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Home , 155 mm, Janjaweed, Mercenary, Tripoli, Wagner Group, War of Attrition

TURNING THE TIDE HOW WON THE FOR

JASON PACK & WOLFGANG PUSZTAI

NOVEMBER 2020

POLICY PAPER CONTENTS * 10 CAPABILITIES

* 10 THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE * 1 ABSTRACT

* 11 , DRONES, AND RADAR * 2 INTRODUCTION

* 12 THE TURNING OF THE TIDE * 2 THE WAR FOR TRIPOLI’S ANTECEDENTS AND OPTICS

* 13 CONCLUSION: THE UNIQUELY LIBYAN WAY OF WARFARE AND * 3 THE FIGHTING ITSELF: PSYCHOLOGY AND TACTICS GENERALIZABLE OBSERVATIONS * 4 THE PILLARS OF THE LNA’S INITIAL AERIAL DOMINANCE * 17 ENDNOTES * 4 THE GNA’S AND LNA’S INTERNATIONAL PATRONS

* 6 SIZING UP THE DYNAMICS AFTER 8 MONTHS OF WAR

* 6 THE JANUARY 2020 “CEASE-FIRE” — A TURNING POINT

* 8 TURKISH STRATEGY AND TACTICS TO BREAK THE OF TRIPOLI

* 8 THE WILLPOWER GAP

* 9 ABSTRACT non-Libyan-owned, non-Libyan-operated INTRODUCTION THE WAR FOR TRIPOLI’S 2 technologies. Conversely, the military ANTECEDENTS AND importance of foreign mercenaries (, During the spring of 2019, ’s The latest phase of Libya’s ongoing rounds OPTICS of civil conflict, known as the War for Sudanese, Chadians, and Russians) of Post-Gadhafi Succession entered a Tripoli (April 2019-June 2020), came to an fighting in ground engagements has been new phase.3 Marshall Khalifa Hifter’s The LNA’s Battle for from 2014 to abrupt end after extensive Turkish military largely overstated. All meaningful ground LNA launched a surprise offensive to 2017 was a drawn-out war of attrition lasting capabilities were introduced to the theater engagements in which territory was lost take Tripoli, the residence of Libya’s more than three years that was finally won beginning in January 2020.1 Looking back or gained were fought by Libyans. Yet, internationally-recognized4 GNA, as well via a bloody street-by-street battle replete with the benefit of hindsight to analyze what the war was contested by foreigners and as the headquarters of the country’s with civilian casualties and catalogued happened in Libya and compare it to similar essentially won by the Turks. most important economic institutions violations on both sides.7 After like the Central of Libya, the Libyan civil wars, it is clear that the determinative For the first nine months of the conflict, the LNA wrapped up its subsequent Derna Investment Authority, and the National Oil factors that swayed the course of the War the Libyan National (LNA) coalition operations by early 2019 (also replete with Corporation.5 The surprise LNA offensive for Tripoli were novel military, technological, enjoyed the upper hand as a result of its human rights violations on all sides), it was met with outrage in many corners and diplomatic phenomena. aerial dominance, due mainly to Emirati began an offensive in southern Libya that while enjoying support in others. saw it first take over the country’s largest This research paper seeks to drill down into and other parties’ technology transfers, oil field and then establish the critical the military, logistical, and technological vintage ex-Soviet former Gadhafi air force Although they had been sporadically logistical lines that would later facilitate aspects of the war, highlighting the unique fighter jets and attack helicopters, and fighting each other for years, with LNA- and maintain its assault on Tripoli.8 role of drones, soft-kill and hard-kill air skilled personnel. Then from January 2020 aligned groups incrementally expanding defense technologies, private military onward, Turkey’s abrupt introduction of their territories from 2014 to 2019, the Hifter was aware that his attack would be contractors (PMCs, aka mercenaries), and new technologies, armaments, skills, and sudden threat to Tripoli incentivized the perceived in many quarters as a violation extraterritorial military professionals (i.e. strategic planning capacities decisively development of a coordination mechanism of and equivalent to members of foreign ) in determining tipped the scales, giving the Government of for the pro-GNA military and an unprovoked military assault on an the final outcome. Most of these arms and National Accord (GNA) coalition the ability coalition: Operation Volcano of Rage (VoR).6 internationally recognized government. personnel were provisioned into Libya to suddenly dominate ’s skies. This is an umbrella grouping for inter- Independent of whatever popular animosity militia coordination, which functioned more in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, This paper shows how and why Turkey’s it would create among Tripoli’s residents, effectively than anything that had come with essentially no penalties for repeat aerial support was: 1.) so different from Hifter hoped for a swift occupation of the before it. It is largely led by the powerful violators. (We will not analyze or discuss aerial assistance offered by patrons to their . He needed it to be both quick military forces and skilled political figures the legal technicalities of the U.N. arms proxies in other civil wars; 2.) decisive for and relatively bloodless to maintain the of , a port city 210 km east of Tripoli embargo in any depth as they were not the GNA coalition’s fighting fortunes; and acquiescence of his support base among that since Moammar Gadhafi’s ouster has really instrumental in shaping the trajectory 3.) what lessons can be learned for other the eastern tribes and not to alienate those rivaled Tripoli as western Libya’s financial, of the fighting — other than possibly to military theaters, as well as for other low- specific segments of the Tripoli population diplomatic, and military center. inhibit Western countries from introducing intensity conflicts around the globe in the that would have likely accepted his rule, if yet more armaments or personnel into the . it also brought an end to militia dominance. theater, in the way that certain regional As things played out, it was anything but powers have done.) short and swift; the initial surprise assault Based on our research, we conclude that did not elicit the hoped for defections of the War for Tripoli’s definitive engagements key GNA-aligned like the Rada were fought aerially and masterminded Force, the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade by non-Libyan actors using exclusively (TRB), the Nawasi Brigade, or the powerful

