Copyright by Hannah Claire Alberts 2016
The Report Committee for Hannah Claire Alberts Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report:
Russia’s OSCE Policy and the Ukraine Crisis: Renewed Interest, Enduring Approach
APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:
Supervisor: Thomas J. Garza
William Inboden
Russia’s OSCE Policy and the Ukraine Crisis: Renewed Interest, Enduring Approach
by
Hannah Claire Alberts, B.A.
Report Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degrees of
Master of Global Policy Studies and Master of Arts
The University of Texas at Austin May 2016 Abstract
Russia’s OSCE Policy and the Ukraine Crisis: Renewed Interest, Enduring Approach
Hannah Claire Alberts; MGPS, M.A. The University of Texas at Austin, 2016
Supervisor: Thomas J. Garza
This report presents a detailed investigation of Russia’s behavior within and toward the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order to determine whether the military crisis Ukraine beginning in late 2013 and the OSCE’s consequent “renewal” as a crisis management organization have altered Russia’s policy toward the organization. The study concludes that Russia’s policy toward the OSCE has not undergone a fundamental change as a result of the Ukraine crisis. While Russia has been willing to endorse an expanded role for the OSCE in Ukraine, Moscow’s approach to the organization remains selective and highly critical. A review of Russia’s rhetoric and actions with regard to the OSCE from late 2013 to early 2016 suggests a limited increase in Russia’s use of the OSCE as a foreign policy tool, but does not indicate that Russia’s assessment of the organization has improved. Unfortunately, because the OSCE’s fate is highly dependent on will of member states, the lack of change in Russia’s policy toward the organization indicates that hopes for a stronger OSCE are unlikely to be realized. iv Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations ...... vii
Introduction ...... 1
1. The OSCE: Comparative Advantages and Ingrained Friction ...... 5 Comprehensive Foundations ...... 6 Inclusive Membership ...... 8 Weak Institutional Foundation ...... 9
2. Russia as a Multilateral Actor ...... 12
3. Russia and the OSCE: Cooperation, Frustration, Disengagement ...... 19 1990s: High Hopes and Cooperation Give Way to Frustration ...... 20 2000 Forward: Disillusionment and Disengagement ...... 25 Sources of Discontent ...... 26 Withdrawal and Subversion ...... 32 Inching toward Irrelevance ...... 35
4. The OSCE and the Ukraine Crisis: A Return to Relevance? ...... 38 OSCE Takes a Leading Role ...... 39 OSCE's Many Mandates ...... 42 Challenges and Limitations ...... 46
5. The Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s OSCE Policy: Poking Holes in the Silver Lining ...... 49 Russia’s Access to the Multilateral Space ...... 50 Russian Statements on the OSCE ...... 51 The OSCE in Russian doctrinal publications ...... 55 Russia’s Actions Within the OSCE ...... 57 A Constructive Russia? ...... 57 Obstructionist Behavior ...... 59 Legitimizing Kremlin Policy ...... 61 Testing Western Resolve ...... 63
v
Net Effects ...... 65
6. Conclusions/Implications ...... 68
References ...... 74
vi Abbreviations
CFE Treaty Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty CiO OSCE Chairman-in-Office CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization EEU Eurasian Economic Union EU European Union HCNM OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities HFA Helsinki Final Act G8 Group of Eight KVM Kosovo Verification Mission MC OSCE Ministerial Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Alliance ODIHR OSCE Office for Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights OM OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PA OSCE Parliamentary Assembly PC OSCE Permanent Council RFoM OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SMM OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine TCG OSCE Trilateral Contact Group UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council
vii Introduction
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) marked the 40th anniversary of its foundational document, the Helsinki Final Act (HFA), in July 2015. A landmark agreement in East-West relations, the 1975 HFA set forth a vision of a universal, inclusive system of European security. Thirty-five states signed the initial agreement, including the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, and all but one of the countries of Europe. The OSCE’s predecessor, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), promoted the comprehensive concept of security outlined in the HFA, encompassing political-military issues, economic and trade matters, and human rights concerns. As the only multilateral security forum in the Euro-Atlantic area that included the Soviet Union as a full and equal member, the CSCE occupied a historically significant role in promoting East-West dialogue, even in times of extreme tension.1 The CSCE became the OSCE in 1994, and it is now the world’s largest intergovernmental security organization, spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In the years leading up to the 2015 anniversary of the historic conference in Helsinki, however, many observers and analysts noted the organization’s slow lapse into irrelevance in the post-Cold War era. Particularly as Russian attitudes toward the organization soured over the years, the OSCE’s future became increasingly unclear. Having been one of the organization’s most enthusiastic supporters in the early 1990s, Russia emerged as one of its most vocal critics in the 2000s. Moreover, as the EU and NATO expanded to form the dominant framework for discussions of European security,
1 The world “multilateral” is used throughout this report to describe institutions and arrangements that involve three or more countries working together in a continuous format. Elana Wilson Rowe, Stina Torjesen, and Robert Legvold, eds., “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy,” in The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2008), 1. 1 the OSCE became increasingly marginalized. Scholars warned that “the very foundations of the Organization” were at stake or, even more pessimistically, that the OSCE already had “lost its relevance as both an instrument of foreign policy and as a framework for multilateral cooperation.”2 In 2013, however, just as the organization prepared to launch a series of seminars to commemorate the HFA and tackle difficult questions about the organization’s hazy future, the Ukraine crisis erupted and dramatically altered the landscape of European security.3 Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and its involvement in the military conflict in the country’s eastern provinces posed grave challenges to the core principles of the OSCE. Despite this affront, the OSCE moved quickly to assume a central role in managing the crisis and facilitating dialogue between Ukraine, Russia, and the pro-Russian separatist groups active in Ukraine’s two easternmost regions. Imbued with renewed purpose, the OSCE took the opportunity to prove its continued relevance in the international arena. The OSCE has garnered much praise for its monitoring and mediating activities on the ground in Ukraine as well as its support of high-level political negotiations. The organization, indeed, has been so omnipresent in Ukraine that many observers are hailing the OSCE’s revival. This report questions the validity of this OSCE “renaissance.” Clearly the organization is more visible and active than it has been in some time, but have the factors constraining the OSCE’s prominence within the European security architecture
2 Wolfgang Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (October 2005): 4; André W.M. Gerrits, “Russia and the OSCE: A Story of High Expectations, Strong Disillusionment and Obstinate Confrontation,” Security and Human Rights, no. 2 (2008): 109. 3 The term “Ukraine crisis” has been used variously to refer to any number of a series of events, beginning with the political crisis sparked by public protests in Kyiv in November 2013. Throughout this text the phrase is used only to refer to the military conflict in Ukraine, including the forcible takeover and annexation of Crimea as well as the fighting in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. 2 fundamentally changed? Russia’s distrust of the organization and its hesitance to engage has been a key driver of the organization’s decline in the past decades. Consequently, this study asks whether the Ukraine crisis and the OSCE’s consequent renewal have had any effect on Russia’s policy toward the organization. Has Russia indeed demonstrated a greater willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation via the OSCE, or are those heralding a lasting restoration of the organization speaking too soon? This study concludes that Russia’s policy toward the OSCE has not undergone a fundamental change as a result of the Ukraine crisis. While Russia has been willing to endorse the OSCE’s expanded role in Ukraine, Moscow’s approach to the organization remains selective and highly critical. A review of Russia’s rhetoric and actions with regard to the OSCE from late 2013 to early 2016 suggests a limited uptick in Russia’s use of the OSCE as a foreign policy tool, but does not indicate that Russia’s assessment of the organization has improved. Unfortunately, because the OSCE’s fate is highly dependent on the will of member states, the lack of change in Russia’s policy toward the organization indicates that hopes for a stronger OSCE are unlikely to be realized. The first chapter of this report will briefly discuss the history and structure of the OSCE, noting that major sources of tension and discontent are rooted in the organization’s fundamental character. Chapter two will briefly apply international relations scholarship to explain general patterns in Russia’s behavior toward multilateral organizations. The following section will examine the evolution of Russia’s OSCE policy in the post-Soviet period, up to the eruption of violence in Ukraine. Chapter four will outline the “reawakening” of the OSCE as a key player in managing the Ukraine crisis. With the stage fully set, chapter five will then present evidence of Russia’s behavior toward the OSCE from 2013-2016 and evaluate the net effects of the Ukraine crisis on Russia’s OSCE policy. Finally, the study will draw general conclusions about Russia’s 3 current approach to multilateral cooperation and will explore the broad implications of these findings for the future of the OSCE and for U.S. policy.
4 1. The OSCE: Comparative Advantages and Ingrained Friction
The OSCE exists within a dense network of intergovernmental organizations in the European space. Though overlapping in membership and, to some extent, in function with the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, and the UN, the OSCE boasts a number of comparative advantages over competing institutions. The organization’s inclusiveness, functional breadth, and flexible institutional basis have bolstered the OSCE’s relevance over its forty-year history. The same elements that define the unique character of the organization, however, have engendered lasting internal tensions, often hampering its organizational effectiveness. This abiding contradiction has defined the OSCE from the time of its earliest Cold War origins and continues to reverberate in the contemporary environment. This chapter will briefly outline the history and organizational structure of the OSCE, highlighting the major advantages and sources of discord sown into the organization’s very foundation. The OSCE is the institutional successor of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a political-consultative process launched in the era of Détente with the intention to regularize East-West dialogue and encourage military transparency between the two Cold War superpowers. The CSCE emerged with the signing of the landmark Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which would become an indispensable international instrument to encourage peace and security in Europe. The Final Act embodies a comprehensive approach to security, inclusive of three dimensions (or “baskets”): political-military security, economic and environmental security, and human security. Thirty-five countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, not only signed on to discuss cooperation and engage in confidence- and security-building measures in these three areas, but also took the monumental step of pledging to respect and put into
5 practice the Helsinki principles – a set of ten norms of state behavior intended to guide relations between participating states. These so-called Helsinki Decalogue calls for respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of frontiers, and territorial integrity; obligates states to refrain from the use of force, seek peaceful settlement of disputes, and engage in cooperation; and stipulates that signatories should uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the right of self-determination of peoples.4
COMPREHENSIVE FOUNDATIONS
This comprehensive conception of security initially gave both Russia and Western states reason to believe that the HFA represented a major victory in bringing the other side closer to its own vision for Europe’s future. From Moscow’s perspective, the commitment in the HFA to freeze the post-War political boundaries in Europe satisfied a long-sought-after Soviet objective.5 The Soviet Union jumped at the chance to formalize West’s acceptance of the Soviet occupation of Latvia and Lithuania and, more broadly, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Western European states, however, saw in the HFA a powerful tool to challenge Soviet “internal” practices and promote democratic development and respect for human rights across state boundaries.6 By the letter of the HFA, both interpretations were correct.7
4 “Helsinki Final Act” (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975), 3–10, http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. 5 P. Terrence Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia: The OSCE,” in Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, ed. Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010), 238, http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/chapter/10.1057/9780230290754_12. 6 Bjørn Møller, European Security: The Roles of Regional Organisations (Durham: Routledge, 2012), 9, https://www.routledge.com/products/isbn/9781409444084. 7 Though the United States was initially skeptical about the inclusion of human rights language in such an agreement, U.S. leaders eventually recognized the need to back the position of Western European allies. On the CSCE negotiations leading to the HFA, see John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975, Duke Press Policy Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). 6 The broad and comprehensive founding principles of the CSCE succeeded in attracting both Russia and Western states to the table, but the HFA fails to address the fact that these principles are not necessarily mutually compatible and indeed often collide. For instance, the commitment to non-intervention might be understood to hinder the obligation to uphold human rights across borders. Likewise, the pledge to respect the right of self-determination of peoples would appear to impinge on the rights of state sovereignty. The Final Act provides no guidance on the prioritization or sequencing of its core principles, allowing participating states to interpret the Decalogue flexibly, as suits their interests. The HFA states that “[a]ll the principles … are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted, taking into account the others.”8 The unresolved contradictions built into the very foundation of the OSCE have led to conflicting expectations of the organization.9 At the same time as the organization’s broad mandate grants it flexibility to serve as a platform for open discussion across the widest possible range of issue areas, the lack of clarity in the organization’s founding documents has triggered perpetual disagreement over the purpose and key priorities of the OSCE. This “trade-off” continues to manifest in tensions that have marred the OSCE’s ability to reach consensus decisions. As such, the organization inevitably serves as both a forum for cooperation and an ideological battleground.10
8 “Helsinki Final Act.” 9 Elena Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (January 28, 2015): 10. 10 Elena Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?,” European Security 21, no. 3 (2012): 370–94. 7 INCLUSIVE MEMBERSHIP
Among the several intergovernmental organizations operating in Europe and Eurasia, the OSCE provides added value as the most inclusive framework. The organization aims to transcend divisions to embody an inclusive definition of Europe. Operating as a “big tent,” the organization provides a stable forum for communication between its fifty-seven participating states, including the United States, Canada, all twenty-eight EU members, as well as the non-EU and non-NATO states of Eastern Europe, the South Caucuses, and Central Asia. Each of these states participates as a full and equal member in the OSCE’s executive bodies. Though the organization is, in fact, Western-dominated (34 of 57 participating states are either EU or NATO members), consensus-based decision making allows for “truly collective decisions that meet the interests of all its participants.”11 Though the OSCE offers a unique framework for dialogue across ideological, political, and cultural divides, its inclusivity also serves to hamper its effectiveness. Because the OSCE operates on the principle of consensus, each participating state has the ability to halt forward progress on any OSCE decision. Russia, for instance, has used its veto regularly to prevent the extension of mandates for OSCE field missions in the former Soviet space, in effect forcing their closure. Notably, a number of semi- independent OSCE institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) do not require the authorization of OSCE executive bodies to engage in field activities in participating states (although
11 “Zaiavlenie ministrov inostrannykh del gosudarstv-chlenov ODKB «O roli OBSE v sisteme obshcheevropeiskoi bezopasnosti», Belgrad [Statement by CSTO Foreign Ministers ‘On the role of the OSCE in the European Security System,’ Belgrade],” December 3, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1964381. 8 they do require the consent of the host state). By structuring these institutions outside central OSCE oversight, participating states have skirted the organization’s requirement for consensus rule. Still, the capabilities of these bodies are limited to the issues of human security. In the dimensions of political-military and economic security concerns, the right of veto prevails. Because the OSCE’s inclusivity is a key component of the organization’s identity, the continued participation of even the most antagonistic states (namely Russia) is vital to its relevance. The OSCE is thus simultaneously empowered and made vulnerable by its inclusive nature – a distinguishing raison d’être and a gaping vulnerability to obstruction. As one analyst sums up the paradox, the OSCE “cannot live with Russia and it cannot live without it.”12
WEAK INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
Lastly, the OSCE is distinct in character from the other multilateral organizations with which it overlaps as a result of its unique organizational basis. While recognized as an international organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter since 1995, the OSCE retains elements of the weak institutional foundation of its predecessor. When the CSCE was remade as an organization in 1994, participating states agreed to create an executive secretariat, standing committees, and formal meeting structures. The new organization, however, would not operate on the basis of a legally binding charter in the form of an international treaty. The OSCE, just as the CSCE before it, is limited to producing only politically binding decisions. As such, the OSCE retains aspects of the CSCE’s character
12 Gerrits, “Russia and the OSCE: A Story of High Expectations, Strong Disillusionment and Obstinate Confrontation,” 109. 9 as a dialogue process, but with the addition of organizational structures and capacities for field operations. The fact that OSCE decisions and declarations are cannot be upheld under international law has been both an asset and a hindrance to the organization. On the one hand, the lack of a legal basis reduces pressure in the negotiation process, allowing for unconditional dialogue and innovative proposals. On the other, there is little recourse when participating states choose to selectively interpret, wholly ignore, or brazenly violate OSCE resolutions. The OSCE’s weak institutional foundation, though a characteristic advantage, has been a subject of contentious debate among participating states. Interestingly, the fight to reform the OSCE on the basis of a formal charter has largely been a project of the Russian Federation. Russia’s calls to further institutionalize the OSCE may appear incongruous with its otherwise negative behavior. Such reform initiatives, however, should be understood in the context of Russia’s desire to more closely regulate the OSCE’s semi-independent institutions, with which it has frequently clashed. In sum, the OSCE is simultaneously empowered and restrained by its three core characteristics: an inclusive membership base, a broad functional mandate, and a non- binding structure. The unresolved contradiction at the heart of the OSCE – the struggle between protecting these comparative advantages and bolstering its ability to operate effectively – leaves the organization in a perpetual state of uncertainty and generates a great amount of friction among participating states. It is this same frustrating ambiguity, however, that has allowed the organization to evolve relatively quickly over time, adopting new personalities and occupying multiple roles. Today, the OSCE functions as an open forum for East-West dialogue on pressing security issues; a mechanism to promote transparency and facilitate confidence- and security-building measures between 10 participating states; a neutral venue for conflict prevention, management, and post- conflict resolution; and an innovative instrument to promote the liberal norms of human rights, civic freedoms, the rule of law, and democratic governance.
