establishing the Welsh Liberal Party in Wales – something we are still proud of today. He was Report a steadfast Liberal who cared for the people of Montgomeryshire and Wales. Emlyn was also a fer- vent advocate of Welsh culture The Liberal–Tory Coalition of 1915 and music having been President of both the national and interna- Evening meeting, 26 January 2015, with Ian Packer and tional Eisteddfod.17 Nigel Keohane; chair: Raymond Asquith (Earl of Oxford and Asquith and great-grandson of Herbert Asquith) Dr J. Graham Jones is Senior Archivist Report by David Cloke and Head of the Welsh Political Archive at the National Library of Wales, n May 1915, following political minority governments, as had been Aberystwyth and military setbacks, Liberal the case from 1910. Hence, Packer IPrime Minister H. H. Asquith suggested, there was not necessar- 1 See J. Graham Jones, ‘Emlyn Hoo- brought senior figures from the ily an aversion to coalitions. When son’s parliamentary debut: the Mont- opposition parties into his govern- the war began there was a possibil- gomeryshire by-election of March ment – thus marking the end of ity that a coalition could be formed 1962’, Montgomeryshire Collections, 81 the last solely Liberal government immediately, as the Liberal Party (1993), pp. 121–29. of Britain. Dr Ian Packer, Acting was not wholly united over fight- 2 Norman Cook in his final article in Head of the School of History and ing the war. Packer argued that if the tour of the Welsh constituencies Heritage at Lincoln University a whole raft of cabinet ministers published in the Liverpool Daily Post, and author of a number of books had resigned, the Prime Minister 15 April 1967. on Edwardian and Liberal politics, and the pro-intervention ministers 3 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, box 42, outlined the events that led to the might have entered into a coalition press cutting entitled ‘The Assize of In May 1915, formation of the Coalition, and with the Conservatives then. How- Youth’. went on to describe the difficulties ever, Asquith’s customary tact held 4 See the obituary in The Guardian, 26 following that it faced and what eventually his colleagues together. February 2012. brought it down. He did this very Once through this difficulty 5 See the reports in The Times, 18 and political and much from the Liberal perspec- things seemed brighter for the gov- 19 January 1967; The Guardian, 19 tive. He was followed by Dr Nigel ernment. Despite having 25 fewer January 1967; and Peter Barberis, military set- Keohane from the Social Market MPs than the Conservatives, the Liberal Lion Jo Grimond: a Political Life backs, Lib- Foundation, author of The Conser- Liberals enjoyed a secure Com- (I. B. Tauris, 2005), p. 139. vative Party and the First World War, mons majority through the sup- 6 Cited in Hooson’s obituary in the eral Prime who provided further narrative as port of the Irish Nationalists and Daily Telegraph, 22 February 2012. well as a commentary on the events the Labour Party. Although both 7 See the penetrating analysis in Ken- Minister H. described by Packer from a Con- parties included opponents of the neth O. Morgan, ‘Montgomery- servative perspective. decision to enter the war, both offi- shire’s Liberal century: Rendel to H. Asquith Packer began by noting that the cially supported it. In Packer’s view Hooson, 1880–1979’, Welsh History first wartime coalition formed in this bound them closer to the Lib- Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (June 1992), pp. brought May 1915 had not received a very erals and made them fear a possible 106–7. good press. Liberals disliked it as Liberal-Conservative coalition: the 8 The Guardian, 4 May 1978. senior fig- representing the end of the last Labour Party because of the threat 9 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, box 45, Liberal government, and it was it might pose to trade union privi- PLP press release dated 15 April 1978, ures from the generally judged a failure for not leges, and the Irish Nationalists for Emlyn Hooson’s speech to the annual securing military victory and the fear it would block home rule. The conference of the Welsh Liberal Party opposition end of the First World