: Facing Political and Ethnic Challenges Matt Fouts

Bangladesh’s history is relatively short, particularly when using the term Bangladesh itself implies the country’s political history. In other words, the country is new if one considers its age from its founding legal framework and the creation of Bangladesh as a geographic entity in 1971.1 Measured in a different way, Bangladesh can be traced back over two thousand years, with the later medieval period witnessing the area’s political coalescent into a shape familiar today, inhabited primarily by Bengali speakers.2

While the older history alluded to above is not of great significance to this report, the paradoxical nuance of a new country in an old land is important when examining Bangladesh broadly as this report seeks to do. Bangladesh is truly a fascinating, if not confusing, country to examine. The last decades have witnessed independence, assassinations, political upheavals, massive suffering, impressive economic growth, and the political domination of two female leaders in a predominately Muslim country. The incredibly intense interparty and interpersonal rivalries between and Khaleda Zia have led to each receiving jail time during the other’s tenure and continued brutality in campus dormitories as youth representatives of their respective parties enforce party allegiance.3 The parties, Hasina’s (AL) and

1 Rashid, Haroun er. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of . Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, 345.

2 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 345.

3 “Bangladesh’s Ruling Party Runs University Campuses With an Iron Fist.” The Economist, October 31, 2019; “Khaleda Zia Freed Gets Back Home.” The Daily Star, March 26, 2020. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/khaleda-zia-released-six-months-1885888; “Sheikh Hasina Was Arrested to Confine Democracy.” The Daily Star, July 20, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/city/news/sheikh- hasina-was-arrested-confine-democracy-1774087.

Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), were founded by Hasina’s father and Zia’s husband, both major figures in the 1971 founding of Bangladesh.

Below, this paper will examine Bangladesh’s political challenges and evolving religious/ethnic conflicts. First, the will be examined briefly, including geography, discussions of British colonial rule, the /Pakistan in 1947, and

Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971. Next, Bangladesh’s political history will be examined through the lenses of the two major parties discussed above, as well as a brief discussion of a more minor Islamic party who plays a major coalitional role in a politically divided country. Finally, this paper will briefly touch on suggestions for solving the political challenges facing Bangladesh, realizing such challenges are intimately tied to religious and ethnic conflict. Throughout, religious and ethnic conflict will be discussed, a topic inseparable from the nation’s history and lasting political challenges.

History

Significant in later discussions of Bangladesh’s political history, Bangladesh means land of the Bengali, or people who speak Bengali.4 Political Bangladesh spans half of this area.5 85 million Bengali speakers live in the Indian states of West , Assam, and Tripura, compared with the 100 million speakers in Bangladesh.6 Beyond language, geographically Bangladesh is

4 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 345.

5 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 345.

6 “Bengali Language.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed May 24, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bengali-language.

2 near many other countries as it is surrounded by India, bordering Myanmar, and within close distance of Nepal and Bhutan from the northern border.7

Modern-day Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan in 1971 and was known formally as East Pakistan (and immediately after the 1947 Partition).8 The

Liberation War led to an unknown number of deaths, with estimates ranging from 300,000 to

3 million civilian deaths.9 Bangladesh’s later independence is tied to the early 1947 Partition and the creation of Pakistan in 1947.10 The separation of India and Pakistan In 1947 similarly followed previous British colonial practices that divided Muslims and Hindus, prioritizing each in certain regions in order to better maintain colonial control of the area.11

The creation of the All India Muslim League in 1905, in Bangladesh’s later capital , followed Muslims leaving the Indian National Congress, as it was increasingly seen as a political entity dominated by Hindus.12 Inequality, in part, between the Hindu elites and poorer Muslims

7 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 347. 8 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.” Minority Rights Group International. Accessed May 12, 2020. https://minorityrights.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/11/MRG_Rep_Ban_Oct16_ONLINE.pdf.

9 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

10 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 348.

11 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 348-49.

12 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 349.

3 in Bengal, led to Muslim demands for a Muslim majority province.13 East Bengal and Assam, with Dhaka as a capital, were created in response, and later eliminated by the colonial government due to Hindu protests largely in Calcutta.14 The brief creation of a Muslim majority province, than sudden elimination, emboldened the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress and infuriated the Muslim League.15 Later in the 1940s, as Britain’s imminent departure became more evident, Hindu and Muslim politicians in Bengal sought to create an independent state.16

This effort failed and the British supported a partition of Bengal and Assam. 17 In 1947, Pakistan was created with two entities: and East Bengal, later renamed East Pakistan.

