ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts MAP SHOWING ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

Isiaka Alani Badmus*

WP/CEAUP #2009/01

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts MAP SHOWING ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

Courtesy: Berman, G. Eric and Nicholas Florquin, “Aims and Aimless”, proposal for ECOWAS, 2005

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION ECOWAS: SOME BACKGROUND ISSUES ECOWAS AND THE SUB-REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES - The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

ECOWAS, SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND THE WEST AFRICAN CIVIL CONFLICTS 1. The Genesis 2. The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of SALW 3. Other African and Global Control Initiatives. [A]. The OAU/AU’s Bamako Declaration [B]. The United Nations Firearms Protocol. [C]. The United Nations Programme of Action [UNPoA] 4. The ECOWAS Moratorium and Institutional Arrangements. [A]. Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development [PCASED] [B]. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa [UNREC]. 5. The Imperatives of Civil Society Organisations in Combating SALW Proliferation. [A]. The West African Action Network on Small Arms [WAANSA] Box 2: Extracts from the Final Communiqué of the WAANSA Foundation Conference [B]. Civil Society Consultation on the Review of the ECOWAS Moratorium and the Evolution of a Draft Supplementary Protocol [The Dakar Process] 6. ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL ARMS AND ECOSAP MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: ECOWAS AND THE WEST AFRICAN CIVIL CONFLICTS • Liberia • Sierra Leone • Guinea Conakry. • Niger • Mali ECOWAS AND THE CHALLEGES OF REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS

Table 1: ECOWAS Signatories to the UN Fire- arms Protocol as of 23 January 2003. Table 2: Liberia: Disarmament Statistics as at 31 January 1997. Table 3: Ceremonial Arms Destruction in Niger, 2000-2003 Table 4: Sources of Weapons in Niger Table 5: Mali: Demobilisation, Weapons Col- lected and Destruction.

List of Boxes.

Box 1: Chronology of Events Relating to the ECOWAS Moratorium. Box 2:Extract from the Final Communiqué of the WAANSA Foundation Conference

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu List of Acronyms and Abbreviations chanism. FODSA Foundation for Security and Develop-

AAFC Allied Armed Forces of the Community ment in Africa [ECOWAS] GoNU Government of National Unity ACP Arms Collection Programme GNP Gross National Product AFL Armed Forces of Liberia IANSA International Action Network on Small AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Arms ANAD Accord de Non-Aggression et INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence of Liberia APRM African Peer Review Mechanism LDCs Less Developed Countries. AWMD African Weapons of Mass Destruction LPC Liberia Peace Council CACDPA Community Arms Collection and MAD Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance Destruction Programme on Defence CBOs Community Based Organisations MALAO Mouvement contre les Armes Legeres CEDE Centre for Democratic Empowerment en Afrique de l’Ouest CDD Centre for Democracy and Development. MFUA Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de CRRP Community Reintegration and Rehabi- l’Azaouad litation Project NGOs Non Governmental Organisations DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re- NISAT Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms integration Programme Transfers DOPHA Department of Operations, Peaceke- NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia eping and Humanitarian Affairs OAU/AU Bamako Declaration OAU/AU Ba- DPAS Department of Political Affairs and Se- mako Declaration on an African Common Posi- curity tion on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and ECOWAS Economic Community of West Afri- Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. can States OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humani- ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring tarian Affairs Group OMC Observation and Monitoring Centre ECOSAP ECOWAS Regional Small Arms Con- PCASED Programme for Coordination and As- trol Programme sistance on Security and Development ECOWAS Convention ECOWAS Convention RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leonean Military on Small Arms, Light Weapons, their Ammuni- Forces tion and other associated material RUF Revolutionary United Front ECOWAS Moratorium Declaration of a Mora- SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons torium on Importation, Exportation and Ma- SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes nufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa SMC ECOWAS Standing Mediation Commit- ECOWAS Mechanism ECOWAS Mechanism tee for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolu- SSR Security Sector Reform tion, Peacekeeping and Security. TEP Training and Employment Programme ESF ECOWAS Standby Force The Dakar Process Civil Society Consultation EU European Union on the Review of the ECOWAS Moratorium ERSF Economic Recovery Support Fund and the Evolution of a Draft Supplementary EWER Early Warning and Early Response Me- Protocol

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu ULIMO--J a Krahn-based United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy ULIMO—K a Mandingo-based United Libera- tion Movement of Liberia for Democracy UN(O) United Nations (Organisation) UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDDA United Nations Department of Disar- mament Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Program- me UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UN Firearms Protocol United Nations Proto- col against the Illicit Manufacture of and Traffi- cking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components And Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Or- ganised Crime UNREC United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa UNDPA United Nations Department for Poli- tical Affairs UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Ser- vices UNPoA United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit Tra- de in Small Arms and Light weapons in All Its Aspects UNDPKO United Nations Department of Pea- cekeeping Operations UNDESA United Nations Department of Eco- nomic and Social Affairs UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarma- ment Research WAANSA West African Action Network on Small Arms

