of the younger ones. But footwear, light clothes, and hats were necessary to counteract the hazards of infections from punctures, infestation by worms, and the effects of the sun. The July temperature variation was a hazard also; scantily— clad or naked children were apt to have common colds turn into serious upper respiratory infections and pneumonia. The Commanding Officer, 4th Marines was prompted by the needs of the peasants in the Chu Lai area to request his wife on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, to organize a drive for clothing and send the collected material to his regiment. Marine Corps wives on Oahu collected over 1,000 pounds of clothing for this humanitarian purpose, and the Marines in the Chu Lai TAOR dis- tributed it to the most needy individuals and families that they were able to find through coordination with the local authorities. (37)
The Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and Project HANDCLASP were additional sources of civic action materials. CARE was a nonprofit, joint organization of 26 accredited American service agencies which had been formed in 1945 to help Americans overseas. Since that time, CARE has changed its emphasis to help human beings everywhere and has delivered almost one billion dollars worth of supplies over- seas. (38) Project HANDCLASP was an official Navy program which had been formed in 1962 to promote mutual understanding between Americans and citizens of other lands. In June 1965, the Marine Corps units in Vietnam were brought into the program and shortly after that month began to receive HANDCLASP supplies for their civic action programs. (39)
On 5 July 1965, the first CARE supplies for III NAP arrived in Vietnam; the shipment was a humble beginning for a program with important possibilities for expansion by the Marine Corps. Two barrels of soap and two boxes of medical supplies comprised the first shipment. The directors of HANDCLASP delivered a substantial amount of supplies during July 1965 to Vietnam for distribution by III MAP. The relief and humanitarian nature of HANDCLASP as it applied to Vietnam was revealed in the shipping list of the first group of supplies. The first shipment, approximately 9,000 pounds of supplies, was comprised mainly of soap, buttons, thread, medicine, nutribio (a food supplement), and toys. Both CARE and HANDCLASP after humble beginnings, would become important sources of aid for Marine Corps civic action as III MAP expanded its TAORs and began to support Vietnamese local government and rural construction. The provision of Marine Corps engineering and general con- struction assistance to Vietnamese in July 1965 highlighted the enforced limits of civic action during the first five months in Vietnam. Operational commitments minimized engineer work in support of civic action. The Marine Corps spent several months on the defensive in TAORs which were only gradually expanded. Construction of Main Lines of Resistance (later termed Porward
28 Edges of the Battle Area) took precedence over all building activity in the infantry battalions. And the engineer effort was split amongst airfield construction and engineer assistance for clearing new campsites, providing for area drainage, and constructing and repairing routes of communication within the expanding TAORs. (40) The continuous buildup of forces and the gradual movement inland and along the coast inhibited civic action construction projects.
The development of new life hamlets and the integration of refugees back into Vietnamese life were vital issues in the war and were affected by the initial defensive posture of the Marine Corps. III MAP units relocated civilian homes lying in fields of fire on the defensive perimeters surrounding the Da Nang Airbase and the Chu Lai Airfield. The movement of civilians under these circumstances was not the usual spontane- ous and humanitarian thing on which the Marine Corps had con- centrated. Coordination with the local governing officials proved difficult; this problem was reflected in the persistent return of displaced civilians to their cultivated plots. Ad- ditionally, the Marine Corps did not succeed in solving the problem of fair and timely payment of claims by the GVN. (41)
The First Five Months of Civic Action: Rising Emphasis on Support for Local Government
Nevertheless, the Marine Corps achieved substantial results in civic action during the first five months (March-July 1965) in Vietnam in the face of difficulties in emphasis, coordina- tion, and adjustment. Command emphasis was primarily on the tactical integrity of the TAORs and secondarily on things like civic action. HQ, III MAP only gradually established coordina- tion between its activities and those of HQ, I Corps Tactical Zone. The CG,I Corps remained suspicious of the intentions and the effectiveness of the Marine Corps and this fact interf erred with coordination. But once General Walt had assured the tactical integrity of his TAORs, he proceeded to the long final step of determining what assistance the GVN required to win the rural struggle. The Marine Corps had required time to adjust to the movements of infantry battalions which were required to secure the expanding TAORs. III MAP also required time to de- velop and apply a sound theory of operations which took into account the necessity for security for the officials of the GVN who were executing the Republic's plan for rural construction. By the end of July, General Walt began to sense that civic action was the link between the Marine Corps tactical mission and Vietnamese rural construction.
Various factors by June and July 1965 pointed out the im- portance of purposeful civic action in support of the GVN. Con- tinuous and regular medical support for the local population,
29 either at fixed locations or at different locations on a fixed schedule, had proven to be extraordinarily effective. The in- creasing emphasis on regular service implied the integration of Marine Corps medical treatments with the struggling Vietnamese Rural Health Service. A vital link with the Vietnamese health program began to be forged by the training of rural health workers by corpsmen both in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. (42) The Commanding Officer, 4th Marines, Colonel Edward P. Dupras, Jr., set up a medical training program for Vietnamese health workers in his area on 23 June 1965. Colonel Dupras' effort was a pioneering one in the Chu Lai TAOR and revealed the trend towards civic action in direct support of the GVN.(43)
But coordination between HQ, III MAP and the U. S. Oper- ations Mission in Vietnam, the civilian side of the J½merican effort in the Republic was slow in developing. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) supplies were distributed by the U. S. Operations Mission to the U.S. agencies and forces in Vietnam. The Marine Corps received no MEDCAP supplies through regular channels in March—April 1965 and not until June were appreciable quantities received. For example, on 30 June 1965, the Marine Corps received 1,500 pounds (value $2,355.25) of medical supplies to be used during the month of July. (44) Coordination between the U.S. Operations Mission and III MAP was critical for both organizations. The mission had funds for medical supplies for support of rural construction but no operating personnel at the hamlet—village level. (45) The Marine Corps, on the other hand, had thousands of Marines and scores of doctors and corps- men who were available as a concrete link between the U.S. government and the people of Vietnam at the hamlet level.
Throughout the first five months in Vietnam as Marine Corps support for Vietnamese rural construction began to coalesce, individual Marines launched spontaneous "programs" of their own which served as a powerful antidote to the Viet Cong propaganda which emphasized the brutality and ruthlessness of a foreign, professional, combat force. Sergeant John D. Moss of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ)1 bought a small horse in mid-June 1965 near the Da Nang Airbase. (46) Sergeant Moss then went into the free pony ride business and brought brief happiness and lasting memories into the lives of many innocents. Less well known was the anonymous Marine who impressed Mr. Nguyen Dinh Nam, Village Chief of Hoa Than (directly west of Da Nang). After observing Marine Corps operations for three months, Mr. Nam wrote a letter expressing the emotions of the people in Northwest Hoa Vang towards the Marine Corps. Both he and the rural population were especially impressed by the spontaneous humanity of the combat Marines. Mr. Nam noted the following:
30 r
S. — a
à "I.. •
—.1 a Medical evacuation: a Vietnamese farmer waits for helicopter evacuation on 5 May 1965 northwest of Da Nang. Sgt Dubry, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, is in immediate command of the move. Evacuation of seriously sick or injured civilians was an important part of the Medical Civic Action Program. (USMC Al84126)
S 0
Eye ailments: infections of the eyes were notoriously com- mon in Vietnam and were the result largely of missing emphasis on the use of soap and water. In this scene HM—2 M.E. Prigmore assists an old grey-beard while a probable father and small daughter wait their turn. Note the curious but apprehensive spectator at lower right. (USMC A184659)
30a
They /the Marines/ have all the favorable attitudes towards the people of this area. For example, it was noted that one officer of the rank of Major while walking saw a child whose foot was bleeding. He stopped and was happy to dress the boy's foot. (47)
Various Marine Corps combat and supporting organizations carried out humanitarian civic action which was imaginative and resourceful. On Monday 19 July 1965, Company D,1st Battalion, 3d Marines purchased a young water buffalo for 4,000 piasters ("tourist" rate of exchange approximately 75 piasters to one dollar) at Hoa Thinh,a village complex located a few miles southwest of the Da Nang Airbase. The company planned to raise the buffalo and then give it to an especially needy family. (48) Closer to the center of the TAOR, the Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG) after its formation in the Da Nang area, began to support local charitable organizations. Members of the FLSG discovered that in the Sacred Heart Orphanage, a struggling religious charity, flour for bread was being provided in moder- ate quantities from Vietnamese government sources. But the Catholic sisters operating the charity seemed less pleased than they should have been with the generosity of the government. The FLSG soon found the answer to the paradox. The orphanage had no facilities for baking bread and the sisters had to deal with a city bakery which took half of the flour as the charge for preparing the remainder as bread. The HQ, FLSG, put avail- able Marine Corps ovens to work in support of the handful of sisters and their brood of helpless and unwanted youngsters. One thousand pounds of bread were soon baked for the cause of the Sacred Heart. The efforts of Marine Corps civic action were difficult to measure in terms of advances in the struggle against the Viet Cong. HQ, III MAF began to collect statistics on the number of medical treatments rendered, pounds of food and clothing dis- tributed, etc.. But the correlation between medical treatments and the erosion of the Viet Cong political and military effort was too complex f or definition. For example, how many civic action medical treatments advanced the Republican cause a certain percent towards final victory in the war? Questions of this sort were possible to broach; however, they were impossible to answer. Probably the most effective correlation between civic action and the struggle against the Viet Cong was information received from the peasants about the movements, activities, and plans of the rural communists. But the receipt of information of intelligence value was more dependent on calculated and effective security than warm, spontaneous, and humanitarian civic action. Nevertheless, there was a close relationship be- tween security and civic action. Whenever Marine Corps civic action took place, Marine Corps rifles provided security, un- wittingly at first in many cases but eventually on purpose. And in spite of the lack of a precise mathematical correlation be- tween medical treatments for Vietnamese civilians and progress
31 against the Viet Cong, there was an indisputable increase in hard information about the enemy. (49)
Why was this information important?The Viet Cong existed only with the silence of the rural population. Viet Cong move- ment and functioning was impossible in the event of general disclosure by the peasantry. Lawrence of Arabia, two generations ago spelled out the reality of a successful guerrilla movement in a brief thought--a civilian population unwilling to disclose the presence and movements of the guerrilla functionaries. Lawrence's thought was a function of his experience in the sparsely populated Northwestern Arabian Peninsula. In the densely populated areas around Da Nang, guerrillas were even less able to move without the knowledge of the peasantry. Viet Cong success depended on muting the local people and this was done by a combination of physical terror and hope for a better future life. The emphasis was on terror, however, and any successful counteraction by the Marine Corps and the Vietnamese government would have to take the form of either more effective terror or decisive security against the Viet Cong atrocities. (50) The Viet Cong promise of a brighter future would have to be undercut by an effective program of rural construction on the part of the Republic and civic action by the Marine Corps.
The success of Marine Corps civic action could be measured by the receipt of intelligence information from the peasantry. And because the peasants provided information only with adequate security, the providing of intelligence information became one of the best indicators of progress in the war. Reliable infor- mation began to increase by mid-June 1965, and by July, peasants were providing information in a large number of exchanges. For example, on 10 July 1965, the peasants at Le My reported that route 545 (see Map Number One) was mined just north of Hill 282. Two days later, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines reported that civilians from Thinh Tay had exposed the presence of a Viet Cong company located approximately 1,200 meters southwest of the district headquarters at Hieu Duc in notorious "Happy Valley" (see Map Number One). Marine Corps infantry battalions which had won the confidence of the people by careful attention to their feelings and needs were sometimes rewarded with re- markably precise and valuable information. On 24 July 1965, a woman living in Kinh Than reported that two days earlier, 100 Viet Cong carrying small arms including one automatic rifle and each carrying one grenade passed by her home. She also noted that the Viet Cong were wearing black uniforms and carrying rice in long cloth rolls. (51)
Civilians like the woman of Kinh Thanh repaid heavy invest- ments in civic action. The Viet Cong insurgency was simply not possible with a population of similar peop1e Civic action aimed to create peasants who recognized the Marine Corps as a benevolent protector and who were willing to work hand in hand with the Republican government for the advancement of the rural
32 areas. And the concept began to emerge that Marine Corps combat operations against the main and guerrilla forces of the Viet Cong were not solely for the purpose of inflicting casual- ties. The higher Marine Corps leadership began to visualize the combat operations as the screen behind which Vietnamese rural construction could progress and "the other war" could finally be won.
33 Chapter V
A Turning Point August 1965
August 1965 ushered in a fresh realization of the importance of civic action. HQ, III MAE and the infantry battalions had learned that successful engagements against main force enemy units and interference with the movements of guerrillas were of little importance if the GVN was unable to fill the re- sulting political and military vacuum. In the area to the south of the Da Nang air base, the GVN was unable either to execute an effective program of rural construction or to re- construct Republican government, and the 9th Marines was obliged to carry out operations behind its frontline positions because of the presence of a Viet Cong dominated peasantry in Cam Ne village. (1) These operations called attention to the need for much greater coordination between HQ, III MAE and the Vietnamese government in the northern region. The Vietnamese government was meeting heavy weather south of Da Nang and the Marine Corps had to trim its combat sails in order to assist Vietnamese rural construction behind the Marine Corps FEBA. On 7 August 1965, General Walt assumed operational control of the I Corps Advisory Group, a task which carried with it the necessity for increased knowledge,of Vietnamese plans and capabilities. (2)
The general situation in August demanded more effective coordination between the commanders, politicians, and function- aries who disposed of the resources for combatting the Viet Cong. HQ, III MAF had coordinated extensively with the Viet- namese authorities prior to August 1965, but the most effective aims for Marine Corps civic action had not yet been determined. At the battalion level, civic action continued to have the spirit of an enthusiastic people-to-people effort rather than a program synchronized towards a single decisive goal. (3) Fr example, the diffuse idea of winning the people was simply not enough to direct a useful program of civic action. The GVN, the U.S. Operations Mission, and the Marine Corps were winning the people; but, the Vietnamese Government was unable to secure areas cleared by the Marine Corps and ARVN combat units. General Walt needed a firmer target for civic action. He had to know two things: first, the Republicts rural construction plans, and second, the resources available in ICTZ to support those plans. To discover those things he needed a better system of coordination between himself and the authorities of the Vietnamese state.
34 The Formation of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council: late August 1965
But the complexities of fighting in a foreign, sovereign state presented problems. Neither the United States nor South Vietnam would accept a single military commander and staff. Yet the Republican Government required the efficient use of all of the resources available for the struggle if it were ever to reestablish control over its Northern Region. The situation called for great tact; both the United States and Vietnamese authorities required a coordinating body to ensure the use of available resources in support of an effective plan for the survival of the Vietnamese government. "Pursuant to the August 25, 1965, conversation between General L. W Walt. ..and Mr. Marcus J. Gordon, Regional Director USOM LUnited States Operations Mission/,I Corps, the first meeting of a permanent regional working group was convened on August 30, l965."(4) The Civil Affairs Officer of III MAP had suggested on 29 August 1965 that the coordinating council which had been created several days earlier by the meeting between Wait and Gordon be called the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council (I Corps JCC). The term, council, had no connotation in the Republic of Vietnam which precluded its use. The term, joint, was used because General Walt and Mr. Gordon intended that the Vietnamese as well as the Americans be represented.
The establistment of the I Corps JCC was a milestone in the development of Marine Corps civic action in Vietnam. The mission of the council spelled out the importance of Vietnamese rural construction and was intended to ensure maximum support for it. The I Corps JCC was to become familiar with the GVN's rural construction program in the ICTZ. Having become familiar with the plan, the I Corps JCC was to determine the requirements for cooperation and support between agencies and to recommend methods or procedures to meet the requirements. (5)
General Walt, who had been designated as Senior U.S. Military Advisor to the CG,I Corps, earlier in August 1965, intended that the I Corps JCC focus Marine Corps civic action on a concrete central mission, essentially that of supporting Vietnamese rural construction. General Walt also intended that all of the U.S. agencies and private organizations operating in ICTZ be synchronized in support of rural construction by a regional—level coordinating body. The Senior (Vietnamese) Government Delegate in the First Region was immediately aware of the importance of the council. General Thi met with General Walt on 28 September 1965 and agreed to the formation and pur- poses of the I Corps JCC and appointed Lieutenant Colonel Cach, I Corps Rural Construction Officer, as the government liaison officer to the council.
The I Corps JCC rapidly became the coordinating hub for the civil activities of most of the U.S. governmental agencies in
288-565 0-68-4 35 the Northern Region of Vietnam. In addition to the representa- tives of the Vietnamese government and HQ, III MAF, membership on the council included members of the following U.S. military, naval, and civilian agencies:
a. I Corps Advisory Group, MACV. b. MACV Combined Studies Division. c. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. d. U. S. Embassy, Political Advisor on Staff, III IvIAF. e. U.S. Agency for International Development, 1st Region. f. Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, 1st Region.
The formation of the council under the auspices of the CG, III MAF focused Marine Corps attention on the importance of the other war in Vietnam and was a powerful boost for organized civic action. (6) But rural construction was a com- plex thing and the members of the council had to establish several working committees to assist them in accomplishing their mission. The committees, within their assigned fields, monitored the development of U.S. and Vietnamese plans for future action and determined the capabilities of the U.S. and Vietnamese military organizations and civilian agencies to support the plans. The committees which were formed by the I Corps JCC read like a list of civic action programs. The following were in operation by January 1966: (7)
a. Public Health d. Commodities Distribution b. Education e. Psychological Warfare c. Roads f. Port of Da Nang
General Walt realized, and his feelings were shared by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, that the central issue of the struggle was the reinstitution of Republican political control over the rural areas. But Walt knew that the lasting control, which had eluded the Marine Corps in its embryonic efforts against the Viet Cong from March-August 1965, would result only from an indigenous political effort. In turn, Marine Corps civic action could provide vital support for the government's effort only if HQ, III MAF, knew the government's plans, both political and military. In the Marine Corps scheme of things, civic action linked Vietnamese rural construction with the combat operations of the Marine air—ground team. To underscore the importance of the I Corps JCC, General Walt designated Brigadier Generals Keith B. McCutcheon and Melvin D. Henderson to sit on the council replacing the former colonel "to ensure that the III MAF Jwas/ giving the council the best possible support in its pro- gram of assisting the government of Vietnam in the execution of its rural construction program in the ICTZ."(g) The two generals began to represent the Marine Corps on 15 November 1965.