2   1 aligned groups’ relative lack of cohesion were also promptly introduced, and communication. The LNA repeatedly but during 2019 these were not sufficient employed what became dubbed “the to successfully challenge the LNA’s aerial Tripoli tactic” — a cat-and-mouse military superiority.17 All of these flows of arms and maneuver that sought to draw the anti- personnel were in violation of the U.N. arms LNA forces into the open or the outskirts embargo. Although they were conducted of the city.12 The LNA forces would briefly largely in the open, there were essentially seize a position and soon abandon it, no consequence for the violations. allowing their opponents to come in and occupy the location only to be either barraged by artillery shelling, aerial attack, THE GNA’S AND LNA’S 13 or an ambush. Using this tactic, the LNA INTERNATIONAL aimed to eliminate, or at least wear down, the Tripoli defenders by leveraging its key PATRONS “Unlike the ragtag, but battle-hardened Islamist forces they had previously confronted in Benghazi or Derna the anti- offensive capabilities and comparative For a range of reasons, among them the LNA forces in the western region were relatively less ideological, better organized, larger in number, and much better supplied and equipped.” (Photo by MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP via Getty Images) advantages at the start of the fighting: distraction of their leaders by domestic artillery and aerial firepower. crises, as well as prior scandals about who they had armed in Libya, the GNA’s commanders in Zawiyya or who Hifter street-by-street and heavy civilian traditional top international allies (, believed would join his cause. Furthermore, casualties — if the fighting ever got to THE PILLARS OF THE the U.S., and the U.K.) did not respond to the LNA assault suffered from very bad central Tripoli. Furthermore, unlike the LNA’S INITIAL AERIAL Hifter’s assault on Tripoli by dispatching domestic and international optics due to ragtag, but battle-hardened Islamist forces 18 DOMINANCE advanced kit and top advisors to Tripoli. Hifter’s strategic choice to launch it on April they had previously confronted in Benghazi Any of the three powers had the requisite 4, 2019 — right before the scheduled U.N.- or Derna the anti-LNA forces in the western The LNA’s aerial dominance, which lasted capacities to tip the scales against the LNA mediated conference, and at a region were relatively less ideological, throughout all of 2019, was based on immediately, if they were willing to commit time when U.N. Secretary-General Antonio better organized, larger in number, and its MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter jets, Mi- sufficient political, and military will. Among Gutierrez happened to be visiting Tripoli.9 much better supplied and equipped. They 24/35 attack helicopters, and skilled UAE the reasons for the reticence of the GNA’s possessed artillery, tanks, professional drone support. Of the 1,040 recorded Western supporters to deploy armaments foreign advisors, and air defense systems drone strikes conducted between April to and trainers was both the seriousness with THE FIGHTING ITSELF: — items that the LNA’s opponents had November, 800 were attributed to the LNA which their foreign ministries and armies PSYCHOLOGY AND conspicuously lacked in Benghazi and coalition.14 The UAE had supplied, and likely take U.N. resolutions and the fears by Derna.10 TACTICS controlled the operation of, the Chinese the political class of domestic blowback Hifter began his long-awaited assault to Wing Loong II combat drones used to for calling attention to previous bungled As Hifter began his War on Tripoli, the take Libya’s capital on April 4, 2019.11 Mindful undertake the majority of these strikes.15 military actions in Libya. Hence, the only LNA was faced with a difficult operating of what had happened in Benghazi, the LNA Additionally, UAE- and Egyptian-manned major military consequence of the U.N. environment, one characterized by high utilized a strategy to take Tripoli that it hoped Mirage 2000-9 planes have been accused embargo on the trajectory of the fighting population density combined with relatively would prevent its forces from becoming of undertaking occasional operations over of the War for Tripoli was to give non- open urban outskirts and a chaotic inner bogged down, as they had in Benghazi, and the capital.16 On the GNA side, about 24 Western powers near total dominance in city road network that could easily lead to capitalize on what it perceived as the GNA- Turkish drones and certain anti-aircraft provisioning of arms, trainers, and advisors

4   3 to the two fighting coalitions. Furthermore, The UAE’s support of the LNA had been frontline. Wagner’s activities were simply how effective the new equipment would Brexit, Donald Trump’s unique relationship assisted by the latter’s long-term ally, incapable of swinging the flow of battle prove or how exactly it would affect the to , and Italy’s complex relationship . Egypt allowed the UAE to utilize one way or another. overall battle dynamics. with likely also contributed to its airspace and have access to its Sidi Although the writing was on the wall that inhibiting decisive multilateral action as Barrani airbase to establish an “air-bridge” Turkey would be ramping up its arms well. to transport military equipment to the LNA SIZING UP THE BATTLE deliveries, a snapshot of the balance of and launch occasionally airstrikes.21 Egypt DYNAMICS AFTER 8 forces and capabilities in late December Due to a range of diplomatic factors and also supported the LNA more directly, MONTHS OF WAR 2019 indicated to some that Tripoli was the aforementioned optics surrounding the continuing its history of training Hifter’s still about to fall into Hifter’s hands. This “unenforced” U.N. arms embargo, the role forces while also providing the LNA with Operating out of its strategically located view affected Emirati, Egyptian, and of supplying the GNA fell to its two main military equipment.22 military airports, as of late 2019, the LNA Russian military planners. From a purely non-Western allies: Turkey and . This dominated Libya’s skies. Furthermore, it As the conflict continued into September military point of view (not considering the report will not discuss Qatari actions as controlled 90+ percent of its oil installations 2019, Turkey’s initial fleet of drones had diplomatic or domestic context) this was they seem to have consisted of financial, and was receiving the vast majority of been virtually eradicated from the aerial not an unreasonable analysis — several diplomatic, and logistical support for Turkish foreign inflows of technical assistance battlefield. It was around this time that attempts to deploy sophisticated air actions, rather than constituting their own and . It struck some the pendulum decidedly swung in the defense systems from Turkey to Misrata separate military engagement in the Libyan analysts who were discounting domestic LNA’s favor as Russia’s direct support for to challenge LNA aerial dominance had theater, except for the deployment of a opposition to Hifter in Tripoli and Misrata Hifter on the ground became increasingly previously failed as the equipment was limited number of . As such, 23 that despite the LNA’s mismanagement of apparent. After the LNA forces became destroyed by the LNA air force before it the Qataris can be considered as junior the optics of the assault, a military success bogged down on the southern outskirts 26 for the LNA seemed only to be a matter could be made operational. partners in all that Turkey has engaged in of Tripoli, , the world’s 19 of practicing sustained attrition. In fact, and achieved in Libya in 2020. most famous PMC with close links to the many Tripolitanian and Misratan military Kremlin, increased its technical assistance Turkey has long been a military supporter commanders that the authors spoke to at THE JANUARY 2020 and maintenance relationship with the LNA of the GNA as well as certain Misratan the time feared that they were on the verge from August 2019, especially in the realms “CEASE-FIRE” — A militias and the Benghazi Revolutionary of losing their grip on the entrances to the of tactical assistance and intelligence, TURNING POINT Shura Council. Ankara provided the GNA capital. surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with Bayraktar TB2 combat drones a month Given the prevailing dynamics at the end for artillery and aerial strikes.24 With the However, unbeknownst to most militia into the Tripoli War, but these were unable of 2019, the GNA and the VoR Operations notable exception of some snipers and commanders as well as most journalistic to compete with the LNA’s capabilities. Room’s leadership realized that they targeting experts, Wagner’s troops did not and foreign military commentators, behind Compounding this, the UAE-provisioned urgently needed a pause in fighting to fight in ground engagements and there the scenes the LNA’s days of domination Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air systems regroup. They dispatched emissaries to were only a few Russian casualties over over Tripoli’s skies were numbered. As soon major international capitals pleading for gave the LNA superior air defense the entire duration of the war. Despite (in as the GNA signed a controversial maritime arms and military . capabilities when compared to the GNA’s part intentionally) exaggerated media deal with Turkey containing separate limited modern anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) reports, there were never more than 350- military provisions in November 2019, For the GNA, a cease-fire could provide a and man-portable air defense systems 400 Russians directly engaged in the battle which were subsequently voted into law window of opportunity for the deployment (MANPADS).20 In short, from the start of for Tripoli, most of whom were not involved by the Turkish Parliament in January 2020, of air defense systems to protect the the Tripoli War, the LNA could fly largely in frontline duties. Their most important it became clear that a massive increase crucial airports of debarkation (APODs) unopposed and also shoot down many contribution was aircraft maintenance, in Turkish technology transfers would be for military supplies — and GNA drones or aerial sorties. specifically of helicopters close to the forthcoming.25 Yet, it remained to be seen Tripoli’s Mitiga airport — as well as the main