11 2. Russia as a Multilateral Actor
The effectiveness of intergovernmental organizations depends largely on the willingness and capability of member states to actively participate and contribute resources. Member states’ behavior, in turn, is determined not only by the availability of such resources but also by a state’s conception of the purpose and utility of intergovernmental organizations. In order to analyze Russia’s relationship with the OSCE and draw conclusions about the organization’s position within the European security architecture, therefore, it is first necessary to understand the Russian approach to multilateralism in general. This chapter will review the insights offered by the major schools of international relations scholarship with respect to multilateral cooperation. Applying the most suitable school of though to the Russian context, it will then examine the most evident patterns in Russia’s motivations for interacting with intergovernmental organizations. Russian foreign policy behavior is generally understood to typify that of a traditional “hard power” or realist actor – a state that seeks to maximize its own security by bolstering and protecting its power relative to other states. Though Russia frequently professes commitment to the concept of egalitarian multilateralism, this framework has rarely been applicable to Russia’s behavior in international forums. Russia, nonetheless, is present and active in a large number of formats for international cooperation, covering a broad geographic space and a range of issue areas. The Russian Federation plays a key role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is highly involved in European and Asian regional forums, and is the architect of several multilateral organizations in the post-Soviet space. Likewise, Russia fought tirelessly for its incorporation into the major global financial and trade organizations. What motivates Russia to engage with the world
12 through these organizations? What interests might a hard power actor pursue though multilateral forums? A number of theoretical frameworks in international relations scholarship can help to explain the general case as well as Russia’s specific behavior. Realist, institutionalist, and constructivist schools of though offer widely divergent insights regarding the purpose and effectiveness of international organizations (IOs). Realists conceive of institutions as little more than reflections of the existing distribution of power in the world – as arenas in which state-centered balance of power politics unfolds.13 From a realist worldview, “cooperation and competition cannot be separated” in multilateral organizations.14 States may choose to cooperate via these venues, but in a very limited fashion. A self-interested state would only choose to participate in a multilateral forum in the case that such action would bolster (or at the very least, protect) its own security. From this perspective, multilateral cooperation is more likely with regard to issues of “low politics” rather than hard security. Institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that IOs give states the capability to produce cooperative outcomes beyond the realm of security competition. The core insight of institutionalism is that co-operation between states may indeed manifest from a strategy of rational self-interest under certain institutional condition.15 More than mere extensions of state power, institutions have the capacity to influence state behavior and therefore meaningfully alter the outcome of interactions between states. Such theories posit that IOs can contribute to the creation of a common good (e.g., collective/mutual
13 See John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49, doi:10.2307/2539078. 14 Charles Doran, “The Two Sides of Multilateral Cooperation,” in International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, ed. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41; quoted in Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?” 15 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984). 13 security) that would otherwise fail to arise from the immediate interests of individual member states. Constructivist thinking, too, maintains that IOs play a vital role in the international system, reaching beyond the self-interested dictates of member states. The Constructivist standpoint, however, differs significantly from that of both Realist and Institutionalist schools in that Constructivists argue that institutions can behave as independent actors in the international system. Proceeding from the core assumption that ideas (not just material conditions) have the power to shape state behavior, Constructivist scholars believe that institutions can serve the purpose of “socialization” or norm sharing in forging an international community.16 This scholarship outside the realist tradition has in turn prompted revisions innovations in realist thinking. The Neoclassical Realist school retains the core rationalist assumption that a state’s foreign policy is primarily driven by the imperative to maintain a position of relative power, but also incorporates additional “subjective” factors in state decision-making, such as cognitive limitations (misperceptions) and domestic realities (politics, popular opinion, etc.).17 Any of these factors may work to make international cooperation more or less likely in a realist context. In a world of transnational threats and challenges, some have argued that today’s realist actors “place a much higher value on the utility of multilateral diplomacy than did the traditional realists.”18 In the
16 See Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 04 (September 1999): 699–732, doi:10.1162/002081899551048. 17 See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72. 18 Earl Sullivan, “A Realist’s Argument for Multilateral Diplomacy,” in The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance, ed. JoAnn F. Aviel et al. (Westview Press, 2011), 285. 14 contemporary security landscape, then, states wishing to maximize their own power and security may frequently elect to work through IOs to achieve specific aims. Russia’s engagement in multilateral forums at times has exhibited elements of each of the major schools of international relations theory (if not in deed, at least rhetorically). From the end of the Yeltsin era forward, however, realist or neoclassical realist reasoning is the most descriptive of Russia’s behavior towards and within international organizations. Though some scholars have noted that “multilateralism in Russian foreign policy is both a tool and a value.” Russia’s actions still largely adhere to realist notions, particularly in the context of multilateralism in the European space, where Russia interacts and competes with Western powers.19 While Russia’s foreign policy documents consistently contain proclamations of the importance of egalitarian multilateralism within the context of a multipolar world, Russia’s brand of cooperation via multilateral institutions in this space has been “selective, conditional, and limited.”20 Just as a realist worldview would dictate, “Russia sees multilateralism…as co-ordinated international action around key issues, rather than dense horizontal co-operation.”21 Russia’s interaction with multilateral organizations in the European space as well as in global organizations demonstrates three primary motivations: seeking prestige, garnering influence, and challenging the Western/unipolar world order. First, Russia
19 Rowe, Torjesen, and Legvold, “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy,” 20. 20 Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 374–5. 21 It is important to note, however, that one cannot necessarily characterize Russia’s approach to multilateralism in a single light. Russia engages in intergovernmental forums in varied contexts. Its strategy for interacting with (Russian-led) multilateral organizations in its “near abroad,” for instance, is unique from its behavior in global contexts such as the UN. Likewise, Russia’s policies with respect to Western- dominated regional organizations such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe are distinct from those it might apply in both global and “local” institutions. Each forum presents different opportunities, suits different purposes, and elicits different behavior. This is not to say that Russia’s approach departs from the fundamental realist paradigm at any of these levels, but the geopolitical context of a given organization certainly shapes how Russia’s motivations manifest in tactics. Rowe, Torjesen, and Legvold, “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy,” 3. 15 participates in international organization in these spaces in order to gain recognition as one of the world’s great powers.22 After the fall of the Soviet Union, membership in important multilateral forums has served as means for Russia to re-establish its identity as a superpower and receive validation of such from the international community. For this reason, Russia’s presence in multilateral forums hinges on the relevance of IOs to the world’s great powers. The more important such institutions are to the Western powers in particular, the more meaningful they will be for Russia as a means to affirm its standing in the international system. Likewise, Russia displays a preference for institutional arrangements that serve as “concerts of powers” in which Russia claims a seat at the top table. Moscow’s motivation for engaging with multilateral organizations that are essentially great power clubs is practical as well as prestige-oriented. Organizations such as the UNSC or the G8, as venues for pragmatic and depoliticized bargaining between powerful states, allow Russia to co-direct the process of resolving issues of international concern while assuming minimal limits on its sovereignty over domestic affairs.23 In its preference for Great Power Management (GPM) as an ordering principle of the international system, Russia’s realist worldview is plainly visible: powerful states can collectively claim authority to make decisions of global significance on the basis of their own national interests. Indeed, Russia’s cooperation in transatlantic multilateral frameworks can at times be best understood as a means to engage in bilateral horse-
22 Olga Oliker et al., “Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications,” Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 90, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG768.pdf. 23 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 15. 16 trading with the United States.24 Great powers thus operate within the context of international law, but are not necessarily bound by its strictures.25 Essentially, GPM is a manifestation of balance of power strategies in the context of Russia’s understanding of a multipolar world system. The primary obstacle to implementing a straightforward strategy of GPM, however, is that such an exclusive system lacks “democratic” legitimacy on the world stage.26 Intergovernmental organizations with broad general membership overseen by a “top table” of great powers are thus a practical and preferable second-best option to practice great power bargaining with a veneer of egalitarian multilateralism. Finally, engagement with multilateral forums can be understood as a tactic in Russia’s strategy of challenging the Western-led global order. The Russian approach to multilateralism is conditioned by Russia’s conception of multipolarity, which entails a wider distribution of global power more inclusive of Russia. Moscow’s rhetorical commitment to the notion of a multipolar world order (in which Russia is one of the poles), however, should be interpreted primarily as an attempt to upset what Russia perceives to be the model of “collective unipolarity” centered on the United States.27 Thus, Russia’s engagement in multilateral forums “has more to do with the [uni]polarity that is resents than the real configuration of power it would prefer.”28 For instance, Moscow uses regional multilateral platforms in its immediate neighborhood to create
24 Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia’s Policy Strategies,” Global Governance 17, no. 3 (2011): 361. 25 Ian Bond, “Russia in International Organizations: The Shift from Defence to Offence,” in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations, ed. Margot Light and David Cadier, Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series (New York, NY: Basingstoke, 2015), 202, http://catalog2.lib.utexas.edu/record=b9110797~S29. 26 Makarychev and Morozov, “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond,” 365. 27 Ibid., 353. 28 Rowe, Torjesen, and Legvold, “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy,” 31. 17 Russian-led power centers that can balance against Western-dominated institutions.29 At the same time as Russia challenges the precepts of Western-dominated transatlantic multilateralism, however, it is important to note that Russia’s participation in these forums indicates that it continues to see value in engaging via these institutions given the prevailing Western-led international order. Just as in the general case, a strictly statist worldview best explains Russia’s interactions with the OSCE in recent decades. Beyond a brief period of enthusiastic cooperation in the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Russia’s OSCE policy has increasingly embodied the logic of balance of power politics, including elements of prestige-seeking, influence-gathering, and East-West confrontation.
29 Makarychev and Morozov, “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond,” 362–363. 18 3. Russia and the OSCE: Cooperation, Frustration, Disengagement
In seeking to determine the effect of the Ukraine crisis on Russia’s approach toward the organization, it is first necessary to understand the nature of Russia’s relationship with the C/OSCE in the preceding decades. While at any given point the Soviet/Russian strategy with respect to the C/OSCE has incorporated simultaneous elements of cooperation, obstruction, signaling, and maneuvering, in the past three decades a consistent negative trend is evident; Russia has steadily downgraded its relationship with the OSCE from one of positive – even eager – participation in the late Soviet period through the mid-1990s to increasing disillusionment and disengagement in recent years. Although the seeds of Russia’s discontent with the OSCE were sown into the organization’s foundational documents (see chapter 1), Russia’s appraisal of the OSCE has shifted over time in response to a number of external and internal factors. As the OSCE’s function expanded to include an array of new missions supported by Western powers, Russia began to perceive the organization as increasingly hostile to its foreign policy interests. Russian attraction to the OSCE further faded as the result of a perceived lack of interest in the OSCE among the Western powers. Lastly, domestic economic and political developments in Russia during this period precipitated a broad shift in Russian foreign policy, which prescribed a more assertive (and less cooperative) stance internationally. Particularly from 2000 forward, these trends have manifested in Russian behavior within the OSCE as well as in Russian officials’ statements about the organization. Examining both Russia’s actions and rhetoric, this chapter will explore the evolution of
19 Russia’s OSCE policy in the post-Cold War era, as Russia developed from one of the organization’s most enthusiastic supporters into its most scathing critic. 30
1990S: HIGH HOPES AND COOPERATION GIVE WAY TO FRUSTRATION
To some extent, Russia’s relationship with the C/OSCE in the early-1990s can be considered a continuation of Mikhail Gorbachev’s approach to the organization in the late Soviet period. The drive to develop political and economic linkages with the West, embodied in Gorbachev’s concept of a “Common European Home,” persisted through post-Soviet Russia’s first several years.31 Russia’s broad interest in cultivating ties to Western institutions manifested in a short period of productive cooperation within the C/OSCE.32 At the time, Russia understood the organization to be the best available and most equitable framework through which it could seek to maintain its global status and achieve its objectives with respect to European security. Russia’s constructive behavior in the C/OSCE in the 1990s was aimed at protecting Russia’s role in European security by strengthening and legitimizing the organization, signaling Russia’s willingness to compromise and cooperate, and demonstrating Russia’s progress in implementing liberal democratic reforms at home.