War. How- Conservatives also had to be care- at the Commodore Conference Cen- ever, he argued that it was not a ful not to be seen to be criticising tre, Aberystwyth. parties into particularly incompetent govern- the government excessively, for 10 Daily Telegraph, 22 February 2012. ment and neither did it demonstrate fear of being seen as unpatriotic – 11 Daily Telegraph, 3 March 1979. his govern- that the Liberals were unable to a concern reinforced by Asquith’s 12 Election address of Emlyn Hooson, adapt their ideology to fighting a masterstroke of appointing Field May 1979. ment – thus modern war. Its problem was that Marshal Kitchener as Secretary of 13 See Morgan, ‘Montgomeryshire’s marking the it was in power during some of the State for War. The Liberals, there- Liberal century’, pp. 107–8. most desperate times of the war. fore, seemed safe. 14 House of Lords Debates, vol. 430, c. 838 end of the The possibility of coalition had Packer noted that the discus- (20 May 1982). hung over British politics since the sions within the cabinet regard- 15 See the obituary in The Guardian, 26 last solely start of the war in August 1914. The ing the conduct of the war did not February 2012. period up until then has been seen appear to affect the cohesion devel- 16 See the funeral report in the Cam- Liberal as a classic period of two-party pol- oped over the course of the Liberal brian News, 7 March 2012. itics, but in fact most of the govern- Party’s nine years in government. 17 Wales Online website, consulted 16 government ments of the preceding thirty years The crucial conflict came over how May 2013. had either been coalitions (Con- much of the country’s economic of Britain. servative and Liberal Unionist) or and manpower resources should

Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 37 Report: The Liberal–Tory Coalition of 1915 be devoted to the war. A group of Then, in the In these circumstances Asquith sense was not one of a man being ministers around McKenna, Run- had to accept that the war was out of control but of one seizing the ciman and Harcourt took a cautious course of a unlikely to be over quickly. The moment. approach, fearing that massively preceding events had damaged the In Keohane’s view Asquith disrupting the economy would lead meeting that government’s credibility and it came away with the spoils. Asquith to financial collapse. Against them, became harder for the Conserva- remained Prime Minister and in Lloyd George associated himself apparently tive leader Bonar Law to restrain a cabinet of 22 members, 12 were with the policy of ‘total war’, call- the attacks of his backbenchers. Liberal and only 8 Conservatives, ing for massive increases in muni- only lasted The government’s reputation was the remaining places being taken tions production and increased also being battered by the Con- by the Labour leader Arthur Hen- government intervention. Packer fifteen min- servative press which hounded it as derson and by Lord Kitchener. In argued that these were not dis- being insufficiently patriotic over addition, the positions taken by the putes between an approach that utes, a coa- the treatment of enemy aliens and Conservatives were relatively mar- was ‘liberal’ and one that was not; hinted that those Liberal ministers ginal ones: Bonar Law himself was the party had already accommo- lition was which had previously had close Colonial Secretary. No Conserva- dated itself to a significant degree links with Germany were secretly tive had a central role in the con- of state intervention, especially in agreed and traitors. duct of the war other than Balfour welfare. He argued that the differ- the last Lib- Asquith then took advantage at the Admiralty, who, as the previ- ences were partly temperamental, of one of what he described as ‘the ous Tory leader, Packer suggested, while also reflecting pre-war atti- eral govern- sudden curves in politics’, which might have been placed there to tudes to social reform. However, Packer noted that he believed he provide a counterweight to Bonar the divisions did lay the basis for the ment was had a special talent for spotting. Law. It was, thus, still very much acrimonious debates in the 1915–16 On 17 May, Bonar Law visited Asquith’s