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Border Trade: Reopening the Tibet Border Claude Arpi the First Part of This Paper Concluded with This Question: Can the Borders
Border Trade: Reopening the Tibet Border Claude Arpi The first part of this paper concluded with this question: can the borders be softened again? Can the age-old relation between the Tibetans and the Himalayans be revived? The process has started, though it is slow. This paper will look at the gains acquired from the reopening of the three land ports, but also at the difficulties to return to the booming trade which existed between Tibet and India before the invasion of Tibet in 1950 and to a certain extent till the Indo-China war of 1962. It will also examine the possibility to reopen more land ports in the future, mainly in Ladakh (Demchok) and Arunachal Pradesh. Tibet’s Economic Figures for 2012 According to a Chinese official website, the Tibetan Autonomous Region is economically doing extremely well. Here are some ‘official’ figures: • Tibet's GDP reached 11.3 billion US $ in 2012, an increase of 12 % compared to the previous year (Tibet's GDP was 9.75 billion US $ in 2011 and 8.75 billion US $ in 2010). • Tibet's economy has maintained double-digit growth for 20 consecutive years. • Fixed asset investment have increased by 20.1 % • The tax revenues reached 2.26 billion US $ (fiscal revenue grew by 46%) • And Tibet received over 11 million domestic and foreign tourists earning 2.13 billion US $ Tibet’s Foreign Trade Figures for 2012 The foreign trade is doing particularly well. On January 23, 2013, Xinhua announced that Tibet has registered new records in foreign trade. A Chinese government agency reported that the foreign trade of the Tibetan Autonomous Region reached more than 3 billion U.S. -
Sino-Indian Border Trade: the Promise of Jelep La
No. 24No. 45 May 2017 December 2014 Sino-Indian Border Trade: The Promise of Jelep La Diki Sherpa Research Assistant, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi [email protected] trade or an instance of trade diplomacy A decade has elapsed since the re-initiation towards India. of the border trade between India and China through Nathu La, though the Indian side This paper first, seeks to highlight the remains undecided on many fronts. Among possible reasons for the trade gap between others, one of the most crucial is the lack of India and China through Nathu La. Second, willingness for infrastructural development considering India’s comparative advantage against China’s agility for road-building. and potential through this sector, it suggests Notwithstanding, trade balance through re-opening of Jelep La as a viable option for Nathu La has continued to be in favour of further enhancing bilateral trade. The India. This is in stark contrast to the steep historical significance of Jelep La from imbalance that India suffers with China Kalimpong in North Bengal suggests the through other Indian border posts, such as vibrancy of this route and that the Lipu Lekh and Shipki La in Uttarakhand and topography facilitates smooth access to Himachal Pradesh. Interestingly, the relative Tibet. Further, it can act as a potent force for trade imbalance that exists through Nathu La bridging the spatial differences, promoting does not seem to be of much concern to mutual cooperation and fostering healthy China, so far. The lack of Chinese protest interdependence between the two here raises the question of whether this neighbouring countries. -
India-Nepal,Kalapani,Nepal,Open Border
APRIL 2020 ISSUE NO. 356 India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer SOHINI NAYAK ABSTRACT Neighbours India and Nepal, who share an open border, have not always had the most amicable of relations, oscillating from one extreme to the other. One of their long-standing disputes is over the border area of Kalapani. This discord has the potential to disrupt the other aspects of their ties, especially in the domains of the economy and cross-border security. Further, if the two countries fail to arrive at a resolution to the disagreement, it might give other stakeholders such as China an opportunity to interfere. This brief explains the Kalapani issue and in that context, explores what can be expected of the bilateral relationship in the future. Attribution: Sohini Nayak, “India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer,” ORF Issue Brief No. 356, April 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-89622-94-2 © 2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer INTRODUCTION External Affairs, Nepal, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali also In November 2019, the Home Ministry of India issued a statement for the media stating that, released a new edition of the Indian political “The Nepal government is committed to map, showing Jammu and Kashmir along with protecting the country’s external borders and it 1 Ladakh as the new union territories of India. -