Soon after the 1947 creation of Pakistan, and the geographically separated entities of

West Pakistan and East Bengal, the political and religious challenges of language quickly became apparent.18 Within a year, political forces in East Bengal demanded that Bengali be declared a national language alongside Urdu.19 Politician in West Pakistan resisted this request, arguing that Urdu was the proper script for Muslims in the west and east as it included more

Arabic words written in the Persian script.20 The problem of language created a major cultural division between the two entities, which was exacerbated further by the inequality in economic development between the wealthier West and East.21

13 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 345. 14 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 345.

15 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 349.

16 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

17 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

18 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

19 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

20 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

21 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 350.

4 Tensions over language and economic inequality between the two regions continued to simmer. Rising nationalism in the East coincided with a military coup in Pakistan led by

General Ayub Khan.22 Khan, seemingly meeting demands from the East, accepted Bengali as an official language of Pakistan (along with Urdu) and renamed East Bengal to East Pakistan.23

Regardless of the success of the Language Movement, the divisions between West and East

Pakistan continued to grow, driven by economic inequalities between the separated regions.24

Population growth remained at a high 2.7% in both regions, stressing the respective economies.25

Yet, regardless of demographic stressors, West Pakistan was experiencing a development boom during the 1950s and 1960s and the 61% difference in per-capita income between the regions allowed the West to better provide for its growing population.26

Language and economics divided the country; however, an election became the catalyst for East Pakistan’s independence. In 1969, General Ayub Khan was forced out by General

Yahya Khan.27 Political pressures later forced Yahya Khan to call an election.28 Prior to the election, Yahya Khan had East Pakistan’s leading politician, Sheikh Mujibor Rahman, arrested.

Sheikh Mujib, leader of East Pakistan’s Awami League political party and father of current

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was released and subsequently won 167 out of 169 parliament

22 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 351.

23 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 351.

24 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 352.

25 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 352.

26 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 352.

27 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 352.

28 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 352.

5 seats in East Pakistan.29 Sheikh Mujib, a politician from East Pakistan, demanded the position of

Pakistan’s Prime Minister.30 Yahya Khan resisted, and negotiations began between Sheikh

Mujibor, Ali Bhutto (a West Pakistan party leader), and Khan himself.31 On March 25, 1971,

Khan suddenly left the negotiations in Dhaka and a brutal military crackdown began.32 The next day, Zia Ur Rahman, prominent politician in East Pakistan and husband of later Prime Minister

Khaleda Zia, proclaimed an independent state of Bangladesh.33 After nearly nine months of fighting, an astronomical number of deaths as mentioned above, and the intervention of India into the conflict, Bangladesh celebrated victory and independence on December 16th, 1971.34

Before concluding this section, it is worth noting the important differences between the

1947 and 1971 revolutions. The 1947 partition was driven by religion as Muslim majority

Pakistan separated from Hindu majority India.35 Significantly, however, the 1971 creation of

Bangladesh focused on a Bengali cultural identity over an Islamic identity.36 This cultural identity had always been present in East Pakistan prior to 1971, as discussed above with the temporary creation of East Bengal and Assam under British colonial rule.37 Though the Bengali identity had always been present, it took multiple decades of neglect by East Pakistan for there to

29 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

30 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

31 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

32 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

33 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

34 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 355.

35 Ishtiaq Hossain and Mahmud Hasan Khan. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh.” Asian Journal of Social Sciences 34, no. 2 (2006): 324-339, 327.

36 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 327.

37 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 349.

6 be a gradual realization that Bengalis had fallen into the arms of another, “internal colonizer.”38

From 1947 until 1971, it can be argued that Bangladesh went through a second period of decolonization, resulting in a national consciousness leading to the creation of Bangladesh.39

Politics

Two parties have essentially dominated politics throughout Bangladesh’s history: the

Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Other parties, particularly

Islamic parties, have played significant roles as well in the polarized country, significantly in giving a majority to the AL or BNP in coalitions. India, a massive economic juggernaut geographically surrounding Bangladesh who intervened in the 1971 Liberation War, unsurprisingly looms large in Bangladeshi politics. This section will first look at the AL, its characteristics, and the leadership of Sheikh Mujibor Rahman (Mujib) and his daughter, current

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Next, the BNP will be discussed, similarly focusing on its founder Zia Ur Rahman and his later Prime Minister daughter Khaleda Zia. Finally, the Islamic party Jammat and it’s relationship to AL and the BNP will be discussed, as well as the fractious politics present on Bangladesh’s college campuses.

