Introduction: Logic, Philosophy, and Philosophical Logic
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Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of Scepticism
This is the final, pre-publication draft. Please cite only from published paper in Philosophical Investigations 26:2 (April 2003), 125-48. LOGIC IN ACTION: WITTGENSTEIN'S LOGICAL PRAGMATISM AND THE IMPOTENCE OF SCEPTICISM DANIÈLE MOYAL-SHARROCK UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA 1. The Many Faces of Certainty: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. (OC 422) In his struggle to uncover the nature of our basic beliefs, Wittgenstein depicts them variously in On Certainty: he thinks of them in propositional terms, in pictorial terms and in terms of acting. As propositions, they would be of a peculiar sort – a hybrid between a logical and an empirical proposition (OC 136, 309). These are the so-called 'hinge propositions' of On Certainty (OC 341). Wittgenstein also thinks of these beliefs as forming a picture, a World-picture – or Weltbild (OC 167). This is a step in the right (nonpropositional) direction, but not the ultimate step. Wittgenstein's ultimate and crucial depiction of our basic beliefs is in terms of a know-how, an attitude, a way of acting (OC 204). Here, he treads on pragmatist ground. But can Wittgenstein be labelled a pragmatist, having himself rejected the affiliation because of its utility implication? But you aren't a pragmatist? No. For I am not saying that a proposition is true if it is useful. (RPP I, 266) Wittgenstein resists affiliation with pragmatism because he does not want his use of use to be confused with the utility use of use. For him, it is not that a proposition is true if it is useful, but that use gives the proposition its sense. -
Logic Model Workbook
Logic Model Workbook INNOVATION NETWORK, INC. www.innonet.org • [email protected] Logic Model Workbook Table of Contents Page Introduction - How to Use this Workbook .....................................................................2 Before You Begin .................................................................................................................3 Developing a Logic Model .................................................................................................4 Purposes of a Logic Model ............................................................................................... 5 The Logic Model’s Role in Evaluation ............................................................................ 6 Logic Model Components – Step by Step ....................................................................... 6 Problem Statement: What problem does your program address? ......................... 6 Goal: What is the overall purpose of your program? .............................................. 7 Rationale and Assumptions: What are some implicit underlying dynamics? ....8 Resources: What do you have to work with? ......................................................... 9 Activities: What will you do with your resources? ................................................ 11 Outputs: What are the tangible products of your activities? ................................. 13 Outcomes: What changes do you expect to occur as a result of your work?.......... 14 Outcomes Chain ...................................................................................... -
Introduction to Philosophy. Social Studies--Language Arts: 6414.16. INSTITUTION Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Fla
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 086 604 SO 006 822 AUTHOR Norris, Jack A., Jr. TITLE Introduction to Philosophy. Social Studies--Language Arts: 6414.16. INSTITUTION Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Fla. PUB DATE 72 NOTE 20p.; Authorized Course of Instruction for the Quinmester Program EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29 DESCRIPTORS Course Objectives; Curriculum Guides; Grade 10; Grade 11; Grade 12; *Language Arts; Learnin4 Activities; *Logic; Non Western Civilization; *Philosophy; Resource Guides; Secondary Grades; *Social Studies; *Social Studies Units; Western Civilization IDENTIFIERS *Quinmester Program ABSTRACT Western and non - western philosophers and their ideas are introduced to 10th through 12th grade students in this general social studies Quinmester course designed to be used as a preparation for in-depth study of the various schools of philosophical thought. By acquainting students with the questions and categories of philosophy, a point of departure for further study is developed. Through suggested learning activities the meaning of philosopky is defined. The Socratic, deductive, inductive, intuitive and eclectic approaches to philosophical thought are examined, as are three general areas of philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology,and axiology. Logical reasoning is applied to major philosophical questions. This course is arranged, as are other quinmester courses, with sections on broad goals, course content, activities, and materials. A related document is ED 071 937.(KSM) FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY U S DEPARTMENT EDUCATION OF HEALTH. NAT10N41 -