NUNAWADING MILITARY HISTORY GROUP MINI NEWSLETTER No. 21 SINO INDIAN WAR of 1967
NUNAWADING MILITARY HISTORY GROUP MINI NEWSLETTER No. 21 SINO INDIAN WAR OF 1967 The Nathu La and Cho La clashes were a series of military clashes between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate. The Nathu La clashes started on 11 September 1967, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched an attack on Indian posts at Nathu La, and lasted till 15 September 1967. In October 1967, another military duel took place at Cho La and ended on the same day. According to independent sources, India achieved "decisive tactical advantage" and managed to hold its own against Chinese forces. PLA fortifications at Nathu La were said to be destroyed, where the Indian troops drove back the attacking Chinese forces. The competition to control the disputed borderland in Chumbi valley is seen as a major cause for heightening the tensions in these incidents. Observers have commented that these clashes indicated the decline of 'claim strength' in China's decision to initiate the use of force against India, and stated that India was greatly pleased with the combat performance of its forces in the Nathu La clashes, seeing it as a sign of striking improvement since its defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Background Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, tensions continued to run high along the Himalayan border shared by India and China. Influenced by its previous defeat, the Indian Army raised a number of new units, nearly doubling their deployed forces along the disputed region. As a part of this military expansion, seven mountain divisions were raised to defend India's northern borders against any Chinese attack. -
SINO‐INDIAN BORDER DISPUTES R R I T O R I a L D I S Analysis
Analysis No. 181, June 2013 SINO‐INDIAN BORDER DISPUTES Hongzhou Zhang and Mingjiang Li Sino‐Indian relations have been marred by their territorial disputes in the past decades. Tensions and disputes in the border region are likely to continue to occur from time to time in the foreseeable future, but the two countries have demonstrated strong political will and incentives not to allow the disputes to hijack their bilateral ties. Hongzhou Zhang and Mingjiang Li are senior research analyst and associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University respectively ©ISPI2013 1 The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo Introduction In April 2013, tensions erupted between India and China over their Himalayan border. India accused Chinese troops of having crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by setting up camp in Indian-claimed territory. In response, Indian forces set up their own camp 300 meters opposite the Chinese facility. Initially, China attempted to play down the tensions by denying the allegations. Beijing claimed that Chinese troops had observed the agreement between the two countries since they did not cross the LAC. Facing strong pressure from the opposition political parties and media, India’s ruling government insisted on settling the incident peacefully through diplomatic means. Eventually, the dispute was peacefully resolved when both sides withdrew their troops. The incident once again highlighted the volatility of Sino-Indian relations. Understanding its volatile nature requires an exploration of the interplay of various factors: geopolitical realities in Asia, the historical legacies in bilateral ties, trade and other economic interests, domestic politics in both countries, the pursuit of common global concerns, and of course, the border disputes. -
Ground Water Scenario of Himalaya Region, India
Hkkjr ds fgeky;h {ks=k dk Hkwty ifjn`'; Ground Water Scenario of Himalayan Region, India laiknu@Edited By: lq'khy xqIrk v/;{k Sushil Gupta Chairman Central Ground Water Board dsanzh; Hkwfe tycksMZ Ministry of Water Resources ty lalk/ku ea=kky; Government of India Hkkjr ljdkj 2014 Hkkjr ds fgeky;h {ks=k dk Hkwty ifjn`'; vuqØef.kdk dk;Zdkjh lkjka'k i`"B 1- ifjp; 1 2- ty ekSle foKku 23 3- Hkw&vkd`fr foKku 34 4- ty foKku vkSj lrgh ty mi;kst~;rk 50 5- HkwfoKku vkSj foorZfudh 58 6- Hkwty foKku 73 7- ty jlk;u foKku 116 8- Hkwty lalk/ku laHkko~;rk 152 9- Hkkjr ds fgeky;h {ks=k esa Hkwty fodkl ds laca/k esa vfHktkr fo"k; vkSj leL;k,a 161 10- Hkkjr ds fgeky;h {ks=k ds Hkwty fodkl gsrq dk;Zuhfr 164 lanHkZ lwph 179 Ground Water Scenario of Himalayan Region of India CONTENTS Executive Summary i Pages 1. Introduction 1 2. Hydrometeorology 23 3. Geomorphology 34 4. Hydrology and Surface Water Utilisation 50 5. Geology and Tectonics 58 6. Hydrogeology 73 7. Hydrochemistry 116 8. Ground Water Resource Potential 152 9. Issues and problems identified in respect of Ground Water Development 161 in Himalayan Region of India 10. Strategies and plan for Ground Water Development in Himalayan Region of India 164 Bibliography 179 ifêdkvks dh lwph I. iz'kklfud ekufp=k II. Hkw vkd`fr ekufp=k III. HkwoSKkfud ekufp=k d- fgeky; ds mRrjh vkSj if'peh [kaM [k- fgeky; ds iwohZ vkSj mRrj iwohZ [kaM rFkk iwoksZRrj jkT; IV. -