36 Golden Fleece
At the highest level the month of August 1965 was a mile- stone in the synchronization of Marine Corps civic action with Vietnamese rural construction. But farther down the chain of command, Marines developed several projects which proved to be of lasting importance. Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, controlled a sector which included four villages and numerous hamlets. Ludwig took a deep interest in the village chiefs and made effective efforts to support their authority and to provide for the real needs of their people. As the price for Marine Corps efforts, Ludwig sought information of intelligence value about the Viet Cong. The battalion formed a joint "Area Security Council" and conducted a vigorous and effective counter— guerrilla campaign which totally changed the balance of power in its TAOR. The peasants, like those at Le My, soon were convinced that the battalion was able to protect them from the Viet Cong. After a particularly aggressive Marine Corps sweep through the battalion TAOR on 29 August 1965, Huynh Ba Trinh, Village Chief of Hoa Hai, "said that the villagers were impressed by the U.S. Marines and wanted to know if /they/ would help them protect their rice crop from the Viet Cong tax."(9) The chain of events was ideal. The peasants needed assistance and had requested it through their govern- ment leader. The Marine Corps was presented with a golden opportunity to support a representative of the local govern- ment and to fulfill a basic need of a large number of people. Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig's efforts at coordination, and demonstrations of Marine Corps superiority over the Viet Cong, were fused with the basic needs of a terrorized and partly starved population. Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig accepted the invitation to protect the rice crop and Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was born. HQ, III MAP seized the opportunity offered in the area of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and by mid—September 1965, GOLDEN FLEECE operations were absorbing the energies of a full Marine regiment and were taking place both in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. The Marine Corps took the initiative from the Viet Cong in the critical field of food supply. Marine Corps infantry battalions forced the Viet Cong to fight for rice which had been uncontested for the last two years of Republican weakness. A major strength of the Viet Cong had been its lack of dependence on fixed supporting installations. Conversely, in order to maintain the image and the reality of political con- trol, the Republican government had to protect fixed installa- tions and areas. The Viet Cong could be likened to bank robbers in a city who had the practical advantages of surprise in point and place of robbery, and the psychological advantages of being daring, resourceful individuals aligned against the
37 police forces of an existing regime. The government and Viet Cong roles were not completely reversed during the GOLDEN FLEECE operations, but only one rice bank could be robbed during the harvest of autumn 1965. Finally, the Robin Hood diguise of the Viet Cong was wearing thin by 1965. The Vietnamese peasantry, in spite of the heady Viet Cong promises for the future and the enforcement of terror in the present, had requested assistance from the Marine Corps. The request of the people for protection against the Viet Cong was the most important fact about GOLDEN FLEECE.
The GOLDEN FLEECE operations in autumn 1965 effectively harassed the Viet Cong. The latter had been so successful during 1963-1964 that they controlled large areas of the rich rice lands in the ICTZ, i.e., the bank robbers had done so well that they owned and occupied the northern rice bank by 1965. But vested interests were anathema to guerrilla move- ments. The strength of the Viet Cong lay in the ability to choose the weakest of a multitude of opposing installations and launch well—planned attacks against them in overwhelming strength. (10) Operation GOLDEN FLEECE forced the Viet Cong either to give up an installation on which they had come to depend after two years of exploitation,or fight on Marine Corps terms. Discretion was the better part of Viet Cong valor. The Viet Cong lost probably 90 percent of the unrefined rice that they could reasonably have expected to collect based on their "tax receipts" during the preceding harvest. (11)
TheImportanceof local Security: Development of the Combined Action Company Concept
The Marine Corps developed another scheme in August 1965 which provided hard security for the peasants and supported rural construction. Security for the Republic's hamlet dwellers was the beginning and the end of rural construction, and al- ready by August, the Marine Corps was providing it against main force Viet Cong units. For example, on 18 August 1965, the 7th Marines launched Operation STARLITE (18-21 August) against a main force regiment and obliterated it. Reliable body count set the Viet Cong dead at 699 and intelligence follow-up revealed probable losses of 1,400 dead including a general officer. (12) And equally as important as success in large unit operations, III MAF launched a program of saturation patrolling and ambushing during the liours of both daylight and darkness. Marines moved freely in "Viet Cong country" 24 hours a day and this professional effort became the shield behind which the Vietnamese government could reestablish control over the countryside. For any lasting effort, however, the govern- ment and not the Marine Corps would have to protect the rural population; but, government was something which had its foundL:ioninthe people. The government officials and the people ultimately had to protect themselves; and, the best
38 k — ..w
v.,s
Golden Fleece: the operations which were called Golden Fleece began in August 1965 in the Da Nang TAOR and rapidly spread to other Marine areas. In this picture taken in Septem- ber, Marine rifles protect peasants carrying rice to amphibi- ous tracked vehicles (LVTP—5) for transport to a secure area. Golden Fleece was a response to local calls for aid. (MCA185781)
$ __. ,—
Soap and water: lack of personal hygiene was responsible for the high incidence of skin disease among children and adults in Vietnam. In this scene Marines wash a little boy as a lesson for the mothers of Thuy Tan village west of Hue/Phu Bai in Sep 65. LtCol Khoa, Province Chief of Thua Thien, evidently approves of this joint operation. (USMC A18554l)
3 8a
form of se1f—1-elp for the people was participation in the security effort against the Viet Cong terror.
The Vietnamese people helped to protect themselves locally by forming Popular Force platoons which were used at the hamlet arid village level. (13) Some of the better trained and motivated platoons produced remarkable results. But in general, the equipment and training of the platoons and their unimaginative use in static defensive positions made them a slender reed in the fight against the Viet Cong. The latter were able to con- centrate themselves at leisure against the fixed posts of the Popular Forces and by launching attacks with a predetermined crushing superiority in numbers and firepower were able to overwhelm them with ominous regularity.
During August 1965, however, in the Hue/Phu Bai area, the Marine Corps with the cooperation of several village chiefs formed a Joint Action Company to meet the problem of local security. Both the Marines and Vietnamese knew the limitations of the Popular Forces but wanted to place local security on Vietnamese shoulders. Several village chiefs agreed to allow four Popular Force platoons to work directly with four Marine rifle squads. The resultant force was called a Joint Action Company and was commanded by a Marine Corps officer who used the Marines to train the Popular Forces in small unit tactics, marksmanship, etc., and to serve as the nucleus for patrols and ambushes throughout the village area assigned to each platoon. The joint platoons would also conduct vigorous civic action programs in support of the local governing officials. The program would emphasize self-help by the peasants in the civic action projects while security would be provided by the joint platoons. (14)
By 14 August 1965 the CG, 1st Vietnamese Army Division, had assigned six Popular Force platoons in the Hue/Phu Bai area to the operational control of the CO, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The latter ensured the coordination of operations within the battalion TAOR by providing communications between the Joint Action Company and the battalion's combat operations center. Additionally, a Marine Corps officer with a knowledge of the Vietnamese language commanded the company and a Vietnamese officer acted as executive officer facilitating cooperation in both directions-—Vietnamese and Marine Corps. The Joint Action Company immediately freed one Marine Corps rifle company from security duty within the perimeter. The concept promised to free the attached Marine rifle squads as soon as the Popular Forces had received the training and gained the confidence to defeat the Viet Cong alone.
The integration of Marines into Popular Force platoons was successful from the beginning. In an "exclusive interview" with a reporter of the Los Angeles Times, General Walt revealed on 21 September 1965, that the concept was being tested and
39 emphasized that the integration did not involve first line Vietnamese soldiers. (15) General Wait cautiously revealed the integration because of the implications of foreign military control over Vietnamese forces. Walt's caution was also justi- fied in order to reduce the impact of any unforeseen setback in the program. By the end of September, though, it was evident that the program was developing successfully and General Walt publically announced a new and successful program in civic action.
The ultimate importance of the integration program or Combined Action Companies——the present term for the former Joint Action Companies——was the support provided for Vietnamese revolutionary development. Captain Francis J. West, Jr., writing at first hand about the Combined Action Companies, had the following to say concerning their broader implications:
Properly used and supervised, the CAC can become a catalyst for development at the village level. Where there are Revolutionary Development Teams it can aid and support them. Where there are no Revolutionary Development Teams it can work to help the Popular Forces and hamlet chiefs and elders bring about change and progress. CAC is an interim program designed to assist the Vietnamese. It is not designed to displace the village leadership or replace the Revolutionary Develop- ment Program. Quite the contrary...village chiefs and Revolutionary Development Team Leaders have been quick to use the CAC units in their support. (16)
Support for Civic Action from the United States: the Reserve Civic Action Fund
While the development of civic action was accelerating in August 1965 with the appearance of the GOLDEN FLEECE and the CAC concepts, the Marine Corps began a notable program of support for civic action on a nation—wide scale in the United States. Captain Rodgers T. Smith, who was stationed at HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, and several other officers knew that tools, food, medicine, and other necessities were in short supply for Vietnamese civilians within the Marine TAORs despite government and private assistance efforts. Yet thousands of Marines were in close, daily contact with Vietnamese civilians at the hamlet level and were available to distribute additional supplies. At the same time thousands of Marine Corps reservists were anxious to assist their regular comrades by contributions of their own. An effective system would have been to purchase supplies in the United States and ship them overseas to III MAP which had the Marines and the machines to distribute them. But shipping space was at a premium as a re- sult of the buildup in Vietnam, and the purchase of commodities directly by Marines was prohibited by Marine Corps policy. (17)
40 it
Claims against the Marine Corps: damage to crops and homes and injuries to civilians were the inevitable result of a war amongst the people. In this picture taken south of Da Nang on 13 Aug 65 the CG, III MAP himself presents a new motor-bike to a claimant. The civilian (right) was struck by a Marine truck which destroyed his former bike. (USMC Al84977)
b.
Clothes for old men: the warm scarf was contributed from the United States to Marines of III MAP who in turn arranged for its presentation to a citizen of Vietnam through officials of the government. In this scene an ARVN soldier contributes the scarf in June 1965 to a needy farmer under pleasant and effective circumstances. Note the waif lower right. (USMC Al84687)
4 Oa
With these problems in mind, Major Glenn B. Stevens and Captain Smith visited the Washington office of CARE on 24 August 1965 and discussed ways that the Marine Corps Reserve and CARE could alleviate the.suffering of human beings in Vietnam and further the cause of Marine Corps civic action. (18) The Marine Corps officers and the Director of the Washington CARE Office, Mrs. Ruth M. Hamilton, rapidly worked out a mutually agreeable plan. Marines would collect no monies; in- stead, each Marine in the reserve would contribute directly to CARE offices throughout the United States in envelopes marked specifically for the "Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action for Vietnam." CARE would then purchase the needed supplies and deliver them to the III MAP. To avoid the bottleneck in shipping space from the United States and to assist the Viet- namese economy, CARE would purchase as much of thesupplies as possible within Vietnam itself. The Commandant of the Marine Corps launched the program officially on 13 September 1965 and emphasized that the conduct of a joint Marine Corps Reserve/ CARE Program was a task short of mobilization for which the Reserve was singularly well—qualified. (19) The Reserve did not disappoint the Commandant; by 3 January 1966 it had contributed over $100,000 and simultaneouslyhad carried out a bit of civic action in the United States--the annual Toys for Tots Program. (20)
41 Chapter VI
Accelerating the Pace of Civic Action The Challenge of Support of Rural Construction (September-December 1965)
For the Marines in Vietnam, the month of September 1965 was one of expanding civic action programs and increasing em- phasis on patrolling and ambushing. Patrols and ambushes be- gan to mesh more closely with civic action and rural construc- tion. Both of the latter were possible only with the security for the operators of the civic action medical teams, Vietnamese People's Action Teams, etc. Operations like STARLITE and PIRANHA (7—10 September 1965) against main force Viet Cong units reduced the chances of overt action against the air facilities in the Marine Corps TAORs.(1) But these operations took place in peripheral population areas and had no direct effect on the people. The Viet Cong defeats, however, affected the enemy's tactics in all of the Marine Corps TAORs. The de- feats convinced the Viet Cong that the bestway to maintain their influence was to intensify guerrilla warfare aimed at positive control over an expanding number of hamlets. Expensive large scale victories or more probable defeats at the hands of a flexibly maneuvered Marine Corps with superior firepower were to be avoided. By early October 1965, the joint Marine Corps and ARVN effort to win in the northern region had forced the Viet Cong into the tactics of small unit guerrilla warfare. But the deeply intrenched Viet Cong infrastructure and associated guerrilla bands were an enemy which in turn required changes in tactics on the part of the Marine Corps. (2)
To defeat the Viet Cong at the enduringgrass roots level, a dramatic increase in Marine Corps civic and small unit counter—guerrilla action took place between October—December 1965. Patrols and ambushes in October totalled 5,327 separate actions; by December the total was 7,206. Marine Corps person- nel strength remained almost stationary during the period(3) thus supporting the view that III MAF had partly shifted its emphasis to small unit action in support of civic action and rural construction. Within the civic action program proper, medical treatment was probably the best indicator of trends towards either the expansion or contraction of the program. Medical treatment was largely the result of command emphasis within III MAF and was not so dependent on outsidesources of transportation and similar factors, as for example the receipt and distribution of food and clothing. III MAF, working through a practically stable number of Marines, raised the number of Vietnamese civilians treated medically from approximately 43,000 in October 1965 to almost 61,000 in December 1965. (4)
42 After August 1965, Marine Corps civic action began to pass out of the stage of people—to-people activity and into the stage of linking Marine Corps civic action with Vietnamese rural construction. The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, with its plainly announced purpose of supporting Vietnamese political activity in the countryside, forced the synchroniza- tion of civic action with Vietnamese plans for political, social, and economic change. Changes in Marine Corps organiza- tion reflected the increased emphasis on civic action. Until October 1965, many battalion, regimental, and divisional civil affairs billets had been additional duty assignments. For example, the Civil Affairs Officer of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines during the Le My pacification program had been primarily the Intelligence Officer of the battalion. Late in October 1965, the Civil Affairs Section of the special staff at HQ, III NAP was changed to a fifth general staff section. The Civil Affairs Officer became the G—5 of III MAF and plans were made to trans- fer the Psychological Warfare Section from the G—3 Section to the G-5. The G-5 officer became responsible for civic action and psychological warfare and had as primary assistants a Civic Action Officer and a Psychological Warfare Officer. (5)
The formation of a G-5 Section at HQ, III MAP led to the formation of similar general staff sections within many of the headquarters elements of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Air Wing. However, all of the appropriate subordinate units of III MAP were not able to form G— or S—5 sections. Regiments and battalions were generally involved monthly in operations against the main force of the Viet Cong and these combat efforts in addition to the counter—guerrilla operations necessitated the use of most officers in combat billets. Most commanders were aware of the importance of civic action, especially when they began to realize that their combat efforts were reduced in value by ineffective Vietnamese rural construc- tion and poorly coordinated Marine Corps civic action. But the large unit combat missions and the burgeoning counter—guerrilla actions took most of the energies of the battalions and prac- tically all of the available personnel. Nevertheless, the regiments and air groups soon had either full-time Civil Affairs Officers or S-5 Officers and the battalions and squad- rons attempted to follow suit. As early as October 1965 the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines established an S-5 Section which was responsible for the civic action and the psychological warfare effort of the battalion. HQ, III MAP remained flexible in the matter of organization and promulgated no directives which en- forced a standard organization for civic action throughout III MAF. The formation of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council and the establishment of G-5 and S-5 sections began the de- cisive coordination of civic action with rural construction and gave III MAP the interal organization to ensure the supportof the latter. The Viet Cong ran afoul of the increasingly
43 effective Marine Corps civic action in October 1965 during the dramatic attack against the Marble Mountain air facility near Da Nang. The action was a typical well—planned but rigidly executed Viet Cong raid. Numerous enemy units were involved in the action. A main force battalion moved out of Happy Valley ten miles southwest of the Da Nang Airbase with the apparent intention of attacking the base from the west and creating a diversion for the demolitions experts at Marble Mountain. (6) On the same night, 27/28 October 1965, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines acting on information gleaned through civic action rapport with the local civilians set up an ambush approximately 1,100 meters south of Bo Mung (see Map Number One) on a trail known to the Marines as Henderson Road. The reinforced squad comprising the patrol waited only 30 minutes before elements of a heavily armed force of approximately company strength heading east blundered into the ambush. Captain Thomas F. McGowan, Executive Officer of the company, who debriefed the patrol leader, was not certain that the ambush had struck the advanced elements of a company. But he noted that the ambush contacted a large group, probably 70-100 men. Fifteen Viet Cong were killed in the action and the large number of dead supported a view that the group had a mission which involved a determined thrust past any resistance which it might encounter in the vicinity of Bo Mung. (7)
By October 1965, civic action had become an efficient pro- gram in most of the Marine Corps battalions and squadrons. The stabilization of the TAORs and the presence of a large civilian population had placed the Marine Corps in close con- tact with the peasants. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines had checked a Viet Cong thrust through its area on 27 October 1965 largely as a result of information received from civilians who had come to respect Marine Corps humanity more than they feared Viet Cong terror. The battalion had a civic action pro- gram in October which was transitional between the people—to— people idea and the concept of deliberate support for Vietnamese rural construction. Its program was representative of Marine Corps civic action towards the end of 1965.