6   5 seaport of debarkation (SPOD), Misrata. to his obviously unrealistic demands, Hifter extensive professional and first-rate Libya’s east, but on a much lower level than Fortuitously, the Russians were also had embarrassed his patron Putin by being capabilities that a NATO country’s military the new Turkish deployments. Therefore, keen on having a cease-fire at the same late to their meeting and then not signing with vast combat experience could deploy. the major change in the GNA’s effectiveness moment. As a result of the media backlash the Russian-prepared document. On the It also relied on intermediaries, restraining as a fighting force began as soon as against the introduction of Wagner Group night of Jan. 13, Hifter departed its smaller, but quite elite, professional experienced Turkish military planners more personnel and the Russians’ fear of losing without signing, feeling abandoned by the military from intervening directly in force, or less took over the planning of the VoR control of the Libya-mediation file, Vladimir Russians, while they also felt betrayed by as Turkey’s did. and developed it into a modern military Putin decided to try to achieve through him. campaign, rationally structured into diplomacy what he had thus far failed to Subsequently, the cease-fire supposedly discrete phases with concrete objectives. secure via force of arms. After several days promised by Turkey was kept for just about TURKISH STRATEGY AND Furthermore, Turkish logistics support of secret summit-level talks, Marshall Hifter 24 hours. Turkish leaders had seen their TACTICS TO BREAK THE ensured that the defenders of Tripoli did supposedly verbally accepted a nominal rivals undermine their interests without not run out of ammunition or other supply cease-fire as of Jan. 12, under heavy massive retaliation, but when the harm to goods. 27 The nominal cease-fire that was touted pressure from Egypt and the UAE. He their interests that a defeat of Operation by the media throughout mid-January, probably believed that Russia would make VoR would entail fully dawned on them, but never unequivocally came into force sure that Turkey would keep its “promise” they became willing to exponentially THE WILLPOWER GAP on the ground was gradually shown to be and not use the cease-fire to deploy troops increase their introduction of armaments. a complete fiction as the Turks continued Neither the UAE nor Egypt had or weapons to Libya. He may not have This realization, coupled with changes in their arms build-up through their APODs demonstrated the will to deliver the realized that due to the stalemate around the international system over the course and SPODs, unhindered by the LNA air force, comprehensive support of a major regional Tripoli, a /Jufra demarcation line was of 2019 that further inhibited a unified while Emirati arms deliveries continued to power. Both countries possessed relatively already being discussed as the future European or American response, allowed boundary between Russian and Turkish the Turks to capitalize on the permissive spheres of influence. diplomatic environment.

Against this backdrop, on Jan. 13 Prime Turkish Air Force transport aircraft deployed Minister Fayez al-Serraj of the GNA signed a HAWK XXI medium-range surface-to- the cease-fire document in Moscow that air missile (SAM) battery to Misrata airport, was jointly prepared by Russia and Turkey; which was made operational immediately. he then left Russia without having a face-to- Shortly thereafter, a second battery was face meeting with Hifter, who he viewed as deployed to Tripoli’s Mitiga airport.29 The air the aggressor and a killer of civilians.28 For superiority of the LNA air force was gone his part, Hifter refused to sign the original overnight, and the preconditions for the document (potentially backtracking from deployment of yet further sophisticated the previous day’s verbal assurances ) and Turkish equipment were now established. insisted on certain changes, including his Furthermore, in the wake of the January frequently voiced “non-starter” provision 2020 Berlin Conference, which supposedly of “disarmament of the militias (i.e. the sought to finally enforce the U.N. arms pro-GNA forces in Tripoli),” as well as the embargo, both the UAE and Turkey vastly “The LNA’s aerial dominance, which lasted throughout all of 2019, was based on its MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter jets, departure from Tripolitania of the Syrian ramped up their introduction of military Mi-24/35 attack helicopters, and skilled UAE drone support. Of the 1,040 recorded drone strikes conducted between April to November, 800 were attributed to the LNA coalition.” (Photo by MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP via Getty Images) mercenaries recruited by Turkey. In addition hardware. The UAE, however, lacked the

