UNITA WE STAND 's Continuing Strife Kenneth Good After Nicaragua, Angola has the government America most wants to see defeated. Why? And can it survive?

ngola has pro-W estern Zaire It anherited from an 750,000 carats in 1985, and the and Zambia to its north-east education system so poor that only country now imports between 50-90 A and east, and Namibia and 15 percent of Angolans were literate percent of its food. South Africa to the south. It is a in 1975, and destroyed equipment This decline is the consequence potentially rich country which, since when the half million Portuguese of external and internal aggression. independence in 1975, has been expatriates fled. But this does not and the effort to oppose it absorbed purposefully prevented - chiefly by account for the losses suffered since 60-80 percent of government revenue the and South Africa then. Earlier, the world's fourth­ in 1986. The government of the - from achieving its potentialities. It largest coffee producer, it has seen its Popular Movement for the has oil, diamonds and iron, and vast production cut to Jess than one-tenth Liberation of Angola (M PLA) has resources of land capable of from 1973 to 1981. Similarly, while faced a situation of continous crisis producing both a range of export formerly the world's sixth-largest since its formation. Avowedly commodities and sufficient food for diamond producer, with an output of marxist since 1977, it is also its relatively small population of 6-7 2.4 million carats in 1974, it has moderate and non-doctrinaire. The million. experienced a drop in production to leadership of the first M PLA AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 29

government, led by , American official then described the second half of 1975. the CIA was described by one authority as them.J But UNITA must be began encouraging South Africa to "skilled, educated, and dedicated",' compared with Roberto's group as interYene in Angola. in association and that of his successor, Eduardo well as with the MPLA. and what with Sa,·imbi and again with dos Santos, has stressed its desire for distinguished it strongly from the Mobutu and Kaunda. To the CIA. foreign investment and trade with the FNLA was the stress which Savimbi says Stockwell. "the South Africans West. The External Trade Minister, placed on organisation inside Angola were the ideal solution". The Gaspar Martins, recently referred to and actual engagement in armed American agency "traditionally the large and growing role of struggle. There is e\idence. howeYer. sympathised with South Africa and American and French corporations that Savimbi in the early 1970s was enjoyed its close liaison with BOSS". in the oil industry, and said: "We're prepared to collaborate with the the then main intelligence not dogmatic. We look at the systems Portuguese in military action against organisation in Pretoria: "co­ of the world and decide what is the MPLA and to discredit it ordination was effected at all CIA applicable to Angola." He noted. politically within the OA U. It was leYels and the South Africans too, that 80-85 percent of his Savimbi who subsequently sought a escalated their inYo!Yement in step country's trade was with Western more durable association with South with our own".~ countries. "This is where the market Africa. Washington's strateg~ in is, where we sell and where we buy. The United States has long Angola following the departure of We want technology from the West. supported Portuguese colonialism the Portuguese administration was There is no reason why this shouldn't and it had foreseen neither the to place Roberto's F:\LA in power in continue. ''2 President dos Santos had collapse of Portuguese militarism in . despite their palpable earlier declared that Angola was Africa nor the overthrow of fascism unfitness for national go,ernment prepared to live "in an atmosphere of and the known strength of the tolerance" with South Africa once UNITA was formed as 'little more M PLA in urban areas. The result Namibia was independent. The was the rout of the inexperienced MPLA government is, at the same than twelve guys with knives' FI'\LA and their Zairean allies. and time, relatively free from the the elimination of the FSLA as a mismanagement and corruption in Lisbon. When the United States 'iable fighting force by the beginning which has self-induced bankruptcy in began to increase its inter\"ention in of 1976. Washington's opposition to some other African countries. Angolan affairs. in January 1975. it the M PLA goYernment thereafter It is not the policies of the did so against the M PLA and by assumed two forms which are still MPLA, but the existence of expanding aid to Roberto. The maintained. SaYimbi ~as ad,·ised to fratricidal divisions within the initiative in Washington came from continue fighting. and the llnited nationalist movement which has Secretary of State Kissinger who was States embarked on a puniti\ e polic~ facilitated external aggression spurred on by a vision of world-wide of non-recognition of the MPLA against the