HQ, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines connected psychological warfare with civic action within an S-5 Section and in October employed the Vietnamese I Corps Psychological Warfare Battalion Audio Team on seven different occasions amongst its "frontline companies." The battalion originated several leaflets as re- actions to specific incidents, e.g., Vietnamese children wounded by Viet Cong mortars, civilian casualties from Marine Corps fire, movement of the battalion dispensary, etc.. The psychological warfare program was designed to react to pre- dictable incidents, to prepare the local population for initial contacts with the Marine Corps, and to condition the civilians of any operational area towards responses favorable to the battalion. Four helicopter broadcasts were made in October 1965
44 warning the people to take cover when the Viet Cong were in their area, and a total of 125,000 pieces of propaganda material were dropped in five additional helicopter missions. (8)
The HQ, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines ensured effective liaison with the Vietnamese government and representatives of the U.S. Operations Mission in its TAOR. The battalion made special efforts at the District/Sub Sector level to coordinate support for the Nine-Village Hoa Vang Pacification Plan, and to avoid duplication of effort. The medical program continued to be the most important for civic action. Battalion medical person— nel treated 1,842 Vietnamese civilians; approximately 80 percent of the people treated were children under 18 years of age. fhe battalion clearly delineated its short-range projects which were similar to those in most battalion—level units. The projects included the following: (9)
a. Medical assistance including evacuation b. Soap distribution c. Food distribution d. Market Areas e. Damage claims f. Civic action orientation for Marines g. Civilian collection points during tactical operations
The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was not a completely repre- sentative battalion, however, and its programs were unusual in their emphasis on psychological warfare and their opportunity for support of the Republic's rural construction in the nine villages south of the Cau Do River in Hoa Vang district. (10) The battalion cleared that area in cooperation with other Marine Corps units and the Vietnamese Army. Following the clearing action, the Chief of Quang Nam province sent survey teams into the area to take a census, to determine the needs of the villagers, to identify the Viet Cong infrastructure, and to prepare plans for rural construction. Training of Vietnamese personnel to carry out the tasks of rural construc- tion went on concurrently, and by the end of October 1965, People's Action Teams were ready to bring a new life to Hoa Vang with the critical support of one Regional Force battalion. In this area III MAP rubbed shoulders with a major Vietnamese rural construction project for the first time. But with the orientation of the Marine Corps forward in the TAOR, the responsibility for the security of the rural construction pro- ject fell on the shoulders of the Regional and Popular Forces whose training and equipment were not fully effective. (11)
Civic Action in November 1965: First Contact with a Major Rural Construction Project
On 1 November 1965 the intensive rural construction effort began in Hoa Vang district. The 59th Regional Force Battalion
45 was committed alongside of a Rural Construction organization of 350 trained Rural Construction personnel who received salaries from the Vietnamese government. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines coordinated closely with the Regional and Popular Forces and the rural construction workers and provided night- time security for the People's Action Teams within the tactical areas of Companies I and L. The Vietnamese conducted patrols, initiated a census, and began political and psychological war- fare operations in the hamlets. As November 1965 drew to a close, the census had been completed, schools were reopening, and local government was budding into life. But security for the rural construction effort depended on local Popular Forces and these had not been brought under the control of the Marine Corps for training and tactical direction. The Popular Forces were ignored by the ARVN, unpaid by the GVN, poorly armed, and defensively oriented. Nevertheless, the Popular Forces were the main target of Viet Cong attacks. And without them, the well—trained rural construction cadre were forced to defend themselves rather than provide direction for a new life in the nine villages. (12)
The campaign made its greatest progress in Hoa Thai village where III MAF forces provided security for the young para- military and political shock troops. But within the village complex the two hamlets of Cam Ne and Yen Ne proved especially difficult to dominate and the rural construction workers were unable to finish the securing stages of rural construction be- fore the defending Marine battalion moved its security forces outward towards the FEBA. On 21 December 1965, elements of the 59th Regional Forces Battalion, which had taken over the security of the hamlets, were attacked by a force of 50—60 Viet Cong. The peasants of Cam Ne and Yen Ne had probably sheltered the Viet Cong for two days prior to the attack. Rural construction came to a halt; the rural construction workers were withdrawn from the hamlets and a reinforced rifle company of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines began a methodical sweep of the area. Rural construction cadre were not reintroduced until January 1966. (13) The I Corps JCC, assured of the full support of Generals Walt and Thi, assisted in the coordination of the Quang Nam Pacification Project. During November 1965, membership on all of the committees of the council was expanded to include representatives of I Corps and the GVN as working members. The I Corps JCC started an Institutional Program which illustra- ted the importance of coordination. As the first step in the program, orphanages, schools, hospitals, sanitariums, ARVN dependents, and survivors of members of the Popular and Regional Forces were contacted to determine their requirements for living. The next step of the council was to discover the resources available within ICTZ and from outside to support the institutions, dependents, and survivors. The political and military organizations within I Corps Tactical Zone would
46 use their resources and those available from outside the zone to fill the requirements. Coordination of this sort reduced overlapping efforts of support and brought relief to those whose needs had been overlooked. (14)
On 22 November 1965, the I Corps JCC took another forward step to assure coordinated programs of civic action and rural construction. The council formed a Joint Psychological War-. fare/Civil Affairs Center whose mission was to develop themes and material of propaganda value, to prepare joint plans for psychological operations, and to organize audio—visual and civic action teams. The officer commanding the 3d Psychological Warfare Battalion of the ARVN was designated as the director of the center and the G—5, III NAP, was made the operations officer.
By November 1965, Marine Corps civic action was being synchronized with the Vietnamese struggle for survival through the medium of the I Corps JCC. HQ, III MAF became aware of the important 1966 plan for rural construction through the close liaison developed by the I Corps JCC and the directives received from Com(JSMACV. Various younger Vietnamese leaders exemplified by Aspirant General Nguyen Duc Thang, Secretary of State for Rural Construction in October 1965, saw victory in the efforts of shock groups of young people trained at the national level in the paramilitary and political arts of bringing revolutionary change to the countryside. The groups would carry the war to the Viet Cong at the grass roots level in areas chosen as de- cisive by the government. One of the four priority, i.e., decisive, areas for rural construction in 1966, lay in the Da Nang area of Quang Nam Province. Marine Corps civic action to be most effective in the future would have to support Viet- namese rural construction in its latest form.
Against a background of improving coordination at the highest level, the Marine Corps battalions and squadrons carried out an imaginative program of civic action which re- mained enthusiastic but became more effective. In spite of a natural reticence on the part of the CG,I Corps, to place armed Vietnamese under the operational control of HQ, III NAP, the integration of Popular Forces in Marine Corps operations continued in November 1965. At the beginning of that month, the CG,I Corps, placed eight Popular Force platoons under Marine Corps direction in the Da Nang TAOR.(15) The Marine Corps began to train those platoons in small unit tactics and to integrate the units into the massive scheme of Marine Corps patrolling and ambushing. (16) Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines established training specifically in rifle marksman- ship and scouting and patrolling in their areas, northwest of Da Nang. A Regional Forces platoon was also assigned to the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and the battalion established a two week basic training camp for the Regional Forces in which personal hygiene, first aid, close order drill, rifle marksman—
288—5850 — 68 — 47 ship, Vietnamese history, and English were stressed. The sub- jects taught revealed the qualitative weaknesses of both the Popular and Regional Forces. Personal hygiene, close order drill, and rifle marksmanship although requiring continuing stress were among the most basic military subjects.
In the Hue/Phu Bai area the tight integration of Marine Corps rifle squads within Popular Force platoons and the re- sulting Combined Action Companies was effective in expanding medical treatment, distribution of commodities, and other types of conventional and humanitarian civic action. The changing complexion of civic action, however, was shown on 29 November 1965 when a CAC squad ambushed a Viet Cong platoon and killed about 25 of its members. (17) The success of the CAC in furthering self-help projects among the villagers and providing security, led to the formation of additional CACs in the Da Nang and the Chu Lai TAORs. The importance of increasing the quality and encouraging the growth of the Popular Forces was difficult to exaggerate. The ARVN concentrated its attention in 1965 and 1966 on operations against the main forces of the Viet Cong; hence, security devolved on the Popular and the Regional Forces. Between main force operations and rural construction a security gap appeared which became the single most important factor in the slow progress of the war against the Viet Cong in l966.(18) The importance of Marine Corps civic action and its dramatic expansion beyond the people-to-people concepts of spring 1965, was shown by the Combined Action Companies which were an attempt to close that gap.
Medical Assistance: Varying Techniques by November 1965 Medical treatments continued to be the mainstay of civic action towards the end of the year. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines which had entered Vietnam in November 1965, took over the responsibility for the northwestern part of the Da Nang TAOR including the dispensary at Le My. In an effort to im- prove medical service by expanding it, the battalionchanged the permanent dispensary at Le My to a mobile aid station which visited 11 different hamlets during each week. The mobile station remained in each hamlet for half a day. In the last few days of November 1965, using the mobile technique, the battalion medical team treated almost 500 civilians daily com- pared with approximately 250-300 daily at the permanent dis- pensary. The effort highlighted the complexities of civic action. For example, if the battalion were ordered to reinforce an operation against the main forces of theViet Cong, the battalion medical team would be unable to provide so extensive a service. It was questionable, also, that the local Vietnamese authorities would ever have the transportation, personnel, or medical supplies to emulate the Marine Corps mobile teams. (19)
48 Farther south in the Da Nang TAOR, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines operated in direct competition with a well developed Viet Cong infrastructure in a heavily populated area. The medical effort was a mobile one by necessity, but the peasants were reticent about receiving aid because of threats from the omnipresent Viet Cong. Whereas the battalion operating in the more securely pacified area around Le My treated approximately 5,000 Vietnamese civilians the harder pressed 3d Battalion, 9th Marines treated only 1,544 and most of these were children. (20) But the challenge in the south generated vigorous techniques for influencing an uncomitted population. On 19 November 1965, Company L coordinated the presentation of clothing and food- stuffs to 20 needy families in An Trach (1). The People's Action Team which operated in the hamlet area selected the families and Major Gia, the ARVN officer in charge of the Ngu Hanh Son Rural Construction Project, attended the presenta- tion. Prior to the presentation an ARVN Psychological Warfare and Drama Team presented information and entertainment. Using techniques developed for the An Trach (1) presentation, i.e., Vietnamese determination of need, and the presence of Marines with local government officials, Company I of the same battalion coordinated the presentation of civic action supplies to needy peasants in Nhan Tho. (21)
Face—to—Face Persuasion
By the end of November 1965, Company K had developed a Civic Action/Psychological Warfare Team and employed it forward of the battalion's Forward Edge of the Battle Area on seven occasions. The company executive officer or the first sergeant acted as team leader. The composition of the team varied with the particular mission, but the team leader generally employed S—2 Section scouts, company and Medical Civic Action Program (MEDcAP) corpsmen, the battalion chaplain, several Marines especially interested in civic action, and possibly most im- portant, an effective interpreter. The team would be trans- ported by tank to a meeting place with a platoon patrol. Then, operating from a secure patrol base, the team would contact the local governing authority in a chosen area and arrange for medical assistance for the people. Simultaneously, Marines passed through the hamlet distributing psychological warfare material, searching homes, and distributing candy and/or other inexpensive supplies. The hamlet chief and the peasants who were felt to have information of intelligence value were separated from the rest of the villagers and interviewed privately.
The Commanding Officer, Company K described the technique. as face—to—face persuasion; the vigorous program soon paid dividends. All members of the company were aware of the im- portance of correct and effective dealings with the rural population. On 15 November 1965, a patrol leader who had
49 entered the hamlet of Bich Bac, nine miles south of Da Nang, interrogated a civilian who revealed the presence of several Viet Cong in the hamlet. The local resident explained that the Viet Cong were part of a larger force which operated west of Bich Bac. He elaborated that when Marine Corps patrols passed through the hamlets of Bich Bac and its western neighbor Thai Cam, the Viet Cong always fled on the trails leading southward from the hamlets. (22)
Using the information obtained from the face—to—face discussion of a well instructed patrol leader with a civilian who had decided to support the allies of his government, HQ, Company K spent several days planning an operation against the hamlets. Following careful planning, the company sent into the area a large patrol which purposely rested south of the hamlets and operated from there for the rest of the day. The patrol departed late in the afternoon but left behind south of the hamlets an ambush group which methodically and quietly moved into positions covering the southern trails from the hamlets. One small team spent approximately 18 hours within a few meters of a Vietnamese home without being detected. The nextday the company sent another patrol into the hamlets from the east. Precisely as described by the friendly civilian the Viet Cong moved out towards the south. Walking swiftly and remaining extraordinarily well spaced, the Viet Cong blundered into the various ambush teams. Surprise was complete. The teams captured ten persons without a single shot being fired. The company commander had combined civic action and careful tactical planning to consummate an unusually successful ambush south of Bich Bac. (23)
A Growing Humanitarian Tradition
Throughout the Marine Corps TAORs individual efforts at civic action continued in what was becoming a growing Marine Corps tradition of humanitarianism. It would be unreasonable to say all or even most Marines were innately, positively oriented towards the individual type of civic action. A care- ful study by psychologists, military officers, statisticians, etc., would be required to establish the generality that all or most Marines were inherently compassionate ambassadors of good will. But, enough Marines were contributing special efforts on an individual basis to lend reality to the propaganda which proclaimed the beneficent purposes of the allies. Simultan- eously the hard, purposeful civic action in support of security and rural construction was made more effective by the gentle- ness and commiseration of a substantial number of Marines. For example, in Company K alone of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines more than 150 dollars had been spent by Marines on clothing for children in the area of Yen Ne (1) by the end of November 1965. The purchases had been an individual effort and they supported the well developed propaganda which emphasized that
50 Marines were friends of the Vietnamese people. In addition, a medical corpsman from the company paid the annual tuition fee enabling an 11-year old child to attend a Catholic girls' school in Da Nang.(24) Examples of individual efforts similar to those in Company K could be multiplied by the number of Marine Corps companies throughout ICTZ.
The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines distributed representative quantities and types of civic action materials also. Various sources, including U.S. private and governmental organiza- tions provided the basic materials in most cases.The battalion distributed several hundred pounds of liquid and bar soap and approximately 1,800 pounds of cornmeal and bulgar. The bat- talion also contributed in support of its civic action program 42 gallons of cooking oil and small quantities of salt, sugar, candy, soft drink mix, and assorted toys. A private source in the United States contributed a particularly humble off ering-- 50 rubber balls for children. Company I gave 25 pounds of garbage daily during the month of November 1965 to the peasants of Bo Mung for animal feed. The material distributed by the battalion was moderate in quantity and disparate in usefulness, e.g., rubber balls, garbage, wheat, and soft drink mix, but it effectively supported medical assistance, psychological warfare, face—to—face persuasion, and several hundred patrols and ambushes. During November 1965, the battalion received an in- creased, amount of intelligence from the Vietnamese peasants in- cluding that which led to the Bich Bac ambush and the identi- fication or destruction of booby traps on five separate occasions by the villagers at An Trach (1).(25) Finally, on 18 November 1965, a Viet Cong defected to the Regional Forces 703d Company, located within the battalion's TAOR, and explained that a psychological warfare leaflet had been instrumental in his defection. The leaflet was one of several hundred thousand laboriously produced by the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.
The End of the Year: December 1965 By December 1965, III MAP and its predecessor the 9th MEB had operated for almost one year in Vietnam. Civic action had initially been a weakly developed effort with limited command emphasis. The complex process of landing and building up strength had taken most of the Marine Corps time and effort. Once the landing areas had been secured and logistics support ensured, HQ, III MAP began to stress the expansion of its TAORs in order to carry out its combat missions more effectively. Each of the numerous expansions involved a change of positions and a reconstruction of the FEBAs. General Walt placed heavy emphasis on a well developed FEBA and a supporting Combat Outpost Line. When the Marine Corps mission was expanded to one of unilateral offensive action within its TAORs, the con- centration of effort was on the detection and destruction of
51 main force Viet Cong units. The physical expansion of the TAORs in July 1965 also marked the beginning of more effective civic action. With the move into the more densely populated areas, competition began with the Viet Cong infrastructure in areas which neither side could afford to lose. The Headquarters of both FMFPac and III MAP became aware of the frustrating reality that successful actions against the main force of the Viet Cong would prevent the Republic's fall but victory would be achieved only with the success of the government's rural construction plan.