30 For the sake of brevity, this chapter will cover only the most telling developments in the period from 1990-2013. For complete and detailed histories of Russia’s relationship with the OSCE, inclusive of the Soviet period, see: Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis”; Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia”; Gerrits, “Russia and the OSCE: A Story of High Expectations, Strong Disillusionment and Obstinate Confrontation”; Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment”; Viatcheslav Morozov, “Russia’s Changing Attitude toward the OSCE: Contradictions and Continuity,” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 23, no. 2 (2005): 69–73; Heather Hurlburt, “Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture,” Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995): 5. 31 Hurlburt, “Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture,” 5–6; Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 243. 32 Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 8. 20 The first objective was evident in Russia’s continuous calls to further institutionalize the CSCE as a treaty-based organization in the hopes that it would supplant NATO as the centerpiece of European security cooperation.33 Russia continued to vocally advocate for the CSCE to assume the primary role in coordinating European security through the mid-1990s. Russia introduced a number of such reform proposals to the 1994 Budapest Summit, during which the OSCE emerged as the formal institutional successor of the CSCE process. Leading up to the summit, Russia proposed the creation of a CSCE executive committee akin to the UN Security Council, which would have had the authority to oversee all CSCE field activities and would have granted exclusive veto rights to the major powers.34 Though its proposals were never accepted by the Western OSCE states, Russia repeatedly offered a vision of the C/OSCE’s future as an inclusive, pan-European security organization managed by a concert of great powers, among whom Russia would number. The Russian Federation demonstrated its desire to cooperate by voting between 1991 and 1994 to accept CSCE monitoring of Russian peacekeeping activities in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan35 as well as to allow the establishment long-duration missions in all three countries as well as in Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. In 1992, Russia also approved OSCE mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict via the Minsk group mechanism, led by co-chairs France, Russia, and the United States. Marking the high point of its cooperation with the OSCE, Russia even accepted intervention on its own
33 Ibid., 10; Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 392. 34 Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 247. 35 Russia voted to approve these monitoring missions in part because it hoped to secure official CSCE recognition of Russian-led CIS peacekeeping missions. In this way, Russia hoped the CSCE could be used to legitimize Russia’s activities in the post-Soviet space and, by extension, its privileged sphere of influence there. By the mid-1990s, however, Russia’s failed to secure this recognition and became increasingly frustrated with the OSCE’s activities in the post-Soviet region. See Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 391. 21 territory in 1995 in the form of an OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, where Russia’s first military campaign against Chechen separatists was already underway.36 By 1999, Russia had consented to field missions in fourteen of the fifteen former Soviet republics (all but Lithuania) as well as six field missions throughout the Western Balkans.37 Though not eager for increased CSCE presence in the former Soviet space, Russia acquiesced to the role of “policy taker” in the organization, accepting the proliferation of field missions as a tradeoff for preserving Russia’s role on the European stage.38 During this period, Russia cooperated with Western powers in the OSCE not only on security matters, but on issues within the “human dimension” as well. Though it would later become highly critical of the OSCE’s election monitoring activities, Russia invited ODIHR to observe a number of elections within in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, including the country’s second-ever presidential election in 1996. Eager to gain recognition for its democratic development, Russia saw ODIHR’s presence as an opportunity to bolster its political legitimacy in the eyes of its international partners. Indeed, ODIHR’s reporting on the 1996 election was largely positive, commending Russia for its rapid advancement in implementing democratic practices and standards.39 Russia’s discontent with certain aspects of the OSCE, however, had already begun to surface in the later half of the decade. NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning in 1992 indicated to Russia that the Western powers had no
36 Apparently Russia’s acceptance of the Chechnya assistance group came as a surprise to the Western powers that had lobbied for the mission. Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 248–249, 258. 37 “Survey of OSCE Field Operations” (OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), February 11, 2015), http://www.osce.org/cpc/74783. 38 Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 391. 39 “Final Report: International Observer Mission, Election of President of the Russian Federation, 16th June 1996 and 3rd July 1996” (OSCE ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), July 12, 1996), 4, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/16288. 22 intention of decentering NATO as the cornerstone of the European security architecture in favor of the OSCE. The OSCE’s failure to officially recognize the validity of Russian- led CIS peacekeeping troops in the former-Soviet republics further chipped away at Russia’s hopes that the OSCE could serve as a valuable avenue for achieving its foreign policy goals. Having failed to secure this objective, the Russian Federation became increasingly frustrated with the “narrowing” of the OSCE’s focus to comprise activities primarily “east of Vienna.”40 As Western powers began to use OSCE forums to issue condemnations of Russia’s brutal military actions in the Chechen campaigns of 1994 and 1999, Russia also began to resist the OSCE’s human dimension agenda more rigorously.41 Finally, the failure of the OSCE to prevent NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 irrevocably damaged Russia’s estimation of the OSCE’s worth as a foreign policy tool. OSCE activities in Kosovo served to confirm Russia’s perception of the organization as biased and inept, and the door all but slammed shut on the era of Russia’s cooperation within the organization. After a concerted Russian diplomatic effort to ensure that the OSCE took a central role in managing the Kosovo crisis,42 the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) deployed 1,500 unarmed international observers in 1998 with a mandate to monitor the conflict and act as on-the-ground mediators when possible.43 Several months into the mission, however, the level of violence increased, and the KVM started to withdraw in March 1999, despite Russian objections. When NATO
40 Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 391. 41 Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 11. 42 Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 393. 43 “Kosovo Verification Mission (Closed),” OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.osce.org/node/44552; Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 250. 23 airstrikes began shortly thereafter, Russia blamed the OSCE for de facto enabling NATO involvement by failing to fulfill its core mission of conflict prevention and resolution.44 From Russia’s perspective, the Western powers had encouraged the KVM’s withdrawal in order to make the case for the necessity of military intervention, thus laying the groundwork for the NATO’s bombing campaign and subsequent armed peacekeeping presence. Russia thus interpreted the failure of the OSCE mission in Kosovo as an indication not only that Western powers were acting to exclude Russia from managing a major European security crisis, but also that they had instrumentalized the OSCE to do so.45 Amid this new low in Russia’s relationship with the OSCE, many questioned the continuing relevance of the OSCE heading into the twenty-first century. If Russia had begun to perpetually obstruct the OSCE’s core functions, the organization would have ceased to merit attention and investment from the West. Although Russia’s frustration with the OSCE was evident, there remained, however, some positive indications that Russian interest in the organization was still sufficient to justify engagement, albeit on an increasingly selective basis. Russia’s active participation in the 1999 Istanbul Summit, for instance, seemed a note of hope amid growing tensions. One of the OSCE’s most productive summits ever, the Istanbul meeting brought a number of important agreements, including the negotiation of an Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (A/CFE).46 Russia, for which the signing of the A/CFE Treaty was a
44 Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 12. 45 Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 393. 46 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty became outdated, as force limits were stipulated in the document on the basis of two competing military blocs. When the Warsaw Treaty Organization ceased to exist, this formulation was no longer relevant. Russia attempted repeatedly to renegotiate the treaty within the OSCE framework, finally succeeding at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. See Stefan Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” Paper (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf. 24 crucial objective, proved willing to accept serious concessions in the document to achieve agreement among all parties. In a number of annexes to the Adapted Treaty as well as in the Istanbul Summit Declaration, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from Moldova and reduce its force levels in Georgia to comply with the limits set forth in the A/CFE Treaty.47 That reaching consensus on such an agreement proved possible despite Russia’s increasing disillusionment with the OSCE gave reason to hope that Russia intended to retain a somewhat cooperative posture within the organization.
2000 FORWARD: DISILLUSIONMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT
In his infamous condemnation of the United States and its “unipolar” aspirations at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin took time to single out the OSCE for recrimination. This landmark speech, which alarmed Western powers with its openly combative tone, was indicative of a major shift in Russia’s relations with the OSCE and the West more broadly. According to Mr. Putin, it was clear that Western countries were seeking to transform the organization “into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”48 Likewise, Putin’s assertion in the same speech that the balance between the three dimensions of the OSCE’s work had been “destroyed” illustrates that the
47 This set of agreements would later be referred to as Moscow’s “Istanbul Commitments.” Unfortunately, the adapted CFE Treaty approved at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 has never come into force. A number of Western states have failed to ratify the A/CFE Treaty, on the basis that Russia has not fulfilled its commitments. Russia, on the other hand, has interpreted these commitments differently and holds that the Western powers’ linking of ratification of the A/CFE Treaty to Russia’s total withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia is an illegitimate stalling tactic to avoid ratification. Russia announced that it would no longer be observing the CFE Treaty in 2007, and officially withdrew from the mechanism in 2015, amid heightened East-West tensions spurred by the crisis in Ukraine. 48 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie i diskussiia na Miunkhenskoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti [Remarks and Discussion at the Munich Security Conference],” February 10, 2007, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. 25 deterioration of Russian attitudes toward the organization, which had begun as early as the mid-1990s, had crystallized into official policy by the mid-2000s. The start of the 21st century ushered in a new era for post-Soviet Russia, both domestically and internationally. With Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, Russia experienced a political and economic transformation that brought rising standards of living, a concentration of political power, and a markedly more assertive foreign policy. Perceiving Russia’s earlier cooperative stance in the OSCE as a manifestation of the country’s weakened state following the Soviet collapse, Putin recalibrated Russia’s approach to the organization. Though the roots of Russia’s frustration with the OSCE long preceded Putin’s presidency, over the course of his first two terms Russia’s behavior toward the OSCE became more openly antagonistic and distrustful. Russian dissatisfaction with the OSCE during this period centered on three perceptions: that 1) the OSCE’s field activities were geographically biased, with a disproportionate number of missions deployed “east of Vienna,” 2) the OSCE’s work was too focused on issues of “soft” security (i.e. human rights and democracy promotion), and 3) the OSCE had lost relevance and potency as Western states turned their attention to other international forums.
Sources of Discontent: Geographical Inequity, Functional Imbalance, and Weakness
Geographical Inequity
As the OSCE’s predominant function shifted over the years from providing an equitable forum for East-West security dialogue to mounting an increasing number of field missions to promote the adoption of liberal, democratic norms in participating states, Russia began to perceive the organization as increasingly hostile to its foreign policy interests. Though Russia appeared willing to accept continual expansion of the 26 OSCE’s physical presence in the post-Soviet space through the end of the 1990s, its frustration with the organization’s “geographical imbalance” reached an inflection point in the early 2000s. Of the OSCE’s various outposts in the former Soviet republics, Russia was most favorably disposed to the missions in Latvia and Estonia, which were established in 1993 – after much Russian lobbying – with the express purpose of protecting Russian-speaking minorities in these transitioning states. When the OSCE failed to extend these two missions upon their expiration in late 2001, Russia denounced the closures as premature, noting the continuing threat to ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics.49 With the shuttering of the only two missions that Russia perceived to be of significant continuing benefit to its own interests abroad, its attitude soured toward the remaining OSCE missions in the region. Russia responded in kind by forcing the closure of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya when its extension came up for a vote at the end of 2002. In the same year, Russian resistance resulted in significant narrowing of the OSCE mission in Belarus. Continuing this pattern, the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan was converted to a smaller “center” in 2002, the Uzbekistan mission was curtailed in 2006, the mission to Georgia was shuttered in 2008, the OSCE presence in Belarus was eliminated in 2010, and the Azerbaijan mission was closed in 2015.
Functional Imbalance
Russia’s growing displeasure with the OSCE during this period stemmed not only from the organization’s asymmetric emphasis on fieldwork “east of Vienna,” but also from a perceived functional bias in favor of democracy promotion and human rights programming rather than activities focused on the political-military dimension of
49 Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 258–259. 27 security.50 Frustrated and threatened by the OSCE’s work to inculcate liberal democratic norms across the Euro-Atlantic space, Russia began to criticize more openly what it perceived to be a patronizing dynamic between Western and nonwestern states within the OSCE. In Russia’s view, the organization’s activities in the human dimension set out clear diving lines between “mentors and pupils,” contravening the its role as a platform for dialogue between states of equal standing.51 Deputy Foreign Minister Evgenii Gusarov expressed this sentiment in a 2000 address, citing attempts by western states to transform the OSCE into a “mechanism of interference in the internal affairs of participating states, a into a kind of ‘democratizer’ of the European periphery” as well as an “instrument for the expansion of Western influence through the introduction of behavioral patterns and values of Western European civilization.”52 Similarly, Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov wrote in 2002 of Western attempts to transform the OSCE into a tool for “forced democratization.” 53 In particular, the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and its election monitoring activities came to exemplify this imbalance in Russia’s view. Moscow saw in ODIHR the result of Western domination of the OSCE: an over emphasis on the human dimension and a consequent tendency to interfere in the domestic affairs of
50 Russia’s repeated calls to reform the OSCE have typically voiced a desire to reduce the OSCE’s involvement in internal human rights issues and instead expand the scope of cooperation on so-called “hard” security issues such as military confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), conflict prevention and resolution, and combating transnational threats. 51 Lavrov. “Reform will enhance the OSCE’s relevance. Financial Times, 29 November 2004 52 Evgenii Gusarov, “Tekst vystupleniia zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii E.P.Gusarova v Diplomaticheskoi Akademii MID Rossii na zasedanii kruglogo stola ‘Khel’sinkskii Zakliuchitel’nyi akt. 25 let spustia’ [Speech by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister E.P Gusarov at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA at a roundtable meeting ‘The Helsinki Final Act 25 years later’],” June 14, 2000, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/- /asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/602920/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_bzhxR3zkq2H5_viewMod e=tv&_101_INSTANCE_bzhxR3zkq2H5_qrIndex=0; Morozov, “Russia’s Changing Attitude toward the OSCE,” 71. 53 I. S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 98. 28 its participating states. Though the Russian Federation had supported ODIHR’s activities in Russia in the 1990s (as earlier in this chapter), Moscow reversed its stance by the mid- 2000s. This change in policy and rhetoric came largely as a result of Russia’s perception that ODIHR’s elections activities in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan played a role in spurring the wave of “color revolutions” from 2003-2005.54 In all three countries, evidence of fraud and questionable election practices spurred massive public protests, eventually leading to the ouster of pro-Russian leaders and paving the way for their replacement with Western-leaning figures. Reporting by ODIHR observation missions harshly criticized the conduct of elections in each case, casting doubt on the initial outcomes that favored pro-Russian candidates or parties. Ascribing nefarious motives to ODIHR, Moscow charged the institution with working to contravene Russian interests by fomenting electoral revolutions across the former Soviet space. Cognizant of the threat that further social unrest could both to Russia’s political influence in its “near abroad” and to its own domestic regime stability, Moscow became increasingly mistrustful of ODIHR and by extension the OSCE’s approach to human dimension as a whole.55 Though Moscow consented to ODIHR’s observation of Russia’s 2004 presidential election, tensions soon rose to a breaking point. After ODIHR issued a critical assessment of the 2004 election, the Russian delegation to the OSCE, in conjunction with a coalition of CIS countries, presented an “unprecedented collective demarche” to the OSCE Permanent Council criticizing the “double standards” employed in the organization’s field work as well as the ODIHR’s “politicized” reporting on elections and human rights issues.56 These unresolved disagreements prompted Russia to
