Buddhist Solipsism -A Free Translation of Ratnakirti's Sathtnfltaradsaiia By

Buddhist Solipsism -A free translation of Ratnakirti's Sathtnfltaradsaiia

By Yuichi Kajiyama

According to the Vijnanavadins, Buddhist idealists, all phenomena in this world are the representations of our mind which do not depend for their origination on the external objects corresponding to them. Thus, they were unanimous in denying the existence of the external world and in admitting only ideas as real. However, there was no agreement among themselves as to the problem of whether ideas or minds other than one's own exist. In other words, they were determinate in denying matter, but they seerxi to have been oscilating between the monistic and the. plural- istic c view of mind. Buddhists think of the mind in terms of the stream of momentary psychic factors, denying the existence of a permanent soul. But this does not lessen the difficulties of the above-said problem. Some of the Vijnanavadins showed a bias towards solipsism, while otherss tended to affirm the existence of other people's minds (samtanantara) (1) risking logical consistency of idealism. They found, however, a way out

(1) I just refer to some of the passages recognizing the existence of other people's minds and those denying it, found in the Vijfianavadins' texts. The enumeration is by no means exhaustive and expositions are omitted. Solipsism denied in: 1) Vimsatika v. 3, 18, 19; 2) Tattvasamgrahapanjika (Abr. TSP) p. 550, 1. 8 ff.; 3) ibid. 559, 13-14; 4) Bodhicaryavatara & Panjika (repro- ducing the Vijn.anavada) IX, v. 25 a-b; 5) Dharmakirti, Samtanantarasiddhi; 6) Ratnakirti, Isvarasadhanadasana (Ratnakirtinibandhavali, ed. A. Thakur) 40, 3 f. b. -41, 7. Solipsism affirmed in: 7) Sutralamkara, ed. S. Levi, 158, 1 fo- b.-159, 12; 8) Viriasatika v. 21; 9) TSP 568, 14-17; 10) Ratnakirti, Samtana- ntaradusana. In some of Jaina works the Vi jnanavada is represented as

-435- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (10) of this embarassing situation, resorting to the theory of the two truths, which they shared with other Indian philosophers. Thus, in the sense of the highest truth (paramartha) or speaking of the Buddha's state of mind, they negated fundamentally the difference of the cognizer (grahaka) and the cognized (grahya) in cognition and accordingly the distinction of the self and others. In the sphere of relative truth (sarhvr- ti), however, they recognized as representations the dichotomy and the (2) existence of all other dinstinct objects including other people's minds. This distinction of the two truths, however, was not always made express when they discussed the existence of other people's minds. Hence, we find in the Vi jnanavadins' treatises, and not seldom in the writings of one and the same author, seemingly contradicting passages, some advocating the existence of another person's mind- and others negating it. Since the inception of the Vijnanavada, the opponent would find a weak point of the idealism in that it 'could easily lead to solipsism. The idealists on their part had some reasons for trying to avoid solipsism as far as they could. For solipsism can easily weaken a religion, since, if no- (3) thing exists except the self, it is meaningless to preach to others. Besides this purely religious reason, another factor was their acceptance of the traditional belief that a Buddha or a Yogin can directly perceive another