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION torium represent an ordinary paper or a legally binding document? Second, why is it that the signatories to this Moratorium, more often The article entitled Small Arms and Light Wea- than not, do not abide by the provisions of the pons Proliferation and Conflicts: Three African Case control instrument? Third, why is it always di- Studies which appeared in the Nigerian Jour- fficult to control SALW during peace support nal of International Affairs, vol. 31, no. 2, 2005, operations and peace processes, especially was my first major study on the issue of Small in West Africa? Fourth, what are the ECOWAS Arms and Light Weapons [hereinafter refer to strategies for regional integration, security, as SALW] proliferation and African conflicts. good governance and human rights? These are Ever since, I have closely been following the some the vital questions addressed in this stu- West African politico-military landscape with dy. reference to SALW proliferation—an interest I intend not to detail my discussions on the that was further sharpened by my invitation meaning of SALW. Instead, a comprehensive to the Economic Community of West African analysis of the roles of ECOWAS as a sub-regio- States [ECOWAS] Executive Secretariat1 in nal organisation in maintaining regional pea- Abuja, Nigeria for an interview into its newly ce and security become imperative, and the pa- initiated Regional Small Arms Control Pro- per is also interested in looking, albeit briefly, gramme [ECOSAP]. At this juncture, I consider at the processes leading to the formation, and it pertinent to advance a very fundamental dynamics of ECOWAS. This is very fundamen- conundrum, viz, why such upswelling interest tal because the insights from such retrospecti- in SALW proliferation and the West African se- ve exercise will help us immensely to really fa- curity landscape? The answer to this question thom the transcendence of ECOWAS beyond its is very simple and simultaneously complex. I original mandate, i.e., economic development. noticed the seriousness of the distinguished In addendum, relying on Article 52 of the United West African officials presented at the panel on Nations [UN] Charter, regional organisations the issue and their eagerness and determina- are empowered to maintain regional peace tion to curb the hazardous effects of these ‘Afri- and security. Thus, ECOWAS that was initially can Weapons of Mass Destruction’ [AWMD]. To established as an institution for economic in- be sure, I am aware of the fact that the West tegration of West Africa ventured into regional African leaders as well as the ECOWAS Executi- security issues as a result of the rebellion that ve Secretariat are not relenting in their efforts started in December 1989 in Liberia by Charles to stall this hideous situation, especially with Taylor against Samuel Doe’s government. With the signing of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the the establishment of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] that is now the SALW on 31 October 19982 [Appendix I]. Para- military force of ECOWAS, the stage was set for doxically, the signing of this ‘confidence-buil- ECOWAS intervention in the West African civil ding’ mechanism championed by Alpha Omar conflicts. It is true that the Nigeria-dominated Konare’s Mali, SALW has remained potent in ECOMOG brought peace to Liberia, while Sier- the hands of both State and sub-State actors ra Leone would have been a ghost of itself by and an important factor in the West African now and Ivorians are now experiencing peace civil conflicts3. This singular fact has left me [albeit fragile] courtesy of the combined roles several mind bugling questions. First, where of ECOMOG and French forces. The question is are the missing links? Does the ECOWAS Mora-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 10 why has SALW continued to attract very high just won their political independence. Thus, premium in the hands of non-State actors and by the mid-1970s, many West African coun- national armies alike? How has ECOWAS been tries, as Nwachukwu [1991: xi] rightly argues, managing arms especially during post-conflict “were already in the throes of economic diffi- peace building?. This is fundamental conside- culties in the aftermath of the global oil pri- ring the fact that for a State that just came out ce shock of 1973. Many of the countries in the of civil conflict in order not to roll back into sub-region, apart from Nigeria which produ- anarchy or Hobbesian state of nature; SALW ces oil, had serious problem of external balan- has to be properly managed in the interest of ces. There was the need for increased foreign sustainable peace and development. The abo- financial support, if they were to be able to ve arguments will be fully developed in the maintain minimum level of imports to ensure subsequent sections. a steady process of economic growth and development”6. Consequently, ECOWAS was seen ECOWAS: SOME as the best answer, as well as the surest multilateral institutional framework with dynamic BACKGROUND ISSUES strategies for surmounting the economic un- ECOWAS was established by the Treaty sig- derdevelopment of West Africa. The reliance on ned on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria by fifte- economic integration as the best way to over- en West African States4. From Generals Yaku- come underdevelopment is predicated upon bu Gowon [Nigeria] to Gnassingbe Eyadema the theoretical logic that integration of this [Togo] through Sangoule Lamizana [Upper nature affects positively the rate of growth of Volta, now Burkina Faso], the raison-d’etre for Gross National Product [GNP] of participating the West African leaders for the formation of countries [Olaniyan: 1990: 2]. These benefits, ECOWAS was to promote cooperation and in- according to Jaber [1979: 254 cited in Olaniyan tegration in order to create a ‘union’ for econo- 1990], include: mic growth and development in West Africa. 1. That the enlargement of the size of the ma- Therefore, ECOWAS is to: rket for firms producing below optimum ca- ………… promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the pacity prior to integration normally sets the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, economies of scale working. Annexed to this is energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, the contention that a large market is needed monetary and financial questions and in social and to sustain efficiently heavy industries, such cultural matters for the purpose of raising the stan- dard of living of its peoples, of increasing and main- as engineering and chemical plants. The next taining economic stability, of fostering closer rela- effect of large market size, therefore, is to en- tions among its members and of contributing to the sure the least unit cost of reduction within the progress and development of the African continent5. integrated area which will further stimulate demand and consumption and ultimately lead The idea of economic integration became to increased investment and economic gro- appealing and imperative going by the adver- wth. se socio-economic conditions experienced by 2. Economic integration increases the level West Africa in particular and Africa in general of economic activity through increase trade; in the immediate post-independence period. hence it permits the exploitation of external Apart from this, the prevailing international economies and inter-industry linkages which political economy of the 1970s was greatly un- also has the effect of lowering cost of produc- favorable to the West African States that had

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 11 tion. ECOWAS AND THE SUB- 3. That economic co-operation promotes eco- REGIONAL PEACE AND nomic efficiency via specialisation and smoo- SECURITY ISSUES thness of trade transactions due to change The Economic Community of West African States is in the degree and nature of competition and one of the sub—regional organisations most active- change in uncertainty and unilaterality of tra- ly involved in conflict prevention and management. de policies of individual countries. In other ter- Since 1990 when the Standing Mediation Com- mittee [SMC] and the Ceasefire Monitoring Group ms, integration brings about a more efficient (ECOMOG) were set up in Liberia, ECOWAS has been utilisation of resources and the harmonisa- working relentlessly to restore peace to West Afri- tion of economic and trade policies ushers in ca. Last year, the most notable development in the a smooth and orderly system of trade among sub-region was the advent on the political scene of democratically elected regimes………… [ECOWAS members of a grouping. And finally, Executive Secretary’s Report, 2000]. 4. That economic integration—except where a deliberate corrective measure is instituted— As stated earlier, since its inception ECOWAS usually gives rise to the polarisation effect. has been preoccupied majorly with the socio- This effect refers to the cumulative worsening economic development of the sub-region with of the relative, or absolute, economic position little concern with matters relating to the sub- of a member country or some regions in the regional peace and security, political coope- integrated area due to concentrated trade cre- ration, democracy and good governance, and ation or attractiveness of labour and capital human rights. The ECOWAS Treaty practically elsewhere. excluded security-related provisions because political issues were, at that time, believed Thus, after more than three decades of ECO- to be too divisive. The founders of ECOWAS, WAS existence, what can then be said of the according to the Nigeria’s ex- military leader organisation? Differently put, what have General Yakubu Gowon, “played down the po- been its major achievements and what have litical aspect when ECOWAS was formed” and Member States been doing to realising the in lieu of this determined to build “a bridge of organisation’s objectives? Despite the fact cooperation” promoting economic coopera- that the tasks of having an integration [milita- tion7. Though attempts have not been complete- ry, economic, socio-cultural] are arduous and ly lacking in establishing an ECOWAS security complex, ECOWAS has recoded some success framework as the Authority of Heads of Sta- in the vital areas of economic advancement of te and Government [the Authority] adopted the sub-region. But our major concern in the a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and a section that follows in this study is the pea- Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on De- ce and security dimensions of these achieve- fence [MAD] in 1981 [Federal Ministry of Justi- ments. ce, 1990: 898-908]8. These two Protocols aim at strengthening the security and defence of the entire sub-region. Before going further, it is pertinent to illuminate the efforts made by the individual States in the sub-region to integrate their defence strategies at the bilateral level. Instances of these are legion. On 26 Mar- ch 1971, Guinea and Sierra Leone later joined