country. Originating in confrontation with the Soviet Union. go,·ernment to undermine Angola's Zaire in the 1950s was what The United States. reports John economic relations with the \\'est subsequently became Holden Stockwell. then chief of the CIA's and hamstring reconstruction 10 the Roberto's Front for the National "Angola Task Force". "clearly ... country. Liberation of Angola (FNLA). wanted this war". It ignored the fact South African forces inYaded Roberto had close association with a that the Soviet Union had stopped Angola before the country's number of American organisations. supporting the MPLA in 1973 and independence. Pretoria would seem and it is said that United States had only resumed significant arms to han! been responding to the pressure encouraged the Organisat­ shipments in March 1975. It also opportunities presented to it by the ion of African Unity (OA U) to recog­ ignored possibilities other than diYided Angolan nationalist nise a Roberto-led government-in­ covert military and economic movement. but also to pressure from exile briefly in the 1960s. But interventiorr. It further ignored the other countries that it should act. Roberto preferred to remain in "life­ obvious negative features of the Stockwell reports that "it came into long exile" in Zaaire. and the FNLA FNLA in apparent preference for the conflict cautiously at first. was structurally incoherent, deeply Roberto's anti-communism. As watching the expanding US program racialist and tribalist little other Stockwell noted: "Most of what (the and timing their steps to the CIA 's".5 than a vehicle for the brutality of its CIA) knew about the FNLA came As it became clear that neither the leader. who also espoused a "visceral from Roberto. the chief recipient of FNLA nor liN ITA had the abilit\· to anticommunism". our largesse". and "we knew even less stop the MPLA. Zambia. Zaire ;lnd The third movement. the Union about Savimbi and UNIT A". the United States called for increased for the Total Independence of The United States. however. did South African interwntion in Angola (UNIT A). was formed by not act alone and. in.the initial stage. support of UNIT A. Like Kissinger. Jonas Savimbi in 1966 as a splinter the CIA obtained the co-operation of both Kaunda and Mobutu feared the group from the FNLA - little more Mobutu in Saire and Kaunda in establishment of a SO\ iet-supported than "twelve guys with knives". as an Zambia. Shortly al'ierwards. during gowrnment in An_gola. In mid- 30 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW

October a South African armoured heavy weaponry, first using Cuban by CIA support bases in Zaire and column, totalling some 2,000 troops, ships and later Soviet aircraft. the South African military in the travelled northwards from Namibia, Cuba's dramatic intervention, says south. The government's dry season drawing UNITA and FNLA units in one authority, represented "a offensive in August-September 1985 its wake. It, too, was repulsed south decisive turning point" in the war, came close to Savimbi at his southern of Luanda, and the bulk of the force but it "followed upon substantial base of Mavinga, but the South was withdrawn in January 1976. intervention by others". The Cuban African military quickly flew in Kaunda was left to rail against the action, unlike that of America, was in reinforcements, and the attack was Soviet and Cuban assistance to the no sense covert, and it was repulsed. The Luanda government MPLA as a fearsome "tiger and its proclaimed by Fidel Castro as an would require additional heavy cubs", and to try to deny recognition expression of established state policy weaponry and would be obliged to to the MPLA government.6 By mid- and Cuba's African heritage. By escalate the fighting in order to 1976, however, Savimbi, with early 1976, about 12,000 Cuban annihilate UNITA today. continuing assistance from Pretoria, troops were present. These forces Washington's non-recognition had organised a renewed rural plus the heavy weaponry which the denies Angola Western economic insurgency against what he now USSR and Cuba supplied, helped the aid, and the bulk of the government's called "Soviet/ Cuban occupation". M PLA 's guerrilla-trained units to budget is financed by oil exports, South Africa carried out two shift successfully to conventional presently depleted by low world oil large-scale invasions of Angola direct confrontations with the South prices. With coffee and diamond under the Reagan presidency, in African military. production seriously curtailed, oil August 1981 and in December 1983. But the war of economic provides 90 percent of Angola's The latter operation, named destruction and South African foreign exchange, and the greater "Askari", involved no less than incursion continued, and in 1980 part of this is exported to the United 10,000 troops, and ended in fiasco. there were about 20,000 Cuban States. Angola is America's fourth- troops and some 17,000 advisers the general manager boldly and technicians from other 'the South Africans were the ideal