proclaiming solipsism, see e. g. 11) Nyayaviniscayavivarana (Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala) I), p. 385; 12) Prameyakamalamartanda, ed. Mahendur Kumar, 80, 3-5. I will' discuss the history of solipsism at the - earliest possible opportunity. (2) If we carefully examine, we come to know that the passages n., 1, 1-6 deal with the problem from the standpoint of the samvrtisatya, while 7-10 from that of the paramarthasatya. (3) Cf. Pramanavarttikabhasya (Abr. PVBh) 293, 21 ff. The opponent questions: If (the world) is none other than the single (self-consciousness), why do you exert yourself to teach others ? (advaite katham parabodhanaya pravartate ?) Prajnakaragupta declares that seen from the standpoint of the paramartha, there is no distinction of the self and others (ayath paro 'ham na para iti svasarhvedanam evaitad udayam asadayati natra paramarthato vibhagah) . -434- (11) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) person'smind (paracittajna).This belief, which was' not only admitted by early Vi jnanavadins, but also preserved in the form of 'yogipratyaksa' by Buddhist logicians, put the idealists into a dilemma. If a Buddha can know another person's mind, it follows that another personality, which is as much external to him as other insentient objects, is existent; it could shatter the basic structure of radical idealism. If, on the contrary, the belief is negated, their tradition breaks down. In fact, Buddhist realists, especially the Sautrantikas made the criticism of solipsim a powerful weapon for at- tacking the idealists. They pursued the problem theoretically and argued: The idealist cannot prove the existence of another person's mind, because, according to him, all the phenomena in this world have the alayavi jn.ana (store-consciousness) as their sole cause and therefore another personality cannot be distinct from it. But if the idealist negates the existence of another personality and external objects, which are independent of the alayavijnana, he cannot explain why things occur only sometimes and not constantly, although their seeds are always at hand in the alayavijnana. It behoves him to admit that those things which occur occasionally in spite of the constant presence of the alayavijnana depend on other independent, external causes, as the speech and actions of another person depend on hi (5) s will and not on our own will. In the meantime, Buddhist logicians like Dharmakirti, Prajnakaragupta, Jnanasrimitra etc. who also called themselves ' Vi jnanavadins ' developed idealistic epistemology in a radical form. Since the content of cognition is

(4) Out of the passages referred to in n. 1, the problem of paracittajna is dealt with in 4, 5, 9, 11, 12. (5) This kind of Sautrantika's criticism of the Vijnanavada is found in: Bhamati ad Brahmasutra 2. 2. 28(Kashi Skt. Sr. 280, 14-281, 12); Sarvadarsa- nasamgraha Chap. II, (V. S Abhyankar's ed., 37, 252-256); Nyayakanika, 258, 7f. b. ff.; Nyayavarttikatatparyatika (Kashi Skt. Sr.) 658, 7-659, 3. A similar criticism is quoted in TSP 574, 19-22 as of Bhadanta Subhagupta, though he does not directly refer to other people's minds. The idealists had much to say 'against this criticism, but I cannot here discuss it in detail. -433- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (12)

cognized necessarily with the cognition itself, it proves that there is no (s) difference between cognition and its object which is none other than a form of knowledge. Moreover, cognition, though it contains in itself various forms, is after all the uniform cognition, because we cannot divide our cognition into two parts. Thus, speaking in the sense of the highest truth, there is no difference in time or space in our cognition. The world is none other than the self -consciousness (svasarnvedana). This theory is called (7) a Citradvaitavada' or ' Vi jnanadvaitavada .' This philosophy had much to do with solipsism at least in the epistemological context. The circumstances stated above seem to have gradually driven the later Buddhist idealists to a confession of solipsism. That is to say, they came to talk of the non-existence of another personality more often and more decidedly than the earlier Vijnanavadins, though they did not negate its existence as a represen- tation and its function in our common life. Although Dharmakirti expounded epistemological monism in his main works, he wrote separately a small treatise named A proof of the existence (8) of other people's minds (Samtanantarasiddhi) in which he showed that so far as logic-which is in the domain of the relative truth-is concerned, the existence of another person's mind can be proved in the idealistic system as well as in the realistic. For while the realists prove the existence of another mind on the ground that a person's speech and actions presuppose the existence of his wishful mind, the idealists do the same on the ground that the representations of the former are preceded by the representa-