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 12 by Liberia signed an agreement on matters harmonious understanding among Member relating to defence and security under “which States of the Community”9. Therefore, Articles arrangement Guinean troops were deployed to 1 and 2 of the Protocol stipulate that Member Sierra Leone to foil a coup attempt”. Guinean States shall, in their relations with one ano- troops were also deployed to Sierra Leone in ther, “refrain from the threat or use of force or the early 1990s to halt rebels incursion from Li- aggression, or from employing any other me- beria based on the 1971 agreement. Furthermo- ans inconsistent with the Charter of the UN re, the idea of the Senegambia confederation and the Organisation of African Unity [OAU] between Senegal and the Gambia was partly against the territorial integrity or political rooted in the quest for achieving maximum independence of other Member States”, and security, especially on the side of the ‘small’ to “refrain from committing, encouraging or Gambia. This arrangement aided Senegal tre- condoning acts of subversion, hostility or ag- mendously in rescuing Sir Dauda Jawara’s go- gression against the territorial integrity or vernment in the Gambia. Senegal, relying on political independence of other Member Sta- this agreement, sent its troops to Banjul to foil tes”. Laudable as these goals are, the Protocol a coup d’etat and subsequently stationed its failed on two crucial issues, viz, occurrence of soldiers to maintain law and order. Such simi- internal insurrection supported by external lar defence pact also linked Nigeria with Benin actor and rebellion within the Community to provide the basis for mutual assistance on [Aning, 1999: 76]. Apart from these failures, the matters of defence. In addendum, a giant stride Protocol was criticised as a mere aspiration was made in 1984 by five West African States, because it did not create institutional and ad- namely; Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Benin and Togo ministrative frameworks for dealing with the when they signed a quadripartite agreement prohibited acts of aggression. Accordingly, the that was centered on cooperation on security, Non-Aggression Protocol, according to Julius customs, extradition, and the cooperation of Okolo [1983: 179] “represent [s] a valuable sta- their police forces. Interestingly: tement of intent and a demonstration of the The desire for greater cooperation on matters re- goodwill that exists among the national lea- lating to defence and security stems from the re- ders of the West African region……[and] signi- cognition by states of the vulnerability of their governments to internal disruptions which can be fies the willingness and commitment by Mem- encouraged and manipulated by forces external to ber States to restrict their sovereignty in a their territorial boundaries. Also, the increase in the new era”. In the light of the foregoing, the 1981 incidence of military interventions by states outside Protocol was intended to address the short- the region in conflicts occurring within the region comings of the previous treaty. It established added to concern over the security of states. The Chadian civil war and the interventionist role played a comprehensive security framework for the by some of the extra-regional states especially Fran- Community by laying the foundation for dea- ce and Libya, in that war raised alarm throughout ling with “internal armed conflict within any the sub-region. This concern was compounded by Member State engineered and supported ac- the Libyan aggressive search for alliance partners in West Africa [Ministry of External Affairs, Nigeria, tively from outside and likely to endanger the 1991: 120]. security and peace in the entire Community”10. In spite of the reaffirmation of the ECOWAS Reverting to the 1978 Protocol, it explicitly Member States of their commitments to peace made it clear that “ECOWAS cannot attain its and security, they came to the realisation that objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and threats of aggression in the sub-region and

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 13 the presence of foreign military bases on the encouraged France’s military interventions in continent is antithetical to peace and socio- the affairs of its Africa’s ex-colonies. Apart from economic development. For this reason, they the dangers posed by ANAD, the institutio- “decided to coordinate and pool their resour- nal frameworks depicted in the 1981 Protocol ces together to ensure the external defence of were developed very late for several reasons. Member States, through mutual assistance These reasons, according to Aning [1999: 78], in case of aggression against Member States. were “first, latent distrust and doubts about The organisation was to create Allied Armed Nigeria’s intentions for the sub-region; second, Forces of the Community [AAFC] which shall the sub-regional hegemony’s own domestic consist of earmarked units from existing Na- and international difficulties and third, there tional Armed Forces”11. The AAFC was intended was the institutional and financial incapacity to deter any breach of the security of Member of the Executive Secretariat to perform beyond States. Furthermore, the mandate of the AAFC the narrow confines within which its formal was equally extended to peacekeeping in in- structure defined its existence and duties until ter-state conflicts involving Member States 1988”. Hence, when the Liberian crisis erupted when diplomacy fails, or intra-state conflicts in 1989, the ECOWAS Defence Protocol was engineered/supported by external actors. The mere instrument of declarative policy16. This Protocol empowers the ECOWAS Authority to definitely hampered ECOWAS intervention in appoint a Force Commander to lead the AAFC12. the Liberian crisis at its embryonic stage. Additionally, it provides for the establishment The Liberian civil war17 that erupted on 24 De- of: [1] Defence Council consisting Ministers of cember 1989 by an armed insurrection led Mr. Defence and External/Foreign Affairs of Mem- Charles Taylor against the government of Sa- ber States under the current Chairmanship of muel Doe served as a major test for ECOWAS in the Authority “tasked with completing prepa- conflict prevention and management. The ori- ratory work on defence matters for Authority gins of the war which can be located within the meetings, examining emergency situations, context of bad governance, exploitative eco- supervising the activities of the AAFC Force nomic policies, corruption, etc, represent the Commander, and submitting a report to the zenith of people’s disenchantment with Doe’s Authority at the end of any AAFC operations”13; administration that became more repressive [2] Defence Commission, consisting of Chiefs than the previous William Tolbert regime he of Staff of Member States, is to deal with te- toppled in April 198018. Doe exhibited dictato- chnical defence matters14. Furthermore, the rial tendencies that ultimately reduced the po- Protocol foresees the appointment of a De- litical space. He promulgated several decrees puty Executive Secretary [Military/Defense] that curtailed fundamental freedoms, while at the ECOWAS Secretariat to support and ethnicisation of politics was in top gear. A ma- oversee defence related activities15. In spite of jor political suicide committed by Doe was the the laudable innovations of MAD, it is dishe- killing of Brigadier Thomas Quiwonkpa, the artening that they were averse by the Franco- regime number two man who was accused of phone Member States, who later concluded a masterminding a failed coup19. Furthermore, Defence Agreement among themselves that President Doe embarked on an ‘endless’ tran- ran parallel to MAD. The Accord de Non-Aggres- sition to civil rule programme that was shifted sion et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence (ANAD) thrice while political murders were highly ins- with headquarters in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire titutionalised as a mode of silencing political

