BOOK REVIEWS British Generals The book is divided into five parts: in Blair’s Wars • Part I: Setting the scene in which by Jonathan Bailey, Richard the political context is described Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.) and in which former Prime Farnham, Surrey, UK, Ashgate Minister Tony Blair comes under a Publishing, 2013 great amount of criticism, for inter 385 pages, $51.70 (softcover) alia, not thinking through the con- ISBN 978-1-4094-3736-9 sequences of his decisions, in par- Reviewed by Colonel ticular those which led to British (Ret’d) P.J. Williams intervention in Iraq in 2003; ne of the generals • Part II: Hard Lessons, which who wrote a chap- focuses largely upon the early ter for this book, stages of Britain’s involvement in commenting on the Second Gulf War; other generals who • Part III: Iraq 2006-2009, and Ohad also authored chapters in this which is sub-titled, “Success of a volume, including some with whom Sort;” he had served, noted: “The major- • Part IV: Improving in Afghanistan; ity I would rate as fair, a few I and would gladly join and assault hell’s gate, and some I wouldn’t follow • Part V: What Have We Learnt? to the latrine.”1 Another, speaking of the press, observed: “You will To those lay readers who might hear media presenters tell you that expect this work to be a series of criti- they are committed to obtaining cal diatribes written by “intellectual an objective assessment of the news. Rubbish.”2 Having spent thugs” (which is how one of my professors characterized my three years on exchange with the British Army, I became very fellow cadets and I at the Royal Military College), there is not aware that the writing style of the Brits remains quite different a bit of that here. Each chapter is very well written, and several to ours, and can perhaps be best described as “robust,” while common themes become apparent: one being the need for clarity also getting its point across in a most forthright manner. And (clarity which was often lacking, as the contributors freely admit) so it was that I obtained a copy of this fine book, and indeed, from the political level in terms of the aim of the intervention. I was not disappointed. For one of the contributors at least, the British involvement in Iraq in 2003 had nothing to with Iraq, and everything to do with British Generals in Blair’s Wars is part of the Ashgate Series British-American security relations.3 Almost without exception, on Military Strategy and Operational Art. The work had its gen- the contributors writing here strongly express the view that we esis in a series of seminars presented at the University of Oxford need to be better at implementing the so-called “Comprehensive from 2005 to 2011 as part of the Leverhulm Programme on the Approach,” or what we in Canada have called the “Whole of Changing Character of War. The seminar consisted of a series of Government Approach.” Sound familiar? presentations by senior British officers, recently returned from senior operational command overseas, while also drawing upon Many of the generals here are writing of their time when a lifetime’s experience, experience which ranged from Northern serving within a higher US headquarters, often as the Deputy Ireland to the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Most Commander, and so the book is replete with insights into the US of the contributors (the majority of whom were from the British way of war. Here I thought that the Brits might be overly critical Army) reached at least three-star rank, and there are also chapters of the military approach of our neighbours to the south. However, from a Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal (full General equivalent), the book quickly disabused me of that notion. For the most part, a chapter on the psychological impact of operations by a senior, while some British generals deployed with a “John Wayne”4 image civilian medical practitioner, and a highly instructive contribution of the US military, they quickly came to be impressed at how rap- on civil-military relations by a former senior civil servant in the idly (compared to their own forces), for instance, the Americans Ministry of Defence (MoD). adapted to the Counter Insurgency (COIN) environment in Iraq. Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016 • Canadian Military Journal 79 BOOK REVIEWS Indeed, the book devotes much space to the subject of “learning • Joint Force Commander for NATO operations over Libya organizations,” with the British Armed Forces not always getting in 2011; top marks. The book is replete with several prescriptions as to • Command (as I write) of the Multinational Force and how things can be done better, admittedly from the military point Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula; of view. However, I found the advice from a former MoD civil servant regarding three potential areas of friction in civil military • Command of Joint Task Forces involved in domestic oper- relations, to be particularly useful. In his view, these were: ations; and indeed, • Component and higher command under the US during the • Timeframe; biennial Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). • Strategic understanding and expectation; and 5 Surely with such an embarrassment of riches to draw from, • Culture, including the reaction to casualties. Canada could produce its own equivalent of British Generals in Blair’s Wars. One would hope that we are not (to quote the title As a very open and honest account (actually several accounts) of one of the chapters in this book), “Too Busy to Learn.” I would of generalship and high-level civil-military/Alliance/coalition rela- very strongly recommend this book to those, both military and tions in the post-Cold War era, this book can hardly be bettered. civilian, who work at the highest levels of Defence, and indeed, Sadly, MoD regulations regarding serving officers publishing for counterparts in Global Affairs Canada and in the Privy Council material that might be considered controversial resulted in six Office, for that matter. To those in uniform about to proceed on of the chapters being withdrawn. Pity. Perhaps there will be an senior collation or Alliance command appointments overseas, updated version of this book published when those contributors you should definitely make reading this book a mandatory part hang up their uniforms. Indeed, the just released (at the time of of your pre-deployment training. the writing of this review) UK Chilcot Report into Britain’s part in the 2003 Iraq War will no doubt reinforce many of the points Colonel (Ret’d) Williams’ final post before retiring was as raised herein. Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff. Canada, apart from the odd exchange or seconded officer, did not participate in the Second Gulf War, although we do get NOTES passing mention in references to the Afghanistan conflict, in which we fielded a relatively sizeable contribution. Which begs 1. Graeme Lamb, “On Generals and Generalship,” in Jonathan Bailey, Richard the question of why we have no produced a similar work about Iron, and Hew Strachan (Eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), p. 144. the experiences of our senior commanders on recent operations? 2. John McColl, “Modern Campaigning from a Practitioner’s Perspective, in In addition to Afghanistan, where we held many senior command Jonathan Bailey et al., p. 108. appointments, including command (by then Lieutenant-General 3. Justin Maciejewski, “Best Effort: Operation Sinbad and the Iraq Campaign”, in Rick Hillier) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Jonathan Bailey et al., p. 157. 4. This was the experience of General (Retired) Sir Nick Parker. He makes this Canadian general and flag officers have held or are holding such admission in a very useful on- line panel discussion about the book, which took diverse senior commands as: place at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, England on 17 July 2013. This discussion, just over an hour long, can be accessed at • Multinational Division South-West (MND-SW) in the https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Obt2tkg4U4k 5. Desmond Bowen, “The Political-Military Relationship on Operations,” in Balkans; Jonathan Bailey et al., p.275. • Command of the multinational naval Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) in the Arabian Sea; • Command of the Canadian team working with the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator to build security capacity in the Palestinian Authority; 80 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 2016.