TURNING THE TIDE HOW TURKEY WON THE WAR FOR TRIPOLI JASON PACK & WOLFGANG PUSZTAI NOVEMBER 2020 POLICY PAPER CONTENTS * 10 TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES * 10 THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE * 1 ABSTRACT * 11 ARTILLERY, DRONES, AND RADAR * 2 INTRODUCTION * 12 THE TURNING OF THE TIDE * 2 THE WAR FOR TRIPOLI’S ANTECEDENTS AND OPTICS * 13 CONCLUSION: THE UNIQUELY LIBYAN WAY OF WARFARE AND * 3 THE FIGHTING ITSELF: PSYCHOLOGY AND TACTICS GENERALIZABLE MILITARY OBSERVATIONS * 4 THE PILLARS OF THE LNA’S INITIAL AERIAL DOMINANCE * 17 ENDNOTES * 4 THE GNA’S AND LNA’S INTERNATIONAL PATRONS * 6 SIZING UP THE BATTLE DYNAMICS AFTER 8 MONTHS OF WAR * 6 THE JANUARY 2020 “CEASE-FIRE” — A TURNING POINT * 8 TURKISH STRATEGY AND TACTICS TO BREAK THE SIEGE OF TRIPOLI * 8 THE WILLPOWER GAP * 9 MERCENARIES ABSTRACT non-Libyan-owned, non-Libyan-operated INTRODUCTION THE WAR FOR TRIPOLI’S 2 technologies. Conversely, the military ANTECEDENTS AND importance of foreign mercenaries (Syrians, During the spring of 2019, Libya’s Wars The latest phase of Libya’s ongoing rounds OPTICS of civil conflict, known as the War for Sudanese, Chadians, and Russians) of Post-Gadhafi Succession entered a Tripoli (April 2019-June 2020), came to an fighting in ground engagements has been new phase.3 Marshall Khalifa Hifter’s The LNA’s Battle for Benghazi from 2014 to abrupt end after extensive Turkish military largely overstated. All meaningful ground LNA launched a surprise offensive to 2017 was a drawn-out war of attrition lasting capabilities were introduced to the theater engagements in which territory was lost take Tripoli, the residence of Libya’s more than three years that was finally won beginning in January 2020.1 Looking back or gained were fought by Libyans. Yet, internationally-recognized4 GNA, as well via a bloody street-by-street battle replete with the benefit of hindsight to analyze what the war was contested by foreigners and as the headquarters of the country’s with civilian casualties and catalogued happened in Libya and compare it to similar essentially won by the Turks. most important economic institutions human rights violations on both sides.7 After like the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan civil wars, it is clear that the determinative For the first nine months of the conflict, the LNA wrapped up its subsequent Derna Investment Authority, and the National Oil factors that swayed the course of the War the Libyan National Army (LNA) coalition operations by early 2019 (also replete with Corporation.5 The surprise LNA offensive for Tripoli were novel military, technological, enjoyed the upper hand as a result of its human rights violations on all sides), it was met with outrage in many corners and diplomatic phenomena. aerial dominance, due mainly to Emirati began an offensive in southern Libya that while enjoying support in others. saw it first take over the country’s largest This research paper seeks to drill down into and other parties’ technology transfers, oil field and then establish the critical the military, logistical, and technological vintage ex-Soviet former Gadhafi air force Although they had been sporadically logistical lines that would later facilitate aspects of the war, highlighting the unique fighter jets and attack helicopters, and fighting each other for years, with LNA- and maintain its assault on Tripoli.8 role of drones, soft-kill and hard-kill air skilled personnel. Then from January 2020 aligned groups incrementally expanding defense technologies, private military onward, Turkey’s abrupt introduction of their territories from 2014 to 2019, the Hifter was aware that his attack would be contractors (PMCs, aka mercenaries), and new technologies, armaments, skills, and sudden threat to Tripoli incentivized the perceived in many quarters as a violation extraterritorial military professionals (i.e. strategic planning capacities decisively development of a coordination mechanism of international law and equivalent to members of foreign armies) in determining tipped the scales, giving the Government of for the pro-GNA military and militia an unprovoked military assault on an the final outcome. Most of these arms and National Accord (GNA) coalition the ability coalition: Operation Volcano of Rage (VoR).6 internationally recognized government. personnel were provisioned into Libya to suddenly dominate Tripolitania’s skies. This is an umbrella grouping for inter- Independent of whatever popular animosity militia coordination, which functioned more in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, This paper shows how and why Turkey’s it would create among Tripoli’s residents, effectively than anything that had come with essentially no penalties for repeat aerial support was: 1.) so different from Hifter hoped for a swift occupation of the before it. It is largely led by the powerful violators. (We will not analyze or discuss aerial assistance offered by patrons to their capital. He needed it to be both quick military forces and skilled political figures the legal technicalities of the U.N. arms proxies in other civil wars; 