8   7 more advanced military hardware troops were also brought in on the LNA hardened jihadists that Turkey wanted to HAWK XXI SAM system.36 Additionally, than Turkey, although they lacked the side, although they likely did not fight in the exfiltrate out of and Turkey.34 After this Turkish-manufactured Korkut 35-mm advantages that the Turkish forces have vicinity of Tripoli. new stage of fighting commenced, about self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAG) acquired via frequently interfacing with 500 Syrians mercenaries were killed and provided low-level all-weather air defense Conversely, Turkey had started to deploy their NATO allies. Overall, the Egyptians more than 2,000 wounded by June 2020, within 4 km. Another important component anti-Assad mercenaries from Syria as and Emiratis possessed the ability to swing with most of those casualties occurring in was the American Stinger MANPADS ground troops as early as December 2019, the battle in favor of the LNA, if they were the Syrians’ first months in Tripoli.35 After operated by Turkish special forces, while just after the signing of the interlocking willing to fully commit their joint financial the initial operations, the mercenaries modernized ex-U.S., now Turkish, missile maritime and military agreements with and professional military resources. Yet, did not see large-scale battles, frigates of the Gabya class established an the GNA the month before.32 Most of they decided not to strike the newly arrived but were more involved in holding early warning and long-range air defense these fighters belonged to the “Syrian Turkish air defense systems, although defensive lines, mopping-up operations, system.37 This was a sufficiently effective National Army” formed to confront the they would have certainly been capable and other low glamor operations where multipronged anti-aircraft (and anti-drone) Assad regime.33 The majority came from of doing so. Conversely, Wagner Group discipline and reliability were essential system cobbled together from different two formations: the Sultan Murad Brigade did not have this capability and — as (two characteristics that Libyan militia components at speed. It was also the first (consisting partially of Turkmen from developments in late May demonstrated fighters have not traditionally displayed). of its kind —operated in the middle of a civil the Aleppo area and self-branded as an (when Russia sent fighter jets to Libya, but The relations between some of the Tripoli war by an extraterritorial military to defeat did not intervene in the fighting as it did “Islamist” group) and the al-Sham Brigade militias and the Syrians became strained, the opposing side’s third-party patron. not want to be caught acting too directly (mostly from and designated as a initially due to Libyan cultural prejudices While all this build up was happening, after in Libya) — neither Wagner nor the Russian terrorist organization by the U.S.). Several toward Levantines, and later as a result Jan. 12 the LNA’s air force did not choose air force had the “green light” from the others were from the al-Mu’tasim Brigade of instances of harassment of civilians to return to the skies of Tripoli in force, as Kremlin to overtly bring their full capacities (Aleppo) and Jabhat al-Nusra (a part of al- by Syrian mercenaries that were later its vintage jets, helicopters, and slower to bear. The reasons for this willpower Qaeda). For the most part, these groups amplified and possibly exaggerated on gap between the Turks and the Egyptians, were well-trained and experienced in drones would now have been fairly easy social media. Emiratis, and Russians are further analyzed cooperating with Turkish combat support. prey for the relatively sophisticated and in the Conclusion. The VoR’s intention was that these Syrian multilayered Turkish air defense system. mercenaries not directly engage in Further away from Tripoli, as 2020 went on, larger offensive operations, but rather be TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES there were a few LNA combat drone and used to provide the infantry manpower attack helicopter sorties in the areas of MERCENARIES Despite the important functions undertaken necessary to hold and retake terrain when and Abu Grein. These also ended by the Syrian mercenaries, they did not truly From about May 2019, the VoR hired a supported via significant artillery and air after some of them were shot down by the significant number of mercenaries, some tip the scales of the battle, just as the LNA’s cover. This method of utilizing of Syrian Turkish frigates and (probably) by Stinger from and some Darfuri rebels, of motley crew of mercenaries had not in the 38 mercenaries allowed for certain kinetic teams. which the largest single group came from first nine months of the conflict. Rather, the offensive operations to be undertaken by the Justice and Equality Movement.30 decisive element in the Turkish campaign Libyan militia personnel, while keeping the Conversely, the LNA employed Sudanese plan was the successful neutralization body count for pro-GNA fighters of Libyan THE ROLE OF (or Janjaweed) and of the LNA’s air force, which had been an nationality artificially low. INTELLIGENCE other troops to defend oil installations, essential backbone of Hifter’s battle plan Libyan Toubou and Chadian fighters in the Until mid-January, only about 1,000 Syrians and his initial advantage over GNA forces. Therefore, after having reversed which side south to defend fields and airstrips, and were deployed, but those figures rose From mid-January onwards, a layered GNA held , the next phase of the Russian PMCs for more technical jobs.31 A quickly and reached 10,000-12,000 in April/ air defense system was built up, including Turkish battle plan was an asymmetrical smaller number of Assad regime Syrian early May, some of them potentially battle- several components around the American war of attrition to degrade the LNA’s ground

10   9 forces by using a version of the LNA’s ARTILLERY, DRONES, AND howitzers from Gadhafi-era army stocks, resistant to Emirati, Russian, and Chinese cat-and-mouse air and artillery RADAR probably with some help from Wagner military and commercial jamming methods, tactics against them. A precondition for this Group repair and maintenance experts. hence allowing the more sophisticated approach was precise information about Turkey deployed at least one, later probably Batteries equipped with these guns were Turkish drone jammers to operate freely the location of Hifter’s troops, artillery, two batteries of self-propelled 155-mm initially capable of moving into position, and counter the LNA’s mini-UAVs.43 This air defense systems, logistics hubs, and heavy artillery T-155 Fırtına with extended- firing a quick salvo of about five or six shells, dynamic of increased Turkish jamming of headquarters. Turkish ISR, including signals range precision-guided ammunition and and leaving before the impact of counter LNA mini-UAVs contributed significantly to intelligence (SIGINT) — intercepting and T-122 Sakarya rocket launchers. Supported fire. While this worked for some time in the the superior situational awareness of VoR locating signals from communications and by -locating radar, their first mission early spring of 2020, combat drones finally and more efficient artillery fire, while slowly other electronic devices on the battlefield was to suppress and destroy the capabilities hunted down and disabled most of these diminishing the LNA’s capacities. — reconnaissance drones, and satellites, of the LNA artillery.40 Such weapon-locating LNA guns. provided the necessary information radar is designed to detect and track Aerial supremacy remained the to pinpoint the targets for subsequent incoming mortars, artillery, and rocket fire predominant factor in determining the THE TURNING OF THE destruction by artillery and combat so as to pinpoint their origin and respond outcome of most military operations in the drones.39 Before January, the ISR support with counter-battery fire within about 30- TIDE Libyan theater. Turkish unmanned combat provided by Turkey/Qatar and Egypt/UAE 60 seconds. Altogether several dozen TB2 and a aerial vehicles (UCAVs, “combat drones”) was at about the same level. Now, the full few Anka-S were delivered to Libya, The LNA was caught off-guard by these played a key role over the battlefield. The weight of Turkish capabilities once again presumably operated exclusively by rapid shifts in battle dynamics. After Bayraktar TB2 is a 630-kg drone with a changed the situation entirely. Turkish specialists. At first, some were suffering some heavy losses, the LNA weapons payload of just 55 kg (i.e. very brought back a couple of old 2S1 122- light missiles and bombs).41 It is controlled shot down by UAE-delivered Russian- mm and 2S3 152-mm self-propelled gun by a ground control station via line-of-sight made Pantsir S-1 self-propelled SAM/AAA datalink. Limited in its range to 150 km, the systems, but over time, Turkey managed TB2s were complemented by TAI Anka-S, to counter this threat successfully by which is operated via SATCOM and hence relying on the now asymmetrical jamming 44 has a broader range capable of covering capabilities. KORAL long-range electronic the whole of Libya and delivering a 200-kg warfare systems (EWS) located the radar payload.42 The Anka-S was mainly used to of the Pantsirs and either jammed them to hunt LNA logistic convoys emanating from allow subsequent attack by combat drones Sebha or Jufra, in the Fezzanese or central or preemptively pinpointed the Pantsirs areas respectively, and destined for to enable their destruction with precision the Tripoli environs. long-range artillery at a distance of almost 50 km. Already in 2019, mini-UAVs were used by both sides for battlefield reconnaissance Of all the above-listed developments and artillery fire observation. But most of the defeat of the Pantsirs was among the them were commercial models, which most significant. In May 2020, the Pantsir proved unreliable and relatively easy to operators (some of them Wagner Group jam. From January 2020 onward, Turkey personnel) switched their tactics by using “Aerial supremacy remained the predominant factor in determining the outcome of most military operations in the Libyan theater. Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles played a key role over the battlefield.” (Photo by Muhammed delivered an increasing number of military their systems mostly in the passive electro- Enes Yildirim/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) models to VoR. These proved widely optical mode, which made jamming by