A Pattern of Civic Action
The following pattern of civic action supported the view that progress was slow at first, but as the importance of the struggle for the people was revealed, an increase in civic action began which only tapered off as III MAF reached the limits imposed by the necessary balance between military and civic action:
Activity Time Periods and Approximate Strengths(26)
7—30May65 l4Aug—30Sep65 1—310ct65 l—3lDec65 (13,000) (38,000) (42,000) (44,000) Medical Aid (Civilians) 4,500 28,465 43,092 60,814 Food Distributed (pounds) 59, 975 28, 168 13,759 Clothing Distributed (pounds) 7,820 108,717 13, 299 Small Unit Operations 5,662 7, 208 Large Unit Operations 7 4 Enemy (KIA) 37 915 253 678
Themostimportant gauges of activity were the numbers of civilians treated medically and small unit operations. These actions were dependent on the emphasis which commanders placed on them. The numbers of civilians treated and the number of small unit operations increased (44 and 28 percent respectively) even during the periods of October and December 1965 when the strength of III MAP remained almost stationary. In contrast, the distribution of food and clothing depended largely upon the receipt of the material from sources outside ICTZ and many cases within the continental limits of the United States. The uneven flow of material from the United States resulted in the uneven receipt and distribution in ICTZ. For example, the large quantity of 54.3 tons of clothing was received during October 1965, while two months later in December only 6.5 tons
52 were received. (27)
By December 1965, III MAP had developed patterns of civic action which would continue through the following year. The I Corps JCC ensured coordination between the headquarters and directors of III MAP,I Corps, U.S. Operations Mission, and the U.S. private relief agencies. High level coordination remained effective although it was sensitive to political un- rest within Vietnam. The working committees of the I Corps JCC focused the attention of the highest leadership on the problems of coordination at the hamlet/village level. But for numerous reasons coordination remained less effective at the lower levels. Coordination at the battalion level with the local government should have been all—encompassing. But the Marine Corps emphasized a coherent FEBA and a supporting Combat Out- post Line of Resistance to keep the main force of the Viet Cong at bay. In conjunction with the FEBA and the large unit operations conducted forward of it, HQ, III MAF placed emphasis on patrols and ambushes forward in the TAORs to suppress the guerrilla activity of the VC infrastructure. The heavy pa- trolling and the ubiquitous pressures of maint:ining a cohesive FEBA/COPL and launching large unit operations gave the Marine Corps battalions little time for civic action in direct support of local government in the great area between the air installa- tions and the forward combat positions. (28)
The Overriding Importance of Security for Effective Civic Action
Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines had formed a joint security council for his batta1ions TAOR in the summer of 1965, but this worthwhile experiment was not emulated by other battalions. Marine Corps civic action functioned as an effective services and supply effort in support of Vietnamese villagers who continued to be heavily influenced by the Viet Cong throughout the Marine Corps TAORs. In addi- tion to the purely humanitarian motives, Marine Corps civic action had become a purposeful attempt to extract information from the rural population about the presence and movements of the Viet Cong. But in spite of an extraordinarily well de- veloped medical aid program, a massive program of food supply, and the general tone of compassion and benevolence in Marine Corps operations, civic action remained defective in the most important particular-—security. (29)
The Vietnamese peasant would not commit himself to the support of the GVN unless he and his family were adequately protected. Rural security had to take two forms. First the peasant had to be assured psychologically that the GVN and its powerful ally, the Marine Corps, were committed to a fight to a victorious conclusion. Second, the peasant had to be assured by the presence and execution of superior physical force that
53 his chances of survival after exposing the presence of the Viet Cong or supporting the GVN/USMC were reasonable. Without giving these assurances to the peasantry, the Marine Corps could expect meager returns from its efforts in services and supply because of the continuing fear of retribution. Without security, the peasantry would remain an uncommitted mass of humanity among which the Viet Cong could continue to operate.
The importance of security was highlighted by the civic action program of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in the Chu Lai TAOR. This battalion had a particularly effective program of might be defined as 'soft" civic action consisting largely of medical action and face-to-face contact with the people with extensive distribution of commodities.(30) Within the TAOR of the battalion, an outstanding hamlet chief came to light. Mr. Truong, the chief of TnBinh (1)(see Map Number Two) was a fearless man who committed himself unequivocally to the Republican cause. Here was a man who was capable of winning the active support of his large hamlet and neighboring area close to Highway One in the southern part of the Chu Lai TAOR for the same Republican cause. He was a potential catalyst for a devasting reaction against Viet Cong influence in the Quang Tin district. On 3 December 1965, the medical aid team which visited TnBinh (1) noted that he had posted several anti- Viet Cong signs in conspicuous locations in the hamlet. Near the entrance was a sign which stated, "Civilians and Soldiers Unite to Fight the Viet Cong." Another unusually provocative one stated, "What Have the Viet Cong Done for You--Nothing." The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines supported the chief with numerous medical visits and at the end of December helped in the con- struction of a pole for the Republican flag. The Marine Corps was pleased with the progress in Tn Binh (1). The people were happier and somewhat cleaner than in the neighboring areas, and sickness was decreasing. A patrol leader from Company L, remarked spontaneously to his gunnery sergeant after an initial visit to Mr. Truong's area: "You know, gunny, this is the first village we came into and found the people laughing and happy." It would be difficult to exaggerate the bene- ficial effects of a committed leader at the hamlet level; a way was opening up before the battalion which led to real control over part of Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the battalion report of 1 January 1966 read as follows:
Mr. Truong, the hamlet chief of TnBinh (1) was killed at approximately 310800 H L8 A.M. 31 December 1965 local time/ on the trail leading into TnBinh (1). Four shots had been fired at him andone hit in the back of the head according to the assistant chief.. .footprints at 565985 showed that at least two murderers waited by the drainage ditch at 565985 to ambush the chief. The ID card had been removed from the...body...Thevillagers buried their chief at 311400 H.(31)
54 b 'fl __,_t, - 42
—.2
Fun and games I: This lad Fun and games II: here the boy of the photo at enjoys himself near DaNang on left is playing hopscotch. Lt Space instigated 2Dec65 while waiting for med- this affair also and is effectively combatting VC ical aid. Lt W.F.Space is pro- propaganda which portrays Marines as ruthless viding the irregular basket- mercenaries. The young lad may soon have to be ball assistance. (USMC A42l636) treated for exhaustion. (USMC A42l637)
With this brief passage the brave Mr. Truong passed into oblivion, but so did the chances of an effective civic action program for the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The chances of creating a rural population committed to the Republic in the battalion's TAOR receded into the distant future. Civic action in Tn Binh (1) again became the furnishing of medical assis- tance, food, clothing, candy, charms, all for a few bits of information snatched from terrified mouths. The flag continued to fly but without Mr. Truong it was a symbol of frustration instead of a rallying point for resistance against the terror.
What might have been done to protect the lion of Tn Binh (1) so that he could have led the peasants to a decisive annihilation of the Viet Cong in his area? A joint security council for the area probably would have revealed the isolated aspect of each hamlet and led to a communications network be- tween the hamlets and between the local leaders and battalion headquarters. The joint security council could have dictated and enforced basic security measures by mutual agreement. For example, Mr. Truong was alone and unarmed when he was assassi- nated. As a committed hamlet chief, he should have been pro- tected by a 24—hour guard of trusted men, preferably blood relations. This guard would have served almost naturally as the nucleus for a hamlet self—defense force. None of these measures would have guaranteed Mr. Truong's life. But the Viet Cong would have had an immensely more difficult task of assassination than having a few political killers loll along the trail into TnBinh (1) and almost casually dispatch the unarmed and unaccompanied hamlet chief. (32)
Security and the Quang Nam Pacification Project: December 1965
In the Da Nang area, the Quang Nam Pacification Project took a dramatic turn for the worse. The effort was designed to reestablish government control in the densely populated area south of Da Nang and was the major rural construction effort in the ICTZ. The importance of the effort was based on the following factor: Da Nang, with its extensive resources in port and communications facilities, repair shops, machine tools, etc., and surrounding air installations was the hub of Republican activity in the north. But the Viet Cong infra- structure was entrenched from the southern outskirts of the port outward into the countryside and served as an opposing axis for insurgent operations in ICTZ. The powerful Viet Cong influence also carried with it the danger of serving as a springboard for a successful raid against Da Nang in the event of any shift of Allied strength out of the area. As a result, the nine villages south of Da Nang had been designated as one of four national priority areas for rural construction. The program had begun in November and immediately ran into stiff Viet Cong resistance. The Viet Cong were forced to react
55 because the center of their strength lay not in the main force units in the uninhabited hills but in the political infrastruc- ture and supporting guerrilla fighters of the rich lowlands. The Viet Cong recognized the Quang Nam Pacification Project as a crucial development. Years of patient, bedrock organizing were threatened by the government campaign.
Marine Corps civic action was clustered rather closely around Da Nang (see Map Number One for a representative day of Marine Corps activity in the Da Nang TAOR) and served as a natural adjunct to the activities of the Vietnamese Rural Construction Cadres of the People's Action Teams. Marine Corps medical assistance and the distribution of food and clothing were a form of rural construction themselves. A calculated blending of civic action and the formal Vietnamese program of rural construction might have had decisive results. But from the beginning the Vietnamese effort lacked satisfactory se- curity forces; and the orientation of the Marine Corps towards combat forward in the TAORs prevented a conclusive reinforcing of the rural construction program by III MAF. The ARVN pro- vided only a penny packet security force; andthe end result was that the program foundered on the rocks of inadequate security. (33)
The Viet Cong broke the back of the campaign during the period 21-28 December 1965. Marine Corps civic action was especially active during this time, and the campaign area lay completely within the Marine Corps TAOR. But the activity was in the soft form of the distribution of commodities and the provision of services rather than in the hard form of a security program wherein services and commodities were supporting appendages rather than the central issue. The Viet- namese operators of the rural construction program were largely members of the People's Action Teams sent into the area. These political units had.only a limited capability of self—defense although they could be called paramilitary organizations as well as political. They existed primarily, however, to lead the rural population in self-help projects of a peaceful political and economic nature in areas where the Viet Cong guerrilla fighters had been eliminated. (34) The campaign be- gan with difficulties in supply, coordination, and changes of leadership, and progress during the first two months was only moderate. But the Viet Cong feared any progress and was painfully aware of the importance of its infrastructure in the Da Nang area.
On 21 December 1965, the Viet Cong launched several attacks specifically against the rural construction program and ominously maneuvered through the area. At 0300, the People's Action Team at 016660 (see Nap Number One which hasa 10,000 meter grid square on it and read to the right 016, and upwards 660) was hit by a Viet Cong guerrilla force which killed four PAT members and carried off two automatic weapons.
56 Fifteen minutes prior to this strike, the Communists had launched a mortar attack against campaign headquarters at 011661. Then, at 0315 a contact was made by the 594th Regional Forces Company with a group of Viet Cong maneuvering through the campaign area; the Regional Forces killed three of the enemy. On the afternoon of the same day, the Viet Cong launched a sharp attack against the 593d Regional Forces Company, a unit whose specific mission was to protect the PATs. The Viet Cong killed seven of the Regional Forces as well as capturing three automatic weapons and two AN/PRC-10 radios (medium range radios carried on packs). (35)
Instead of reinforcing the campaign area with adequate security forces, the GVN replaced the campaign chief on 24 December 1965 with an ARVN regimental commander who moved the campaign headquarters and required precious days to be- come an effective leader in the new assignment. Even more important, the direct leadership of the PATs devolved on no single assistant to the new chief, and rural construction be- gan to grind to a halt because of the lack of security and leadership. The Viet Cong, however, were far from finished with their activity. At 1700 on 28 December 1965, at 037704, a sniper deliberately picked out and killed a member of a PAT. Later on the same day, at 1930, the People's Action Team at 041721 was attacked by the Viet Cong who killed two team members and wounded a third. Approximately two weeks after these events, Lieutenant Colonel Loc, the new rural construc- tion chief,was replaced by yet another man. The Viet Cong in a series of purposeful attacks had set back progress in the Quang Nam Pacification Project to an indeterminate future date. (36)
Marine Corps "Power"
Security was the most important part of any civic action program carried out by the Marine Corps which was intended either to support rural construction or to gain the willing support of the populace. It was so basic a part of successful civic action that in many cases it was overlooked as the in- dispensable factor in progress towards a committed Vietnamese population. As far in the past as May 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Clement had seen that in order to be in control of his TAOR, he would have to fight his battle within the hard- core Viet Cong village complex of Le My. He was fortunate in his location. His battalion's TAOR and mission coincided in such a way that the rifle companies were available for security throughout the village complex. Faced with an effective effort to destroy its infrastructure, the Viet Cong was forced to fight to maintain its influence within Le My. But the rifle companies and a reviving Popular Force organization were too strong for the Viet Cong and Le My village fell under the control of the Republican government. The neighboring village
57 chief, Mr. Tac—Bac of Hoa Thanh, expressed his feelings about the civic action of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines in a manner which stood out like a beacon in expressing what was important about the battalion's activities:
We the people of Northwest Hoa Vang District wish
to express our feelings toward.. .the2d Battalion, 3rd Marines who.. .arenow acting in our Northwest Zone. We are very pleased with the battalion. 7ebelievein US Marine Corps power. LThe Marine Corps/ came to our country, landed, and cleared our zone of Viet Cong. Then with its power it defended and held our zone, keeping the Viet Cong from invading us.. .To present an example of the fighting power and will_of the ?merican Government, the Viet Cong in Hoa Lac Le My/ village have all been flushed out...the Viet Cong have not
dared come back to harrass us any more.. .Alsowe are very happy because you helped us rebuild our bridges in Hoa Lac. ..Andwe are very thankful towards your doctors. (37)
Mr. Tac—Bac's letter was a guide to successful civic action in Vietnam. The guide emphasized two vital points. First, ensure the security of any area in which successful civic action was contemplated. Then, support the reviving local government in projects chosen by that government. By December 1965, the Combined Action Company of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines in the Hue/Phu Bai area struck an ideal balance between hard and soft civic action, or effective security and distribution of services and supplies. Marine rifle squads actually lived with the Popular Force platoons in Vietnamese hamlets and ensured the domination of the countryside by fire and physical presence. Communications between the CAC and the battalion Combat Operations Center ensured the use of most of the weapons in the Marine Corps armory against the Viet Cong. The closeness of the Marine rifle squad to the villagers re- sulted in an unusually effective medical program and the pro- vision of various bits of assistance to the local government officials. Probably though, the rapport which developed be- tween the Marine rifle squads and the Popular Forces and villagers was based on the supreme camarderie of sharing real danger and overcoming it. By the time the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines left Hue/Phu Bai, on 22 December 1965, a close bond had been forged between the Marines and the Vietnamese villagers. "The people were sad and heartbroken" and they lined "the road for three hundred meters watching.. .the Marines leave. The Marines noted that many of the people were crying.... "(38)
By the end of the first calendar year for major Marine Corps forces in Vietnam, other shreds of evidence supported the importance of security for civic action. Early in December 1965, several Marine Corps units contributed to a sweep of the Phong Bac area located only a few thousand meters south of the
58 Da Nang Airbase and close to Route One. Phong Bac had been well within the Marine Corps TAOR for many months and had been the object of civic action efforts by several Marine Corps units. The 3d Motor Transport, 3d Tank, and 1st Miphibian Tractor Battalions had carried on civic action programs in the hamlet which had become a saturated area for medical service and the distribution of commodities (see Map Number One f or a representative day of civic action in the Da Nang TAOR). During the sweep, about 160 villagers were interrogated con- cerning Viet Cong activities in the area. The peasants' lingering fear of the Viet Cong was sharply etched in the re- port of the questioning. The 3d Tank Battalion's report noted that the "villagers seemed to be grateful for our concern over their safety. "(39)
The villagers had good reason for concern over their safety. Although retribution took a while, the Viet Cong managed to extract it from people who had consorted with their own government and its allies. The report of the 3d Tank Battalion on 2 December 1965 took on an ominous cast when set next to the following: "25 January 1966. The Battalion CAO talked to the various people of Phong Bac concerning the asassination of Nguyen Tang, youth director of Hoa Tho Village Jwhich included Phong Bac/." From the information received, the Youth Director was evidently taken from his home near Phong Bac by a Viet Cong assassination squad which led him to Route One, several hundred meters. above the Hoa Tho Village headquarters and shot him. The 3d Tank Battalion repgrt cofl- cluded with the masterful understatement that "this murder/ will create serious difficulties in the village."(40)
Farther south, in the Chu Lai TAOR, the Vietnamese also sought protection from the Viet Cong and were grateful for Marine Corps security. The peasants of Nuoc Man hamlet in the area of responsibility of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines spontaneously carried out a people—to—people project of their own. In order to provide shelter for Marines located near the hamlet, they built a grass and bamboo building which was com- pleted on 2 December 1965. The villagers then donated the building specifically to the Marines who were manning the near- by security outpost. One month later in the TAOR of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, Company D conducted a survey in the Ky Xuan village complex (487103) to gather information on the people's reaction to the Marine Corps civic action program. The sweep was similar to the one conducted by the 3d Tank Battalion at Phong Bac in the Da Nang TAOR and revealed the same ominous concern of the peasants for their lives. "The villagers of Ky Xuan felt that they were/ safe from the Viet Cong during the day but still not at night. They wanted Marines or some troops to stay in the village at jJ times." (41) The peasants also wanted their children to go to school and felt that the Marine Corps medical assistance was helpful. But the primary concern of the peasants was security.
59 Christmas 1965: "Peace on Earth, Good Will Towards Man"
The Christmas season presented opportunities for in- creased contact between Marines and the local population. Christmas parties for children of neighboring hamlets, refugee centers, orphanages, and hospitals burgeoned and reinforced the normal medical assistance and distribution of commodities. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion originated an imaginative program using its enormous LVTP-5s (Landing Vehicle Tracked, Personnel, Model Number 5). The battalion painted one of the vehicles white, placed a Santa Claus, sled, reindeer, and a Christmas tree on top and painted various Christmas designs around the LVTP-5. The slogan, "Peace on Earth, Good Will Toward Man," was painted on both sides of the vehicle in Vietnamese, and the LVT was outfitted with a Sound system that played Christmans carols continuously while the vehicle was on the move. (42)
On 23 December 1965, the white LVT went to the Sampan Community of Khue Trung (036757) where Santa Claus distributed candy and toys to approximately 200 children of that unusual floating community. During the next two days, Santa continued his benevolent rounds, making one trip through downtown Da Nang to Marble Mountain on 24 December, and another trip through Hoa Yen (990770) and the Hoa Cam Training Center for Popular Forces (985718) on Christmas Day. During the three days of his travels, the hard-working Santa Claus distributed about 500 pounds of candy to approximately 2,500 children. Adults as well as children "were overjoyed at seeing Santa and his sleigh and reindeer." The inscription on the sides of the LVT ——Peace on Earth, Good Will Toward Man——was also well received by a violence-weary population. (43)
60 ilk ri :\ -.- 4&'..
