Challenger: a Ondv2a1-1 Betrayal of NASA
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Dr. Sneed, . Enclosed is my final paper entitled, "Challenger: A Ondv2a1-1Betrayal of NASA." I have enclosed all of my data that I used in the paper as well as an outline for your convenience. If you would please gve the entire paper to Ms. Betty Cole in the Honors Program Office I would greatly appreciate it. Also, if you would write my final grade for the class down I on the paper it would be appreciated. Thanks for a great semester. Hope to see you around UAH again!! Sincerely, challenge^: A Ondan Betrayal of NASA Scenario: I would like to write th~spaper form my point of view as a NASA employee who has been working at the Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center for the past two years. Using the Rogers Commission Report and the Challenger Launch Decision by Dianne Vaughn for data, I would like to examine the decision to launch by Morton Thiokol and NASA by the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. More precisely, I would like to take a look at the conduct of the NASA employees involved and see exactly how there actions merit against the standards in place by the federal govenment. Factual Situation O-ring erosion has occurred since STS-2 with no apparent signs of a pattern - charts from Rogers Comnussion Changing o-rings from Criticality 1R to 1- very siplicant point - Lawrence Mulloy and MTI's recommendation - was approved for and used after STS-6 for all missions - Discussion of Criticality 1R to 1- show how by doing this, it violates the rationaled to launch 51-L Study on Contractors of boosters - MTI found to be the cheapest, yet not the best Putty used to seal the joint - procedure to check the seating of the o-rings caused holes in it - causes hot gases to "get to" the o-rings People Directly Involved in O-ring Incident Lawrence Mulloy - SRB Project Manager at MSFC - made presentations to MSFC Board, Shuttle Projects Board, and Level I Board - discussion of these boards and what they did - did not disseminate the data to the "hgher ups" - charts show that he did not tell the upper boards (above) of the problems - adopted the philosophy that there was no failure last time, so you can continue to fly Members of Panel at MSFC on January 27,1986 - did not tell upper managers about MTI preliminary discussion - recommended launch of STS 51-L - no safety representative was present at the meeting Morton Thokol, Inc. - discuss members at meeting on January 27,1986 with respect to their title and responsibility and their overall field of expertise - situation at Thiokol and why the decision to proceed with launch was gven Breakdown in Conm~unicationboth Internally and Externally to NASA Internally - NASA managers, who were under direct authority to give the final decision to launch each mission, were not aware of the continuing problems of the o-ring eroding - no one, who briefed the astronauts about the decision to launch, were aware of the o-ring erosion problem, and therefore did not disseminate the information to the crew - the crew never knew about the problem Externally - NASA MSFC's action to force Thokol to launch 51-L was in direct violation of the contractor/contractee relatioship - "My God Thiokol, what do you want me to do, launch next April?" Data from previous missions was sometimes not available for the next flight - flight manifest was too cornpad Speculative Analysis (who should have been involved and the outcome if so?) Astronauts - they should be briefed as to the current major problems of the system and allowed to determine their response - their respons should serve as a veto at the Level I Board - Launch would have been scrubbed and in-depth evaluation would have been made into the cause of thea-ring problem - the&ng task force, created by MTI, would have probably gotten more emphasis and their recommendations seriously considered to remedy the o-ring problem Safety Representative - safety representatives should have been involved to ensure complete compliance with all NASA established procedures and protocols - recommendation would have been carefully scrutinized The Higher Ups at NASA - would have carefully analyzed the situation and probably would have postponed the launch until the 53 "F temperature was met. Nothing else would have been done about the o-ring problem as a design error - politics would have weighed heavily into the situation Data for Launch of STS51L Predicted temperature at launch - 25 OF Worst O-ring erosion occurred on flight where temperature was 53 OF Ice was on the pad