government. Reflect- coalition and caused lasting enmity terminated. Lloyd George at the Treasury to ing on a later question, Packer sug- between McKenna and Lloyd find out whether Fisher had indeed gested that Asquith had perhaps George. resigned. Although there were no been even too successful in mar- Gradually during 1914–15 the contemporary records of the dis- ginalising the Conservatives and cautious approach of McKenna cussions held during the day, events that this had contributed to his later was superseded, not least because seemed to develop as follows. Dur- difficulties. of Kitchener’s decision to recruit a ing the discussions between Lloyd Many Liberals outside govern- volunteer army of a million men. George and Bonar Law the idea ment, however, were dismayed: This rapidly started to distort the of an all-party coalition emerged. a Liberal government had been economy, with an accompany- Lloyd George then went to Down- dismantled without consultation. ing expansion in munitions pro- ing Street to report this to the Many still saw the Conservatives as duction and a contraction in other Prime Minister. Asquith in turn their main political enemy and had sectors starved of manpower and phoned Bonar Law and asked him no wish to cooperate with them. resources. The government was, to a meeting. Then, in the course Packer noted that Asquith had to therefore, increasingly drawn into of a meeting that apparently only be at his very best to convince a the management of the economy lasted fifteen minutes, a coalition meeting of Liberal MPs to back the regardless. was agreed and the last Liberal gov- coalition. As Christopher Addi- What finally undermined the ernment was terminated. son noted, ‘some of the members government, however, was its Why did Asquith take this were moved to tears, as was the PM inability to win the war quickly. momentous step? Packer suggested himself ’. Packer noted that military crises that he probably felt the need to Packer suggested that the real in France at the beginning of the agree a deal as soon as possible difficulty Asquith created for him- war had led to a coalition govern- before cabinet authority and Lib- self was one that he had not fore- ment in that country; a similar eral Party popularity waned any seen. Since he had been elected series of events had the same effect further. A coalition would force the Liberal leader in 1908 no credible in Britain. The decisive battle on Conservatives to share responsibil- contender had emerged. Lloyd the Western Front never came; ity – and therefore blame – for the George had no supporters in cabi- instead, there were a series of mili- conduct of the war. This was not net other than Churchill (whose tary and diplomatic setbacks. The welcomed by all in the Conserva- reputation had been eclipsed) and Anglo-French offensive in spring tive leadership, but they felt unable many others hated or despised 1915 failed to break the German to refuse. Packer also noted that him. Once the coalition had been lines, and this was compounded by the Labour Party joined the coali- formed, however, it was no longer reports in The Times on 14 May 1915 tion, whilst the Irish Nationalists necessary to be Leader of the Lib- suggesting that a lack of ammuni- did not. In questions it was sug- eral Party in order to be Prime tion was to blame. The landing at gested that the emotional conse- Minister. Indeed, Packer believed the Dardanelles led to another stale- quences of Venetia Stanley ending that it was probably the only way mate, with neither the Ottoman her relationship with Asquith only that Asquith could have been Empire forced out of the war nor a few days before had contributed displaced. the neutral Balkan states brought to what, in retrospect, seemed like A number of factors then came into it on Britain’s side. On 15 May a rash decision. Packer replied that into play. Initially Asquith had the Head of the Admiralty, the First it was very hard to judge the impact intended to make Lloyd George Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, resigned of private emotional developments Secretary State for War, but Kitch- over the Dardanelles policy. on public actions. However, his ener’s popularity prevented this.