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 14 opponents [Ohanwe, 2000: 64-65]. As adum- Committee [SMC] to mediate the Liberian im- brated, the rebellion of December 1989 was, broglio. The SMC met and decided that urgent prima facie, believed by the Liberian govern- action was required to effect an immediate ce- ment to be a minor border skirmish soon de- ase-fire, facilitate the evacuation of the large veloped into a full scale civil war with devasta- number of refugees, an estimation of which ting effects. Taylor’s National Patriotic Force of was over 1 000 000, restore some law and or- Liberia [NPFL] struck from the Nimba County der to Liberia and facilitate the establishment on the Liberia/Cote d’Ivoire borders in the eas- of a truly democratic process. Consequently, tern part of the country. It was widely believed the July meeting of the SMC Heads of State re- that these forces were assembled and trained solved that: in Libya and Burkina Faso before and later ECOWAS shall establish, under the Authority of the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Go- deployed to Cote d’Ivoire for onward invasion vernment of ECOWAS and under the command of 20 of Liberia . With the rebels’ advancement to- an ECOWAS member state, a Ceasefire Monitoring wards the capital, Monrovia, hostilities were Group [ECOMOG] to be composed of military con- skyrocketed with both government and rebel tingents drawn from the member states of the ECO- WAS Standing Mediation Committee as well as from forces unleashing unprecedented assaults Guinea and Sierra Leone22. on the civilian population [both Liberian and West African nationals]. Embassies of foreign The establishment of ECOMOG and its inter- missions became objects of attack of Taylor’s jection into the Liberian crisis was dogged NPFL, while thousands of West African citizens with controversies and subjected to criticisms were killed in the premises of their Embassies especially among the Francophone Member for supporting Doe. It was reported that “in States. First, it was contested that ECOWAS the early stage of the war, in July 1990, Taylor was established to promote economic inte- attacked the Nigerian Embassy compound in gration of West Africa and not to perform se- Monrovia and harassed members of its diplo- curity related functions. Second, the decision matic corps. A month later, Taylor revisited the of the SMC to create and deploy ECOMOG is Nigerian Embassy and massacred an estima- at variant with the provisions of the OAU and ted 700—1000 Nigerians inside the embassy!” the UN Charters outlawing interference in in- [Ohanwe, 2000: 79]. These imperiled security ternal affairs of Member States and the 1978 situations and carnage with the accompanied ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression [Adisa, humanitarian disasters gave a signal to the 1993: 168]. Furthermore, the critics of interven- West African leaders of the coming anarchy tion also flawed the SMC’s reference to the 1981 that need to be arrested in the interest of pe- Defence Protocol in establishing ECOMOG on ace and security. Let it be clearly understood two grounds—that the 1981 Protocol had not that at this time Doe had completely lost out21 been operational and even if the Protocol had and the rebels were in perfect control of more been operational, it cannot be invoked in the than 95% of the Liberian territory, including Liberian situation because the civil war was Buchanan, the country’s second largest city. regarded as purely an internal affair of Libe- It was within this context that the 13th Summit ria. And that before such military intervention of ECOWAS held between 28 and 30 May 1990 could be embark upon, Article 16 of the 1981 in Banjul, the Gambia under the Chairmanship Protocol required ‘a written request for assis- of Blaise Campaore, President of Burkina Faso tance’ from the ‘legitimate’ head of state of the resolved to establish a Standing Mediation country in problem to the ECOWAS Chairman

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 15 simultaneously copying other member states. States, and even beyond, justified ECOMOG Thus, Article 16 states that: interjection on military humanism. Military When an external armed threat or aggression is di- humanitarianism apparently finds justifica- rected against a member state of the Community, tion in the position of Thomas G. Weiss and the Head of State of the country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman Kurt Campbell [1991: 452] that: of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other When a calamity strikes, either natural or man- members. This request shall mean that the Authori- made, politicians frequently turn to the military for ty is duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under help: armed forces can respond rapidly and massi- a state of emergency. The Authority shall decide in vely to a wide range of crises; they have disciplined accordance with the emergence procedure as stipu- and well trained organisations; and they have access lated in Article 6 above. to crucial resources such as food, medicine and fuel. They also have transportation capabilities [land, sea, and air] communications equipment, building 23 It is doubtful whether Doe sent such a request . supplies, tools and temporary shelters These criticisms were completely debunked by the proponents of intervention. First, in the Supporting the above assertion, the former contemporary international system, economy, OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim politics, and security operate in a symbiotic contends: relationship; implying that they are insepara- Before ECOWAS undertook its initiative many, including the African media, were condemning the ble. In reality, regional security is a sin qua non indifference demonstrated by Africa. The most de- for regional economic integration. Economic sirable thing would be to have an agreement of all cooperation/integration thrives within the parties to the conflict and the convergence of views context of political stability and peace and se- of all member states of ECOWAS. But to argue that there is no legal basis is surprising. Should the coun- curity, good governance and accountability. tries in West Africa just leave Liberians to fight each Dr. Abbas Bundu, the erstwhile ECOWAS Exe- other? Will that be more legitimate? Will that be cutive Secretary, contends that: “the two are more understandable? Salim continued: I will rather inseparable and therefore have to be discussed make a mistake trying to solve the problem than to remain indifferent in such a situation [Cited in Adi- inter alia. It is clear that regional solidarity and sa, 1993: 168]. commitment to integration will be considera- bly enhanced where political stability becomes Furthermore, the words ‘internal affairs’ do a common identity and is also perceived as a not hold in the Liberian case, for, according to shared responsibility” [West Africa, 7 July, 1991: the regional proponents of ECOMOG, Taylor’s 1085]. Even long before the Liberian crisis, the NPFL was supported by external actors which Nigerian military president, General Ibrahim were to endanger the peace and security of the Babangida [1987: 12], had observed that: “The entire sub-region. Thus, the external supports Community is not designed to serve economic to the NPFL even contradicts Article 3 of the purposes alone. We must explore ways and 1978 Protocol which states that “each Member means of reinforcing the political will behind State shall undertake to prevent any foreigners the functioning of ECOWAS”. Second, the argu- resident in its territory from committing the ment that the deployment of ECOMOG contra- acts referred to in Article 2 above against the venes the 1978 Non—Aggression Protocol and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member ‘non-interference’ provisions of the UN and the States” and Article 4 also demanded that “each OAU Charters are unfounded for different mu- Member State shall undertake to prevent non- tually reinforcing reasons. First, the apologists resident foreigners from using its territory as a of governments in different ECOWAS Member base for committing acts referred to in Article