(6) Pramanaviniscaya, Peking ed., 263, b4 (Skt. text is quoted in various works): sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nilataddhiyoh. The verse is discussed in Ratnakirti's Citradvaitaprakasavada (Ratnakirtinibandhavali) 122, 15 ff. (7) Pramanavarttika (Abr. PV), III, v. 389, 221, 222 etc.; PVBh 295, 2 f. b.; para- marthatas svasaihvedanam ekam eva...... ; 289, 22: citrabhasapi buddhir ekaiva bahyacitravilaksanatvat etc. etc. Jnanasrimitra and Ratnakirti discuss the citradvaitavada in Sakarasiddhi and Citradvaitaprakasavada respectively. (8) This work is translated into English by H. Kitagawa: A refutation of solipsism, journal of the Greater India Society, Vol. XIV, no. 1 and 2; Stcher- batsky gives a brief exposition in Buddhist Logic, I, 521-524. -432- (13) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) tion of the latter. As such there is no logical difference between the two proofs. On the other hand, Ratnakirti, who proved in a work the existence (9) of another mind from the standpoint of the relative truth, wrote A refuta-

(10) tion of the existence of other people's minds (Sarntanantaradusana) from the standpoint of the highest truth. However, his Sarntanantaradusana is par- ticularly interesting because it unreservedly declares solipsism as the final destination of idealism and because his logical analysis in it represents an aspect of Buddhist philsophy at its zenith. Space consideration prevents me from giving a detailed appraisal of this work and a more historical sketch of its background. What follows is merely a tentative, free translation of this work.

(11) A refutation of the existence of other people's minds

Having revealed the unreality of the whole aggregate of insentient things (jadapadartha) by means of the proof that they are cognized together with (12) (the cognition) illuminating (them), and having established that all kinds of things, blue, yellow etc., being by nature the appearances of our own (13) mind, are of uniform nature like a dream or illusion etc., we will now enter into the following (discussion) in order to examine (the problem of) whether or not other personalities exist. (14) Some people argue as follows : There exists another person's mind,

(9) Cf. n. 1, (6). (10) A. Thakur, ed., Ratnakirtinibandhavali, pp. 138-142. (11) Corrections to the text, excluding those recorded by the editor in Sudd- hipatra: p. 138, 1. 6 Read abhasa (instead of abhyasa); 138, 10 vyahara (vya- vahara); 139, 4 I retain na here in spite of the editor's deletion.; 139, 7 drsyah (drsyam)? The text is dubious in this sentence; 139, 23 vyahara) (vyava-); 140, 15 neti (naiti), cf. n. 21; 140, 32 bhedapratibhasa- (bhaved apratibhasa-); 141, 3 parasarhvitty- (parasamvity-); 141, 4 anadhigame'pi (adhigame'pi). (12) Cf. n. 6 above. (13) Cf, n. 7 above. The author obviously refers to his Citradvaitaprakasavada. (14) This argument is similar to that of the Sautrantika found in the very beginning of Dharmakirti's Samtanantarasiddhi. But here this proof of the existence of other people's minds is proposed by a Vijnanavadin. In our pre- -431- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (14)

and it is proved through inference. For we perceive that our speech and actions appear being preceded by our wishful mind, and do not perceive the former in the absence of the latter. We first ascertain within our own personality the relation of a cause and an effect between a wishful mind and the appearance of speech etc.-this relationship is then established by perception (upalambha) and non-perception (anupalambha) and consists of the concomitance in agreement (anvaya) and in difference (vyatireka) (15) (between the two terms). And then, even when we do not perceive the wishful mind (of another person), we infer a wishful mind to be the cause (of his speech and actions) on the ground that we see his speech and actions (which have been perceived) come to an end (when he has no longer the (16) wishful mind). Thus the existence of another person's mind is proved. (The author:) Regarding this (inference), the following is to be con= sidered: Can this wishful mind, which is going to be established as the cause of the appearance of speech etc., be seen by the person who so infers, or is it simply a wishful mind in general which need not be qualified by visibility or invisibility ? If you favour the first alternative, the fact that we do not, while in- ferring, perceive a wishful mind makes us understand the very absence rof it, because it is (as admitted by you) a visible entity . Thus, since it is negated by non-perception which is no more than another name of

