', Army Ordnanee (lanuary-February 1946), p. 34. 7. Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training, A Programme for National Security, known as The Compton Report (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1947), p. 12. 8. Bernard Brodie and Eilene Galloway, The Atomie Bomb and the Armed Services Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, May 1947), pp. 30-1. 9. Arnold, in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 30. 10. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (London: Heinemann, 1950), pp. 90, 96-7. 11. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 32; Bush, op. cit., p. 117; P. M. S. Blackett, The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London: Turnstile Press, 1948), p. 68. Notes 469
12. Reprinted in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch (eds.) TheAtomieAge: Scientists in Nationaland World Affairs (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 13. 13. Edward Condon, 'The new techniques of private war', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 41 ('We must no longer expect the special agent to be special'). On this concern see Roberta Wohlstetter, 'Terror on a grand scale', Survival, xvm.S (May/Iune 1976), pp. 98-9. 14. In The Atomie Bomb and Ameriean Security (Yale University, Memorandum No. 18, 1945), p. 5, he wrote of how a war of the future 'might take the form of a revelation by one nation to another that the latter's major cities had atomic bombs planted in them and that only immediate and absolute submission to dictates would prevent thern from going off". 15. Bernard Brodle, TheAbsoluteWeapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 49. 16. Blackett, op. cit., p. 50. 17. Bernard Brodle, Absolute weapon, p. 41; idem., 'Cornpiler's critique on U.S. navy views', in Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., pp. 46-7. 18. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 68; The Compton Report, p. 12; New York Times, 3 October 1949. 19. William Fox, Atomie Energy and International Relations (Mirneo: Yale Institute of International Affairs, june 1948), p. 4. 20. Vannevar Bush, op.cit., pp. 104, 139. 21. Iacob Viner, 'The implications of the atomic bomb for international rela• tions', Proeeedings of the American Philosophical Society, xc:1 (January 1946), p. 55. Fox (Atomie Energy, pp. 11-12) doubted that small countries would find bombs much use for 'blackrnail' purposes, though he thought 'they might strengthen respect for neutrality'. Others were less certain of the advantages: 'Even small countries can make these bombs in numbers if they are such utter fools as to engage in this lethaI business. They will not because they know they would be completely destroyed if bombs were used', Harold Urey, 'How does it all add up?', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 55. 22. There was some wishful thinking on this score. In October 1949 Commander Eugene Tatom of the US Navy still feIt confident enough to assert that it would be possible to stand on the runway at Washington National Airport 'with no more than the clothes you now have on, and have an atom bomb explode at the other end of the runway without serious injury to you', Quoted by Albert Wohlstetter in unpublished letter to Michael Howard, 6 November 1968, p. 26. Professor Wohlstetter has kindly permitted quotation from this letter. 23. See Brodie, Absolute weapon, pp. 28, 31. 24. Summary (Pacific War), United States Strategie BombingSurvey, IV, p. 29. 25. Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 32. 26. Bush, op. cit., p. 59. 27. 'Very greatly increased bomber speeds will immensely increase the difficul• ties of providing adequate warning and effective interception, and indeed the fighter's superiority of speed over the bomber ... may weil dwindle to almost nothing.' Lord Tedder. Air Power in the War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), p. 44. 28. Bush, op. cit., pp. 116-17. 29. Blackett, op. cii., p. 54. 30. Bush, op. cit., p. 100. 470 Notes
31. Louis Ridenour, 'There is no defense', in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 37; idem., 'A US physicist's reply to Professor Blackett', ScientificAmerican (March 1949), reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1973).
3 Aggression and Retaliation
1. Quoted in Wohlstetter letter to Howard, p. 5. 2. 'In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggres• sor', the Franck Report, reprinted in Grodzins and Rabinowitch, op. cit., p. 21. 3. H. O. Smyth, A General Accountofthe DevelopmentofMethods ofUsing Atomic Energy [ot Military Purposes under the Auspices ofthe United States Govemment 1940-1945 (Washington, OC: USGPO, August 1945), p. 134. 4. Caryl Haskins, 'Atornic energy and American foreign policy', Foreign Affairs, xxiv.a (Iuly 1946); The Eliot quote comes from The Atomic Age Opens, prepared by the editors of Pocket Books (New York, August 1945) - this is a useful compilation of immediate reactions to the bomb; Robert Oppenheimer, 'Atomic weapons', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, xc.I (January 1946), p. 9; O. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. n, The Atomic Energy Years 1945-50 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 5. Edward Mead Earle, 'The influence of air power upon history', The Yale Review, xxxv:4 (lune 1946), pp. 577-93; 'The effects of the atomic bomb on national security (an expression of War Oepartment thinking)', in Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 70. See also Bernard Brodle, Atomic Bomb and American Security, p. 9. 6. lan Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 351-6. 7. Cited in Robert W. Tucker, The [ust War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine(Baitimore: johns Hopkins Press, 1960), p. 12. 8. Areport to the President by the Special Counsel to the President, American Relations with the Soviet Union (24 September 1946). Reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and john Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-50 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 66. 9. Quoted in ibid., p. 21, fn. 14. 10. Title of book edited by Masters and Way. 11. One book examined how a war would be fought after the adoption of an international control agreement. The conclusion seemed to be that prior to a war both sides would build up their forces and develop their facilities as much as possible without actually contravening the treaty, available facilities would be seized on the outbreak of war, arid, until they became operational, the main military activity would consist of trying to destroy the facilities and delivery vehicles of the other side. Ansley J. Coale, The Problem ofReducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947). 12. Cited in Blackett, op. cit., p. 177. 13. 'The prevention of war', in Grodzins and Rabinowitch, op. cit. 14. Cited in Margaret Gowing, lndepcndencc and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952, vol. 1, Policy Making (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 79. Notes 471
15. Quoted in Wohlstetter letter to Howard, 6 November 1968. Wohlstetter emphasizes the importanee of this 'sooner or later' syndrome. 16. Arnold, in Masters and Way, op. cit., p. 31. 17. Gowing reports the eomments of UK seientists in [une 1945 that 'the only answer to the bomb was to use it in retaliation', and by Oetober of that year the chiefs of staff were emphatie that the best means of defenee would be 'the possession of the means of retaliation' (op. cit., p. 164). 18. NSC 20/2, Factors Affecting the Nature of the US Detense Arrangements in the Light ofSoviet Policies (25 August 1948). Reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis, op. cit., p. 298. 19. B. M. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in wartare, pp. 85-6. 20. Viner, op. cit., p. 54. This was a leeture given in November 1945. 21. Brodle, Absolute weapon, pp. 74, 85; Frederic S. Dunn: 'The bomb is well adapted to the teehnique of retaliation' (p. 16); Arnold Wolfers: 'The threat of retaliation in kind is probably the strongest single means of deterrent' (p. 134). 22. William 1. Borden, There Will Be No Time (New York:Maemillan, 1946), p. 83. 23. Brodle, The Absolute weapon, pp. 76, 88-91. The 1947 War Department paper suggested that: 'The initial strategy of the armed forces, ... , is that of absorb• ing or diverting initial attaeks, delivering immediate eounter-attaeks with long-range bombers or missiles, aeeomplishing initial essential deployment, and effeeting without delay the neeessary mobilization of national resourees' (Brodie and Galloway, op. cit., p. 78). This suggests a greater optimism than Brodie as to the capa city for mobilization in war. 24. General Arnold raised this possibility in 1946: 'In a world in whieh atomie weapons are available, the most threatening program that anation eould undertake would be one of general dispersal and fortifieation', One World or None, p. 31. Brodle, in a diseussion of the need to deter through the threat of atomie retaliation, noted the diffieulty of stopping the 'irresponsibility of madmen', Absolute weapon, p.15.
4 Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly
1. Walter Lipprnann, 'Why are we disarming ourselves?', Redbrook Magazine (September 1946), p. 106. 2. Bernard Brodle, 'The atom bomb as poliey-maker', Foreign Affairs, XXVII:1 (Oetober 1948), p. 21. 3. William Fox, The Supetpowerst The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union and Their Responsibility [or Peace (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1944), p. 102. 4. Perry Smith, The Air Force Plans [ot Peace, pp. 52-3. 5. William Fox, Atomic Energy and International Relations, p. 14. 6. 'Spaatz Report', The Implications of the Atom Bomb for the Size, Composition, Organization and Role of the Future Air Force (23 Oetober 1945); Joint Staff Strategie Survey, Statement ofthe Effect ofAtomic Weapons on National Security and Military Organization (12 [anuary 1946). See Frank Klotz, The US President and the Control of Strategie Nucleat weapons, unpublished D.Phi!. thesls (Oxford, 1980). 7. 'X', 'The sources of Soviet conduet', ForeignAffairs, XXV (July 1947); George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, Little Brown: 1967), p. 358. 472 Notes
8. Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, p. 391. 9. Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (London: Cassell & Co. 1952), p. 45. 10. NSC-30, United States Poiicy on Atomie Weapons (10 September 1948). Reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis, op. cit., p. 341. lt was suggested that a decision against employment 'might gain the praise of the world's radical fringe'. 11. Millis, op. cit., pp. 433-4, 457. 12. Blackett had raised a similar problem in a November 1945 memorandum and then later in his book. He argued that it would be in the interest of any nation faced with an atomic threat to neutralize enemy bases close at hand. Threatened with atomic bombs she would 'expand her effective frontiers to include all possible potential bases from where such attacks might be launched'. Once ensconced in Western Europe they could not be removed as this would involve attacking friendly populations. (Reprinted in Gowing, Independencc and Deterrence, p. 203.) 13. Brodie argued that any attacks on the soviet horneland. even if not directly related to the progress of an invasion of Western Europe, were likely to impede the invasion. He argued that 'the destruction of Soviet cities and industries would make a great deal of difference in the ability of the Soviet armies to overrun Western Europe, or to maintain themselves in that area if they got there', 'Atom bomb as policy-rnaker, op. cit., p. 30. 14. Air Staff, Strategie lmplications or the Atomie Bomb in Warrare (3 February 1947). See Klotz, op. cit. 15. Joint Chief of Staff, Evaluation or Current Strategie Air Offensive Plans, (21 December 1948), in Etzold and Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 357-60. 16. The Harmon Report, Evaluation orEffect on Soviet War Effort Resulting[rom the Strategie Air Offensive (11 May 1949). Reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 360-4. 17. H. S. Dinerstein. War and the 50viet Union (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 32. 18. In 1949, cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 174. 19. Colonel-General of Aviation Nikitin, cited in Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Strategy in the NuclearAge (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 173-4. 20. Ibid., p. 67. 21. Marshai of Aviation Vershinin in 1949, cited by Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine, p. 175. 'Marshallized Countries' were these that had accepted US economic aid under the Marshall Plan. 22. On the Soviet atom bomb project see Arnold Krarnish, Atomic Energyin the Soviet Union (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960). 23. The similarities of views on this particular matter between such figures as Blackett and the Soviet Union were widely noted. As many feit that the only reason that the Kremlin disparaged the bomb was that it wished to under• mine Western confidence in its major strategie asset, those in the West who assisted in this effort were open to the charge of being virtual fifth• columnists. For example Louis Ridenour on Blackett's book, The Military and PoliticalConsequences ot'Atomic Energy, His ideas coincide remarkably with the standard Russian views. He belittles the atomic bomb - which Russia had not got, but wants. He depreciates strategie air power - wh ich is the only arm we have that can strike a blow at Notes 473
Russia .... Blacketr's argument carries its own antidote. The excesses and absurdities of the political views he urges are so clearly the result of bias, and so clearly dominated by pro-Soviet prejudice, that the wh ole work is suspect, and will appear so to the least discerning. 'A US physicist's reply to Professor Blackett', ScientiticAmerican (March 1949). In the April 1949 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Edward Shils described the book as a 'gift to Soviet propaganda', The British delegation to the UN Atomie Energy Commission feit obliged to issue a refutation.
5 Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate
1. This could be the only explanation for the mid-1953 report of an advisory committee (written before the introduction of the TU-16) of a plausible cur• rent threat of 100 atomic bornbs being accurately delivered on the US, suffi• cient to destroy up to one-third of America's industrial potential, with up to 13 million casualties. CharIes Murphy, 'The US as a bombing target', Fortune (November 1953), p. 119. 2. GAC Report o( October 30 1949, reprinted in Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). See also Warner R. Schilling 'The H-Bomb decision: how to decide without actually choosing', PoliticalScience QuarterlyLXXV! (March 1961). 3. Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, pp. 628-9. 4. Samuel F. WeHs jr., 'Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat', International Security, Iv:2 (Fall 1979), pp. 120-1. 5. York, The Advisors, p. 59. 6. Dean Acheson, Presentat the Creation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 349. 7. Viner, 'The implications of the atomie bomb', op. cit., p. 53. 8. Omar Bradley, 'This way lies peace', Saturday EveningPost (15 October 1949). 9. ScientificAmerican, November 1951. 10. AReport to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, NSC-68 (14 April 1950). It is reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis, op. eit. See Paul Hammond 'NSC-68: prologue to rearrnarnent', in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond and Glenn Snyder, Strategy, Politiesand DefenseBudgets(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 11. See Bernard Brodle, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 319-20. 12. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 13. Testimony of Secretary of State Acheson, Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, Assignment ofGround Forces ofthe United States in the European Area (February 1951).
6 Massive Retaliation
1. Bernard Brodle, 'Nuclear weapons: strategie or tactical'?, Foreign Attairs, xxxn.z (January 1954), p. 222. 474 Notes
2. Gowing, Independeneeand Detertence, p. 184. 3. Gowing, op. cit., p. 441; Glenn Snyder, 'The new look of 1953', in Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Detense Budgets; CharIes Murphy, 'Defense and strategy', Fortune (January 1953). 4. Sir lohn Slessor, 'The place of the bomber in British strategy', International Attaires, xxrx.J (July 1953), pp. 302-3; idem., 'Air power and world strategy', Foreign Affaris, xxxt.l (October 1954), pp. 48, 51; idem., Strategy[or the West (London: Cassell 1954). 5. NSC-162/2 is reprinted in full in The Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, vol. I (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 412-29. 6. Field Marshai Bernard Law Montgomery, 'A look through a window at World War IlI', The Journalofthe Royal United Services Institute, xClx:596 (November 1954), p. 508. 7. See lohn Foster Dulles, 'A policy of boldness', Life (19 May 1952), p. 151; Snyder, 'The new look', in Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, op. cit., p. 390. See also Martin C. Fergus, 'The massive retaliation doctrine: a study in United States military policy formatiori', Public Poticy, XVII (1968). 8. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 102, 48-9; David Rces, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan 1964), pp. 417-20; Robert j, Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 116-19. 9. Speech is reprinted as 'The evolution of foreign policy', Department ofState Bulletin, xxx (25 january 1954), 107-10. 10. lohn Foster Dulles, 'Policy for security and peace', Foreign Affairs, XXXII:3 (April 1954). 11. Pentagon Papers, p. 92.
7 Limited Objectives
1. The growing concern on these matters is described in Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The NuclearTest Ban Debate 1954-60 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 2. P. M. S. Blackett, Atomie Weapons arid fast-West Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 3. 3. Robert Oppenheirner, 'Atomic weapons and American policy', Foreign Affairs, XXXI:4 (July 1953), p. 529. 4. Paul Keeskemeti, Strategie Surrender: The Polities ot Vietory and Defense (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). 5. See jarnes King, 'Strategie surrender: The senate debate and the book', World Politics, XI (April 1959). 6. These attempts are discussed in M. Howard (ed.), Restraints on War. 7. LiddelI Hart, Strategy: The indirect Approach, p. 25. On LiddelI Hart's theories see Brian Bond, l.iddell Hart: A Study ofhis Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1977). 8. LiddelI Hart, The Revolution in wariare, pp. 99-102. 9. Edward Mead Earle, 'The influence of air power upon history', op. eit. 10. Taken from a piece written in April 1954 that was later reprinted in B. H. LiddelI Hart, Deterrent or Defence (London: Stevens & Sons, 1960), p.23. Notes 475
11. Letter of 26 April 1957: 'you led all the rest of us in advocating the principle of limited war'. Quoted in Bond, op. cit., p. 196. 12. Bernard Brodle, 'Unlimited weapons and limited war', The Reporter (1 November 1954). 13. William Kaufmann (ed.), Military Poliey and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 21, 24-5. 14. Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to Ameriean Strategy (The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 26, 242. 15. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Poliey (New York: Harper, 1957). 16. Brodle, 'Unlimited weapons and limited war', op. eit. 17. Osgood, op. cit., p. 18. 18. W. Kaufmann, Military Policy, p. 117. 19. james King, 'Limited war', Army (August 1957).
8 Limited Means
1. Bernard Brodle, 'Strategy hits a dead end', Hatpers (October 1955); Osgood, Limited War, p. 230. Osgood was not totally convinced of the value of tactical nuc!ear weapons. His discussion of the costs and benefits attached to their use is careful and balanced. For a discussion of the debate about how best to fight a limited war see Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: lohn Wiley, 1963). This book contains an excellent bibliography. 2. Denis Healey 'The bomb that didn't go off", Eneounter (JuIy 1955); Blackett, Atomie weapons and Bast-west Relations, p. 8. 3. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 174-83. 4. Iames E. King, 'Nuclear weapons and foreign policy. 1I - limited annihilatiori', The New Republic (15 juIy 1957), p. 18. 5. William Kaufmann, 'The crisis in military affairs', World Politics, x:4 (JuIy 1958), p. 594. 6. For a devastating critique of the Arrny's attempts to do so, see T. N. Dupuy, 'Can America fight a limited nuc!ear war?', Orbis, v:1 (Spring 1961): '[T]here is every reason to believe that our ground troops - the basic components of a limited war force - are not capable of existing, let alone operating in the very nuc!ear environment to which our strategy has consigned them' (p. 32). 7. All quotations are from Chapter 7 of Garthoff, SovietStrategyin the Nuclear Age. 8. Originally in Deterrenee by Denial and Punishment, Research Monograph No. 1, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 2 january 1959, and then to a wider audience in Deterrenee and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 9. In a letter to the London Times of 29 August 1955 in which he spoke of the principle of 'appIying the minimum force necessary to repel any particular aggression and deter its extension', 10. Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, 'Massive retaliation and graduated deterrence', World Politics, vm:2 (January 1956); On Limiting Atomic War (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), written by Richard Goold-Adams on the basis of discussions with Buzzard, Blackett and Denis Healey M.P. 11. Richard Goold-Adams, On Living Atomie War, p. 20. 476 Notes
12. 'Graduated deterrenee', Economist(5 November 1955), p. 458. 13. Colonel Riehard S. Leghorn, 'No need to bomb eities to win war', US News & World Report (28 january 1955), p. 84. 14. Buzzard, op. cit., p. 229. These ideas are early versions of the coneept of esealation dominanee, see pp. 218 and 389. 15. Bernard Brodie, 'Strategy hits a dead end', op. cU.; idem., Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 321-5. 16. Bernard Brodie, 'More about limited war', WorldPolities, x:l (Oetober 1957), p.117. 17. jarnes King, 'Limited war', op. cit. William Kaufmann had never been eonvineed that preparations for limited war would not require large conven• tion al forees or that taetieal nuclear weapons offered decisive advantages to the West. See his essay on 'Limited war' in his book Military Policy and National Security. 18. LiddelI Hart, Deterrence or Defence, p. 81; P. M. S. B1aekett, 'Nuclear weapons and defenee', International Affairs, xxxlv:4 (Oetober 1958). 19. Henry A. Kissinger, 'Limited war: eonventional or nuclear? A reappraisal', Daedalus, vo!. 89, No. 4 (1960). This was published in book form a year later by George Braziller in New York, edited by Donald Brennan as Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, p. 145.
9 The Importance of Being First
1. Paul Nitze, 'Atoms, strategy and policy', Foreign Affairs, XXXlv:2 (January 1956), pp. 190-1. See also Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, p. 68: "The eoneepts of "winning" and "losing" have to do with the military or poweroutcome of the war. ... They have nothing to do with the intrinsiceosts of damage suffered in the war.' 2. For example john Foster Dulles: 'Khrusehev does not need to be convineed of our good intentions. He knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the seeurity of the Soviet Union', quoted in Robert jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Prineeton: Prineeton University Press, 1976), p. 68. The most eareful eritique of preventive war as a poliey ean be found in Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 228-91. 3. W. D. Puleston, The influence of Force in Foreign Relations (New York: Van Nostrand, 1955), From extract in US News & WorldReport (4 February 1955), p.133. 4. Co!. jack Nicholas, 'The element of surprise in modern warfare', Air University Quarterly Review(Summer 1956), pp. 3-4. 5. T. F. Walkowicz, 'Counter-force strategy: how we can exploit America's atomic advantage', Air Force Magazine (February 1955), p. 51. 6. Charles Murphy, Fortune (July 1953). Though accepting the need for a Iim• ited air defence effort, Murphy insists that protection against nuclear attack is 'unattainable and in any case completely impractical, cconomically and technically'. 7. Quoted in George E. Lowe, The AgeofDeterrence (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 100-1. 8. Colonel Robert Richardson, '00 we need unlimited forces for Iimited war', Air Force (March 1959). Notes 477
9. For example, Lord Tedder in 1947: 'The most effective defence against air attack is to stop it at source, and in the future it may become the only way; it is certainly the only method of dealing with the rocket. The only decisive air superiority is that established over the enemy country.' Air Power in the War, pp. 44-5. 10. Quoted in Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peaee: The Origins ofthe Cold War and the National Security State (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 478. 11. In Borden, There Will Be No Time. See p. 43. 12. Richard Leghorn, commenting on a 1954 news report that the military were studying earth satellites, noted that: 'The present state of the aeronautical art makes the satellites feasible in the not-too-distant future. A few simple ca\culations, assuming lenses no larger than those now used in aerial pho• tography, show that these might see, and return to earth by electronic means, gross details of larger military installations.' 'No need to bomb cities to win war: a new counter-force strategy for air warfare', US News & World Report(28]anuary 1955), p. 87. 13. Bernard Brodle, The Reporter (11 October 1954). 14. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 270, 278, 311, 397. See ]ames King's excellent review, 'Airpower in the missile gap', World Polities, XII:4 (July 1960), pp. 628-39. 15. H. Kahn, On Thermonuelear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 559-60. 16. Ibid., p. 32 (emphasis in original). 17. One who took the problem seriously was Thomas Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force in the Truman Administration. In 1954 he wrote a book which sug• gested that: 'the Russians will not use their air-atomic power to destroy our cities and industry unless they can simultaneously knock out enough of the US Atomic-Air to stop it from making an overwhelming counter-attack on Russia ... and ... they are very busy working on a plan to do just that'. Power and Policy (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1954), p. 26. 18. The story of the strategic bases study is told in Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: CaseStudy ofa Non-profitAdvisoryCorporation (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1966). The Report was published as A. ]. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. ]. Lutz and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use ofStrategie Air Bases, RANDR-266, 1 April 1954 (declassified 1962). 19. Albert Wohlstetter, 'The delicate balance of terror', Foreign Affairs, XXXVII:2 (January 1959). 20. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 282. 21. For example, Kissinger in his 1961 book, Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper & Row): 'A precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable retaliatory force' (p. 22). 22. George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and The West (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 52-4.