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 16 2 above against the sovereignty and territorial Outcome [EO], Captain Strasser was unable integrity of Member States”. All said, what is of to, either win the war outrightly or halt rebel striking importance is that proper procedures advancement. This development saw his exit for invoking the applicability of the Non-Ag- from power as a result of a coup d’etat led by gression and Defence Protocols were not follo- his Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier-General wed. For instance, the 1981 Protocol demanded Julius Maadia Bio and eventually became the that ‘the Authority shall appreciate and deci- new strongman of this West African State in de’ whether a particular ‘internal conflict’ is January 1996. As scheduled, elections were held actively supported from outside and possibly in February 1996 and General Bio stood down to upset sub-regional peace and security, and after Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected to the therefore qualifies for an armed intervention presidency. Sadly, the advent of democracy and by ECOWAS24. In the Liberian case, however, Kabbah’s ascendancy to the presidency did ab- there was no such concerted determination solutely nothing to change the conflict dyna- by the ECOWAS Authority [Kuffor, 1993: 533]. mics in Sierra Leone. This is because, though Supporting this thesis is the fact that many of Kabbah may have had democratic legitimacy, the Community Member States25, at that time, he had little power. His position was further asserted that appropriate decision-making weakened after the EO withdrew in January channels were bypassed. Thus, the Liberian cri- 1997 in line with the terms of the November sis exposed the lack of a functioning security 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. On 25 May 1997, the framework of the Community. Supporting this Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [AFRC] position Adibe [1994: 162] argues that, “the [May overthrew Kabbah, while an alliance was for- 1990] Banjul Summit basically handed over the med between the AFRC, led by Major Johnny issue of the Liberian conflict to the SMC rather Paul Koromah, and the RUF. than institute the mechanism for collective se- With this development, the stage was set for curity as provided for by the Defence Protocol”. Nigeria’s ‘interference’ in the Sierra Leone’s ‘in- These problems were later to resurface in ECO- ternal affairs’. Abuja intervened to support and WAS intervention in Sierra Leone. The Sierra reinstate Kabbah’s government. Nigeria’s in- Leone situation was even compounded by the tervention raised eye brow in West Africa and Nigeria’s domineering/flagship role. was questionable. Though, Abuja based its ac- With Charles Taylor’s help, Corporal Fodah tion on the bilateral defence pact that links it Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front [RUF] with Freetown which called on Nigeria to pro- launched a military campaign against the All vide training to Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces. In People’s Congress Party [APC] led government line with the provisions of the defence agree- in Sierra Leone in March 199126. After six years ment, it is reported that close to 1 000 Nigerian of bloody civil conflict, it was apparent that troops were already present in Sierra Leone. the RUF couldn’t gain power and during this This comprised a military training team and period too, the country, unfortunately, expe- a battalion attached to ECOMOG operation in rienced three military coups. First, the April Liberia transiting through Sierra Leone’s Lungi 1992 coup saw the rise of a 28-year-old Captain Airport. As said earlier, Nigeria’s intervention Valentine Strasser to the presidency. With the raised many questions. While Abuja claimed assistance of the former British Army Gurkhas, that the defence pact with Sierra Leone autho- the Gurkhas Security Group and the South rised the intervention, it was widely believed African private security force, the Executive that no agreement ‘explicitly’ granted those