12   11 KORAL or detection and destruction by CONCLUSION: THE mid-January 2020 onward, the belligerent Russia’s objectives in Libya have been to artillery less likely. As a result, several UNIQUELY LIBYAN parties’ levels of military capabilities enhance its regional stature as a diplomatic Turkish combat drones were shot down rapidly diverged. Ever increasing levels of facilitator, consolidate infrastructure WAY OF WARFARE thereafter, but it was already too late Turkish ISR and aerial firepower capabilities contracts, collect back payments ,and more to have a real impact on the battlefield AND GENERALIZABLE were the decisive elements in an uneven broadly undermine Western and American dynamics. The remaining Pantsirs were MILITARY OBSERVATIONS war of attrition. From March onward, it was hegemony while promoting forms of either knocked out of action, captured, or insecurity that take crude production We have demonstrated that the final obvious that the LNA would eventually rendered irrelevant by the advancing VoR offline.46 Traditionally, Moscow has pursued outcome of the War for Tripoli was not be defeated, if it did not promptly receive ground forces. this through a dual engagement strategy, significantly shaped by Russian, Syrian, or significant outside support to eliminate the After the neutralization of the LNA’s air other mercenaries.45 The ability of Libyan Turkish air defenses that had grounded its primarily supporting the LNA, but partially force and then the subsequent destruction or ground forces to conquer aerial capabilities. Therefore, as Turkish hedging between the GNA and LNA of its ability to effectively use anti- or retake territory was only ever possible aerial superiority mounted and softened through its Foreign and Defense Ministries respectively.47 aircraft batteries, the Turkish-GNA-VoR when and where aerial dominance up LNA positions and patronage for the However, at some point in 2019, this balancing act was temporarily war of attrition tactics established the was previously achieved. This may be LNA did not drastically increase, it was preconditions for the final phase of the battle abandoned, and Moscow threw its weight understood as partially stemming from also inevitable that LNA defenders would plan, the breaking of the siege of southern further behind Hifter’s offensive even the uniquely Libyan way of warfare, which eventually slink away back to eastern Libya. Tripoli and expelling of the surviving Hifter throughout the Wars of Post-Gadhafi though it was not consulted in the decision troops from Tripolitania. Syrians were Succession has revealed itself to be highly The three potential candidates to provide to launch it. neither involved in the lightning advance casualty averse (with certain exceptions of the LNA with the required capabilities Despite this development, it is important along the coast toward to capture disregard for civilian casualties) and usually were Egypt, Russia, and the UAE. Yet Egypt to highlight that Russia’s support of Hifter Sabratha and Surman (formerly LNA involving of troops advancing was never pleased with Hifter’s ambition has usually been overstated. Moscow ground bases) in April, nor the occupation in pickup trucks and technicals and then to take Tripoli by force. It was also aware helped him gain greater territorial control of (formerly LNA-controlled) al-Wattiya air rapidly retreating in disarray when they are that would never accept an open and elevated his profile only so far as the base in May, nor in the battle for outflanked, come under fire, or potentially military engagement in Tripolitania and any in June (the stronghold of the LNA’s most Russians thought it would provide them even before any opponent fire or ground attempts would likely occasion a response. important western Libyan allies). Taken with enough leverage and an opportunity maneuvering transpires, if they determine Therefore, direct Egyptian intervention together, these actions ended the War for themselves to be outgunned or subject to to arbitrate a negotiated settlement, rather did not materialize. Egypt’s vital security Tripoli. enemy air superiority. Control of key pieces than in a belief he would achieve an outright interests in Libya are to keep Turkish forces 48 of transport infrastructure — highways, military victory. The Russians do not Sabratha, Surman, al-Wattiya, and Tarhuna and rogue Libyan Islamist militias away airports, strategic crossroads — is essential support Hifter unconditionally for the sake had all fallen without major casualties. from the Egyptian border, in specific, and to this form of war and those locations of an alliance with Hifter per se, but out of With air superiority achieved and the LNA unable to operate in , in general. cannot be held against an enemy who can a desire to achieve their dominance over defenders open to continual artillery or project air superiority over the key nodes did not need a Hifter victory in the the “Libya file,” so as to mediate a solution aerial barrages, they simply fled, continuing of transport infrastructure in question and War for Tripoli to meet these requirements. to their liking. For Russia, its support of a pattern that has characterized Libyan therefore put opponent ground forces to This was effectively expressed by President Hifter’s assault on Tripoli came at a low warfare since 2011. flight. Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi’s declaration of a cost financially and politically: neither the “red line” around Sirte — that if it were U.S. nor the EU placed retaliatory sanctions During 2019, this Libyan way of warfare transgressed by Turkey or their affiliated specifically about Russian actions in Libya enabled certain LNA gains around southern Libyan militias, would occasion a decisive while the Wagner mercenaries it deployed Tripoli due to its air superiority. Then from Egyptian intervention. were probably paid for by the UAE and