sent work Ratnakirti's opponent is not a. Sautrantika, but a Vijfianavadin. (15) For a detailed discussion on the establishment of a causal relation and the meaning of 'anvaya ' and 'vyatireka ', see my Trikapaficakacinta, Misce- Ilanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos. 4-5, pp. 1-15. Anvaya and vyatireka, when used with regard to the establishment of a causal relation, are a little different in their meaning from the same used in relation to a vyapti. (16) To understand the author's argument here and in the following passages it is necessary to keep in mind that inference on the ground of a causal relation is possible only when the causal relation itself is beforehand established. Therefore, the opponent here must, as the first step, establish the causal relation between the mind and the speech etc., and then he can proceed to the inference of the existence of another person's mind on the-ground of his speech etc. -430- (15) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama)

(17) perception, where is the room left for its inference? If, on the contrary, a wishful mind is perceived even when you infer (its existence), what is, the use of this inference? If we, having established the causal relation of fire and smoke in a mountain thicket, perceive, a moment later, (the same) smoke (in the same place), we will not then infer again the existence of fire, as you (infer the existence of another's mind while you are perceiving it). For in this (example) too, fire, (if it is absent), is negated by non-perception itself, and if it is seen, inference is of no use. (What actually takes place is) not like this. For at the time of inference, fires, which is remote in space and unable to be seen is beyond (the cognizance of) the 'non-perception (qualified by referring to) a perceptible object (drsye- anupalabdhi)'. (Nor can we rely on) the non-perception not (qualified by referring to) a perceptible object (adrsyanupalambha), because this is incon- gruouswith (i. e. disqualifiedto be) a proof of non-existence.On the other- hand, a wishful mind (which is perceptible) is never remote in space, for a; wishful mind which is connected with the person who infers is alone perceptible to him. And to say that it is remote in space contradicts common sense. If you choose the second alternative, meaning that what is determined as the cause of the appearance of speech etc. is a wishful mind in general which is common to one's own and another's personality, and which need not be qualified by visibility or invisibility, (then we ask) by which proof you determine it. You should seek to establish the causal relation resorting; to the knowledge (i. e. vyatireka) that the appearance. of speech etc. does. not take place when a wishful mind in general is absent. But we cannot know the absence of a wishful mind in general, common to one's own and