38 Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 Report: The Liberal–Tory Coalition of 1915

Instead Asquith moved Lloyd the Conservative support that he its predecessor, and difficult deci- George to the new Ministry of claimed. This was a miscalculation. sions, such as rationing and price Munitions. This new role enabled On 5 December Asquith resigned control, were still reached slowly. him to enhance his reputation as and challenged his critics to put Behind the rhetoric there was much a wartime leader. Tackling one of another government together. continuity. the greatest crises facing the gov- King George V approached Bonar In summing up, Packer noted ernment suited him very well, and Law, who replied that he could not that the birth of the coalition was he did it successfully. The mas- form a government but suggested inauspicious. It was a government sive increase in munitions produc- that Lloyd George could. Lloyd no one really wanted, an ingen- tion kept the war effort going and George was thus invited to form his ious scheme born on the spur of the made Lloyd George’s reputation. government. moment. However, it had to deliver At the same time, however, there Packer then turned to an analy- military success and without that were increasing questions over sis of this outcome on the Liberal the calls for new men and new manpower and conscription. Lloyd Party, on Liberalism and on the war measures would not go away. George thought that conscription effort. He believed that the Lloyd Nigel Keohane began by not- was necessary and made his views George coalition was not the inevi- ing that it was perhaps a little unfair public in September 1915. This table outcome, arguing that Lloyd on Asquith to talk about him in aligned him with the Conservative George had not intended to replace the Lloyd George Room of the Party rather than with his Liberal Asquith as Prime Minister. None- National Liberal Club and won- colleagues, who were largely reluc- theless, the impact on the party In terms dered in passing whether in a hun- tant. 1915–16 saw a long political was catastrophic: it was cut in two, dred years time there would be a battle about conscription which led which led directly to the electoral of the con- meeting about David Cameron to it being pushed through in stages disaster of 1918. It also ended the in the Farage Room! His inten- during 1916, mainly because the progressive alliance with Labour, duct of tion was to fill in any gaps and war effort simply needed the men. as Arthur Henderson refused to act to provide the perspective of the Packer argued that once he had with Asquith, arguing that Labour war, Packer Conservative Party, including got conscription through Asquith would decide for itself, and took its verdict on the coalition and its very much lost his usefulness to on an enhanced role in the new observed impact on the party. the more hawkish members of the coalition. As Packer noted later in Keohane shared Packer’s view government. In addition, his dila- response to a question, this enabled that Lloyd on the fluidity of politics at the toriness on the matter frustrated Labour to look like a national party time. He noted that Lord Selborne, Lloyd George. Events in 1916 only and helped ensure that there was an George’s a Liberal Unionist, had argued that increased this sense of dissatisfac- independent successor to the Lib- it was the Conservative Party that tion: defeat in Iraq, the collapse eral Party waiting in the wings. government was the natural heir to mid-Victo- of Romania and, above all, the Was the 1915–16 government proved to rian Liberalism and to principles Somme offensive. At the same time any better as a defender of Liberal abandoned by the Liberal Party. food production was perilously low values? Asquith might argue that be not much Nonetheless, domestic politicians and the general shortage of man- conscription was introduced in a had been at loggerheads. The key power in the economy meant that it fairly liberal way, including allow- better than divisions in Edwardian politics had was increasingly reliant on Ameri- ing for conscientious objection. On been between tariff reform and free can loans. There was the begin- the other hand Packer noted that a its prede- trade, and home rule and the union. ning of talk of a compromise peace. number of Liberal sacred cows had Initially at least, these continued Both the Conservatives and Lloyd ben slaughtered – such as free trade, cessor, and even after the patriotic truce agreed George felt that Asquith was not following the introduction of the between the parties in August and being determined enough in his McKenna duties in the 1915 budget. difficult deci- September 1914. The Liberals con- conduct of the war. Lloyd George Some eminently Liberal policies tinued to enact controversial legis- also believed that the government had not been enacted, such as home sions, such lation, such as the disestablishment needed to be restructured, with a rule for Ireland after the Easter Ris- of the Welsh Church and the Irish small war cabinet operating