communist states in Angola. They observed that the US was 'backing operated and trained Angolans in the solution' the wrong guy' use of tanks, missiles and radar systems as well as the fighters and largest trading partner in Africa, but But UNITA continues to provide assault helicopters which are the the oil corporations are under South Africa and the United States shield against South African attack pres s ure from the Reagan with the weapon of economic on Luanda and a limited offensive administration to pull out, and are destabilisation over much of the capability against Savimbi's even threatened with attack by sparsely populated countryside. sabotage. It was this weaponry which UNIT A. In this sharp polarisation of Savimbi's forces concentrated on threatened a major defeat for proclaimed natiOnal and commercial economic sabotage, mining roads Pretoria's Operation Askari at the interests, the American companies and fields in the richest farming end of 1983. Soviet satellites had have chosen to maintain their areas. The apartheid regime provides monitored the build-up that effective alignment with Luanda, UNITA with requirements like preceded the invasion, and Soviet which is thus in a stronger economic uniforms and fuel and stands ready diplomats informed the South position to defend itself. Oil giant to defend Savimbi's redoubts in the Africans in new York that the USSR Cabinda Gulf's general manager south when M PLA attacks are close. was ready to strengthen its forces in boldly observed that the United Angola in response to any escalation The Reagan government has recently States was "backing the wrong guy~ in pressure from Pretoria. offered Savimbi increased in Savimbi, and the president of recognition, money and new This was a significant Chevron, its parent company, weaponry, and greatly enhanced expression of tacit policy, but what assured dos Santos that his company UNIT A's destructiveness. the Soviet Union did not provide is would not be bullied into leaving.s also significant. Soviet economic aid From March 1975, some two to Angola is parsimonious - Similar Under Reagan, the United months after the United States and to what is offered to other socialist­ States has moved closer to South Zaire initiated covert assistance to oriented African states, but totally Africa. Reagan soon referred to FNLA, the Soviet Union and then unlike the heavy financial assistance South Africa as a friend that had Cuba moved to provide the MPLA given to Cuba and Viet Nam; on the stood by America in all its wars, and with its vital defence capability. figures of one authority, Soviet which was "strategically essential to Cuban military aid was requested by economic aid through 1978 totalled the free world". Controls on sensitive the MPLA in March 1975. Some 230 only US$17 million.7 Nor,afterelven exports to South Africa, introduced advisers arrived around May, years' fighting, has the Angolan under Jimmy Carter, were relaxed in followed from September by a very government acquired the capacity to 1982, and important computers and rapid build-up o'f Cuban troops and eliminate Savimbi, shielded as he is perhaps nuclear materials were AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 31

supplied. Military relations were suddenly depicted not as a traitor House in Washington. The restored. Attaches were again placed and saboteur but as a "freedom organisation can claim greater in the respective capitals, top South fighter" and "scholar warrior" in the political reality than the FNLA African military commanders were global anti-communist crusade. earlier or Renamo in Mozambique brought secretly to Washington for When Congress, in July 1985. today, the latter being nothing other briefings, and the CIA shared repealed the Clark amendment than faceless terrorists. But what intelligence data with Pretoria. which had barred covert aid to UNIT A is concentrating upon inside American approval in 1982 helped UNIT A, Reagan quickly supplem­ Angola in 1986 is indiscriminate Pretoria to secure a much-needed ented recognition with financial and assault in the countryside. In loan from the International military assistance. CIA chief, the reports of foreign relief agencies Monetary Fund. Reagan and his William Casey, met with Savimbi in as well as the Luanda government, entourage saw South Africa as a Kinshasa in March 1986. and the UNJTA had planted anti-personnel good anti-communist country which shipment of new weapons through land mines by the hundreds in village should be brought within Zaire began. In June 1986, a farmlands. trails and roads, in the Washington's strategic embrace. delegation from the US Senate north and the south-central Following the policy of"constructive secretly visited Savimbi in Angola, highlands. The immediate result was engagement", apartheid was and met CIA station chiefs in injuries inflicted on thousands of accepted as a problem internal to Kinshasa and Pretoria. In August the peasants with, for example, 6.000 to South Africa. CIA was training UNITA forces on 8,000 victims