Promotion of Trade and Investments Between China and India: the Case of Southwest China and East and Northeast India
PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA: THE CASE OF SOUTHWEST CHINA AND EAST AND NORTHEAST INDIA BISWA N. BHATTACHARYAY PRABIR DE CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1508 CATEGORY 7: TRADE POLICY JULY 2005 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1508 PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA: THE CASE OF SOUTHWEST CHINA AND EAST AND NORTHEAST INDIA Abstract Open regionalism and integration between the world’s two largest developing countries - the People’s Republic of China (China) and India - in trade, investments and infrastructure development can foster outward-oriented development and economic and social benefits that could result in poverty reduction. In view of the increasing trend toward regional integration, particularly the expanded European Union and North American integration, the opportunity costs of not moving toward greater economic integration between China and India involving common neighbouring countries could be increasing. This paper discusses the above subject in the context of possible areas of China - India economic cooperation and integration in the Eastern and Northeastern region of India and Southwestern provinces of China, including neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal. JEL Code: F1, F2, Q1, Q4, R4. Keywords: India, China, economic cooperation and integration, trade, investment and infrastructure development. Biswa N. Bhattacharyay Prabir -
Current Analyses on Shipki-La Trade, Kinnaur 2017
Ethnologia Polona, vol. 37: 2016 (2017), 31 – 52 PL ISSN 0137 - 4079 CURRENT ANALYSES ON SHIPKI-LA TRADE, KINNAUR, 2017 RAFAL BESZTERDA DEPARTMENT OF ETHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY NICOLAUS COPERNICUS UNIVERSITY IN TORUN, POLAND This paper reflects on the most current trading activities through Shipki Pass in Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh. Apart from presenting economic data it discusses the background context, political conditions and some future prospects of the trading process. * * * Tekst artykułu omawia współczesne przedsięwzięcia handlowe dokonujące się przez przełęcz Szipki w okręgu Kinnaur, Himaćal Pradeś. Obok danych ekonomicznych przedstawia tło kontekstowe, uwarun ko wania polityczne oraz pomysły rozwojowe tej działalności. K e y w o r d s: Himalayas, Kinnaur, trade, Shipkila, Tibet, China. INTRODUCTION In my own previous publications some false predictions in relation to the declining tendencies of total border trade value through Shipkila in Kinnaur (Beszterda 2015, 239–259; Beszterda 2014, 117–134) were made. In the light of more recent research findings, I wish to take the opportunity to revise some of my earlier conclusions and interpretations. For readers who are not fully aware of the issue, taxfree border trade between India and Tibet was reactivated in the 1990s. Until this reopening the Himalayan passes had been officially sealed since 1962. The first pass designated for this purpose was Lipulekh in Pithoragarh Distt., Uttarakhand (opened to all intents and purposes in 1992). The second was Shipkila in Kinnaur Distt., H.P. – the subject of this paper (opened in 1994), and the third was Nathula in Eastern Dist., Sikkim (since 2006). -
Iasbaba 60 Day Plan 2020 –Geography
IASBABA 60 DAY PLAN 2020 –GEOGRAPHY 60 DAYS PROGRAMME-2020 IASBABA IASBABA 60 DAY PLAN 2020 –GEOGRAPHY Q.1) With respect to the seismic waves consider the Following statements: 1. Primary waves travel to and fro in the line of propaGation and travel only in liquid medium 2. Secondary waves travel perpendicular to the line of propagation and they travel both in solid and liquid medium. Which amongst the above statements is /are correct? a) 1 only b) 2 only c) Both 1 and 2 d) Neither 1 nor 2 Q.1) Solution (d) Basic InFormation: • Seismic waves are waves of enerGy that travel throuGh the Earth's layers, and are a result of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, maGma movement, larGe landslides and larGe man-made explosions that Give out low-frequency acoustic energy. • The place of occurrence of an earthquake is called ‘focus’ and the place which experiences the seismic event first is called ‘epicenter’. • Epicenter is located on the earth’s surface and focus is always inside the earth. • The propaGation velocity of seismic waves depends on density and elasticity of the medium as well as the type of wave. Velocity tends to increase with depth throuGh Earth's crust and mantle, but drops sharply GoinG from the mantle to the outer core. • Seismic waves are Generally divided into 1. Primary waves, 2. Secondary waves and 3. Surface waves. Primary waves: • They are called lonGitudinal waves or compressional waves and are analoGous to sound waves where particles move to and fro in the line of propaGation. • They travel both in solid and liquid medium. -
