Monitoring and Control of Power Systems and Communication Infrastructures Based on IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25
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A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid
electronics Review A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid Jesús Lázaro 1,* , Armando Astarloa 1, Mikel Rodríguez 2, Unai Bidarte 1 and Jaime Jiménez 1 1 UPV/EHU, 48015 Bilbao, Spain; [email protected] (A.A.); [email protected] (U.B.); [email protected] (J.J.) 2 System-on-Chip Engineering, 48950 Erandio, Spain; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: Since the 1990s, the digitalization process has transformed the communication infras- tructure within the electrical grid: proprietary infrastructures and protocols have been replaced by the IEC 61850 approach, which realizes interoperability among vendors. Furthermore, the latest networking solutions merge operational technologies (OTs) and informational technology (IT) traffics in the same media, such as time-sensitive networking (TSN)—standard, interoperable, deterministic, and Ethernet-based. It merges OT and IT worlds by defining three basic traffic types: scheduled, best-effort, and reserved traffic. However, TSN demands security against potential new cyberattacks, primarily, to protect real-time critical messages. Consequently, security in the smart grid has turned into a hot topic under regulation, standardization, and business. This survey collects vulnerabilities of the communication in the smart grid and reveals security mechanisms introduced by international electrotechnical commission (IEC) 62351-6 and how to apply them to time-sensitive networking. Citation: Lázaro, J.; Astarloa, A.; Keywords: IEC 62351-6; smart grid; time-sensitive networking; IEC 61950 Rodríguez, M.; Bidarte U.; Jiménez, J. A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid. 1. Introduction Electronics 2021, 10, 1881. -
Standards Published in 2010
IRISH STANDARDS PUBLISHED BASED ON CEN/CENELEC STANDARDS 1. I.S. ENV 13710:2000 Date published 8 AUGUST 2010 European Ordering Rules - Ordering of characters from the Latin, Greek and Cyrillic scripts 2. I.S. ENV 13801:2000 Date published 8 AUGUST 2010 Plastics piping systems for soil and waste discharge (low and high temperature) within the building structure - Thermoplastics - Recommended practice for installation 3. I.S. CEN TS 13853:2004 Date published 13 FEBRUARY 2010 Swap bodies for combined transport – Stackable swap bodies type C 745-S16 – Dimensions, design requirements and testing 4. I.S. EN 61360-4:2005 Date published 7 JANUARY 2010 Standard data element types with associated classification scheme for electric components -- Part 4: IEC reference collection of standard data element types and component classes (IEC 61360-4:2005 (EQV)) 5. I.S. EN 1990:2002/A1:2006 Date published 29 MARCH 2010 Eurocode - Basis of structural design 6. I.S. EN 1991-4:2006 Date published 31 MARCH 2010 Eurocode 1 - Actions on structures - Part 4: Silos and tanks 7. I.S. EN 60512-13-5:2006/AC:2006 Date published 12 JANUARY 2010 Connectors for electronic equipment - Tests and measurements -- Part 13-5: Mechanical operation tests - Test 13e: Polarizing and keying method (IEC 60512-13 -5:2006 (EQV)) 8. I.S. EN 60034-9:2005/A1:2007 Date published 7 JANUARY 2010 Rotating electrical machines -- Part 9: Noise limits (IEC 60034-9:2003/A1:2007 (EQV)) 9. I.S. EN 548:2004/AC:2007 Date published 8 AUGUST 2010 Resilient floor coverings - Specification for plain and decorative linoleum 10. -
IEC 62351-7 ® Edition 1.0 2017-07
This is a preview - click here to buy the full publication IEC 62351-7 ® Edition 1.0 2017-07 INTERNATIONAL STANDARD colour inside Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 7: Network and System Management (NSM) data object models INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION ICS 33.200 ISBN 978-2-8322-4442-5 Warning! Make sure that you obtained this publication from an authorized distributor. ® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission This is a preview - click here to buy the full publication – 2 – IEC 62351-7:2017 © IEC 2017 CONTENTS FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................... 8 1 Scope ............................................................................................................................ 10 2 Normative references .................................................................................................... 10 3 Terms and definitions .................................................................................................... 12 4 Abbreviated terms and acronyms ................................................................................... 13 5 Overview of Network and System Management (NSM) .................................................. 14 5.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................. 14 5.2 NSM concepts...................................................................................................... -