10 Sputniks and the Soviet Threat
1. On the response to Sputnik, see]. R. Killian, Sputniks,Scientists and Eisenhower (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977) and Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: 478 Notes
A Participant's View of the Arms Raee (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971). Killian reports how the Soviet satellite did violence to a belief so fundamen• tal that it was almost heresy to question it. A belief I shared that the United States was so far advanced in its technologicaI capacity that it had in fact no serious rival. That others possessed their share of technology I was aware, but somehow I pictured them all laboring far behind this country, looking towards the United States for guidance, envying our skills, our trained capa• city, and above all our enormous industrial substructure that could be put to the task of converting advanced technological notions into performing hardware (p. 3). 2. The evidence upon which these projections were based is discussed in Lawrence Freedrnan. US lntelligenee and the Soviet Strategie Threat (London: Macmillan, 1977). Though the Air Force was the most extreme in its projec• tions, many of the fears were shared by other intelligence analysts, including those in the CIA. 3. So starting an intelligence debate that has persisted to this day. 4. General Thomas S. Power, Design for Survival (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964), p. 111. 5. Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate Balance of Terror' op. cit., p. 222. 6. Herman, Kahn, in his On Thermonuclear War, continually uses the 20 million figure as a benchmark for judging the losses likely to be acceptable or bearable for the Soviet Union. So 5 to 10 million casualties is presented as 'only a fraction as many people as they lost in World War 11' (p. 132), the implication being that this would be insufficient hurt to ensure deterrence. 7. P. M. S. Blackett, Studies ofWar - Nuclear and Conventional (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1962), p. 139. 8. Power, Op. cit., pp. 112-13. 9. Colonel G. C. Reinhardt, 'Atomic weapons and warfare' in B. H. LiddelI Hart (ed.), The Soviet Army (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson 1956), p. 429. 10. Herbert S. Dinerstein, 'The revolution in Soviet strategic thinking', Foreign Affairs, xxxvr.z (Ianuary 1958), p. 252. 11. H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, pp. 37-45. 12. INd., p. 186. 13. See Frederic S. Burin, 'The communist doctrine of the inevitability of war', American Politieal Scienee Review, LVII:2 (June 1963), pp. 334-54. 14. For example Major-General Talensky: 'at any moment ... mankind might be faced with the accomplished fact of the beginning of a destructive nuclear war'. Dinerstein. War and the Soviet Union, p. 141. 15. Ibid., p. 142. 16. In a November 1957 interview with an American reporter Khruschev explained the virtues of Russia's size. In a nuc!ear war, 'we too, of course, will suffer great losses. But look at the vast spaces on our map and look at Germany, France and Britain.' He agreed that the US also had vast spaces but then pointed out that American industry was much more concentrated. 17. Dinerstein. War and the Soviet Union, pp. 186, 187. 18. It also referred to intelligence capabilities out of a recognition that a timely warning of attack would be essential to a pre-emptive strike: 'It is absolutely clear and beyond argument that Marxist-Leninist science is fully capable of Notes 479
foreseeing such a significant phenomenon in the life of society as the transi• tion from a condition of peace to a condition of war.' 19. Dinerstein. War and the Soviet Union, pp. 216-20. 20. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuc/ear Age, pp. 222-3. 21. Ibid., pp. 230, 231. 22. By September 1957 General Pokrovsky was cautioning that some defence against ICBMs could and would be developed in the future, noting that radar detection might be sufficient to allow for the launch of a defensive rocket. 23. See Arnold Horeliek and Myron Rush, Strategie Powerand Soviet Foreign Poliey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
11 The Technological Arms Race
1. Denis Healey, 'The Sputnik and western defence', International Affairs, xxxrv.Z (April 1954), p. 147. 2. 'The meaning of stalernate', Army (August 1958). 3. lohn Foster Dulles, 'ChaHenge and response in US policy', Foreign Atfairs, xxxvr.I (October 1957). 4. Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategie Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 101. 5. Herbert Yorkwrote in 1970: 'Surprising as it may seem, the wild out-bursts of ideas inspired by Sputnik and the missible-gap psychology has produced nothing of direct value to our current strategie posture more than twelve years Iater.' Raee to Oblivion, p. 144. 6. As an example he adds: 'I have not seen any figures, but I surmise that reiatively thin margins of cost prevent us from doing such extraordinary projects as melting ice caps and diverting ocean currents' (this is for 1965!). On Thermonuc/ear War, p. 484. 7. Emphasis in the original. Quotations from report are taken frorn section reproduced in]ames R. KiIIian]r., Sputniks, Scientistsand Eisenhower, pp. 71-9. 8. In both KiIIian and Gaither Reports 'decisive' was defined as: (1) ability to strike back is essentiaHy eliminated; or (2) civil, political or cultural life are reduced to a condition of chaos; or both (1) and (2). 9. Security Resources Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Deterrenee and Survival in the Nuc/ear Age, Washington, DC: November 1957 (declassified ]anuary 1973). Though the President was not happy with the report, in a speech he made a week after its presentation to the National Security Council he showed signs of having been influenced by this forecast of the shape of things to come: lassure you ... that for the conditions existing today they [the US mili• tary forces] are both efficient and adequate. But if they are to remain so for the future, their design and power must keep pace with the increasing capabilities that science gives both to the aggressor and the defender. Quoted in Morton Halperin, 'The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process', World Politics, xm:3 (April 1961), p. 370. 10. Henry Kissinger, 'Arms control, inspection and surprise attack', Foreign Affairs, xxxvm:3 (April 1960), p. 557. 480 Notes
11. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 54. 12. See J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Poliey(Colurnbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1962). 13. Brodie, The Reporter (18 November 1954); Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 192. Senator john Kennedy wrote (in the middle of his Presidential Campaign), reviewing Basil LiddelI Hart's book, Deterrenee or Defence]for the Saturday Review on 3 September 1960: 'We have no right to tempt Soviet planners and politicalleaders with the possibility of catching our aircraft and unprotected missiles on the ground, in a gigantic Peari Harbor.' 14. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). 15. Snyder, Deterrenee and Defense, p. 108. Snyder also noted that if the enemy was only aliowed the second strike, and if his strategie forces were not elim• inated, his attack was much more likely to be counter-city than it would have been as a first strike, so, perhaps, increasing the severity of the damage. 16. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 495. (He considered this a possibility for 1969.) 17. Bernard Brodle, 'The Development of Nuclear Strategy', International Security, 11:4 (Spring 1978), p. 68. Brodle, though sympathetic to Wohlstetter's rnotives, adds that he 'could never accept ... that the balance of terror ... ever has been or ever could be delicate'. 18. The quotations are from an unclassified summary of National Poliey Implications ofAtomie Parity (Naval Warfare Group Study, Number 5, 1958) and a speech by Admiral Burke to the Press Club on 17 january 1958. They are taken from George Lowe, The Age of Deterrence, a rendition of the argu• ments against the Air Force view from the viewpoint of a Navy partisan. For similar arguments see George Fielding Eliot, Victory without War: 1958-61 (Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute, 1958). 19. Snyder, Deterrenee and Defense, p. 88 (pp. 85-95 provides a thorough discus• sion of the issues discussed in this section). See also George Rathjens Ir., 'NATO strategy: total war', in Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and Ameriean Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). 20. Kahn, op. cit., p. 13. 21. J. King, 'Air Power in the Missile Gap', op. cit., p. 635. 22. Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 74. 23. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 110, 94-5. He also made the valid point that a mixed force complicates the enemy's counter-force attacks and his air defence problem. There would be a diversity of targets and a diversity of sources of retaliatoryattacks.
12 The Formal Strategists
1. Charies Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics ofDetense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 2. P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War - Nuclear and Conventional, p. 201. For a brief history see Chapter 3 of Andrew Wilson, War Gaming (London: Pelican, 1970). Notes 481
3. Sir Solly Zuckerman, ']udgement and control in modern warfare', Foreign Affairs, xxxx:2 (January 1962), p. 208. 4. Dr. Samuel Glasstone, The Effeets o( Nuclear Weapons (US Atomie Energy Commission, 1957) is the most authoritative compilation. 5. Letter to Michael Howard, 6 November 1968, p. 49. He names ]. F. Digby, E.]. Barlow, E. S. Quade, P. M. Dadant, E. Reich, F. Hoffman and H. Rowen. 6. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Strategy and the natural scientists', in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (ed.), Scientists and National Poliey Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 189, 193, 195. 7. P. M. S. Blaekett, 'Critique of some contemporary defense thinking', in Studies o( War. 8. Sir Solly Zuckerman. Scientists and War, The Impact o(Scienee on Military and Civil Affairs (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956), p. 63. 9. lohn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory o(Games and Eeonomie Behavior (Prineeton: Prineeton University Press, 1944). 10. Sehelling's The Strategy o( Conflict is a collection of some of his seminal essays. A less teehnieal presentation of his ideas is to be found in a later work, Arms and lnftuence (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1966). Agame theory type of analysis by Morton Kaplan is found in his 'The ealculus of nuclear deterrenee', World Polities, XI:l (Oetober 1958). The influenee of Game Theory is evident in Oskar Morgenstern's The Question o( National Defense. Game Theory, he claims, 'has clarified the coneeptual problem of decision• making', established the neeessary theorems and shown the methods for seleeting and eomputing the optimal strategies (p. 164). Anatol Rapaport provides useful guides to the subjeet in Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: Miehigan University Press, 1960) and Strategy and Conscienee (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). The latter provides his most fervent attaek on the abu ses of Game Theory. 11. Sehelling, The Strategy o(Contlict, p. 3. Bernard Brodle, while eonsidering the 'refinements' of Game Theory to be 'generally of littJe importanee to the strategie analysts', applauded its spirit: 'the eonstant awareness that we will be dealing with an opponent who will eounteraet our moves and to whom we must in turn reaet'. 'The seientifie strategists', Gilpin and Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy-Makers, p. 252. Wohlstetter also saw this as its main value, while adding that taking every reaetion into aeeount 'need not be done in the framework of a formal game'. In general he took a 'temperate view' of the uses of Game Theory, eonsidering it 'still a Iong way from direet applieation to any complex problem of policy'. 'Analysis and design of con• fliet systerns', in E. S. Quade, Analysis [or Military Decisions (Chieago: RAND MeNaHy, 1964), pp. 130-I. 12. The most thorough critlque of the methods adopted by the new strategists is to be found in Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory o( Nuclear Deterrenee (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966). See also Rapaport's Strategy and Conscienee. For eritiques of the eritics see D. G. Brennan's review of Rapaport's book, Bulletin ofthe Atomie Scientists, XXI:12 (Deeember 1965), and Hedley BuH, 'Strategie studies and its erities', World Polities (July 1968). 13. Green, op. cit., p. 98. 14. SeheHing, The Strategy o(Conflict, p. 4. 482 Notes
15. Hedley Bull, The Control otthe Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p. 48. 16. See Glenn Snyder, ' "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" models in interna• tional politics', International Studies Quarterly, xv:l (March 1971). 17. Ibid., p. 98.
13 Arms Control
1. Schelling, The StrategyofContlict, p. 15. 2. Morgenstern, The Question ofNational Detense, pp. 9-10. 3. C. W. Sherwin, 'Seeuring peace through military technology', Bulletin ot the Atomic Scientist (May 1956). A short piece by Amster entitled 'Design for deterrence', was appended. The original Amster study appeared as A Theory [or the Design of a Deterrent Air Weapon System (San Diego, Calif.: Convair Corporanon. 1955). For evidence of the influence of Amster/Sherwin see Schelling, StrategyofConflict, p. 7 and Arthur Lee Bums, 'Disarmament or the balance of terror, World Politics, XII: 1 (October 1959), p. 134. 4. Arnster, 'Design for Deterrence', op. cit., p. 165. 5. Sherwin, op. cit., p. 162. 6. lbid., p. 161. 7. Schelling, Arms and lnfluence, pp. 12,35. 8. Schelling, The StrategyofConflict, pp. 239-40. 9. Schelling, The Strategy of Contlict, p. 233. This essay on 'Surprise attack and disarmament' first appeared in Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security. 10. Ibid., p. 288. 11. Schelling, Strategyand Conflict, p. 236. See also Arthur Lee Bums, op.cit. 12. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategyand Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 1-2. 13. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 232. 14. Schelling and Halperin, op. cit., p. 5. 15. Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations [orArms Contral (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1961). 16. There is some link with the earlier usage in Hedley Bull's definition of arms control as 'restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy'. Hedley Bull, The Control ot the Arms Race, p. 1. 17. Schelling and Halperin, op. cit., p. 2. 18. Alva Myrdal, The Game ofDisarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Raee (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. xiv. 19. Robert Osgood, 'Stabilizing the military environment', Ameriean Politieal ScienceReview, iv.I (March 1961). 20. Maleolm Hoag, 'On stability in deterrent races', World Politics, xIlI:4 (July 1961), p. 522. 21. The term is taken frorn Thomas Murray, Nuclear Poliey [or War and Peace, (Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1960), p. 28. Murray, a catholic member of the Atomic Energy Commission, attempted more than most others connected with the nuclear programme to inject a moral element into the debate. A discussion of a variety of ethical problems is found in Green, Deadly Logic, chap. 6. Green also provides a useful bibliography. Green's ideas are Notes 483
discussed, unsympathetically, in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), Strategie Thinking and Its Moral Implieations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). See also Sydney Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints in Warfare (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 22. Lieutenant-GeneraI Sirlohn Cowley, 'Future trends in warfare', Journalofthe Royal UnitedServices Institute (February 1960), p. 13. 23. The 1961 review in ScientiticAmeriean is collected with other small pieces by Newman in The Rule ofFolly (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962). Kahn became a particular bete noire of the nuclear pacifists. Philip Green's Deadly Logieis Iargely an attack on Kahn. Anatol Rapaport was inspired to write his critique of the abuses of Game Theory after listening with mounting anger to a lecture by Kahn. Bertrand Russell's book was entitled Commonsense and Nuc/ear Warfare (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959). 24. Aceidental War: Some Dangers in the 19605, Mershon National Security Program Research Paper (Iune 1960). 25. Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, Fall-Safe (London: Hutehinson, 1963); Sidney Hook, The Fall-Safe Fallacy(New York, Stein & Day, 1963). 26. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). 27. Aaron Wildavsky, 'Practical consequences of the theoretical study of defence policy', Publie Administration Review, xxv (March 1965). Reprinted in The RevoltAgainst the Masses (New York: Basic Books, 1971). 28. Robert Iervis, 'Hypotheses on misperception', World Polities, xx (April 1968), p.455. 29. On the British campaign see Christopher Driver, The Disarmers (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964). 30. Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Raee (London: lohn Calder, 1958). 31. Leo Szilard, 'Disarrnarnent and the problem of peace', Bulletin ot the Atomie Scientists, XI:8 (October 1955), p. 298. 32. One notable attempt to integrate the insights of the formal strategists with those of the nuclear pacifists was .l- David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Controland Disarmament, op. cit. 33. Leo Szilard, 'How to live with the bomb and survive', Bulletin ofthe Atomie Scientists, xVI:2 (February 1960), p. 59. 34. Green, op. cit., p. xii.
14 Bargaining and Escalation
1. Thorton Read, in Knorr and Read (eds.), Limited Strategie War (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 93. 2. Herman Kahn, On Esealation: Metaphots and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 138. 3. In Kaufmann (ed.), Military Poliey and National Security, p. 122. The basic ideas can be found in Clausewitz. 4. There is no reference to escalation in the index of Strategy of Conflict; only two in Arms and lnfluence. 5. Kahn, On Esealation; Bernard Brodie, Esealation and the NucIear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 6. Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuc/earAge, p. 3. 484 Notes
7. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 19, 32, 34. 8. Kaplan, in Knorr and Read, op. cit., p. 146. 9. Schellings Strategy ofCorftict, pp. 57, 77. Whether or not Game Theory, with its formalized conflicts, could cope with the introduction of such unfath• omable phenomena as the culturallandmarks on mental maps is beyond the scope of this study. 10. Schelling, Arms and Infiuence, p. 137. 11. Ibid.,p.I92. 12. Leo Szilard, 'Disarmament and the problem of peace', p. 299. 13. Morton Kaplan, 'The calculus of nuclear deterrence', pp. 40-3. 14. Morton Kaplan, The Strategy of Limited Retaliation, Policy Memorandum No. 19, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 9 April 1959. 15. Knorr, in Knorr and Read, op. cit., p. 3. 16. Kaplan, in lbid., pp. 145-6. See also Read's essay. 17. Read, in ibid., p. 89. 18. Khan in ibid., pp. 44-5. 19. Schelling, in ibid., p. 254. 20. Kahn had first raised the concept in On Thermonuclear War, and then dis• cussed it further in Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962) where he introduced an escalation ladder of 16 rungs. 21. Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 186, 190, 221. He noted that Canadians and Europeans had yet to reach this higher level of consciousness; rnainly, he suspected because of an absence of serious discussion. 22. Ibid., pp. 217-20. He admits that 'in most of this book, I have committed the besetting sin of most US analysts and have attributed to the Soviets a kind of behaviour that may in fact be appropriate to US analysts - and not at all rel• evant to Soviet conditions and attitudes'. 23. Ibid., p. 137. 24. Ibid., p. 290. 25. Ibid., p. 290. 26. Strategy ot Confiict, p. 188 (emphasis in the original). 27. See Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defence: 'it cannot be too often repeated that the Soviets can never be sure of the degree of rationality in their victim' (p. 164). For a discussion of this point see Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1977), Chap. Five. 28. Arms and lnfluence, p. 93. 29. Strategy ot Conflict, p. 193. 30. Ibid., pp. 200, 193. 31. Arms and Intluence, p. 182. 32. Strategy ofConflict, p. 194. 33. Ibid., pp. 193, 196. 34. Arms and lnfiuence, p. 194. 35. One is reminded of Assistant Secretary of Defense lohn McNaughton's 1965 memorandum to Robert McNamara on US aims in Vietnam: 70 per cent - To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). 20 per cent - To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands. 10 per cent - To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life. Cited in Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantarn Books, 1971), p. 432. Notes 485
1S City-Avoidance
1. Henry Kissinger could still write in 1960, in a book published in 1961, that 'there is no dispute about the missile gap as such. It is generally admitted that from 1961 until at least the end of 1964 the Soviet Union will possess more missiles than the United States.' Necessity [orChoice, p. 15. 2. Roswell L. Gilpatric, 'Address before the Business Council, Hot Springs, Virginia, 10 October 1961'. Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1961 (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962), pp. 542-50. 3. William M. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 49. 4. john, F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper & Row 1960), pp. 37-8. 5. The best account of the development of strategic doctrine under the Kennedy Administration is contained in Desmond Ball, Policies and Force Levels: The Strategie Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). An enthusiastic account of the first few years is found in Kaufmann's The McNamara Strategy. This probably contains a few recycled words, as Kaufmann quotes liberally frorn McNamara's speeches and staternents, a number of wh ich were drafted by Kaufmann. Two of McNamara's former aides, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, have provided in How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) a thorough description of the McNamara approach in action, with some lucid explanations of most of the important themes of the period. The views of McNamara in the later 1960s are found in a collection of his speeches: Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Refleetions in Office(London: Hodder & Stoughton Ud, 1968). 6. To House Armed Services Committee in February 1961. Quoted in Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 53. 7. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 88. 8. See Ball, Policies and Force Levels. 9. Robert S. McNamara, 'Defense arrangements of the North Atlantic commu- nity'. DepartmentofState Bulletin, 47 (9 Iuly 1962), pp. 67-8. 10. Kaufmann, op. eit., p. 75. 11. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 174-5. 12. Schelling, Arms and Intluence, p. 25. See also Thomas Schelling, Controlled Response and Strategie Warfare (London: llSS,Iune 1965). 13. Morton Halperin, 'The "no cities" doctrine', New Republic (8 October 1962). This was one of four articles in New Repubiic which discussed the new strat• egy. The others were an editorial on 'McNamara's strategy' (2 Iuly 1962); Michael Browner, 'Controlled thermonudear war' (30 Iuly 1962); and Robert Osgood, 'Nuclear arms: uses and limits' (10 September 1962). 14. The Times (London), 4 Iuly 1962. The comparable figures for Western Europe were 115 million with Soviet counter-city targeting and 15 million with counter-force targeting. 15. See Halperin, 'The "no eitles" doctrine', p. 19. 16. Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, Statement on the defense budget for fiscal years 1964-1968, DefenseProgram and 1964 Defense Budget (27 january 1963), p. 41. 486 Notes
17. Marshai V. D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy (2nd edn), p. 88. 18. Cited in Browner, op. cit., p. 12. 19. Testimony of Secretary McNamara, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture (1963), p. 332. 20. US Air Force, This is Countcrtorce, dated 7 February 1963 (fram IlSS files). By the time this document was prepared the doctrine was at its most refined. 21. Ball, op. cit., p. 290. 22. Claude Witze, 'Farewell to counterforce', Air Force Magazine (February 1963). Compare this to the appraving tones of Iohn Loosbrack in 'Counterforce and Mr. McNamara' in the same magazine in September 1962. 23. See George Quester, Nuciear Diplomacy, p. 246. 24. Arthur Schlesinger, j r., A Thousand Days: lohn F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769.