John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected]
John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected] LOGIC & PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY Introduction For present purposes “logic” will be understood to mean the subject whose development is described in Kneale & Kneale [1961] and of which a concise history is given in Scholz [1961]. As the terminological discussion at the beginning of the latter reference makes clear, this subject has at different times been known by different names, “analytics” and “organon” and “dialectic”, while inversely the name “logic” has at different times been applied much more broadly and loosely than it will be here. At certain times and in certain places — perhaps especially in Germany from the days of Kant through the days of Hegel — the label has come to be used so very broadly and loosely as to threaten to take in nearly the whole of metaphysics and epistemology. Logic in our sense has often been distinguished from “logic” in other, sometimes unmanageably broad and loose, senses by adding the adjectives “formal” or “deductive”. The scope of the art and science of logic, once one gets beyond elementary logic of the kind covered in introductory textbooks, is indicated by two other standard references, the Handbooks of mathematical and philosophical logic, Barwise [1977] and Gabbay & Guenthner [1983-89], though the latter includes also parts that are identified as applications of logic rather than logic proper. The term “philosophical logic” as currently used, for instance, in the Journal of Philosophical Logic, is a near-synonym for “nonclassical logic”. There is an older use of the term as a near-synonym for “philosophy of language”. -
A Survey of Indian Logic from the Point of View of Computer Science
Sadhana, "Col. 19, Part 6, December 1994, pp 971-983. © Printed in India A survey of Indian logic from the point of view of computer science V V S SARMA Department of Computer Science & Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India Abstract. Indian logic has a long history. It somewhat covers the domains of two of the six schools (darsanas) of Indian philosophy, namely, Nyaya and Vaisesika. The generally accepted definition of In- dian logic over the ages is the science which ascertains valid knowledge either by means of six senses or by means of the five members of the syllogism. In other words, perception and inference constitute the sub- ject matter of logic. The science of logic evolved in India through three ~ges: the ancient, the medieval and the modern, spanning almost thirty centuries. Advances in Computer Science, in particular, in Artificial Intelligence have got researchers in these areas interested in the basic problems of language, logic and cognition in the past three decades. In the 1980s, Artificial Intelligence has evolved into knowledge-based and intelligent system design, and the knowledge base and inference engine have become standard subsystems of an intelligent System. One of the important issues in the design of such systems is knowledge acquisition from humans who are experts in a branch of learning (such as medicine or law) and transferring that knowledge to a computing system. The second important issue in such systems is the validation of the knowl- edge base of the system i.e. ensuring that the knowledge is complete and consistent. -
The Etienne Gilson Series 21
The Etienne Gilson Series 21 Remapping Scholasticism by MARCIA L. COLISH 3 March 2000 Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies This lecture and its publication was made possible through the generous bequest of the late Charles J. Sullivan (1914-1999) Note: the author may be contacted at: Department of History Oberlin College Oberlin OH USA 44074 ISSN 0-708-319X ISBN 0-88844-721-3 © 2000 by Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 59 Queen’s Park Crescent East Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4 Printed in Canada nce upon a time there were two competing story-lines for medieval intellectual history, each writing a major role for scholasticism into its script. Although these story-lines were O created independently and reflected different concerns, they sometimes overlapped and gave each other aid and comfort. Both exerted considerable influence on the way historians of medieval speculative thought conceptualized their subject in the first