54 Hopmann, “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia,” 260–261. 55 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” 56 Yuri Kozlov, “Russian Official Says OSCE Failing to Meet CIS Interests,” ITAR-TASS World Service, July 8, 2004, 29 block ODIHR observation of its 2007 parliamentary elections and 2008 presidential elections. In 2008, Putin colorfully dismissed the right of ODIHR observers to instruct Russia in election procedures, suggesting the observers should instead stay home and “teach their wives to make cabbage soup.”57 Moscow began to re-admit OSCE representatives election observers in 2011, but ODIHR has remained a constant target of Russian criticism, particularly after its reporting on Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections
and 2012 presidential elections indicated serious irregularities in electoral processes.58
Perceived Weakness
Beyond Russia’s claims of geographical and functional imbalance, the OSCE’s lack of effectiveness also prompted Moscow to gradually disengage with the organization from 2000 forward. Russia came to see the OSCE as an impotent institution, as Western states exhibited clear preference for NATO and the EU as the primary venues for discussing matters of European security. While Russia had hoped to empower the OSCE as the central component of the European security architecture, the continued expansion of these Western institutions left Russia with little hope that its vision would come to pass. As new frameworks emerged for multilateral cooperation between the world’s powers, Russia increasingly bypassed less effective OSCE channels. NATO and EU enlargement in the 2000s precipitated Russia’s disengagement with the OSCE in three ways. First, the increasing dominance of Western blocs within the
http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TASS000020040709e078000tp&cat=a&ep=ASE; “Zaiavlenie gosudarstv-uchastnikov SNG otnositel’no polozheniia del v OBSE [Statement by member states of the CIS regarding the state of affairs in the OSCE]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 3, 2004), http://www.mid.ru/integracionnye-struktury-prostranstva-sng/- /asset_publisher/rl7Fzr0mbE6x/content/id/465074. 57 “Putin O Trebovaniiakh BDIPCh: Eto Ikh Khotelki, Pust’ Svoiu Zhenu Uchat Shchi Varit’ [Putin on ODIHR Requirements: It Is Their Wishlist, Let Them Teach Their Wives to Cook Shchi],” Interfax, February 14, 2008, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/1179. 58 Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 15. 30 OSCE left Russia feeling less able to accomplish its foreign policy goals through the organization. By the mid-2000s, more than half of OSCE participating states had become members of either the EU or NATO, prompting regular Russian criticism of the Western “bloc mentality” within OSCE.59 Second, the formation of common EU foreign and security policy instruments threatened to encroach on the OSCE’s core competencies, particularly in the realm of crisis management. Finally, the steady growth in NATO’s membership and mission indicated to Russia that Western states would continue to see NATO rather than the OSCE as the lynchpin of European security. Russia’s ambition to decenter NATO by bolstering the capacities of the more inclusive OSCE appeared less and less realistic. Then-foreign Minister Ivanov noted in 2002 that “[a]ttempts to limit the OSCE’s sphere of work to humanitarian and human rights issues clearly result from a drive to build European security around exclusive organizations and Unions, chiefly NATO.”60 The current Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov again illustrated Russia’s changing perception of the OSCE when he dismissed the organization as all but irrelevant in the context of the expanding membership, mission, and capacity of both the EU and NATO: “NATO deals with security issues, the EU with economic issues, while the OSCE will only monitor the adoption of these organizations' values by countries that have remained outside the EU and NATO.” 61 Russia, accordingly, expressed greater interest in direct dialogue with the EU and NATO during this period. The EU-Russia Partnership Agreement and the NATO-Russia
59 In 1995, only 35% of OSCE participant states held membership in EU or NATO. With subsequent waves of EU and NATO expansion, this number grew to 42% by 1999, 57% by 2004, and finally 60% by 2009. 60 I. S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 98. 61 Sergei Lavrov, “Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order.,” Russia in Global Affairs 3, no. 1 (2005), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4422. 31 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security62 became increasingly relevant as frameworks for Russia’s engagement with the West outside of OSCE mechanisms. Russia’s inclusion in additional multilateral forums such as the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20) further decreased its desire to coordinate with the West via the OSCE.63 Similarly, Russia’s increased engagement with the U.S. via its cooperation with the global anti-terrorism coalition formed after the September 11th attacks provided Russia with yet another avenue to assert itself in global affairs, yet again obviating Russia’s need for the OSCE framework to guarantee its seat at the table.64
Withdrawal and Subversion
In 2007 and 2008, Russia took a number of forceful steps to express its extreme dissatisfaction with the OSCE. In addition to blocking ODIHR personnel from observing Russian elections (discussed above), Russia also suspended its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, launched a major diplomatic initiative to institute a new European security treaty outside the OSCE framework, and excluded the OSCE from playing a meaningful role in mediating the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Though the CFE Treaty had long been in need of fundamental reform, Russia’s decision to back away from the landmark arms control agreement was nonetheless a clear signal of its frustration with the OSCE’s failings. Though the OSCE framework had
62 The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security established the Joint Permanent Council (JPC), which served as the basis for formal NATO-Russia relations until it was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. 63 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” 5; Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment,” 392–393; Pál Dunay, “The OSCE and the East: The Lesser Evil,” in Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspective on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2014), 17, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities- studies/pdfs/Perspectives-on-the-Role-of-the-OSCE-in-the-Ukraine-Crisis.pdf. 64 Morozov, “Russia’s Changing Attitude toward the OSCE,” 72. 32 succeed in producing an Adapted CFE Treaty in 1999, a number of Western states refused to ratify the new document on the basis that Russia had failed to fulfill its “Istanbul commitments” to withdraw of military forces and equipment from Moldova and Georgia. Frustrated by nearly ten years of deadlock on this issue of key importance to European security, Russia announced that it would no longer be observing the existing CFE Treaty from 2007 forward. Given Russia’s consistent stance on the need for greater emphasis on the political-military dimension within the OSCE, its decision to torpedo the CFE Treaty would appear contradictory in that it served to further marginalize the OSCE’s in negotiating solutions to Europe’s “hard” security issues.65 In this sense, Russia’s decision signaled a near total loss of its faith in the OSCE’s continued relevance. In 2008, the President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposals for a new European Security Treaty yet again signaled Russia’s distrust of and frustration with the OSCE framework. In a major foreign policy speech to German political, parliamentary and civic leaders, Medvedev expressed Russia’s dissatisfaction with existing European security institutions, particularly the OSCE. Charging the current network of institutions with “marginalizing and isolating countries, carving out zones with varying degrees of security, and abandoning the creation of a regional collective security system,” Medvedev called for the major European powers to design an entirely new framework.66 While Russia made numerous attempts to sustain discussion of this ambitious plan outside OSCE forums, the initiative failed to garner serious interest. 67 Instead, Russia’s push to reframe the entire
65 Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?,” 377–8. 66 Dmitri Medvedev, “Vystuplenie na vstreche s predstaviteliami politicheskikh, parlamentskikh i obshchestvennykh krugov Germanii [Remarks at a meeting with representatives of German political, parliamentary, and public circles],” June 5, 2008, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320; Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” 67 Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?,” 379. 33 European security architecture succeeded only in spurring a short-lived series of internal OSCE reform discussions dubbed the “Corfu Process” (2009-2010). Just months after Medvedev’s Berlin speech, the outbreak of armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 gave Russia an additional opportunity to repudiate aspects of the OSCE mission. Rather than rely on OSCE conflict resolution mechanisms, Russia would accept only limited international involvement in the form of EU mediation, managed personally by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. By all accounts, Sarkozy’s involvement was essential in achieving a ceasefire agreement, but helped pave the way for the OSCE’s diminishing relevance in the region.68 Citing the OSCE’s failure to play a productive role in preventing the outbreak of war or resolving the conflict, Russia vetoed the extension of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and forced its closure in early 2009. In a major blow to the OSCE’s prestige, Russia and Georgia approved and EU Monitoring Mission to assume many of the OSCE’s former responsibilities.69 Russia’s relationship with the OSCE in these years can be understood as a self- reinforcing cycle, whereby Russia signaled displeasure with the OSCE’s marginalization by refusing to cooperate on vital issues, thus further diminishing the organization’s relevance.70 By the close of the 2000s, the director of the Department of Pan-European Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remarked of Russia’s relationship
68 Makarychev and Morozov, “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond,” 359. 69 Dennis Sammut and Joseph D’Urso, “The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: A Useful but Flawed OSCE Tool,” Policy Brief (Brussels: European Policy Centre, April 23, 2015), 1, http://aei.pitt.edu/63784/1/pub_5511_the_special_monitoring_mission_in_ukraine.pdf; Valerie Pacer, Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012, BASAAS/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 105 (New York: Routledge, 2016), 61. 70 Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?,” 385. 34 with the OSCE, “to a large extent, Russia today hardly needs anything at all from such a disunited and impotent OSCE.”71
Inching toward Irrelevance
Entering the second decade of the twenty-first century, the OSCE’s shortcomings as an inclusive and comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security organization were evident and widely acknowledged. Longstanding tensions within the organization had come to a head over the past years, prompting Russia’s disengagement and the overall neglect and underutilization of the OSCE. Illustrating the organization’s stagnation, for the past ten years the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting has proven unable to reach agreement on an annual political communiqué.72 As tension and gridlock dominated these forums, buy-in from Moscow and Western states decreased, furthering the organization’s decline. The 2014 OSCE unified budget marked a new low in agreed-upon contributions by participating states, in total a 32% decline from 2004.73 The difficult challenges facing the organization have inspired a number of multilateral attempts to revive the OSCE in recent years. These initiatives, while keeping a platform for discussions open, have been less than fruitful in producing viable reform proposals. The 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana – the first held since 1999 – marked an important attempt to reinvigorate the organization and refocus its mission on the creation of an broad and inclusive “security community.” Russia’s participation at Astana
71 Vladimir Voronkov, “Novaia arkhitektura bezopasnosti v Evrope - put’ vpered [A new security architecture in Europe - the way forward],” Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’ 6 (June 24, 2009), http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzeniami/- /asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/288090. 72 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” 5. 73 2014 year-end revised unified budget: 139,350,400 EUR; 2004 year-end revised unified budget: 205,500,746 EUR. Source: annual OSCE year-end adjusted unified budget reports for 2004 and 2014. 2004 figure adjusted for inflation (Dec 2014 EUR). 35 demonstrated its continued interest in the OSCE, despite its persistent grievances. President Medvedev traveled to Kazakhstan to participate in the 2-day summit, for which heads of state are customarily present. President Obama and a number of European heads of state, on the other hand, sent foreign ministers in their stead. Though the summit attendees succeeded in adopting a political declaration, OSCE participating states later failed to agree of an action plan for follow through on the ambitious summit declarations. Following the conference, Medvedev remarked that the Astana Summit “demonstrated a certain helplessness of the OSCE to make significant decisions.”74 Leading up to the fortieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2015, the “Helsinki+40” process again aimed to revitalize the OSCE by promoting structured discussion on the organization’s future. Launched in 2013 (incidentally, at the start of Ukraine’s one-year chairmanship), the discussions were soon overshadowed by the eruption of the Ukraine crisis. When political turmoil in Kyiv opened the door for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in Ukraine’s easternmost regions, dialogue on large-scale organizational reforms fell by the wayside as the OSCE assumed an increasing number of crisis management roles in Ukraine. By the time the EuroMaidan protests flared in Kyiv in late 2013, Russia (and many other major powers) no longer saw the OSCE as an effective forum for managing the most pressing issues of European security. In the fourteen years or more leading up to the OSCE’s biggest challenge yet, Russia’s approach toward the organization drifted toward ambivalence. Its engagement with the OSCE became more pragmatic and selective, and Russia remained deeply distrustful of the organization. While periodically advocating for reforms that would empower the OSCE to take on greater responsibility
74 “Medvedev: Posledniy Sammit Pokazal ‘Opredelennuyu Bespomoshnost’ OBSE,” Korrespondent.net, December 7, 2010, http://korrespondent.net/world/1146623-medvedev-poslednij-sammit-pokazal- opredelennuyu-bespomoshchnost-obse. 36 within the European security space, Russia simultaneously acted to undermine the organization’s capacity and reach.
37 4. The OSCE and the Ukraine Crisis: A Return to Relevance?
The eruption of the Ukraine crisis posed the greatest challenge to security and stability on the European continent seen since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine shook the very foundation of peace in modern Europe – namely, the precept that borders in Europe cannot not be altered by force. Russian aggression in Ukraine cut at the heart of the Helsinki Final Act, brazenly violating the central principles of sovereignty, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The crisis thus called into question the continued relevance of the OSCE, the body tasked with the protection and promotion of those very ideas. Yet at the same time, many observers have proclaimed that the confrontation in Ukraine has revitalized the OSCE, bringing the marginalized organization back into the
limelight.75 While the outbreak of violent conflict illustrates the OSCE’s limited ability to prevent the violation of the Helsinki principles, events in Ukraine granted the OSCE an opportunity to fulfill its conflict resolution mission. Indeed, as the OSCE rose to the challenge and became the primary framework for managing the crisis, the organization once considered a “backwater of international diplomacy” appears to be back in
75 Such positive assessments can be found in: Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis”; Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis”; Arie Bloed, “OSCE Revitalized by the Ukraine Crisis,” Security and Human Rights 25, no. 1 (January 14, 2014): 145–51, doi:10.1163/18750230-02501004; Thomas Greminger, “The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship,” in Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspective on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2014), 11–12, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special- interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Perspectives-on-the-Role-of-the-OSCE-in-the-Ukraine- Crisis.pdf; Christian Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE,” The International Relations and Security Network Blog, December 23, 2014, http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/summing-up-switzerlands-2014-chairmanship-of-the-osce. 38 business.76 The OSCE and its various institutions have been involved in almost every aspect of the international response to the Ukraine crisis, from facilitating high-level political negotiations to deploying networks of on-the-ground observers. Endowing the OSCE with crucial mandates in Ukraine, the global powers appear to have acknowledged the organization as a relevant and valuable component of the European security architecture. Nevertheless, the challenges of the Ukraine crisis have also exposed certain of the OSCE’s limitations. This chapter will explain how the previously neglected and overlooked OSCE came to play such a vital role in Ukraine, describe the impressive extent of the organization’s mandate there, and explore the limitations the organization has faced in managing the Ukraine crisis.
