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Should the United States Give Support to Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA

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Should the United States Give Support to Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA Should the United States Give Support to Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA Movement in Angola? by David S. Wiley Michigan State University It is the judgment of practically all American academic experts on Africa, that proposals to provide U.S. aid for the UNITA movement in Angola will both harm the long-term interests of the United States and result in an intolerable loss of life and human welfare in Angola. A petition has been signed by approximately 500 "scholars of Africa" in colleges and universities in approximately 40 states calling on President Reagan and the Congress to prevent all military and non-lethal assistance to UNITA or other insurgent movements devoted to civil war, sabotage, and destruction in Angola. Signers of the petition include five current and former presidents of the African Studies Association - two of whom are Angola specialists, directors of major university African studies centers, two former U.S. ambassadors in Africa, the co-chairpersons of the Assocation of Concerned Africa Scholars, senior officers of the Ford Foundation and of the African-American Institute, and specialists on African politics. In addition, the petition was signed by African specialists from Colum­ bia, ~arvard, Yale, Stanford, Univers~ty of Chicago, Northwestern, Massachu­ setts Institute of Technology, Michigan State University, Georgetown, Dart­ mouth, and many other institutions. The petition has been circulated by the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS), a voluntary association of African studies scholars concerned about U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Angola, a grossly underdeveloped nation as large as the eastern USA from Maine to Florida, has been torn apart by foreign intervention for almost 500 years - first by the rapacious Portuguese slave trade which forcibly brought so many Angolans to this nation as slaves. Then the Portuguese used Angola as a penal colony, a source of mining and plantation revenue, and a safety v~lve for relocating landless peasants from northern Portugal to the better African farmlands of central Angola. After 1960, Angolans endured thirteen years of brutal colonial warfare by the Portuguese, who used NATO weapons, na­ palm, and herbicides to decimate popular resistance in the villages and stra­ tegic hamlets into which much of the population was crowded. Since indepen­ dence in 1975, Angolans have been invaded by the Zairean army and repeatedly attacked, sabotaged, and bombed (indeed, partially occupied 1981-85) by the South African army. Foreign support of Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA movement only continues the destruction and death of civil war and sabotage that denies so many Angolans the healthcare, schooling, and stable agriculture, which are the real needs of this destabilized nation. There are other important reasons for the United States to return to the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of Angola. 1. Supporting civil war in Angola will damage U.S. economic interests. Angola is the fourth largest U.S. trading partner in Africa, and two-way trade has grown to over $1 billion since 1980. Chevron, Gulf Oil, Texaco, and nearly 50 other U.S. corporations are received hospitably in Angola. Encouraged by the Administration and with National Security Council review, -2- U.S. corporate interests there have grown to investments exceeding $500 mill­ ion, especially with the new offshore oil finds. As David Rockefeller has written, "Angola is trying to facilitate a larger western role in its economy through policies promoting greater privatization and reliance on market mecha­ nisms." Thus, U.S. companies oppose aid to Savimbi, who has announced his intention to destroy their installations. As the tenth largest supplier of oil to the USA, Angola is a source closer to U.S. ports and free from the cauldron of instability of the Middle East. As potentially one of the weal­ thiest nations of Africa with a storehouse of natural resources, the Angolans are a prime target for long-term increasing U.S. trade. Contrary to the admo­ nitions of Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker who suggests the companies are not serving U.S. interests by operating in Angola (Washington Post, 1-29-86), these investments and trade help to normalize the relations with Angola and to create the exchanges within which government negotiation and compromise can occur. 