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 17 already stationed Nigerian troops in Freetown nisation and administration of his/her socie- to respond militarily in support of President ty. In this vein, all the Heads of State and Govern- Kabbah. At another level, it is argued that the ment in the sub-region committed themselves to the deposed president requested for Nigeria’s mi- encouragement and promotion of political pluralism, litary assistance in the wake of the coup, but and the representative institutions and guarantees the legality of such request is suspect. Nigeria of personal safety and freedom under the law then tried to characterise its intervention as that are the common heritage of the peoples an ECOMOG initiative. However, ECOWAS had of West Africa [Cited in Ahmed, 2003: 60. Ita- not authorised the military actions. It is im- lics added]. portant to note that official ECOWAS authorisation did not come until after three months These political principles formed an integral after Abuja had intervened. Thus: part of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty that was When seeking to designate its intervention as ‘ECO- adopted in 1993. In the 1993 Revised Treaty, the MOG’ action, Nigeria took advantage of the fact that Authority collectively expressed and reaffir- ECOWAS still lacked a formal security framework. No institutionalised mechanism had been establi- med their commitment as well as adherence shed during the course of the Liberian conflict. Thus, to the rules and principles of ECOWAS. These in response to the crisis in Sierra Leone, Nigeria include: simply pushed another ad hoc approach. Whereas 1. The protection and promotion of human and in Liberia, Nigeria sought some form of ECOWAS authorisation prior to intervening, in Sierra Leone, people’s rights in accordance with the provi- Nigeria responded militarily first and sought - ECO sions of the African Charter on Human and WAS approval only after it had intervened [Berman People’s Rights; and Katie, 2000: 114]. 2. Accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development; One important lesson from the volatile secu- 3. The promotion of a peaceful environment by rity situation of the late 1980s and early 1990s all citizens; in West Africa is the realisation by the West 4. The promotion and consolidation of a demo- African leaders that economic integration can cratic system. only be achieved in a secure environment and that the surest/easiest way to such environ- The ECOWAS Mechanism ment is the deepening democratic culture and good governance. In line with this, in July 1991, for Conflict Prevention, the Authority adopted a Declaration of Poli- Management, Resolution, tical Principles and reaffirmed their commit- Peacekeeping and Security. ment and adherence to these principles which One crucial aspect of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS include: Treaty is Article 58 dealing with regional secu- 1. Full enjoyment, by all peoples in West Africa, rity. Article 58.2 provides that ECOWAS Mem- of their fundamental human rights, especially ber States “shall undertake to cooperate with their political, economic, social, cultural and the Community in establishing and strengthe- other rights that are inherent in the dignity ning appropriate mechanisms for the timely of the human person and essential to free and prevention and resolution of intra- and inter progressive development. state conflicts”. Despite the fact that the Article 2. Belief in the liberty of the individual and in made provision for the need to “establish a re- his inalienable rights to participate, by means gional peace and security observation system of free and democratic processes, in the orga-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 18 and peacekeeping forces where appropriate”27, terventions; [2] determining mandates and it failed to expand upon the structure of the terms of reference for such interventions; [3] envisioned peace and security mechanism. reviewing such mandates and terms of refe- The new security framework did not see the li- rence periodically; [4] appointing actors such ght of the day until after a very tough decision as the Special Representatives of the Executi- taken by the Authority in December 1997. At ve Secretary and the Force Commander, upon the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the ECO- the Executive Secretary’s recommendation; WAS Authority held on 17 December 1997 in the and [5] informing the UN and the OAU of its Togolese capital, Lome, the ECOWAS Heads of decisions28. Regarding military intervention, State and Government unanimously agreed to the Mechanism empowers ECOWAS to un- implement the Regional Security provisions dertake peacekeeping operations in internal of the 1993 Revised Treaty, existing Protocols, conflict where the situation: threatens to tri- and agreed, in principle, to establish a Pro- gger a humanitarian disaster; poses a serious tocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict threat to peace and security in the sub-region; Prevention, Management, Resolution, Pea- erupts following the overthrow or attempted cekeeping and Security. It is hoped that such a overthrow of a democratically elected gover- Mechanism would aid tremendously in circu- nment29. The Council operates at three levels: mventing many of the shortcomings that mar- [1] the Committee of Ambassadors of the nine red previous ECOMOG operations, to reinforce Member States accredited to Nigeria and ECO- sub-regional peace and security, and above WAS which meet monthly, but more frequen- all, will forge unity/harmony among Member tly if the need arises. The reports of the Com- States. This ECOWAS Security Mechanism was mittee on regional peace and security matters finally adopted on 10 December 1999 in Lome. will be forwarded to all Council members as The Protocol establishes the following institu- well as to any affected State; [2] the Commit- tions/structures for its implementation: the tee of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs Mediation and Security Council; the Defence and Security. The Committee meets quarterly and Security Commission; the Council of El- to deliberate on general political and security ders; the ECOMOG; the Executive Secretariat; situations in the ECOWAS sub-region. The re- the ECOWAS Parliament; the ECOWAS Court of port of the Committee is subject to the appro- Justice; and the Economic and Social Council. val of [3] the Meeting of the Heads of State and It also established the Sub-regional Security Government of the ECOWAS Mediation and Observation and Monitoring system. Security Council. The Heads of State meet at The Mediation and Security Council, com- least twice a year and decide on any measure prising nine Member States, elected for a to be taken30. two-year mandate, is the principal decision- The Mediation and Security Council might so- making organ. The current and immediate licit the expert opinion of Defence and Security past ECOWAS Chair are automatic members Commission. Membership of the Commission of the Council. The Council, whose decisions shall be dictated by the issues for discussion. will required a two-third majority, is charged Therefore, ECOWAS Member States may be with the responsibility of taking decisions represented by their Chiefs of Staff, Security on all matters relating to sub-regional peace Chiefs, Experts from the Ministry of Foreign and security. Its responsibilities include: [1] Affairs, Heads of Immigration, Customs, Nar- authorising political as well as military in- cotics, or Border Patrols. The Commission ser-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 19 ves as a technical advisory body to the Media- Mediation and Security Council and to the tion and Security Council on the requirements ECOWAS Member States on the activities of of the administration and logistics support for the Mechanism33. peacekeeping operations. Thus, it examines For proper management and overseeing of the technical aspects of defence matters31. The ECOWAS field missions, the Mechanism pro- Mechanism also proposed to develop a strate- posed for the establishment of a new branch- gy that would necessarily be based on African --the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary traditional methods of settling disputes. The for Political Affairs, Defence, and Security—wi- method tasks the elders of the land, who serve thin the ECOWAS Secretariat34 consisting of as conflict mediators, peacemakers, conflict three Departments, viz, Department of Opera- adjudicators in African communities, with tions, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs the responsibility of settling disputes. In this [DOPHA]; Department of Political Affairs and spirit, an ad hoc Council of Elders was establi- Security [DPAS]; and an Observation and Mo- shed for the sub-region. This is based on the nitoring Centre [OMC]. The DOPHA will be res- conviction that Africans should build on their ponsible for the formulation and implementa- indigenous values and practices to see them- tion of policies in all the Community military, selves as their brother’s keepers and intervene peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, or mediate in conflicts without impediments spotlighting on such issues as planning, ad- to sovereignty [Aderinwale et al, 2000: 5-6}. ministering, and monitoring operations, in The Council of Elders will be made up of emi- addition to training. The DPAS is to deal with nent personalities with excellent credentials political-related activities concerning conflict from the sub-region, Africa, and beyond. The prevention, management, and resolution; for- Council is expected to exploit their vast expe- mulation and implementation of policies on rience, competence, and goodwill on ECOWAS’ issues as diverse as cross-border crimes, light behalf to play the role of mediator, conciliator weapons flows, drug controls, and peace res- and arbiter. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary toration measures35. is charged with the responsibility of choosing Proposals were advanced a propos de the esta- the Council members in close consultation blishment of an Observation and Monitoring with the current ECOWAS Chair32. System. Expectedly, the Observation System The Mechanism envisaged enhanced func- would consist in the establishment of a re- tions for the Executive Secretary in matters gional network within which Member Sta- relating to conflict prevention and manage- tes would be grouped into zones. A Regional ment. The Executive Secretary will be respon- Observation and Monitoring Centre [OMC] sible for the following tasks: administrative, should be established within the ECOWAS operational, and political aspects of ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to give early warning of field activities; recommendation of individu- impending crisis. Zonal bureaux are to collect als to serve as Special Representatives, Force and transmit all information having a bearing Commanders, and as Eminent Persons on the on the Community peace and security to the Council of Elders; deployment of fact-finding OMC. The OMC is tasked to record and analy- and mediation missions on his/her own ini- se all such data and take action on any signs tiative; organise and participate in meetings of a breakdown in relations between Member of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Cou- States or of alarming socio-political develop- ncil; and finally, submission of reports to the ments within Member States. Four [4] zonal

