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Home , Peter Singer

A Utilitarian Argument for

Nicholas Dixon Alma College

Editors' note: The original of this paper by Professor Dixon, the response by Professor Wellington, and the reply by Dixon were presented at the Central Division meetings that animals' interests are qualitatively less important of the Society for the Study of and than those of humans or even that animals' interests Animals, held in Chicago, Dlinois, April, 1995. are not morally significant at all. While we should not gratuitously cause them , we may use them as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second group "human supremacists." My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what 1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones. I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' strategic reason that it requires only that we extend interests in general) come in many varieties, we may moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer likely to grant this premise than they are to accept base their argument on the suffering thatfactory farming Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable view that all animals have an intrinsic that may benefits to humans.l Second, the animal view, as notbe sacrificed in the course ofutilitarian caIculations.4 expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons to include nonhumans and argues that meat 2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.2 Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types In this section, I am interested in those who try tojustify of defense of meat eating. My division is based on meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian terms. They how each group responds to Singer's demand that we agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by extend the equal consideration of interests principle3 simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans to include nonhumans and to his parallel between is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do deserve equal consideration ofinterests, but they argue either that animals actually benefit from being raised on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights PHILOSOPHY approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. However, they argue, in direct opposition to Regan,

Between the Species 90 Summer & Fall 1995 A Utilitarian Argumentfor Vegetarianism

how human gains from meat eating outweigh non­ Frey argues that the concerned individual's tactic is human suffering. I will focus mainly on R.G. Frey's sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to justification ofmeateating in his book, Rights, Killing, justifycontinuing to raise animals for meat. lbroughout and Suffering.sFrey takes Singer's challenge seriously his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that and gives a careful, detailed response.. Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned principle does not necessarily condemn all meat individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to farming, since animals raised on free range farms (and, reform farming techniques in order to eliminate cruelty we may suppose, on the kind of refOlmed farms that to farm animals. He argues that Singer's demand for Frey proposes? may avoid much of the suffering for the end of factory farming is based on the implausible which Singercondemns factory farms. However, Singer "single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is questions whether even free range farms would reduce wrong if it causes any suffering at all to farm animals. animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life" by humans' gains and whether, even if they did so, they view of suffering, according to which we may be would be economically feasible. 8 Moreover, he points justified in causing animals some in order to raise outthat the pertinent issue is whether we may eattoday s them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are meat, most of which is raised on factory farms.9 In any on balance more pleasant than painful. He points out event, even ifFrey wereable to show that the concerned that the "single experience" view of suffering would individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have almost certainly have the absurd consequence that equally consequences for the animals, his raising human children would also be wrong, since it argumentfor continuing to raise animals for meat would would be practically impossible' to eliminate all still depend on showing that doing so would have better suffering from their lives.6 consequences for humans than vegetarianism. Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable Before we tum to Frey's answer to this challenge, life" view of suffering is sup'erior to the "single let us examine another utilitarian defense ofmeat eating experience" view. However, his argument neglects a that goes even further than Frey's and argues that our third option that is more salutary than either ofthe ones practice ofraising animals on farms benefits the animals he considers. I will call this third option the "minimal themselves. Farm animals have become domesticated, suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the in nature, were we to set them free. Ifexposed to life in opposite fault ofbeing too lenient. Itis itselfvulnerable the wild-bitter winters, savage predators, etc.-farm to a reductio: it would justify even the gratuitous animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the starvation, or quickly and savagely at the hands of suffering is justbarely outweighed by the they wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal individual's tactic and reform our farming practices to suffering" view, which permits the infliction ofsuffering give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable, when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior. even though it might contain some pain, is preferable Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of overall outweighs their suffering) is ending meat farming. repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate This "" argumentcan draw support punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term from an unexpected source: 1. Baird Callicott's defense suffering, either for our children orourselves. Similarly, of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal the suffering caused to animals when we raise them rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is and domestic animals.lO He argues that none of the clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even likely outcomes ofourceasing to raise animals for meat greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to to show what the benefits of continuing to raise fending for themselves in competition with other wild animals for meat are and how they outweigh the animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct, suffering caused to animals. and we might consider itmore humane simply to allow