16 Assured Destruction
1. Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough] p. 174. 2. lbid., pp. 177-8. See also Freedman, US lniclligence and the Soviet Strategie Threat, pp. 84-6. 3. Fred IKle reports that in order to caiculate the number of the enemy popula• tion that would be killed, a method known by the distasteful term 'cookie cutter' was used, in which nuclear weapons are assumed to 'take out' people in a neat circle, like a piece of dough, so that all are killed or injured within this circumference and none outside. Fred Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Centurv] (Santa Monica, Calif.: Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, january 1973) pp. 13, 34. 4. Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 207-8. 5. Oonald Brennan was most responsible for drawing attention to the acranym. Oonald Brennan, 'Symposium on the SALT agreements', Survival, September/October 1972. 6. Warner Schilling has demonstrated how one can play with acronyms to make any point you care to make, e.g.: Capability of Firing First If Necessary = COFFIN. Warner Schilling et al., American Arms and a Cilanging Eutope (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 44. 7. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 301. 8. james Trainor, '000 says AICBM is feasible' Missiles and Rackets, 24 Oecember 1962. 9. Address at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 19 Oecember 1962. This speech is quoted at length in Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 138-47. 10. Stewart Alsop, 'Our new strategy: the alternatives to total war', The Saturday Evening Post 1 December 1962. 11. john Kennedy, as a Senator, contributed to the belief in the strategic value of space by writing: 'Control of space will be decided in the next decade. If the Soviets contral space, they can contral earth.' This was cited by General Power to justify a call to 'surpass them [the Soviets] in every phase of the space effort so as to prevent them from gaining contral of space, denying us the space medium, and using space for aggressive purposes', Power, Design [or Survival, p. 239. One example of the 'space war' iiterature of the time is M. N. Golovine, Conttict in Space: A Pattern of War in a New Dimension. Notes 487
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1962). He argued that earth might be spared if the super-powers could be persuaded to decide their conflicts in space. 12. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 57-8. 13. Henry Rowen, 'Formulating strategic doctrine', Appendices to the Report otthe Commtssion on the Organization o(Government (or the Conduct o(Foreign Policy, Val. IV, Appendix K (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), p. 227. 14. See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 15. Herbert York and Ierome Wiesner, 'National security and the nuclear test ban', Scientific American (October 1964). This article became caught up in a general debate over whether military technology had now reached a plateau or whether there were to be more quantum jumps, and from that whether or not enough money was being spent in the Department of Defense on new projects. For a denunciation of the York/Wiesner thesis as it affected the welfare of the defence industry see Hanson Baldwin, 'Slow-down in the Pentagon'. Foreign Affairs (January 1965). 16. See Edward Randolph Iayne, The ABM Debate; Strategie De(ense and National Security (MIT Center for International Studies, june 1969), Morton Halperin, 'The decision to deploy the ABM', World Politics, xxv (October 1972) and Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategie Threat, Chapter 7. 17. Secretary of State, Robert S. McNamara, 'The dynamics of nuclear strategy', Department o(State Bulletin, LVII (9 October 1967). Morton Halperin was the actual author of the speech.
17 The Soviet Approach to Deterrence
1. Roman KoIkowicz et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Super-power Dilemma (Baltimore, Md.: Iohns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 34-7. 2. Interview with Robert McNamara, 15 February 1966, in Documents on Disarmament 1967 (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967). 3. Richard Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union thinks it could fight and win a nuclear war', Commentary, 64 (1) (July 1977). 4. This indictment is forcefully set out in Chapter 3 of Colin Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race (Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 1976). Its significance for the strategic debate of the 1970s is discussed below, pp. 364-7. 5. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategie Policy (Santa Monica, CaIif.: RAND Corporation, 1976), p. 14. 6. R. S. McNamara, The Essence otSecurity, pp. 159-60. 7. Nikita Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers, vol. 2, The Last Testament (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 48-50. Khruschev also describes how, drawing on the physics he had learnt as a youth, he explained to M. K. Yangel, the head of the Soviet rocketry programme, the rockets might be kept at constant readiness. He iIIustrated his point using two glasses on the coffee table in front of hirn. 8. Edward L. Warner, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Polnies (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 99-100. 488 Notes
9. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-70 (Baitimore: johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 134. 10. Warner, op. cit., pp. 139-40. 11. A. W. Tupolev, the leading designer of Soviet aircraft, presented the case for the manned bomber in terms that would have been appreciated by SAC: A rocket-carrying aircraft can be considered the first state of a multistage system which has important advantages over multistage missiles. It does not require permanent launch sites or complex and expensive launch equip• ment. The first stage, the piloted aircraft, is used repeatedly. When necessary, the aircraft can be redirected after a command declsion. lf the target is relo• cated, the aircraft crew can make adecision in order to successfully execute the combat mission. Only rocket-carrying aircraft possess these qualities. A. W. Tupolev, 'Missile-carrying aircraft', Aviation and Cosmonauties (Iune 1962). Quoted in Warner, op. cit., p. 146. 12. The book went through three editions - 1962, 1963, and 1968. A translation of the first edition was published with an introduetion by Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and Thomas Wolfe of RAND as Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentics-Hall, 1963). The third edition, with full details of all amendments from previous editions was published under the same title with an introduction by the editor, Harriet Fast Scott (London: Macdonald &jane's, 1975). 13. Horeliek and Rush, Strategie Power and SovietForeign Policy, p. 88. 14. This Idea was given credence following an interview given by Khruschev to C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times in September 1961. Sulzberger reported: Khruschev believes absolutely that when it comes to a showdown, Britain, Franee and Italy would refuse to join the United States in a war over Berlin for fear of their absolute destruction. Quite blandly he asserts that these eountries are, figuratively speaking, hostages to the USSR and a guarantee against war. Quoted in Horeliek and Rush, op. cit., p. 94. 15. In October 1961 Marshall Malinovsky chided the Americans for under• estimating the damage the USSR could inflict upon thern, asserting that ca1• culations had been made with 'only' a 5 megaton warhead. He continued: 'we have nuclear changes equivalent to several tens of thousands and up to 100 million tons of TNT,and our ballistic rockets have proved to be so splen• did no one ean doubt their ability to lift and deliver sueh charges to any point on earth' (quoted in lbid., p. 98). In the event the largest yield ever employed on a Soviet ICBM warhead was 25 megatons. 16. Military Strategy (first edition), pp. 91, 308, 314, 399-400. 17. Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff. 'Mutual deterrence and strategie arms limitation in Soviet policy', International Security, III: 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 129-30. Garthoff provides a number of similar quotes. 18. Warner, op. cit., p. 81. One can note here the similarity with American views of the Soviet Union wh ich divide the ruling group into 'modernist' or 'orthodox' factions, the former being the most realistic and moderate. See for example Lawrence Caldwell, SovietAttitudes to SALT(London: !ISS, 1972). Notes 489
Of course, at moments when defence issues have become highly politicized, in either country, it may weil be legitimate to describe debate in such polar• ized terms (as with 'hawks' and 'doves' in the US over the Vietnam War). At times when the argument is less heated, a less rigid, pluralistic system can be assumed to operate. 19. Warner, op. cit., pp. 77-9, 181-2. 20. Ibid., pp. 88-9; Garthoff. op. cit., pp. 115-22. 21. Leon Goure, Foy Kohler, and Mose Harvey, The Role or Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miarni, Florida: Center for Advanced Studies, University of Miarni, 1974). Fritz Ermarth has referred to two very unpleas• ant features in Soviet military doctrine: 'a strong tendency to pre-empt and adetermination to suppress the enemy's command and control systems at all costs'. 'Contrasts in American and Soviet strategie thought', International Security, 111: 2 (Autumn 1978), p. 152. 22. Dennis Ross, 'Rethinking Soviet strategie policy: inputs and implications', The Journal or Strategie Studies, 1:2 (May 1975), pp. 3-30, argues that the Soviet Union has opted for deterrence through denial (convincing an enemy that an attack will be unsuccessful) rather than punishment. 23. Goure et al., op.cit., pp. 35-6. 24. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 126. 25. Quoted by Goure et al., op. cit., pp. 119-20. 26. Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy(University of Miami Press, 1976) takes this more seriously. For a critique, Fred M. Kaplan, 'Soviet civil defense: some myths in the Western debate', Survival, xxx:3 (May/Iune 1978). Also see introductory note by Maleolm Mackintosh. 27. Warner, op. cit., p. 152. 28. Garthoff op. cit., p. 137.
18 The Chinese Connection
1. Sensitive observers had become aware of the strains much earlier. For exam ple, Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Contlict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 2. Quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the NuclearAge (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 132. 3. Ralph Powell, 'Maoist military doctrine', Asian Survey(April 1968). 4. Lin Piao, 'Long live the People's War', quoted in Raymond Garthoff 'Politico-military issues in the Sino-Soviet debate, 1963-65', in Raymond Garthoff (ed.), Sino-SovietMilitary Relations(New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 178. 5. Ralph Powell, 'Great powers and atomic bombs are "paper tigers'", China Quarterly, No. 23 (luly/September 1965). 6. Quotes from Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decisionto Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 142, 198. A 'resist America' drive began in late October 1950, which attempted to reassure the audience both about the improbability of employment of atomic bombs and their effects should they be used. 7. Quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, 'The Sino-Soviet nuc!ear dialogue 1963', in Garthoff (ed.), op. cit., pp. 156-7. 490 Notes
8. john Thornas, 'The limits of alliance: the Quemoy crisis of 1958', in Garthoff (ed.), op. cit., pp. 114-49. 9. The paralleis between Chinese and French rationale have been pointed out by B. W. Augenstein, 'The Chinese and French programs for the develop• ment of national nudear force', Orbis (Autumn 1967). 10. Hsieh, 'The Sino-Soviet nuclear dialogue', in Garthoff (ed.), op. cit., pp. 160, 161. 11. I. Yerrnashev, 'The Peking version of "total strategy"', reprinted in ibid., pp. 239-52. 12. Khrusehev Remembers, vol. 1 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), pp. 467-70. In 1962, by which time relations had become even Iess cordial, Khruschev discovered to his fury that the military had been reprinting Mao's works on warfare. This he considered 'absurd': 'The Soviet Army crushed the crack forces of the German army, while Mao Tse-tung's men have spent between twenty and twenty-five years poking each other in the backsides with knives and bayonets' (p. 471). One of the few significant changes between the first (1962) and second (1963) edition of Marshall Sokolovsky's major work on Military Strategy was that all positive references to the Chinese were expunged. 13. An editorial in an army paper of February 1966 explained: We acknowledge the tremendous role played by modern weapons and equlprnent, yet ultimately they cannot solve problems. In solving problems ultimately, we must still rely on man, on rifles, on hand grenades, on bayonets, on close range fighting, on night-fighting, and on close quarter fighting.... Modern, long-range weapons, the atom bomb induded, are useless for close-range fighting or night-fighting. Quoted in Jonathan D. Pollack 'Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons, 1964-9', China Quarterly, No. 50 (1972), p. 269; Jonathan D. Pollack, 'The logic of Chinese military strategic', Bulletin o( the Atomie Scientists (January 1979).
19 A Conventional Defence for Europe
1. Communique, Ministerial Meeting o( North Atlantic Councll, 14 December 1967. 2. Quoted in Wilfred Kohl, Freneh Nuclear Diplomaey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 227. 3. Henry Klssinger, Neeessity[or Choice. 4. For a discussion of the debate see Halperin, Limited War in the NuclearAge. 5. Helmut Schmidt, Defence or Retaliation (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 211. 6. A pessimism on Soviet offensive strength led Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor to rule out a full conventional defence in Arms and Stability in Europe (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963). 7. Deterrentor Defense, pp. 89-96, 165-73. Discussion of these ideas can also be found in F. O. Miksche, The Failure o( Atomie Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1958) and in Maleolm Hoag, 'Rationalizing NATO strategy', World Politics, XVII: 1 (October 1964). Notes 491
8. Sehelling, Strategy ot Contiict, p. 190. Charaeteristieally, Sehelling saw Iimited war in terms of the imposition of hurt rat her than the denial of gain. 9. Henry Kissinger, Neeessity [orChoice, p. 62. 10. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uneertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p.153. 11. john Foster Dulles, 'Challenge and response in US poliey', op. cit. 12. NATO Letter, v:12 (Deeember 1957). 13. Defenee; Outline ofFuture Policy, Cmnd 124 (London, HMSO, April 1957). 14. Alastair Buehan suggested: 'In praetieal terrns, the British reaetion to new Ameriean poliey may be somewhat negative. But in Franee and Germany, it is almost hostile.' NATO in the 1960s (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963). This is an exeellent guide through the issues of the period. 15. Kaufmann, The MeNamara Strategy, p. 104. It should be remembered that eoineident with this debate was the first Freneh veto on Britain's applieation to join the Common Market. 16. Report on Defence, Britain's Contribution to Peaee and Security. Cmnd 363 (London: HMSO, 1958), para 12. 17. In late 1945, when eonsidering a proposal prepared by some offieials for nations owning atomie bombs to all agree to use them against any eountry whieh initiated use, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee eommented: 'What British Government in view of the vulnerability of London would dare aeeept the obligation of entering on atomie warfare against an aggressor who might be able, before going down, to destroy London?' Quoted in Gowing, Independenee and Deterrence, vol. 1, p. 71. 18. See jarnes L. Riehardson, Germany and the Atlantie Alliance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), Chapter 4. 19. See, for exarnple, Power and Diplomacy by Dean Acheson, Truman's Seeretary of State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). Aeheson beeame one of the most determined advoeates of greater eonventional forees during the Kennedy Administration, seeing in these forees the key to greater diplomatie strength in eonfrontations with the Soviet Union. 20. Kaufmann, The MeNamara Strategy, p. 106. 21. Citations are from ibid., pp. 112, 113. 22. All quotations are taken from Chapter 4 of Enthoven and Smith, How Mueh is Enough? 23. Bernard Brodle, 'What priee eonventional eapabilities in Europe', The Reporter (23 May 1963) and Escalation and the Nuclear Option. A sharp review by Brodie of Kaufmann's book appeared as 'The MeNamara phenomenori', World Politics, xVlI:4 (July 1965). 24. The quotations are all taken from Brodle, Esealation and the Nuclear Option, Chapter X. Aron's views are found in his The Great Debate (New York, Doubleday 1965), pp. 152-4. 25. Pierre M. Gallois, 'US strategy and the defense of Europe', Orbis, vn.Z (Summer 1963).
20 The European Nuclear Option (i)
1. See, for example, National Planning Association, The 'Ntn Couniry' Problem and Arms Control (New York: NPA, 1959). A correetive to some of the pessimism 492 Notes
on the subject is found in Fred Ikle, 'Nth countries and disarmament', Bulletin ofthe Atomie Scientists, XVI: 10 (December 1960). A useful compilation of articles is R. N. Rosencrance (ed.) The Dispersion of Nuc/ear weapons (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964). 2. 'In a nuclear world, the "small" nuclear powers, vis-a-vls one another, would have: greater opportunities for blackmail and mischief-making; greater like• lihood of an accidental triggering of weapons; an increased possibility of a "local" Munich, a Pearl Harbor, and blitzkriegs; pressures to pre-emption because of the preceding three items; a tendency to neglect conventional capabilities because of an over-reliance on nuclear capabilities; internat (civiI war, a coup d'etat, irresponsibility, etc.) and external (the arms race, fear of fear, etc.) political problems.' Herman Kahn, 'The arms race and some of its hazards', in Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, p.119. 3. The most extreme version of this notion was developed by Arthur Lee Bums, in which a minor nuclear power would devise a means to make one super• power believe it had been attacked by the other, so causing a nuclear war. The Rationale of Catalytie War (Princeton University Center of International Studies, April 1959). 4. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country', Foreign Affairs, XXXIX: 3 (April 1961). 5. Thomas Schelling, 'Nuclears, NATO and the "New Strategy"', in Henry Kissinger (ed.), Problems ofNational Strategy(New York:Praeger, 1965), p. 179. Schelling regretted (with hindsight) that McNamara's new strategy was used as an 'argument against independent nuclear deterrents. The new strat• egy was new enough, at least in public discussion, to need a sympathetic audience.' 6. Maleolm Hoag, 'Nuclear strategic options and European force participation' in R. N. Rosencrance (ed.), op. cit., p. 227. 7. Kaufmann, The MeNamara Strategy, p. 116. 8. Enthoven and Srnith, How Mueh is Enough?, p. 131. 9. Cited in Kaufmann, The MeNamara Strategy, pp. 116-17. 10. Once could also add the unwillingness of the British government to release information on strategic matters, and the more rigid demarcation line between government and Academia. It is less easy to move in and out of government in Britain than in America. 11. Seep.I77. 12. D. G. Brennan, 'Review of "Strategy and Conscience''', op. cit., p. 28. 13. john Garnett, 'British strategie thought', in john Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policyin aChanging World (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 163. 14. Hedley Bull, 'International theory: the case for a classical approach', World Polities (April 1966). The key articles in the resultant debate are collected in Klaus Knorr and james Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaehes to International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 15. Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds.), Limited Strategie War, pp. v-vi. The quote was taken from 'On thermonuclear coexistence', Survey, No. 39 (December 1961). 16. Laurence Martin saw 'the heavy reliance of British politicians upon American authors for their arguments' as a symptom of the lack of interest in national security policy amongst academics. He wondered whether Labour Notes 493
Party leaders, such as Denis Healey, had not overdone this reliance 'arid acquired opinions - favourable observers would say sophistication • wh ich partly accounts for their losing touch with the sentiments of many of their followers'. 'The market for strategie ideas in Britain', Ameriean Politieal Seienee Review, LVI:1 (March 1962), pp. 40-1. 17. lohn Groom's British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974) has virtually nothing on the period after the early 1960s. 18. One attempt to do so is a sharp little book by Emanuel ]. de Kadt, British Defence Poliey and Nuclear War (London: Frank Cass, 1964). He spoke of Britain's '[non-independent] contribution to the total Western nuclear force', as being 'insubstantial and, moreover, unwanted', p. 130. 19. Stephen King-Hall, Power Polities in the Nuclear Age: A Poliey [or Britain (London: Gollancz Ud, 1962), p. 171 (emphasis in original). 20. lohn Strachey, On the Prevention ofWar (London: Macmillan, 1962). 21. The problems of miscommunication in this affair are examined in Richard Neustadt, Alliance Polities(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). 22. Television interview of February 1958. Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Polities: The British Experienee with an Independent Strategie Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 178. 23. Ibid. 24. Statement on Defence 1964, Cmnd 2270 (London: HMSO, 1964), p. 6. 25. Lawrence Freedrnan, Britain and Nuclear weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980).
21 The European Nuclear Option (ii)
1. Speech of November 1961 quoted in Wilfred Kohl, Freneh NuclearDipiomacy, p.129. 2. Pierre Gallois, 'The policy and strategy of air-nuclear weapons', Bulletin ofthe Atomie Scientists, xn.e (Iune 1956). 3. Strategie de l'age Nucleaire (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1960). The English edition appeared as The Balance of Terror: Strategy [or the Nuclear Age, translated by Richard Howard (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1961). 4. lbid., (English edn.), p. 93. 5. He was correct in his suspicions. Schelling commented on some of Gallois's views on the efficacy of 'irrational outbursts' in shoring up deterrence: '[Tlhe American Government ought to be mature enough and rich enough to arrange a persuasive sequence of threatened responses that are not wholly a matter of guessing a President's temper.' 'Nuclears, NATO and the new strategy', in Kissinger (ed.), op. cit., p. 185. 6. Gallois, BalanceofTerrot, p. 22. 7. Gallois, US strategy and the defence of Europe', Orbis, vn.z (Summer 1963). 8. Quotations are from Andre Beaufre, Deterrenee and Strategy (London: Faber & Faber, 1965). This was originally published as Dissuasion et Strategie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964). (Emphasis in original.) 9. Andre Beaufre, 'The sharing of nuclear responsibilities: a problem in need of solution', International Affairs, xxxr.J (July 1965), p. 416. (Emphasis in original.) 494 Notes
10. Aron, The GreatDebate, p. 142. 11. For example, Enthoven and Smith thought it involved: a curious piece of logic: the Americans can't be trusted to retaliate against the Soviets for attacking France (or Great Britain); therefore, we will have our own independent nuclear force to cause the Americans to retaliate against the Soviet Union for a French (or British) attack on the Soviet Union. How Mueh is Enough?, p. 131 12. Snyder, Deterrence and Detense, pp. 162-4. 13. Cited in Kohl, French NuclearDipiomacy, p. 150. 14. Quoted in ibid., p. 129 (Press Conference, 10 November 1959). 15. General 0'Armee Ailleret, 'Directed defence', Survival (February 1968), pp. 38-43. Translated from 'Defense "dirigee" ou defense "tous azimuts"', Revuede Defense Nationale (December 1967). 16. General Guy Mery, 'French defence pollcy', Survival (September/October 1976). President Giscard d'Estaing gave explicit support to these ideas. 17. Prime Minister Raymond Barre, 'Speech on defence policy', Survival (September/October 1977). 18. Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Germanv and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 165,282. 19. Quoted in ibid., p. 160. 20. For arguments in favour of the MLF, see Robert Bowle, 'Strategy and the Atlantic alliance' International Otganization, xVII:3 (Summer 1963). 21. Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: A Historieal Perspective (London: !ISS, 1964). 22. A. Wohlstetter, 'Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country', 23. Gallois, 'US strategy and the defense of Europe', Orbis, vII:2 (Summer 1963). 24. Beaufre, 'The sharing of nuclear responsibilities', op. eit. 25. NATO in the 1960s (2nd edn.), p. 92. 26. Buchan, The Multilateral Force. 27. Seep.386. 28. North Atlantic Council, Deciaration on Alliance Relations (Ottawa: 19 june 1974).