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 20 observation centres with headquarters in [1] Monitoring/observation of Moratorium Banjul [the Gambia]; Cotonou [Benin]; Monro- compliance, [2] Facilitation of technical as- via [Liberia]; and Ouagadougou [Burkina Faso] sistance to individual Member States for Mo- will be created so as to quickly draw the neces- ratorium-related activities, [3] Facilitation of sary political implications and taking appro- Moratorium related activities, [4] Serving as priate measures36. focal points for transmitting arms registration To overcome many of the shortcomings and information to ECOWAS database, [5] Serving structural/operational failures of the previous as focal points for publicity, and finally [6] Fa- military interventions, the new Mechanism cilitation of Member States’ dialogue with su- sets up a permanent Force for the sub-region ppliers [see Obasi, 2002]. The Heads of State and laid down procedures to be followed when and Government of the Community adopted the decision is taken to intervene. The Me- the draft declaration on 31 October 1998. chanism overhauls ECOMOG in terms of its composition, chain of command, duties and ECOWAS, SMALL ARMS roles, and funding for administrative and lo- AND LIGHT WEAPONS gistic supports. To redeem its image regarding some noticeable shortcomings of its previous PROLIFERATION AND military operations, and to effectively abet its THE WEST AFRICAN CIVIL peacekeeping operations with humanitarian CONFLICTS action, it is recommended that, in conflict si- This belief in disarmament does not proceed from idealism, or from naiveté. The best strategy for pre- tuations or natural disasters, ECOWAS should vention of armed conflict is to eliminate the means ensure a towering profile vis-à-vis bringing of violence [Alpha Omar Konare, cited in Raymond, succor to the affected population and quicken 1998]. the return of normalcy. Many important recommendations were made in respect of this 1. The Genesis and peace-building. One important factor fuelling political instabi- To ensure a secured environment for West lity and insecurity in West Africa is the uncon- Africa, the ECOWAS Mechanism provides for trolled proliferation of SALW which constitutes a number of recommendations for combating one of the greatest humanitarian challenges of illicit small arms trafficking and proliferation. our time37. It is estimated that over ten million It is believed that the quantity of arms outsi- of these weapons of destruction are proli- de the control of governments in West Africa is ferating in the West African sub-region. The estimated at ten million. Such arms fuel con- availability and easy procurement of SALW by flicts and encourage incidence of cross-border non-State actors, especially war mongers and crimes in West Africa. The ECOWAS Executive human rights abusers are, to a large extent, Secretariat has sought to combat weapons responsible for a great number of civilian cau- proliferation more effectively by preparing salities in the West African civil conflicts, and a draft declaration of a Moratorium on light nay Africa at large [Koroma, 1999]. The illicit weapons based on the Moratorium presented trafficking in arms is of great concerns not by Mali on the importation, exportation and only in West Africa, but Africa as a whole. This manufacture of light weapons. The four zonal is evidenced in the fact that in most societies, observation bureaux are to perform the follo- especially in the Mano River Union countries, wing roles in relations to the Moratorium, viz, SALW is as cheap as second hand clothes. The

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 21 sources of SALW proliferation are multiface- countries has made the sub-region to loose its ted. First, the glut of arms provided by the two destiny to the external forces of capitalism. This opposing superpowers in their competitive is because of the acceptance of the neo-liberal, pursuit of local advantages in Africa during anti-statist, anti-developmentalist Structural the Cold War is remarkable. Although, Africa Adjustment Programmes [SAPs] of the World was not directly affected by the Cold War, but Bank [WB] and the International Monetary a great number of weapons were pumped into Fund [IMF] to revamp their economies became the continent by the superpowers to fan proxy counterproductive as the implementation of inter-state conflicts. the Bretton Wood’s imposed conditionalities The post-1989 international system left Afri- further increased the pre-SAPs social crisis ca [West Africa in particular] with a problem by frustrating the masses and wiping out the of surplus weapons in the clear absence of an middle class. The cut-backs in the social servi- enemy. The leftover arms have found their way ces and the withdrawal of states from the pro- via underground networks involving rouge vision of most of the basic functions, and the arms merchants, security entrepreneurs, eth- rise of unemployment compelled citizens to nic militia groups, private military companies, cater for themselves. This has increased crime mercenaries, and local smugglers to increase rates in the sub-region. Hence, the increase in the tempo of on-going wars and facilitate the arms proliferation. commencement of new ones in Africa. The Other factors at play that warrant arms proli- recycling of arms accounted for the greatest feration include, but not limited to: increase percentage of arms proliferation in West Africa. in the activities of, and demand for weapons Second, until very recently nearly all countries by the various ethnic militias most especially were under one form of authoritarian regime in Nigeria; the existence of countries that are or the other. Bad governance, coupled with the arms manufacturers in Africa—South Afri- underdevelopment nature of the West African ca, Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe and Morocco economies with high degree of poverty and among others; breakdown of state structures, all the negative features associated with the poor service conditions for security personnel, LDCs, form the basis of SALW proliferation. etc. Thus, West Africa is finding it difficult in Apparently, this is discouraging considering providing or even guaranteeing public safety the fact that West Africa is blessed with stu- as a result of weapons proliferation. The overall pendous human and material resources. For implications of SALW proliferation, especially, instance, despite its stupendous mineral re- in the sub-region are: source endowments [diamond, rutile, etc], Some 2 million West Africans are reported to have died in conflicts involving SALW since 1990. Small Sierra Leone for sometime now is the poorest Arms bring devastation to lives, property and the country in the whole world, while the sub-re- physical environment, exacerbate conflict, spark gional economic giant, Nigeria, is also among mass displacement and refugee flows, undermine the poor countries of the world. This situation the rule of law, and promote and sustain a culture of violence. Small Arms proliferation mostly affects the is not favoured by the scramble for sub-regio- vulnerable segments of society [children, women, nal natural resources by various internal and and the aged]. A major issue is in particular their external interests within the context of a per- impact on children. More than 120, 000 African chil- vasive governance crisis [largely explains the dren under the age of 18 are reported to be engaged in civil wars and wielding small arms. This is made persistence of small arms proliferation in West easier by the fact that small arms are light, portable, Africa]. The downsizing of the West African and can be operated with minimal instructions and

