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A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

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A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism Nicholas Dixon Alma College Editors' note: The original of this paper by Professor Dixon, the response by Professor Wellington, and the reply by Dixon were presented at the Central Division meetings that animals' interests are qualitatively less important of the Society for the Study of Ethics and than those of humans or even that animals' interests Animals, held in Chicago, Dlinois, April, 1995. are not morally significant at all. While we should not gratuitously cause them suffering, we may use them as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second group "human supremacists." My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what 1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones. I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' strategic reason that it requires only that we extend interests in general) come in many varieties, we may moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer likely to grant this premise than they are to accept base their argument on the suffering thatfactory farming Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable view that all animals have an intrinsic value that may benefits to humans.l Second, the animal rights view, as notbe sacrificed in the course ofutilitarian caIculations.4 expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat 2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.2 Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types In this section, I am interested in those who try tojustify of defense of meat eating. My division is based on meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian terms. They how each group responds to Singer's demand that we agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by extend the equal consideration of interests principle3 simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans to include nonhumans and to his parallel between is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do deserve equal consideration ofinterests, but they argue either that animals actually benefit from being raised on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights PHILOSOPHY approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. However, they argue, in direct opposition to Regan, Between the Species 90 Summer & Fall 1995 A Utilitarian Argumentfor Vegetarianism how human gains from meat eating outweigh non­ Frey argues that the concerned individual's tactic is human suffering. I will focus mainly on R.G. Frey's sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to justification ofmeateating in his book, Rights, Killing, justifycontinuing to raise animals for meat. lbroughout and Suffering.sFrey takes Singer's challenge seriously his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that and gives a careful, detailed response.. Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned principle does not necessarily condemn all meat individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to farming, since animals raised on free range farms (and, reform farming techniques in order to eliminate cruelty we may suppose, on the kind of refOlmed farms that to farm animals. He argues that Singer's demand for Frey proposes? may avoid much of the suffering for the end of factory farming is based on the implausible which Singercondemns factory farms. However, Singer "single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is questions whether even free range farms would reduce wrong if it causes any suffering at all to farm animals. animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life" by humans' gains and whether, even if they did so, they view of suffering, according to which we may be would be economically feasible. 8 Moreover, he points justified in causing animals some pain in order to raise outthat the pertinent issue is whether we may eattoday s them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are meat, most of which is raised on factory farms.9 In any on balance more pleasant than painful. He points out event, even ifFrey wereable to show that the concerned that the "single experience" view of suffering would individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have almost certainly have the absurd consequence that equally good consequences for the animals, his raising human children would also be wrong, since it argumentfor continuing to raise animals for meat would would be practically impossible' to eliminate all still depend on showing that doing so would have better suffering from their lives.6 consequences for humans than vegetarianism. Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable Before we tum to Frey's answer to this challenge, life" view of suffering is sup'erior to the "single let us examine another utilitarian defense ofmeat eating experience" view. However, his argument neglects a that goes even further than Frey's and argues that our third option that is more salutary than either ofthe ones practice ofraising animals on farms benefits the animals he considers. I will call this third option the "minimal themselves. Farm animals have become domesticated, suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the in nature, were we to set them free. Ifexposed to life in opposite fault ofbeing too lenient. Itis itselfvulnerable the wild-bitter winters, savage predators, etc.-farm to a reductio: it would justify even the gratuitous animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the starvation, or quickly and savagely at the hands of suffering is justbarely outweighed by the pleasure they wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal individual's tactic and reform our farming practices to suffering" view, which permits the infliction ofsuffering give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable, when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior. even though it might contain some pain, is preferable Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of overall happiness outweighs their suffering) is ending meat farming. repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate This "animal husbandry" argumentcan draw support punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term from an unexpected source: 1. Baird Callicott's defense suffering, either for our children orourselves. Similarly, of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal the suffering caused to animals when we raise them rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is and domestic animals.lO He argues that none of the clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even likely outcomes ofourceasing to raise animals for meat greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to to show what the benefits of continuing to raise fending for themselves in competition with other wild animals for meat are and how they outweigh the animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct, suffering caused to animals. and we might consider itmore humane simply to allow Summer & Fall 1995 91 Between the Species A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism existing fann animals to die peacefully on fanns than animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and animals resulting in their extinction.ll we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in wild animals would create at least as much happiness response to this reductio ad absurdum argument.12 The as is currently experienced by farm animals.16 discontinuation ofmeat farming will likely result in the Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals replacement of domestic by wild animals. But this is have no natural instincts that could be violated, our an advantage, since it will result in an increase in the utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since animals. First, even ifthe adoption ofFrey's concerned animals that both have a nature and live in nature individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives. pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land in this paper can further criticize the confmement of previously used for grazing on farms. i3 Second, wild animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that animals live more pleasurable lives than domestic ones. raising animals on farms violates their inherent value, Gruzalski points out that no amount ofmodification of by treating them only as a means.
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