OSCE TAKES A LEADING ROLE
A number of multilateral organizations could potentially have served as forums to manage tensions in Ukraine as domestic turmoil became a full-blown international crisis with Russia’s incursion into Crimea in February 2014. The UN, EU, and NATO, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross and a host of other international NGOs all boast crisis management and peacekeeping mechanisms that in theory could have been deployed to reduce tensions and observe on-the-ground developments. The OSCE took the leading role for two reasons: the Swiss chairmanship proved adept at asserting the OSCE’s utility, and the OSCE was the only framework acceptable to Russia. Swiss President and Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter assumed the role of OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in January 2014, taking over for Leonid Kozhara of Ukraine. Though the Swiss agenda for its yearlong leadership was focused on the Helsinki+40 reform process, modernizing arms control CSBMs, and addressing
76 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” 3. 39 transnational threats, these plans were soon overwhelmed by events in Ukraine. Because the OSCE’s agenda is primarily chairmanship-driven, Burkhalter held much of the responsibility for determining how the organization would react to the escalating conflict. The Swiss President and Foreign Minister quickly took advantage of the opportunity to “awaken the sleeping beauty” and put forth a range of activities and solutions that would put the OSCE front and center in Ukraine.77 During the course of his chairmanship, Burkhalter presented more than 60 statements on Ukraine in a variety of forums and served as an indispensible mediator between the clashing parties.78 Speaking before a UN Security Council meeting on Ukraine in late February 2014, Burkhalter proposed the establishment of an OSCE monitoring mission, the creation of an international contact group of key stakeholders, and the selection of an OSCE Special Representative to Ukraine.79 As the result of persistent Swiss diplomacy, each of these proposals materialized over the next several months. As negotiations for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine were underway, for instance, Burkhalter personally convinced Vladimir Putin over the phone to consent to the large-scale mission. Having little faith or trust in the OSCE’s effectiveness, Putin had opposed deploying such a mission for weeks, until the Swiss chairman, as a trusted impartial actor, succeeded in changing his mind.80 Burkhalter also took the initiative to host the first bilateral meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers after the ouster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych81 and was the first
77 Greminger, “The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship,” 11. 78 Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” 79 Greminger, “The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship,” 11. 80 Christian Nünlist, “OSCE Crisis Management in the Ukraine Crisis,” Security and Human Rights - Netherlands Helsinki Committee, December 18, 2014, http://www.shrblog.org/blog/Guest_Blog_Entry__OSCE_Crisis_Management_in_the_Ukraine_Crisis.html ?id=503. 81 Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” 40 Western leader to meet with President Putin in person after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.82 Via the work of the Burkhalter’s Special Representative in Ukraine, Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, the OSCE was also able to broker the first ceasefire agreement between Moscow, Kyiv, and the pro-Russian separatists that cleared the way for the Minsk agreements in September 2014.83 At each turn, the Burkhalter used the crisis as an opportunity to demonstrate the OSCE’s utility, making the OSCE and its extensive crisis management toolkit “more visible.”84 The result, as one scholar notes, is that “[t]he OSCE, under the Swiss chairmanship, is once again recognized as a leading international security organization.”85 In addition to having an active and trusted chairman at the helm, the OSCE regained prominence amid the Ukraine crisis also as a result of its unique configuration and reputation for impartiality. The OSCE, as the most inclusive European security organization, proved to be the best available framework for managing a crisis in which Russia perceived the EU and NATO to be involved parties. Whereas the EU (via French leadership) took a central role in mediating tensions in Georgia in 2008, Russia would not have allowed it to assume a similar position in Ukraine, given the fact that the prospect of Ukrainian integration with the EU sparked the initial political turmoil in Kyiv. NATO, long perceived in Russia as an adversarial military alliance and conduit for U.S. policy, was for obvious reasons an even less acceptable forum to manage the crisis in Moscow’s eyes. While the Ukraine crisis has been frequently discussed at the UN Security Council, this forum also would not have provided a viable framework for managing the conflict, as Russia and Ukraine are not represented on equal footing in that body. Excluding Ukraine
82 Nünlist, “OSCE Crisis Management.” 83 Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” 84 Ibid. 85 Greminger, “The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship,” 12. 41 from the discussions while including Russia would only have promoted a false narrative by portraying Russia as a neutral third party rather than a directly involved participant. The OSCE, then, was the best and indeed the only acceptable option. Its weak institutionalization reinforced by consensus-based decision-making, the OSCE succeeded in attracting all parties to the table. To some extent, the organization reclaimed its position in the European security space both as a “first responder” enabled by bold Swiss initiatives and as a framework of “last resort” in the context of other unsuitable platforms.86
OSCE'S MANY MANDATES
The OSCE plays a vital role in managing the Ukraine crisis in a number of respects. As the only significant international presence on the ground in Ukraine, it not only serves as the eyes and ears of the international community, but also acts as a local mediator when possible. Beyond its ground-level functions, the organization also facilitates high-level political negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as well as discussions at the working-group level, which include Russia, Ukraine, and representatives of self-declared pro-Russian “peoples republics.” The OSCE’s initial response to the crisis came just days after the first appearance of Russian forces in Crimea. Thirty-five international military observers from 18 OSCE participating states (all NATO members) arrived in Ukraine in early March 2014, authorized under the Vienna Document (VDoc) to observe and report on “unusual military activity” on Ukrainian territory. VDoc inspectors typically are tasked with on- site short-notice inspections to verify compliance with VDoc provisions requiring
86 Paul Fritch, “The OSCE in Ukraine: ‘First Responder’ or Last Resort?,” European Leadership Network, April 17, 2015, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-osce-in-ukraine-first-responder-or-last- resort_2660.html. 42 transparency in military activities, troop levels, and equipment. In this instance, however, Ukraine itself triggered the mission by requesting an “over-quota” voluntary observer mission, a feature of the Vienna Document never previously activated.87 Since that time, Ukraine has welcomed several additional voluntary VDoc missions. These missions, limited in time and scope and staffed only with unarmed observers, have primarily performed a signaling function during the crisis. Though the VDoc inspectors are unable to travel in active conflict zones due to security concerns, Ukraine has requested these missions as a means to underscore its transparency and highlight its willingness to cooperate with the international community. By the end of March, all 57 OSCE participating states had also agreed to institute the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. Within twenty-four hours of the vote to authorize the SMM, OSCE observers landed in Ukraine with a mandate to gather information on the security situation in the conflict zone, to document and report on violations of OSCE principles, to facilitate dialogue between parties, and promote respect for human rights.88 Since authorizing an initial 100 observers, the OSCE Permanent Council has voted on three occasions to expand the SMM. Authorized to deploy up to 1000 unarmed monitors, the SMM is now the largest-ever field operation directed by the OSCE. The votes to approve and expand the SMM represent a remarkable development for the OSCE, which had not launched a new field mission in over ten years. Reversing the longstanding trend of shuttering and downgrading field missions, the establishment of the SMM is certainly the OSCE’s most significant achievement in the context of the Ukraine crisis.89
87 Sammut and D’Urso, “The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: A Useful but Flawed OSCE Tool.” 88 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” 89 Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” 43 In July 2014, amid continued allegations of Russian fighters and weapons flowing across the Russia-Ukraine border, the OSCE deployed a second observer mission of a much more limited nature. The Observer Mission (OM) consists of just 16 personnel tasked with monitoring two Russian border checkpoints. Such a narrow mission, capable of monitoring only a tiny fraction of the long Russia-Ukraine border, was intended as a confidence-building measure that could later be expanded. Calls to enlarge the OM, however, failed to gain traction, as Ukraine lost all control of a large portion of its border with Russia in subsequent months.90 In addition to special missions authorized by the OSCE Permanent Council, the OSCE’s independent institutions have also maintained an active presence in Ukraine since the crisis began. In one of its largest-ever undertakings, ODIRH sent over 1,000 observers from a large number of participating states to oversee Ukraine’s May 2014 presidential election and October 2014 parliamentary elections, reinforcing the political legitimacy of the first elected post-Maidan government.91 Likewise, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media deployed their own missions to observe and report on the state of human rights and media freedoms across Ukraine (including Crimea). Beyond deploying field missions to Ukraine, the OSCE has also played an important role facilitating political negotiations throughout the crisis. Though international discussions of the Ukraine crisis have assumed a number of different formats, some of which exclude OSCE participation, the organization has been central to maintaining dialogue and reducing tensions.92 After OSCE CiO Burkhalter traveled to
90 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” 6. 91 Bloed, “OSCE Revitalized by the Ukraine Crisis,” 148. 92 Early negotiation platforms included the Wiemar triangle (foreign ministers of Germany, France Poland, Ukraine) and the Geneva format (foreign ministers of United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the EU’s foreign 44 Moscow for direct talks with Vladimir Putin, the OSCE succeeded in instituting the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE in June 2014. The TCG not only provides a regular discussion mechanism for the key state actors, but also comprises lower-level working groups that encourage Russia and Ukraine to engage in structured dialogue with separatist representatives. The TCG remained the primary negotiation forum until a steep escalation of fighting over the summer prompted the elevation of discussions to the Normandy format, which brings together the heads of state or foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine.93 Still the TCG, led by the adept hand of Heidi Tagliavini, was the primary framework for drafting the September Misnk Protocol, in which representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics agreed upon an immediate ceasefire as well as a number of steps to de-escalate military activities and achieve political settlement. In drafting this agreement, the OSCE had not only brokered a major diplomatic accord, but had also ensured the continued involvement of the OSCE’s field missions in monitoring implementation of the ceasefire and other key stipulations of the Minsk Protocol.94 In February 2014, after months of continued fighting
policy chief). Both proved unsuitable for the task at hand, given Russia’s objection to the involvement of either Poland or the EU.
93 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” 7–8. 94 The Minsk Protocol expressively gives the OSCE sole authorization to monitor and verify the ceasefire as well as permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border. The Minsk II package of measures tasked the OSCE with monitoring a renewed ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, the removal of foreign (i.e. Russian) military personnel, and monitoring local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. See “Protokola po itogam konsul’tatsii Trekhstoronnei kontaktnoi gruppy otnositel’no shagov, napravlennykh na implementatsiiu Mirnogo plana Prezidenta Ukrainy P. Poroshenko i initsiativ Prezidenta Rossii V. Putina [Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group regarding steps for implementing the peace plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President of Russia V. Putin]” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 5, 2014), http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true; “Kompleks mer po vypolneniiu Minskikh soglashenii [Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements]” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 15, 2015), http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true. 45 and failure on all sides to carry out elements of the Minsk agreement, the TCG worked in concert with the Normandy format to produce the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (Minsk II), which offered a specific details and timelines for executing the precarious Minsk agreement.
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
While the Ukraine crisis provided an opening for the OSCE to demonstrate its relevance, the conflict has also revealed a number of weaknesses and shortcomings of the organization. The very fact that tensions in Ukraine rose to the level of interstate military crisis between two OSCE participating states could be considered a fundamental failure of the OSCE to fulfill its mission of conflict prevention. After the appearance of large number of Russian military personnel in Crimea, but before the Russian Federation annexed the peninsula, the OSCE framework could possibly have been used to prevent further escalation. In a lengthy telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014, President Obama suggested that OSCE mechanisms be used to prevent the outbreak of violence by deploying neutral observers and facilitating immediate dialogue between Ukraine and Russia.95 Despite its impressive toolkit, however, the OSCE was unable to prevent the crisis from developing into a full-blown military conflict. In the face of strong Russian interests driving further confrontation, the OSCE simply could not have been expected to reverse the course of events already in motion. Although conflict prevention may have been an excessively high bar in the context of the broader geopolitical dynamics playing out in Ukraine, the crisis has also challenged the organization’s ability to fulfill more modest missions. The OSCE’s
95 Henry Farrell, “Obama Is Using the OSCE to Give Russia an Exit Strategy … If It Wants One,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2014/03/01/obama-is-using-the-osce-to-give-russia-an-exit-strategy-if-it-wants-one/. 46 success in securing consensus among all 57 participating states to launch new field activities in Ukraine is remarkable, but insufficient cooperation nevertheless hampers the work of these operations.96 The unarmed SMM observers, for instance, face consistent freedom-of-movement restrictions within separatist-held and Ukrainian territory.97 Harassment of and acts of violence against OSCE personnel have further hindered the effectiveness of the organization’s field activities. The mandate of the OSCE border Observation Mission remains extremely limited, and attempts to expand the operation have been repeatedly vetoed by Russia. Clearly, the effectiveness of the OSCE’s field operations continues to be contingent on sufficient cooperation of all involved parties. The OSCE’s work to facilitate dialogue beyond the local level has likewise encountered roadblocks that call into question its capacity to manage such a crisis. At times, the organization’s inclusive 57-member framework proved too unwieldy to serve as an arena for the highest-level political negotiations. The OSCE Trilateral Contact Group reached its diplomatic ceiling as the conflict reached its bloodiest point in the summer of 2014, when top-level management of the political crisis was rerouted to the Normandy format, which allowed for direct talks among a select group of foreign ministers and heads of state.98 Nonetheless, the TCG has proven to be an indispensable forum for negotiation on the detailed implementation of the Minsk agreements. However, the four TCG working groups (covering political, security, economic, and humanitarian issues) have failed to achieve much forward progress. The political working group, in
96 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” 97 In daily reports, the SMM catalogues routine denial of access by armed men within its authorized area of operation. These reports also describe military-grade GPS jamming of OSCE observation drones, restricting the SMM’s capacity to carry out its mandated mission. 98 Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” 47 particular, has repeatedly reached deadlock, with separatist representatives walking out or declining to attend meetings on a number of occasions.
48 5. The Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s OSCE Policy: Poking Holes in the Silver Lining
Despite the challenges and limitations the OSCE has encountered in carrying out its wide-ranging mission in Ukraine, the organization has unquestionably gained in relevance and visibility. The question remains, however, whether a change in Russia’s policy toward the organization has emerged in conjunction with this reinvigorated OSCE. There exist a number of hypothetical avenues through which the crisis in Ukraine and the OSCE’s elevated position could be related to a shift in Russia’s policy toward the organization. Russia’s approval of the OSCE’s extensive involvement in Ukraine – enabling the OSCE’s rise – could indeed indicate that Russia has taken a more cooperative tack in the OSCE. It could be the case that Russia has taken the opportunity presented by the Ukraine crisis to elevate the OSCE and push for long-sought-after reforms. Or perhaps the newly empowered OSCE in turn inspired Russia to reconsider the organization’s utility. In fact, in the context of a reduced range of international forums available to Moscow, Russia may be left with little option but to redirect engagement with Europe through OSCE mechanisms. Through a close study of Russian behavior toward the OSCE from 2013-2016, this chapter will identify any evident changes in Russia’s OSCE policy over the course of the Ukraine crisis. Setting the stage, this section will begin by briefly detailing the effect that the crisis has had on Russia’s interaction with multilateral forums in general. The chapter will then turn to careful study of Russia’s engagement with the OSCE by examining public statements, official documents, and the record of Russia’s actions within the OSCE as well as those directed at the organization.
49 RUSSIA’S ACCESS TO THE MULTILATERAL SPACE
The broad effect of the Ukraine crisis has been to drastically narrow Russia’s access to multilateral forums in the European space. Punitive measures undertaken by Western powers in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine sought to isolate Russia from the international community by ousting the country from international forums. The Russian response has been to back away from the remaining mechanisms that have long enabled dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the West. As Western powers searched for ways to condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the first response was to eject Russia from its place of prestige as a member of the Group of Eight (G8). Just three days after Russia’s Federation Council ratified the treaty incorporating the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation, the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy agreed to suspend the G8, returning instead to the G7 format, which had been active before the addition of Russia in 1997. Cementing this decision, the G7 states boycotted the G8 Summit in June 2014, which was to be hosted in Sochi, Russia. The following month, NATO foreign ministers announced that the organization would suspend “all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and
Russia.”99 Though the statement explicitly noted that political dialogue would remain open, this decision effectively ended the work of the NATO-Russia Council, eliminating yet another for multilateral engagement with Russia. A year later, the Russian foreign ministry announced that Russia would completely halt all cooperation under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This move came in response to the buildup of NATO forces in Eastern Europe in
99 “Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers” (NATO, April 1, 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108501.htm. 50 2014 and 2015, which Russia claimed was a de-facto violation of the CFE Treaty. As discussed previously (see chapter 4), the CFE Treaty was long seen as a pillar of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War period. The treaty established limits on categories of conventional military equipment in Europe, setting equal ceilings for the Eastern and Western blocs (the Warsaw Pact and NATO). Though Russia had “suspended” its participation in 2007, citing a need for reform of the treaty, its 2015 announcement ended Russia’s cooperation with the Joint Consultative Group, the only vestige of the CFE Treaty mechanism that continued after 2007. The loss of these multilateral forums in 2014 and 2015 could potentially have put greater emphasis on the OSCE as the best (in fact, only) remaining avenue for regularized multilateral dialogue between Russia and the Western powers on issues of European security. With the OSCE as the last forum standing for such inclusive dialogue, it is conceivable that Russia’s policy toward the organization could have undergone a significant shift.