(17) (drsya-) anupalambha is, according to Buddhist logic, not the absence of perception, nor the perception of non-existence, but the perception of things other than the denied object, which are present at the same place and time as it. Hence, it is another name of perception. (18) According to Buddhist logic, negation or non-perception is effective only when it refers to a perceptible object. A non-perception of an imperceptible object, say a ghost, has no logical significance because such an object remains just problematic. -429- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (16) another's personality, by means of self-consciousness (svasaxhvedana) or any other proof. For instance, one who infers can establish the causal relation (of fire and smoke) regarding only such fire of which he can, though it is remote in space or time, suppose (sarhbhavayati) that if it were pre- snt at the place and the time in which smoke occurs, it would be surely perceived by himself; and in fact he can do so only when he is sure, through his own sense-perception, that (fire), is absent before smoke is pro- duced. This is the procedure through which we determine that fire, though remote in space and time, is the cause of smoke in general. However, we .cannot comprise in this kind of pervasion (vyapti) nominal fire which is, being inaccessible in essence (svabhavaviprakrsta), common even to the fire of digestion (jatharagni) and the absence of which can be never known by one who infers. As for a wishful mind common to (one's own and) another's personality, if we could thus establish the concomitance in difference (vyatireka), then we would be sure that it is a cause. In fact, however, your argument falls to the ground, since a (wishful) mind in general is inaccessible in essence. Moreover, another person's mind is never remote in time because it is always present. One talks about remoteness in time only of a thing belonging to the past or future. Nor can you argue that it is remote in space, for (what we actually experience is that) we do not know the mind of another person appearing in the form of yellow in the same spot such as a white shell, where we cognize through self-consciousness our own mind appearing in the form of white. How can this be a case of remoteness in space. (The following objection may be raised:) A wishful mind in general is not inaccessible in essence when seen from the standpoint of self-consciousness in general. For example, the fire which we saw (yesterday) by one sense-perception is not cognized today by the same (perception); yet we establish that fire in general is perceptible with reference to visual perception in general. Of the problem in question, we can say similarly that a wishful mind in general, though common to one's own and another's personality, is perceptible in relation to self-consciousness in general. -428- (17) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) To this objection this is our reply: Isn't it to the effect that by the words 'in general' you admit any and every person's sense-perception which, though perceiving a thing, is specified neither as connected to nor as disconnected from the person who infers, and (the content of) which has no particular characteristics even when we envisage its visible form ? If this is the case, a (problematic) object like a demon would also be perceptible, for it may be an, object of the sense-perception of some person such as a Yogin or of another demon of the same kind. Thus, no- thing would be inaccessible in essence. Therefore, the words' in general' should be applied only when we disregard the difference in individual qualities of (the things belonging to the same class) without neglecting their connection with the person who infers. Fearing such (an misunderstand- ing), Dharmottara had this to say: This definition of direct perception is made from the standpoint of an (19) individual observer, etc. Therefore, the supposition of perceptibility (drsyatasambhavana) must be made in this way: If a jar etc. were present at this spot or at this moment, it would be surely perceived, and in fact it would be an object of my own visual perception alone. As for another person's mind, however, we cannot make the supposition that if there were here another's mind, it would be surely an object of my own self-consciousness alone. If a wishful mind in general were to be supposed as perceptible when we grasp the causal relation (between it and speech etc.), then it would follow that even when we infer (the existence of another person's mind), we can, supposing it to be perceptible, prove its non-existence by virtue of its non-perception. How then should we begin to produce an inference, since the very assertion (that another's mind is existent) has been negated by perception? (Even if you say) that it is sometimes accessible in essence and another time inaccessible, it is quite insignificant. Therefore, a wishful mind in general common to one's own, and another's personality

(19) Nyayabindutika (Bib. Bud.) 23, 7-8. -427- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (18) cannot be supposed as perceptible. And accordingly we do not ascertain that the absence of speech etc. is necessarily concomitant with the absence of a wishful mind, since we cannot ascertain even the non-perception (of the latter) before the production of the former. How, then, is it possible to establish it as the cause (of speech etc.), due to which we infer (another's mind) on the ground that (speech is) its effect? As for a wishful mind as belonging to one's own personality, it may not be perceptible to one who infers. However, we have already pointed out that you can then by no means resort to inference since (the existence of a wishful mind ) in the subject under consideration (i. e. in another personality) has been negated by the non-perception of a perceptible object. Thus, (to sum up the result of our examination :) 1) When the existence of a wishful mind specified as belonging to one's own personality is the object to be inferred, your assertion is sublated . (by perception). 2) A wishful mind in general, common to one's own and another's personality, being the object to be inferred, (a) if you, when you (first) establish the causal relation, know its absence (before the production of speech etc.) by means of the mere non-perception not qualified by (referring to) a perceptible object, then the same fallacy (of the non-perception of an imperceptible object) is pointed out (also when you infer the existence of such a mind) in the subject of your assertion (i. e. another person); (b) and if you do not know its absence (when you establish the causal relation), your probaans 'speech etc. ' is determined to be fallacious due to the uncer- tainty of the negative pervasion (samdigdhavyatireka). Some people say: We have so far found neither a proof (sudhaka) of the existence of another person's mind nor its disproof (badhaka). There- fore, it is just indeterminable (sarndeha eva). (We reply: No.) Bear well in mind the disproof we are going to produce. If the mind of another person is possibly existent, then our own mind would be differentiated from that; otherwise what is admitted as another mind would not be distinct from our own mind which is being manifested. But we' do not actually discern the difference between the two. Thus,