22 Military-Industrial Complexities
1. McNamara, The Dynamies ofNuclearStrategy. See pp. 254-6. 2. He retired as Secretary of Defense in February 1968, to be replaced by Clark Clifford. 3. Richard L. Garwin and Hans Bethe, 'Anti-ballistic missile systems', Seientific American (March 1968). Reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 164. 4. Abram Chayes, jerorne Wiesner, George Rathjens, and Steven Weinberg, 'An overview', in Abram Chayes and Ierorne Wiesner (ed.), ABM: An Evaluation ofthe Deeision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 58-9. This was the key anti-ABM document. 5. 'It is my contention that with minor exceptions, the United States has led in the development of military technology and weapons production through• out the Cold War. ... This ... has placed the United States in a position of Notes 495
being fundamentally responsible for every major escalation of the arms race.' Edgar Bottome, The Balance o( Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. XV-XVI. 6. George Rathjens, 'The dynamics of the arms race', Scientific American (April 1969). Reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 187. 7. Quoted in Nancy Lipton and Leonard Rodberg, "The missile race: the contest with ourselves', in Leonard Rodberg and Derek Shearer, The Pentagon Watchers (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), p. 303. 8. Herbert York, 'Military technology and national security', in Scientific American (August 1969) reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 198. York developed his views in Race to Oblivion. 9. F. A. Long, 'Arms control from the perspective of the nineteen-seventies'; Harvey Brooks, 'The military innovation system and the qualitative arms race'; lohn Steinbruner and Barry Carter, 'Organizational and political dimensions of the strategic posture: the problems of reforrn', in Daedalus, clv:3 (Summer 1975). 10. Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, 'Exploring the determinants of military weapons', in ibid. The force of this point was diminished by the acknowledgment of boundaries, within wh ich the level of forces, defence budgets, and specific weapons must fall, determined by some 'minimum set of widely shared values (e.g. a secure second-strike capability)'. The quality of the analysis suffered by failing to ask where these 'values' came from, but the interest lay in the fact that the essen ce of an assured destruction capability could be taken so easily for granted, beyond internal debate, apart of the general consensus. 11. See note 4. 12. Some of the better works of this genre are: Ralph Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Richard Kaufman, The War Profiteers (New York: Doubleday, 1972). To gain the flavour of the 1969 fervour on this matter and the general strategic views of the critics, see the report of a conference organised by The Progressive magazine involving Congressmen and a sundry collection of critics. Published as Erwin Knoll and ]udith Nies McFadden (eds.), American Militarism 1970 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969). 13. For example, Sam Sarkesian (ed.), The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications: 1972). 14. The best of the studies in Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1975). 15. The inevitable tendency to concentrate research on weapons proposals that did actually come to fruition, rather than those that fell by the wayside, helped to confirm this Law. 16. ]erome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, p. 330. 17. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), pp. 202-3. 18. Quoted in Desmond Ball, Dejä Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration (California: Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974), p. 8. 496 Notes
19. Richard M. Nixon, United States Foreign Poliey [or the 19705: Building the Peaee (25 February 1971), pp. 53-4. 20. Quoted in Ball, Deia Vu, p. 8. The criteria involved a second-strike capability; denying the Soviet Union any incentives to attempt a first strike; a capacity 'to cause considerably greater destruction than the United States could inflict in any type of nuclear exchange'; and a measure of damage limitation against small attacks or accidental launches. 21. Melvin Laird, A Hause Divided: America's Security Gap (New York: Henry Regnery, 1962). When questioned about this book when he was appointed Secretary of Oefense he said it had been written at a time of confrantation that had now passed. 22. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US-USSR Strategie Policies (Washington, OC: USGPO, March 1974), p. 25. He also suggested that in his position statement there had been a switch away 'from what I will call the canonical logic of the triad'. There is little substantive evidence of this switch.
23 The Consensus Undermined
1. An important source on the programmes of both sides is john M. Collins, Ameriean and Soviet Military Trends sinee the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, OC: The Center for Strategie and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978). 2. Proponents of explanations of the arms race in this way often acknowledged, to quote George Rathjens, that it would be 'an obvious oversimplification' to use the action-reaction hypothesis to 'explain alI the major decisions of the super-powers'. Unfortunately in the polemies of defence debate the qualifi• cations tend to get lost, rendering the argument unduly dogmatic. "The dynami es of the arms race', Scientitic Ameriean (April 1969). 3. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Is there a strategie arms race?'; 'Rivals but no "race" '; 'Optimal ways to confuse ourselves', Foreign Policy, xv (Summer 1974); XVI (Autumn 1974); xx (Autumn 1975). 4. Foteign Policy, xv (Summer 1974), p. 8. 5. Foreign Policy, XVI (Autumn 1974), p. 79. 6. Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-Ametican Arms Race, p. 182. 7. Foreign Policy, XX: 198. 8. There were exceptions. Norman Moss recounts the story of a SAC General being given a briefing on counter-force strategies in the 1950s. The briefing drew on Game Theory and had matrices indicating the alternative payoffs. The General needed to look at only one square to know he was against the strategy, the square that showed the number of Soviet casualties. He com• mented: 'Counter-force means less Russians dead. So I'm against it.' Norman Moss, Men Who Play God: The Story ot the Hydrogen Bomb (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 260. 9. Kahan, A Strategie Poliey [or the 19705, pp. 336-7. 10. Donald Brennan, 'The case for population defense.' in Iohan Holst and William Schneider (eds.), Why ABM? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969). Notes 497
11. lbid., p. 109. Brennan hirnself was arecent convert to this view. 12. 'Can nuclear deterrence last out the century', Foreign Affairs, LI:2 (Ianuary 1973). This was also published under the same title at the same time in an extended version, including an interesting collection of footnotes, by the Califomian Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar. It is from this latter version that the quotations are taken. 13. On this see Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counter-Conventional Strategie Problem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1971). 14. Ikle, op. cit., p. 15. It is not clear whether Ikle believed this could be done wholly with 'smart' conventional weapons. A similar approach can be found on Arthur Lee Bums, Ethies and Deterrenee: A Nuc/earBalanceWithout Hostage Cities? (London: IISS, 1970). See Chapter 5. 15. Herbert York, 'Reducing the overkill', Survival, xVI:2 (March/April 1974). 16. Wolfgang Panofsky, 'The mutual-hostage relationship between America and Russia', Foreign Affairs, LII:l (October 1973). 17. Foreign Policy, XVI: 71-9. 18. CEP is defined as the radius of a circle centred on the target within which 50 per cent of the re-entry vehicles would impact if the tests were repeated many times. 19. See D. G. Hoag, 'Ballistic-missile guidance', in B. T. Feld eta/. (eds.), Impact of New Teehnologies on the Arms Raee(Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971): Hoag estimated that 'an overall ICBM CEP of 30 meters may be expected with rea• sonable and practical application of science and technology to the task', and that 'there was no theoretical justification to feel that individual MIRV war• heads will not have a CEP essentially the same as that of a single-warhead missile using the same technology' (pp. 81, 90). In a paper written in 1967 on 'Strength, interest and new technologies', Albert Wohlstetter singled out as particularly significant 'the multiplication of armed offensive re-entry vehicles carried in a single launch vehicle (MIRVs) and the great improve• ments on offence accuracy and reliability'. In IISS The Implieations o(Military Teehnologies in the 1970s (London: IISS, 1968). 20. See Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV. 21. See p. 377. 22. The main consequences of mobility were feit in arms contro!. One of the valuable features of strategic weapons had been that they could be placed in clear categories and readily counted. Reconnaissance satellites meant that military bases could be located with precision, so aiding counter-force tar• geting, and their contents identified, so aiding the verification of arms con• trol agreements. 23. Bemard Brodle, 'On the objectives of arms control', International Security, 1:1 (Summer 1976), pp. 17-36. 24. To make way for the extra SLBMs, the Soviet Union had to dismantle 209 old ICBMs. On SALT I see lohn Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story o( SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973); Mason Willrich and lohn B. Rhinelander, SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974). 25. US Pub/icLaw, 92-448. 26. On the developing problems of SALT, see Christoph Bertram (ed.), Beyond SALT II (London: IISS, 1978). 498 Notes
24 Parity
1. Secretary of Defense ]ames Schlesinger, Annual Defense Report FY 1976 (5 February 1975), pp. 11-3-11-4. 2. lbid., pp. 1-13, 1-14. 3. Enthoven and Smith, How Mueh is Enough", p. 184. This did not stop McNamara shifting the indicator for measuring military strength from nurn• bers of delivery vehicles, where the Soviet Union was catching up, to num• bers of warheads, where the US was about to move ahead. 4. Laurence Martin, 'The utility of military force', in Francois Duchene (ed.), Force in Modem Societies: lts Place in International Politics (London: IISS, 1973), p. 16. For an early discussion of the issue, see Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of MilitaryPower in the Nuc/earAge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 5. ]. I. Coffey, Strategie Power and National Security (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). 6. McGeorge Bundy, '1'0 cap the volcano', Foreign Affairs, XLvIII:1 (October 1969), pp. 9-10. (Emphasis in original.) 7. See Walter Slocombe, The Political lmplications of Strategie Parity (London: IISS, 1971), Appendix 11; Benjamin Larnbeth, 'Deterrence in the MIRV era', World Politics (Ianuary 1972), pp. 230-3. 8. The most important book, blending theory with research, was Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 9. George and Smoke, op. cit., pp. 560-1. For similar observations see Patrick Morgan, Deterrenee: A Conceptual Analysis, Chapter 6; Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrenee (London: IISS, 1968), p. 19. The 'third wave' of deter• rence theory is discussed by Robert ]ervis in 'Deterrence theory revisited', World Politics, xxxi.z (lanuary 1979), pp. 289-324. 10. Slocornbe, op. cit., p. 25. Lambeth argued, after a review of various crises, that: 'The lesson of the examples thus seems to be that the overall nature of the objective rather than strategic "supcriorlty" ultimately determines which protagonist will prevail in a cnsis', op. cit., p. 233. 11. Edward N. Luttwak, 'The missing dimension of US defense policy: force, per• ceptions and power', in Donald C. DanieI (ed.), InternationalPerceptions ofthe Superpower Military Balance (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 21-3. 12. Henry Kissinger, Press Conference of 3 ]uly 1974, reprinted in Survival, xVI:5 (September/October 1974). 13. Reprinted in York, Arms Control, p. 276. 14. In Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategie Arms Limitation Talks (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1972), pp. 394-5. 15. See p. 347. 16. The dominant view in the intelligence community in 1969 had been that: 'We believe that the Soviets recognize the enormous difficulties of any attempt to achieve strategic superiority of such order as to significantly alter the strategie balance.' Seven years later, after an exercise in wh ich a team of notable outside hawks had been allowed to challenge the 'home' team of intelligence estimators frorn within in the drawing-up of National Intelligence Estimates, this question was left much more open. See Freedman, US Intelligence and the SovietStrategie Threat, pp. 133, 194-8. The next year the NIE reverted to the earlier view. Notes 499
17. Gray, The Soviet-Ameriean Arms Race,p. 181. For a similar point of view from a conservative source see Leon Goure, Foy Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role o{ Nuc/ear Forees in Current Soviet Strategy. Foy Kohler in the Foreword noted a tendency
to perceive the Soviet leaders as thinking and seeing things as we do, and, in effect, to project into Soviet affairs a mirror-image of ourselves and our own concepts. The consequence of such an approach ... is that it has led to serious misjudgments in understanding and forecasting Soviet behaviour. (p. x)
18. ]eremy Stone, Strategie Persuasion: Arms Limitations Through Dialogue (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 8-9, 169. 19. Gray, op. cit., p. 79. 20. For support for this view of Soviet perception of military power see Lawrence L. Whetten (ed.), The Futureo{Soviet Military Power (New York: Crane Russak, 1976). Whetten noted in the lntroduction: 'The Soviets expect to use this new strategie posture as a back-drop for the conduct of a more flexible for• eign policy that may, when appropriate, include an increase in their willing• ness to accept risk in the face of challenge or to be more assertive under favourable circumstances' (p. 14). In the same volume William Van Cleave wrote of 'the Soviet concept that military force confers meaningful political power, arid thus that inferiority is a political liability and superiority an important political asset'. 'Soviet doctrine and strategy', p. 48. 21. ]oseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber, Soviet Strategy [or Nuclear War (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979). 22. Pravda, 14 june 1977. Quoted by Garthoff 'Mutual deterrence and strategie arms limitation in Soviet policy', International Security, m.t (Summer 1978), p.142. 23. David Shipler, 'Soviet tested a neutron weapon, Brezhnev teils group of sen• ators', New York Times, 18 November 1978. This quote, plus a reference to the fact that 'Carter and I know we both have a couple of dozen minutes when satellites will tell us missiles are coming', provides added confirmation of a Soviet dependence on a launch-on-waming strategy (see pp. 267-8). 24. Michael Deane, 'Soviet perceptions of the military factor in the correlation of world forces', in Daniel (ed.), op. cit., pp. 72-94. 25. D. Tomashevsky, November 1976, quoted in ibid., p. 77. 26. Quoted in lohn Vincent, Military Power and Political Influenee: The Soviet Union and Western Europe (London: IISS, 1975), p. 15. 27. See jervis, Perception and Mispereeption in International Polities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); also Irving Ianis, Vietims o{ Group-Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 28. Luttwak, op. cit., p. 28. He notes that: 'If "true" combat capabilities were always perceived correctly, then all distinctions between power and force, or between political utility and military effectiveness, would not matter at all from the viewpoint of defense planning.' 29. lohn Steinbruner, 'Beyond rational deterrence: the struggle for new concep• tions', World Politics, xxvin.Z (Ianuary 1976), p. 237. 30. See p. 356. 31. Schlesinger, Annual Defense ReportFY 1976, p. 11-7. 500 Notes
32. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiseal Year 1979 (Washington, DC: 2 February 1978), p. 5. 33. One of the better examples of this sort of analysis is Fred A. Payne, 'The strategie nuclear balance: a new measure', Survival, xx:3 (May/Iune 1977). 34. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Report FY 1976, p. 11-8. 35. See Lawrence Freedman, 'Balancing acts', Millennium, vII:2 (Autumn 1978). 36. Daniei (ed.), op. cit., pp. 185-90. One interesting finding was a trend among American Allies to prefer parity to US superiority because of the perceived gain in international stability. 37. Gabriel A.Almond, 'Public opinion and the development of space technology: 1957-60'. In ]oseph M. Goldsen (ed.), Outer Spaee in Wor/d Polities (London: Pali Mall Press, 1963), pp. 71-96.
25 Selective Options
1. William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett. 'Strategie adaptability', Orbis, xVIII:3 (Autumn 1974), pp. 655-76. 2. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Threats and promises of peace: Europe and America in the new era', Orbis, xVIl:4 (Winter 1974), p. 1126. This point had been made forcefully in the 1950s by Kahn, see earlier, pp. 133-4. 3. Michael May, 'Some advantages of a counterforce deterrent', Orbis, XIV (Summer 1970), p. 274. 4. Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London: Martin Robertson. 1976). 5. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 216. 6. Richard M. Nixon, United States Foreign Poliey [or the 1970s (18 February 1970), pp. 54-5. 7. Ibid. (25 February 1971), pp. 54-5. 8. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 217. 9. The main sources on the development of these options are found in Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrenee and the New American Doetrine (London: IISS, 1976) and Desmond Ball, Deia Vu. These accounts have been supplemented with some interviews of the author's, 10. ]. R. Schlesinger, 'Quantitative analysis and national security', Wor/d Politics, xv (1963), pp. 295-315. 11. ldem., Arms Interaction and Arms Control (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1968), pp. 16-17. 12. Idem., European Security and the Nuelear Threat sinee 1945 (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, April 1967), pp. 12-13. This passage came in the context of the feasibility of such forces for European states. The requirements were described as 'onerous', 13. The main discussion of the policy was in a press conference of 24 ]anuary 1974 and the Department of Defense Reports for Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976 (4 March 1974 and 5 February 1975 respectively). Schlesinger was ques• tioned in detail by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in two sets of hearings: US and Soviet Strategie Policies (March 1974) and Briefing on Counterforee Attaeks (September 1974). Notes 501
14. Report of Secretary of Defense, ]ames Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 De(ense Budgetand FY 1975-79 De(ense Program (4 March 1974). 15. Such a debate as there was, which embraced the general questioning of assured destruction and the concern over perceptions is weil covered in Ted Greenwood and Michael Nacht, 'The new nuclear debate: sense or non• sense', Foreign Affairs, LIl:4 (Iuly 1974). Among critiques of the Schlesinger doctrine see Herbert Scoville jr., 'Flexible madness', Foreign Policy, No. 14 (Spring 1974) and Barry Carter, 'Nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons', Scientific American, 230:5 (May 1974). A useful compilation of relevant arti• cles and documents is Robert ]. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie (eds.), NucIear Strategy and National Security: Points o( View (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). 16. Carter, op. cit., p. 30 (Scoville used a similar phrase). 17. Bernard Brodie, 'The development of nuclear strategy', InternationalSecurity, n:4 (Spring 1978), pp. 78-83. 18. Carter, op. cit., pp. 24, 31. 19. 'If the nuclear balance is no longer delicate and if substantial force asymme• tries are quite tolerable, then the kinds of changes I have been discussing here will netther perturb the balance nor stimulate an arms race. If, on the other hand, asymmetries do matter (despite the existence of some highly survivable forces), then the critics themselves should consider seriously what response we should make to the major programs that the Soviets currently have underway to exploit their advantages in numbers of missiles and payload.' Report on FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 39. 20. Benjamin S. Lambeth, 'Selective nuclear options and Soviet strategy', in ]ohan Holst and Uwe Nerlich, Beyond NucIear Deterrence (London: Macdonald & janes, 1978). 21. Quoted in ibid., p. 92. 22. William Van Cleave, 'Soviet doctrine and strategy', op. eit. Lambeth also engaged in this search in his essay in a final section on 'possible private Soviet thinking and planning'. ('This silen ce as to the possible existence of a Soviet policy regarding controlled nuclear targeting should not automati• cally be interpreted as a sign of Soviet uninterest'.) However, he advised not to regard whatever changes there may be in Soviet policy 'as emulative reac• tions to the US retargeting policy or as mirror images of contemporary American strategic concepts but rather as uniquely "Soviet" responses to the potential of Soviet military power'. Lambeth, op. cit., pp. 97, 100. Warner, too, deviated from his customary scrupulousness in citing Soviet sources when he claimed that 'Despite their frequent denials, the Soviets may in fact be prepared to launch deliberately controlled strategic attacks and thus engage in some form of limited warfare as long envisioned by Western military theorists and more recently endorsed as offletal US policy.' Warner, The Military in Contemporary SovietPolitics, p. 150. 23. Wohlstetter, Threats and Promises o( Peace, p. 1136. For a sympathetic discus• sion of limited options in a European war see essays in Holst and Nerlich, op. cit., particularly Peter Stratmann and Rene Hermann, 'Limited options, escalation and the central region'; and Laurence Martin, 'Flexibility in a tactical nuclear response'. 24. Quoted in Davies, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 6. 502 Notes
25. Quoted in Richard Burt, New Weapons and Teehnologies: Debate and Directions (London: IISS, 1976), p. 21. This is an excellent survey of these issues. See also Christoph Bertram (ed.), New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security (Two Parts) (London: IISS, 1978). 26. Michael]. Brenner, 'Tactical nuclear strategy and European defence: a critical reappraisal', International Affairs, LI:1 (january 1975). 27. S. T. Cohen, 'Enhanced radiation weapons: setting the record straight', Strategie Review (Winter 1978); Fred M. Kaplan. 'Enhanced radiation weapons', Scicntific Ameriean, 238:5 (May 1978). 28. On this set of issues see Richard Burt, 'The SS-20 and the Euro-strategie bal• ance', World Today (February 1977); Greg Treverton, 'Nuclear weapons and the gray area', Foreign Affairs, LVII (Summer 1979); Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons; G. Philip Hughes, 'Cutting the Gordian knot: a theatre nuclear force for deterrence in Europe', Orbis, XXII (Summer 1978). 29. Henry Kissinger, 'NATO: the next thirty years', Survival (Novernber/Decernber 1979), p. 265. 30. Colin Gray, The Future ofLand-Based Missile Forees (London: IISS, 1978), p. 1. This is a useful analysis of the problem and ways of 'solving it'. 31. The history of this issue is discussed in Freedman, US Intelligenee and the Soviet Strategie Threat. 32. Lynn Etheridge Davis and Warner Schilling, 'All you ever wanted to know about MIRV and ICBM ca!culations but were not cleared to ask', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17:2 (lune 1973). lohn Steinbruner and Thomas Garwin, 'Strategie vulnerability: the balance between prudence and paranoia', International Secutity, L:1 (Summer 1976). 33. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistie Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation ofStrategie Offensive Arms (Washington, OC: USGPO, 1972), p. 145. 34. Ibid., p. 579. 35. Colin Gray, 'The strategic force triad: end of the road?', Foreign Affairs, LVI (luly 1978), p. 775. 36. When large numbers of US submarines were linge ring at port or bombers immobile at base were to be caught in the attack, and if (very) worst-case assessments of Soviet civil defences were included, the scenario approx• imated to a straightforward first strike. Paul Nitze did much to publicize these pessimistic versions of the scenario. See his articles: 'Oeterring our deterrent', Foreign Policy No. 25 (Winter 1976-7); 'Assuring strategic stability in an era of detente', Foteign Affairs, LIv:2 (lanuary 1976). 37. The term 'launch on assessment' was adopted, which sounded slightly less irresponsible. See Gray: 'As an operational firing tactic, it would be monumental folly, but as a veiled suggestion of the "we refuse to rule it out" variety, it should not be despised.' The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces, pp. 14-15. 38. United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nucleat War (Washington, OC: USGPO, 1979); Kevin N. Lewis, 'The prompt and delayed effects of nuclear war', Scieniitic American (luly 1979). 39. ]an Lodal, 'Assuring strategic stability: an alternative view', ForeignAffairs, LIV (April 1976). In a reply Paul Nitze argued that this would only be true if such Notes 503
retaliation as the US could muster was directed deliberately against counter• value rather than counter-force targets 'despite the desperate consequences to us and the world of doing so'. Paul Nitze, 'Strategie stability', Foreign Attairs, LIV (July 1976). Colin Gray suggested that, in the 1980s, the USSR 'might possibly be able to hold down its civilian casuaIties to a level below that suffered in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-5 - even if the United States should proceed aII the way up the escalation ladder', as if the risk of losing 20 million people and probably more was in the realm of acceptability. Op. cit., p. 778. On an earlier version of this argument see p. 142. The sort of analysis of the military balance that presented a picture of comparative capabilities after the first volleys was known as adynamie measure as opposed to a statie measure. Such measures are somewhat misleading because they inevitably require a large set of arbitrary assum pt ions on areas of massive uncertainty. 40. DefenseDepattment RepottofFY 1976, p. 1-16. Vladivostock was the scene of the November 1974 Brezhnev-Ford summit which set guidelines for SALT Il. 41. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiseal Year 1980 (25 january 1979), p. 76. 42. Desmond Ball, Developments in US Strategie Nuclear Poliey under the Carter Administration (California: Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1980). 43. Richard Burt, 'US stresses limited nuclear war in sharp shift on military strategy', InternationalHerald Tribune (7 August 1980). 44. Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, 'Victory is possible', Foreign Policy, No. 39 (Summer 1980), p. 21.