Summer & Fall 1995 91 A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

existing fann animals to die peacefully on fanns than animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and animals resulting in their extinction.ll we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in wild animals would create at least as much happiness response to this reductio ad absurdum argument.12 The as is currently experienced by farm animals.16 discontinuation ofmeat farming will likely result in the Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals replacement of domestic by wild animals. But this is have no natural instincts that could be violated, our an advantage, since it will result in an increase in the utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since animals. First, even ifthe adoption ofFrey's concerned animals that both have a nature and live in nature individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives. pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land in this paper can further criticize the confmement of previously used for grazing on farms. i3 Second, wild animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that animals live more pleasurable lives than domestic ones. raising animals on farms violates their inherent value, Gruzalski points out that no amount ofmodification of by treating them only as a means. Even though he our current farming practices will eliminate the rejects Singer's and Regan's approach, Callicott frustration of animals' natural urges and instincts, in himself gives a nonutilitarian reason against factory terms ofmovement, social organization, and diet. Thus, farming, namely that it involves "the monstrous it isn't clear that animals raised in the manner proposed transformation of living things from an organic to a by Frey's "concerned individual" have lives that are on mechanical mode of being."17 balance pleasurable. In contrast, while wild animals can The foregoing discussion suggests that nonhuman indeed suffer painful "natural" deaths from predators, animals would be better offifwe completely ended meat these deaths at least avoid the additional terror caused farming than if we followed the tactic of Frey's by the unfamiliar environment of the . concerned individual. Consequently, the justifiability And some wild animals die peacefully of old age, thus of the concerned individual's lactic hinges on showing avoiding any terror at all. that the benefits for humans of continuing to raise We still need to address another of Callicott's animals for meat outweigh its disutility for nonhumans. objections, which is also based on the distinction Let us tum at last to Frey's main argument. between domestic and wild animals. Arguments (such Frey bases his utilitarian defense of meat farming as Gruzalski's) that claim that meat fanning frustrates on a detailed conjecture as to the bad economic animals' "natural " neglect the fact that "human consequences for humans of its cessation.is Frey artifacts" such as domestic animals do not hflve a nature predicts a massive loss of income and employment, that can be violated. not only for farmers but also for the vast number of people in meat-related industries. He also includes the It would make almost as much sense to speak loss ofpleasure resulting from a decrease in such social of the natural behavior of tables and chairS. 14 activities as restaurant-going and barbecues. Since space does not permit detailed discussion of Frey's In response, Gruzalski cites experts who believe that specific predictions, I will confine myself to a few general responses. the natural, instinctive urges and behavioral First, Frey's argument is based on worst-case patterns...of... ancestral wild species have scenarios which underestimate the new economic and been little, if at all, bred out in the process of social opportunities that will arise because of the need domestication.15 for enormously greater production of vegetarian food. For instance, the growing popularity of vegetarianism In the face of this stalemate on the nature of domestic in the United States and, especially, in England has led animals, we may reasonably err on the side of caution to a profusion of vegetarian restaurants, and most and place the burden of proof on those who would use restaurants now offer vegetarian options. These