-426- (19) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) it follows that another person's mind, which is excluded neither from what is different from our own mind, nor from what is identical with it, is simply non-existent as a universal (samanya) or a rabbit's horn. How then can you say it is just indeterminable? Thus, our own mind would necessarily be different in relation to another's mind. And this difference, being the nature (svabhava) of a mind, should be necessarily perceptible when our own mind is being perceived. If this is not (perceived), how can the difference of our own mind from another's mind be settled as the nature (of a mind) even if we may simply imagine the two incompatible qualities, visibility and invisibility? Such difference, 'however, is not actually seen. For if the difference is manifestly cognized, another's mind, forming the limit of our own mind, would unavoidably manifest itself. In this connection, you should go through the following verses and all other words found in the Pravcanapradipasrisakarasamgraha etc. (by Jnanasrimitra). If it is the nature of one's own mind that it is different from another, it (i. e. one's own mind) should be perceived as having a limit; other- (20) wise it is not cognized as such. Even a shade of another (mind) is not seen in (one's own mind which (21) is supposed to be) a different thing; what, then, is it different from? When one's own mind alone presents itself, it is' not seen differently from another mind which is not presented, just as it is not seen differently from an invisible rabbit's horn. For any such slight difference of one's own mind as is not found in comparison with a rabbit's horn is not seen also in comparison with another person's mind. When one's own mind appears in the same form in comparison both with a rabbit's horn and another person's mind, yon cannot establish that though it appears neither as different from, nor as identical with a rabbit's horn, it is different compared with another person's mind. For just as the distinctness (of a thing)

(20) Sakarasiddhi (Jnanairmitranibandhavali ed. A. Thakur), 458, 6f. b.; a- karasarhgraha (ibid) v. 149. The original verse reads grahyavastunah instead of svasya cetasah. (21) Sakarasiddhi, 450, 2f. b.; Sakarasariigraha, v. 185. neti instead of naiti. -425- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (20) is established through refuting its non-discrimination both from the homogeneous and heterogeneous (things), just so the manifestation of the distinctness (of a thing) is possibly maintained when it is distinguished from the manifestation of the absence of the homogeneous and heterogeneous things. And such is not experienced (in the case of another person's mind). If you still insist that the difference is discernible, it is merely an artificial arrangement of speech (vacanaracana). You should understaa d the logic of the Bhasyakara (Prajnakaragupta) concerning this point by extensibly (22) reading his Bhedapratibhasadusana. If (you contend that) even when the limit (of one's own mind) is not manifested, the distinctness of it is to be a dmitt:: d through the fact that we have compassion for another person's mind, how do you establish the non-existence of external objects ? You can ind harbour suspicions about this as well. You may object: External objects do not manifest themselves to anyone, but the mind of a person becomes manifest to another person; therefore we have doubt about the (non-existence of another person's mind), but not about (the non-existence of) external objects. (No.) All this falls back to the realm of doubt. For we can say at the same time that a person's mind does not always become manifest to another, and that it sometimes does not exist, nor becomes manifest. Let us agree (for argument's sake) that external objects do not become manifest to anyone. But how can you, who admit the manifestation of difference, prove the non-existence of them ? That was what we wanted to emphasize here. And you cannot find any fault in this (way of argument). How can (you and we) agree, just because we are all idealists, on the problem of another person's mind, as there is agreement (among us) on (the non-existence of) external objects. Furthermore, you who assert the different manifestations of two cogni; tions cannot restrict the causal relation (to a relative truth). For (accord-