26 The Reagan Administration and the Great Nuclear Debate
1. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (London: Collins, 1987). 2. There has not yet been a fuII study of the anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s and their political significance. For some interesting essays see Peter Van Den Dungen (ed.), West European Pacifism and the Strategy For Peaee (London: Macmillan, 1985). For a rieh study with a slightly broader canvas (though confined only to Britain) see Philip Sabin, The Third World War Seare in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1986). On West Germany see David Yost and Thomas Glad, 'West German party politics and theater nuclear moderniza• tion since 1977', Armed Forees and Society (Summer 1982) and jeffrey BoutweII, 'Politics and the peace movement in West Germany', International Security (Spring 1983). On France, where anti-nuclear protest is most rernark• able for its absence, see jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton (eds.), Defence and Dissent in Contemporary Franee (London: Croom Helm, 1984). 3. See David Capitanchik and Richard Eichenberg, Defence and Public Opinion, Chatham House Paper No. 20 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for RIlA, 1983). 4. The most quoted was probably that by Colin Gray and Keith Payne, 'Victory is possible', Foreign Policy No. 39 (Summer 1980), p. 21. At times it appeared 504 Notes
that if Colin Gray did not exist, the anti-nuclear movement would have had to invent hirn as his writings seemed designed to confirm their worst fears. 5. In Oetober 1981 the President noted that he 'could see where you eould have the exchange of taetieal weapons against troops in the field without it bring• ing either one of the major powers to pushing the button', International Herald Tribune, 21 Oetober 1981. 6. Fred Halliday, The Making ofthe Seeond Cold War (London: Verso, 1983). 7. In E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), Protest and Survive (London: Penguin, 1980). This book (the titie of whieh is a pun on the British government's eivil defenee leaflet Protect and Survive) provides the most aeeessible statement of the anti-nuclear movement's ease. Thornpson's most substantial eritique of deterrence theory is found in 'Deterrence and addic• tiori', included in a eolleetion of essays, E. P. Thompson, Zero Option (London: Merlin Press, 1982). 8. I address these arguments in Lawrenee Freedman, The Price of Peaee: Living with the Nuc/ear Dilemma (London: Firethorne, 1986), eh. 4. 9. Such as Horst Afheldt of the Max-Planck-Institut. See, for exarnple, his 'The necessity, preeonditions and eonsequences of a no-first-use poliey' in Frank Blackaby, [ozef Goldblat and Sverre Lodgaard (eds.), No-First Use (London: Taylor & Franeis for SIPRI, 1984). 10. Vladimir Bukovsky, 'The peaee movement and the Soviet Union', Commentary (May 1982). 11. See Randall Forsberg, 'A bilateral nuclear-weapon freeze', Scientific American 247:5 (November 1982). Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Mark Hatfield, Freeze: How You Can Prevent Nuclear War (New York: Bantarn Books, 1982). For analyses, see Adam Garfinkel, The Politics ofthe Nuclear Freeze (Philadelphia: Foreign Poliey Research Institute, 1984) and Paul Cole and William J. Taylor (eds.), The Nuclear FreezeDebate (Boulder, Co!.: Westview, 1983). 12. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (London: Cape, 1982); The Abolition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982). 13. Carl Sagan, 'Nuclear war and climatie catastrophe', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983/84). 14. George Carrier, 'Nuclear winter: the state of the science', Issues in Scienee and Technology (Winter 1985). For a hostile eritique, see Russell Seitz, 'In from the cold: "nuclear winter" rnelts down', The National Interest (Fall 1986). 15. Seeretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, The Potential Effects ofNuc/ear War on the Climate (A Report to the United States Congress, March 1985) uses the hypothesis to justify the Strategie Defense Initiative. 16. National Conferenee of Catholie Bishops. 'The challenge of peaee: God's promise and our response', Ortgins (National CathoIie Doeumentary Service), vo!. 13 (19 May 1983). 17. The Chureh of England eventually opted for a no-first-use position, follow• ing a debate stimulated by the pubIieation of a working party report wh ich was much more unilateralist in tone. i.e. the report of a working party under the chairmanship of the Bishop of Salisbury, The Chureh and the Bomb: Nuc/ear Weapons and the Christian Conscienee (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982). A leading British poliey-maker who is a praetising CathoIie argued the moral case for nuclear deterrenee in Michael Quinlan, 'Preventing war', The Tablet (July 1981). The Catholic bishops of France, not surprisingly, took Notes 505
a more relaxed view of the moral dilemma than did their American counter• parts, and concluded that nuclear deterrence was justified as an 'ethic of distress'; see winning Peaee (December 1983). 18. Michael Novak, 'Moral clarity in the nuclear age', National Review (l April 1983); Albert Wohlstetter, 'Bishops, statesmen, and other strategists on the bombing of civilians', Commentary (Iune 1983). For a response see Francis X. Winters, 'Bishops and scholars: the peace pastoral under siege', The Review of Politics (Winter 1986). 19. Robert Tucker, The Nuclear Debate (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). See also joseph Nye, Nuc/ear Ethics (New York: The Free Press, 1986), Geoffrey Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuc/ear Deterrenee (London: Croom Helm, 1982). 20. For a list of 60 members of the Board of Directors of the Committee, starting with the President hirnself who occupied a position with the Administration in either a government department or an advisory body, see Charles Tyroler 11 (ed.), Alerting Ameriea: The Papers of the Committee on the Ptesent Danger (Washington, DC: Pergarnon-Brassey, 1984), pp. ix-xi. 21. The distinctiveness of Soviet thinking and the danger of an American failure to appreciate its implications are constant themes in the writings of Colin Gray. For a later version see Colin Gray, Nuc/ear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Books/Abt Associates, 1986). 22. See, for example, Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art ofWar (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). 23. The influence of this approach in the conventional sphere was reflected in the US Army Field Manual, FM 100/5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1982). 24. Fred Ikle, 'The Reagan defense program: a focus on the strategie imperatives', Strategie Review (Spring 1982); Paul Nitze, 'Living with the Soviets', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1984/85). 25. Albert Wohlstetter, 'Between an unfree world and none: increasing our choices', Foreign Affairs (Summer 1985). 26. The Report of the Commission On Integrated Leng-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrenee (Washington, DC: january 1988). 27. Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Sirnon & Schuster, 1984). 28. See Walter Slocombe, 'The countervailing strategy', International Security (Spring 1981). 29. On the continuities and contrasts between the Reagan and previous Administrations see Leon Sloss and Mare Dean Millot, 'US nuclear strategy in evolution', Strategie Review (Winter 1984) and jeffrey Richelson, 'PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan strategie modernization program', The Journal of Strategie Studies vI:3 (Iune 1983). 30. Washington Post, 10 November 1982. For early reports see New York Times, 30 May 1982; Washington Post, 4 june 1982. 31. Quoted in New York Times, 9 August 1982. There was an interesting exchange on this matter between Weinberger and the historian Theodore Draper. See Theodore Draper, Present History: On Nuc/ear War, Detente, and Other Controversies (New York: Random House, 1983). 32. In 1981 the Pentagon published the first in what became an annual presenta• tion on Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1981). In the introduction (p. 2) Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrote that 506 Notes
'For the past quarter century, we have witnessed the continuing growth of Soviet military power at a pace that shows no sign of slackening in the future.' The Soviet Union was provoked into publishing a counter-blast entitled Whence the Threatto Peace (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982). 33. Some of the most substantial work of this sort was undertaken under the auspices of the Natural Resources Defense Council which produced aseries of Nuclear Weapons Databooks, opening with a volume which underlined the extent and the quality of the US nuclear arsenal: Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984). Somewhat less careful is Tom Gervasi, The Myth ofSoviet Military Supremacy (New York: Harper & Row, 1986) which exhibits many of the faults the author is criticizing. 34. See, for example, Seweryn Bialer and joan Afferica, 'Reagan and Russia', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1982/83). 35. Bruce Blair, Strategie Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War be ContralIed? Adelphi Papers 169 (London: lISS, 1981). 36. Paul Bracken, The Commandand ContralofNuclearweapons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 37. Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangeraus Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 38. Robert jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrenee (Baltimore: johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 39. A debate on the relevance of August 1914 for the contemporary situation was carried out in the pages of International Security, See Stephen Van Evera, 'The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War' and Iack Snyder, 'Civil-military relations and the cult of the offensive' in International Security 9:1 (Summer 1984); Scott Sagan, '1914 revisited: allies, offense and instahility', International Security 11:2 (Fall 1986) and correspondence between Snyder and Sagan, International Security, 11:3 (Winter 1986/87). 40. For an interesting compilation of the various positions in the nuclear debate wh ich notes the continuities with previous decades see Robert Levine, The Strategie Nuclear Debate (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1987). 41. Morton Halperin, Nuclear Fallaey: Dispetting the Myth ot Nuclear Strategy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987); Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). They are discussed in Lawrence Freedman 'I exist: therefore I deter?', International Security (Summer 1988). 42. Thomas Schelling, 'What went wrong with arms control?', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1985/86), p. 233. 43. Robert jervis, The l/logie of American Nuclear Strategy (lthaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 44. Leon Wieseltier, Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983). 45. McGeorge Bundy, 'The bishops and the bornb', The New York Review (16 [une 1983). 46. For a rare attempt to suggest targeting criteria from this perspective (wh ich were essentially geared to terminating hostilities as soon as possible) see Leon Wieseltier, 'When deterrence fails', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1985). Notes 507
47. The journalist was Robert Scheer and the offending official was T. K.Iones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategie and Theater Nuc!ear Forces; the offending quote was: Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top ... It's the dirt that does it ... if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it.
This inspired the title of Robert Scheer's book, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuc/earWar (New York: Random House, 1982). 48. There is now general agreement that their improvements in missile accu• racy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to wipe out our land-based forces on Minuteman ICBMs by 1982. Whether this capa• bility is ever exercised or not - and I consider it improbable - it reverses and hence revolutionizes the strategie equation on which our security and that of our friends have depended through most of the postwar period. Henry Kissinger, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on SALT 11,31 july 1979. Reprinted in Henry Kissinger, For the Reeord: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981), p. 197. 49. Report ofthe President's Commissionon Strategie Forees (Washington, DC: April 1987). For an insider's assessment of the Commisstori's analysis see james Woolsey, 'The politics of vulnerability: 1980-83', Foteign Affairs (Spring 1984). 50. This is another example of how an apparently simple arms control idea can soon become very complicated. See Glenn A. Kent, A New Approach to Arms Control, R-3140-FF/RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, june 1984). 51. Address to the Nation by President Ronald Reagan, Peaee and National Seeurity (23 March 1983). 52. The practicalities of nuc!ear war are discussed in full in Ashton Carter et al. (eds.), Managing Nuc/ear Operations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). 53. Richard Ned Lebow, Nuc/ear Crisis Management, p. 121. 54. The issues are discussed in Pranklin Long, Donald Hafner and jeffrey Boutwell (eds.), Weapons in Spaee (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986) and William Durch (ed.), National Interests and the Military Uses of Spaee (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984). Ashton Carter and David Schwartz (eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984). These also cover related issues of anti-satellite weapons. For a thorough assessment from a crit• ical perspective see R. I. P. Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, Spaee Weapons: Deterrenee orDelusion(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). 55. For one example, related to the previous concern over the developing problems of ICBM vulnerabllity, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Iastrow and Max Kampeiman, 'Defense in space is not "Star Wars"', New York Times Magazine(27 january 1985). 56. On the politics of SDI see Gerald Steinberg, Lost in Spaee: The DomesticPolitics ofthe Strategie DefenseInitiative (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Bocks, 1988). 57. The first major critique was provided by the Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallaey ofStar Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1983). For a rare scientific 508 Notes
statement in favour of SDI see Robert jastrow, How to Make Nuclear Weapons Obsolete (London: Sidgwick & jackson, 1985). For another early critique see Sidney Drell, Philip Farley and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategie Defense Initiative:A Technicai, Political and Arms Control Assessment (A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control: Stanford University, july 1984). 58. Ivo Daalder, The SDI Challenge to Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987). See also chs. 9 and 10 of Lawrence Freedman, The Price ofPeace. 59. On which one of the most authoritative discussions is found in United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, DC: USGPO, September 1985); Hans Bethe et al., 'Space-based missile defense', Scientific American(October 1984). 60. One of the key criteria for the eventual deployment of SDI as set down by Paul Nitze was that 'they must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offen• sive capability to overcome the defense'. The other criterion was that the key components of the defence should be themselves 'survivable'. Paul Nitze, Speech before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, 20 February 1985. 61. George Sehnelter. 'Implications of the strategic defense initiative for the ABM Treaty', Survival (Fall 1984); William Durch, The Future of the ABM Tteaty, Adelphi Paper 223 (Summer 1987). 62. For a critical assessment of the new interpretation see Raymond Garthoff. Policy Versus The Law:The Reinterpretation ofthe ABM Treaty (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). The case in favour of the new interpreta• tion is made by the State Department's legal counsel, judge Sofaer, with a critique by Abram and Antonia Chayes in Harvard Law Review (Iune 1986). See also Alan Sherr, 'Sound legal reasoning or policy expedient: the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty', InternationalSecurity (Winter 1986/7). 63. james Schear, 'Arms control treaty compliance: buildup to a breakdowri', International Security (Fall 1985); Sanford Reback, 'Responding to Soviet non• compliance', Arms Control (December 1986); john Baker, 'Improving prospects for compliance with arms-contro! treaties', Survival (September/ October 1987). 64. The definitive account of the development of nuclear arms control policies in the first term of the Reagan Administration is found in Strebe Talbott. DeadlyGambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). 65. See Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott. 'Reykjavik and beyond', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1986/87). For a discussion of some of the themes of the summit see articles in International Securitv (Summer 1987). 66. Two useful collections of essays indicating the range of debate on the nature of Soviet strategic thought are: john Baylis and Gerald Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981) and Derek Leebaert (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981). Also of great value is David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (London: Yale University Press, 1983). 67. The destruction of nuclear weapons and interference with command and control facilities will be a priortty task of Warsaw Pact forces in a continental land battle. See C. N. Donnelly, 'The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group: a new challenge for NATO', International Defense Reviewxv:9 (1982). Notes 509
68. For one analysis along these lines see ]oseph D. Douglas]r. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Conventional Warand Escalation: The SovietView(New York:Crane Russak, 1981). 69. Stephen M. Meyer, SovietTheatre Nuclear Forces, Partn, p. 23. For elaboration of this point see Stephen M. Meyer, 'Soviet perspectives on the paths to nuclear war', in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, ]oseph S. Nye (eds.), Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda [or Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), p. 169. 70. Quoted in William Garner, Soviet Threat Perceptions of NATO's Eurostrategie Missiles, Atlantic Papers No. 52-53 (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1983), p. 63. See also Garner's discussion on pp. 30-4 of Soviet perceptions of US strategy as an attempt to wage war against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact without being engaged itself. 71. In 1972 the Soviet Union even proposed to the United States a treaty in which the two sides would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against each others' horneland even if they were being used against the territory of their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. See Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1979), pp. 183-90, and Meyer in Allison et al., Hawks, Dovesand Owls ... r pp. 181-2. 72. Cynthia A. Roberts, 'Soviet INF policy and Euro-strategie options' in Gloria Duffy (ed.), Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe (Palo Alto: Stanford University, 1982), pp. 35-6; Stephen M. Meyer, SovietTheatre Nuclear Forces. Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, Adelphi Paper 187 (London: IISS, 1984), p. 32. 73. A useful corrective to the presumption of an adversary 'assured of its combat virtuosity and unencumbered by doubts over doctrine and capabilities' is found in Benjamin Lambeth, 'Uncertainties for the Soviet war planner', International Security (Winter 1982/83). 74. lohn Erickson, 'The Soviet view of deterrence: a general survey', Survival (November/December 1962), p. 249. 75. Stephen M. Meyer, SovietTheatre Nuclear Forces. 76. President Brezhnev announced the new policy in a message to the UN General Assernbly's Special Session on Disarmament in ]une 1982. Prior to this the option had been maintained to use nuclear weapons against other nuclear powers committing 'aggression' (wh ich could take a variety of forms); now it was only to be maintained against 'nuclear aggression'. See ]ames McConnell, The SovietShift In Emphasis[rom Nuclear to Conventional, 2 volumes (Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, ]une 1984), vol. I, p. 19. See also Stephen Shenfield, The Soviet undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first and its significance', Detente(Oct. 1984). 77. See ]ames McConnell, The Soviet Shift ... ; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in SovietForeign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). There is evidence of some dissatisfaction with this trend and of argu• ments for more emphasis on nuclear weapons. See, for example, Ilana Kass and Michael]. Deane, 'The role of nuclear weapons in the modern theatre battlefield: the current Soviet view', Comparative Strategy Iv:3 (1984). 78. Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for RllA, 1987). 79. A. Arbatov, 'Military doctrine' in 1988 Yearbook (Moscow: IMEMO, 1988). 510 Notes
80. This point is made with great force in Philip Bobbitt. Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1988). 81. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1982). 82. Robert S. McNamara, 'The military role of nuclear weapons: perceptions and misperceptions', Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983), p. 79. He adds 'I believe they accepted my recommendations.' 83. Fred Ikle, 'NATO's "first nuclear use": a deepening trap?', Strategie Review (Winter 1980). 84. Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz-joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear weapons and the preservation of peace: a German response to no first use', Foreign Affairs (Summer 1982). 85. ]. M. Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO StrategyofFlexibleResponse (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RANDCorporation, 1983). 86. See, for exarnple, john Mearsheirner, 'Why the Soviets can't win quickly in Central Europe', International Security (Summer 1982).
27 The Threat Evaporates
1. Michael R. Beschloss, and Strobe Talbott. At the HighestLevels: The Inside Story of the End ot the Cold War (Boston: Little Brown, 1993); Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition: American Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (Washington, OC: Brookings Institution, 1994). 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. Iack Levy proclaimed: 'the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations', 'Domestic politics and war', in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Ortgins and Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88. For evaluations of the claims, see Miriam Fendius Elrnan, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 4. Robert Caplan, 'The coming anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly (February 1992). 5. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and FallofGreat Powers (New York:Vintage, 1989). For a critique of the 'declinist' thesis, see joseph Nye, Bound tu Lead:The Changing Nature ofAmerican Power(New York: Basic Books, 1991). 6. See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: 1990-91 (London: Paber, 1993); Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals' War (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1995). 7. Andrew Mack, 'Why big nations lose small wars: the politics of asymmetric conflict', World Politics, 27, 2 (Ianuary 1975). 8. Secretary of Oefense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Detense Review (Washington, OC: Oepartment of Defense, May 1997, Section 11). 9. Oepartment of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, OC: The joint Staff 2000), p. 5. This paragraph draws heavily on Steven Metz and Oouglas V. johnson, Asymmetry and V.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Notes 511
Strategie Coneepts (Carltsle, PA: Strategie Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001). 10. lohn A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning [or Conilict (London: Brassey's, 1989). 11. Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn ofthe 21st Century (Boston, MA: Little Brown & Co, 1993); Lawrenee Freedman, The Revolution in Strategie Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategie Studies, 1998). 12. Robert Litwak, Rogue States and US ForeignPoliey (Washington, OC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St Martin's Griffin, 1999). 13. By the end of the 1990s there was a substantial literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruetion. See Gavin Carneron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment [or the 21st Century (London: Maemillan - now Palgrave Maemillan, 1999); Riehard A. Falkenrath, Robert O. Newman and Bradley Thayer, America's Aehilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemieal Terrorism and Covert Attaek (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Peter R. Lavoy, Seott O. Sagan, and ]ames]. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemieal and Biological Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); ]an Lodal, The Priee ofDominanee: The New weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Chal/enge to American Leadership (New York: Couneil on Foreign Relation, 2001). 14. Charles Glaser, 'Nuclear poliey without adversary', International Security (Spring 1992). 15. lohn Leppingwell, 'Is Start stalling?', in George Quester, ed., The Nuclear Chal/enges in Russia and the New States ofEurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 103. 16. The first major study outlining these was that of K.M. Campbell et al., Soviet Nuclear Fission. Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Center for Seienee and International Affairs, 1991); See also O. Isby and T. ]ohnson, 'Post-Soviet nuc1ear forees and the risk of aeeidental or unauthorised limited nuc1ear strikes', Strategie Review, 21, 4 (Fall 1993), 7-21: Oleg Bukharin 'Nuclear Safeguards and Seeurity in the Former Soviet Union', Survival (Winter 1994-95), 53-72. 17. For exarnple, Bruee Blair, The Logie ofAecidental Nuclear War (Washington, OC: Brookings Institution, 1993); Paul Oouglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control ofNuclear weapons in the United States (lthaea, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Seott O. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Prineeton, NY: Prineeton University Press, 1993). For a diseussion, see Bradley Thayer, 'The risk of nuc1ear inadvertenee', Security Studies, 111, 3 (Spring 1994), 428-93 and sub• sequent responses. 18. Ash Carter and William]. Perry, Seeretary of Oefense under Clinton, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy [or Ameriea (Washington, OC: Brookings Institution, 1999). For expenditure of $7 billion, Washington helped deaeti• vate some 5500 nuc1ear warheads and keep employed seientists who might otherwise have been getting up to misehief. 19. Peter Vineent Pry, War Scare: Russia and Ameriea on the Nuclear Brink (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). 512 Notes
20. jacob W. Kipp, 'Russia's nonstrategie nuclear weapons', Military Review (May-Iune 2001). 27-38. 21. On this decay, see William Odorn, The Collapse o( the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 22. 'The future of nuclear deterrence', Survival (Spring 1992), 84. 23. For an argument in favour of a reconstitution strategy which very much reflected contemporary German cancerns about forward basing of nuclear systems on their territory, see Kar! Kaiser, 'Frorn nuclear deterrence to gradua• ted conflict control', Survival, 32, 6 (November/December 1990), 483-96. For a critique, see David S. Yost, 'Europe and nuclear deterrence', Survival, Val. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993),97-120. 24. Robert Art, 'A US military strategy for the 1990s: reassurance without dorninance', Survival, Val. 34, No. 2 (Winter 1992-93), 3-23. 25. According to Walter Slocombe: 'So lang as there is a reluctance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be astrang case for an American nuclear guarantee made manifest by the presence of nuclear weapons nearby', 'The future of US Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured Wor!d', in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maarenen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives trom Europe, Asia and Notth America (New York: Plenum Press, 1992). 26. For example, British Secretary of State for Defence Maleolm Rifkind:
It is not in our interests to encourage any tendency towards thinking that there could be a major conflict in Eurape in which the question of nuclear use arasewhich did not involve the vital interests of all the allies incIuding the United States. (Speech of 30 September 1992, pp. 16-17).