at the ing. Thus the government had not as rationing Home Rule Act, the latter leading highest level. As a questioner later been good for Liberalism either. A the Conservative Party to walk out noted, A. J. P. Taylor highlighted questioner at the end of the meeting and price of the House of Commons in silence. this period as a stark turning point argued that this indicated that the In 1915, however, war policy between a negotiated peace and Liberals were ideologically inco- control, were gained greater traction. No fewer socialism. herent. Dr Keohane did not wholly than 139 Conservative MPs were On 1 December 1916 Lloyd agree; he believed that there were still reached fighting at the front and they George put a proposal for a war a number of coherent ideologi- slowly. reported back on the lack of guns cabinet to Asquith. While Asquith cal positions within the party, but and high explosives. Many Con- would remain Prime Minister they did not add up together. The Behind servatives felt that the Liberals and Liberal leader he would not Labour Party suffered from this were not dealing with the issue be a member of the war cabinet. also, but the Conservatives not at the rheto- of enemy aliens effectively. There Asquith’s response was initially all, and this contributed to their were also divisions on the issue of cautious and he indicated a will- later success. ric there drink. The government began to ingness to negotiate. However, Finally, in terms of the con- be worried about the effect of drink he later back-tracked, possibly, duct of war, Packer observed was much on munitions production and con- Packer suggested, because he did that Lloyd George’s government sidered restrictions on the sale of not believe that Lloyd George had proved to be not much better than continuity. alcohol. Conservatives, for a range

Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 39 Report: The Liberal–Tory Coalition of 1915 of reasons, some self-interested, MPs expressed their anger at the strategy led to the collapse of the did not believe that alcohol was an outcome of Lloyd George’s nego- coalition. But he also noted that, in issue. These divisions contributed tiations with the Irish. During the terms of strategy and the govern- to the climate prior to the forma- Nigeria debate almost as many ment’s relationship to the generals, tion of the coalition. Conservative MPs voted against Asquith was closer to the Con- Keohane noted that thirty years Bonar Law as sided with him. All servative position of support for the ago historians would have been this influenced Bonar Law’s think- ‘Western Strategy’ than was Lloyd united in their view that the coali- ing in his discussions with Lloyd George, who sympathised with con- tion government had been a fail- George. Historians tended to sideration of an ‘Eastern Strategy’ ure. However, he believed that it regard the Liberal Party as the weak and was keen to meddle in military did have some significant successes party at this stage; Keohane argued strategy. The problem, as Packer to its name: the increase in muni- that the Conservative Party was noted, was Asquith’s failures on the tions production, keeping Britain almost as divided. domestic front through his failure in the war, the introduction of con- Why, then, was Bonar Law to provide inspirational leadership scription, the relatively low lev- not pushed out? Essentially, there committed to the effective organisa- els of industrial unrest and, at the wasn’t a Lloyd George within the tion of the economy at home. Somme, embarking on the biggest Conservative Party. Each possi- A questioner followed this up battle in which Britain had ever ble successor had significant flaws: by asking about Asquith’s alleged engaged. Austen Chamberlain was a natu- indecisiveness and whether he suf- Why, then, did the coalition ral lieutenant, not a leader; Wal- fered from a lack of good ‘PR’ and fail? In part, Keohane argued, it ter Long was obsessed with the of friends in the press. It was also was because of the power balance Irish question; Lord Milner was suggested that Asquith had been within it. Bonar Law was a rela- regarded as not being a proper badly affected by the death of his tively meek leader and so the Liber- Tory; and Carson was leader of son Raymond at the Somme. Ray- als ran away with the spoils at the the Ulster Unionists. Keohane also mond Asquith, the meeting’s chair, start. This meant that the Conserv- noted that if the war had ended in confirmed that Asquith had been atives did not in reality possess the December 1916 the Conservative very hard hit by the death of his power that their supporters thought Party would have been in a diffi- son but argued that he was not the they had. As F. S. Oliver said, the cult position, with significant party kind of man who would have had ‘predominating flavour remained disunity, especially over Ireland. his professional judgement affected the same’. There were divisions In the longer term, however, by it. Packer added that he did not over war strategy, with Conserva- the picture was very different and