RUSSIAN STATEMENTS ON THE OSCE
The tone and content of official Russian statements with regard to the OSCE can lend a degree of insight into Russia’s perception of the organization. Analysis of such statements indicates a clear uptick in positive assessments of the organization’s capability and utility. The dissatisfaction and disillusionment that has long characterized Russia’s attitude toward the OSCE, however, remains evident in the frequent criticisms voiced by Russian officials. Though public pronouncements cannot necessarily be taken at face value in evaluating Russia’s strategy toward the OSCE, they can reveal information about the image that Russia chooses to project concerning its relationship with the OSCE and its stance on cooperation via multilateral forums. 51 As the OSCE has assumed a central role in managing the Ukraine crisis, Russian officials and scholars close to the state have offered a number of positive appraisals of the OSCE’s value for Russia and for European security more broadly – an opinion rarely expressed in the years leading up to the conflict. Highlighting the OSCE as one of the few remaining forums for Russian dialogue with the West, political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov, chair of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, referred to the OSCE just before the 2014 Ministerial Council as “the only instrument that may be useful now in work on local conflicts,” adding, “by its mandate and de facto the OSCE is a mechanism without alternative.”100 Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Meshkov conveyed the same sentiment after the close of the 2014 Ministerial Council, expressing appreciation of the OSCE’s “role as a platform and forum for political dialogue” and noting that, given “the scaling down of [Russian] relations with NATO and [Russia’s] limited interaction with the EU, the importance of … OSCE functions has significantly increased.”101 102 A number of public statements have directly connected the OSCE’s role in the Ukraine crisis with an improvement of Russia’s perception of the organization. The Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of Russia’s upper chamber of parliament asserted in a February 2015 committee debate on Russia’s future participation in the OSCE that “the latest events around Ukraine … are now giving the OSCE a new lease of life and a new role.”103 Likewise, the director of the pan-European Department of
100 Pavel Tarasenko and Yelena Chernenko, “Rossii I Zapadu, Vozmozhno, Skoro Budet Negde Vstrechat’sia [For Russia and the West, Possibly, There Will Soon Be Nowhere to Meet],” Коммерсантъ, December 3, 2014. 101 Yelena Chernenko, “«OBSE Nazyvaiut Spiashchei Krasavitsei» [‘We Call the OSCE a Sleeping Beauty’],” Коммерсантъ, December 16, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2634372. 102 Kommersant, December 16, 2014, p. 8 103 “Ukraine Events May Give OSCE New Lease of Life - Kosachyov,” Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, February 24, 2015, Factiva. 52 the Russian Foreign Ministry, addressing a parliamentary hearing in June 2015, argued in favor of Russia’s active participation in the OSCE, given its newfound significance:
“The events in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated that the OSCE, which used to be in the shadows for a long time, has now remained the only floor for a political dialogue. It has real potential for coordinating collective measures to settle the conflict and end the systemic European security crisis in the future.”104
While such positive assessments of the OSCE have surfaced in official statements amid the Ukraine crisis, this new thinking has not displaced Russia’s long-standing dissatisfaction with the organization. The Foreign Ministry’s December 2015 statement on the year’s major foreign policy developments, for instance, emphasizes the positive contributions of the OSCE to European security, but at the same time is tempered by sharp criticisms. The document notes that “the outgoing year has reaffirmed the important role of the OSCE in European affairs in the context of resolving the Ukraine crisis.” It then continues in the same vein, underlining the OSCE’s expanding role as a platform for dialogue “[a]mid the ongoing ‘freeze’ in relations between Russia and the EU as well as Russia and NATO.” Taking a sharp turn, the statement then clouds this rosy assessment by asserting that “certain negative trends in the organization’s work have also grown,” in particular those of ODIHR, the HCNM, and the RFoM, prompting Russia to “strengthen its counteraction against hostile rhetoric and the promotion of approaches in the OSCE that are contrary to [Russian] interests.”105 In similar statements released throughout 2015, the Russian Foreign ministry voiced consistent criticism of the “thematic and geographical imbalances in the [OSCE’s]
104 States News Service, “OSCE to Increase Its Role in Pan-European Architecture - Russian Foreign Ministry,” ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/804018. 105 “Osnovnye vneshnepoliticheskie sobytiia 2015 goda [The major foreign policy events of 2015],” December 29, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2003505?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_I NSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU. 53 operation.” 106 In a November press conference, Deputy Foreign Minister Meshkov went as far a to call for a full audit of ODIHR’s budget and expenditures, implicitly noting Western bias in the institution’s field activities.107 Just a month later, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE Aleksandr Lukashevich again noted Moscow’s displeasure with ODIHR and the HCNM, in connection with a critical report on human rights in Russian-annexed Crimea, produced by the two institutions and funded by voluntary extra-budgetary contributions from OSCE participating states.108 Similarly, the official Russian position published before the 2015 Ministerial Council in Belgrade voiced strong objections to the work of ODIHR, the HCNM, and the RFoM. The document also articulated Russia’s desire to close OSCE field missions, which in Russia’s eyes have become “less relevant and appealing.”109 Official remarks furthermore continue to emphasize Russia’s objective to reform and further institutionalize the OSCE.110 At the December 2015 Ministerial Council, the
106 “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi s vizitom v Rossiiu General’nogo sekretaria OBSE L.Zan’era [Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian MFA on a visit by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier to Russia],” October 10, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1838672?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_I NSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU. 107 “Moskva vystupaet za audit raboty BDIPCh OBSE [Moscow calls for an audit of the work of the OSCE’s ODIHR],” ITAR-TASS, November 11, 2015, http://tass.ru/politika/2426658. 108 “Interv’iu Postoiannogo predstavitelia Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri OBSE A.K.Lukashevicha, opublikovannoe v gazete «Kommersant‘» [Interview of the Russian Permanent Representative to the OSCE A.K. Lukashevich published in the newspaper ’Kommersant"],” December 11, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/1977416. 109 “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi s uchastiem Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova v ocherednom zasedanii SMID OBSE [Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian MFA on Russian Foreign Minister S.V Lavrov’s participation in the next ОSСЕ Ministerial Council meeting],” December 2, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1956982. 110 Russia’s repeated calls to empower the OSCE by making it a fully-fledged treaty-based organization may appear incongruous with its otherwise consistent efforts to limit the activities of the organization. However, Russia’s calls for OSCE reform should be understood as a gambit to prevent the expansion of NATO. Russia’s ultimate hope that an OSCE charter would grant the principle of “indivisible security” a firm a legal footing. Russia could then argue against NATO expansion on a legal basis, drawing on the concept that no OSCE member state should increase its security at the expense of another. 54 formal written statement of the Russian Federation highlighted the organization’s advantages – “its unique and comprehensive approach to security” – but urged major reforms to convert the OSCE into a treaty-based organization with a legally binding charter (thus bringing semi-independent institutions such as ODIHR under the control of OSCE executive bodies).111 In a press conference at the same gathering, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praised the work of the SMM, but noted Russia’s wish to establish a clear legal framework for the OSCE and re-focus its work on the military-political dimension in order to preclude further “NATO-centrism” in the European security space.112
THE OSCE IN RUSSIAN DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS
Beyond the public remarks of Russian officials, signposts of continuity and change in Russian foreign policy can often be found in the country’s major doctrinal reviews. These publically available documents, updated periodically by the Russian government, outline in broad strokes aspects of the country’s foreign policy and national security strategies. While such publications generally contain very broad assertions of Russia’s overarching goals and interests in the international arena, the OSCE has at times occupied a significant enough position to merit specific mention. For instance, in its 1992 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia called for the OSCE to become the cornerstone of “a
111 “Zaiavlenie delegatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na zakrytii 22-go zasedaniia SMID OBSE, Belgrad [Statement by the Russian delegation at the closing session of the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Belgrade],” December 4, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1965797. 112 Sergei Lavrov, “Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova v khode press-konferentsii po itogam pervogo dnia raboty Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del OBSE i riada dvustoronnikh vstrech, Belgrad [Remarks and response to media questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a press conference after the first day of work of the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and a number of bilateral meetings, Belgrade],” December 3, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1965325. 55 stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation.”113 In later years, however, the OSCE is mentioned only briefly in a long list of multilateral organizations to which Russia belongs. A review of the most recently published strategy reviews yields no evidence to indicate that Russia’s approach to the OSCE has changed significantly during the course of the conflict in Ukraine. The 2015 National Security Strategy and 2014 Military Doctrine, as compared to the previous versions of these documents (published in 2009 and 2010, respectively), place no additional emphasis on the OSCE as a component of European security. The National Security Strategy continues to frame Russia’s involvement in the European security space largely in terms of its direct interactions with NATO and the EU.114 Likewise, the Military Doctrine mentions the OSCE only as one of many regional security organizations. Just as in previous versions, the document dedicates no space to discussion of Russia’s strategy with respect to the OSCE, though it does elaborate on Russia’s engagement with several other regional platforms.115 Because the most recent Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was issued in 2013, before the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, there is as of yet no basis for analyzing the effect of the crisis on Russia’s OSCE policy by reviewing document.116 Overall, the
113 Osnovnye polozheniia kontseptsii vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation], April 23, 1993. 114 “Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation],” December 31, 2015. 115 “Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (v redaktsii ot 2015 g.) [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (as redacted in 2015)],” March 3, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/976907. 116 In the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, the OSCE appears toward the bottom of a long section on “regional priorities,” with great emphasis on the need for institutional reform within the organization. Only upon the publication of a revised version will comparison of the pre- and post-Ukraine Concepts be possible. Russia re-issues these documents at irregular intervals and it is unclear when a new Foreign Policy Concept will be published.“Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation],” February 12, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. 56 continued de-emphasis of the OSCE in these documents supports the notion that continuity, rather than change, best characterizes Russia’s fundamental strategy for engagement with the OSCE, despite the organization’s reemergence.
RUSSIA’S ACTIONS WITHIN THE OSCE
While official statements and doctrinal reviews reveal some fraction of Russia’s approach to engaging with the OSCE, Russia’s behavior within and actions toward the organization provide the most revealing insight into Russian intent. A close examination of Russia’s careful maneuvering with respect to the OSCE throughout the course of the Ukraine crisis indicates a continued pattern of selective and pragmatic engagement. Though the Ukraine crisis has given the OSCE an avenue to assert its relevance in the realm of crisis management, the Russian response to the OSCE’s enhanced stature has been limited and of a mixed nature. While Russia’s OSCE policy has in some respects taken a positive turn, Russia ultimately continues to use the organization not as a means to regularize regional security cooperation but as a tool to achieve national objectives. While the Ukraine crisis may have increased the frequency with which Russia makes use of the OSCE to work towards its own foreign policy goals, it does not appear to have fundamentally altered Russia’s assessment of the organization.
A Constructive Russia?
Though Russia’s recent support of OSCE decisions may at first glance appear to indicate a more cooperative policy, closer scrutiny reveals that Russia’s engagement with the OSCE remains contingent upon the degree to which the organization’s activities satisfy Russia’s own foreign policy goals. In what has been perceived as an uncharacteristic turn toward cooperation within the OSCE, Russia has repeatedly voted to
57 approve the organization’s expanding role in Ukraine. While simultaneously fueling the conflict in Ukraine’s easternmost provinces, Russia’s representatives to the OSCE have voted in favor of a number of sizeable new field missions in Ukraine, ending the ten-year gap in which Russian objections precluded any growth of OSCE activities in the former Soviet space. Most significantly, Russia endorsed the establishment of the SMM and has agreed to three subsequent extensions and expansions of its mandate, allowing it to become the OSCE’s largest-ever field operation. Behind the scenes, however, a number of compromises were sown into the Permanent Council decision authorizing the SMM, representing significant diplomatic victories for Russia. Moscow blocked the SMM’s creation over weeks of deliberation, waiting until after its annexation of Crimea to force a change in the mission’s mandate, explicitly excluding the territory of Crimea.117 In essence, the OSCE was able to gain Russia’s approval for the SMM only by indirectly recognizing a Russian Crimea as the new status quo. Moscow additionally succeeded in its push to prohibit Ukrainian citizens from serving as SMM monitors, while allowing active Russian participation. In this way, Russia was able to compel the OSCE to reinforce the narrative that the Russian Federation is a neutral mediator in the Ukraine crisis, rather than a direct party to the conflict.118 Over the course of the conflict, Russia has also attempted to use active participation in OSCE processes to project an image of itself as a constructive multilateral actor, fulfilling its responsibilities as a great power in managing an international crisis. Russia has worked to cultivate the appearance of contributing to a diplomatic solution in Ukraine, while continuing to provide support to separatist military
117 Sammut and D’Urso, “The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: A Useful but Flawed OSCE Tool.” 118 Ibid. 58 operations. Moscow’s invitation to deploy a limited OSCE observation mission on the Russian side of the Russia-Ukraine border was Moscow’s clearest attempt to demonstrate such “good will.” With access to only two checkpoints on a lengthy and porous border and a cap of just sixteen personnel, the Observer Mission has been hamstrung in its task of monitoring the transfer of weapons and personnel across the border. Ultimately, the mission has performed little function other than to bolster Russia’s own conflict narrative. As Moscow repeatedly blocked any expansion of the OM, it became evident that the mission had been nothing but a “fig leaf” from the start.119 Russia’s efforts to demonstrate constructive behavior within the OSCE over this period has extended beyond direct dealings with the Ukraine crisis. In September 2014, by hosting the very first seminar of the Helsinki+40 process, Russia positioned itself as a champion of a strengthened OSCE and a committed multilateral actor. Though the yearlong series of seminars did not result in the adoption of concrete reform proposals, Russia’s leading role at the start served to portray the country in a positive light, despite its involvement in the bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Obstructionist Behavior
Beyond such “constructive” behavior, Moscow has also moved to impede OSCE pursuits that it perceives to be threatening to Russian interests. By blocking decisions within the OSCE executive bodies and refusing to attend meetings, Russia has used its membership in the OSCE over the course of the Ukraine crisis to guard its own interests, often at the expense of the organization’s standing. When the OSCE community expressed grave concern over Russia’s troop buildup along its border with Ukraine in
119 “Russia Rejects Calls for Substantial Monitoring of Russian Side of Border” (U.S. Mission to the OSCE, July 24, 2014), https://osce.usmission.gov/russia-rejects-calls-for-substantial-monitoring-of-russian- side-of-border/. 59 March and April 2014 and attempted to employ OSCE mechanisms to head off the approaching crisis, Russia refused a request under the terms of the Vienna Document to engage in a multilateral consultation to explain its actions.120 In doing so, Russia disregarded the Vienna Document, which has no provision for a participating state to refuse such meetings. Many OSCE participating states then called for a joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and Permanent Council to discuss Russia’s military activity along the Russia-Ukraine border. Russia again refused to attend this and several subsequent meeting on the same topic, preventing the OSCE from applying the stipulations of the Vienna Document requiring military transparency between participating states.121 From 2013-16, Russia has regularly used its veto to block OSCE decisions and declaration. Such behavior has been particularly visible at the annual Ministerial Council meetings, the output of which often serves as a basis to evaluate the state of the OSCE. In one of many such instances, Russia prevented the passage of a political declaration on the Ukraine crisis at the 2014 Ministerial Council in Basel. The document would have supported the consensus view of participating states that the crisis was “the result of the pressure from one participating state against another.”122 Likewise, at the 2015 Ministerial Council in Belgrade, Russia did not approve a single of twelve proposals put forth in the human dimension.123
120 “Request for Consultation on Russian Military Buildup on Ukraine Border Refused, OSCE to Meet Monday” (U.S. Mission to the OSCE, April 5, 2014), https://osce.usmission.gov/request-for-consultation- on-russian-military-buildup-on-ukraine-border-refused-osce-to-meet-monday/. 121 Daniel Baer, “On Russian Military Activities Near Ukraine’s Border” (U.S. Mission to the OSCE, April 30, 2014), https://osce.usmission.gov/on-russian-military-activities-near-ukraines-border/. 122 Nünlist, “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” 123 Christian Nünlist, “In Switzerland’s Shadow: Summing up Serbia’s 2015 OSCE Chairmanship - Netherlands Helsinki Committee,” Security and Human Rights, December 11, 2015, http://www.shrblog.org/blog/In_Switzerland___s_Shadow__Summing_up_Serbia_s_2015_OSCE_Chairm anship.html?id=579. 60 Legitimizing Kremlin Policy
Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has increasingly sought to use the OSCE as an avenue to legitimize Moscow’s policies and perspectives on the world stage. As the organization has regained prominence as a result of its work in Ukraine, Russia has sought to take advantage of this platform to more vocally promote its broad vision for the future of the European and Eurasian space – an “integration of integrations.”124 This concept, which espouses increased ties between Russian-led regional organizations (the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) and their European and East Asian “equivalents,” is at its core a strategy to legitimize Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space and, by extension, Russia’s preference for great power management as the model for international order. This strategy of seeking international recognition for Russian-dominated integration projects is not a new one,125 but the push to use the OSCE as an arena for dialogue on this issue marks a shift in Russian behavior in recent years. As evidenced by a number of statements within OSCE forums from 2013-2016, Russia has fully integrated this issue into its OSCE agenda. From calls for the “harmonization of integration projects”126 to efforts to engage in dialogue on “how to align integration processes,”127 most of Russia’s high-level remarks to the OSCE in this period have incorporated this theme.
124 Vladimir Putin, “Transcript: Putin’s Address to the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly,” accessed April 15, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50385. 125 Aliaksei Kazharski, “Is Putin Winning the Recognition Game? Is the Eurasian Union Back on the Table?,” Policy memo (PONARS Eurasia, February 12, 2015), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/putin- winning-recognition-game-eurasian-union-back-table. 126 Sergei Lavrov, “Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova na plenarnom zasedanii Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del OBSE, Kiev [Remarks of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov at the plenary session of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kiev]” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2013), http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/B569FE37BAAAEB5E44257C380044A8FE. 127 “Zaiavlenie delegatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na zakrytii 22-go zasedaniia SMID OBSE, Belgrad [Statement by the Russian delegation at the closing session of the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Belgrade].” 61 To the same end, Russia has also used a strategy of consolidating CSTO member states as a bloc within the OSCE. This strategy forces interaction with the CSTO an organized grouping, thus granting a form of recognition to the organization and legitimizing Russia’s policy of “aligning integrations.” In recent years, the OSCE Chairman has acquiesced to this strategy, often meeting with the CSTO bloc as a group in Moscow to discuss OSCE business. Consensus among CSTO states within the OSCE also serves to bolster Moscow’s grand vision by echoing Russian language on the subject. In a release on the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, the CSTO foreign ministers urged their fellow OSCE participating states to establish a “direct dialogue between the various integration associations in the OSCE region.”128 The group later met on the margins of the 2015 Ministerial Council in Belgrade to produce a joint declaration on the role of the OSCE in the European security system. The statement not only emphasizes the need for CSTO members to act in concert within the OSCE, but also notes the need “to align the integration processes in the East and West of Eurasia.”129 In the case of Russia’s quest to promote “integration of integrations” within the OSCE, Russian conduct in the organization boils down to a set of instrumental interactions. Though instrumentalization of the OSCE does not mark a departure from Russia’s previous approach, the above evidence suggests that the prominence of the OSCE within Russia’s broader foreign policy strategy has expanded since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis.