Clothes for little boys: Vietnamese children were generally poorly protected from ground and weather. Punctures of the feet and infestation by worms were by—products of missing foot wear. The danger of overexposure to the sun was great and the early morning chill turned colds into pneumonia amongst scant- ily—clad children. (USMC A184605) 4 7
Clothes for little girls (and boys): lightweight clothes were welcomed by the needy in Vietnam. These were received from U.S. charity and are being presented by Sgt Kurt L. Cordes to two relaxed youngsters. In a parallel program the Marine Reserve and CARE contributed sewing kits and cloth which helped to balance charity with self—help. 1966 (USMC A421367)
288—5850 — 68 — 6 60a
Chapter VII
A New Calendar Year: Patterns of Civic Action in January—March 1966
The new year, 1966, opened with the rural construction campaign of the GVN stalled in the Ngu Hanh Son area, south of Da Nang. The Viet Cong attacks of 21-28 December 1965 had forced a reorganization of the program. The GVN had originally scheduled the campaign to be completed by 31 December 1965, but early in January 1966, Major Nhat, the "current pacifica- tion chief," who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Loc, noted that a new three—phase concept was in effect for rural con- struction in the area of the nine villages. The GVN scheduled five of the villages in the area for pacification during April 1966. Major Nhat prepared for the future effort by re- organizing the civilian teams which lacked a clear—cut chain of command. But he was unable to reinforce the security forces enough to assure the safety of the People's Action Teams. Security forces comprised an understrength battalion of the Regional Forces, four platoons of Popular Forces, and a single company o the ARVN. The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was to assist in providing security in the forward fringe of the rural construction area. But the Marine Corps and the ARVN continued to focus most of their attention on the main force of the Viet Cong. (1)
Security within the Marine Corps TAOR and behind the FEBA remained inadequate to support the Vietnamese rural construc- tion effort. The Vietnamese government lost its initial, driving interest in the campaign and the ARVN continued to neglect the effort in any calculations of the allotment of resources. For example, the single ARVN company supporting the campaign was no more than a token force and was hard—pressed to provide for the security of the campaign headquarters. In the meantime, during the last four months of 1965, the national government at Saigon had begun to plan for rural construction in 1966. The failures of 1965 and the gains of the Viet Cong from 1963-1965 dictated more emphasis on winning the peasantry at the hamlet level and changing the bland term rural construc- tion. The words revolutionary development (RD) began to be used for the better-coordinated 1966 program in place of the former uninspired terminology. (2) In February 1966, the national government revived its interest in winning the Quang Nam peasantry by political, social, and economic action, and renamed the Quang Nam Pacification Project area the Revolution- ary Development National Priority Area of I Corps. But the GVN decided to complete Phase I of the new program during April 1966, i.e., in the indeterminate future. Civil strife, however, wracked the ICTZ during the months of March-May 1966
61 and cancelled any efforts at revolutionary development in the Ngu Hanh Son area. A policy of drift had set in after the Viet Cong attacks of late December 1965. The policy resulted from the lack of resources to protect the political teams and set back progress in the campaign beyond the middle of 1966.
Nevertheless, HQ, III MAF cooperated with the GVN on certain lesser projects around Da Nang short of an area cam- paign. Planning began on 19 January 1966 for the construction of the Cam Ne/Yen Ne New Life Hamlet. The plans for the hamlet were well coordinated; planners included the Quang Nam Province Chief, Commanding Officer, Ninth Marines, G.—5,III MAF, and the Provincial Representative of USAID. The Vietnamese government was firmly in control of the project but needed bits and pieces of Marine Corps assistance. The Vietnamese required a TD-18 type earth moving tractor for leveling the proposed site. After the original coordinating meeting the G-5, 3d Marine Divisionand the Division Engineer took up the precise details of support. (3) This important project, which actually formed one small part of the Quang Nam Pacification Project, went forward in fits and starts. The Vietnamese officials had a difficult time in choosing a location for the hamlet; the original site which included part of a cemetery proved un- acceptable to the future inhabitants. They had come to be- lieve that the past death Lf so nany people near the site was an unfavorable omen for the future. The Marine Corps played its proper civic action role in this affair. It faithfully supported the GVN with engineer equipment and patiently re- located its equipment after the tractor operators had begun work on the superstition-laden first site.
Operation MALLARD: Civic Action in Support of Large Unit Operations
Southwest of the Da Nang TAOR, and early in January 1966, the 3d Marines conducted Operation MALLARD, a search and de- stroy mission in an area which provided an ideal testing ground for civic action during a large unit tactical operation. The area was densely populated and had been under Viet Cong control for two years. Several challenges to civic action existed. The Marine Corps would have to subject a large popu- lation to an intense, short—term civic action program; and, voluntary refugees would have to be retrieved. The 3d Marines gathered a vast quantity of food, MEDCAP supplies, clothing, soap, and candy. The supplies were placed in the Logistics Support Area (LSA) for the operation and were available at the call of the commander. HQ, 3d Marines directed its subordinate units to establish civilian collection points. These were locations where the civilians would be relatively safe from the hazards of formal combat and where they would not interfere with the tactical maneuver. The supplies available on call at the LSA were used to care for the civilians who were temporarily
62 separated from their homes, food supplies, cooking facilities, etc., and to support a combined civic action and psychological warfare effort which would influence the population favorably towards the GVN. Civilians at the collection points who re- quested to leave the areas controlled by the Viet Cong were transported to the GVN district headquarters to begin a new life. (4)
The Vietnamese peasants responded in the usual favorable way to relief from the harsh control of the Viet Cong. Signi- ficant numbers stated that they were tired of the war and wished to escape the rigors of Viet Cong domination. The 3d Marines exploited the anticipated unrest with aerial broad- casts urging the people to leave their homes for resettlement in government—controlled areas. Approximately 1,000 civilians responded to the call in spite of the challenge of resettle- ment. (5)
The operation revealed another reason for the dissatis- faction of the peasantry besides ruthless administration. The Viet Cong were exploiting the entire area as a food supply and storage area. Enormous quantities of rice had been taken from the peasantry to support the Viet Cong apparatus not only for local guerrillas, but also for larger units operating in distant areas. The 3d Marines uncovered more than 35 tons of hidden rice and transported it to the Dai Loc district headquarters for government use. The favorable psychological impact of 35 tons of rice arriving at the district headquarters for distri- bution by the local government was a major victory for Marine Corps civic action. (6)
Operations of the I Corps JCC
During and after Operation MALLARD, at the highest level of civic action coordination, the I Corps JCC concentrated on plans for the distribution of the supplies received through the Christmas collection campaign in the United States. Americans contributed supplies through the American Christmas Trucks and Trains program (ACTT) for the needy in Vietnam. The material had to be distributed efficiently and fairly through- out the ICTZ. The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council was ideally suited to coordinate the distribution, and the Commodi- ties Distribution Committee handled the manifold details. Those details provided an insight into the complexities of the Viet- namese situation and the problems of inertia at the various levels of government. Upon the recommendation of the com- mittee, the I Corps JCC set up province-level Commodities Distribution Committees to estimate province needs in accordance with the following priorities system: (7)
1. Needy families in newly pacified hamlets. 2. Refugees and ralliers 'VC defectors) in resettle- ment centers.
63 3. Popular Force members and their families. 4. Widows and survivors of armed forces personnel. 5. Orphanages and hospitals.
These priorities also served as a guide for concentration of effort in the provision of services and the distribution of commodities for civic action programs at any level of command in Vietnam throughout the year.
United States and Vietnamese personnel who were assigned the task of inventorying the ACTT commoditiesdid not complete it until March 1966. By that time the tactical units and the provincial committee had made known their requirements and the I Corps JCC Commodities Distribution Committee coordinated the issue of the Christmas donations using transportation con- tributed by the military units and civilian agencies. The military commanders in ICTZ agreed through the JCC to give 20 percent of the commodities to the tactical units and to divide the remainder among the Vietnamese civilian authorities in the five provinces. (8)
Civic Action Pattern of Activity: January 1966
By January 1966, Marine Corps civic action had settled into an effective and well defined pattern. Important but unusual projects like the receipt of ACTT supplies were co- ordinated by the I Corps JCC. In the more characteristic day- to—day civic action, the medical assistance program was extra- ordinarily well—developed and the tendency was towards either permanent fixed dispensaries or mobile service operating on a regular schedule. Marines distributed the following types of supplies in large quantities and often in conjunction with medical services: food, clothing, soap, CARE school kits (see Appendix One), and candy. Marines assisted Vietnamese in con- struction projects which fell into the pattern of repairs on bridges and culverts and the construction of schoolrooms and dispensaries. The construction projects were simple, re- strained, and oriented toward self—help on the part of the Vietnamese. Psychological warfare had been combined with civic action in many Marine Corps units by January 1966 under the direction of either a G-5 or a Civil Affairs Officer. Civic action visits were commonly combined with the distribution of propaganda leaflets, drama and cinema presentations, and loud- speaker broadcasts. (9)
The Growing Bond Between Civic Action and Psychological Warfare
The Vietnamese Open Arms Amnesty Program (its Vietnamese designation, C1-iieu Hoi) helped to focus Marine Corps civic
64 action and psychologicalwarfare on an important part of Vietnamese revolutionary development——the encouragement of Viet Cong to defect to the government side. The Diem govern- ment had introduced Chieu Hoi in March 1963 as an effort parallel with the strategic hamlet concept of the time. The open arms campaign was based on the successful policy of the Philippines' Defense Minister Magsaysay in encouraging the de- fection of Huks. Magsaysay resettled them on land of their own with equipment and supplies for farming. "Ineffecthe made it both easy and attractive to become loyal to the government. "(10)
The Vietnamese government had made elaborate plans for Chieu Hoi late in 1963, but the coup in November 1963, which overthrew Diem, dislocated the program. Without firm direction, the program drifted throughout 1964. In 1965, however, with the arrival of major U.S. ground forces and the increase in government morale, the program became effective. Problems re- mained in the indoctrination of officials and infantrymen who received ralliers and in the provisions for resettlement; but, the rising numbers of defectors signalled important successes. "After mid—1965, an average of 1,000 returnees each month cam./ to the government side; and the numbers for January (1,672) and February (2,011) of 1966 broke previous monthly records."(ll)
Psychological warfare themes by the turn of 1966 were closely tied to Vietnamese revolutionary developrnent.(l2) The following themes were the key ones in mid—January 1966 and illustrated the importance of Marine Corps civic action and Vietnamese revolutionary development in the war: (1) the Viet Cong are losing the war,(2) the GVN has the resources to govern the people best,(3) the GVN can provide a more abundant life than the Viet Cong,(4) the Viet Cong are the real enemies of the people, and (5) surrender and be received with open arms. (13) The themes supported the allied war effort yet they were more closely associated with revolutionary development and civic action than formal combat.
The Marine Corps emphasized the five themes during Operation MALLARD (11—17 January 1966) but towards the end of the month introduced two others to support an effort of in- doctrination during the celebration of the lunar new year by the Vietnamese. The celebration, known as Tet Nguyen Dan (TET) formally extended from 21—23 January 1966 but actually included about 12 days of activity. (14) During TET, in accordance with social custom, the Vietnamese reduced business activity and in some areas even raised prohibitions against receiving medical attention. The Vietnamese envisioned TET as a time of joyous family gatherings with games and feasting as well as the ritual associated with the veneration of the family ancestors. (15) Marine Corps psychological warfare concentrated on the burden placed on the people by the Viet Cong and especially the
65 separation of family members and the taxes and physical terror. Finally, the second fresh theme reminded the Viet Cong them- selves of their own hardships during TET with particular em- phasis on broken family ties. (16)
Emphasis on Medical Assistance
During January 1966, medical assistance continued to be the most important part of civic action. Marines and Navy corpsmen treated a sharply reduced number of civilians as a result of the TET celebrations, but in spite of the four-day suspension of medical assistance, Marine Corps units treated 56,000 people for medical and dental ailments. A total of 40 MEDCAP teams provided the assistance at 120 different locations. The most common ailment treated was skin infection especially in the scalp area. Headaches and complaints of the upper respiratory tract were the next most common ailments. Fifty— f our percent of the Vietnamese assisted medically were treated for these three general afflictions.(17) The afflictions re- vealed the unsophisticated nature of the medical service in which children received most of the treatments with adult females and males following in that order. The bulk of the MEDCAP program consisted of quick and simple treatment for a multitude of scantily-clad and poorly attended children. (18)
The distribution of treatments revealed the following pattern. The 3d Marine Division with most of the Marines carried out the bulk of the medical assistance, treating more than 38,000 civilians. The 1st Marine Air Wing assisted approximately 2,000 civilians and the Force Logistics Support Group treated most of the remaining 16,000 citizens.(19) The thin effort of the air wing deserved examination because the static nature of the air installations favored a well—developed program. For example, a fixed operating area was important for the continuity of medical treatment and favored the build up of a large clientele. Part of the explanation for the paucity of medical treatment in the air wing lay in the general co- incidence of civic action areas of responsibilities with TAORs. The TAORs of the battalions of the 3d Marine Division abutted on the perimeters of the air installations; and, the battalions carried out civic as well as combat action within their TAORs. The result was that little territory remained for the air wing in which to carry on civic action programs except on a shared basis with a neighboring battalion. The enormous maintenance and air control effort required to keep both the fixed wing and helicopter aircraft flying was another factor which drastically reduced civic action in the air wing.
66 Civic Action Programs Rivaling Medical Assistance by January 1966
Although medical assistance remained the single most important part of civic action, several other programs were beginning to rival it in importance. The Catholic Relief Service, a private relief society, made an impressive effort in January 1966, delivering the huge quantity of 430,000 pounds of rolled wheat to units of III MAF. Project HANDCLASP, a combined effort of the naval service and a multitude of private relief donors in the United States, delivered through Navy and Marine Corps transportation approximately 63,000 pounds of miscellaneous basic commodities e.g., clothing, food, drugs, etc.. The special C1-iristmas program carried on in the United States for Vietnamese relief and called ?jnerican Christmas Trains and Trucks delivered 300 measurement tons (one measurement ton was the equivalent of 40 cubic feet of cargo space) of commodities to Vietnam in January. The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund for Vietnam operating through CARE channels delivered 3,666 school kits to III MAP as well as large quantities of other kinds of self—help kits, e.g., textile, woodworking, and midwifery (see Appendix One). (20) The reserve fund concentrated on improving rural education while the CRS was the major contributor of food.
Early in January 1966, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in the Chu Lai area launched an intensive civic action program in the Vinh An-Hai Ninh complex of hamlets (see Map Number Two) at the mouth of the Tra Bong River. The three hamlets, which were scheduled for revolutionary development by the Vietnamese with Marine Corps assistance, were a scant 6,000 meters from the southern edge of the air installation at Chu Lai. But no Vietnamese government had existed in them for the two years since the overthrow of the Diem regime late in 1963. No schools functioned and no medical assistance was available to the villagers. The hamlets served the Viet Cong as a convenient way station for movements into the Chu Lai area from the south and east. On 29 December 1965, Company A moved into the hamlets, established a permanent patrol base, and began to work closely with a 25—man People's Action Team.
While the People's Action Team ferreted out the Viet Cong infrastructure and established local government, Company A con- centrated on medical assistance and the improvement of hygiene. The Marine rifle company provided saturation security for both its own civic action and Vietnamese revolutionary development, and as a result, progress was rapid. After a few days, the PAT discovered a former school teacher and soon after reopened a primary school. The people of the hamlets selected officials in elections organized by the PAT. Company A in close co- ordination with the political team began to organize a Popular Force unit. The people of the hamlets responded warmly to the program and were relieved at being withdrawn from Viet Cong
67 control. The village chief of the three hamlets proved to be an aggressive leader who concentrated on developing an effec- tive Popular Force unit for the defense of his flock. (21)
What were the lessons of the rapid progress in Vinh An— Hai Ninh? Probably most important was the hard fact that the people feared and hated the Viet Cong. Once the people were assured of protection and were reorganized by the Republican Vietnamese they eagerly, almost pathetically, clutched at the opportunity to live productive lives in the Republic. The swiftness and ease with which the Vietnamese in the Vinh An- Hai Ninh area were returned to the government camp, proved the hatred of the villagers for the Viet Cong. Additionally, Company A provided blanket-like security in the limited area of the three hamlets and the combination of Marine Corps "power" and Vietnamese revolutionary development quickly reestablished a community responsive to the Republican will. The hold of the Viet Cong over the villagers had been based on psychological and physical fear and an enormous hostage system. The main force of the Viet Cong held the young fighters as hostages from their families while simultaneously the clan- destine infrastructure held families as hostages from the fighters in the main force. But the Viet Cong hold over the countryside lapsed with the institution of security and the destruction of the infrastructure. Conversely, however, a loyal Republican peasantry could be terrorized back into sub- mission to the Viet Cong practically overnight. (22)
Vietnamese New Year: 20-23 January 1966
On 19 January 1966, the Civil Affairs Officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, returned the PAT operating with Company A to Vinh Son for the celebration of TET. Civic action was a never-ending task and while in Binh Son the CAO turned over 16,000 dollars (VN) to Father Diek of the Catholic Refugee Center for the care of 40 orphans. TET officially began at 1200 20 January 1966 and III MAF carried out a drastic reduc- tion of civic action on that day. But while III MAF reduced medical assistance to negligible proportions and restricted the distribution of the normal commodities, it increased face— to—face contacts with the Vietnamese people. The Marine Corps emphasized small cash gifts in envelopes for children; and numerous Marines and Vietnamese civilians met for the first time during the general distribution of the envelopes to the children. (23) Additionally, many local government officials and private citizens extended invitations to Marines to participate in the holiday festivities.