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Cyber Security Practical considerations for implementing IEC 62351 Frank Hohlbaum, Markus Braendle, Fernando Alvarez ABB [email protected] Switzerland 1. Introduction Two trends are currently changing substation automation systems: IEC 61850 and the need for increased cyber security. IEC 61850 has gained global acceptance by both vendors as well as customers. Cyber security on the other hand has quickly become one of the most dominant topics for control systems in general and electrical utilities in particular. The combination of the two, securing IEC 61850 based communications, has been one of the goals of the recently published technical specification IEC 62351. In the authors‟ view IEC 62351 is overall a good starting point and will be the future standard to help secure IEC 61850 communication. However, there are some shortcomings of the current standard and some challenges that need to be addressed before IEC 62351 can be implemented and gain wide acceptance. This paper will highlight the challenge of addressing secure communication in the substation real-time environment, complying with the IEC 61850 real-time specifications. The major difficulties are to reach the performance defined in IEC 61850 for GOOSE and SV data with today‟s proposed technical specification defined for IEC 62351 part 6. In chapter 2, we will give a short overview about the structure of IEC 61850 as well as the detailed performance requirements for the various data types. Chapter 3 will present an introduction of the IEC 62351 standard including the used methods to secure the IEC 61850 communication. Chapter 4 will then show the major implementation issues of IEC 62351 part 6. -
Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (Hereafter Referred to As “IEC Publication(S)”)
This is a preview - click here to buy the full publication IEC/TS 62351-5 ® Edition 2.0 2013-04 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION PRICE CODE XE ICS 33.200 ISBN 978-2-83220-732-1 Warning! Make sure that you obtained this publication from an authorized distributor. ® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission This is a preview - click here to buy the full publication – 2 – TS 62351-5 © IEC:2013(E) CONTENTS FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................... 6 1 Scope and object .............................................................................................................. 8 2 Normative references ....................................................................................................... 9 3 Terms and definitions ..................................................................................................... 10 4 Abbreviated terms .......................................................................................................... 11 5 Problem description (informative) ................................................................................... 11 5.1 Overview of clause ................................................................................................ 11 5.2 Specific threats addressed ................................................................................... -
IEC 62351 Security Standards for the Power System Information Infrastructure
IEC TC57 WG15: IEC 62351 Security Standards for the Power System Information Infrastructure Frances Cleveland, WG15 Convenor Xanthus Consulting International Contents 1. OVERVIEW: IEC TC57 WG15 SECURITY FOR POWER SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS ................... 1 2. DUAL INFRASTRUCTURES: THE POWER SYSTEM AND THE INFORMATION SYSTEM .................. 2 3. WHY CYBERSECURITY? ............................................................................................................ 3 3.1 Legacy Approach: Security by Obscurity .......................................................................... 3 3.2 Smart Grid as Cyber-Physical Systems .............................................................................. 4 4. SECURITY CONCEPTS ............................................................................................................... 5 4.1 Security Threats ............................................................................................................... 5 4.2 Security Purposes ............................................................................................................ 5 4.3 Security Processes ........................................................................................................... 6 4.4 Security Planning ............................................................................................................. 7 4.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................... 8 4.6 Security Attacks .............................................................................................................. -
OPC Unified Architecture Interoperability for Industrie 4.0 and the Internet of Things