27. Robert Zadra, European Integration and Nuclear Detertence after the Cold War, Chaillot Paper 5 (Paris: Western Eurapean Union Institute for Security Studies, November 1992). 28. Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (London: Adamantine Press, 1991), p.106. 29. Tom Halverson, The Last Great Nuclear Debate (London: MacmiIIan - now Palgrave MacmiIIan, 1995). 30. Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice o( Flexible Response (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 31. NATO Comprehensive Concept o(Arms Control and Disarmament, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Brussels, 30 May 1989, Para 48. 32. Arms Control Reporter (29 May 1989), 408.B.59. 33. Financial Times, 2 April 1990. Kohl accepted, however, that 'if one side has nuclear weapons, the other side needs them too'. 34. London Declaration on a Transtormcd North Atlantic Alliance, NATO Press Communique S-l (90) 36, 6 (Iuly 1990). 35. Chevenement, quoted in Atlantic News, No. 2241 (11 Iuly 1990), p. 2. 36. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 'The Alliance's New Strategie Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, on 7-8 November 1991', reprinted in NATO Review Val. 39, No. 6 (December 1991), 10, 13 (my emphasis). Notes 513
For a diseussion, see David Yost 'Europe and nuclear deterrenee', Survival (Autumn 1993). 37. George Bush and Brent Scoweroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); p. 544. 38. These were completed in September 1996, although in Oetober 1999 the Senate refused to ratify them. 39. William Potter, The Polities or Nuclear Renuneiation: The Cases or Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995). 40. Dean A. Wilkening, 'The future of Russia's strategie nuclear force', Survival (Autumn 1998). 41. Regina C. Karp, Seeurity without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Seeurity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); ]oseph Rotblat, jack Steinburger and Babalehandra Udgaonkar, A Nuclear Weapon-Free World. Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 42. I used the term in 'Eliminators and marginalists', Survival (1997) but was not the only one to do so. See, for example, Erie Mlyn, 'U.S. nuclear poliey and the end of the Cold War', in T. V. Paul, Riehard]. Harknett and ]ames ]. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Miehigan Press, 1998). Mlyn, however, sees this stanee as being the most liberal, to be contrasted with the more pro-nuclear traditionalists, whereas my eontrast was with eliminators. See also Patriek Garrity and Steven Cambone, 'The future of US nuclear poliey', Survival (Winter 1994/95). 43. Glenn Buchan, US Nuclear Strategy [or the Post Cold-War Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), p. 49. 44. Michael Mazarr, 'Virtual nuclear arsenals', Survival (Autumn 1995); Bruee Blair, Harold Feivson and Frank von Hippel, 'Taking nuclear weapons off ha ir-trigger alert', Scieniific Ameriean (November 1997). 45. Steven Lee, Morality, Prudenee and Nuclear weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 327-8. 46. Michael Quinlan, "The future of nuclear weapons: poliey for western possessors', International Affairs, 69, 3 (1993),485-96. 47. The IC] had issued a non-binding opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons: The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be eontrary to the rules of international law applieable in armed conflict, and in particular the prineiples and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the eur• rent state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court eannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme cireumstanee of self-defenee, in whieh the very survival of astate would be at stake. 'The word 'generally', however, provides a suffieient get-out for powers claiming that they have no interest exeept in deterrenee of extreme aets against thern, and the Court's argument was for disarmament under striet and effeetive international control (international Court of ]ustiee, Legality ot' the Threat or Use or Nuclear weapons, 8 ]uly 1996). 48. The Gorbaehev, Raja Gandhi and RockefeIler Foundations, as weil as the Carnegie Corporation, baeked the projeet on the elimination of nuclear 514 Notes
weapons of the 5tate of the World Foundation. http://www.arq.co.uk/ worldforum. See also the interview with Butler and other nuclear disarmers in jonathan Schell, The Gift ot Time: The Case [or Abolishing Nuclear weapons (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Cornpany, 1998). 49. Cathleen Fisher. Preface to Steve Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 290 (October 1996). See also An Evolving US Nuclear Posture: Seeond Report o(the Steering Committee: Projeet on Eliminating weapons o( Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1995). SO. Schell, op. eit. p. 13. Schell acknowledged that many of his subjeets were rat her old. 51. Michael McGwire, 'ls there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (April 1994). 52. Report o( the Canberra Commission on the Elimination o( Nuclear Weapons (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 1996), p. 24. 53. For a critique which also takes in the marginalists, see Robert G. joseph and john F. Reichart. 'The case for nuclear deterrence today', Orbis (Winter 1998). 54. Canberra, op.cit., p. 10. The Commission avoided setting a firm timetable for its goal to be achieved (p, 15). 55. Schell considers the distinction between technical zero (when the weapons are truly dismantled and cannot be covertly reconstructed) and political zero (when nuclear use has been completely disavowed). 56. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Seiences. The Future o( U.S. Nuclear Weapons Poliey (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997). 57. Ground-based interceptors were given an erroneous boost as a result of the misleading first impressions of the performance of the Patriot missile during the Gulf. For the first demonstration of the limits of Patriot, see Ted Postol, 'Lessons of the Gulf War experience', International Security, 16, 3 (Winter 1991/92). 58. joseph Cirincione, 'Why the Right lost the missile defense debate', Foreign Policy, 106 (Spring 1997). 59. Bradley Graharn, Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America [rom Missile Attaek (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 60. Ivo H. Daalder, jarnes M. Goldgeier and jarnes M. Lindsay, 'Deploying NMD: not whether, but how', Survival, 42, 1 (2000), 6-28. 61. George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, 'National missile defense: an indefensible system', Foreign Poliey, 117 (Winter 1999-2000), 120-37. 62. As examples of the more moderate pro- and anti-viewpoints, and so an indication of the marginality of the decision, see Iarnes M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, De(ending America: The Case [or a Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001); Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, 'National missile defense and the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy', International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001). See also the cor• respondence between these two views in International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002). 63. Dennis Gorrnley, 'Enriching expectations: 11 Septembers lessons for missile defence', Survival44, 2 (Summer 2000), 19-36. Notes 515
64. Desmond Ball and Robert Toth, 'Revising the SIOP: taking war-fighting to dangerous extremes', International Security, Vol. 14 (Spring 1990), 65-92. 65. On the Clinton period, see Ianne Nolan, An Elusive Consensus (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999). 66. Ash Carter, lohn Steinbruner and Charles Zraket, eds., Managing Nuc/ear Operations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987). 67. David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, 'Nuclear first use revisited', Survival, 37 (Autumn 1995), 27-44. 68. Scott D. Sagan, 'The commitment trap: why the United States should not use nuclear threats to deter biological and chemical weapons attacks', International Seeurity, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000),85-115. 69. Nuc/ear Posture Review Report, Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; New York Times (10 March 2002); Economist (16 March 2002).
28 The Second Nuclear Age
1. lohn Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the end of the Cold War', International Security 17, 3 (Winter 1992/93). A decade later Bruce jentleson was complaining in the same journal that 'Overall, international relations and political science as academic disciplines have limited answers to offer to the questions posed by September 11; 'The need for praxis', InternationalSecurity, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002). 2. Michael Cox, ed., Rethinking the Soviet Collapse (London: Pinter, 1999); Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 3. Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternational Polities (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 4. David A. Baldwin, 'Security studies and the end of the Cold War', World Politics, 48 (October 1995), 117-41, raised doubts against the continuing value of the subject. For a riposte, see Richard K. Betts, 'Should strategic studies survive', World Politics, 50, 1 (October 1997), 7-33. See also the com• peting view of Stephen Walt, 'The renaissance of security studies', InternationalStudies Quarterly, 35, 2 (Iune 1991), 211-39 and Edward Kolodziej, 'Renaissance of security studies? Caveat lector!' International Studies Quarterly, 36, 4 (Dec 1991), 421-38. 5. Richard Price and Nina Tannewald. 'Norrns and deterrence: the nuclear and chemical weapons taboo', in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Polities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 121-2. T.V. Paul described the taboo as 'an unwritten and uncodified prohibitionary norm against nuclear use', Ashe notes, Dulles first used the term in 1953 but then with the hope of removing the notion from foreign policy discourse. T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear taboo and war initiation in regional conflicts', Journal ofConfliet Resolution, 39, 4 (December 1995), 701. 6. Michael Howard, 'Lessons of the Cold War', Survival, 36 (Winter 1994-95) 161, 164. 7. Richard Ned Lebow and Ianice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, N]: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 368. 516 Notes
8. The lack of contemporary case studies is striking. Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Polities (lthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), which challenges the view that areputation for resolve is worth fight• ing for, draws on studies of pre-First World War crises. Stephen R. Rock's Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), which seeks to rehabilitate strategies of appeasement, has three case studies from pre-cold war but at least has two - dealing with Iraq and North Korea - that are more contemporary. 9. The analytical work in this area has been dominated by two teams. Richard Ned Lebow and Ianlce Stein's work can be found in 'Rational Deterrence Theory: I think, therefore I deter', World Polities, 41, 2 (January 1988), and most recently in We All Lost the Cold War (op eit.). The book is dominated by case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In 1990 they published a critique of Paul Huth and Bruce Russett in 'Deterrence: the elusive dependent variable', World Polities, 42, 3 (April 1990), 336-69. Huth and Russet replied with 'Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor makes a difference', World Polities, 42, 4 (April 1990), 466-501. For other work by Huth and Russett, see 'What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980', World Politics, 36, 4 (July 1984), 496-526; 'Deterrence failure and crisis escalatiori'. International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1 (March 1988), 29-46. See also Paul Huth, Extended Deterrenee and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988). There is an article sum• marizing his theory by the same title in Ameriean Political Seienee Review, 82, 2 (June 1988). 10. john Mueller, Retreat [rom Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 11. See john Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon. Ernest R. May and Jonathan Rosenberg, Cold War Statesmen Con(ront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Sinee 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 12. Matthew Woods, 'Waltz, Burke and nuclear proliferation', Review of International Studies, 28, 1 (January 2002), 163-90. 13. In 1981, Waltz published The Spread ofNuclear Weapons: More May Be Better Adelphi Paper 171 (London: llSS). 14. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). See also the essays on the Waltz-Sagan debate in Seeurity Studies, 4, 4 (Summer 1995). 15. See, for exarnple, Christopher Layne, 'The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993). 16. For the fullest statement of his views, see john Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Polities (New York: Norton, 2001). His 1990 views on Germany were found in J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Seeurity, 15 (Summer 1990). IohnJ. Mearsheirner, 'The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Summer 1993), 50-66. A contrasting view was provided by Steven E. Miller, 'The case against a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Summer 1993), 67-80. For a critique of Mearsheimer's view, see Glenn Chafetz, 'The end of the Cold War and the future of nuclear proliferation: an alternative to the neorealist perspective', in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankei, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results), special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993). Notes 517
17. lohn Mueller, 'The escalating irrelevance of nuclear weapons', in T.Y. Paul, Richard]. Harknett and ]ames]. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited. Nuclear Anns and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 18. ]ames]. Wirtz, 'Beyond bipolarity: prospects for nuclear stability after the Cold War', in T. V. Paul et al, op. cit., p. 153. 19. Fred Charles Ikle, 'The second coming of the nuclear age', Foreign Affairs, 75, 1 (January-February 1996). 20. Colin S. Gray, 'The second nuclear age: insecurity, proliferation, and the control of arms', in Williamson Murray, ed., Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, 1995-96 (Washington, DC, Brassey's, 1997); Keith B. Payne, Deterrenee in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, MA: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). Note also A. S. Krass, 'The second nuclear era: nuclear weapons in a transformed world', in M. T. Klare and D. C. Themas, eds., World Seeurity: Challenges [or a New Century (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 85-105. 21. Cited in Payne, op. cit, p. 14. 22. Etel Solingen, The Domestic Sourees of Nuclear Postures: Influencing 'Fence• Sitters' in the Post-Cold War Era (San Diego, CA: IGCC, University of California, 1994), pp. 51-2. 23. Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, N]: Princeton University Press, 2001); Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Proliferation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 24. George Perkovich, lndia's Nuclear Bomb (1999); Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequenees of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Paper 332 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for llSS, 1999). 25. Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, 'US-lndia tensions: misperceptions on nuclear proliferation', Foreign Affairs, 74 (Ianuary-February 1995), 13-18, argue that India had demonstrated caution in past wars with regard to civil• ian areas. 26. Paul et al., p. 26. 27. Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Balir Hause (Philadelphia, PA:Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002). 28. Colin Powell with ]oseph Perlsco, My American [ourney: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 452, 486. 29. Statement by Robert Gates, in Frontline, 'The Gulf War, Parts 1 and 11' (9 and 10 ]anuary 1996), background materials available via www.wgbh.org. 30. Aecording to Baker, 'I purposely left the impression that the use of ehemical or biologieal agents by lraq eould invite taetieal nuclear retaliation', ]ames Baker, The Politics ofDiplomacy (New York:G.P. Putnarn, 1995), p. 359. The threats in the relevant transcripts, however, put the regime at risk. See Lawrenee Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The GulfConfliet: 1990-91 (London: Faber, 1993). 31. Scott Sagan, 'The commitment trap: why the United States should not use nuclear threats to deter biologieal and ehemieal weapons attacks', International Secutity, Vol. 24 No. 4 (Spring 2000), 85-115; William Arkin, 'Calculated ambiguity: nuclear weapons and the Gulf War', Washington Quarterly, 19, 4 (Autumn 1996); Norman Cigar, 'Iraq's strategie mindset and the Gulf War: blueprint for defeat', Journal of Strategie Studies, 15, 518 Notes
1 (March 1992), 1-29. Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollak and Matthew Waxman, 'Coercing Saddam Hussein: lessons from the past', Survival, 40, 3 (Fall 1998); Barry R. Posen, 'U.S. security policy in a nuclear-armed world, or: what if Iraq had had nuclear weapons?', Security Studies, 6, 3 (Spring 1997), 1-31; ]anice Gross Stein, 'Deterrence and compellance in the Gulf, 1990-91: a failed or impossible task?', International Security, Vol. 17 No. 2 (1992), 147-79. 32. The thesis that this did have an impact on Bush's calculations is not convincing. It is not required to explain the conclusion of the ground war. Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence (New Haven. CT: Yale University Press, 1999). 33. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 'Hyping the Iraqi bomb' and 'Iraq's bomb: blueprints and artifacts'. See also their 'Iraq's nuclear hide-and-seek'. In The Bulletin ot' the Atomie Scientists (March 1991, ]anuary/February 1992 and September 1991) respectively. 34. Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant: The Threat ofMass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000). 35. Brian M. ]enkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1975); see also Ehud Sprinzak, 'Rational fanatics', Foreign Poliey (September/October 2000). 36. Bruce Hoffman, 'America and the new terrorism: an exchange', Survival, 42 (Summer 2000), 163-4. 37. US Commission on National Security/21 st Century, New World Coming: Ameriean Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC, 1999), p. 48. 38. Richard K. Betts, 'The new threat of weapons of mass destruction', Foreign Affairs, 77, 1 (January/February 1998), 41. The al-Qaeda cell that organized the 11 September attacks appear to have explored the possibility of using crop-spraying aircraft to release biological weapons and decided that the outcome was too uncertain. 39. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), US Department of Defense, National Strategy To Combat Weapons Of Mass Destruction (December 2002). 40. The most convincing presentation of this argument was found in Kenneth Pollack, The ThreateningStorm: Tlie Case[orInvading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002). 41. Robert Litwak, 'The new calculus of pre-emption', Survival, 4 (Winter 2002).