2. Supporting a civil war in Angola will hurt U.S. strategic interests. A clear understanding of U.S. interests in Angola is bedeviled by a number of myths - such as that Angola is another Afghanistan with Soviet occupation, that Soviets and Cubans "run Angola," and that Angola is the spearhead of Gor­ bachev's plan to deny the U.S. access to Southern Africa's minerals. In fact, Angola has sought to remain non-aligned, has refused to provide regular facil­ ities for the Soviet navy, is not a member like Cuba of the Eastern Bloc COMECON trade community, and has repeatedly appealed to the West to facili­ tate her non-alignment. Indeed, in 1977 Angola even ejected the ambassadors of the USSR and Cuba in response to perceived meddling in Angolan affairs. Angola also did not side with the USSR and Cuba on the Afghanistan and Cambo­ dia issues in the Non- Aligned Nations Summit meeting in Luanda. Funding a ci­ vil war against the Angolan government will further erode her non-alignment. Second, opting for a military instead of a negotiated solution to this issue in Southern Africa is a major departure in U.S. foreign policy in Africa which throws to the wind the respect gained in negotiating the Zimbab­ we settlement and seeking a Namibia solution. Such action by the U.S. offers other nations legitimacy in seeking military solutions there too. Third, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations will be immensely pleas­ ed with a U.S. intervention of any kind because a) it gives new legitimacy to their military aid and advisors and to the Cuban troops in Angola, b) they know MPLA will win in any military confrontation with UNITA short of a full­ scale South African and U.S. entry to the war, c) it decreases further the legitimacy of Savimbi and UNITA in the eyes of the rest of Africa, d) it squarely aligns them with the DAU and most independent African governments, and e) the U.S. then is seen as the defender of racist South Africa. 3. Supporting civil war in Angola will isolate the United States from both European and NATO allies and from many African nations. Europe and Japan are interested to expand trade with Angola, to participate in her new oil finds, and to normalize relations. Active U.S. prosecution of civil war would set us at odds with their policies. In July 1985, the African Heads of State at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) stated that "any American covert or overt involvement in the internal affairs of the Peoples Republic of Angola, directly or through third parties, will be considered a hostile act against the OAU. The OAU earnestly hopes that the - 3 - U.S. Administration would not want to assist the racist regime of Pretoria and rebels aided by them to subvert or overthrow sovereign and independent African Governments. (OAU, Aide Memoire, 11-4-85) Furthermore, important trading partners of the USA such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe have stated their concern about potential U.S. funding of civil war. U.S. corporations, diplomats, and scholars are likely to become less welcome if the U.S. supports a civil war on this continent which has experienced so much foreign colonialism and subversion. 4. The aim of the U.S. to dislodge Cuban troops in Angola will not be furthered by aiding UNITA. It is important to remember that the escalation in the numbers of Cubans in Angola from a small contingent of 200 trainers to more than 30,000 troops occurred directly in response to the South African invasion of Angola, which began in October 1975. In 1976, one-third of the Cubans left when South African attacks ceased, but then returned as aggression began again (Marcum, CSIS, 12-20-85). The Angolans and Cubans have both said on various occasions that the Cuban troops will leave when Angola is no longer under attack and the nation is free of sabotage and civil war sponsored by foreign clients. More concretely, the Angolans have offered to send home two-thirds of the Cubans over a three-year period, to locate the remainder at least 1,000 miles from South African territory, and to withdraw all of them later. Angolans and Cubans have not been involved in attacks on any surrounding territories. In fact, it seems plausible that the South Africans actually are seeking, through repeated raids into Angola and assistance to UNITA, to keep the Cubans in Angola, thereby providing an excuse for South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. U.S. assistance to UNITA also will ensure that the civil war will grow and that the Cubans will remain. 5. Under any circumstances, UNITA is not the type or movement the U.S. would want to support. UNITA and its leaders have a long history of opportunism and factionalism, were not an effective guerrilla movement according to both Portuguese and CIA testimony, cooperated with the Portuguese during the liberation war against the other movements, allied themselves against the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), and have joined forces with the South Africans for more than ten years. Savimbi has declared publically his alliance and friendship with South African State President P.W. Botha, whose inauguration he attended as the only foreign black representative. Furthermore, the UNITA movement, like its historical ally, the northern FNLA movement among rural KiKongo-speaking peoples, is a regional movement based primarily on Ovimbundu language and ethnic loyalties.
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