Early on the morning of 21 January 1966, Mr. Dien, the hamlet chief of Tn Binh (1)(see Map Number Two) and the man who had replaced the ill-fated Mr. Truong, extended a general invitation to the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, to celebrate TET
68 OD
English classes: by the end of 1965, English classes burgeoned in the Marine TAORs. The Vietnamese people showed deep interest, and adults as well as children enrolled in large numbers. PFC Patrick Moore instructs in this scene in January 1966. (USMC Al86596) in his hamlet. Five officers and 46 men represented the Marine Corps in what turned out to be an extraordinarily successful affair. Mr. Dien initiated the celebration with sound political sense by reading messages from the Province and District Chiefs wishing the villagers a prosperous and happy new year. After the messages has been read, Mr. Dien raised the Republican flag over the hamlet. Then he explained to the villagers that five months ago Tri-Binh (i) had been poor, but since that time the Marine Corps had come to the assistance of the hamlet with medical treatment, food, and clothing. The chief emphasized that the Marines had helped the villagers to improve themselves. Finally, he picked up the ubiquitous theme of security and stated that he was not afraid and would work to improve Tn— Binh (1) even though the Viet Cong had killed the former chief, Mr. Truong.(24)
The villagers and Marines enjoyed each other's company so much on 21 January 1966, that the villagers extended an invita- tion for the following day. The visiting Marines enjoyed them- selves even more on 22 January and at 2230 were still in the hamlet playing the Vietnamese version of bingo. At that time the village elders divided the Marines into groups of twos and threes and then took them to their respective homes where Marines and Vietnamese participated in an extensive banquet. "The villagers were excited and happy that the Marines were able to participate in TET" and requested that the Marines return for a third day of holiday revelry. The success of the face-to-face social activity at Tni-Binh (1) was based on several factors. The hamlet chief vigorously courted the Marine Corps for his hamlet. The Civil Affairs Officers of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, realized the privilege of social interaction with the villagers on their New Year's holiday and the beneficial impact of about 50 well-instructed Marines on the peasants. Finally, Chief Dien was a paragon of earthy peasant guile--50 Marines alert for a possible Viet Cong inci- dent made TnBinh (1) the most secure hamlet in the Chu Lai area during TET.(25)
In the TAOR of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, the villagers of the Vinh An-Hai Ninh area celebrated TET with two significant ceremonies. First, they planned and carried out an elaborate symbolic ambush of the Viet Cong. Apparently using the principles of homeopathic magic, the villagers sought to ensure a successful defense against their former harsh masters. In addition to the ambush, the villagers conducted a flag raising ceremony and committed themselves overtly to the Republican cause. These activities originated with the villagers; the People's Action Teams assigned to the village for Revolutionary Development had departed to celebrate TET in its own area around Binh Son. (26) Farther north, in the Da Nang TAOR, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines carried on an active Civic Action Program concentrating on the local school at Duong Son (3)(999670). The villagers were anxious to get
69 their school in operation notwithstanding TET. As a result, the Marines presented CARE school and woodworking kits, and desks of their own making to the people and also treated patients at the battalion aid station.(27) At Hue/Phu Bai, the Vietnamese registered complete acceptance of the Marine Corps members of the CAC during TET. In one of the villages, the peasants invited members of the Marine rifle squad of the combined action platoon into more than fifty different homes for games and banquets. (28)
A Representative Day of Civic Action
January 1966 was a reasonable month to take stock of Marine Corps Civic Action in Vietnam in the general sense, for example, of representative activity on a particular day. The Marine Corps had been ashore in strength for almost a year and civic action had developed patterns which would be reflected on a carefully chosen day. On 15 January 1966, the Marine Corps operated in a representative way for the Vietnamese war, and civic action was not affected by unusual events like Christmas, TET, etc. Maps One, Two, and Three show Marine Corps civic action at work in the three TAORs. The Marine Corps units concentrated on medical assistance (red circles) but distributed commodities (blue, circles) in significant quantities at numerous locations. Marines also assisted the Vietnamese in construc— tion projects (green circles) which varied in complexity from the building of a schoolroom or a children's hospital to the repair of a culvert on a primitive road. (29) Dr. A. R. Frankle, Assistant Civil Affairs Officer, 3d Engineer Battalion pressed hard for a dispensary at Da Son and the Battalion technical personnel pooled their talents to produce a complex civil engineering effort in his support. (30)
The units of III MAP carried out most of their civic action close to the defensive centers of the TAOR, i.e., the air installations. Most of the ground units which supported the infantry battalions were located near the air installations. The air units themselves and the infantry battalions which manned the immediate perimeters were clustered in and around the bases. In the Da Nang area in particular, a pattern of saturation in civic action had grown up by the middle of January 1966. The battalions close to the base concentrated vigorously on the two hamlets of Phong Bac and Da Son. These hamlets became saturated with civic action while farther out in the TAOR in the vast areas controlled by the infantry battalions, civic action was spread more thinly. The pattern of action on the maps pointed to an enlargement of the civic action areas of responsibility of the supporting battalions and the air units to prevent an unfair distribution of services and com- modities. The units of the 1st Marine Air Wing were especially restricted in their civic action programs by both the protec- ting and the neighboring ground units.
70 Unexpected Reinforcements
In February 1966, III MAF discovered unexpected reinforce- ments for civic action. The 3d Marine Division Band and Drum and Bugle Corps played at a series of public events and excited enthusiastic, favorable response. Warrant Officer William E. Black, director of the band (and the drum and bugle corps), presented one of the highlights of civic action in the TAOR of the 7th Marines. On 17 February 1966, the band gave concerts in several key areas for civic action. The band treated the hamlet of Vinh An, where Company A,1st Battalion, 7th Marines had furnished unusually effective support for revolutionary development, to an impressive performance of western music and precision marching. The band also played at TnBinh (1) and Nuoc Man and was applauded enthusiastically by the villagers. Two days later, at the Da Nang Catholic cathedral, in an area neatly cordoned off with white nylon line and with Vietnamese and U.S. flags flying, the drum and bugle corps performed before a huge curious crowd. Drum head designs set the theme of the presentation with flags of both states combined with a handshake symbol. The words, "Friendship Through Music," in Vietnamese tied together the theme. The Vietnamese responded ecstatically. (31) From that time onward, both the band and the drum and bugle corps became purposeful weapons in the campaign to place the Vietnamese people behind the government. Marines also began to include music appreciation periods along with English classes in order to appeal to the Vietnamese interested in music and drama.
Operation DOUBLE EAGLE: the Team of Civic Action and Psychological Warfare in Support of a Major Operation
By late January 1966, civic action was becoming more closely integrated into large unit operations of the Marine Corps, especially with the successful precedent of Operation MALLARD and various lesser cordon and search operations of 1965. On 28 January 1966, III MAP conducted the largest amphibious operation since the Korean War. The Marines of several battalions landed from shipping of the Amphibious Task Group of the Seventh Fleet near Thach Tru south of Chu Lai. The landing was part of a month-long joint ARVN/U. S. Marine Corps operation called DOUBLE EAGLE.(32) The operation showed the advances in Marine Corps thoughts about the team of civic action and psychological warfare in Vietnam. HQ, III MAP en- sured that a civic action organization was included in the Marine Corps task organization. Two U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams also came under Marine Corps control and were used to handle refugees and to assist the Vietnamese District Chief of Duc Pho (located approximately 50 miles south of Chu Lai on Highway One) in processing and caring for the expected influx of people. The civic action group brought ashore large
71 quantities of basic supplies to support civilians separated from their homes and to care for the expected refugees. The Marine Corps supported Operation DOUBLE EAGLE with more than 27 tons of food specifically for the care of civilians in the operating area. Claims against the Marine Corps for damage to crops, homes, etc., had been a persistent problem in Vietnam also. But the Civic Action Officer for DOUBLE EAGLE carried with him a special fund of 3,665 piasters to deal on the spot with small claims. (33)
The lessons learned about civic action in Operations MALLARD and DOUBLE EAGLE reinforced each other. To be effec- tive, Marine Corps civic action had to be coordinated through the Vietnamese district government. The Marine Corps depended on the district headquarters to collect, classify, and clear all refugees and displaced persons once they had been trans- ported to the general area of the district headquarters by Marine Corps helicopter or truck. The processes carried out by the Vietnamese with the exception of collection, were political and administrative and were a function of local government. The Marine Corps learned that the large quantities of captured foodstuffs and similar materials were best processed through the closest district headquarters. The Vietnamese officials were best equipped by language and local knowledge to effect redistribution. The major civic action lesson of both MALLARD and DOUBLE EAGLE was that coordination between the Marine Corps and local Vietnamese government ensured the greatest and most lasting effect on the local population. (34)
Marines carried out a major psychological warfare effort in support of DOUBLE EAGLE. Propaganda themes directed at the Viet Cong fighter predominated in the written and oral attacks against the enemy. The thies were both short and long—range and were capable of being used against civilians also. The Psychological Section coordinated the dropping of almost three million leaflets in the objective area during the first part of the operation. The Marine Corps received nine ralliers during the first phase of DOUBLE EAGLE largely as a result of emphasizing Viet Cong hardships and making it easy for the enemy to defect. Aerial loudspeaker systems proved especially effective and they broadcast the same effective themes found on the leaflets: Viet Cong lack of food, poor medical care, separation from home and family; as well as the strength of the GVN and its allies, surrender appeals, and explanations of how to surrender. (35)
Medical Assistance Twelve Months after the Landing
During February 1966, III MAP recovered handily from the adverse effects of TET on medical assistance. Units of III MAP using 40 MEDCAP teams treated either medically or dentally almost 67,000 Vietnamese citizens in 122 locations. The most
72 Jhl I',-
V17
Medical assistance was the mainstay of civic action. The more advanced type is shown in this scene where two girls are being trained as rural health workers. The reinforcement of the Vietnamese rural health program was the goal of Marine as- sistance. Lt G.L. Williams MC,USN, supervises one of the girls who is treating a case of skin infection. 18Sep65 (USMC A185695)
Medical assistance even at the end of March 1966 was not an elaborate thing. In this photograph taken in March in the chu Lai TAOR, a corpsman of the 7th Marines begins to treat a mod- erate-sized gathering consisting largely of children. (uSMc A369926)
288-585 0 -68 7 7 2a numerous ailments continued to be skin diseases, headaches, and respiratory infections which formed well over half of the ail- ments of individual citizens. In addition to medical treatment, and probably more important from the long—range viewpoint, Navy corpsmen trained 16 health workers, two volunteer nurses, and four volunteer medical assistants. By February, the medi- cal training programs had taken on special importance as a source of Vietnamese medical personnel. Prior to December 1965, the GVN had insisted on giving the trainees the normal examination for hiring as health workers. The scheduling, testing, and correctingprocess was time consuming and affected the morale of the trainees. Additionally, the process did little to further the prestige of the U.S. military force which had conducted the training. The Vietnamese Minister of Health decided, therefore, on 4 December 1965, to hire auto- matically Vietnamese citizens trained by U.S. military/naval medical teams if the programs were approved in advance. As a result, by February 1966, appreciable numbers of Vietnamese medical trainees were flowing through III MAP medical training programs directly into the Public Health Service. (36)
The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund for Vietnam was used by CARE to provide major quantities of food as well as blacksmith kits, carpenter kits, and more than 2,000 textile kits. CARE delivered over 37 tons of rice to III NAP and this rice and the large number of textile kits represented a change in emphasis from previous months. Formerly, CARE had used the reserve fund primarily for school supplies.HQ, III MAP en- sured that all of the material received during February was delivered to local government officials who actually distri- buted the supplies to the Vietnamese people. In the immediate vicinity of Da Nang, the powerful Buddhist faction of the popu— lation controlled an important system of schools and orphanages. Here, the CG, III MAP, supported the Buddhist program with large outlays from his reserve civic action contingency fund. General Walt had contributed over 9,000 dollars (U.S.) in support by February 1966. (37)
Project HANDCLASP
Project HANDCLASP, an official Navy program since 1962, shipped 63,000 pounds of miscellaneous, basic commodities to III MAP in February 1966. HANDCLASP was part of the Navy's people—to—people effort and overseas community relations program; and, since 1963, the Navy had been shipping HANDCLASP materials to Vietnam. Individuals and organizations within the United States donated material to the naval service and shipped it to warehouses at San Diego for further delivery by the Navy overseas. With the buildup of Navy and Marine Corps forces in Vietnam in 1965, the Navybegan to emphasize civic action programs within Vietnam for both Navy and Marine Corps forces. Prior to 1965, HANDCLASP had been a Navy program only,
73 but in June 1965, the Corrimander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, noti- fied the CG,11.1 MAP that HANDCLASP supplies were available for use by the Marine Corps. The materials which were available were basic and included, clothing, food supplements,medical supplies, and books. The CG, III MAP accepted the support and requested in particular the following items: pens, soap, vita- min and worm pills, sewing needles, thread, and salt. The CG's request reflected in microcosm the whole Marine Corps civic action program. Pens reflected education; soap, and vitamin and worm pills reflected pressing necessities in medical aid; sewing needles and thread represented self-help for clothing; and salt was the most basic of food necessities. (38)
Project HANDCLASP became one of the major sources of supplies for Marine Corps civic action, but the project oper- ated on a tenuous basis. Handclasp was a nonfunded activity of the Navy which meant that the Navy was able to move material only on a space available basis in naval shipping and aircraft. For example, Military Sea Transport Service ships and Military Air Transport Service aircraft could not be used to deliver Handclasp material. As a result, the shipment of material de- pended on naval operational requirements for space and the flow was uneven. After early 1965 naval operational commitments increased and threatened the effectiveness of the program in the Western Pacific. Simultaneously, however, the Navy realized the importance of civic action in the Vietnamese war and the end result was that space was made available. The shipment of Handclasp supplies rose sharply in 1966. Nevertheless, American charity seemed to be practically limitless and the final check on the program was limitations in shipping space.(39)
The Breadth of Civic Action by March 1966: From Candy to County Fair
By March 1966, after one year of operations in Vietnam, Marine Corps units were carrying out a broad range of civic action. Contrast, for example, the receipt of private U.S. charity commodities via naval operational shipping for use in soft and indirect civic action, i.e., the distribution of commodities through local governing officials, with the follow- ing technique. The 3d Marine Division originally tested some- thing called the County Fair concept on a pilot basis in February 1966. The concept was a variant of Marine Corps cordon and search operations which had been used as early as August 1965 in the Da Nang TAOR by the 9th Marines. (40) The concept was further refined after February and established by March 1966 as a standard type of operation for division units.
County Fair was a joint Marine Corps/ARVN operation designed to destroy Viet Cong influence in chosen hamlets and to re- establish the authority of the GVN. Marine Corps units pro- vided security during the County Fair operations by cordoning
74 off chosen hamlets with riflemen alert for a possible break- out by Viet Cong guerrilla fighters. Surprise was the vital necessity during the positioning of the cordon; if surprise were complete, members of the Viet Cong infrastructure would be trapped within the cordon. ARVN forces and GVN political workers then entered the cordoned area and moved all of the villagers to a central area where they were interrogated, pro- cessed for identification, fed, and exposed to propaganda lectures, drama presentations, and movies. While this combined military and civic action was being carried out, ARVN forces conducted a detailed search of the hamlet for hidden tunnels, food, munitions, and hiding Viet Cong. (41)
County Fair was designed to destroy the laboriously es- tablished Viet Cong infrastructure within a hamlet or village by trapping the Viet Cong within the inhabited complex and then methodically using police and intelligence techniques to isolate the Viet Cong from the villagers. Well conducted County Fair operations impressed the villagers with the power, efficiency, and benevolence of the GVN. (42) The operations in their refined form were a traumatic surprise to the Viet Cong, who emphasized in captured documents the necessity to take immediate countermeasures against the new technique. The Viet Cong concentrated on two defenses against County Fair: first, if surprise were not complete, every effort had to be bent towards breaking through the incomplete cordon; second, acknowledging that surprise might be complete, the Viet Cong ordered the preparation of stocks of food and water to support passive hiding for periods of three to five days. (43)
County Fair operations emphasized Marine Corps support for hard civic action, i.e., security and direct support for Viet- namese revolutionary development. They were a far cry from the candy and pill patrols of April 1965. They were also different from the distribution of Handclasp commodities in secure areas in March 1966. County Fair operations and Combined Action Companies represented Marine Corps civic action in its hardest and most aggressive state by March. Both concepts had been proven successful by the anniversary of the first year of major Marine Corps forces in Vietnam. In February 1966, the first CAC had been formed in the Da Nang TAOR in emulation of the successful company at Hue/Phu Bai. And shortly thereafter, III MAP introduced the CAC concept at Chu Lai. County Fair operations began to expand rapidly also. In March 1966, III MAP conducted a total of four County Fair operations under the immediate direction of HQ, 9th Marines. Several months later, in July 1966, operations numbered in the twenties and were taking place in all of the TAORs.(44)
75 The Importance of Civic Action: Indicators of Progress
At the end of the first year in Vietnam, Marine Corps civic action with its many ramifications had become so important that it ranked almost equally with the formal combat effort. General Walt specifically emphasized the operational concept of two powerful hands, one a clenched fist used to smash the enemy main force and guerrilla fighters, and the other open and ex- tended to the Vietnamese people to shield them from the terror and to assist their government. But HQ, III MAF found it diff i- cult to describe or present civic action progress. Combat actions were measurable in terms of the numbers of actions fought, patrols run, and ambushes laid as well as the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy. But HQ, III NAF for the first year had no satisfactory system of quantifying the re- suits of civic action in support of revolutionary development. Assuredly, HQ, III MAF had collected statistics on civic action including number of medical treatments, number of persons treated (uniformly .a lower figure), pounds of food and clothing distributed, etc.. But the statistics were not satisfactorily correlated with progress in the war until February 1966.
Progress in the war largely depended on the advancement of Vietnamese revolutionary development. In February 1966, in an attempt to relate civic action to that progress, HQ, III MAF adopted a system of rating the progress of Vietnamese revolutionary development in the Marine Corps TAORs in ICTZ. The system was important because it not only related civic action and revolutionary development but also tied in Marine Corps combat operations with the latter. For the first time the Marine Corps had a system which allowed it to estimate its general progress in the Vietnamese struggle. The system essentially equated progress- in revolutionary development to progress in the war in general and included certain indicators of progress which could only be accomplished by the Marine Corps or a similar military organization, e.g., ARVN. The system included the following general indicators of progress:*
1. Destruction of enemy units ———-20 Points 2. Destruction of enemy infrastructure——20 Points 3. GVN establisi-iment of security —20 Points 4. GVN establishment of local governrnent-20 Points 5. Degreeof development, new lifeprogram 20 Points Total 100 Points (Equivalent to accomplishment of revolutionary develop- ment) (45) *SeeChart Number Two for a detailed breakdown of these indicators.