half of the twentieth cen- tury. Both versions of the map drawn by these two sets of cartographers illustrated what Wallace K. Ferguson later described as “the revolt of the medievalists.”1 One was confined largely to the academy and appealed to a wide variety of medievalists, while the other had a somewhat narrower draw and reflected political and confessional, as well as academic, concerns. The first was the anti-Burckhardtian effort to push Renaissance humanism, understood as combining a knowledge and love of the classics with “the discovery of the world and of man,” back into the Middle Ages. The second was inspired by the neo-Thomist revival launched by Pope Leo XIII, and was inhabited almost exclusively by Roman Catholic scholars. -
Logical Empiricism / Positivism Some Empiricist Slogans
4/13/16 Logical empiricism / positivism Some empiricist slogans o Hume’s 18th century book-burning passage Key elements of a logical positivist /empiricist conception of science o Comte’s mid-19th century rejection of n Motivations for post WW1 ‘scientific philosophy’ ‘speculation after first & final causes o viscerally opposed to speculation / mere metaphysics / idealism o Duhem’s late 19th/early 20th century slogan: o a normative demarcation project: to show why science ‘save the phenomena’ is and should be epistemically authoritative n Empiricist commitments o Hempel’s injunction against ‘detours n Logicism through the realm of unobservables’ Conflicts & Memories: The First World War Vienna Circle Maria Marchant o Debussy: Berceuse héroique, Élégie So - what was the motivation for this “revolutionary, written war-time Paris (1914), heralds the ominous bugle call of war uncompromising empricism”? (Godfrey Smith, Ch. 2) o Rachmaninov: Études-Tableaux Op. 39, No 8, 5 “some of the most impassioned, fervent work the composer wrote” Why the “massive intellectual housecleaning”? (Godfrey Smith) o Ireland: Rhapsody, London Nights, London Pieces a “turbulant, virtuosic work… Consider the context: World War I / the interwar period o Prokofiev: Visions Fugitives, Op. 22 written just before he fled as a fugitive himself to the US (1917); military aggression & sardonic irony o Ravel: Le Tombeau de Couperin each of six movements dedicated to a friend who died in the war x Key problem (1): logicism o Are there, in fact, “rules” governing inference -
Mathematical Logic Part One
Mathematical Logic Part One An Important Question How do we formalize the logic we've been using in our proofs? Where We're Going ● Propositional Logic (Today) ● Basic logical connectives. ● Truth tables. ● Logical equivalences. ● First-Order Logic (Today/Friday) ● Reasoning about properties of multiple objects. Propositional Logic A proposition is a statement that is, by itself, either true or false. Some Sample Propositions ● Puppies are cuter than kittens. ● Kittens are cuter than puppies. ● Usain Bolt can outrun everyone in this room. ● CS103 is useful for cocktail parties. ● This is the last entry on this list. More Propositions ● I came in like a wrecking ball. ● I am a champion. ● You're going to hear me roar. ● We all just entertainers. Things That Aren't Propositions CommandsCommands cannotcannot bebe truetrue oror false.false. Things That Aren't Propositions QuestionsQuestions cannotcannot bebe truetrue oror false.false. Things That Aren't Propositions TheThe firstfirst halfhalf isis aa validvalid proposition.proposition. I am the walrus, goo goo g'joob JibberishJibberish cannotcannot bebe truetrue oror false. false. Propositional Logic ● Propositional logic is a mathematical system for reasoning about propositions and how they relate to one another. ● Every statement in propositional logic consists of propositional variables combined via logical connectives. ● Each variable represents some proposition, such as “You liked it” or “You should have put a ring on it.” ● Connectives encode how propositions are related, such as “If you liked it, then you should have put a ring on it.” Propositional Variables ● Each proposition will be represented by a propositional variable. ● Propositional variables are usually represented as lower-case letters, such as p, q, r, s, etc. -
Concrete Possible Worlds (Final)