(22) Is this a lost work of Prajnakaragupta, independent of PVBh or a portion of the latter ? For Prajnakara's argument against Bhedapratibhasa see, for instance, PVBh p. 292, but I am not sure if Ratnakirti refers to this. -424- (21) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) ing to you) preceding knowledge cognizes its difference from succeeding knowledge and -its own priority, even if those (cognitions) are not under- stood as appearing with a limit. Likewise, succeeding knowledge cognizes its difference from preceding knowledge and its own posteriority, as one (23) person's mind (cognizs s its own distinctness). Thus, when the relation of a cause and an effect, which is characterized as a definite relation of the antecedent and the subsequent, is manifested and ascertained (by you) as a from of cognition like blue etc., how can the words of the revered Vart'tikakara (Dharmakirti) " Let (the causal function) be established so far as the relative truth (24) is concerned " be significant in this thought (of yours). Again, how can you, following (the theory that) difference is cognized. escape from (us), the other party, without coming to suspect (the existence of) another person's mind, when we proclaim that the object of cognition i s free from the perception grasping difference ? Indeed we bring forward the ground (sadhana) 'being visible (prakasamanatva) ' etc. in order to prove that the subject of our inference, ' the whole realm (of our cognition) (25) containing various forms (citrakaracakra)', is of uniform nature (advaita).

(23) According to Dharmakirti and his followers, the causal relation is admitted only as a relative truth. In the sense of the highest truth difference in time as well as in space, and accordingly the causal relation cannot be established. Cf. PVIBh 292, 19-31; PV III, v. 389 a-b : bhed.as ca bhrantivijnanair drsyetendav ivadvaye, and PVBh on it (410, 5-6): tasmad uttarakalabhavina vikalpenanvayavyatirckabhyam iti dvayabhedakalpana na pratyaksa pra-titih

(24) PV III, v. 4 d. (25) Citradvaitaprakasav da, 122, 19-20: yat prakasate tad ekam, yatha citra- karacakramadhyavarti nilakarah; prakasate cedam gauragandharamadhurasu- rabhisukumarasatetaradivicitrakarakadambakam iti svabhavahetuh. (The syllogism based on the identity of the probans and the probandum may be formulated: Whatever is visible is of uniform nature, as the form of blue which is in the middle of the sphere (of cognition) containing various forms; this aggregate of variegated forms such as white, gandhara-note, sweetness, -423- Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (22) (The objection may be raised:) It may be so. But by which proof do -you establish the non -existence of another person's mind ? You cannot do it through perception anyhow, because, having as its object only a reality to be affirmed (vidhivisaya), perception is not qualified for a negative judg- ment; nor through inference, because it is determined to prove only the absence of a perceptble object and is not fit to prove the non-existence of another person's mind which is (by nature) beyond -(the cognizance of) the senses. To this we reply: If another person's mind woud be possibly existent, it should be a limited entity, from which one's own mind is different. If, on the contray, it is not different from one's own mind, it would follow that there exists only another person's mind (and not one's own mind). (Thus our syllogism may be formulated:) If x, being perceived, is not seen in the form of y, then x cannot be said to exist in the form of y, as e. g. blue is not in. the form of yellow; one's own mind, though being

perceived, is not cognized in a form distinct from another person's (2s) mind; (theref ore, one's own mind is not distinct from another's mind). This (syllogism), negating distinctness as the nature of one's own mind, is formulated accoding to the formula of 'the non-perception of the nutare (27) of the denied object' (svabhavanupalabdhi) without using the qualifier