The All Muslim League’s creation prior to partition in 1905 partially unified Muslims within their own party and stood in opposition to the Indian National Congress that had recently become popularly understood as a Hindu-centric party.40 In 1949, the Awami Muslim League broke away from the All Muslim League with Sheikh Mujibor Rahman as an important

38 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 327.

39 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 327.

40 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 349.

7 member.41 Soon after, Muslim was dropped from the party name.42 In 1965 the Awami League first advocated for autonomy for East Pakistan, issuing a six-point demand and challenging the national government to a free and fair election.43 As mentioned above, when General Ayub

Khan finally held elections in 1970, after arresting Mujib, the Awami League swept nearly all of

East Pakistan’s parliamentary seats and Mujib demanded his installation as prime minister.44 As discussed in the above history section, this election ended up sparking later war.

Following Bangladesh’s independence in late 1971, a first national constitution was completed in November of the following year.45 The central principles of the state were proclaimed as ‘nationalism,’

‘socialism,’ ‘secularism,’ and

‘democracy.’46 These principles represented a desire for secular and inclusive political environment, recognizing that Bangladesh, while predominately Muslim and Bengali speaking, has signficant numbers of Bengali speaking Hindus and non-Bengali communities.47 This new constitution particularly emphasized the secular optimism present in 1972:

Article 12 of the Constitution called for the elimination of ‘communalism in all its forms; the granting by the state of political status in favour of any religion; the abuse of religion

41 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 351.

42 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 351.

43 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 351.

44 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 353.

45 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

46 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

47 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

8 for political purposes; any discrimination or persecution of persons practicing a particular religion’48

For all the optimism present within certain articles of the Constitution, however, other provisions did not support a secular, inclusive, and pluralistic state. For example, Article 6 tied the

“solidarity of the Bengalee nation” to Bengali language and culture, excluding non-Bengali communities within Bangladesh.49

Leading newly independent Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib was faced with a country divided not only culturally and ethnically, but also politically. The involvement of India in the war had increased Bengali Muslims’ suspicions that the creation of Bangladesh was a Hindu plot meant to undermine Muslim Pakistan.50 Much of this can be tied to West Pakistan’s political maneuvering during the 1950s and 1960s as economically neglected East Pakistan’s desire for independence grew. West Pakistan would challenge movements like the Awami League, arguing that such movements for independence were anti-Islamic and an Indian conspiracy meant to disintegrate Pakistan.51 The suspicion of Indian ties to the Awami League was strong in the early period following Bangladesh’s independence, and continues today in political jostling with party opponents.

Beyond the differences in language and culture discussed above, ideological divisions separated West and East as Mujib’s Awami League advocated for socialist policies.52 This

48 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

49 “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

50 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 355.

51 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 330.

52 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 355.

9 created a divide between Muslim and Socialist ideologies.53 Resulting from the socialist beginnings of the Awami League, Mujib’s early leadership presided over an Awami League divided between right and leftist factions.54 The factions within his party, aggressive leftist student groups, and radical leftists causing havoc in Bangladesh’s rural areas, led Mujib to pursue strong-armed political tactics, one-party rule, and a “cleanse and purify” policy within the party, alarming civil administrators and the military.55 In 1975 Sheikh Mujib launched the

Bangladesh Krishok Shromik Awami League (BAKSAL), announcing a second revolution

(within four years) with one-party rule of the country.56 Unsurprisingly, this move unsettled the military leading to a 1975 coup and the assassination of Mujib and several members of his family

(though daughter Sheikh Hasina was safe abroad).57

Military rule followed Mujib’s 1975 assassination. The country’s first military leader was Major General Zia Ur Rahman, who promoted Bangladeshi nationalism reinforced by his formation of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) in 1976.58 Zia’s focus on nationalism and religion is apparent in the changes to the Constitution he brought forward. Specifically, Zia replaced the state principle of secularism with Islam and socialism with “economic and social justice.”59 Significantly, whereas the first Constitution in 1972 had called all citizens “Bengali,”

Zia’s amendments changed “Bengali” to “Bangladeshi,” representing his nationalist goals and

53 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 355.