128 “Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie Postoiannykh Predstavitelei gosudarstv-chlenov ODKB pri OBSE o 40-letii podpisaniia Khel’sinkskogo Zakliuchitel’nogo Akta, Vena [Joint statement of the Permanent Representatives of CSTO member states to the OSCE on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Vienna],” September 11, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/- /asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/1755687. 129 “Zaiavlenie ministrov inostrannykh del gosudarstv-chlenov ODKB «O roli OBSE v sisteme obshcheevropeiskoi bezopasnosti», Belgrad [Statement by CSTO Foreign Ministers ‘On the role of the OSCE in the European Security System,’ Belgrade].” 62 Testing Western Resolve
Finally, Russia has cleverly used the OSCE to challenge the West’s willingness to uphold policy positions condemning Russia’s activities in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and military involvement in Ukraine’s eastern regions. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, generally a quiet and relatively uncontroversial body, has become a battleground on which Russia has tested the firmness of Western policy toward Russian Crimea, probed the EU’s readiness to enforce its sanctions against Russian officials, and disputed those sanctions’ validity. In this way, Russia has not only used its position in the OSCE to publicly contest Western policies denouncing Russian aggression, but has also succeeded in compelling OSCE officials and participating states to push back against or even contravene EU policy. Russia took a notable action in this vein in February 2015, when it designated Olga Kovitidi, the representative from Crimea in Russia’s upper house of parliament, as a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly representing Russia. The Bureau of the OSCE PA unanimously rejected Russia’s candidate on the recommendation of a Credentials Committee, which determined that Kovitidi could not be considered a
legitimate representative of the Russian government.130 The committee’s report emphasized that the Crimean government is “illegal de-facto authority on Ukrainian territory” established by Russia “in a way considered illegal by the overwhelming majority of the OSCE participating States.”131 Russia’s permanent representative to the
130 “Statement on the Rejection of Russia’s Designation of Olga Kovitidi as a Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 18, 2015), https://www.oscepa.org/news-a-media/press-releases/2015/2105-statement-on-the-rejection-of-russia-s- designation-of-olga-kovitidi-as-a-member-of-the-osce-parliamentary-assembly. 131 “Report and Recommendation of the Credentials Committee Regarding the Russian Federation’s Designation of Ms. Olga Kovitidi as a Member of the OSCE PA” (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, February 18, 2015), https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/winter-meetings/2015- vienna/reports-3/2730-report-and-recommendation-of-the-credentials-committee-regarding-the-russian- federation-s-designation-of-ms-olga-kovitidi-as-a-member-of-the-osce-pa/file. 63 OSCE called the decision “totally unacceptable,” suggesting that Kovitidi’s rejection was merely a Western “provocation.”132 This incident illustrates the beginning of a pattern of behavior, which Russia continued later in the year in an even bolder fashion. Scheduled to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, the July 2015 session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Helsinki carried great symbolic meaning for the organization and its participating states. Russian State Duma speaker Sergei Naryshkin was slated to lead the Russian delegation to the historic meeting. Naryshkin, along with five of fourteen other parliamentarians selected for the delegation, however, had been subject to EU sanctions since the previous year in connection with their public support for the annexation Crimea and the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, all six were subject to visa bans in EU member states. When Finland’s foreign ministry refused to issue visas for the sanctioned members, the entire Russian delegation boycotted the event.133 In Russia’s absence, the Assembly succeeded in adopting a resolution condemning Russia’s action in Ukraine.134 Russia then condemned the Assembly for engaging in “propagandistic activities” during the meeting. While Finland initially held the line on EU sanctions, Russian outrage after the fact forced a number of concessions from the OSCE and its participating states. Noting that “the OSCE with Russia makes no sense,” the Vice President of the OSCE PA indicated that the OSCE “would be willing to relax the sanctions in an attempt to
132 “Revoking of Russian Senator’s Status of Delegate at OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Illegitimate, Says Diplomat,” ITAR-TASS World Service, February 18, 2015, Factiva. 133 Tom Balmforth, “Russia To Boycott OSCE Session After Finland Blocks Delegates,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July 1, 2015, sec. Russia, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-osce-finland- naryshkin-/27104453.html. 134 http://www.oscepa.org/news-a-media/press-releases/2015/2273-osce-parliamentary-assembly-adopts- resolution-condemning-russia-s-actions-in-ukraine 64 establish dialogue.”135 By way of apology to Russia, the President of the OSCE PA sent a written appeal to the EU to grant travel ban waivers for participants in international meetings and assured Moscow that Russian parliamentarians participating in PA sessions in European countries would never again be denied visas.136 After receiving assurances from the Austrian government, a Russian delegation led by Naryshkin and including several parliamentarians under EU sanction attended a PA session in Vienna without
issue in February 2016. Following the scuffle over the Helsinki meeting, Russia repeatedly pushed the Assembly to consider adopting a permanent rule disallowing sanctions against parliamentarians. Naryshkin plans to continue this charge at the summer 2016 session in Georgia on the basis of a Swiss proposal.137
NET EFFECTS
In sum total, Russian policy toward the OSCE does not appear to have undergone a fundamental shift over the course of the Ukraine crisis. Moscow’s active engagement has in part enabled the OSCE to assume a central role in managing the crisis, but Russia’s strategy for interacting with the OSCE remains pragmatic and selective. Ultimately, Moscow continues to approach the organization as an instrument to achieve Russian foreign policy objectives, just as it has throughout the majority of the organization’s post- Cold War existence. The effort Russia devotes to working with, through, and around the
135 http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/13438-russia-s-absence-casts-shadow-on- osce-session.html 136 Aleksi Teivainen and Tuomas Muraja, “Russia’s Absence Casts Shadow on OSCE Session,” Helsinki Times, July 6, 2015, http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/13438-russia-s-absence- casts-shadow-on-osce-session.html; “PA OSCE President Will Ask EU to Lift Restrictive Measures from Delegation Members,” ITAR-TASS, July 17, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/world/809367. 137 Andrei Zolotov, “Russia’s Parliamentarians Lead the Charge against EU Sanctions,” Russia Direct, March 2, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russias-parliamentarians-lead-charge-against-eu- sanctions. 65 OSCE, however, has changed in accordance with Moscow’s estimation of the organization’s importance and potential potency on the world stage. Though Russian rhetoric and behavior from the end of 2013 to the present has changed course to acknowledge the OSCE’s newfound prominence and take advantage of the organization’s consequently expanded capability, the sources of Russia’s core dissatisfaction with the OSCE remain unchanged. Moscow consistently criticizes the OSCE on the same grounds as it has since the late 1990s, taking objection to perceived functional and geographical imbalances in the organization’s activities. The work of OHIRD, the HCNM, and the RFoM remains of central concern to Russia, which continues to favor the closure of field missions despite the positive impact OSCE field activities have had in moderating tensions in Ukraine. Similarly, Russian actions in the OSCE continue to exhibit a pattern of instrumental engagement. The OSCE’s renaissance in Ukraine has not slowed the pace of Russian obstructionism in OSCE forums. Whether by boycotting meetings or making free use of its veto, Russia does not hesitate to protect its foreign policy interests at the expense of the OSCE’s effectiveness. Likewise, a glace under the hood reveals that much of Russia’s constructive behavior in the organization in recent years has in fact enabled Moscow either to achieve narrow national objectives or to veil self-interested behavior with the appearance of international cooperation. Russia’s use of the OSCE as a battleground to challenge Western interests and as a forum to promote a broad vision of the international system as it manifests in the European-Eurasian space is also not unique to this time frame. Nevertheless, some degree of change is evident in Russia’s interaction with the OSCE since late 2013, particularly in the broader context of dwindling East-West interaction. While Russia’s fundamental approach to the organization remains 66 unchanged, the way in which this stance manifests has shifted in response to a changing environment. A slight difference in Russia’s tone and behavior within the OSCE over this period attests to its recognition of the reinvigorated organization as body capable of drawing significant Western interest and influencing the outcome of major international disputes. This can be seen in both the increasing number of positive assessments of the OSCE offered by top Russian officials as well as Moscow’s more frequent use of the OSCE as a platform to put forth grand policy concepts. The manner in which Russia has used OSCE forums to indirectly challenge Western sanctions policy and exploit fissures among European states likewise indicates that Russia has capitalized on new opportunities that the OSCE’s elevated stature provides.
67 6. Conclusions/Implications
Having closely investigated Russia’s OSCE policy in the context of the Ukraine crisis, this report will now draw general conclusions regarding the future of the OSCE and more broadly about Russia’s current approach to multilateral engagement. The report will conclude with a number of recommendations that could allow U.S. decision makers to enhance the OSCE as a valuable contributor to American foreign policy objectives. Given that Russia’s fundamental relationship with the OSCE has not shifted significantly over the course of the Ukraine crisis, hopes for a renaissance of the OSCE as a key forum for coordination and cooperation on issues of European security may be too optimistic. Ultimately, the OSCE can only be effective to the degree that its most powerful participating states are willing to invest energy and resources in making it so. While Russia has recognized the OSCE’s more prominent stature of late and has to some degree expanded its activity within the organization in response, Moscow remains largely ambivalent about the OSCE’s role in managing European security. Just as before the crisis, Russia is clearly interested in the OSCE, but its level of engagement is mediated by opportunities for national gain. Thus, the attitudes of other major actors are paramount in determining Russia’s behavior toward the OSCE. The greater the level of interest in the OSCE displayed by powerful actors, the more Russia may find it advantageous to operate within that framework. On a note of hope, the 2016 German chairmanship of the OSCE sends a positive signal regarding the West’s desire to invest in the organization. As the most powerful state to ever take on this position, Germany is breaking a decades-long pattern of small- state leadership of the OSCE. It is conceivable that, if Western powers work to sustain the OSCE’s course toward increased relevance, Russia too may continue to take the
68 organization more seriously. Indeed, Russia has proven successful in achieving policy goals through the OSCE framework in the past years, and will likely continue to do so as long as opportunities present themselves within that context. While it appears unlikely that Russia’s deep seeded reservations about the OSCE will be resolved, other influential participating states do have the capability to attract greater Russian participation through their own actions. If interest on the part of both Russia and Western states cannot be sustained, however, the current surge of relevance for the OSCE will likely fade in tandem with the crisis. Though Russia may take advantage of the opportunities that a more active and visible OSCE provides, the fundamental structure of the OSCE as a “big tent” organization limits the degree to which Russia is willing to invest in this framework. Russia’s preference for managing issues of international concern lean strongly toward either direct bilateral negotiation or engagement via forums that allow Russia to participate in Great Power Management. Organizations with a “top table” of major powers, unburdened by the need to achieve consensus among a wide membership, have been and are likely to remain Russia’s first choice for multilateral engagement. The OSCE, despite its renewal amid the conflict in Ukraine, faces a difficult challenge in securing Russian buy-in precisely because it is designed to encourage inclusivity, rather than expedience. Russia has chosen to use OSCE when it appears to be the best available option, but barring major reforms to bring the organization closer in line with Russia’s vision of a UNSC-like body dedicated to European security, it is likely to remain relegated to the spheres of conflict management and human rights and democracy promotion rather than assuming a role as a central component of the European security system.
69 More broadly, this study of Russia’s interaction with the OSCE serves as a small window onto a number of general truths about Russian foreign policy – its strategy for participating in multilateral forums and its outlook on the utility of international organizations. Russia’s behavior with regard to the OSCE over the course of the Ukraine crisis demonstrates that, even in circumstances in which an organization such as the OSCE is most primed to draw additional interest and facilitate cooperative engagement, Russia still behaves according to a strictly statist worldview. As would be expected of a realist actor, Russia selectively employs multilateral mechanisms as tools of its wider foreign policy. Such a perspective dictates that Russia’s status as a great power precludes the need to “share its sovereignty in order to protect its interests.”138 In other words, Russia rejects components of multilateral organizations that require participants to sacrifice any authority over domestic affairs. The frequency with which Moscow criticizes the OSCE’s work in the human dimension is indicative of this approach. Russia’s efforts to reform the OSCE also accord with a realist preference for Great Power Management as an order principle of the international system. Regardless of statements broadcasting Russia’s commitment to the notion of broad multilateral egalitarianism, Russia’s continued preference for engagement via great power concerts is evidenced by its persistent calls to either install a “top table” at the OSCE or create an entirely new institution to govern European security. Similarly, Russia’s use of the OSCE to promote its grand policy of an “integration of integrations” demonstrates that Russia’s willingness to engage in multilateral institutions is proscribed by the degree to which they can be used to reinforce a vision of multipolar world order in which Russia is one of the dominant poles.
138 Bond, “Russia in International Organizations: The Shift from Defence to Offence,” 202. 70 Though the primary focus of this report is to study and understand Russian foreign policy behavior in a very particular context, its conclusions have wider relevance for U.S. policy toward Russia and toward the multilateral frameworks in which both the United States and Russia participate. The OSCE, while of limited capacity for the reasons discussed above, remains uniquely positioned to achieve a number of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Alongside NATO, the OCSE serves as a second institution ensuring the continued presence of the United States in discussions of European and Eurasian security. Home to the greatest concentration of U.S. allies in the world, security and stability in Europe remains a key priority for the United States. The OSCE not only gives the United States a voice in Europe, but also provides an additional forum to bolster ally relationships and guard transatlantic unity on issues beyond traditional military security. In fact, among all the multilateral forums in which the United States participates, the OSCE has forged the strongest and most explicit links between human security concerns and international security. Additionally, the OSCE is a crucial source of information, resulting from both its on-the-ground monitoring missions and its robust mechanism to promote military transparency among participating states. Considering the OSCE’s unique ability to satisfy certain U.S. goals and objectives, the fate of the organization cannot be disregarded as an issue of minimal concern. Because Russia’s ambivalence toward the OSCE appears likely to remain a stumbling block in the foreseeable future, U.S. policy must both understand the inherent limitations of the OSCE framework and work to maximize the organization’s comparative advantages. As the result of the OSCE’s inclusive (and disunited) membership base, the organization’s successes are often restricted to pursing modest policy goals and identifying areas of potential compromise between participating states. As such, 71 American policymakers would be wise to invest efforts signaling U.S. interest in the organization by actively participating in each of the OSCE’s dialogue platforms and including senior officials to head U.S. delegations when possible. Continued enthusiasm on the part of Western powers has the potential to build on the momentum the OSCE has gained throughout the Ukraine crisis and reinforce Russia’s perception of the organization’s importance and utility. As demonstrated by the OSCE’s remarkable performance in managing a number of aspects of the Ukraine crisis – from monitoring ceasefire violations to brokering political agreements between opposing parties – the organization’s conflict prevention and resolution toolkit is an invaluable resource. Though Russia’s efforts to promote and protects its own interests are evident in the compromises woven into the OSCE’s various mandates in Ukraine, the organization’s field activities have nonetheless been a net positive in promoting greater transparency and stability throughout the conflict. Accordingly, the United States should consider ways to bolster the OSCE’s conflict management capabilities, perhaps by institutionalizing the tools developed for Ukraine to enable immediate deployment in the case of future crises in the OSCE space. Likewise, promoting greater visibility and wider use of the OSCE’s detailed reporting would not only help to elevate the OSCE’s reputation but also to make clear and accurate information more available in conflict situations. Particularly in an environment in which the information space is just as hotly contested as physical territory, efforts should be made to improve and more widely propagate OSCE reporting. The United States should also consider taking steps to push back against Russia’s moves to use the OSCE to promote broad policy initiatives based on the logic of zones of privileged interest. Russia has relied on gaining recognition for Russian-led regional organizations within the OSCE as a means to legitimize its concept of an “integration of 72 integrations” in Europe and Eurasia. The consolidation of the CSTO states as a bloc within the OSCE serves this purpose. U.S. representatives in OSCE bodies must work to promote co-authorship of decisions and declarations across blocs to the extent possible. The East-West divide within the organization has become increasingly evident in recent years as the frequency of such co-authorship has dramatically decreased. By encouraging collaboration across this gulf, the United States can work to avert the OSCE’s descent into an outright battleground. Finally, American policymakers should continue to emphasize commitments to the OSCE, the UN, and NATO as vital components of the European security architecture. Recognizing the unique capabilities of the OSCE, the United States likewise should be mindful not to further marginalize the organization by focusing excessively on NATO, the EU, and bilateral channels as means to manage questions of European peace and stability.