Kmy-Guide.Pdf
EAST ASIA DIVISION MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA KAILASH MANASAROVAR YATRA – 2014 INFORMATION GUIDE FOR YATRIS CONTENTS SL.NO. DETAILS PAGE NO. 1 INTRODUCTION 03 a) Eligibility 03 b) Applying for the Yatra and Selection Process 03 c) Confirmation of Participation by Yatris 03 d) Important Documents 03 e) Fees and Expenditure 04 f) Preparations for the Yatra 04 2 LEGAL 04 3 STAY IN DELHI 05 a) Day-1: Arrival of Yatris in Delhi and Accommodation 05 • How to Reach Gujarati Samaj Sadan 05 b) Day-2: Medical Check-up at DHLI and Chinese Visa 05-06 • How to Reach Delhi Heart and Lung Institute 06 c) Day-3: Medical Tests at ITBP Hospital 06 • How to Reach ITBP Base Hospital 06 d) Day-4: Briefing Session at MEA and Submission of Indemnity Bond 06 4 ROUTE OF THE YATRA 07 a) Delhi to Lipulekh Pass – Table 07 b) Route on Chinese Side – Table 07 c) Return Journey – Table 08 5 YATRA SCHEDULE 08 a) Day-1: Delhi to Almora 08 b) Day-2: Almora to Dharchula 08 c) Day-3: Dharchula to Sirkha 08 d) Day-4: Sirkha to Gala 09 e) Day-5: Gala to Budhi 09 f) Day-6: Budhi to Gunji 09 g) Days-6 and 7: Gunji 10 h) Day-8: Gunji to Navidhang 10 i) Day-9: Navidhang to Lipulekh Pass 10 j) Day-9: Lipulekh Pass to Taklakot 11 k) Days-9 and 10: Taklakot 11 l) Days-11 to 16: Kailash-Manasarovar Parikramas 11 • Parikrama of Mount Kailash 12 • Parikrama of Manasarovar 13 1 | Page SL.NO. -
India-China Border Trade Through Nathu La Pass: Prospects and Impediments
HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies Volume 38 Number 1 Article 7 June 2018 India-China Border Trade Through Nathu La Pass: Prospects and Impediments Pramesh Chettri Sikkim University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya Recommended Citation Chettri, Pramesh. 2018. India-China Border Trade Through Nathu La Pass: Prospects and Impediments. HIMALAYA 38(1). Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol38/iss1/7 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. India-China Border Trade Through Nathu La Pass: Prospects and Impediments Acknowledgements The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to the peer reviewers for their valuable review of the article, and to Mark Turin, Sienna R. Craig, David Citrin, and Mona Bhan for their editorial support, which helped to give it the present shape. The author also wants to extend his appreciation to the Commerce and Industries and Tourism Department in the Government of Sikkim, to Sikkim University Library, and to the many local traders of Sikkim with whom he spoke while conducting this research. This research article is available in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol38/iss1/7 India-China Border Trade Through Nathu La Pass: Prospects and Impediments Pramesh Chettri This paper attempts to examine and analyze aspects, the Nathu La border trade has faced the prospects and impediments of the many problems. -
The Skirmish at Nathu La (1967), by V K Singh
scholar warrior The Skirmish at Nathu La (1967) VK SINGH Background Nathu La lies on the Old Silk Route between Tibet and India. In 1904, Major Francis Younghusband led a successful mission through Nathu La to capture Lhasa. This led to the setting up of trading posts at Gyantse and Gartok in Tibet, and gave control of the surrounding Chumbi Valley to the British. In 1947, Sikkim became an Indian protectorate. After China took control of Tibet in 1950, and suppressed a Tibetan uprising in 1959, refugees entered Sikkim through Nathu La. During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Nathu La witnessed skirmishes between soldiers of the two countries. Shortly thereafter, the pass was sealed and closed for trade. Five years later, Nathu La was the scene of a ‘border skirmish’ between India and China, which resulted in heavy casualties to both sides. Significantly, it was the first and only instance when the Chinese got a ‘bloody nose’ from the Indians. In order to help Pakistan during the 1965 War, the Chinese served an ultimatum and asked India to withdraw its posts at Nathu La and Jelep La, which were then held by 17 and 27 Mountain Divisions respectively. Accordingly, orders were issued by Corps Headquarters (HQ) to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La. As a result, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Major General Sagat Singh, GOC 17 Mountain Division, refused to vacate Nathu La, which was a Border Out Post (BOP), while the main defences were at Changgu. In the adjoining sector, manned 142 ä AUTUMN 2014 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior The Chinese got by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also a BOP, a ‘bloody nose’ with the main defences located at Lungthu.