54 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 355.

55 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 356-57.

56 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 357.

57 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 358.

58 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 331.

59 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 360; “Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.”

10 his belief that Bangladeshis are culturally and linguistically different from Bengalis in India.60

Beyond promoting nationalism and a Bangladeshi identity, there is a general consensus that Zia and the BNP were moving Bangladesh to the right and away from more leftist and socialist

Awami League policies.61 Under Zia, nationalization without compensation was eliminated, and private property rights emphasized.62 In 1981, Zia, like Mujib a few years earlier, was assassinated in a military coup. His wife Khaleda Zia, later BNP leader and Prime Minister, survived him.

Following Zia’s assassination by the military, martial law was again imposed by

Lieutenant General , who suspended the Constitution and dissolved the national assembly.63 Ershad pushed government policies further to the right, promoting capitalist policies while continuing to publically appeal to Islamic beliefs.64 Ershad’s movement to the right attracted development agencies and multilateral organizations such as the World

Bank, who increased aid to Bangladesh, allowing growth in infrastructure.65 NGOs also proliferated in Bangladesh during this period.66 During this time, Khaleda Zia returned to

Bangladesh and began protesting corruption within Ershad’s government.67 The party her late

60 Hossain. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh,” 331.

61 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 360.

62 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 360.

63 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 361.

64 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 361.

65 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 361.

66 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 362.

67 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

11 husband founded, the BNP, won a 1991 election following Ershad’s departure and she became

Prime Minister.68

The first two years of Khaleda Zia’s tenure saw rare cooperation between the Awami

League and her BNP.69 In 1994, however, the Awami League charged the BNP with election fraud in an election officially won by a BNP candidate.70 The breakdown in cooperation between the Awami League and the BNP led to economic and industrial stoppages within

Bangladesh, as Awami League demonstrations shut down urban areas.71 In the following 1996 national election, BNP and Zia claimed victory, though the reported large vote total was incongruent with the perceived low voter numbers caused by Awami League demonstrations and street violence.72 The perceived stolen election led to demands that a caretaker government, agreed upon by both parties, takeover the government prior to the election and oversee the results.73 In the next caretaker government overseen election, the Awami League won overwhelmingly, leading to Sheikh Hasina becoming Prime Minister of the party her father helped found in 1949.74

The next two decades of Bangladeshi politics witnessed the government change hands two additional times between Hasina’s Awami League and Zia’s BNP. Though the Awami

League early on pursued a more socialist agenda, military rule had enshrined a capitalist, free-

68 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

69 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

70 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

71 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

72 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 363.

73 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 364.

74 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 364.

12 market orientation within the Bangladeshi economy that Hasina continued.75 Similar to earlier decades, Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League were attacked by Zia and the BNP for perceived pro-India leanings. Hasina did in fact achieve a major agreement with India regarding water sharing in 1997 and a peace accord with indigenous rebel group in the Hill area.76

Regardless of this success, in 2001 Khaleda Zia and her BNP defeated the Awami League in an internationally acclaimed free and fair election.77

The BNP and Zia, following her election as prime minister, did not withdraw from

Hasina’s water sharing treaty with India or her accord with the Chittagong Hill rebels, even though the BNP campaigned strongly criticizing the two deals.78 Nevertheless, Zia and BNP rule witnessed repression against the Hindu community, seen as core supporters of Hasina and the

Awami League.79 Further, extremist Islamic militant groups began committing attacks during

Zia’s tenure, including an attack against Sheikh Hasina herself.80 During the end of Zia’s tenure, her son became a prominent figure in BNP policies, raising fears that he was seeking a dynastic takeover, though himself not a government minister.81 Following Awami League threats to again paralyze Bangladesh with protests if a new election wasn’t called, a military intervention created a new caretaker government. Though both party leaders Hasina and Zia were under indictment by the caretaker government, Hasina came out victorious in the next election, starting

75 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 364.

76 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 365.

77 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 366.

78 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 366.

79 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 366.

80 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 366.

81 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 367.