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developments indicate that the gloomy predictions that yet be does not include these effects in bis discussion Frey made twelve years ago about the future of the of consequences. Only if be can sbow that the benefits restaurant industry ifmeat eating were to be abandoned for humans of meat farming outweigb its disutility for were unfounded. The fact that even MacDonalds bas animals arul/or humans has be successfully responded developed a vegetarian burger, and that supermarkets to Singer's utilitarian argument defended in this paper. now stock a wide variety ofdifferent types ofnon-meat In sum, Frey's argument, even if supplemented by burgers and hot dogs, undermines Frey's claim that fast the animal busbandry argument, fails to overcome the food restaurants would collapse and shows that utilitarian case against raising animals for meat Neither barbecues could continue even if we gave up meat. More bis contention that it will sufficiently reduce animals' generally, Frey's claim that all vegetarian restaurants suffering, nor bis argument that it will have betterresults are alike reflects the common myth that vegetarian for humans than vegetarianism, have succeeded in cuisine is bland, a charge that is already belied by the making the case for the concerned individual's strategy. imaginative menus available in such restaurants. Consequently, the only certainties are that today's meat Second, even granting that conversion to vegetar­ farming causes the animals considerable suffering and ianism would cause some economic bardship, and that discontinuing meat farming will end that suffering. granting Frey's point that this hardship is commen· surable with animals' suffering,19 economic factors are 3. Human Supremacism unlikely to outweigb the physical and mental suffering that would remain for farm animals even ifwe reformed We bave seen that meat eating is bard to justify on farming methods. By analogy, even a purely utilitarian utilitarian grounds. Once we concede that the moral approach, which forswears any reference to rights, interests of nonhumans sbould be given equal weigbt would certainly not accept the economic arguments that alongside those of bumans in our moral deliberations, could doubtless bave been made in favor ofchild labor buman gains from meat eating appear trivial compared in the 19th. century. The children's suffering outweighs to animals' losses. At this point, many defenders ofmeat any financial gains that might bave arisen from eating take a different tack and withdraw their assent exploiting this source of cbeap or free labor. from Singer's application of the equal consideration of Tbird, a consistent utilitarian approacb must interests principle to nonhumans. According to this consider not only the potentially bannful effects for position, wbich I call "buman supremacism," bumans' bumans of giving up raising animals for meat but also interests sbould count for more than those of non­ its potential benefits for us. As well as the health benefits bumans, making utilitarian comparisons of human and arising from giving up meat, we must take into account nonhuman gains and losses inappropriate. the fact that, as a far more efficient source of protein The issue at stake between utilitarian vegetarians than a meat-based diet, a vegetarian diet may belp sucb as Singer and, on the other hand, buman substantially to alleviate the problem of world hunger.2o supremacists is wbether the of meat eating Now, Frey is aware of these arguments based on buman depends on a quantitative comparison between the gains welfare,21 and, reasonably enough, be decides to focus and losses ofhumans and animals. Singer believes that instead on arguments based on , since it does and argues that giving preference to bumans in these arguments bave "recently given the question of spite of animals' greater interests is speciesist and, vegetarianism a new focus."22 The problem for Frey is therefore, wrong. Human supremacists, in contrast, that tbe alleged harmful effects for bumans of claim that a qualitative comparison is also needed. vegetarianism playa vital role in bis response to the Because humans bave greater inherent moral value than argument for vegetarianism basedon animals' suffering. nonbumans, human interests should take precedence The structure ofhis argumentis that, since the concerned over those of animals. I devote this section to an individual's tactic is effective in reducing animals' examination ofone such buman supremacist view, that suffering, the harmful effects for humans of giving up of Carl Coben, who brazenly embraces the label of meat farming are sufficient to tilt the utilitarian balance speciesist. His paper concerns medical experiments on against vegetarianism. Consequently, any beneficial animals, but I will consider its implications for effects of vegetarianism for bumans are also directly vegetarianism.23 Cohen himselfclearly believes that bis relevant to Frey's utilitarian defense of meat farming, argument justifies meat eating, since he offers as a

Summer & Fall 1995 93 Between the Species A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