2.) decisive for and relatively bloodless to maintain the of Misrata, a port city 210 km east of Tripoli embargo in any depth as they were not the GNA coalition’s fighting fortunes; and acquiescence of his support base among that since Moammar Gadhafi’s ouster has really instrumental in shaping the trajectory 3.) what lessons can be learned for other the eastern tribes and not to alienate those rivaled Tripoli as western Libya’s financial, of the fighting — other than possibly to military theaters, as well as for other low- specific segments of the Tripoli population diplomatic, and military center. inhibit Western countries from introducing intensity conflicts around the globe in the that would have likely accepted his rule, if yet more armaments or personnel into the 2020s. it also brought an end to militia dominance. theater, in the way that certain regional As things played out, it was anything but powers have done.) short and swift; the initial surprise assault Based on our research, we conclude that did not elicit the hoped for defections of the War for Tripoli’s definitive engagements key GNA-aligned militias like the Rada were fought aerially and masterminded Force, the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade by non-Libyan actors using exclusively (TRB), the Nawasi Brigade, or the powerful 1 2 aligned groups’ relative lack of cohesion weapons were also promptly introduced, and communication. The LNA repeatedly but during 2019 these were not sufficient employed what became dubbed “the to successfully challenge the LNA’s aerial Tripoli tactic” — a cat-and-mouse military superiority.17 All of these flows of arms and maneuver that sought to draw the anti- personnel were in violation of the U.N. arms LNA forces into the open or the outskirts embargo. Although they were conducted of the city.12 The LNA forces would briefly largely in the open, there were essentially seize a position and soon abandon it, no consequence for the violations. allowing their opponents to come in and occupy the location only to be either barraged by artillery shelling, aerial attack, THE GNA’S AND LNA’S 13 or an ambush. Using this tactic, the LNA INTERNATIONAL aimed to eliminate, or at least wear down, the Tripoli defenders by leveraging its key PATRONS “Unlike the ragtag, but battle-hardened Islamist forces they had previously confronted in Benghazi or Derna the anti- offensive capabilities and comparative For a range of reasons, among them the LNA forces in the western region were relatively less ideological, better organized, larger in number, and much better supplied and equipped.” (Photo by MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP via Getty Images) advantages at the start of the fighting: distraction of their leaders by domestic artillery and aerial firepower. crises, as well as prior scandals about who they had armed in Libya, the GNA’s commanders in Zawiyya or Zintan who Hifter street-by-street battles and heavy civilian traditional top international allies (Italy, believed would join his cause. Furthermore, casualties — if the fighting ever got to THE PILLARS OF THE the U.S., and the U.K.) did not respond to the LNA assault suffered from very bad central Tripoli. Furthermore, unlike the LNA’S INITIAL AERIAL Hifter’s assault on Tripoli by dispatching domestic and international optics due to ragtag, but battle-hardened Islamist forces 18 DOMINANCE advanced kit and top advisors to Tripoli. Hifter’s strategic choice to launch it on April they had previously confronted in Benghazi Any of the three powers had the requisite 4, 2019 — right before the scheduled U.N.- or Derna the anti-LNA forces in the western The LNA’s aerial dominance, which lasted capacities to tip the scales against the LNA mediated Ghadames conference, and at a region were relatively less ideological, throughout all of 2019, was based on immediately, if they were willing to commit time when U.N. Secretary-General Antonio better organized, larger in number, and its MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter jets, Mi- sufficient political, and military will. Among Gutierrez happened to be visiting Tripoli.9 much better supplied and equipped. They 24/35 attack helicopters, and skilled UAE the reasons for the reticence of the GNA’s possessed artillery, tanks, professional drone support. Of the 1,040 recorded Western supporters to deploy armaments foreign advisors, and air defense systems drone strikes conducted between April to and trainers was both the seriousness with THE FIGHTING ITSELF: — items that the LNA’s opponents had November, 800 were attributed to the LNA which their foreign ministries and armies PSYCHOLOGY AND conspicuously lacked in Benghazi and coalition.14 The UAE had supplied, and likely take U.N. resolutions and the fears by Derna.10 TACTICS controlled the operation of, the Chinese the political class of domestic blowback Hifter began his long-awaited assault to Wing Loong II combat drones used to for calling attention to previous bungled As Hifter began his War on Tripoli, the take Libya’s capital on April 4, 2019.11 Mindful undertake the majority of these strikes.15 military actions in Libya.