14   13 used as a geopolitical tool that could Due to their asymmetrical interests 4. In Libya-like scenarios with a battle at stake and the proximity to , the maintain a modicum of Moscow’s plausible in western Libya, the Turks decided theater spread out along a vast coastline, EU was remarkably passive throughout the 49 deniability. to asymmetrically introduce military air defense frigates can easily provide War for Tripoli. Now the EU is faced with the flexible early warning and area air defense challenge of finding a way to mitigate the For the Emiratis, the calculus was slightly capabilities. As a NATO country with years without a real risk to the ships. negative impact of a sustained Turkish and different. They were less concerned with of experience training and organizing Russian presence in Libya.51 All of which is strategic, financial, or security outcomes Syrian militias and provisioning air defenses 5. The War for Tripoli demonstrated that to say that due to an initial lack of decisive than the Egyptians or Russians. Their against a Russian-supported Assad regime, the outcome of a conflict can become decision making, EU decision makers will desire was more ideological and long term: inevitable as soon as one side’s patrons are they possessed both the required technical now have much tougher choices forced to prevent the rise of a chaotic Libya — willing to contemplate a greater escalation and strategic capacities. Viewed in its upon them. possibly Islamist or possibly democratic than its opponents are comfortable totality, Turkey’s successful degradation — which could have cascading effects with and the international community In summation, the recently concluded War of the LNA’s prior aerial superiority offers a throughout the whole region. The UAE is prevaricates or lacks the resolve to punish for Tripoli was the first of a new kind of few stark lessons for other global conflicts fundamentally a status quo actor needing escalations. In the Libyan case, although military conflict. The way in which drones not to upend the existing order but rather to in the 2020s: the LNA and its patrons, Egypt, UAE, and counter anti-aircraft capabilities were maintain its global position as a respected France, and Russia, have been viewed by decisively deployed by Turkey is surely 1. International norms and even U.N. player bound by financial and diplomatic some as the aggressors of the conflict, they to be studied and likely imitated in other resolutions are no longer capable of ties to all major world powers. An overt later showed a clear lack of willingness for theaters. Nonetheless, the Turks’ successful preventing the unbridled introduction military escalation in Libya to counter indefinite escalation. Turkey possessed defense of Tripoli never meant that they of sophisticated weapon systems and Turkey would have cast them too much in the required military capabilities to prevail could conquer the LNA’s heartland in the role of a rogue. operatives into previously low-intensity and then became willing to employ them eastern Libya or would want to face the and low-tech civil wars. as a result of geopolitical calculations that ensuing global political backlash, even if By contrast, Turkish interests in western came into play from late 2019 onward. All they could. Over the last months the KORAL Libya were of a far more existential 2. Especially when adversaries suffer from of these acts — from the initial aggression EWS, TB2s, Anka-S, and mini-UAVs have left nature than Russian, Egyptian, or even casualty-aversion or are fighting in the to the subsequent escalations — occurred their imprint on Libya’s future and shown Emirati interests.50 Increasingly isolated largely open spaces of desert-like terrain, at the same time as all the patrons claimed new aspects of how airpower will likely in the eastern Mediterranean and with an aerial supremacy can offer the decisive to outwardly be respecting the arms be used in non-state and extraterritorial economy in freefall, the Libyan theater factor in contemporary low-intensity civil embargo. warfare in the mid-2020s. Now it is time for offered Turkish strategists an ability to wars. the international community, especially the single-handedly resuscitate their entire 6. If a major global stakeholder, like the EU, U.N., EU, and U.S., to begin addressing the geostrategic positioning, while potentially keeps out of a conflict in its neighborhood 3. Mercenary ground troops are unlikely to real underlying causes of conflict in Libya, offering significant medium-term economic — whether for legal or moral reasons — win civil wars in situations where the local especially the oft-neglected dysfunctional advantages in the form of back payments it must later learn to live with whatever populations lack the requisite will and economic system.52 on tens of billions of dollars of construction outcome emerges. Although many casualty thresholds, or lack the ability to contracts, potential eastern Mediterranean European countries were partially militarily fight effectively. Mercenary forces are likely gas discoveries, and the preservation of and diplomatically involved in Libya’s civil to suffer from casualty-aversion and to a long-standing unique relationship with war, particularly France, Italy, and , Libya’s Central Bank, which makes Istanbul outrage local populations by their excesses. the EU as an institution did not find a the key center for a whole range of licit and Furthermore, any mercenary successes in coherent or an effective way to put its thumb illicit financial services connected to the ground fighting can become propaganda on the scale of the crisis in Libya. In fact, Libyan economy. successes for their opponents. given the profound nature of EU interests

16   15 ENDNOTES libyaherald.com/2020/04/29/lpa-remains- 10. Wolfram Lacher, Who is Fighting Whom in armored vehicles, ammunition, and some sole-internationally-recognized-political- Tripoli? How the 2019 is Transforming modern MANPADS. Although these caused framework-in-libya-international-community/; Libya’s Military Landscape (Geneva: Graduate some problems for the LNA and added to the 1. Jason Pack,“The Turkish Victory Dividend in Jason Pack, “How to End Libya’s War,” The New Institute of International and Development VoR’s operational capacity, they were far from Libya,” InsideArabia, May 25, 2020, https:// York Times, January 21, 2015, https://www. Studies, 2019), http://www.smallarmssurvey. sufficient to break the LNA’s siege of Tripoli. insidearabia.com/the-turkish-victory-dividend- nytimes.com/2015/01/22/opinion/how-to- org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS- in-libya/. end-libyas-war.html; International Crisis Group, SANA-BP-Tripoli-2019.pdf. 18. James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael S. Schmidt, “U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels 2. Jason Pack, “Turkey Doubles Down on Libya,” “The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset”, Report 170 / Middle East & North , 11. Pack and Sinkez, “’s Miscalculated Fell Into Jihadis’ Hands,” , Middle East Institute, December 10, 2019, Attack.” December 5, 2012, https://www.nytimes. https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey- November 4, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/ com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons- doubles-down-libya. 12. Pack, Kingdom of Militias; Michel Cousins, “In sent-to-libyan-rebels-with-us-approval-fell- libyan-political-agreement-time-reset; Azza Deliberate Tactic, LNA Tries to Draw GNA Forces into-islamist-hands.html 3. Jason Pack. Kingdom of Militias: Libya’s Second Maghur, “Leading Constitutional Lawyer Azza ; Furthermore, some to South Tripoli,” The Arab Weekly, April 4, 2019, Western governments’ were also War of Post-Qadhafi Succession. (Milan: Italian Maghur Evaluates the Next “Plan” for Libya,” Al https://thearabweekly.com/deliberate-tactic- concerned about intelligence information Institute for International Political Studies, 2019), Marsad, September 27, 2020, https://almarsad. lna-tries-draw-gna-forces-south-tripoli. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/ co/en/2020/09/27/constitutional-lawyer-azza- concerning certain radical Islamists fighting in kingdom-militias-libyas-second-war-post- maghur-evaluates-the-next-plan-for-libya/. 13. “Libya: Haftar’s LNA Begins to Strike Back the ranks of VoR. They feared another scandal qadhafi-succession-23121. After String of Losses,” , June 2, akin to when Western armaments and training 5. Jason Pack. It’s the Economy Stupid: How Libya’s 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ later indirectly benefited jihadists in Syria from 4. Article 1, Clause 4 of the 2015 Skhirat Civil War Is Rooted in Its Economic Structures libya-haftar-lna-strike-back-losses-west- 2013-17 or in Libya from 2011-15. Agreement (also known as the Libya (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2019), gna#:~:text=%E2%80%9CPulling%20back%20 19. “Turkey, Libya, and Qatar Agree on Signing Political Agreement) states: “The term of the https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1917. troops%20from%20Tripoli,city%20earlier%20 Military Deal,” TRT World, August 12, 2020, Government of National Accord shall be one pdf. in%20Libya’s%20conflict. year as of the date of granting it a vote of https://www.trtworld.com/africa/turkey- confidence by the House of Representatives.” 6. Wolfgang Pusztai, “Libya’s Conflict: A Very 14. “Foreign Involvement in Libya Must Be Stopped, libya-and-qatar-agree-on-signing-military- Article 3 states again that the GNA needs a Short Introduction,” Institute Top Official Tells Security Council, Describing deal-38967. vote of confidence of the HoR. As none of these for Security Studies, November 4, 2019, https:// ‘Race against Time’ to Reach Peaceful Solution, www.iss.europa.eu/content/libyas-conflict. 20. Ben Fishman and Conor Hiney, “What Turned events have ever happened, the legal basis of Spare Lives,” Security Council, the Battle for Tripoli?,” Washington Institute for https://www.un.org/press/ the GNA in international law remains uncertain. 7. Pack, Kingdom of Militias; Sami Zaptia, “Hafter November 18, 2019, Near East Policy,” May 6, 2020, https://www. en/2019/sc14023.doc.htm That said, all Western and most international Announces ‘Liberation’ of Derna,” Libya Herald, . washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ and regional governments considered June 29, 2018, https://www.libyaherald. 15. Ryan Oliver, “The Strategic Implication of what-turned-the-battle-for-tripoli. the GNA (from March 2016 to the time of com/2018/06/29/hafter-announces-liberation- Chinese UAVs: Insights from the Libya Conflict,” publication) as “the sovereign government 21. “UAE Mirages Deployed in Egypt,” Itamilradar, of-derna/; “Libya: battle for City Endangers Brief (20), no. 15, August 31, 2020, https:// of the State of Libya” and in U.N. resolutions May 7, 2020, https://www.itamilradar. Civilians,” , May 14, 2018, jamestown.org/program/the-strategic- and official Western government legislation com/2020/05/07/uae-mirages-deployed-in- https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/libya- implications-of-chinese-uavs-insights-from-the- and communiques it is referred to as the “the egypt/. battle-city-endangers-civilians#. libyan-conflict/. International-Recognized Government.” Many 22. Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaïd in Libya and abroad disagree with the U.N. and 8. Umberto Profazio, “Push for Southern Libya Test 16. Tarek Megerisi, “Geostrategic Dimensions of Lazib, Dynamics in Libya, international community’s approach to the Ethnic Ties and Regional Alliances,” International Africa Security Brief Libya’s Civil War,” , no.17, (Blacksburg: Proxy Wars Project, 2019), GNA from a legal and legitimacy perspective, Institute for Strategic Studies, March 15, 2019, May 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/ https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/ others consider the GNA as having been formed https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/03/ resrep24408?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_ handle/10919/91990/HarchaouiLazibLibya. legitimately from the Skhirat Agreement and southern-libya. contents . pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; “Point Blank: that it is the HoR who acted illegitimately by 9. Jason Pack and Matthew Sinkez, “Khalifa Egypt, Russia and UAE sent arms to Libya’s not approving its cabinet list and mandate. 17. Paul Iddon, “Turkey is Fighting a Formidable Haftar’s Miscalculated Attack on Tripoli Will Haftar,” , November 13, 2019, https:// For more background information on this Drone War in Libya,” Ahval News, September Cost Him Dearly,” Foreign Policy, April 10, 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/13/point- very complex topic and how this is currently 14, 2019, https://ahvalnews.com/libya/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/10/khalifa- blank-egypt-russia-and-uae-sent-arms-to- affecting diplomatic attempts to resolve the turkey-fighting-formidable-drone-war-libya; haftars-miscalculated-attack-on-tripoli-will- libyas-haftar/. conflict please consult: Sami Zaptia, “LPA Although the focus of this paper is Turkey’s cost-him-and-libya-dearly-un-benghazi-gna- remains sole internationally recognized political game-changing military assistance to the VoR lna/. 23. Dario Cristiani, “A Piece of a Greater Puzzle: framework in Libya: international community,” starting in January 2020, it is crucial to note The Libyan Civil War, External Influences and Libya Herald, April 29, 2020, https://www. that during 2019 Ankara did deploy some Regional Trends,” Monitor (18), no. advisers and delivered a number of drones,