fragrance, tenderness, pleasure, pain etc. is also visible; (therefore, this aggregate or the whole realm of cognition is of uniform nature)). (26) Dharmakirti, while discussing anupalabdhi, comes to say that the distinctness of a thing is established since it is perceived with a distinct form (PV, IV, v. 271: viseso gamyate ' rthanarn visistad eva vedanat, tathabhuta- tmasarnvittir bhedadhi hetur asya ca; v. 273: visistarupanubhaven nato' nya- nyenirakriya...) Of couse, this is argued on the level of the relative truth. But Ratnakirti seems to take advantage of this theory to refute the distinctness of one's own mind in the sense of the highest truth. According to the, citradvaitavada, our cognition contains diverse forms, but at the same time the cognition as a whole is one. Hence, the theory can be utilized for both the establishment and the refutation of distinct objects. However, we must again keep in mind that the refutation is made in the paramertha and the establishment in the sarimvrti-satya. -422- (23) Buddhist Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) imperceptibility ' Neither is this (syllogism) illegitimate (asiddha). For if a thing is manifested distinctly, its limit would be necessarily seen, and if the limit (of a thing) is not seen, it is not seen distinctly, just as a rabbit's horn is not distinctly seen; this is quite legitimate. Since the difference of another person's mind from one's own mind is driven away by this proof, and since (to maintain its) identity (with one's own mind) is evidently impossible, it is proved to be designated neither by 'distinct' nor by 'indistinct'. (That is. to say,) it is bereft of reality like a universal etc. How then can you express only a doubt about another person's mind on the ground that there is no disproof. I have written above only some points meant for causing to remember the subjects stated in the authoritative books. The rest you will have to investigate by yourself. Moreover, you 'have approved the doubt expressed by worldly persons about' (the existence of) another person's mind. What is to be ascertained from (the words of) the Blessed One (Buddha) ? If the problem is still exposed to doubt (even after consulting his words), how can he be called the omniscient being ? In fact, the Tathagata did not at any time confirm that there was another poerson's mind. How is it that he is omniscient ? We have already examined above (the inefficency of your) inference with (the existence of) another person's mind as its object. Even if (another person's mind) were known through inference, it would not (allow you to call him) omniscient, (because omniscience means to know every thing by direct perception). If another person's mind were known (by the Tathagata) then it would follow that between another person's mind and the Tathagata's mind there exists the relation of the cognized and the cognizer; this behoves you to admit in a roundabout way the theory of the reality of external objects. But how- can such a theory escape (our criticism) ?

(27) The formula is no. 1 of the 11 (or 16) kinds of negative judgments clas- sified by Buddhist logicians. Cf. Nyayabindu, II, s. 32(p. 31): Moksakaragu- pta's Tarkabhasa, ed. Rangaswami Iyenger, 31, 10-12. -421- Buddhist, Solipsism (Y. Kajiyama) (24) According to our view, on the contrary, the fault that the Blessed One is not omniscient does not follow, even though he did not confirm the non-existence of another person's mind, (because the problem is to be dealt with differently in the highest and the relative truth, and thus not definite) . Nor is there the fallacy of a self-contradicting argument (svacanavirod- ha), (even if we persuade others that in the sense of the highest truth (28) there is not another person's mind), since we produce our argument only to enlighten them that doubts regarding (the existence of) another person's mind occur just as long as they remain in the relative truth consisting of the erroneous conception that difference is cognized. We do not in fact recognize that we have no doubt in any form about another person's mind, but it is in the sense of the highest truth (and not in the relative) that we have revealed (the non-existence of another person's mind). This proof of the non-existence of another person's mind is made in the same way as the proof of the uniform nature (of cognition) (advayasadhana), and accordingly the criticism of self-contradiction as well as its counter- criticism is not definite on one and the same level (i. e. the proof may be self-contradictory if it is made in the sense of the relative truth but not in the sense of the highest truth). The obscurity caused by (the similarity of our theory with) the Vedanta doctrine was removed by the Bhasyakara who showed (the difference between the two) through pointing out the mere fact that (our uniform cognition) contains in it various forms as well. So, commenting on (Pramanavartika III, v. 327) beginning with " The perception cognizes its own self, and not an y other object ", (29) the Bhasyakara elucidated as follows : If the opponent says that (the theory of uniformity in diverse forms) will result in the theory of atman, then we (30) say 'No', because various forms are also cognized

(28) Cf. n. 3 above. (29) PVBh 352, 26 ff. (30) I refrain from translating the last two lines, since, as the editor notes; our text is here vitiated by corruption.

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