reductio ad absurdum of arguments against medical sense that no animal bas a right to be treated in this research on animals the consequence that meat eating way. Coben does not explain exactly what the extent of would also be wrong.24 our imperfect obligations to animals is. At one point, Speciesism is not analogous to racism and sexism, be refers to the duty not to gratuitously barm sentient Cohen argues, because whereas no morally relevant creatures. On the interpretation of "gratuitous" that I distinctions exist between the races and sexes, the assume Cohen intends, this would rule out torturing morally relevant differences between humans and animals for our pleasure but would permit virtually any nonhumans are "enormous, and almost universally ofthe currently cornmon uses ofnonhumans, including appreciated.,,25 Now, Singer would not deny that meat eating and medical experiments. However, humans, because of their greater intelligence, have defenders ofanimal rights regard most of these cornmon greater interests than do nonbumans. The equal practices as gratuitous, because the sacrifices imposed consideration of interests principle requires not equal on nonhumans are not outweighed by human gains. treatment but, rather, that like interests be given equal Consequently, Cohen's view, whatever its other merits, weigbt. Consequently, in situations in which bumans' fails to give a clear criterion for determining which uses and nonhumans' interests clasb, bumans' greater of nonhumans are justified. interests will sometimesjustify giving them preference. To his credit, Cohen deals directly with the most For example, since "[n]orrnal adult buman beings bave obvious objection to his account ofrights. The objection, mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances, the so-called "argument from marginal cases," is that lead them to suffer more than animals would in the same very young, severely retarded, or comatose bumans circumstances,"26 we may sometimes be more justified would also fail to qualify if being able to exercise and in performing scientific experiments on nonhumans respond to moral claims is a necessary condition for tban on bumans. Singer opposes meat farming, baving rights.29 They are not moral agents, since they bowever, because our benefits are easily outweigbed are unable to reciprocate any moral concern that we by animals' suffering. show towards them, nor are they able even to understand In contrast, Coben flatly denies that "the of any moral claims that may be made on their own behalf. all animate beings must be counted equally"27 and But we do regard them as having rights, and we punish even that nonhumans bave any rigbts at all. On wbat people, sucb as child abusers, wbo violate these rights.30 qualities does Coben base bumans' alleged greater Coben's response is that qualification for rights inberent moral value? depends upon the "natural moral functions" of the Coben believes that only beings that are capable of species. Members that, due to youth, birth defects or both claiming their own and respecting other beings' accidents, do not bave these capacities are, as it were, rigbts are eligible for baving rigbts: carried through on the coattails of the rest ofthe species.

Humans confront cboices that are purely The capacity for moral judgment that distin­ moral; bumans-but certainly not dogs or guisbes bumans from animals is not a test to mice-lay down moral laws, for others and be administered to buman beings one by for themselves. Human beings are self­ one...The issue is one of kind.31 legislative, morally auto-nomous...Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense All nonhuman animals, in contrast, simply lack the of that word) lack this capacity for free moral capacities that most bumans have. The first problem judgment. Tbey are not beings of a kind with Coben's respon~ is that, while it produces the capable of exercising or responding to moral result be desires-bumans bave rigbts, and nonhurnans claims. Animals therefore bave no rigbts...28 don't-it amounts to an assertion rather than an argument. Exactly why sbould rigbts be based on the Cohen does not deny that we do bave duties towards normal capacities of a species rather than on the nonhumans, even thougb they have no rigbts. In capacities ofeacb individual member? Second, his view particular, we "are at least obliged to act bumanely" seems to entail an absurd consequence. Suppose that towards animals, in view of their status as sentient one of the cbimpanzees that bave been taught sign creatures. But these obligations are imperfect, in the language develops an ability to understand moral

Between the Species 94 Summer & Fall 1995 A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