18   17 3, February 7, 2020, https://jamestown.org/ 31. “Who Are ’s RSF and Their Commander Command Drones Operating in Libya,” South com/2020/05/22/lethal-stalkers-how-turkish- program/a-piece-of-a-greater-puzzle-the- Hemeti?,” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2019, https://www. Front, March 29, 2020, https://southfront. drones-are-neutralizing-haftars-pantsirs-in- libyan-civil-war-external-influences-and- aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/06/who-are- org/turkey-is-using-e-7t-aewc-aircraft-to- libya-bda/. regional-trends/. sudans-rsf-and-their-commander-hemeti/. command-drones-operating-in-libya/. 45. Jason Pack, “Can the Turks Be Magnanimous 24. East Africa and North and West Africa 32. “Footage Reveals ‘Syrian Mercenaries’ in Libya,” 40. Gianandrea Gaiani, “I Turchi Sbarcano a Tripoli After Their Victory in Libya?,” Middle East Counterterrorism Operations (Washington D.C.: Middle East Monitor, December 30, 2019, Artiglieria e Cingolati da Combattimento,” Institute, May 26, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/ U.S. Department of Defense, USAID, and U.S. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191230- Analisi Difesa, February 1, 2020, https:// blog/can-turks-be-magnanimous-after-their- Department of State, 2019), https://media. footage-reveals-syrian-mercenaries-in-libya/; www.analisidifesa.it/2020/02/a-tripoli-i- victory-libya. defense.gov/2020/Feb/21/2002252793/- Pack, “Turkey Doubles Down.” turchi-sbarcano-artiglieria-e-cingolati-da- 1/-1/1/LEAD%20IG%20EAST%20AFRICA%20 combattimento/; “Turkey Deploys T-122 Sakarya 46. Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia’s Approach to AND%20NORTH%20AND%20WEST%20 33. Elizabeth Tsurkov, “The Syrian Mercenaries and T-155 Firtina in Libya,” Global Defense Corp, the Conflict in Libya, the East-West Dimension The Search for AFRICA%20COUNTERTERRORISM%20 Fighting Foreign Wars for Russia and Turkey,” May 31, 2020, https://www.globaldefensecorp. and the Role of the OSCE,” in https:// Stability in Libya: OSCE’s Role between Internal OPERATIONS.PDF. The New York Review, October 16, 2020, com/2020/05/31/turkey-deploys-t-122- www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/10/16/the- Obstacles and External Challenges sakarya-and-t-155-firtina-in-libya/; “T-155 , eds. Andrea syrian-mercenaries-fighting-foreign-wars-for- 25. Pack, “Turkey Doubles Down”; Ethan Firtina,” Military Today, http://www.military- Dessi and Ettore Greco (Rome: Instituto Affari russia-and-turkey/ Chorin, “Turkey’s Mediterranean Challenge . today.com/artillery/t155_firtina.htm; “T-122 Internazionali/Nuova Cultura, 2018), pp. 89-111, http://www.estepanova.net/Stepanova_Russia_ — A Step Too Far,” Forbes, December 23, Çnra 122 MM Çok Namlulu Roketatar Sistemi,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 34. “Reports Shed Light on Mercenaries, Terrorists Libya.pdf 2019, Roketsan, https://www.roketsan.com.tr/urun/t- . ethanchorin/2019/12/23/confronting-turkeys- Sent by Turkey to Libya,” The Arab Weekly, July https://thearabweekly.com/reports- 122-cnra-122-mm-cok-namlulu-roketatar- Russia’s Foreign and christmas-surprise/?sh=7fb32a0b16b6. 18, 2020, 47. Ekaterina Stepanova. shed-light-mercenaries-terrorists-sent-turkey- sistemi/. Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the libya 2020s 26. Ayman al-Warfalli, “East Libyan Forces Target . 41. “Bayraktar TB2 Tactical UAV,” Army Technology, (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, Munitions in Misrata With Air Strikes,” , https://www.army-technology.com/projects/ 2020), https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/ https://www.reuters.com/ 35. Hassanin Tayea, “SOHR: Turkey Deployed 15,300 iaip2016.pdf November 19, 2019, bayraktar-tb2-tactical-uav/. . article/us-libya-security-idUSKBN1XT16D. Turkish-Backed Mercenaries in Libya,” Sada https://see.news/ Elbalad English, July 5, 2020, 42. Turkish military-grade drones usually chose to 48. Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Strategy in Libya,” sohr-number-of-syrian-mercenaries-in-libya- 27. “Forces Loyal to Libyan Strongman Haftar fly above 2,000 meters so as to avoid 23-mm Royal United Services Institute, April 7, 2020, rises-to-153/ https://rusi.org/commentary/russias-strategy- Announce ,” France24, January 11, ; “Turkey Sending More Syrian AAA fire. After suffering some heavy losses https://www.france24.com/en/20200111- libya 2020, Mercenaries to Die in Libya,” Middle East Online, in the fall of 2019 when they did not enjoy air . forces-loyal-to-libyan-strongman-haftar- https://middle-east-online.com/ May 18, 2020, superiority, Turkey optimized the way it was announce-ceasefire. en/turkey-sending-more-syrian-mercenaries- 49. Sergey Sukhankin, “Wagner Group in Libya: operating the TB2, creating a “relay”-based Terrorism die-libya. Weapon of War or Geopolitical Tool,” 28. “Libya Conflict: Haftar ‘Leaves’ Moscow approach to help the drone fleet operate as a Monitor (18), no. 3, June 26, 2020, https:// Ceasefire Talks Without Deal,” BBC, January 36. Can Kasapoğlu, “Turkey’s Air Defense System single unity. While Misrata and Tripoli-Mitiga jamestown.org/program/wagner-group-in- 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Deployments to Libya,” Edam, January 17, 2020, remained the main drone bases, several other libya-weapon-of-war-or-geopolitical-tool/. africa-51104846. https://edam.org.tr/en/turkeys-air-defense- take-off/landing strips and a network of “relay system-deployments-to-libya/. stations” were used to extend the operating 50. Wolfgang Pusztai, “Libya: From Civil War to 29. “Turkish ‘Hawk’ Deployed in Tripoli,” Itamilradar, area of the drone fleet. The TB2s were stored Regional Conflict,” The Affiliate Network, May 21, January 18, 2020, https://www.itamilradar. 37. “Gabya Class (O.H. Perry),” Bosphorus Naval in remote sites and transported to the take-off 2020, http://affiliate-network.co/2020/05/libya- com/2020/01/18/turkish-hawk-deployed-in- News, https://turkishnavy.net/gabya-o-h-perry- strips by truck, where they were armed, and from-civil-war-to-regional-conflict/. tripoli/. class/. then took off within minutes to make it more 51. Wolfgang Pusztai, “Turkey and Russia’s Libyan difficult for the LNA to eliminate them on the 30. UN Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to 38. “Turkey’s Warships Use Long-range Anti-aircraft Adventure Is a European Problem,” Institute ground by simply bombing the airstrips. Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005). Letter Missiles Against Haftar’s Aircraft,” Bulgarian for International Political Studies, July 2, 2020, dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts Military, April 3, 2020, https://bulgarianmilitary. 43. “Anti Drone Defense System Military Drone https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution com/2020/04/03/turkeys-warships-use-long- Jamming Gun,” Made-in-China, https:// turkey-and-russias-libyan-adventure-european- 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the range-anti-aircraft-missiles-against-haftars- zzhanvy.en.made-in-china.com/product/ problem-26807. Security Council (New York City: United Nations aircraft/. CvHEwrSjZQGL/China-Anti-Drone-Defense- 52. Jason Pack, “An International Financial Security Council, 2019), https://digitallibrary. System-Military-Drone-Jamming-Gun.html. un.org/record/1659763#record-files-collapse- 39. “Turkey AWACS off Libya,” Itamilradar, Commission is Libya’s Last Hope,” Middle East https://www.itamilradar. https://www. header. February 13, 2020, 44. Harm, “Lethal Stalkers: How Turkish Drones Are Institute, September 14, 2020, com/2020/02/13/turkish-awacs-off-libya-2/; Neutralizing Haftar’s Pantsirs in Libya (BDA),” mei.edu/publications/international-financial- “Turkey Is Using E-7T AEW&C Aircraft to T-Intelligence, May 22, 2020, https://t-intell. commission-libyas-last-hope.