76 Chart Number Two Detailed Breakdown of the Revolutionary Development Indicators of Progress
POINTS 1. Destruction of Enemy Units a. VC units destroyed or expelled 15 b.. Local defensive force established 5 TOTAL 20
2. Destruction of Enemy Infrastructure a. Village census completed 2 b. VC infrastructure destroyed 8 c. Local intelligence net established 5 d. Census, grievance interviews completed 2 e. Action completed on grievances 3. TOTAL 20
3. Vietnamese Establishment of Security a. Defensive plan completed 2 b. Defensive installations completed 3 c. Security forces trained and in place 12 d. Communications net established 3 TOTAL 20
4. Establishment of Local Governments a. Village chief and council in office 4 b. Village chief residing in village 3 c. Hamlet chiefs and councils in office 4 d. Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet 4 e. Psychological operations and information program established 3 f. Minimum social and administrative organization 2 TOTAL 20
5. Degree of New Life Program Development a. Adequate public health program 4 b. Adequate education facilities 4 c. Adequate agricultural development 4 d. Adequate transportation facilities 4 e. Necessary markets established 4 TOTAL 20
7 6a
III MAF had the mission within its TAOR of destroying the main force of the Viet Cong and the guerrilla forces. This combat mission was closely linked with Vietnamese revolutionary development because the indispensable factor for the beginning of RD in the Marine Corps TAORs was successful combat against the overt fighting elements of the Viet Cong. But III NAP, with remarkable candidness, rated the destruction or expulsion of Viet Cong combat units at only 15 percent of the accomplish- ment of RD. The Marine Corps combat effort provided the shield behind which the complex, political, economic, social, and para- military action could take place which formed the remaining 85 percent of revolutionary development. (46)
Marine Corps civic action meshed with revolutionary de- velopment in a broader range of the RD indicators than combat operations. For example, 25 percent of the Itdestruction of enemy units" involved the establishment of a local defense force. By February 1966, HQ, III NAP had established two Combined Action Companies and had conducted systematic training for large numbers of Popular Forces, thus making an important contribution to RD by means of the hard or security type of civic action. Eighty-five percent of the "Vietnamese establish- ment of security" comprised the training of Popular Forces, planning for defense, and the construction of defensive in- stallations. Again, Marine Corps civic action directly sup- ported adequate public health programs, education facilities, transportation facilities, agricultural development, and the establishment of markets. Considering the support of public health programs alone in March 1966, III MAP gave medical treatment1to more than 84,000 Vietnamese citizens and was in the process of training 77 persons as medical assistants of various types. The RD indicators placed the medical effort of III MAP in a meaningful relationship with the general progress of the war. The establishment of an adequate public health program was rated at only four percent of the total accomplishment of revolutionary development. (47)
Principles of Effective Civic Action for Vietnam
By March 1966, the Marine Corps had formulated effective principles of civic action. The Marine Corps had advanced be- yond its initial defensive military mission and had become part of a full-blooded effort to establish a viable South Vietnamese government. The broader outlook of the Marine Corps in its new role in revolutionary war was strongly etched in the new principles which included purposeful support for local govern- ment at the expense, if necessary, of the acknowledgement of Marine Corps assistance. The Marine Corps had faced revo— lutionary movements in the past in the Central American and the Caribbean areas. But the disciplined insurgent organization in Vietnam and the international complications rendered the Vietnamese situation so much more intense that it had to be
77 ranked as something different in Marine Corps experience. (48)
The principles of effective civic action for Vietnam com- prised more than a dry-as-dust list of etiquette for relations between Marines and officials and citizens of the Republic of Vietnam. The principles represented a new form of warfare, a concept balanced between sophisticated modern combat and direct support for indigenous political, social, and economic action. Six points could be differentiated; together they formed a pronouncement of the Marine Corps response to the struggle to rescue the people"(49) from a subtle, intellectually brilliant form of warfare. First, Marine Corps civic action programs had to be con- tinuous. Discontinuity and incompletion were synonymous with failure. Civic action programs were responsible acts which were promises of benefits to a seriously demoralized population. Failure to produce the promised benefits allowed the irresponsi- ble Viet Cong to outbid the government in power by promising superior results at an undefined future time. Ultimately, no Marine Corps civic action could be lasting unless it were part of a program requested and needed by the local Vietnamese population and allocated the resources required for completion and continuation by the national government. To provide real continuity the Marine Corps had to support Vietnamese projects rather than, with misplaced zeal, create Marine Corps projects.
Second, civic action had to function through local Viet- namese officials. Again, the tendency to produce Marine Corps programs or to work through individuals had to be strictly controlled. (50) Only Vietnamese programs could be tolerated and support of those programs had to take place through Viet- namese governing officials. However, spontaneous humanitarian acts and contacts between individual Marines and Vietnamese citizens were exceptions to functioning within the Vietnamese chain of governmental command. These acts and contacts were important adjuncts to the Vietnamese programs encompassing revolutionary development and the programs of rural health, agricultural assistance, etc.. The spontaneous Marine Corps acts served to popularize the Marine Corps and the government which it had come to support. But Marine Corps civic action was not a popularity contest between Marines and the local population. Even though the spontaneous acts and individual contacts were important, they had to fit within the framework of a disciplined, single-minded program of support for the Vietnamese government. An enemy so ruthless and well—entrenched as the Vietnamese communist of the mid—1960s could be success- fully overcome only by the discipline, purpose, and control possible within a first-class military organization. (51)
Third, civic action programs had to be related to the basic needs of the rural population. The production of food was the central issue of life for most of the Vietnamese people. Concentration of effort, one of the principles of war and a
78 Support for education: a winsome young orphan at Trung Phu Orphanage south of Da Nang receives booklets from a Marine vis- itor early in 1966. By this time support for education had be- come a vital part of civic action. The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund which had been announced in Sep 65 concen- trated initially on the buying of CARE school kits. (MCA187646) r 0 ftf
Support for therural school system: in a well organized program at Le Tinhvillage near Chu Lai, LtCol Paul X. Kelley, Ca, 2nd Battalion,4th Marines presents precious school sup— plies to a child. Note the schoolmaster (raised hands) promp— ting the children,ARVN soldier (beret), loudspeaker system (upper right), andthe Vietnamese flag. (USMC A369053)
78a sound principle of business management, ruled the field in the case of basic needs. Marine Corps civic action had neither the resources nor the time to support frivolous activities. The Viet Cong and predecessor Viet Minh had operated in parts of the South Vietnamese countryside for a quarter of a century. In the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Viet Cong had made important advances in 1964 and these were characterized by meticulous attention to honesty in dealings with farmers and fishermen. In both its earlier operations and the more recent ones, the Viet Cong had displayed a masterful grasp of what was real to the peasant and the fisherman. The Marine Corps had to reveal to the rural population the same benevolent realism. But the pressing, basic needs of the countryside could be most effec- tively determined by the people themselves. And even though the Marine Corps could determine by pure reason that support for food production was the basic need of the people, the precise programs for implementation were so complex as to re- quire playing the subtle game of waiting for the request of the local peasant for assistance. (52)
Fourth, once civic action programs had begun which were requested by the people, were coordinated with Vietnamese revolutionary development, and had been assured of the resources necessary for completion and continuation, the Marine Corps had to bend every effort to enhance the prestige of the local officials who were directing the programs. The assassination of effective governing officials was one of the mainstays of Viet Cong political action. Marine Corps civic action projects had to enhance the reputation of Vietnamese officials who were able to produce concrete gains for the peasants and provide justice. Support and protection for honest officials was the foundation for Marine Corps civic action. Even the Southeast Asian form of the Marxist dialectic would find it a tortuous path to justify assassination of effective and honest men. Marine Corps civic action had to help to create those men and support their actions. Marine Corps rifles would make the Viet Cong form of public "execution" a greater challenge than the cheap exercise in deliberate terror which it had been in the past. Fif, in the cases where choices existed, Marines had to choose civic action projects with the shortest time of com- pletion. The mobility of the Marine Corps and its preoccupation with combat against the main forces and the guerrillas of the Viet Cong movement emphasized the reality that long-term pro- jects and ultimately revolutionary development were the re- sponsibility of the people and the Government of Vietnam. Assuredly, the Marine Corps would support both individual long- term projects and revolutionary development but Marine Corps support was forced to take the form of short—term projects within the framework of the larger, longer ones. For example, medical assistance was one of the keystones of Marine Corps civic action and was probably the essence of short—term, high—
79 impact civic action. But the most effective medical assistance was that which reinforced the existing Vietnamese rural health service and that carried out as part of revolutionary develop- ment. It was generally true that the words, short—term and high—impact, best described Marine Corps civic action. But the levels of service established in programs involving Marine Corps support had to be delicately curtailed in many cases to ensure the same level of service after the departure of the Marine units.
Sixth, civic action encouraged and supported projects which used Vietnamese talent and materials to the maximum practical extent. A guiding principle in civic action projects proved to be self-help on the part of the peasantry. Self- help projects meant more to the peasants than gifts; and the Viet Cong, who were barometers of the effectiveness of Marine Corps actions, normally avoided damage to projects which were the result of peasant labor. On the other hand, government or Marine Corps projects were fair game for criticism and destruc- tion. The peasants had to have a predominating influence in projects which were, after all, aimed at beneficial change for them. Marine Corps ingenuity could never be allowed to predominate if civic action programs were going to have lasting significance for the Vietnamese people and be a source of lasting influence for their governing officials. (53)
80 :(II..'y
Clothes for old women: clothes along with food and medicine were the most important commodities distributed by Marines. The essence of this view seems to be that happiness is a bun- dle of old clothes. The youngster looks pleased also. The dis- tribution was made late in 1966 at Ly Son island off the coast near Chu Lai by MAG-26. (USMC A421460)
8 Oa
NOTES
Chapter I
1. Based on lstLt Kenneth W. Clem, Ltr. Background Data on Killed or Captured Viet Cong, dtd 17 April 1967, presently on file in Historical Branch, G—3 Division, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps.
2. Clem, Ltr., Background Data, 17Apr67.
3. Vietnamese villages often include hamlets with identical names differentiated only by a following numeral.
4. New York Times, 8 March 1965, p. A-3.
5. Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/ki, 5700 16 June 1965 to Commanding General, III MAP, paras 1-4.
6. William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962—1965 (Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 1966), pp. 138-154. See also HQ (G—2), FNFPac, A Marine's Guide to the Republic of Vietnam, 11 May 1966.
7. Ft4PPac, III MAP Operations, December 1966 (5), pp. 30,31.
8. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, Command Chronology, February 1966 (5). The 2d Battalion, 1stMarineswas the successor to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Hue/Phu Bai and continued the CAC operations of the former unit.
Chapter II
1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Vietnam Information Notes, Number 1, February 1967, pp. 2, 3.
2. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet—Nams: Political Military Analysis, Revised Edition (New York: 1965), pp. 252- 253. 336.
3. See the New York Times, 13 June 1965, for a concise summary of the political shifts in Vietnam from November 1963- June 1965.
4. Washington Post, 19 June 1965, p. 1. See also Ky's de- scription of the critical nature of the Vietnamese situation in the Washington Post, 20 June 1965, p. 1.
28B-5850 - 66 - 6 81 5. "Charts" and "Summaries" provided by Mr. J. J. Helble, Off ice of South Vietnamese Affairs, Department of State, dtd 1 March 1965, 19 June 1965, 12 October 1965, 21 February 1966, 13 July 1966, 18 November 1966, and 28 January 1967 (herein- after referred to as Heible, "Charts" and "Summaries").
6. Single Sheet entitled The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Field Administration and Local Government, Unofficial as of January 1966, and Produced by the U.S. Agency for International Development, Public Administration Division. See also, Department of State, Agency for International Development, A Vietnamese District Chief in Action, pp. 19,31. The term, hamlet, is used in this paper to include the traditional "thon" or small village (hamlet) and the "xa" or village of normal size. The term, village, is used to refer to the grouped village or unit of administrative convenience.
7. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, Notes for Public Appearances (effective March 1967), p.2. The quotation has a certain poetical meter and was quoted in its most effective form.
8. George A. Carver, Jr. "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No.3, April 1966, pp. 347—372. Carver's work is a detailed analysis of the organization of the Viet Cong movement. Carver emphasizes the use of terror by the Viet Cong and notes. that the main strength of the movement is in the countryside.
9. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Plans and Policies Division, Civic Action Branch, Revolutionary Development Planning, p. 2.
10. Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, MACJ332, dtd 23 November 1965, Establishment of the 1966 Rural Construction (Pacification) Plan, pp. 1,2.
11. Heible, "Charts" and "Summaries".
12. Richard C. Kriegel, Jr., Revolutionary Development: Last Chance for Victory in Vietnam, pp. 1—12. This document is a pamphlet presently on file in the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U. S. Marine Corps. Kriegel was one of the U.S. advisors to General Thang at the National Training Center, Vung Tau, in 1966. General Thang carried out the training of the revolutionary development cadres at Vung Tau.
82 Chapter III
1. Jerome of Westphalia originated the remark that "man could do anything with bayonets but sit on them." He made the remark during a conversation with his redoubtable relative, Napoleon I.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, Field Manual No. 41-10, p. 88.
3. Ibid.
4. In 1965 the government's plan to secure the countryside, and hence, the state was called rural construction. The term revolutionary development appeared at the turn of 1966 and replaced the words, rural construction, as the general descrip- tion of the government's plan for survival.
5. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Civic Action Branch, Revolutionary Development Planning, pp. 1-4.
6. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, Notes for Public Appearances, p. 5. The definition was a general one. A definition applying more directly to the situa- tion in Vietnam was found in III MAF Order 1750.1, 7 June 1965, p.1.
7. Ibid., p. 4. The definition was based on, Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, November 1966, para. 4—5.
8. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 161-166.
9. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Civic Action Branch, Chart: US/GVN Organization for Revolutionary Development, SVN.
10. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, p. 287. The author em- phasizes the central importance of security for any progress in revolutionary development.
11. Major Charles J. Keever, III MAF Civic Action Summary, pp. 7-13. This document is a 16-page authoritative descrip- tion of Marine Corps civic action by the first Civic Action Officer of III MAF.
83 Chapter IV
1. HQ, U. S.MarineCorps, G—3 Division, Historical Branch, Manuscript, Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, January 1965- June 1965 (s)p. 8.
2. U.S. Department of State, WhitePaper,"Aggression from the North," excerpts in The Viet— Reader: Articles documentson American Foreign Policy in the Viet-Narn Crisis, ed. by Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (New York: 1965), pp. 143—154.
3. Washington Post, 8 March 1965, p. 1. See also the Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 March 1965, p.1 and the editorial page.
4. 9thMEB,Command Chronology, March 1965 (S), pp.1, 2.
5. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of the Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 1, 5, 18.
6. 9th NEB,Command Chronology,March1965 (S).The whole chronologyexudes concern over the problems of the buildup.
7. 9th MEB, CommandChronology, April 1965 (S), p.4.
8. FNFPac, Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam,March—September 1965 (5), pp. 17—24.
9. Washington Post, 7 May 1965.
10. 3d NABCommandDiary, April/May 1965, p. 23.
11. LtCol David A. Clement, Taped Interview #189: Civic Action Program of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, pp. 63-77.
12. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March—September 1965,(5), pp. 26—31. 13. HQ, USMACV,Letterof Instruction, Da Nang Administrative Coordination, 29 May 1965, pp. 1-3.
14. Force Order 1750.1, Concepts of Civic Action in the Republic of Vietnam, 7 June 1965.
15. Ibid., p. 1. The problems were described succinctly under the heading, "Background."
16. Ibid., p.2, para. 2.
17. Ibid., p.2, para. 6.
84 18. See the Howard Margolis column in The Washington Post, 11 June 1965.
19. HQ, III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, dtd 18 July 1965, Enclosures (4), (5), (6), (10), (13), (14),(16).
20. Ibid., Enclosure (13).
21. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, Comand Chronology, June 1965 (S), pp. 1—3 of the Narrative.
22. Fr"IFPac, III MAP Operations, March—September 1965, (5), pp. 27, 35. The exact figures were 8,204 (25May65) and 17,601 (15Jun65).
23. HQ, III MAP, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, Enclosure (13).
24. Ibid.
25. lstLt William F. B. Francis, Taped Interview #120: Work as Civil Affairs Officer, 3d Marines, 15 April—15 July1965, pp. 38—51.
26. Ibid., p. 49.
27. Ibid., p. 40.
28. Ibid., pp. 50, 51.
29. Capt Lionel V. Silva, Taped Interview #37: Civic Action in the Le Area, pp. 1-18.
30. Ibid., pp. 6—7.
31. See the remarkably detailed account of the action in the Baltimore 'J2'1 July 1965, p.1. See also, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, Division of Information, United Press International Clips, 1600 (local time)1 July 1965.
32. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965 (5) pp. 33,34.
33. III MAP, Command Chronology, July 1965 (5), p. 6.
34. III MAP Order 5800.3, 17 June 1965, Civic Action Medical Teams, p.3.
35. III MAP, Command Chronology, July 1965 (S), p. 6.
36. HQ, III MAP, Civic Action Reports, 8 March—15 July 1965, p. 2.
85 37. Ibid., Enclosure (3), p. 2.
38. CARE Fact Sheet, effective May1967,pp. 1, 3.
39. See OPNAV Instruction 5726.3A, dtd 28 August 1964, and the information sheet, Commander J. F. Dow, Project Handclasp/Civic Action, dtd 10 November 1965.