CONCRETE POSSIBLE WORLDS Phillip Bricker 1. INTRODUCTION. Open a book or article of contemporary analytic philosophy, and you are likely to find talk of possible worlds therein. This applies not only to analytic metaphysics, but to areas as diverse as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics. Philosophers agree, for the most part, that possible worlds talk is extremely useful for explicating concepts and formulating theories. They disagree, however, over its proper interpretation. In this chapter, I discuss the view, championed by David Lewis, that philosophers’ talk of possible worlds is the literal truth.1 There exists a plurality of worlds. One of these is our world, the actual world, the physical universe that contains us and all our surroundings. The others are merely possible worlds containing merely possible beings, such as flying pigs and talking donkeys. But the other worlds are no less real or concrete for being merely possible. Fantastic? Yes! What could motivate a philosopher to believe such a tale? I start, as is customary, with modality.2 Truths about the world divide into two sorts: categorical and modal. Categorical truths describe how things are, what is actually the case. Modal truths describe how things could or must be, what is possibly or 1 The fullest statement of Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is contained in his magnum opus, Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis’s view is sometimes called “modal realism.” 2 Historically, it was the attempt to provide semantics for modal logic that catapulted possible worlds to the forefront of analytic philosophy. -
Logic, Sets, and Proofs David A
Logic, Sets, and Proofs David A. Cox and Catherine C. McGeoch Amherst College 1 Logic Logical Statements. A logical statement is a mathematical statement that is either true or false. Here we denote logical statements with capital letters A; B. Logical statements be combined to form new logical statements as follows: Name Notation Conjunction A and B Disjunction A or B Negation not A :A Implication A implies B if A, then B A ) B Equivalence A if and only if B A , B Here are some examples of conjunction, disjunction and negation: x > 1 and x < 3: This is true when x is in the open interval (1; 3). x > 1 or x < 3: This is true for all real numbers x. :(x > 1): This is the same as x ≤ 1. Here are two logical statements that are true: x > 4 ) x > 2. x2 = 1 , (x = 1 or x = −1). Note that \x = 1 or x = −1" is usually written x = ±1. Converses, Contrapositives, and Tautologies. We begin with converses and contrapositives: • The converse of \A implies B" is \B implies A". • The contrapositive of \A implies B" is \:B implies :A" Thus the statement \x > 4 ) x > 2" has: • Converse: x > 2 ) x > 4. • Contrapositive: x ≤ 2 ) x ≤ 4. 1 Some logical statements are guaranteed to always be true. These are tautologies. Here are two tautologies that involve converses and contrapositives: • (A if and only if B) , ((A implies B) and (B implies A)). In other words, A and B are equivalent exactly when both A ) B and its converse are true. -
David Lewis's Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames by The
David Lewis’s Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames By the early 1970s, and continuing through 2001, David Lewis and Saul Kripke had taken over W.V.O. Quine’s leadership in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic in the English-speaking world. Quine, in turn, had inherited his position in the early 1950s from Rudolf Carnap, who had been the leading logical positivist -- first in Europe, and, after 1935, in America. A renegade positivist himself, Quine eschewed apriority, necessity, and analyticity, while (for a time) adopting a holistic version of verificationism. Like Carnap, he placed philosophical logic and the philosophy of science at the center of philosophy. While not entirely avoiding metaphysics and epistemology, he tried to “naturalize” both. By contrast, Lewis and Kripke embraced the modalities Quine rejected.1 They also had no sympathy for his early verificationism, or his twin flights from intension and intention. As for philosophy of science, it was transforming itself into specialized philosophies of the several sciences, and did not lend itself to unified treatment. Although Lewis had deep interests in scientific issues, and was commendably realist about science in general, science itself was not the center of own distinctive approach to philosophy. Despite similarities in their opposition to Quine, the differences between Lewis and Kripke were large – especially in the semantics and metaphysics of modality. They also had different philosophical styles. Whereas Lewis was a wide-ranging thinker who pieced together a systematic philosophical world view, Kripke gave little thought to system, focusing instead on a few central topics. There is, therefore, no conflict between the two on many of the issues on which Kripke was silent. -
Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Right Way of Thinking
SANDIA REPORT SAND2011-5583 Unlimited Release Printed August 2011 Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking Philip L. Campbell Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550 Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited. Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily con- stitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.