29 Can there be a Nuclear Strategy?
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ABMTreaty (1972),247,256,338, See Church and nuclear war; 342,346,396-7,424,430,431 Nuclear freeze movement re-interpretation of, 397 Anti-submarine warfare, 158,337 Aceidental war, 192,253,361 Appeasement, 36, 91, 193, 516n Accuracy Arms control, 184-95,245,254,318, of bornbers, 11 320-2,338-41,346-7,408,421, of missiles, 24, 150, 335-6, 339, 423-4, 455 413,497n as a concept, 184-6 Action-reaction phenomenon, 231, See ABMTreaty; Disarmament; 240-2,319-22,331,496n Intermediate Nuclear Forces 'Action-inaction', 330-1 Talks; Strategie Arms Limitation Active defence, 237 Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Afghanistan, 408, 413, 414, 417, 445, Talks; Test Ban Treaty 452 Arms Race, 124, 143, 149, 178, 192, Soviet invasion of, 341, 353 219, 240-1, 319, 320, 330-1, 347, Africa, 409 407,429,430,442 Aggression, 32, 38-40, 90-1, 132-3, Army (US), 21-2, 27, 65, 89, 97, 135 103-4, 146 and atom bombs, 34-7 Assured destruction, 38, 216, 222, and deterrence theory, 82-3 232-4,245-6,319,325,331-2, Air defence, 30-1, 48, 121-2, 127, 339,342-3,358,360,495n,460 147, 148, 155-6, 159,251, 477n defined, 233-4 Air Force (US) See Mutual assured destruction; as Army Air Force, 11, 16-17, 21-2, Second Strike 47-8 Asymmetrical strategy, 413, 452 as separate service, 21-2, 25, 27, 39, Atlantic Alliance, 219 51,61,65,89,121-3,125,128, See Alliances; North Atlantic Treaty; 132-3,156,165,230-1,233, North Atlantic Treaty 236,336 Organization Al-Qaeda, 414, 445, 452, 518n Atlantic nuclear force, 312 Alliances, 445, 461-2 Atom bomb in US security policy, 68, 77-8 development, 13-15 Anglo-American nuclear co-operation, principles, 14 294-6 first test, 15 Anti-ballistic rnissiles, 150-2, 155-7, and strategic bombardment, 21-3 159,206,239-42,247,251,256, compared with hydrogen bornb, 266,319-20,322-3,329,332, 61-3 335-6,338,360,270,430 as paper tiger, 260-3 See ABMTreaty; Safeguard; Sentinei; Atomic diplomacy, 48-9 Strategic Defense Initiative Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Anti-nuclear movement, 385, 427 64, 65 US,383-5 General Advisory Committee of, 62, Western Europe, 381-3 65
549 550 Subject Index
Atoms for Peace, 289 Bush (George W.) Administration, Attrition, war of, 3-4, 265, 466n 424,433,447,452,455,457 Australia, 427 Canberra Commission, 427, 428 B-IB bomber, 387, 433 Carter Administration, 351, 375-6, B-29, 16,23,48,61, 468n 387,391-3 B-36, 51, 61 Catalytic war, 192,288, 492n B-46,61 Chemical weapons, 432, 446, 448, B-47,231 449,450,451 B-50, 61 Chernobyl, 384 B-52, 61, 346 Chicken, game of, 176-8, 204-7, 210, B-70, 230, 236 351 Backfire bomber, 341 China, 430, 434, 435, 439, 444, 447, Balance of terror, 119, 134-5, 147, 451 182-3, 186, 188, 192, 194-5, 333, missile threat to US, 240, 266-7 343,381,434,440,443,463 strategie doctrine, 258-67 delicacy of, 129-30, 151,362-3, Christian Democrats (Germany), 425, 480n,501n 278 Ballistic missile defence, 130, 428, Church and nuclear war, 385 430,446 Circular error probable, 335 See Anti-ballistic missiles; Strategie City-avoidance, 170,222-31,235-8, Defense Initiative 246,290,317,363 Bargaining, 182, 197,200-3,223,228 Civil defence, 28-9, 125-7, 129, Belarus, 423, 442 144,148,155,158,206,237-8, Berlin crisis, 246,256 1948,50,69 Clinton Administration, 429, 432 1961,216,225,229-30,251,271, Cold war, 47, 55, 89, 91, 92, 100, 282,408 154, 193, 318-19, 410, 424, Biological weapons, 428, 432, 433, 434,437-40,443,453,459, 448,450,451,518n 461-3 BIue Streak, 295 end of, 407-8, 415, 418, 435, 436 BIunting mission, 6-7, 123-5 Collateral damage, 9-10, 121, 361-2, Bomber, 4-5, 21-3, 38, 156, 165,226, 366,413,460 326,329,335,371,432,433 Combined arms, 249 during World War ll, 10-12 Command and control, 41-2, 220, and atom bornbs, 29-31, 52 222,290,359-60,373,387,389, bombers versus missiles, 143-4, 431-2 158-60, 488n Command of the air, 6, 9-11, 19-20, in SALT, 340-1 118, 123 See B-IB; B-29; B-36; B-46; B-50; Compellance, 197-8,208-11,437 B-52; B-70; Backfire; MY-4; Compton Report, 24, 26 TU-4; TU-16; TU-20 Congress (US), 22, 34, 92-3, Bosnia,413 236,318,320-1,324,329, Brinkmanship, 82, 208 360,362 British strategie doctrine, 11, 74-6, Conservative Party (UK), 74, 278-9 279-80,292-8 Containment, 49, 72-3, 463 Brushfire wars, 91, 218 Controlled response, 182,200-1, Bush (George) Administration, 432, 450 290-1,317,362-3,375 SubjectIndex 551
Conventional strategy, 50-2, 67-71, See Denial; Extended deterrence; 85, 220, 273-87, 365-7, 412-13 Graduated deterrence; See Local defence Minimum deterrence; Correlation of forces, 349 Proportional deterrence; Cost of nuclear development, 407 Punishment; Reprisals; Counter-city targeting, 22-3, 40, 121, Retaliation 128, 142, 159-60, 181, 183,356, Detonator, 304-5 360-1,371 Disarrnament, 184-6, 195,415,420, Counter-force targeting, 40, 120-3, 423, 425-7, 456 124-5, 127-8, 130, 142, 153-4, and arms control, 186-8, 380 159-60, 183,221,232, Reykjavik summit (1986), 400, 304-5, 334, 336, 361-3, 369, 405-6 370-5, 412 See Unilateral nuclear disarmament and city-avoidance, 224-6, 228-9 Double-key, 289 Countervailing strategy, 387 Dresden, 189 Credibility, 92, 96-7, 108-10, 127, 201, 230-1, 255, 283, 289-90, Eisenhower Administration, 72-3, 299-300, 303-4, 333, 342, 345, 76-7,80,91-2,97-8,146-7,215, 355-6, 363 220-2, 237-8, 250, 273-4, 278, Crisis management, 333-4, 389 281,289,309 Cruise missiles, 336-9 Elite/mass distinction, 8-9, 377 in Europe, 381, 382-3, 399, 401-2 Equivalent mega-tonnage, 352, 382 in SALT, 340-1 Escalation, 92-3, 198-208,229,247, SeeSnark 251,283,286,313 Cuban missile crisis, 195,231,253, defined, 198-9 295,344,347,357,516n Escalation dominance, 205-6, 208-9, Cultural Revolution, 260, 265 365, 371, 373-4, 476n Czech Republic, 417 Essential equivalence, 354, 356, 374 defined, 351 Damage limitation, 216, 225, 229, Euro-strategie balance, 368-9 236-8, 241, 246, 332, 364-5, European Union, 419 375 Extended deterrence, 276, 404-5 Defense Department (US), 66, 93, 217, Extended sanctuarization, 308 234,246,318,359,487n, 433 SeeGuarantee Democratic Party (US), 74,91,97, 218,272,319,321 Fallout, 89,110,125,140,151, Derrial. deterrence by, 107, 281 237, 373 SeeCountervailing strategy Finlandization, 349 Dense pack, 392-3 Fire-break, 205, 246, 283-4, 285-6, Desert Storrn, 408, 412, 449 288,334 Detente, 195,231,309,318,339 First strike, 31, 125-6, 127-8, 130, Deterrence, 92, 107, 180-1, 302-4, 133,146-7,154-5,160,174, 310, 356, 416, 419, 425-6, 429, 183-4, 216, 241, 252-4, 290, 304, 437-41,442-3,448-9,457,464 324, 325-6, 329, 343, 356, 362, eariy thoughts, 37-8 365-6, 371-5, 379, 460, 480n and massive retaliation, 82-4 in strategie bombardrnent, 6 Soviet approach, 139 and city avoidance, 223-6 and arms control, 185 SeeCounter-force targeting 552 Subject Index
First use, 67, 229, 365-6, 418, 421 lncomplete antagonism, 185, 196 Fission, concept, 13-14 Independent nuclear forces, 273, 290, Flexible response, 216, 229, 271-2, 313-14,483n, 494n 301,303,317,332,406 Britain, 292-8 See Graduated deterrence; France, 300-9 Controlled response India, 444-5, 454 Formal strategists, 171-2, 174-5, Indo-China, 84 179-80, 196 'Inevitability of war', 139-40 Forward defence, 71, 105,275,310 In-flight refuelling, 61 France, 422, 426-7, 448, 451 Information technology, 409, 412, withdrawal from NATO, 258, 271 413-14 strategie doctrlne, 298-309 Intelligence estimates, 61, 67, 132, Franck Report, 33 215,329,331,498n Fratrieide effect, 392-3 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 23-5, 128, 131-2, 143-4, Gaither Report, 149, 151-3,237,242 151-2,157-60,180-1,216,226, Game Theory, 171-8, 181, 199-201, 228,253,266,320,326,329-30, 225,292,481-2n, 484n, 496n 336-7, 346-7, 369-75, 423, 432, See Chicken; Prisoner's dilemma 433 Gaullism, 306-9, 313-14 in SALT, 339-41 Germany, 9-11, 419, 420, 421, 435, See Midgetman; Minuteman; M-X; 441-2, 443 SS-9; SS-19 and atom bornb, 14-15 Interdiction, 102-3, 108, 141 and tactical nuclear weapon, Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 104-5 Talks, 381, 397-400 strategy, 309-11 INF Treaty, 397-8, 400-1, 406, 420 and MLF, 312-13 See Cruise missiles in Europe; unification, 408, 410-11 Pershing 11 Glasnost, 379, 403 Intermediate range ballistic missiles, Global Proteetion against Limited 157,158-61,226,253 Strikes system (GPALS), 429 See Iupiter: Thor Graduated deterrence, 107-10,272 International control, 186-7 Great Britain, 411, 420-2, 425, 448 of atomic energy, 36-8 Guarantee (US nuclear to Europe), International Institute for Strategie 50-1,125-7,296-8,312-14, Studies (IISS), 292-3, 345 368-9,374,405 Intra-war deterrence, 197-8,210,243, GulfWars, 408, 412, 413, 447-8, 361 514n See City-avoidance; Compellance Iran, 410, 434, 448, 452, 454 Hamburg Grab, 170 Iraq, 408-9, 410, 412, 417, 418, 432, Harmon Report, 53 433-4,444,447-51,452,455-6, Hiroshima, 21-3, 25, 36, 41, 48, 94, 516n 168,189,261-2,468n Israel, 433, 448, 449 strategy of, 16-20 Hudson Institute, 204, 224-5, 371 Japan, 16-20,411,430,442,443,446, Hungary, 408, 417, 439 447,451 Hydrogen bornbs, 95-6, 414 johnson Administration, 284-5 princtples, 61 Joint chiefs of staff (US), 26, 54, 73, US decision to deploy, 61-4 76-7, 240, 448 SubjectIndex 553
Joint Data Exchange Center, 417 'Missile gap', 132, 144,215,235, jupiter (IRBM), 157 478n,485n Missiles, 23-5, 30, 58, 191,420-1,429 Kazakhstan, 423, 442 missiles versus bombers, 143, Kennedy Administration, 85, 218, 158-60 233-6,250,273,279,281,311, missiles versus missiles, 180-1, 317,491n 336-7, 369-75 KiIlian Report, 149-50 See V-weapons Korean war, 68-71, 73, 75, 79-80,85, Mobility, 24-5, 156-9, 335-7, 497n 97, 261 Morale Kosovo, 413, 431 as a target, 5, 6-9 Kuomintang, 64, 260, 263 in Chinese doctrine, 259-61, 263 Multilateral force, 311-14 Last resort, 49-50, 105 Multiple decision-centres, 296, 303-4, Launch-on-warning, 252-3, 372, 430, 312 499n, 502-3m Multiple warheads (MIRVs), 150, League of Nations, 34, 186, 189, 194 329-30,335-6,339,370,374, Lethality, 352 423,424 Limited nuclear war, 101-13,201, in SALT, 340-1 222,284,334,375-6,383 Mutual assured destruction, 150, 181, Limited war, 93,117,119,121-2,192, 234-6,244-7,255-6,317,323, 251,276-7 331-2, 334, 342-3, 364, 385-7, concept, 93-100 429,443,461 European view of, 279-83 See Balance of terror; Stability; Lisbon force goals, 71, 273 Stalemate Local defence, 78,81,83 M-X ICBM, 374, 387, 392-4, 398, 433 Luftwaffe, 9-10 MYA-4bornber, 61
'Maginot Line mentality', 85, 275 Nth country problem, 288 Manhattan project, 14, 17, 37-8, 62, Nagasaki, 18-19,21-2, 168, 238 189,261 Maoism, 260 National Security Council (US) 50, 66, Marginalization, 425-6, 429 119-20,149,318,325,359-60, Marshall Aid, 55, 472n 479n Marxism, 54, 244, 258, 478-9n Navy (US), 22, 24-8, 89, 157-8 Massive retaliation, 72, 78-84, 90, Neutron bornb, 367 123, 146, 220, 244, 272, 276, 294, NewLook, 76-9,83, 84-5,273, 278 302-3,317 'New New Look', 78 Midgetman, 394 Nixon Administration, 317, 320, Military-industrial cornplex, 321-4, 324-7, 332, 358-9, 370 330 'No first use': Military-technical revolution. 244 NATO, 405-6, 432 Militia, 275 Soviet Union, 403 Minimax, solution in game theory, Non zero-sum games, 173, 235 176,225 North Atlantic Treaty, 69-70 Minimum deterrent, 195,248-50,375 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Minuteman lCBM, 157-8,215,336, (NATO), 75,83-5, 104, 111, 127, 370,373, 433 161, 197, 222, 229, 251, 271, 291, Misperception,193, 241-5 294, 306, 308-10, 357, 381-2, 554 Subject Index
North Atlantie Treaty Organization Pre-emptive war, 35, 106, 120-1, (NATO) - continued 133, 136, 141-3, 145, 153, 160, 398-401,405-6,412,415, 187-8,252,255,455,456,457, 417-18,419-23,426,432,436, 469-70n 439,462 Presidential direetive, 59, 376 formation, 70-1 Preventive war, 119-21,441,456-7 strategy of, 273-87, 311-14, 337 Prisoner's dilemma, 175-8 North Korea, 410, 430, 433-4, 439, Proliferation, 27, 288-91, 301, 444, 445-7, 452, 453 311,339,418,419,426,428, NSC 162/2, 77-9,81-2 440,442-4,446,454,464, NSC-68, 66-8, 70, 78, 117 469n,473n Nuclear freeze movernent, 383-4 SeeNth eountry problem Nuclear paeifists, 188-95 Proportional deterrenee, 289-90, and deterrenee, 191-2 300-2 Nuclear Planning Group (NATO), 313 Proportionality, as principle of limited Nuclear taboo, 68, 110 war, 97, 189, 200-1 Nuclear winter, 384 Protest movement: See Anti-nuclear movement Offenee-defenee duel, 29-31, 90, 152, Punishment, deterrenee by, 35-6, 78, 155, 238-42, 256, 332 83-4, 107 Operational research, 167 Push-button war, 23, 26, 58 Options, 220-2, 317, 355, 358-63, 364-5,377 Quemoy, 263-4 Overkill, 195 Overseas bases, 48, 51, 61 Radar, 156, 238 vulnerability, 128-9 RAND Corporation, 92, 128-9, 156, 166, 168, 181, 204, 218, 224, Pakistan, 444-5, 447, 454 244,292,309,317,360,459 Parity, 251-2, 339-40, 342-7, 349, 'RAND tradition', 355, 365 351,369,448,500n Rapid deployment force, 353 See Essential equivalenee Rationality Peaeeful eoexistenee, 139, 254 assumed in strategie theory, 172-5, Pearl Harbor, 189 177,204,207,305 type of attack, 31-2, 36, 144, 480n in deeision-making, 219-20 'People's war', 259-61, 264, 266 Reagan Administration, 379-80, 389, Perceptions, 153-4, 349-55 392 Perestroika, 379 eritique of strategie poliey, 388-92 Permanently operating faetors, 56-9, and nuclear strategy, 385-8 136-8 SeeAnti-nuclear movement; Pershing 11, 381, 383, 399, 402 Intermediate Nuclear Force; See Intermediate Nuclear Forees Nuclear freeze movement; Plate glass, 276 Strategie Arms Reduetion Talks; Pluton SRBM, 308 Strategie Defense Initiative Poland, 408, 417 Realist theory, 436-7, 442 Polaris missiles, 157,215,289,295-6, Reeiproeal fear of surprise attack, 312,335 153-5, 183, 188, 225-6, 235 Poseidon SLBM, 336 Reeonnaissanee satellites, 124, 225, Preeision warfare, 412 250, 335,470n, 490n Subject Index 555
Reprisals, 9-10, 200-1 Spaatz Report, 48, 52 and deterrenee, 37-9 Spaee, 236, 429,479-80n and intra-war bargaining, 201-2 Spasm war, 204 Republiean Party (US), 74, 79-80,431 Sphere of influenee, 55 Retaliation, Sputnik, 129, 131-2, 136, 146-7,218, and V-weapons, 12-13 263,478n, 479n and deterrenee theory, 39-40, SS-9 (ICBM), 329 189-90, 464n SS-19 (ICBM), 340 Retribution (as objective), 11-12, Stability, 170-1, 174, 180,235,318-19, 35-7, 189-90 323-4,436,440,441,443,458 'Rogue states', 410, 433-4, 435, 444, and arms control,187-8, 194 451, 454, 456 Stable eonfliet, strategy of, 166, 178, Roll-back, 73 180-4, 196 Royal Air Force (RAF), 6, 10-11 Stalemate, 90-1, 100, 119, 133, 146-7, Royal Navy, 11 155, 178, 180, 188,230 Russia, 408, 414, 415-18, 422-4, 428, Stalinism, 58, 138 429,430,432,433,434,451 Star Wars: See Soviet Union See Strategie Defense Initiative START treaties, 423-4 Safeguard, 320-1, 325, 370 State Department (US), 39, 66, 68 Salami taeties, 91 Stockpiles, 124 Sanetuaries, in Korea, 68, 73, 80 US,26,48,65,141 Saudi Arabia, 410-11, 448, 449 USSR,26-7,60 Scenarios, 170-1,204,300,365-6 Strategie, as adjeetive, 5, 112, worst-ease, 233-4 201,368 Seoweroft Commission, 393-9 Strategie Air Command (SAC), 61, 65, See Vulnerability 76,85, 125, 134, 149-51, 156, Seud rnissiles, 449, 450 168,427,486n Second Strike, 128, 160, 174, 183, 196, Strategie Arms Limitations Talks 216,226-7,236,279-80,334-5, (SALT), 242, 256, 318, 328-9, 332, 442 338-41, 346-7, 351, 356, 359-60, See Counter-city targeting 362,369-71,393 Sentinel, 320, 396 and Reagan Administration, 391-2, September 11th, terrorist attaeks, 410, 393,397 414,431,451,452,463, 518n See ABMTreaty Single integrated operations plan Strategie Arms Reduetions Talks, (SIOP), 232, 395, 431 398-400 Sino-Soviet split, 222, 264-7 Reykjavik summit, 400, 406 Skybolt,295 Strategie bombardment, 41, 47-8, 90, Snark (eruise missile), 337 165, 182,413 Soeial demoerats, 272 theory of, 4-9 Soviet Union, 437, 440, 447, 462 in World War 11, 9-11 strategie doctrine, 55-9, 105-7, against Japan, 17 136-45, 243-4, 246-57, 347-50, and atom bornb, 21-2 400-4, 494-500 Soviet views, 57-8 strategie build-up, 329-31, 343, 355 Strategie Defense Initiative (SOl), split, 408, 442 394-7,429,431 See Russia and arms eontrol, 399-400 556 SubjectIndex
Strategie Defense Initiative (SDI) • Terror continued and V-weapons, 12-13 and the Soviet Union, 397 and atom bombs, 34, 41 opposition to, 395-7 of Soviet arsenal, 251 Strategy Terrorism, 410, 412, 414, 416, 431, indirect, 94 433,434,445,447,451-2,454, Submarine-launched ballistic missiles 456-7 (SLBM), 215-16, 228-9, 333, Test Ban Treaty, 338-9 336-7,362,369,370,423,432, (1963),195,231,239 497n Theatre nuclear forces, 369 in SALT, 340-1 See Euro-Strategie Balance See Polaris; Poseidon; Trident Thor (IRBM), 157 Submarine-launched crutse missile, 413 Threat that leaves something to Submarines, 24, 183-4, 226, 248, 335, chance, 206-11, 276-7, 285 . 336-7,416 Tous Azimuts, 307 Sufficiency Triad, 326-7, 496n 1956 version, 147 Trident (SLBM), 296-7, 387, 433 1969 version, 325 Trip wire, 85, 276, 353 'Suitcase bomb', 25 Truman Administration, 47-51,62, Superiority, 118, 132,230,241-2,244, 64, 71, 72,80,281 250,343-4,346,348,498n,500n TU-4,61 Surprise attack, 18,31,39-40, 118, TU-16, 61, 473n 128, 138-9, 149-50, 187, 194,333 TU-20,61 suitability of atom bombs, 32-4 advantage of totalitarian as against Ukraine, 423, 442 liberal regimes, 34, 66-7, 129, Unilateral nuclear disarmament, 188, 132-3,371-2 193, 293-4 in Soviet doctrine, 56-7, 136-44 United Nations, 68-9, 186, 189, See First Strike; Pre-emptive war; 194,408,446,447,450-1, Preventive war; Reciprocal fear 456,463 of surprise attack US strategic bombing survey, 22, 29, Surrender, 92, 97, 100, 197 468n as concept, 18-19,92-3 Syria, 434 V-weapons, 12-15, 19-20,38 Systems analysis, 168-70 VI, 12-13,337 V2, 12-13, 21, 23-4, 31, 337 Tactical airpower. 5, 10 Victory, 117-18, 197,254-5,347,376, Tactical nuclear weapons, 63, 64-6, 382, 386, 387-8 73-4, 78, 146, 197, 275, 283, 285, Vietnam war, 170, 195, 198,210,221, 310,367,368,476n 261, 271, 321, 344-5, 349, 353, distinguished from 'strategic', 73, 362,366,412,439,484n 79,82,92, 110-13 Vladivostok (SALT Agreement), concept,92 340, 373 and limited nuclear war, 101-13 Vulnerability See Neutron bomb; Pluton to surprise attack, 128-9, Taiwan, 263,430,433,439 149-50, 54 Technological arms race, 129, 147-8, missile vulnerability,156-7, 228-9, 150-3 369-75, 393 See Offence-defence duel See Scowcroft Commission Subject Index 557
War Department (US), 26, 34 strategie bombardment in, 9-12 Warsaw Paet, 85, 111, 229, 274, 284, V-weapons in, 12-13 294,310 atom-bornbs in, 13-20 end of, 408, 417, 418, 419 and USSR, 55-6 Watergate, 329, 353 Weapons of mass destruction, 410, Yom Kippur war (1973),357,366, 412,414,428,433-4,445, 516n 449-50,455,456 Yugoslavia, forrner, 409, 413, 417 World Trade Center, attacked, 410, 451 World War 1,3, 10,34,98-9, 154, 193 World War II, 8-9, 38, 41, 59, 94, Zero option, 399 167, 193 Zero sum games, 174 Name Index