think Asquith was indecisive and tives holding the relatively crude much more positive for the Con- believed that his will to power view of conscripting labour and servatives. The Lloyd George coa- was as strong as ever at this time. sending them to fight, and the Lib- lition succeeded in the objectives Packer did acknowledge, however, erals worrying about the economy that the Conservatives set it: win- that Asquith had a public relations and the philosophical implications Overall, the ning the war and responding to the problem. By the end of 1916 it had of conscription. Over time Lloyd threat of Bolshevism. It also ena- become apparent that, as the war George and the Conservatives came message of bled the party to display its govern- went on, the kind of leader the to hold the same position and as ing and patriotic instincts and put country needed was an inspira- Asquith’s star fell, Lloyd George’s the meeting behind it the threats of civil war tional and driving figure, and Lloyd rose within the Conservative Party. made in 1914. Since it was in power George fitted that requirement bet- By October 1915 the Conservative was of a gov- the party was also able to shape ter. Asquith’s public image before Chief Whip was already informing its own political destiny, notably 1914 had been of a serene political his leader that most Conservative ernment and in terms of electoral politics; for orchestrater who didn’t panic and MPs were behind Lloyd George. example, the distribution of seats who took the right decisions when Bonar Law was very weak at a Prime Min- ensured that there were good agri- needed. He was not an inspirational various points during this period cultural and suburban seats the orator. In addition, while Asquith and Keohane argued that this was ister brought party could win. Plural voting, and Grey had their ‘spin doctors’, also a contributing factor. A later which enabled businessmen also to they were not as numerous nor as questioner from the floor noted that down by vote where their business resided, effective as those working for Lloyd a leadership crisis had led Bonar and other outdated aspects of the George. Law to write a resignation letter ‘events’ and electoral system which favoured the A final questioner suggested on 6 May. Keohane proposed that Tories, were retained. They were that the role of the press had also pressure from his back-benchers to a fundamen- also able to ensure that the House of been understated and argued that be more active in his criticisms of tal failure Lords retained a significant voice. Kitchener’s initial opposition to the government, despite his belief In questions from the floor it war correspondents had created that Asquith should remain Prime to win, or at was argued that the massive weight distrust between the government Minister, may have contributed to of military failure, from Jutland to and the press, compounded by the the initial formation of the coali- least, suc- the Somme and to Russia, had been official communiqués being con- tion and the weak position of the understated by the speakers. Keo- tradicted by the casualty lists in the Conservatives within it. In the cessfully hane queried whether, with a cen- local papers. Packer acknowledged spring 1916 crisis on conscription sored press, the public was aware of the important role of the press as Bonar Law was only saved by the prosecute, the extent of the military setbacks. a vehicle for information and for intervention of Baldwin. In the Nonetheless, he acknowledged the opinion. Public images were partly summer of 1916 200 Conservative the war. general point that the failure of war shaped by the press and, as noted at

40 Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 Report: The Liberal–Tory Coalition of 1915 various points in the meeting, Overall, however, the mes- and a fundamental failure to David Cloke is a member of the Conservative frustrations with sage of the meeting was of a win, or at least, successfully Liberal Democrat History Group the government came out in the government and a Prime Min- prosecute, the war. executive. Conservative press. ister brought down by ‘events’ RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65) The life of Professor Reginald W Revans, 1907–2003 Knowledge of the whereabouts of any letters written by Cobden in Any information anyone has on Revans’ Liberal Party involvement would private hands, autograph collections, and obscure locations in the UK be most welcome. We are particularly keen to know when he joined the and abroad for a complete edition of his letters. (For further details of party and any involvement he may have had in campaigning issues. We the Cobden Letters Project, please see www.uea.ac.uk/his/research/ know he was very interested in pacifism. Any information, oral history cobdenproject). Dr Anthony Howe, School of History, University of East submissions, location of papers or references most welcome. Dr Yury Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ; [email protected]. Boshyk, [email protected]; or Dr Cheryl Brook, [email protected].