40. 3d Engineer Battalion (Reinf)(Forward), Command Chronology, 1-31July1965 (s),PartII, third arid fourth pages (pages not numbered).
41. The problem of payment of claims was especially important in both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs because of the problems of airfield construction, maintenance, and defense.
42. Keever, III MAP Civic Action Summary, pp. 3-4.
43. HQ, 4th Marines, Regimental Order 6000.1, dtd 23 June 1965, pp. 1—2.
44. HQ, III MAP, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15July1965, End. (14).
45. In 1965 and 1966 civilian personnel of the U.S. Operations Mission were established no lower than province level. The situation was only beginning to change by April 1967. See the chart entitled, /GVN Organization for Revolutionary ment and held by U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Operations, Civil Affairs Division, Civic Action Branch.
46. III MAF, Combat Information Bureau, Release No. 247-65, 16 July 1965. See also Pacific Stars and Stripes, 26 July 1965.
47. CO, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/klj, 5700, 16Jun65, Reconstruction of Le (known to local people as Hoa Loc village, district of Hoa Vang, province of Quang Nam), End: (9).
48. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Command Chronology, July 1965 (5), Situation Report 104, 19 July 1965.
49. See, for example, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr //k1, 5700 16 June 1965, para. 3.
50. Special Operations Research Office, J½merican University, Human Factors Considerations of Undercirounds in Insurgencies, 1 December 1965, pp. 182, 183. This document appeared in September 1966 as Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550—104.
51. FIVIFPac, III MAP Operations, March—September 1965 (S), pp. 11-14. See also, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report,2 December 1965.
86 Chapter V
1. Interview with Col Don P. Wyckoff, dtd 5 June 1967. Col Wyckoff was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 3d MarDiv in August 1965.
2. Keever, III MAP Civic Action Summary, pp. 6—8, 10.
3. See the description of the various civic action programs in HQ, III MAP, Civic Action Report, 8 March-15 July 1965, Enclosures (1), (2), (3), for a brief, general description of civic action through the middle of July.
4. HQ, III MAP, Minutes of Planning Meeting Lfor a Regional Working Grou/, 30 August 1965.
5. HQ, III MAP, Civil Affairs Officer, Memo to Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 August 1965. This document contained a suggested mission which was accepted by the planning meeting of the I Corps JCC on 30 August 1965.
6. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3 Division, Civic Action Branch, I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Summary of Activities During CY 1966.
7. HQ, III MAP, Minutes of the Meeting of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Statement of Mission, Composition, and Functions I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.
8. HQ, III MAP, Minutes of the Meeting of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, 15 November 1965, para. 3.
9. LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, "Bus to Tra Khe," Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 50, no. 10, October 1966, p. 34.
10. Col Bryce F. Denno USA, "Viet Cong Defeat at Phuoc Chau," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, No. 3, March 1965, p. 35.
11. Recall the quotation of the village elder from, Notes f PublicAppearances, Civic Action Branch, G-3 Division, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps: "...the Viet Cong never take anything, they tax...."
12. New York Times, 20 August 1965.
13. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 177-179.
14. MSgt George Wilson, "Combined Action," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 50, No. 10, October 1966, pp.28—31.
15. See the article in the Washington Post, 22September 1965, entitled "Viet Militiamen are Attached toU.S. Marines," by Mr. Jack Foisie, reporter for the Los AngelesTimes.
87 16. Captain Francis J. West, Jr., The CAC as a Catalyst, mimeographed sheet recounting the impressions of Captain West after duty with the CACs in Vietnam in late 1966.
17. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Mimeographed Sheets Entitled, Marine Corps Civic Action Fund for Vietnam- Summary, two pages.
18. Ronwyn M. Ingraham, Assistant Director, Washington, D. C. Office CARE, Inc., Letter addressed to Major Stevens and Captain Smith, dated 26 August 1965.
19. Marine Corps Order 5710.4, dtd 13 September 1965.
20. HQ, U. S. Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Reserve Civic Action Fund—Summary, two pages.
Chapter VI
1. See The New York Times, 8 September 1965, p. 1, and The Washington Post, 9 September 1965, p. 12, for details about PIRANHA.
2. Washington News, 7 September 1965, p. 8.
3. FMFPac, III MAP Operations, October 1965 (S), p. 24. See also, FMFPac, III MAP Operations, December 1965 (s),p.51.
4. FMFPac, III MAP Operations, October 1965 (5), p.23, and FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1965 (5), p. 50.
5. III MAF, Command Chronology, October 1965 (S), Part Three, p. 10.
6. HQ, III MAP, Press Release, 29 October 1965.
7. Interview with Capt Thomas J. McGowan, USMC, on 19 April 1967 at HQ, U. S. Marine Corps. Capt McGowan was Executive Officer, Company I,3d Battalion, 9th Marines at the time of the action.
8. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, October 1965 (s),p.12.
9. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, October 1965 (s),p.10. 10. This rural construction effort had several names including the following: (1) Quang Narn Pacification Project,(2) Ngu Hanh Son (FIVE MOUNTAIN Pacification Campaign.
11. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 150-154. This account is thin on detail but does emphasize the importance of security
88 and the challenge of rural construction after two years of Viet Cong gains.
12. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Reports, Reports Nos. 1-7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
13. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 3 January 1966, Report No. 7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS
14. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, November 1965 (S),p.16.
15. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, November 1965 (S),p. 2.
16. A small unit was defined as a company or smaller organiza- tion.
17. Clem, Ltr, Background Data, 17 April 1967.
18. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 95, 285—288, 291—292. See also, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 21 December 1965, Report No. 6, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
19. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report 15 December 1965. The Report shows the medical activity of the battalion on 13 December 1965 and gives a lucid picture of the effectiveness of the mobile concept. A total of 655 persons were assisted on 13 December 1965.
20. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, November 1965 (5), p. 7.
21. Ibid., p. 8.
22. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Command Chronology, November 1965 (S), Enclosure (8), After Action Report No. 8—65.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 2 December 1965. The report of 2 December 1965 included part of the civic action summary for November 1965.
26. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, December 1965 (5), pp. 50-51. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, October 1965 (5), pp. 23-24. FMFPac, III MAF Operations, March-September 1965 (S), pp. 32,48.
27. Ibid. (The material in this paragraph is based on the data in the listing preceding it in the text).
89 28. See the material contained in 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Situation Reports, 1-31 December 1965. The informa- tion in this massive source supports a view that Marine Corps civic action was not yet fully coordinated with either Viet- namese local government or rural construction.
29. Compare, LtCol Clement, Taped Interview #189, pp. 67—69, with 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 1 January 1966, to see the unchanged problem of security be- tweeri June 1965-December 1965.
30. See 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Situation Reports, for the months of December and January 1965/1966. They form a voluminous account largely of the soft type of civic action.
31. 3d BattaliOn, 7th Marines, Civic Action Situation Report Lhereinafter abbreviated to SitRep/, 1 January 1966.
32. The shot in the back of Mr. Truong's head was probably fired from close range by unhurried gunmen who had downed the chief with three previous shots.
33. See the brief analysis of security in, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Situation Report, 21 December 1965, Re- port No. 6, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
34. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, pp. 161—163.
35. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Sit ,1—7 January 1966, Report Number 7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
36. Ibid.
37. The Republic of Vietnam, Quang Nam Province, Hoa Vang District, the Northwest Zone, Impressions of the People of Northwest Hoa Vang District, 12 June 1965. This letter was also included as Enclosure (1) to HQ, III MAF, Ltr. l/drw 5720 29 June 1965.
38. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, Civic Action Sit p, 1700, 22 December 1965. The italics were included in the report.
39. 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Sit Reps, 1-7 December 1965. For the quotation see 3d Tank Battalion, Civic Action Sit , 2December 1965.
40. 3d Tank Battalion, Civic Action Sit ,25January 1966.
41. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, Civic Action Sit , 2 January 1966.
42. 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Civic Action Sit Rep 25 December 1965.
90 43. Ibid.
Chapter VII
1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Civic Action Sit , 3January 1966, Report No. 7, Operation FIVE MOUNTAINS.
2. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,DeputyChief of Staff for Military Operations, Civil Affairs, Plans and Policies Division, Civic Action Branch, Revolutionary Development Planning, pp. 1-4.
3. 3d Marine Division, Command Chronology, January 1966, p. 22.
4. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Sit p, 25 January 1966 After Action Report Operation MALLARD.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Weekly Meetings, Minutes, 27 January 1966, p.1.
8. I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, Weekly Meetings, Minutes, 22 February 1966, p. 1.
9. Based on 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Sit Reps, 1 December 1965—31 January 1966.
10. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification, p. 207.
11. Ibid., p. 208.
12. By the turn of 1966, it was more accurate to speak of Vietnamese plans for change in the countryside as revolutionary development rather than the older term, rural construction.
13. III MAF, Command Chronology, January 1966 (S), p. 14.
14. See FNPPac, Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, October 1966, pp. 57-58.
15. Ibid.
16. FNFPac, III MAE' Operations, January 1966 (s),p.2.
17. III MAP, Command Chronology, January 1966 (5), p. 14.
18. Definition of a diild: a human younger than 18 years of age.
91 19. 3d Marine Division, Command Chronology, January 1966 (5), p.2, and 1stMarineAir Wing, Command Chronology, January 1966 (Unclassified), pp. 3, 4.
20. III MAP, Command Chronology, January 1966 (5), p. 14.
21. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Sit ,10 January 1966, Special Civil Affairs Program of Company A, 1-9 January 1966.
22. Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, Ltr 6/DAC/kl, 5700 16 June 1965, para. 4. The letter was addressed to CG, III MAP.
23. 3dMarine Division, Civic Action Situation Reports, 22-31 January 1965.
24. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Sit ,22 y 1966.
25. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Sit Reps, 22—23 January 1966.
26. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Civic Action Sit ,2.4 January 1966.
27. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, Civic Action Sit , 22 January1966.
28. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, Civic Action Sit , January 1966.
29. The civic action data presented on the maps was taken from the following source: 3d Marine Division, Civic Action Sit Reps, 13—17 December 1966. Hence, the data represented the civic action of the most numerous part of III MAF and the part which carried out the majority of civic action projects be- tween May 1965—March 1966.
30. 3d Engineer Battalion, Civic Action Sit ,12January 1966.
31. Telephone Interview with First Lieutenant William E. Black, on Friday 19 May1967.
32. Da Nang Press Briefing, 1100, 28 January 1966 pp. 4, 5, covering the period of Marine Corps action from 0600, 27 January-0600, 28 January 1966.
33. For details about Operation DOUBLE EAGLE see, Sgt Bob Bowen, "Operation Double Eagle I," Leatherneck, Vol. XLIX, No. 6, June 1966, pp. 26—29, and Sgt Bob Bowen, 'tOperation DOUBLE EAGLE II," Leatherneck, Vol. XLIX, No. 6,pp. 30-33, 81.
92 34. 3d Marine Division, Command Chronology, February 1966 (5), p. 29.
35. III MAP, Command Chronology, February 1966(S),p.20.
36. III MAP, Command Chronology, February 1966 (5), p. 18.
37. III MAP, Command Chronology, February 1966 (S), p. 20.
38. Cdr J. F. Dow, Letter, OP—345F, X57725, 10 November 1965, Prolect HADCLA'CiviC Action. Commander Dow was the Naval Operations Coordinator for Project HANDCLASP in 1965.
39. Telephone Conversation with the Director, Project Hand- clasp, Cdr Arthur P. Ismay, U.S. Navy, on Monday 5 June 1967.
40. Interview with Col Don P. Wyckoff on Thursday 8 June 1967. Col Wyckoff was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 3d Marine Division in August 1965.
41. FMF Pac, Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, January 1967, pp. 42, 43. See also, FIVIPPac, Professional Experience Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, October 1966, pp. 1-3.
42. Ibid., p. 42.
43. 3d Marine Division, Command Chronology, March 1966 (s), P. 19.
44. CG, III MAF, County Fair Operations, 7 August 1966. This document is a message addressed to CG, FMFPac (070332Z August 1966) and includes the pamphlet entitled, 9th Marines, tion County Fair. The pamphlet states that "over twenty county fairs were held during July in villages throughout the three tactical areas" of III MAP.
45. FMFPac, Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, October 1966, pp. 53, 54.
46. Ibid., p. 53.
47. Ibid., p. 54.
48. Comparison of the material contained in Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, Number 21, The United States Marines Nicaragua, Revised 1962, with the details of the intervention in Vietnam supported the view that the intensity and pervasiveness of the Vietnamese struggle rated it as a "different" experience.
49. See John Mecklin, "The Struggle to Rescue the People," Fortune, April 1967, pp. 126—139, 238-247, for an imaginative
93 yet sound analysis of the Viet Cong's method of "advance."
50. FNFPac, Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in the Republic of Vietnam, August 1966, p. 39.
51. FNFPac, Tactical Trends and Training Tips, January 1966, pp. 2, 3.
52. Marine Corps Bulletin 3480,1 August 1966, End (2) Civic Action Lessons Learned,p. 4.
53. Ibid., p. 5.
94 APPENDIX
Contents of CARE kits provided through Reserve Civic Actions Fund for Vietnam
Elementary School Kit Classroom Supply Kit
Quantity Item Quantity Item
2 Pen Points 2 Notebook 1 Pen Holder 24 Ink Pellets 1 Ink Holder 2 Erasers *2 Notebooks (100 pages) 4 Blotting Paper 1 Ruler 2 Pencils *24 Ink Pellets 1 Plastic Bag 1 Slate 1 Piece of Chalk *2 Erasers *4 Blotting Paper *2 Pencils *4 Pieces of Chalk *1 Plastic bag to contain the kit
*Classroom Supply Kit Items For those students who need only the replacement components
Sewing Kit Physical Education Kit
Quantity Item Quantity Item
1 Scissors 1 Soccer Ball 1 Packet of Needles 1 Volley Ball 1 Spool of Black Thread 1 Volley Ball Net
Textile Package
Quantity Item
12 m Black Rayon 1,600 m Black Sewing Thread 75 Needles 0.75 kg Laundry Soap 144 Black Plastic Buttons 1 Scissors
95 Midwifery Kit Blacksmith Kit
Quantity Item Quantity Item
1 Sponge Bowl 1 Bellow 1 Stainless Steel Tray 1 Hacksaw Frame 1 Surgical Scissors 12 12" Hacksaw Blades 2 Forceps 1 Aluminum Ruler 2 Plastic Bottles 1 Steel Tin Snip 1 Packet of Safety Pins 1 Sledge Hammer 18 Sterile Packets 1 Square Hammer 1 Plastic Soap Container 1 Vice 2 Toilet Soap 1 12" Bastard File 1 Plastic Nail Brush 1 12" 2nd Cut File 2 Hand Towel 1 Half Round 2nd Cut File 1 Plastic Apron 1 Balipeen Hammer 1 Clear Vinyl Sheeting 1 32" Tongs 1 Waterproof Bag 1 Cold Chisel
Midwifery Replacement Kit Woodworking Kit
Quantity Item Quantity Item
8 cakes Soap 1 Ripsaw Blade 2 each Hand Towels 1 Crosscut Saw Blade 2 each Nail Brushes 1 Claw Hammer 2 each Vinyl Plastic Aprons 1 Steel Plane 18 each Sterile Packets, each 1 Triangle File containing 2 umbilical 1 5 Piece Chisel Set tapes, 16" strand, one 1 12mm Drill Bit muslin binder 18" x 1 16mmDrillBit 40", and one gauze pad, 1 Aluminum Ruler 3", 12 ply
SOURCE: Cooperativefor knerican Relief Everywhere, Inc. 34 Ngo Nhiem, Saigon, Guidelines and tions, pp. 2—3.
96
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE1968 0 -288-595 MAP NUMB ANANG AND ViCINITY REPUBLIC OFSOUTH VIETNA CALE 1 INCH=2.5 MILES NOTEALSOTHE1O,000 METER GRID SQUARE EXPLANATORY NOTE: THE COLORED CIRCLES LOCATE CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES ON 15 JAN 1966, A REPRESENTATIVE DAY OF CIVIC ACTION FOR EARLY 1966. 00
RED
MEDICAL TREATMENT. ANANG INNOCULATIONS, ETC.
BLUE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, CLOTHING, ETC.
CONSTRUCTION
SCHOOLROOM,
MARKET, ETC.
. HILL 41 A
BICH BAC S
PHU LONG MAP NUMBER TWO CHU LAI AND VICINITY SCALE 1 INCH 2 MILES NOTE ALSO THE 10.000 METER GRID SQUARES
XPLANATORY NOTE: THE COLORED CIRCLES LOCATE CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES ON 15 JAN 6 LAIAIRFIELD A REPRESENTATIVE DA OF CIVIC ACTION FOR EARLY 1966.
RED MEDICAL TREATMENT, INNOCULATIONS. ETC.
BLUE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, CLOTHING, ETC.
AN (2J • GREEN CONSTRUCTION E.G.,SCHOOLROOM, MARKET,
TRI BINH (1)
NUOC MAN MOUNTAINS MAP NUMBER THREE HUE PHU BAI AND VICINITY SCALE 1 INCH = 1.1 MILES (NOTE ALSO 1O,000M. GRID SOUARE) EXPLANATORY N OTE THE COLORED CIRCLES LOCATE CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES ON 15 JAN 1966,
A REPRESENTATIVE DAY OF CIVIC ACTION FOR EARLY 1966.
RED:MEDICAL TREATMENT, INNOCULATIONS, ETC. BLUE : DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, CLOTHING, ETC. GREEN: CONSTRUCTION E.G.,SCHOOLROOM, MARKET, ETC.
DE L'EST
HILL180
LOW HILLS
GHT 618
ETER CONTOUR
U. S. GOVERNTENTPRINTtNGOFFICE 19F70-255-833