20   19 ABOUT THE AUTHORS ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS Jason Pack is a consultant, author, and commentator with over two decades of experience living in, and working on, the Middle East. In 2004, he was a Fulbright Scholar in Syria. In

Cover photo: Libyan people gather at Martyrs Square 2008, he moved to Tripoli to assist Western businesses in reentering Libya amidst the in Tripoli to inspect Russian-made Pantsir-type air late Qadhafi-era reforms. In 2011, Jason created Libya-Analysis LLC — a consultancy defense system used by Khalifa Hifter’s forces, after organization producing evidence-based analysis, forecasting, business intelligence, it was destroyed. (Photo by Hazem Turkia/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) and commercial research on Libya. In 2015, Jason founded Eye on ISIS in Libya — a non- profit 501c3 monitoring service detailing the group’s history, its interactions with other Contents photo: Vehicles of the “”, a jihadi actors, and Western actions toward the group. In 2016, he became the Senior Libya militia loyal to the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), parade through the Martyrs’ Analyst at CRCM , a German strategy firm. In 2017-18, he served as Executive Square at the centre of Tripoli on July 10, 2020. Director of the U.S.-Libya Business Association. Currently, he is working on a popular book (Photo by MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP via Getty Images) exploring what Libya’s dysfunctional economic structures and its ongoing civil war tells us more broadly about globalization and the geopolitics of the 21st century.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a graduate of the U.S. National War College and Austria’s former defense attaché to Libya (2007-12), is a security and policy analyst with a special focus on the MENA region. He is the chairman of the advisory board of the “National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations,” and a director of the California-based advisory company Perim Associates.

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