Dadabhai Naoroji Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935 Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) was an Indian nationalist and Liberal Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an member for Central Finsbury, 1892–95 – the first Asian to be elected understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include to the House of Commons. This research for a PhD at Harvard aims personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of to produce both a biography of Naoroji and a volume of his selected the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a correspondence, to be published by OUP India in 2013. The current Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. phase concentrates on Naoroji’s links with a range of British progressive organisations and individuals, particularly in his later career. Suggestions Four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis for archival sources very welcome. Dinyar Patel; [email protected] A four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis, attempting to or 07775 753 724. rebalance the existing Anglo-centric focus. Considering Scottish and Welsh reactions and the development of parallel Home Rule movements, The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper along with how the crisis impacted on political parties across the UK. Strutt was Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and Sources include newspapers, private papers, Hansard. Naomi Lloyd-Jones; Nottingham; in 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston [email protected]. Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a friend of Jeremy Bentham and a supporter of free trade and reform, Beyond Westminster: Grassroots Liberalism 1910–1929 and held government office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster A study of the Liberal Party at its grassroots during the period in which it and Commissioner of Railways. Any information, location of papers or went from being the party of government to the third party of politics. references welcome. Brian Smith; [email protected]. This research will use a wide range of sources, including surviving Liberal Party constituency minute books and local press to contextualise Charles Day Rose (1847–1913) the national decline of the party with the reality of the situation on Charles Day Rose, a partner in the City banking firm of Morton Rose, the ground. The thesis will focus on three geographic regions (Home was Liberal MP for Newmarket 1903–10 and 1910–13. Living at Hardwick Counties, Midlands and the North West) in order to explore the situation House on the banks of the Thames in Oxfordshire, he may have been the Liberals found themselves in nationally. Research for University of the model for Mr Toad in Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows. Leicester. Supervisor: Dr Stuart Ball. Gavin Freeman ; [email protected]. Rose died just before the First World War after being taken up for a spin in an aeroplane, leading the coroner to observe that’ airoplaning’ The Liberal Party’s political communication, 1945–2002 should clearly be left to ‘the young, the vigorous and the robust’. Any Research on the Liberal party and Lib Dems’ political communication. documentary information bearing on any aspect of his multifarious life Any information welcome (including testimonies) about electoral would be of interest. Dr Michael Redley, 10 Norman Avenue, Henley on campaigns and strategies. Cynthia Boyer, CUFR Champollion, Place de Thames, Oxfordshire, RG9 1SG; [email protected]. Verdun, 81 000 Albi, France; +33 5 63 48 19 77; [email protected].

The emergence of the ‘public service ethos’ The Liberal Party in Wales, 1966–1988 Aims to analyse how self-interest and patronage was challenged by the Aims to follow the development of the party from the general election advent of impartial inspectorates, public servants and local authorities of 1966 to the time of the merger with the SDP. PhD research at Cardiff in provincial Britain in the mid 19th century. Much work has been done University. Nick Alderton; [email protected]. on the emergence of a ‘liberal culture’ in the central civil service in Whitehall, but much work needs to be done on the motives, behaviour Policy position and leadership strategy within the Liberal Democrats and mentalities of the newly reformed guardians of the poor, sanitary This thesis will be a study of the political positioning and leadership inspectors, factory and mines inspectors, education authorities, prison strategy of the Liberal Democrats. Consideration of the role of warders and the police. Ian Cawood, Newman University Colllege, equidistance; development of policy from the point of merger; the Birmingham; [email protected]. influence and leadership strategies of each leader from Ashdown to Clegg; and electoral strategy from 1988 to 2015 will form the basis of the Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933) work. Any material relating to leadership election campaigns, election I am currently writing a biography of Sir Edward Grey, and I am keen to campaigns, internal party groups (for example the Social Liberal Forum) discover any letters or other documents relating to him that may be in or policy documents from 1987 and merger talks onwards would be private hands. Thomas Otte, University of East Anglia; [email protected]. greatly welcomed. Personal insights and recollections also sought. Samuel Barratt; [email protected].

Journal of Liberal History 86 Spring 2015 41