73 References
Baer, Daniel. “On Russian Military Activities Near Ukraine’s Border.” U.S. Mission to the OSCE, April 30, 2014. https://osce.usmission.gov/on-russian-military-activities-near- ukraines-border/. Balmforth, Tom. “Russia To Boycott OSCE Session After Finland Blocks Delegates.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. July 1, 2015, sec. Russia. http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-osce-finland-naryshkin-/27104453.html. Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004. ———. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53, no. 04 (September 1999): 699–732. doi:10.1162/002081899551048. Bloed, Arie. “OSCE Revitalized by the Ukraine Crisis.” Security and Human Rights 25, no. 1 (January 14, 2014): 145–51. doi:10.1163/18750230-02501004. Bond, Ian. “Russia in International Organizations: The Shift from Defence to Offence.” In Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations, edited by Margot Light and David Cadier, 189–203. Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series. New York, NY: Basingstoke, 2015. http://catalog2.lib.utexas.edu/record=b9110797~S29. Chernenko, Yelena. “«OBSE Nazyvaiut Spiashchei Krasavitsei» [‘We Call the OSCE a Sleeping Beauty’].” Коммерсантъ, December 16, 2014. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2634372. Doran, Charles. “The Two Sides of Multilateral Cooperation.” In International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, edited by I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Dunay, Pál. “The OSCE and the East: The Lesser Evil.” In Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspective on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, 17–22. Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2014. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for- securities-studies/pdfs/Perspectives-on-the-Role-of-the-OSCE-in-the-Ukraine- Crisis.pdf. Farrell, Henry. “Obama Is Using the OSCE to Give Russia an Exit Strategy … If It Wants One.” The Washington Post, March 1, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/01/obama-is- using-the-osce-to-give-russia-an-exit-strategy-if-it-wants-one/. “Final Report: International Observer Mission, Election of President of the Russian Federation, 16th June 1996 and 3rd July 1996.” OSCE ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), July 12, 1996. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/16288. Fritch, Paul. “The OSCE in Ukraine: ‘First Responder’ or Last Resort?” European Leadership Network, April 17, 2015. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the- osce-in-ukraine-first-responder-or-last-resort_2660.html. Gerrits, André W.M. “Russia and the OSCE: A Story of High Expectations, Strong Disillusionment and Obstinate Confrontation.” Security and Human Rights, no. 2 (2008). 74 Greminger, Thomas. “The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship.” In Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspective on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, 11–12. Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2014. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for- securities-studies/pdfs/Perspectives-on-the-Role-of-the-OSCE-in-the-Ukraine- Crisis.pdf. Gusarov, Evgenii. “Tekst vystupleniia zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii E.P.Gusarova v Diplomaticheskoi Akademii MID Rossii na zasedanii kruglogo stola ‘Khel’sinkskii Zakliuchitel’nyi akt. 25 let spustia’ [Speech by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister E.P Gusarov at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA at a roundtable meeting ‘The Helsinki Final Act 25 years later’],” June 14, 2000. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/- /asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/602920/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_bzhx R3zkq2H5_viewMode=tv&_101_INSTANCE_bzhxR3zkq2H5_qrIndex=0. “Helsinki Final Act.” Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975. http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. Hopmann, P. Terrence. “Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia: The OSCE.” In Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, edited by Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet, 238–70. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/chapter/10.1057/9780230290754_12. Hurlburt, Heather. “Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture.” Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995): 5. “Interv’iu Postoiannogo predstavitelia Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri OBSE A.K.Lukashevicha, opublikovannoe v gazete «Kommersant‘» [Interview of the Russian Permanent Representative to the OSCE A.K. Lukashevich published in the newspaper ’Kommersant"],” December 11, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/- /asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/1977416. Ivanov, I. S. The New Russian Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct =true&db=nlebk&AN=91942&site=ehost-live. Kazharski, Aliaksei. “Is Putin Winning the Recognition Game? Is the Eurasian Union Back on the Table?” Policy memo. PONARS Eurasia, February 12, 2015. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/putin-winning-recognition-game-eurasian- union-back-table. Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984. “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi s uchastiem Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova v ocherednom zasedanii SMID OBSE [Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian MFA on Russian Foreign Minister S.V Lavrov’s participation in the next ОSСЕ Ministerial Council meeting],” December 2, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1956982. “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi s vizitom v Rossiiu General’nogo sekretaria OBSE L.Zan’era [Comment by the Information and Press 75 Department of the Russian MFA on a visit by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier to Russia],” October 10, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1838672?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cK NonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU. “Kompleks mer po vypolneniiu Minskikh soglashenii [Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements].” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 15, 2015. http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true. “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation],” February 12, 2013. http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. “Kosovo Verification Mission (Closed).” OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Accessed March 24, 2016. http://www.osce.org/node/44552. Kozlov, Yuri. “Russian Official Says OSCE Failing to Meet CIS Interests.” ITAR-TASS World Service. July 8, 2004. http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TASS000020040709e078000t p&cat=a&ep=ASE. Kropatcheva, Elena. “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?” European Security 21, no. 3 (2012): 370–94. ———. “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (January 28, 2015): 6–24. Lavrov, Sergei. “Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order.” Russia in Global Affairs 3, no. 1 (2005). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4422. ———. “Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova v khode press-konferentsii po itogam pervogo dnia raboty Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del OBSE i riada dvustoronnikh vstrech, Belgrad [Remarks and response to media questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a press conference after the first day of work of the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and a number of bilateral meetings, Belgrade],” December 3, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1965325. ———. “Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova na plenarnom zasedanii Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del OBSE, Kiev [Remarks of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov at the plenary session of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kiev].” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2013. http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/B569FE37BAAAEB5E44257C380044A8F E. Lehne, Stefan. “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.” Paper. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf. Makarychev, Andrey, and Viatcheslav Morozov. “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia’s Policy Strategies.” Global Governance 17, no. 3 (2011): 353–73. 76 Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. Maresca, John J. To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973- 1975. Duke Press Policy Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 1987. Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49. doi:10.2307/2539078. Medvedev, Dmitri. “Vystuplenie na vstreche s predstaviteliami politicheskikh, parlamentskikh i obshchestvennykh krugov Germanii [Remarks at a meeting with representatives of German political, parliamentary, and public circles],” June 5, 2008. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320. “Medvedev: Posledniy Sammit Pokazal ‘Opredelennuyu Bespomoshnost’ OBSE.” Korrespondent.net, December 7, 2010. http://korrespondent.net/world/1146623- medvedev-poslednij-sammit-pokazal-opredelennuyu-bespomoshchnost-obse. Møller, Bjørn. European Security: The Roles of Regional Organisations. Durham: Routledge, 2012. https://www.routledge.com/products/isbn/9781409444084. Morozov, Viatcheslav. “Russia’s Changing Attitude toward the OSCE: Contradictions and Continuity.” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 23, no. 2 (2005): 69–73. “Moskva vystupaet za audit raboty BDIPCh OBSE [Moscow calls for an audit of the work of the OSCE’s ODIHR].” ITAR-TASS. November 11, 2015. http://tass.ru/politika/2426658. Nünlist, Christian. “In Switzerland’s Shadow: Summing up Serbia’s 2015 OSCE Chairmanship - Netherlands Helsinki Committee.” Security and Human Rights, December 11, 2015. http://www.shrblog.org/blog/In_Switzerland___s_Shadow__Summing_up_Serbia_s_ 2015_OSCE_Chairmanship.html?id=579. ———. “OSCE Crisis Management in the Ukraine Crisis.” Security and Human Rights - Netherlands Helsinki Committee, December 18, 2014. http://www.shrblog.org/blog/Guest_Blog_Entry__OSCE_Crisis_Management_in_the _Ukraine_Crisis.html?id=503. ———. “Summing Up Switzerland’s 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE.” The International Relations and Security Network Blog, December 23, 2014. http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/summing-up-switzerlands-2014- chairmanship-of-the-osce. Oliker, Olga, Kieth Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov. “Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications.” Monograph Series. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG768.pdf. Osnovnye polozheniia kontseptsii vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation], April 23, 1993. “Osnovnye vneshnepoliticheskie sobytiia 2015 goda [The major foreign policy events of 2015],” December 29, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2003505?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cK NonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU.
77 Pacer, Valerie. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012. BASAAS/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 105. New York: Routledge, 2016. “PA OSCE President Will Ask EU to Lift Restrictive Measures from Delegation Members.” ITAR-TASS, July 17, 2015. http://tass.ru/en/world/809367. “Protokola po itogam konsul’tatsii Trekhstoronnei kontaktnoi gruppy otnositel’no shagov, napravlennykh na implementatsiiu Mirnogo plana Prezidenta Ukrainy P. Poroshenko i initsiativ Prezidenta Rossii V. Putina [Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group regarding steps for implementing the peace plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President of Russia V. Putin].” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 5, 2014. http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true. “Putin O Trebovaniiakh BDIPCh: Eto Ikh Khotelki, Pust’ Svoiu Zhenu Uchat Shchi Varit’ [Putin on ODIHR Requirements: It Is Their Wishlist, Let Them Teach Their Wives to Cook Shchi].” Interfax, February 14, 2008. http://www.interfax.ru/russia/1179. Putin, Vladimir. “Transcript: Putin’s Address to the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly.” Accessed April 15, 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50385. ———. “Vystuplenie i diskussiia na Miunkhenskoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti [Remarks and Discussion at the Munich Security Conference],” February 10, 2007. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. “Report and Recommendation of the Credentials Committee Regarding the Russian Federation’s Designation of Ms. Olga Kovitidi as a Member of the OSCE PA.” OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, February 18, 2015. https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/winter-meetings/2015- vienna/reports-3/2730-report-and-recommendation-of-the-credentials-committee- regarding-the-russian-federation-s-designation-of-ms-olga-kovitidi-as-a-member-of- the-osce-pa/file. “Request for Consultation on Russian Military Buildup on Ukraine Border Refused, OSCE to Meet Monday.” U.S. Mission to the OSCE, April 5, 2014. https://osce.usmission.gov/request-for-consultation-on-russian-military-buildup-on- ukraine-border-refused-osce-to-meet-monday/. “Revoking of Russian Senator’s Status of Delegate at OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Illegitimate, Says Diplomat.” ITAR-TASS World Service, February 18, 2015. Factiva. Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72. Rowe, Elana Wilson, Stina Torjesen, and Robert Legvold, eds. “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy.” In The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, 21–45. Routledge, 2008. “Russia Rejects Calls for Substantial Monitoring of Russian Side of Border.” U.S. Mission to the OSCE, July 24, 2014. https://osce.usmission.gov/russia-rejects-calls-for- substantial-monitoring-of-russian-side-of-border/. Sammut, Dennis, and Joseph D’Urso. “The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: A Useful but Flawed OSCE Tool.” Policy Brief. Brussels: European Policy Centre, April 23, 2015. 78 http://aei.pitt.edu/63784/1/pub_5511_the_special_monitoring_mission_in_ukraine.pd f. “Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie Postoiannykh Predstavitelei gosudarstv-chlenov ODKB pri OBSE o 40-letii podpisaniia Khel’sinkskogo Zakliuchitel’nogo Akta, Vena [Joint statement of the Permanent Representatives of CSTO member states to the OSCE on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Vienna],” September 11, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/rso/osce/- /asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/1755687. “Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers.” NATO, April 1, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108501.htm. “Statement on the Rejection of Russia’s Designation of Olga Kovitidi as a Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 18, 2015. https://www.oscepa.org/news-a-media/press- releases/2015/2105-statement-on-the-rejection-of-russia-s-designation-of-olga- kovitidi-as-a-member-of-the-osce-parliamentary-assembly. States News Service. “OSCE to Increase Its Role in Pan-European Architecture - Russian Foreign Ministry.” ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2015. http://tass.ru/en/russia/804018. “Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation],” December 31, 2015. Sullivan, Earl. “A Realist’s Argument for Multilateral Diplomacy.” In The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance, edited by JoAnn F. Aviel, Richard Reitano, James P. Muldoon, and Earl Sullivan, 285–96. Westview Press, 2011. “Survey of OSCE Field Operations.” OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), February 11, 2015. http://www.osce.org/cpc/74783. Tarasenko, Pavel, and Yelena Chernenko. “Rossii I Zapadu, Vozmozhno, Skoro Budet Negde Vstrechat’sia [For Russia and the West, Possibly, There Will Soon Be Nowhere to Meet].” Коммерсантъ, December 3, 2014. Teivainen, Aleksi, and Tuomas Muraja. “Russia’s Absence Casts Shadow on OSCE Session.” Helsinki Times, July 6, 2015. http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland- news/domestic/13438-russia-s-absence-casts-shadow-on-osce-session.html. “Ukraine Events May Give OSCE New Lease of Life - Kosachyov.” Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, February 24, 2015. Factiva. “Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (v redaktsii ot 2015 g.) [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (as redacted in 2015)],” March 3, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/976907. Voronkov, Vladimir. “Novaia arkhitektura bezopasnosti v Evrope - put’ vpered [A new security architecture in Europe - the way forward].” Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’ 6 (June 24, 2009). http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola- nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/288090. “Zaiavlenie delegatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na zakrytii 22-go zasedaniia SMID OBSE, Belgrad [Statement by the Russian delegation at the closing session of the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Belgrade],” December 4, 2015.
79 http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1965797. “Zaiavlenie gosudarstv-uchastnikov SNG otnositel’no polozheniia del v OBSE [Statement by member states of the CIS regarding the state of affairs in the OSCE].” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 3, 2004. http://www.mid.ru/integracionnye-struktury-prostranstva-sng/- /asset_publisher/rl7Fzr0mbE6x/content/id/465074. “Zaiavlenie ministrov inostrannykh del gosudarstv-chlenov ODKB «O roli OBSE v sisteme obshcheevropeiskoi bezopasnosti», Belgrad [Statement by CSTO Foreign Ministers ‘On the role of the OSCE in the European Security System,’ Belgrade],” December 3, 2015. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1964381. Zellner, Wolfgang. “Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (October 2005): 389–402. Zolotov, Andrei. “Russia’s Parliamentarians Lead the Charge against EU Sanctions.” Russia Direct, March 2, 2016. http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russias- parliamentarians-lead-charge-against-eu-sanctions.
80