Rational and Irrational Beliefs Research, Theory, and Clinical
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Rational and Irrational Beliefs This page intentionally left blank Rational and Irrational Beliefs Research, Theory, and Clinical Practice Edited by Daniel David, Steven Jay Lynn, and Albert Ellis 1 2010 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright Ó 2010, by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rational and irrational beliefs : research, theory, and clinical practice / edited by Daniel David, Steven Jay Lynn, & Albert Ellis. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-19-518223-1 1. Delusions. 2. Irrationalism (Philosophy) 3. Rationalism. 4. Health behavior. I. David, Daniel, Dr. II. Lynn, Steven J. III. Ellis, Albert, 1913–2007. RC553.D35R38 2009 616.89—dc22 2009003476 987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Preface In the 1950s, influential researchers and theoreticians (e.g., Noam Chomsky, George Miller, Alan Newell, Herbert Simon) departed from the behaviorist tradition and broke the intellectual ground for the nascent field that Ulrich Neisser (1967) termed ‘‘cognitive psychology’’ in his book by the same name. During this fertile period, Albert Ellis parted ways with both psychodynamic and behavioral psychotherapists to delineate a cognitive approach to concep- tualizing and treating psychological conditions. As early as 1955, Ellis applied the verb catastrophize (and later awfulize) to the way people think when they are anxious. After the publication of the article ‘‘Rational Psychotherapy’’ (Ellis, 1958) and the seminal book Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy (Ellis, 1962, 1994), Ellis became a tireless advocate of a cognitive approach to psy- chotherapy. Although other professionals (e.g., Adler, Horney, Kelly) before him had stressed the importance of cognitions in the clinical field, they did not promote the cognitive paradigm as an entity in and of itself. It is fair to assert that Ellis’s rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT), which highlights the integral role of cognition in adaptive and maladaptive functioning, is the oldest form of cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) and represents the prototype of contemporary cognitive-behavior therapies. By identifying the manifold ways in which individuals react to similar situations, and by exploring how their attitudes, beliefs, and expectancies shape their reality and behavior, Ellis played a pivotal role in instigating the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’ in psychotherapy and psychology more broadly. Accordingly, it is not surprising that concepts derived from REBT have pene- trated and/or been assimilated by cognitive psychology, psychotherapy, and vi PREFACE many domains of mainstream psychology, including the psychology of stress, coping, and resilience. Indeed, contemporary cognitive-behavioral therapies, regardless of their stripe, share the following propositions, derived from or related to Ellis’s REBT: (1) cognitions can be identified and measured, (2) cognitions play a central role in human psychological functioning and disturbance, and (3) irrational cognitions can be replaced with rational cogni- tions and thereby abet functional emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses in keeping with personal goals and values. Ellis’s ‘‘ABC(DE)’’ model is the cornerstone of REBT and cognitive-beha- vioral therapies. In a nutshell, Ellis argued that individuals respond to an undesirable or unpleasant activating (internal or external) event (A) with a gamut of emotional, behavioral, and cognitive consequences (C). The diverse ways in which people respond to the same or similar events is largely the result of differences in their cognitions or belief systems (B). Rational beliefs can be characterized as efficient, flexible, and/or logical. Rational beliefs promote self- acceptance and adaptive coping with stressful events, reduce vulnerability to psychological distress, and play an instrumental role in achieving valued goals. According to REBT, beliefs are infused with emotion. In fact, Ellis has argued that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are intimately interconnected. Irrational beliefs (IBs) are related to unrealistic demands about the self (e.g., ‘‘I must be competent, adequate, and achieving in all respects to be worthwhile.’’), others (‘‘I must become worried about other people’s problems.’’), and the world or life conditions (‘‘I must be worried about things I cannot control.’’) and are associated with a variety of dysfunctional feelings and behaviors. According to Ellis, vulner- ability to psychological disturbance is a product of the frequency and strength of irrational beliefs, as compared to rational beliefs. Clients who engage in REBT are encouraged to actively dispute/restructure (D) their IBs and to assimilate more efficient (E) and rational beliefs in order to increase adaptive emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses. It is notable that this general framework (at least the A-B-C part of Ellis’s scheme) is at the heart of most, if not all, cognitive-behavior therapies. Cognitive-behavioral therapies are the most popular contemporary therapeutic approaches (Garske & Anderson, 2004), and have steadily increased in acceptance and influence. Not surprisingly, thousands of books and scholarly publications have been devoted to cognitive psychology and CBT. Since its introduction to the psychological community, hundreds of papers have been published on the theory and practice of REBT. Some studies (e.g., Dryden, Ferguson, & Clark, 1989; McDermut, Haaga, & Bilek, 1997) have confirmed the main aspects of Ellis’s original REBT theory (Ellis, 1962), whereas other studies (e.g., Bond & Dryden, 2000; Solomon, Haaga, Brody, & Friedman, 1998) have made critical contributions to the evolution of REBT PREFACE vii theory and practice (for details, see Ellis, 1994; Solomon & Haaga, 1995). Furthermore, meta-analytic studies have supported the contention that REBT is an empirically supported form of CBT (e.g., Engels, Garnefski, & Diekstra, 1993). Despite the centrality of rational and irrational beliefs to CBT and REBT, it is also legitimate to say that no available book, monograph, or resource provides a truly accessible, state of the science summary of research and clinical applica- tions pertinent to rational and irrational beliefs. Our concern about this gap in the extant literature provided the impetus for this volume. This book is designed to provide a forum for leading scholars, researchers, and practitioners to share their perspectives and empirical findings on the nature of irrational and rational beliefs, the role of beliefs as mediators of functional and dysfunctional emotions and behaviors, and clinical approaches to modifying irra- tional beliefs and enhancing adaptive coping in the face of stressful life events. Many of the chapters in this volume represent international collaborations, and bring together and integrate disparate findings, to offer a comprehensive and cohesive approach to understanding CBT/REBT and its central constructs of rational and irrational beliefs. The authors review a steadily accumulating empirical literature indicating that irrational beliefs are associated with a wide range of problems in living (e.g., drinking behaviors, suicidal contemplation, ‘‘life hassles’’), and that exposure to rational self-statements can decrease anxiety and physiological arousal over time and can be a major tool in health promotion. The contributors identify areas that have been ‘‘underresearched,’’ including the link between irrational beliefs and memory, emotions, behaviors, and psychophysiological responses. The major focus of our book is on rational and irrational beliefs as con- ceptualized by proponents of REBT. However, the contents encompass other cognitive constructs that play an influential role in cognitive-behavior therapies including schemas, response expectancies, intermediate assumptions, auto- matic thoughts, and appraisal and coping. While important in their own right, these concepts are discussed in terms of their relation to rational and irrational beliefs and their role in cognitive-behavioral therapies and psychotherapy more generally. In addition to focusing on the ways irrational beliefs hamper ade- quate functioning, we highlight how rational beliefs contribute to positive coping and engender resilience in the face of stressful life events. It bears emphasizing that our book is not be an ‘‘advocacy piece,’’ slanted toward positive findings regarding REBT. In fact, where appropriate, the con- tributors directly challenge claims made by proponents of REBT and other cognitive therapies. Our intention was to produce a balanced, critical treatise that provides: (a) cogent summaries of what is known and what is