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Foreknowledge and Predestination n Rennick, Stephanie (2015) Foreknowledge, fate and freedom. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6480/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] FOREKNOWLEDGE, FATE AND FREEDOM By STEPHANIE RENNICK BA(Hons), Macquarie University Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Joint PhD) August 2014 Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Macquarie University, University of Glasgow, Sydney, Australia Glasgow, UK 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 2 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 STATEMENT OF CANDIDATE ......................................................................................................................... 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 8 LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................ 9 LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................................................. 9 CHAPTER ONE: FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED (An Introduction) ............................................................. 10 1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 10 1.2 STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................................................... 12 1.3 ASSUMPTIONS, PARAMETERS & METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 13 CHAPTER TWO: FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION ....................................................................... 16 2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 16 2.2 THREE SENSES OF PREDESTINATION .................................................................................................... 19 2.2.1 NOW-NECESSITY: PAST AS PARADIGMATIC ................................................................................... 20 2.2.2 NOW-NECESSITY: COUNTERFACTUALS AND DETERMINISM ......................................................... 23 2.2.3 WHY WP DOES NOT ENTAIL MF ..................................................................................................... 25 2.3 THE FOREKNOWERS .............................................................................................................................. 27 2.3.1 ORDINARY FOREKNOWLEDGE ....................................................................................................... 27 2.3.2 THE TIME TRAVELLER ..................................................................................................................... 28 2.3.3 THE DETERMINED PREDICTOR ....................................................................................................... 31 2.3.4 GOD ................................................................................................................................................ 33 2.3.4.1 Does God have foreknowledge? ............................................................................................. 36 2.3.4.2 Objections to the Timeless God View ..................................................................................... 40 2.3.4.3 Does God know ‘necessarily’? ................................................................................................ 43 2.3.4.4 The role of infallibility ............................................................................................................. 53 2.4. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 54 CHAPTER THREE: FOREKNOWN BUT FREE .................................................................................................. 58 3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 58 3.2 FREEDOM AS ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES............................................................................................... 60 3.3 FOREKNOWLEDGE AND ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES .............................................................................. 63 3.3.1 PAP & WEAK PREDESTINATION ..................................................................................................... 64 2 3.3.2 PAP & DETERMINISM ..................................................................................................................... 64 3.3.3 PAP & METAPHYSICAL FATALISM .................................................................................................. 66 3.4 FOREKNOWLEDGE AND COMPATIBILISM ............................................................................................. 67 3.4.1 CLASSICAL COMPATIBILISM ........................................................................................................... 69 3.4.2 MESH/HIERARCHICAL ACCOUNTS ................................................................................................. 70 3.4.2.1 WOLF’S MESH ACCOUNT ........................................................................................................ 72 3.4.3 REASON-RESPONSIVE ACCOUNTS.................................................................................................. 74 3.5 FOREKNOWLEDGE AND INCOMPATIBILISM ......................................................................................... 76 3.5.1 NON-CAUSAL INCOMPATIBILISM ................................................................................................... 76 3.5.2 AGENT-CAUSAL INCOMPATIBILISM ............................................................................................... 78 3.5.3 EVENT-CAUSAL INCOMPATIBILISM ................................................................................................ 79 3.5.3.1 KANE AND ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................... 80 3.6 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 83 CHAPTER FOUR: KNOW THYSELF ................................................................................................................ 85 4.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 85 4.2 THE THREE-FOLD DISTINCTION ............................................................................................................. 87 4.2.1 SMITH & THE DATED OBJECTS ....................................................................................................... 87 4.2.1.1 Invisible Ink (S has foreknowledge)......................................................................................... 88 4.2.1.2 Invisible, but known (You knowing S has foreknowledge) ..................................................... 89 4.2.1.3 Visible and Implications Understood (You knowing the content of S’s foreknowledge) ....... 89 4.2.2 NEWCOMB’S PROBLEM ................................................................................................................. 90 4.3 THE CONSEQUENCES ............................................................................................................................ 93 4.3.1 FIRST-PERSON FOREKNOWLEDGE & PREDESTINATION ................................................................ 93 4.3.2 FREE WILL ....................................................................................................................................... 95 4.3.2.1 ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES ....................................................................................................... 97 4.3.2.2 COMPATIBLIST ACCOUNTS ..................................................................................................... 98 4.3.2.3 OTHER INCOMPATIBILIST ACCOUNTS ..................................................................................... 99 4.3.3 CAUSAL LOOPS ............................................................................................................................. 100 4.4 THE DILEMMAS ................................................................................................................................... 103 4.4.1 SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY ........................................................................................................ 104 4.4.1.1
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