1 OPC Unified Architecture Interoperability for Industrie 4.0 and the Internet of Things IoT Industrie 4.0 M2M 2 Welcome to the OPC Foundation! As the international standard for vertical and horizontal communication, OPC-UA provides semantic interoper- ability for the smart world of connect- ed systems. Thomas J. Burke President und Executive Director OPC Foundation OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) is the data ex- OPC-UA is an IEC standard and therefore ideally change standard for safe, reliable, manufacturer- suited for cooperation with other organizations. and platform-independent industrial communication. As a global non-profit organization, the OPC Foun- It enables data exchange between products from dation coordinates the further development of the different manufacturers and across operating sys- OPC standard in collaboration with users, manufac- tems. The OPC-UA standard is based on specifica- turers and researchers. Activities include: tions that were developed in close cooperation be- tween manufacturers, users, research institutes and ➞ Development and maintenance of specifications consortia, in order to enable safe information ex- ➞ Certification and compliance tests of change in heterogeneous systems. implementations ➞ Cooperation with other standards organizations OPC has been very popular in the industry and also becoming more popular in other markets like the This brochure provides an overview of IoT, M2M Internet of Things (IoT). With the introduction of Ser- (Machine to Machine) and Industrie 4.0 requirements vice-Oriented-Architecture (SOA) in industrial auto- and illustrates solutions, technical details and imple- mation systems in 2007, OPC-UA started to offer a mentations based on OPC-UA. scalable, platform-independent solution which com- The broad approval among representatives from re- bines the benefits of web services and integrated search, industry and associations indicates OPC-UA security with a consistent data model. -
Timing, Networking & Security
Timing, Networking & Security Company Profile ........................................................................... 5 Technology ....................................................................................... 6 Providing Time-Sensitive Networking Providing High-Availability Networking Providing Security for Critical-Mission Embedded Systems IP Cores for FPGAs: Networking ....................................... 8 Deterministic Ethernet Switch IPs ...........................................................................8 Multiport TSN Switch IP Determinisitic HSR IP High-Availability Ethernet Switch IPs: ..............................................................10 HSR/PRP Swith IP Secure HSR IP MRP IP Time-Aware & Industrial Ethernet Switch IPs ..............................................12 Managed Ethernet Switch IP Unmanaged Ethernet Switch IP Profinet IP Ethernet IP/DLR IP Cyber-Security Surveillance Switch IP IP Cores for FPGAs : Synchronization ....................... 14 MultiSync IP IEEE 1588 Precise Time Multi-profile IP 1588Tiny Slave-Only IP IRIG-B Master IP IRIG-B Slave IP IP Cores for FPGAs: Security for Critical Traffic ....18 Substation Automation Systems (SAS) Crypto-core IP Secure Configuration-over-Ethernet IP Secure IEEE 1588 Secure HSR IP FPGA Networking Modules SMARTmpsoc Family ............................................................................................... 20 Module Brick Kits SMARTzynq Family .................................................................................................. -
Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid
sensors Article Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid Haftu Tasew Reda 1 , Biplob Ray 2 , Pejman Peidaee 3 , Adnan Anwar 4 , Abdun Mahmood 1 , Akhtar Kalam 3 and Nahina Islam 2,* 1 Department of Computer Science and IT, La Trobe University, Plenty Rd., Bundoora 3086, Australia; [email protected] (H.T.R.); [email protected] (A.M.) 2 Centre for Intelligent Systems (CIS), School of Engineering and Technology, CQUniversity, Rockhampton 4700, Australia; [email protected] 3 Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Victoria University, Ballarat Rd., Footscray 3011, Australia; [email protected] (P.P.); [email protected] (A.K.) 4 School of IT, Deakin University, 75 Pigdons Rd, Waurn Ponds 3216, Australia; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Abstract: IEC 61850 is one of the most prominent communication standards adopted by the smart grid community due to its high scalability, multi-vendor interoperability, and support for several input/output devices. Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which is a widely used communication protocol defined in IEC 61850, provides reliable and fast transmission of events for the electrical substation system. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of this protocol and analyzes the potential impact on the smart grid by rigorously analyzing the security of the GOOSE protocol using an automated process and identifying vulnerabilities in the context of smart grid communication. The vulnerabilities are tested using a real-time simulation and industry standard Citation: Reda, H.T.; Ray, B.; Peidaee, hardware-in-the-loop emulation. -
