During the Celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo Issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for Brevity) Declaring a State of National Emergency

David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

Facts of the case:

During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency. The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017. The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims to oust the President and takeover reigns of government as clear and present danger. On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017. Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the AFP. However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to show disgust. At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited. The next morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus. PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration. Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed component to Anti- Arroyo protests. Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5. Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I. Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented. Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down the government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then represented the Anakpawis Party. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional? Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional? Ruling of the court: Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which calls for military aid. Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the basis then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence. The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is the prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers such as the taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which is entirely different from the martial law. As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court considers those actions unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional mandate of freedom of expression.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staf G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties. Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items. Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant. As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

Columbia Pictures v. Flores G.R. No. 78631 June 29, 1993

I. THE FACTS As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45 which reads:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit: (a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the attached list; (b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the reproduction/retaping business of the defendants; (c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above- mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described, which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs. In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters. FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.” Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT. II. THE ISSUE Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant? III. THE RULING [The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge Flores.] NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant. Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit: (c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described. On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th Century Fox: Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all- embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable. The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).”

Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

I. THE FACTS On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. II. THE ISSUE WON the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures? III. THE RULING [The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.] NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures. xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

PRUDENTE vs DAYRIT G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

FACTS: The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions. Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President. Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that: Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers Search warrant was a general warrant Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid? HELD: Search Warrant annulled and set aside. RATIONALE: Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. “Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched. - This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. PARTICULARITY For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. – – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.

Pollo v. Constantino-David G.R. No. 181881 18 October 2011

Facts Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.” Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show- Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer. He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte. The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition. Issue WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy Ruling The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right. Ratio Decidendi In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner. Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.” O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement. Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace. The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files. As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope. The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08- 2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

Virgilio Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines Inc. GR No. 70615, Oct. 28, 1986

Facts:

1. Petitioner Virgillio Callanta was employed by Carnation Philippines, Inc. as a salesman in the Agusan del Sur Area. Five years later or June 1, 1979, respondent Carnation filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), Regional Office X, an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Virgillio Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12,000.00 more or less.

2. On June 26, 1979 MOLE approved the said clearance and Virgillio Callanta was terminated effective June 1, 1979.

3. On July 5, 1982, Callanta filed with MOLE Regional Office X, a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement, back wages and damages against respondent Carnation.

4. On October 5, 1982- Carnation put in issue the timeliness of Callanta’s complaint, alleging that the same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than three years after Callanta’s dismissal. 5. On March 24, 1983- Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos ruled in favor of Callanta and ordered re-instatement.

6. On April 18, 1983, respondent Carnation appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC].

7. NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and it declared that the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Virgilio Callanta to have already prescribed.

Labor Code provides that: Art. 291. Offenses. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years.

Art. 292. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employer- employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.

Callanta filed a petition in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Callanta’s case of illegal dismissal prescribes in 3 years, pursuant to Art. 291 and Art. 292 of the Labor Code.

Callanta’s Contention:

Callanta contends that since the Labor Code is silent as to the prescriptive period of an action for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement, backwages and damages, the applicable law, by way of supplement, is Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which provides a four [4]-year prescriptive period for an action predicated upon "an injury to the rights of the plaintiff".

He added that, an action for illegal dismissal is neither a "penal offense" nor a mere "money claim," as contemplated under Articles 291 and 292, respectively, of the Labor Code.

Petitioner further claims that an action for illegal dismissal is a more serious violation of the rights of an employee as it deprives him of his means of livelihood; thus, it should correspondingly have a prescriptive period longer than the three [ 3] years provided for in "money claims."

Carnation Phil.’s Contention

Carnation, counters that a case for illegal dismissal falls under the general category of "offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations pursuant thereto" provided under Article 291 or a money claim under Article 292, so that petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal filed on July 5, 1982, or three [3] years, one [1] month and five [5] days after his alleged dismissal on June 1, 1979, was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period as provided under Labor Code, hence, barred by prescription; SC’s Decision:

The Supreme Court Find for Callanta.

It reasoned that, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations.

Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense.

It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.

In the case, of illegal dismissal, no penalty of fine nor imprisonment is imposed on the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. By the very nature of the reliefs sought, therefore, an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally categorized as an "offense" as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which must be brought within the period of three[3] years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, the same is forever barred.

The case of Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement, et al., 106 Phil. 732, a 1959 case cited by petitioner, is applicable in the instant case insofar as it concerns the issue of prescription of actions.

In said case, this Court had occasion to hold that an action for damages involving a plaintiff seperated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for " injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within four [4] years.

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.

[1] Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.

SC grant the petition and the decision of the NLRC was reversed and set aside.

Gacal Vs. Judge Infante

FACTS: It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the Prosecution. Any judge who so allows bail is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules, and is subject to appropriate administrative sanctions. Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a prosecution for murder arising from the killing of Felomino O. Occasion, charges Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Branch Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled for arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for the latter’s failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail. Antecedents On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infante’s Branch. On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody. On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent motion). On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion on the ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge; that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he should not be too dependent on the public prosecutor’s comment considering that the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge;[4] [4] and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.[5][5] ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Jaime Infante is guilty of Gross ignorance of the law. HELD: The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge in Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas.[32][32] In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two accused who had been charged with murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise, in Loyola v. Gabo,[33][33] the Court fined the respondent judge in the similar amount of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder case without the requisite bail hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court prescribes a fine of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with. WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.