arguments, to restrain its behavior in the light of these that we give preference to humans in these rare arguments, and to make moral claimson its own behalf. situations. The moral community is strengthened when, These abilities would remain far above the "natural other things being equal, we give priority to beings moral functions" of chimpanzees as a species. capable ofreciprocating our moral concern. And when Consequently, according to the view that bases rights either a human or a nonhuman has to suffer physically upon the normal capacities of the species as a whole, or die, humans' greater capacity for suffering will this chimpanzee would have to be denied the status of usually tilt the utilitarian balance in their favor. a right-holder. But this seems arbitrary and unfair. The situation is completely different when we None of this is to deny that humans' greater consider the involved in the debate over meat capacities sometimes give rise to special moral eating. Since we do not need meat to survive, we are obligations towards them. For instance, because of their not faced with the choice of imposing comparable ability to make and respond to moral claims, I am able suffering on either humans or nonhumans, and so to make agreements and promises and to enjoy deep, humans' greater capacities are irrelevant to the tradeoff mutually supportive relationships with healthy humans ofinterests involved. As we saw in the previous section, that are difficult or impossible with nonhumans or a quantitative comparison of rival interests shows that "marginal" humans. These agreements, promises and human gains are insufficient to justify the imposition relationships make our moral ties to healthy adult ofsuffering on noubumans. So, the only way to justify humans more extensive and complex than those we have continuing to raise animals for food is to abandon the to nonhumans. But this does not preclude nonbumans utilitarian approach that gives equal weight to the like from having rights, any more than the fact that I have interests of humans and nonhumans. But we have just special moral obligations towards some people, such seen that Cohen has failed to give a cogent reason for as my friends and family members, precludes strangers abandoning the utilitarian approach and regarding from having moral rights that I treat them certain ways. human interests as qualitatively more important than Since I am defending Singer's utilitarian view, my those of nonhumans. Consequently, the human response to Cohen is not intended to show that animals supremacist approach fails to dislodge our earlier have rights. My point, rather, is that nonhumans have conclusion that raising animals for food is wrong. as much claim to baving rights as do humans and that the existence of special obligations towards healthy 4. Conclusion: Tbeory and Practice adult humans does not entail human supremacism. Similarly, I can concede other justified differences I have argued that the strongest utilitarian defense of between the moral standing ofhealthy adult humans and raising animals for meat-Frey's-does not work and nonbumans, without resorting to human supremacism. that the human supremacist attempt to sidestep The view that only self-conscious beings capable of utilitarian calculations by attributing greater intrinsic future-oriented desires, especially the for continued moral worth to humans is unfounded. However, even life, can have a tight ro life32 can be justified on the ifwe accept that the discontinuation ofraising animals utilitarian ground thatpersons' greatermental capacities, for meat would have better results than following the including their greater power of anticipation, mean that concerned individual's tactic, Frey points out that a they would losemore than nonpersonsfrom beingkilled. crucial step remains to be provided before any utilitarian These human capacities that are not shared by argument can condemn meat eating. This step is nonhumans--e.g., the ability to make and respect moral showing that the act of becoming a vegetarian and claims and to form extensive future-oriented desires­ encouraging others to do so will actually help to achieve willsometimes act as a "tie-breaker" thatjustifies giving the goal of the abolition of meat farming and, hence, preference to humans-for instance, ifwebad to choose produce better results than the concerned individual's between feeding humans or a dog in a time of extreme tactic. Frey argues that the practical impact of anyone shortage. However, the justification for giving person's becoming a vegetarian will be negligible, given preference to humans has nothing to do with humans' the vastness of the in countries like the alleged greater inherent moral worth. It is, rather, that u.s,33 In contrast, political action in order to reform giving equal weight to the like interests ofhumans and farming practices to reduce animals' suffering is far nonhumans, an impartial utilitarian calculus requires more likely to produce tangible benefits.

