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Puerto Rico and PROMESA: Reaffirming Colonialism

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Puerto Rico and PROMESA: Reaffirming Colonialism University at Albany, State University of New York Scholars Archive Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Studies Faculty Scholarship Studies 2017 Puerto Rico and PROMESA: Reaffirming Colonialism Pedro Caban [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/lacs_fac_scholar Part of the Latina/o Studies Commons Recommended Citation Publisher Acknowledgment This article was reproduced with permission: Caban, Pedro. “Puerto Rico and PROMESA: Reaffirming Colonialism” New Politics Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, (Summer 2017): http://newpol.org/content/puerto-rico-and-promesa-reaffirming-colonialism This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Studies at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Studies Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Puerto Rico and PROMESA: Reaffirming Colonialism PEDRO CABÁN “Puerto Rico will be in a death spiral!” ITH THIS DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT, PROMESA gives the oversight board Governor Alejandro García Padilla “ certain sovereign powers over the Puerto transformed the island nation’s long-simmering Rican government and its instrumentalities.”1 debt overhang problem into an international The sublimely understated purpose of the spectacle. A financial mess that seemingly con- bill “is to provide a method for a covered cerned only institutional investors, municipal territory to achieve fiscal responsibility and bondholders, and some hedge fund managers access to capital markets.” But PROMESA exploded into a full-blown debt crisis with was designed to protect bondholders from disquieting parallels to the situation in Greece. catastrophic losses, imposes fiscal discipline, Puerto Rican officials revealed that, given and mandates deep structural adjustments. the depressed economy, the government could Ultimately, PROMESA will enforce a friendly never generate the revenues required to pay the investment environment for U.S. capital. Title staggering $73 billion debt. They warned that III of PROMESA also authorizes the U.S. without federal assistance Puerto Rico would District Court to restructure the debt if the soon face a profound humanitarian crisis that oversight board is unable to reach a consensual the insular government was incapable of man- agreement with the creditors. The oversight aging. The federal government’s response was board filed the petition for debt restructuring the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and with the court on May 5, 2017. Economic Stability Act, popularly known by PROMESA has resurrected issues that its acronym, PROMESA. The law, signed by are troubling legacies of Puerto Rico’s status as President Obama on June 30, 2016, authorizes a colony of the United States. One persistent the president of the United States to appoint a issue is the measure of authority granted by the financial control board with extraordinary pow- federal government to the Puerto Rican people ers and with a mandate to enforce measures to to govern themselves. Puerto Ricans, whether compel Puerto Rico to repay its creditors. Ac- living in the diaspora or the colony, have consis- cording to the law, the financial control board tently fought to diminish or eradicate the bonds “holds supremacy over any territorial law or of colonialism. Throughout their history, Puerto regulation that is inconsistent with the Act or Ricans have contested the federal government’s Fiscal reform plans.” overbearing control, relentlessly seeking to end or redefine the onerous terms of their colonial subordination. PROMESA also revealed that PEDRO CABÁN is professor and chairperson of the Depart- irrespective of which political party controls the ment of Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino colonial state, whether the Popular Democratic Studies at the University at Albany. He is author of Party or the New Progressive Party, neither can Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898-1932. halt the inevitability of Puerto Rico’s fiscal de- bacle and in fact are both duplicitous in creating Summer 2 0 1 7 • 120 Puerto Rico the debt crisis. sources. The nonpartisan Center for a New PROMESA reaffirms without equivoca- Economy in Puerto Rico generates sobering, tion that Puerto Rico is a colony of the United well-documented position papers that are criti- States. Alone among the four U.S. congressional cal of PROMESA. Federal Judge Juan Torruella representatives of Puerto Rican descent, Luís called for civil resistance and an economic boy- Gutíerrez waged a vigorous campaign against cott, after denouncing PROMESA as “the most PROMESA. He pointed out that “the control denigrating, disrespectful, anti-democratic, and board and its members, no matter who they are, colonial act” the United States has perpetrated 4 start with a deep ocean of mistrust from the against the people of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican people, who question why a new The process that resulted in the enactment layer of opaque, undemocratic, colonial over- of PROMESA was every bit as colonial as the sight and control is being imposed in secrecy.”2 legislation. Neither the Puerto Rican govern- Governor Alejandro García Padilla objected to ment nor representatives of the different politi- the extraordinary powers of the board, which cal forces in Puerto Rico were formally involved are “excessive” and “not consistent with our in designing the law. PROMESA is not the 3 country’s basic democratic principles.” first time that Puerto Ricans were denied any But PROMESA has also energized Puerto voice in a decision that will affect their futures. Ricans to actively confront the financial con- In the 1898 Treaty of Paris negotiations, the trol board and protest the austerity measures fate of the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies imposed by the island’s ineffectual political ceded to the United States was decided with- class. This resistance is binational, multisec- out involvement of the people of Cuba, Puerto toral, crosses ideological lines, and might be Rico, and the Philippines. Article IX of the unparalleled in Puerto Rico’s long quest for self- treaty simply states that “the civil rights and determination. Puerto Ricans have overwhelm- political status of the native inhabitants of the ingly derided the United States for enacting territories hereby ceded to the United States this avowedly colonial legislation. They have shall be determined by the Congress.” Indeed, challenged the credibility and legitimacy of an by 1898 the United States had a long tradition oversight board comprised in part by financial of excluding racialized inhabitants of acquired capitalists implicated in the very debt crisis territories from any role in deciding their legal they are tasked with resolving. Students have standing within the empire. PROMESA has marched by the thousands to protest the $450 resurrected this shameful imperial practice. In million cut to the University of Puerto Rico effect, PROMESA redefines the U.S. citizens that the oversight board ordered. Puerto Ricans of Puerto Rico as racialized native inhabitants have demanded an audit of the outstanding debt of a mere territorial possession. They are denied to determine the legality of government debt representation in Congress but are subject to its issuances. Activists in New York and Puerto plenary powers. Ultimately PROMESA em- Rico have disrupted meetings of the oversight bodies the quintessential contempt for Puerto board. The Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Ricans as colonial subjects who have been the City University of New York organized “Di- granted a substandard U.S. citizenship that is aspora Summits” for grassroots organizations highly racialized and who can be discounted and activists. New York-based Puerto Rican in momentous decisions that affect their lives. journalists Juan González and Ed Morales U.S. citizenship is inconsequential for the have written extensively on the politics and inhabitants of Puerto Rico when it comes to economics of PROMESA and have disputed determining their economic and political future. complacent narratives from established media But with the conferral of statutory U.S. citizen- Summer 2 0 1 7 • 121 Puerto Rico ship in 1917, Puerto Ricans were allowed to Congress or the president. The financial control migrate freely to the United States. Migration board reclaims the federal government’s triple flows linked to changes in the island’s political veto over local legislation. However, there are economy are an unintended consequence of two significant differences between PROMESA granting U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. In and the early colonial legislation. The Foraker the last decade, 10 percent of the population, and Jones acts were comprehensive colonial leg- among them many highly educated young islation that assigned Puerto Rico key strategic professionals, has left the island. Depopula- and economic roles in the expanding American tion started in 2006 when Section 936, a fiscal empire. In contrast, PROMESA’s function is measure enacted by the United States to en- strictly pecuniary, to find ways of extracting hance capital accumulation by American firms wealth from Puerto Rico. Secondly, Congress operating in Puerto Rico, was terminated. The also designed the Foraker and Jones acts to current phase of depopulation surpasses the generate revenue
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