Acheson, D., 71, 473n, 491n; quoted, Bertram, c., 497n, 502n 64,71 Beschloss, M.R., 510n Adams, S., 474n Bethe, H., 494n, 508n; quoted, 320 Afferica, ]., 499n Betts, R., 518n; quoted, 452 Afheldt, H., 497n Bialer, S., 499n Ailleret, General C, 494n; quoted, 306 Blackett, P.M.S., 28-9, 40, 60, 111, Albright, D., 518n; quoted, 450 170, 292, 294,469n, 470n, Allison, G., 499n, 518n 472-3n, 474n, 475n, 476n, 478n, Almond, G., 500n 479n; quoted, 24-5, 31, 90, 102, Alsop, S., 486n; quoted, 229 134-5, 167, 472n, 473n Arnster, W., 180, 200, 482n; quoted, Blair, B., 506n, 511n, 513n 180-1 Bobbitt. P., 510n Anderson, 0., 467n Bocharev, general, quoted, 255 Arbatov, A., 509n; quoted, 404 Bond, B., 474n, 475n Archidamus, quoted, 19 Borden, w.t., 124, 471n, 477n; Arkin, W.M., 506n, 517n quoted,40 Arnold, General H., 22-3, 24, 48, Bottome, E., quoted, 494-5n 468n, 471n;quoted,22,39 Boulding, K., 483n Aron, R., 362, 491n, 494n; quoted, Boutwell,]., 503n, 507n 272,287,304,459 Bowie, R., 494n Art, R. 512n; quoted, 419 Bracken, P., 389, 507n Aspin, L., 432 Bradley, general 0., 473n; quoted, 65 Attlee, c., 54, 68; quoted, 38, 491n Brennan, D., 332, 476n, 481n, 486n, Augenstein, B.V., 490n 492n, 496n, 497n;quoted,332 Axthelm, General von, quoted, 13 Brenner, M.]., 502n Aziz, T., 449 Brezhnev, President L., 340, 503n, 509n; quoted, 348-9, Bailey, S., 483n 424,499n Baker,]., 449, 508n; quoted, 517n Brodle. B., 28, 29, 98, 126, 127, 160, Baldwin, DA, 515n 285,390, 459,460, 468n, 469n, Baldwin, H., 487n; quoted, 23 470n, 471n, 473n, 475n, 477n, Baldwin, S., quoted, 4-5 480n, 483n, 491n, 497n, 501n, Ball, D., 485n, 486n, 495n, 496n, 518n; quoted, 25, 28, 40, 41, 500n,503n, 506n, 515n 73-4,95-6,98,101,109-10,111, Barlow, E.]., 481n 124-5, 129, 154, 285-6, 362, Barnett. R., 500n; quoted, 355-6 468n, 469n, 472n, 475n, 480n, Barre, R., 308; quoted, 494n 481n Barton. ]., 503n Brooks, H., 495n Baylis, ]., 492n, 508n Brown, H., 387, 500n, 503n; quoted, Beaufre, General A., 299, 302-5, 313, 351,375 493n,494n;quoted,303-4 Browner, M., 485n, 486n Beard, E., 468n Brownli e, 1., 470n Bechhoefer, B., 482n Brzezinski, Z., 507n
558 Name Index 559
Buchan, A., 293, 465n, 490n, 494n; Clark, 1., 465n quoted, 312, 313, 494n Clausewitz, General von, 7, 448, Buchan, G., 513n; quoted, 425 483n Bukovsky, v., 504n CIay, General, quoted, 50-1 Bulganin, Marshai, 137, 139; Clifford, c, 494n; quoted, 36 quoted,140 Clinton, President W., 409, 410, 417, Bull, H., 292, 481n, 482n, 492n; 423,424,429,430-2 quoted, 174, 482n Coale, A.]., 470n Bundy, M., 467n, 468n, 498n, 507n, Cochran, T.B., 506n 510n;quoted, 344,391 Coffey, J., 498n; quoted, 343 Burdick. E., 192, 483n Cohen, S.T., 502n Burin, ES., 478n Cohen, W.,510n;quoted,432-3 Burke, Admiral, 480n; quoted, 157, Cole, P., 504n 227 Collins, i, 496n Bums, A.L., 482n, 492n, 497n Conant,J.,17 Burt, R., 502n, 503n Condon, E., 469n; quoted, 25 Bush, President G., 407-9, 410, 422-3, Cowley, Lieutenant General, Sir I., 429, 447, 450, 513n, 518n; 483n; quoted, 190 quoted,421 Cox, M., 515n Bush, President G.W., 410, 424, 431, 452,454,456;quoted,424 Daalder, 1., 508n, 512n, 514n Bush, v., 17,28,60, 468n, 469n; Dadant, P.M., 481n quoted, 24, 26-7, 30-1 Daniel, D., 498n, 499n, 500n Butler, General L., 427 Davis, L.E., 500n, 502n Butler, R., 451, 514n, 518n Dean, G., quoted, 65-6 Butow, R.].C., 468n; quoted, 19 Deane, M., 499n, 509n Buzzard, Admiral Sir A., 109, 292, De Gaulle, General c.. 272-3, 301, 475n,476n;quoted,107 305-8;quoted,298,305,306 D'Estaing, President V.G. 308, 494n Caldwell, L., 488n Digby, J.E, 481n Carneron, G., 511n Dinerstein. 472n, 478n, 479n, 488n; Carnpbell, K.M., 511n quoted, 56, 136 Capitanchik, D., 503n Divine, R., 474n Caplan, R., 510n Donnelly, C.N., 508n Carnesale, A., 518n Donovan, R.J., 474n Carrier, G., 504n Douglas-Horne, Sir A., quoted, 296 Carter, A., 432, 507n, 515n Douglass, J., 499n, 508n Carter, B., 495n, 501n; quoted, 362 Douhet, G., 9, 57, 58, 377, 465n; Carter, President l., 340, 341, 375-6, quoted,5-8 378,381,417,446,499n Draper, T, 505n Chamberlain, N., 351 Drell, S., 508n Chariton, M., 466n Driver, c. 483n Chayes, A., 322, 494n Dror, Y., 497n Cheney, R., quoted, 448-9 Duchene, E, 498n Chevenernent, J-P., 512n Dulles, J.E, 72, 76, 79, 85, 89-90, 92, Chiang, K-S., 263 95,146,220,474n,479n,491n, ChurchiII, Sir W.s., 75; quoted, 15, 515n; quoted, 50-1, 79-85,208, 50-1, 79, 118 220,278,476 Cirincione,]., 514n Dunn, ES., quoted, 471n 560 Name Index
Du Picq, A., 7 Galloway, E., 468-71n Dupuy, T.N., quoted, 475n Garfinkel, A., 504n Durch, W., 507n, 508n Garner, W., S09n Garrity, P.]., 512n, 513n Earle, E.M., 470n, 474n; quoted, Garthoff, R.L., 472n, 475n, 479n, 33-4, 95 488-50n, 499n, 510n;quoted,58 Eichenberg. R., 503n Garwin, R., 494n, 504n; quoted, 320 Eisenhower, President D., 72-3, 186, Garwin, T., 502n 295,439;quoted,73,479n Gates, R., 449, 517n Eliot, Major G.E, 470n, 480n; Gates, T., 217 quoted,33 George, A., 498n; quoted, 345 Ellsberg, D.,I71, 218 Gervasi, T., 506n Elman, M.E, 510n Gilpatric, R., 485n; quoted, 262 Enthoven, A., 218, 291, 485n, 486n, Gilpin, R., 481n, 487n 491n, 492n, 498n; quoted, 283-5, Giovannitti, L., 467n, 468n 343,494n Glaser, c., 511n Erickson,]., 509n; quoted, 402-3 Glasstone, S., 481n Erlichman, j., 324 Goebbels, ]., quoted, 13 Ermarth, E, quoted, 489n Goldsen, J.M., SOOn Etzold, T.H., 471n, 472n, 473n Golovine, M.N., 486n Gompert, D., 504n, 515n Falk, R., quoted, 450 Goodwin, G., 505n Falkenrath, RA, 511n Goold-Adams, R., 475n Farley, P., 508n Gorbachev, M., 379-80, 397, 399-400, Feis, H., 467n 407-8,415,423,424,431,503n Feld, B.T.,497n Gordon. M.R., S10n Fergus, M., 474n Gordon. P.H., 516n Finletter, T., quoted, 477n Gormley, D,. S14n Fisher, c., 514n Goure, L., 488n, 489n, 499n Foch, Marshal, 7 Gowing, M., 467n, 470n, 472n, 474n, Ford President G., 340, 503n 491n; quoted, 74 Forrestal,]., SO-I; quoted, SO Graham, B., 514n Forsberg, R., 384, 504n Gray, c., 331, 382, 487n, 496n, S02n, Fox, w., 469n, 471n; quoted, 26, S17n, S18n; quoted, 331, 347, 47,469n 370,371-2,376,502-5n Freed, E, 467n Grechko, Marshal, quoted, 256 Freedman, L., 466-7, 478n, 486n, Green, P., 481-3n; quoted, 173-4, 488n, 493n, 499n,500n, 502n, 194-5 504n,506n,510n,511n,517n Greenwood, T., 495n, 497n, 501n Frisch, O.R., 13 Grodzins, M., 469-70n Fukuyama, E, 510n Gronlund, L., 514n Fuller, Major General j.C, 4, 56, 377, Groom, J., 493n 468n;quoted,8,23-4 Groves, General L.R., 17, 468n Guderian,4 Gaddis,].L., 470n, 472n, 473n, 515n, 516n Hafner, P., 507n Gaither, 149 Halliday, E, S04n Gallois, General P., 299-302, 313, Halperin, M., 198-9,389-90, 479n, 491n, 493n, 494n; quoted, 482-3n, 485n, 497n, 490n, 506n; 286,299 quoted, 185-6, 224-5 Name Index 561
Halverson, T., 512n jcntleson, B., quoted, 515n Harnmond, P., 473n, 474n Iervls, R., 390, 476n; quoted, 193 Harknett. R.]., 513n, 517n johnson, D.V., 510n Harmon, Lieutenant General M.R., 91 ]ohnson, 1., 66 Harvey, M., 489n, 499n johnson, L.B., 242, 338, 430, 439 Haselkorn. A., 518n Iones, T.K., quoted, 507 Haskins, c.. 470n; quoted, 33 joseph, R.G., 514n Healey, 0., 272, 475n, 479n, 493n; quoted, 102, 146 Kadt, E,J.de, quoted, 493n Hermann, R., 501n Kahan, I-, 466n, 495n, 496n; quoted, Hewlett, R.G., 467n 324 Hibbs, M., 518n; quoted, 450 Kahn, H., 158, 172, 180, 191-2, 198, Hirohito, Emperor, 16 203-6, 224-5, 288, 371-2, 387, Hiteh, c, 218, 480n; quoted, 166 390,459, 477n, 480n, 482n, Hitler, A., 9, 12, 13, 15, 46, 69, 351; 483n,484n,485n,500n,505n; quoted,13 quoted, 126-7, 148, 154, 157, Hoag, D.C., quoted, 497n 185, 197,204, 478n, 479n, Hoag, M., 171, 482n, 490n, 492n; 484n,492n quoted, 188, 291 Kaiser, K., 5IOn, 512n Hoeber, A., 499n, 509n Kaplan, E, 489n, 502n Hoenig, M.M., 506n Kaplan, M., 171-2, 481n, 483n, 484n, Hoffman. ES., 477n, 481n 508n;quoted,201-3 Hoffrnan, B., 518n Karp, R.C., 513n Holloway, 0., 466n, 508n Karsh, E., 5IOn, 517n Holst,]., 496n, 501n Kass, 1., 509n Hook, S., 192, 483n Katzenstein. 515n Horeliek. A., 479n, 488n Kaufman. R., 495n Howard, M., 467n, 469n, 471n, Kaufman, VV.,96,98, 318,475n,476n, 474n, 481n, 515n, 518n; 484-7n, 491n, 192n; quoted, 96, quoted, 437, 459 99,104,198,217,221,279,282 Hsieh, A.L., 489-90n Kecskerneti, P., 92-3, 474n Hughes, G.P., 502n Kelleher, C; 494n; quoted, 308-9 Hugo, V., 215 Kernpelman, M., 507n Huntington, S.P., 479n Kennan, G., 63-4, 66, 471n, 477n, Hussein, S., 412, 417, 447, 448-9, 480n;quoted,48, 63,130,153 455, 463 Kennedy, Senator E., 504n Huth, P., 516n Kennedy, Presldent l.E, 225, 229, 237-8, 250, 264, 295, 485n; Ikle, E, 386-7, 486n, 492n, 497n, quoted,218,231,480n, 486n 517n;quoted, 333-4, 443 Kenned~ ~,411, 510n Irving, 0., 13, 467n Khruschev, N.S., 137-9, 144,229, Isayev, Major-General, quoted, 57 247-54, 260, 264-5, 487n, (Sergei) 248; quoted, 140, 143,247-9, jackson, Senator H., 340, 371; 264, 265,379,478n, 487n, 490n quoted, 371 Killin,]., 149, 479n; quoted, 477n, ]anis, 1., 495n 478n jastrow, R., 508n Ktng.j., 200, 466n, 474-7n, 480n; jayne, E.R., 487n quoted, 100, 103-4, 111, 160 ]effries, Z., 33 King-Hall, S., 493n; quoted, 293 jenkins, B., 518n; quoted, 451 Kipp, j.YV., 512n 562 Name Index
Kissinger, H., 103-4, 273, 285, 311, Lilienthal, D., 49, 64, 66, 470n, 477n; 324-5,359,393,411,459,475n, quoted, 33, 63 476n,479n,490n,491n,492n, Lin, P., quoted, 260 493n, 495n, 498n, 500n, 502n; Llppman, w., 471n; quoted, 46 quoted, 97, 101-3, 111, 153, 277, Lipton, N., 495n 324, 346-7, 358-9, 370, 477n, Litwak, R., 511n, 518n 485n Lodal, L 502-3n, 511n Klotz, F., 471n, 472n Long, FA, 495, 507n; quoted, 322 Knoll, E., 495n Loosbrock, L 486n Knorr, K., 480n, 482n, 483n, 484n, Lowe, G., 476n, 480n 492n,498n;quoted,201 Lugar, R., 416 Kohl, H., quoted, 421 Luttwak, E., 346, 382, 498n, 505n; Kohl, w., 490n, 493n, 494n; quoted, quoted, 350-1, 499n 512n Lutz, R.]., 477n Kohler, F., 490n; quoted, 499n Kolkowicz, R., 487n; quoted, 243 Maarenen, S.A. 512n Kotkin, S., 515n MacArthur, General D., 68; quoted, Krarnish, A., 472n 84-5 Krasilnikov, Lieutenant-General, McConnell, j., 509n quoted, 107, 142 McFadden, ].N., 495n Krylov, Marshal, quoted, 252-3 McGovern, Senator G., 360 Kuznetsov, V.Z., 235 McGwire, M., 509n, 514n MacIsaacs, D., 468n Labrie, R.P., 503n Mack, A., 5 IOn Laird, M., 325-6, 362, 370, 496n McKean, R., 480n; quoted, 166 Larnbeth, B., 469n, 501n; quoted, Mackintosh, M., 492n 245-6,498n,501n McMahon, Senator, B., 37 Lanchester, F.W., 167 MacMillan, H., 295; quoted, 295 Lapp, R., 495n McNamara, R.S., 216-21, 223, 227, Lavoy, P.R., 511n 229-30,232-6,238-42,243-7, Leber, G., 510n 250,255-6,266,272-3,286-7, Lebow, R.N., 437-8, 506n, 507n, 288,290-1,304,312-13,317-20, 515n, 516n;quoted, 437 322-3, 325-6, 329, 332, 335, 343, Lee, S., 513n; quoted, 425 362-3,366,389,484-7n, 492n, Leebaert, D., 505n 494n, 506n, 510n; quoted, 220, Legge,1.M., 510n 221,222-3,225,228,240-1,244, Leghorn, Colonel R., 108, 121, 476n; 282-3,291, 405, 510n quoted, 108, 477n McNaughton, j., 484n; quoted, 235 Le May, c. 468n; quoted, 17 Malenkov, 139 Leppingwell, L 416, 511 n Malinovsky, MarshaI R.Ya, 249; Levine, R., 506n quoted, 250-2, 489n Levy.}., quoted, 510n Mandelbaum, M., 504n, 509n Lewis, G., 514n Mao, Tse-tung, 258,261,265-6, Lewis, K., 502n 490n; quoted, 259-60, 263 Liddell Hart, Captain B., 4, 93-4, 107, Marshall. A., 218, 224, 317 136,274,294,466n, 467n, 468n, Marshall. General, 17-18, SO; 471n, 474n, 476n, 478n, 480n; quoted,18 quoted, 11, 18-20, 40, 95, 111, Martin, L., 365, 498n, 501n; quoted, 275,292,475n 343,492n, 493n Name Index 563
Masters, D., 468-71n Nunn, S., 416 Maxwell, S., 498n Nye,]., 505n, 510n, 518n May, E.R., 516n May, M., 500n; quoted, 356 Odom, W., 512n Mazarr, M., 425, 513n, 517n Ollapally, D., 517n Mearsheimer, ].,441-2, 510n, 516n O'Neill, R., 427 Mettes, A., 510n Oppenheimer, R., 17, 62, 64-5, Mery, General G., 494n; quoted, 308 238, 470n, 474n; quoted, 17,33, Metz, S., 510n 63,90 Meyer, S.M., 509n Osgood, R., 98, 473-5n, 482n, 485n; Mikshe, EO., 490n quoted,96-7, 98,101-2,187 Milch, Field Marshai P., quoted, 13 Millis, w., 472n Packard, D., quoted, 325 Millot, M.D., 505n Panofsky, W., 334, 497n; quoted, 334 Milosevic, S., 417 Paul, T.V., 513n, 515n, 517n Montgomery, Field Marshai B., 474n; Payne, E,500n,504n quoted,79 Payne, K., 503n, 517n; quoted, 376 Morgan, P., 484n, 498n P'eng Te-Huai, Marshal, quoted, 260 Morgenstern, 0.,171,218, 480n, Perisco,]., 517n 482n;quoted, 160, 179,481n Perkovich, G., 517n Morris, EA., 495n Perle, R., 391 Moss, N., 496n Perry, W.]., 511n Mueller, r, 438-9, 516n, 517n Pierre, A., 493n Murphy, c., 477n; quoted, 76, 466n Pipes, R., 487n Murray, T., 482n Pokrovsky, Major General, quoted, Musharraf, General P., quoted, 445 106, 143 Myrdal, A., 482n; quoted, 187 Pollack, ]., 490n Pollack, K., 518n Nacht, M., 501n Potter, W., 513n Nerlich, U., 501n Powell, C. 517n; quoted, 448 Neumann. ] .von, 171, 490n Powell, R., 489n Neustadt, R.]., 493n Power, General T.S., 478n; quoted, Newhouse, i. 497n 134, 135, 486n Newman,]., 191, 483n; quoted, 191 Pranger, R., 501n Newman, R.D., 511n Price, R., 515n Nicholas, Colonel]., 476n; Pry, P.V. 511n quoted,121 Puleston, Captain W.D., 476n; Nikitin, Colonel-General of Aviation, quoted,120 472n Putin, V., 417, 424, 431, 454 Nimitz, Admiral c., quoted, 29 Nitze, P., 66, 311, 386-7, 505n; Quade, E.S., 481n quoted, 117-18, 502n, 508n Quarles, D., quoted, 147 Nixon, President R., 318, 324, 345-6, Quester, G., 467n, 486n, 511n; 360, 424, 496n, 500n; quoted, quoted,418 81-2, 325, 359 Quinlan, M., 425-6, 504n, 513n Noel-Baker, P., 194, 483n Norstad, General L., 48, 311; Rabb, T.K. 510n quoted,278 Rabinowitch, E., 469-70n; Novak, M., 505n quoted,192 564 Name Index
Ramanna, R., 517n Sandys, D., quoted, 279-80 Rapaport, A., 172-3; quoted, 157 Sarkesian, S., 495n Rathjens, G., 480, 494n, 495n; Schear, J., 508n quoted, 158, 321, 496 Scheer, R., 507n Read, ~,201,208,483n,492n; Schell, J., 384, 504n, 514n; quoted, quoted, 197,203 427-8 Reagan, President R., 379-80, 382, Schelling, T., 171, 174, 193, 197-8, 385,395-6,399-400,407,429, 203,204,219,221,345,390,459, 432,460-1;quoted, 394, 504n 480-5n, 491n, 506n; quoted, 154, Reardon, S., 466n 179, 181-7, 199,200,203, Reback, S., 508n 206-11,223,277,390,492n, Rees, D., 474n 493n Reich, E., 481n Schilling, w., 473-4n, 486n, 502n Reichart, ].E, 514n Schlesinger, A., 486n; quoted, 235 Reinbardt, Colonel G.c., 478n; Schlesinger, J., 221, 360-4, 365, quoted, 137 368-70, 374-5, 386-7, 498n, Reston, J., quoted, 81 499-500n, 50ln; quoted, 327, Rhinelander, J., 498n 342, 351, 360-1, 366, 373, 496n, Richardson, ].L., 491n 500-1n Richardson, Colonel R., 476n; Schmidt, H., 272, 490n; quoted, 274 quoted,129 Schneider, G., 507n Richelson, J., 505n Schneider, W., 496n Ridenour, L., 470n; quoted, 31, 472n Schulze, EJ., 510n Riedei, B., 517n Schwartz, D., 507n Rifkind, M., quoted, 512n Scott, H.E, 488n Roberts, c.. 509n Scoville, H., 501n Rodberg. L., 495n Scowcroft, General B., 393, 513n; Rosenau, J., 492n quoted,422 Rosenberg, D., 465n Seaborg, G., 466n Rosenberg. J., 516n Seagal, G., 508n Rosencrance, R.N., 492n Seitz, R., 504n Ross, D., 489n Shearer, D., 495n Rostow, W., 235 Shenfield, S., 509n Rotberg, R.l., 5IOn Shepilov, D., quoted, 140 Rotblat, J., 427, 513n Sherwin, c.w., 180, 192,200, 482n; Rotmistrov, General, quoted, 137-8, quoted,181 141-2,479n Shils, E., quoted, 472n Rowen, H., 218, 477n, 481n, 487n Shipler, D., 499n Rumsfeld, D., 429-30, 431, 433-4; Sidorenko, Colonel A.A., 364 quoted,433 Sigal, L., 517n Rush, M., 479n, 488n Simonyon, General R., quoted, 348 RusselI, B., 37, 191, 483n; quoted, 37 Singer, ].D., 480n RusselI, Senator R., quoted, 92-3 Skaggs, D., 466n Russett, B., 516n Slessor, Sir)., 474n; quoted, 76 Rybkin, Lieutenant General, 254 Slocornbe, W., 498n, 505n; quoted, 345,512n Sabin, P., 503n Sloss, L.,505n Sagan, c.. 384, 507n; quoted, 384 Smith, B.L.R., 477n Sagan, S., 440-1, 442, 511n, 515n, Smith, D., 504n 516n, 517n Smith, G., 510n Name Index 565
Smith, P., 21, 468n, 471n Tomashevsky, D., 499n Smith, w., 291, 485-6n, 491n, 492n, Toth, R., 515n 498n;quoted,283-5,343,494n Trachtenberg. M., 465n Smoke, R., 484n, 498n; quoted, Trainor, General B.E., 510n 199, 345 Trainor,]., 486n Smyth, H., 470n; quoted, 33 Trenchard, Air Marshal, quoted, 5 Snyde~G., 107, 171,390, 474-5n, Treverton, G., 502n 480-2n, 494n; quoted, ISS, 158, Truman, President H.S., 15, 25, 36, 38, 160-1,178,304-5,476n,484n 49-50,64,66,68,72-3,84-5, Sokolovsky, MarshaI L., 249, 486n, 491n;quoted, 29, 36, 49, 70 490n; quoted, 252 Tucket, R., 474n, 505n Solingen, E., 517n Tupolev, A.W., quoted, 488n Spaatz, General, 48 Tyroler, c., 505n Stalin, Marshal j., 54-9, 136-9, 141-3, 250 Ullman, R., quoted, 419-20, 512n Stassen, H., 186-7 Urey, H., 470n Stein,J.G., 437-8, 506n, 515n, 516n, Ustinov, Marshal, quoted, 401-2 518n; quoted, 437 Steinberg. G.,507n Van Cleave, W., 500n; quoted, 356, Steinbruner, j., 495n, 499n, 502n, 364,371, 499n 515n; quoted, 351 Van Den Dungen. P., 503n Steiner, B., 466n Vandenburg, General, 48 Stimson, H., 17, 467n, 468n; quoted, Vandenburg, Senator, quoted, 69 15, 18, 25 Vershinin, MarshaI of Aviation, 472n; Stone.j., 499n; quoted, 347-8 quoted, 58, 141 Strachey, i. 294, 493n Vincent, r, 499n Stratrnan, P., 501n Viner, J., 28, 469n, 471n, 473n; Strauss, EJ., quoted, 309-10 quoted, 27, 40, 65 Strauss, Admiral L., quoted, 64 Strong, A.L., 259 Walkowitz, Colonel T.E, 476n; Sulzberger, c.t., quoted, 488n quoted,121 Synnott, H., 517n Waltz, K., 436, 440, 441, 442, Szilard, L., 25, 483n, 484n; quoted, 515n, 516n 194, 200-1 Warden, J.A., 511n Warner, E., 487-9n; quoted, 492n Talbot. S., 508n, 512n Watman, K., 515n Talensky, Major General N., 143; Watt, D.C., 468n quoted, 137-8,254, 478n Way, K., 468-71n Tannewald. N., 515n Weinberg, S., 494n Tanter, R., 5Un Weinberger, c.. 388; quoted, 504n Tatom, E., quoted, 469n Wells, H.G., 4 Taylor, General M., 491n; quoted, Wells, S.E, 473n 277-8 Wheeler, H., 192, 483n Taylor, W.S., 504n Wheeler, N., 466n Tedder, L., quoted, 469n, 477n Whetten, L., quoted, 499n Thatcher, M., quoted, 421 Whiting, A.S., 489n Thayer, B., 511n Wieseltier, L., 506n Thomas, r, 490n Wiesner, J., 322, 486n, 494n; quoted, Thompson, E.P., 504n; quoted, 382-3 239,322 Toffler, A. & H., 511n Wildavsky, A., 483n; quoted, 193 566 Name Index
Wilkening, 0., 513n, 515n Wright, c.. 481n Williams, P., 500n Wright, 0., 514n Willrich, M., 497n Wilson, A., 481n Yangel, M.K., 487n Windsor, P., 490n Yarmolinsky, A., 322-3, 495n Winters, EX., 505n Yeltsin, B., 417, 423, 424, 431 Wirtz, L 442, 511 n, 513n, 517n Yergin, 0., 477n Witze, c.. 486n; quoted, 230 Yermashev, I., 490n Wohlstetter, A., 128-9, 135, York, H., 470n, 473n, 477n, 487n, 151-8, 169,219,224,289, 495n, 497n, 498n; quoted, 238-9, 290, 335,347, 387, 459,469n, 322,334,346,479n 470n, 477n, 478n, 481n, 492n, Yost, 0., 466n, 504n, 513n 494n,496n,500n,501n,505n; quoted, 129, 134, 168-9, 290, Zadra, R., 512n 312, 331, 357, 365, 481n, Zagoria, 0., 489n 482n,497n Zakharov, General, quoted, 248 Wohlstetter, R., 469n Zhukov, Marshai, 137, 142; Wolfe, T., 248, 488n quoted, 106 Wolfers, A., quoted, 471n Zraket, c.. 515n Woods, M., 516n Zuckerman, Sir 5., 481n; quoted, 167, Woolsey, ]., 507n; quoted, 443 170-1