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In response, the private action of becoming a concerned individual may then resume eating meat. So vegetarian in no way precludes political activism of even the concerned individual is not justified in eating precisely the kind that Frey supports. The only meat raised on today's factory farms. The concerned difference is that the activism would aim at the abolition, individual who continues to eat meat, even though she rather than the reform, of raising animals for meat. admits that it was produced in cruel conditions and that Additionally, while my becoming a vegetarian may have her eating meat will in no way enhance her efforts to negligible effect, Frey dismisses too easily the impact improve these cruel conditions, seems to be guilty ofa of the combined effect of thousands of people's lack ofintegrity. becoming vegetarians. Given the dramatic increase in In conclusion, my utilitarian argument that raising vegetarian restaurants and vegetarian options within animals for meat is wrong does indeed demand a conventional restaurants in the twelve years since Frey's vegetarian diet. And even ifFrey were correctthat trying bookappeared, we may plausibly claim that conversion to reform ourpractice ofraising animals for meat would to vegetarianism really has reduced the amount ofmeat have better consequences than working for its abolition, that would otherwise have been produced and eating the meat raised on today's factory farms would consumed. Finally, as vegetarianism becomes more still not be justified on utilitarian grounds. "mainstream," it gains more credibility and power as a political force. I am grateful to an anonymous referee, commen­ My second response to Frey concerns the morality tatorAlex Wellington, Harlan Miller, and audience of eating today's meat, the vast majority of which is members for helpful suggestions. raised on the very factory farms that he wants to reform. A great strength ofFrey'sbookis that he gives a detailed Notes and sophisticated discussion ofthe charges ofinsincerity and inconsistency that we might level at the concerned 1Peter Singer,, 2nd. edition (New York: individual, who, while campaigning for reform, New York Review, 1990); and , 2nd. edition continues to eat meat raised in a manner that he or she (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 3-5. concedes causes unfair suffering to animals.34 Frey 2 , The Case forAnimalRights (Berkeley, CA: responds plausibly enough by pointing out that University of California Press, 1983). demanding that we have absolutely no contact with a practice that we consider wrong is unduly rigid. For 3 "The of the principle of equal consideration of instance, I can quite actively and consistently oppose interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations my country's foreign policies, without leaving the to the like interests of all those affected by our actions." Practical Ethics, p. 21. country in order to express the extent ofmy disapproval. Similarly, argues Frey, as long as the concerned 4 Similarly, the fact that I do not discuss arguments for individual actively strives to reform cruel farming vegetarianism based on a feminist ethic of care is not intended practices, the fact that she continues to eat meat is proof to reflect a negative judgment on these arguments. Itreflects of neither insincerity nor inconsistency. only the fact that the purpose of this paper is to respond to However, continuing to eat meat while striving for objections to the best-known argument for vegetarianism: Singer's utilitarian view. reform is different in a crucial respect from Frey's analogies. Remaining in a country and trying to change sR. G. Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford: Basil its policies from within is arguably far more effective Blackwell, 1983). than simply leaving the country and having no contact 6 Ibid., pp. 174-83. with it. In contrast, continuing to eat meat seems to have no positive impacton the effectiveness ofthe concerned 7 Frey is not expliciton whether his reformed farms would individual's attempt to end cruel farming practices. On be considered free range farms or more humane factory farms. the contrary, a reduction in the demand for meat (which 8 See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 64-65. is the likely result ofa temporary boycott by concerned individuals) would seem to create economic pressure 9 Ibid. I pursue this theme further in section 4. on the meat industry that is likely to accelerate the 10 1. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular desired reforms. Once the reforms have occurred, the Affair," Eugene C. Hargrove (ed.), The /

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Environmental Ethics Debate (Albany, State University of 26 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 59. New York Press, 1992), pp. 52-59. 27 Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in 11 Ibid., p. 54. Biomedical Research," p.463.

12 BartGruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing 28 Ibid., p. 460. Animals for Food," Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), Ethics andAnimals (Humana Press, 1983).The section 29 This objection is a variation on an argument given by in which he discusses the animal husbandry argument is Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 67-68,74-78. reprinted in Thomas Mappes and]ane Zembaty (eds.), Social 30 For a discussion ofother unsavory consequences ofthe Ethics, 4th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 449­ view that bases moral standing on the ability to reciprocate, 53. Page references are to the reprint. see Peter Singer, Ibid., pp. 78-82.

13 Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing 31 Cohen, ''The Case for the Use ofAnimals in Biomedical Animals for Food," pp. 450-51. Research," p. 461. 14Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," p. 32 See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 95-99; and 53. See also Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, pp. 185-86, AnneWarren, "Human and Animal Rights Compared," Social for a similar argument. Ethics, p. 469.

15 Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing 33 Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, pp. 206-16. Animals for Food," p.452. 34 Ibid., ch. 18. 16 In his more recent article, "Animal Liberation and ," reprinted in Eugene C. Hargrove (00.), The Animals RightslEnvironmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1992), Callicott has proposed a partial recon­ ciliation between his view and that of supporters of individual animals' interests, such as Singer and Regan. However, his view on the moral status of so-called domestic farm animals has not changed significantly. Continuing to distinguish them from wild animals, Callicott regards the use of domestic Konrad Gessner animals for food as unobjectionable, as long as, unlike factory Beasts & Animals farmers, we do not violate the "kind ofevolved and unspoken New York: Dover, 1983 social contract between man and beast." (Ibid., p. 256)

17 Callicott, "Animal Uberation: A Triangular Affair," p. 58.

18 Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, pp. 197-206.

19 Ibid., p. 241.

20 See Grnzalski, ''The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food," p. 451; and Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 220.

21 Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, pp. 17-20.

22 Ibid., p. 24.

23 Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 315 (Oct. 2, 1986). Page references are to its reprint in Mappes and Zembaty, Social Ethics.

24Cohen, ''The Case for the Use ofAnimals in Biomedical Research," p. 466.

25 Ibid., p. 463.

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