in the H uambo region Such policies had strong American anti-aircraft missiles and alone. The longer consequence is the implications for Angola. Next to anti-tank weapons at a secret abandonment of the fields in some of Pretoria, Washington by 1982 was location. Buoyed up by this support. the most fertile districts and a further the strongest supporter of the notion Savimbi intended to seek a larger drop in national food production. of linkage between the Cuban forces commitment from Washington. The The Luanda government, in April in Angola and independence for harmony of outlook between 1986, put the number of "totally South African-dominated Namibia. Washington and Pretoria was destitute and mutilated persons" in Unlike its Western allies, America indicated when the South African need of food aid from foreign donors insisted on the prior withdrawal of Defence Minister. General Malan at 600,000, an increase of 100,000 Cuban forces from Angola, a policy announced. in September 1985, that over the previous year. which not only delayed freedom for it would continue supporting Savimbt has many foreign Namibia, but promised to expose UNIT A because this was in the sympathisers in addition to the Luanda to Pretoria's attack. Then. "interests of the free world".9 Reagan right wing, and the apartheid from the opposite side, the "Reagan UNIT A has come a long way in regime. President Mobutu in Zaire doctrine" represented increased 20 years, from tortuous exile still renders important assistance, American support for Savimbi, manoeuvrings in Zaire to the White chiefly as an alternative to Savimbi's 32 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW

total regional reliance upon Pretoria, movement for international 4. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, and Tunisia, Morocco, and possibly economic sanctions against Pretoria . 1979. pp. 38. 52, 91, 95, 191-195. certain Francophone West African inexorably undercuts Reagan's 5. Stockwell, p. 191. governments are sympathetic. There support for both South Africa and is also support in political and Savimbi. Secretary of State Shultz 6. Quoted in R.W. Johnson. How um Will South Africa Survive.' London. 1977, pp. 147 financial circles in Britain, not least reportedly resisted the rearming of and 163. See also "Briefings",RP£,pp.85-86, from the Lonrho corporation, a Savimbi in 1985-86 because it where it is suggested that Savimbi "begged" company with extensive African disrupted American diplomacy in South Africa to intervene and was assisted m interests; and a minister of the Chirac southern Africa, 11 and Congress has this by Kaunda, Mobutu. and Houphouet­ government in France recently defied Reagan to impose a range of Boigny of the Ivory Coast. praised what he called, in Reaganite significant sanctions. 7. Crawford Young, Ideology and terms, Savimbi's "brave fight for Decreased American support for Development in Africa, New Haven, 1982. p. 87. There was also in 1978 a Comecon freedom ".JO Nevertheless, it is very Pretoria would rationally involve agreement which pledged USS75m. likely that UNIT A would be defeated dissociation from Savimbi. But the without United States and South anti-communism of the Reagan 8. Cabinda Gulf's installations were attacked in April, and Savimbi later demanded that African support. At the end of 1985, entourage is of a rabid, crusading, Chevron must assure him that it would not two of the three major intelligence and adventurist kind, which revels in block hb efforts to obtain more American aid. agencies in the United States, the covert action in Angola and other He noted that French companies in Angola CIA and the State Department's socialist-oriented were "keeping up their contacts with us~. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, countries. If such tendencies are, in Guardian Week~l'. 17 August 1986. concluded that Savimbi had no fact, both the bed rock and content of 9 Hanlon. p. 109 chance of winning on the battlefield, Reagan foreign policy, UNIT A 10. Sa\tmbt held meetings with a number of and little prospect of forcing a might for some time yet survive. Chtrac\ mmister~ and with the speaker of the coalition government in l.uanda. national assembly in Paris in October. The sole agency predicting a possible Interviewed on French radio. he said that NOTES: "the} understood us and promised us atd". victory for UNIT A was the Times of lamb/a, 28 and 29 October 1986. Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency which had then, for several I. John A. Marcum. Thi! Angolan Rl!volwion. II. Economist, 5 April 1986. months, shared intelligence material Vol. Two. Cambridge. Ma,sachusell~. 197!!. p. 279. with Savimbi and provided communications support to his 2 Quoted by David Ouaway in KENNETH GOOD teaches politics at Wuklr. 17 August 19R6. forces. the University of Zambia, Lusaka. 3. Report in the Guardian Wi!i!kh referred to Rising black resistance inside in "Briefing~". Revil!w of African Political South Africa. and the growing Economy (RPE). 5. Jan-April 1976, p. 83.