due to the cold weather - problem with the o-rings Measured temperature on right SRB was 8 "F Due to the facts presented in ths report and from my own personal observations at NASA as an engineer, the only justifiable option would be to ground the shuttle fleet until a solution could be determined. I base this recommendation on the fad that Mr. Mulloy recommended and receive a change in hazard title for the o-rings from a Criticality 1R to a 1. By doing this, Mr. Mulloy placed the&rings on a list of thngs that must be completely understood and safe for the shuttle to fly. To know that there was a problem with thep-rings and do nothing about it, including not reporting it up the chain of command, is a direct violation of every ehcal code ever written. It is certainly a violation of the code for federal employees. Above all else, it violates the right of infomed consent. The astronauts of 51-L had no knowledge of what they were getting themselves into when they lifted off of that pad on January 28,1986. Challenger: A One Man Betrayal of NASA My Perspective: The perspective I am taking in writing hspaper is that of a NASA employee who has been employed by the NASA MSFC for approximately two years. My experience at MSFC in the Systems Analysis & Integration Laboratory gives me a unique perspective of how as federal employees are to act with regards to the safety and welfare of the shuttle and its crew. I plan on taking the data and testing compiled by the Rogers Commission as well as some data and studies in " The Challenger Launch Decision" to illustrate my view of what unehcally ?? happened. The p~ajorfocus of ths paper is on Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, the Solid Rocket Booster - C (SRB ) project manager, and specifically lus action leading up to the launch of 51-L. I will /It l/ heap examine Mr. Mulloy's Conduct dtheStandards A Executive Branch, Using these sources as the-f my paper, I Mieve that Mr. Mulloy's oughout hsm.It 6y opinion &&(he only justifiable option for Mr. Mulloy on the night of January 27, 1986 was to not m/& recommend launch of STS51L. Ths paper will describe, in detail? the certain situations that prove the above statement as well as the details needed to elaborate and fully understand the subject matter. The Factual Situation To fully understand the implications of this case, you must have knowledge of the events leading up to January 27th when Mr. Mulloy recommended launch. In several paragraphs below particular facts of the case are examined with their relatively to the situation explained. The relatively to the situation is of most importance to the case for you to understand my view as a NASA employee. A History of Erosion The SRM is designed to be stacked and mated to its other segments at the Kennedy Space Center ( KSC ) in Florida. Figure 1illustrates the different segments of each motor. Because of these segments being mated at KSC ,a rubber@ring is installed to completely seal off the hot gases inside the booster from the outside environment. The original design of the SRM field joint included a secondary seal for safety. Figure 2 ( left) shows a normal SRB field joint during operation while the other shows how the hot gases of the SRM could penetrate the Q-rings to erode them. Factory Juint Insulation Shape Nurtlu to-Casc Join 01Iiet,--G~[I~II~ Support Equipnwnt / Asscrnbly Aids Narrlt! Figure 1. The Solid Rocket Booster Figure 2. (Left) The Way the Hot Gases are to Not Affect the O-ring; (Right) The Way in Which O-ring ion Oc CM~E Since the second manned space shuttle flight .- STS-2, NASA and MTI had known about the erosion of tha-rings. In the data presented before the Rogers Commission STS-2 's erosion was the deepest of a primary field joint until STS 51-L ( Rogers H-1 ). Yet 'tNASA felt that the erosion was all right due to the redundancy of the seals, having a primary and a secondary. Therefore, as long as the secondary sealed the mission was okay for launch. This logc soon proved to be wrong. ~h@n~erosion problem from STS-2 through STS 61-C puzzled the entire engneering community of MTI and NASA. The data shown to the members of the panel at NASA on January 27th was inconclusive. It showed that you had erosion and blow-by with a joint temperature at 75 OF as well as erosion and blow - by at 53 OF. The data presented no clearat pattern. However, the data did show that the most erosion blow-by of a primary field joint ring did occur at the 53 OF temperature. Correlation could be made that the lower the temperature of the field joint, the more likely erosion and blow-by would occur.