Requirements and Challenges of a Future Proof Migration Towards A
Panel Session #1 Standards for Smart Grids Your Panelists • Lars Nordström, KTH, Sweden – is associate professor in Power System Management at KTH – The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, Since 2006 Director of the Swedish centre of Excellence in electric power engineering and active in IEC’s SMB Strategic group on Smartgrids and EU DG Energy taskforce on Smartgrids. • Mathias Uslar, OFFIS, Germany – Dr. Uslar is head of the CISE, the Centre for IT Standards in the Energy Sector. He is member of German GI, IEEE, ACM and IEC german mirror commitee member DKE K 952, 952.0.10, 952.0.17 and international member of IE TC 57 WG 14 and 16 • Karlheinz Schwarz, Nettedautomation, Germany – President of Schwarz Consulting Company, SCC, specializing in distributed automation systems, is involved in many international standardization projects (IEC 61850 – utility automation, DER, hydro power, IEC 61400-25 – wind power, IEC 61158 - Fieldbus, ISO 9506 – MMS, …) since 1984. • Arshad Saleem, DTU, Denmark – is currently pursuing a Ph.D. degree from the Department of Electrical Engineering of DTU, Denmark. He received his bachelor degree in Computer Science and an M.Sc degree in Intelligent Systems from BTH, Sweden. His research interests are application of intelligent systems and autonomous agents to power system control, communication in power systems and distributed control. Definitions of Smartgrids “Smart“Smart GridGrid isis anan electricityelectricity networknetwork thatthat cancan costintelligently efficiently integrate integrate the -
Timing, Networking & Security
Timing, Networking & Security Company Profile ........................................................................... 4 Technology ....................................................................................... 6 Silicon IP cores .............................................................................. 8 Ethernet Networking ........................................................................................ 8 1G Multiport TSN Switch 10G Multiport TSN Switch 1G HSR/PRP Switch D-S HSR Switch 10G Managed Ethernet Switch 1G Managed Ethernet Switch Spacecraft Networking & Interfacing .................................................. 16 SpaceWire Cameralink RX Interface Accurate Timing Synchronization ......................................................... 17 MULTIsync 1588Tiny Slave-Only IRIG-B Master IRIG-B Slave Wire-speed Cryptography .......................................................................... 21 Multi-algorithmic low-latency AES-GCM Crypto-core Secure Ethernet for Substation Automation Systems Crypto-core Secure Configuration-over-Ethernet IP Industrial Computing Acceleration........................................................22 Sampled Measured Values Subscriber Deep-packet Inspection Engine FPGA Networking Modules ............................................... 24 SMARTmpsoc Family SMARTzynq Family SMARToem Family Multiport FMC Board MEZU Family Embedded Software ............................................................... 32 SoC-e Portable Tools RSTP Posix-compliant Software Stack SoC-e Layer-3 -
Relationships Between I4.0 Components
WORKING PAPER Relationships between In Cooperation with I4.0 Components – Composite Components and Smart Production Continuation of the Development of the Reference Model for the I4.0 SG Models and Standards Imprint Publisher The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs Energy was awarded the audit berufundfamilie® and Energy (BMWi) for its family-friendly staff policy. The certificate Public Relations is granted by berufundfamilie gGmbH, an initia- 10119 Berlin tive of the Hertie Foundation. www.bmwi.de Text and editing Plattform Industrie 4.0 Bertolt-Brecht-Platz 3 10117 Berlin Design and production PRpetuum GmbH, Munich Status June 2017 Illustrations This publication as well as further publications Fotohansel – Fotolia (Title) can be obtained from: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) This brochure is published as part of the public relations work Public Relations of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. It E-mail: [email protected] is distributed free of charge and is not intended for sale. The www.bmwi.de distribution of this brochure at campaign events or at informa- tion stands run by political parties is prohibited, and political Central procurement service: party-related information or advertising shall not be inserted Tel.: +49 30 182722721 in, printed on, or affixed to this publication. Fax: +49 30 18102722721 2 Contents 1 Preliminary remarks .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................