13 her second term in 2008. Hasina has remained as Prime Minister since 2008 and has been reelected twice, most recently in a late 2019 election widely viewed as fraudulent.82

It is worth concluding this paragraph by summarizing more succinctly the rivalry between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, one that has been described quite aptly as a literal

“blood feud destructively mapped onto the country’s religious schism.”83 As mentioned above,

Zia and BNP attacked the Awami League as a party with nefarious Indian influences. The BNP and the Awami League have both partnered in coalitions with the Jama’at-I’Islami, or Jamaat, during different elections, as both parties are often evenly balanced in popular support.84 The

Jamaat, linked by ideology to a separate party of the same name in Pakistan, is controversial as it is seen as pro-Pakistani and is intolerant of non-Muslims as it seeks to establish a government that will follow the Shariat.85 All three parties have powerful and violent student arms that, depending on the party in power, turn college dormitories into centers of violent enforced party ideological purity.86 As discussed above, both parties are willing to use the criminal law to go after their opponents. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the rivalry between Sheikh Hasina and

Khaleda Zia, Zia has spent the last year in jail, serving a 10-year sentence for corruption.87 She was recently temporarily released due to Covid-19 concerns.88

82 “Bangladesh’s Farcical Vote,” editorial, The New York Times, January 16, 2019.

83 Macdonald, Geoffrey. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.” United States Institute of Peace. Accessed May 27, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20199.

84 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 372-74.

85 Rashid. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, 374.

86 “Bangladesh’s Ruling Party Runs University Campuses With an Iron Fist.” The Economist, October 31, 2019.

87 “Khaleda Zia Freed Gets Back Home.”

88 “Khaleda Zia Freed Gets Back Home.”

14 Bangladesh Moving Forward

The international community has expressed concern over rising political violence and radicalization in Bangladesh, particularly the “creeping secular authoritarianism of the Awami

League” over the past two decades.89 Renewed acts of Muslim extremist violence have been tied to this secular authoritarianism, particularly as the Awami League has deconstructed previous political institutions like the use of caretaker governments.90 The Awami League disavowing the use of neutral caretaker governments caused the BNP and Jamaat to boycott the 2014 elections, making the Awami League’s victory illegitimate and surrounded by political violence.91

Recently, Sheikh Hasina’s late-2019 election victory was reportedly understood internationally as an electoral farce.92

The suggestions for reducing recent violence and reversing the erosion of what may already have been nascent political norms unsurprisingly involve institutional reforms.

• Security Sector Reform: as highlighted above, often the government’s security services act

as partisan actors and political militias.

• Election Management Reform: the election commissions in Bangladesh are rightfully seen

as highly partisan and ineffectual.

• Enhancing Democratic Norms: youth targeted civic programs are nearly non-existent,

resulting in the problematic, and violent, instruction of political values through the

respective parties’ student groups.93

89 Macdonald. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.”

90 Macdonald. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.”

91 Macdonald. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.”

92 “Bangladesh’s Farcical Vote.” 93 Macdonald. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.”

15 Undoubtedly, considering the current pandemic, increasing extremist violence, and the ongoing intense rivalry between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia (recently paroled from jail), there is pessimism regarding Bangladesh’s ability to reform its political institutions. Nevertheless, when looking at the political history of Bangladesh, there exists some room for positivity as the country has previously resisted military coups, corruption, and attempts at religious extremism.

16 Bibliography

“Bangladesh’s Farcical Vote,” editorial, The New York Times, January 16, 2019.

“Bangladesh’s Ruling Party Runs University Campuses With an Iron Fist.” The Economist, October 31, 2019.

“Bengali Language.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed May 24, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bengali-language.

Ishtiaq Hossain and Mahmud Hasan Khan. “The Rift Within an Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh.” Asian Journal of Social Sciences 34, no. 2 (2006): 324-339.

“Khaleda Zia Freed Gets Back Home.” The Daily Star, March 26, 2020. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/khaleda-zia-released-six-months-1885888.

Macdonald, Geoffrey. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh.” United States Institute of Peace. Accessed May 27, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20199.

Rashid, Haroun er. Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

“Sheikh Hasina Was Arrested to Confine Democracy.” The Daily Star, July 20, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/city/news/sheikh-hasina-was-arrested-confine-democracy- 1774087.

“Under Threat: The Challenges Facing Religious Minorities in Bangladesh.” Minority Rights Group International. Accessed May 12, 2020. https://minorityrights.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/11/MRG_Rep_Ban_Oct16_ONLINE.pdf.

17