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 22 training. However, many children are also often vic- sing wave of crime and banditry in the sub-re- tims of SALW, through slavery and rape for example gion. This is premised on the strong conviction [Ebo and Mazal, 2003: 12] that the availability and easy access to SALW The proliferation of SALW and their easy trans- may invite violent solutions to problems and, fer from one war theatre to other conflict sce- consequently, acquisition of SALW for self-de- ne, and by extension to a ‘relatively’ peaceful fence since there may be no effective police country becomes worrisome to the West Afri- to rely upon. The increase in socio-economic can leaders thereby prompting them, espe- development in general and donor supported cially President Alpha Omar Konare of Mali, to development projects in particular constitute initiate and eventually adopt the West African the third objective of the West African Mora- Moratorium38. As stated earlier, the West Afri- torium. This is because the basic condition can Moratorium was signed on 31 October 1998 for development in any state is that adequate in Abuja, Nigeria for an initial period of three level of security is maintained by the govern- years. It was extended for an additional period ment of that country. This is, absolutely, the of three years on 5 July 2001, and is applicable rationale behind the ‘security first’ approach. till 31 October 2004. This approach, shorthand for an integrated and proportional to security and develop- 2. The ECOWAS Moratorium on ment, is based on the idea that “without secu- the Importation, Exportation and rity, conditions will not exist for development Manufacture of SALW projects to be conducted. Part of the develop- The ECOWAS Moratorium represents a funda- ment aid may, therefore, best be invested in a mental step and comprehensive strategy to- more effective law and order mechanism, i.e. wards addressing SALW proliferation in West in security sector reform under appropriate in- Africa. The Moratorium is a novel initiative in ternational monitoring. It is only when func- two respects. First, it is a regional ‘confiden- tional substitutes are offered for the role that ce-building’ agreement that originated at the weapons now play that incentive schemes to recipient end where the problems posed by collect arms can work well” [Lodgaard, 1999]. uncontrolled flows of arms are felt. Second, Furthermore, it is argued that it is only when the supplier states, especially the Wassenaar arms have been brought under control and the 39 Arrangement , were drawn into, and asked security environment has become stable that to respect the Moratorium’s provisions and to development programmes can be conducted. support in its implementation. Thus, the West And it is only when there is a ‘sense of securi- African Moratorium represents the first ever to ty’ for the long term that foreign investments be tried by the recipients of arms. Previous at- may become substantial. Thus, the imperative tempts at controlling the proliferation of such of the ‘security first’ approach which forms the weapons from the supplier states were highly basis and inspires the ECOWAS Moratorium ineffective. [Lodgaard, 1999; also see Badmus, 2005: 87-91] Three key objectives are central to the Morato- [See Box 1 for background information]. rium regime. First, it aims at preventing conflicts. The second is post-conflict reconstruc- tions. The logic behind these objectives is that in post-conflict reconstruction, a major task is to avoid the process sliding back into armed conflict. Another goal is to stem the increa-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 23 Box 1: Chronology of Events Relating to the ECOWAS Moratorium

The Moratorium announced at the ECOWAS meeting of Heads of State in Abuja, Nigeria, 30-31 October 1998 originated from a succession of events and initiatives which began in 1993. Acting upon an initial request from the President of Mali, the Secretary-General of the Uni- ted Nations established an advisory mission on the control and collection of small arms in the Sahara-Sahel region. The mission visited Mali (1994) as well as Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal (1995). A major lesson from these missions was that curbing the dissemination of small arms within each country and throughout the region was an essential factor in establishing the minimal security prerequisites for future development projects to be undertaken effectively. Hence, an integrated and proportional approach to security and development (“security first”) was elaborated and, in principle, endorsed at a high-level consultation of the UN/UNDP and donor countries held in New York on 21 October 1996. In this spirit, a UNIDIR/UNDP conference on conflict prevention, disarmament and development in West Africa was convened in Bamako on 25-29 November 1996. Delegations from 12 West African countries sought common ground on options for future regional cooperation. The Moratorium proposal drew particular interest throughout the conference. Delegates undertook to convey the suggestion to their respective governments for further consideration. As participants in the Bamako Conference, both ECOWAS and ANAD took an active part in the discussions on the Moratorium idea. Subsequently, the secretariat of the OAU was briefed on the proposal. In February 1997, “Friends of the Chair” of the Wassenaar Arrangement--an export control forum based in Vienna--were likewise informed of the Moratorium proposal, and of the West African wish to conduct a dialogue on the matter. Another consultation of West African countries held in Bamako in March 1997, was attended by a representative of the Chairman in Office of the Wassenaar Arrangement in an observer capacity. This meeting agreed that the Moratorium might be of a three-year duration. In a public statement of 10 December 1997, the Wassenaar Arrangement “welcomed and encouraged the initiative of the West African countries in establishing a Moratorium on import, export and manufacture of light weapons.” In its communiqué of 12 March 1998, the ECOWAS meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Abid- jan instructed the ECOWAS secretariat to prepare a draft text for the declaration of the Mora- torium proposal with a view to its adoption and announcement at the upcoming summit of ECOWAS. At the twenty-first ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECO- WAS, meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 30-31 October 1998, all 16 Heads of State of ECOWAS “solem- nly declare(d) a Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states which shall take effect from the first day of November 1998, for a renewable period of three (3) years.” In a public statement of 3 December 1998, the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arran- gement confirmed that they “will undertake an appropriate collaborative role with ECOWAS member states to respect the provisions of the moratorium and will be open to providing advi-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 24 sory and/or technical assistance in the implementation of the Moratorium.” At the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers meeting in Bamako, Mali, 24-25 March 1999, a plan of action was agreed for measures to be undertaken within the framework of the Moratorium, to create a secure environment for development. Four areas were singled out for immediate financial assistance. The Moratorium is a framework within which a number of measures must be taken in order to achieve the objectives of secure peace and development. Sometimes referred to as associated measures, these measures are vitally important for the success of the entire undertaking, and technical and financial assistance is needed to enhance confidence in the framework as well as to implement these measures in the course of the three-year “period of grace,” i.e. while the Moratorium is in force. From a list of nine priority items, the Foreign Ministers encouraged immediate financial support for the Program for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) in the following four areas: 1. measures to enhance confidence in the moratorium, such as improving controls at harbors, airports and border crossings. To this end, donor country assistance is sought for the installa- tion and effective operation of such control mechanisms; 2. security sector reform, including initiating and strengthening regional training programs for the uniformed services; 3. incentive schemes to collect and destroy weapons in uncontrolled circulation or unauthorised possession; and 4. cooperation with civil society organisations.

The Foreign Ministers decided to notify the UN Security Council and the Wassenaar Arrange- ment of the entry into force of the Moratorium, and of the list of the categories of light weapons covered by it. Notice has already been made of the Moratorium in Security Council Reso- lution 1209 of 19 November 1998, which commends the ECOWAS members for their subregional initiative in combating illicit arms flows. The Foreign Ministers furthermore supported the convening of the high-level consultation that has been initiated by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) to promote international support for the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Develop- ment (PCASED), which was established under UNDP auspices to facilitate the implementation of the Moratorium and its associated measures. PCASED was officially launched in Bamako on 25 March on the occasion of the Foreign Ministers meeting. The high-level consultation was convened at the Henri Dunant Center in Geneva on 5 May.

Source: Adapted from Sverre Lodgaard, 1999.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 25 The ECOWAS Moratorium regime is comprised the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufac- of three instruments, viz; ture of, and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 1. The Moratorium Declaration [Appendix: I] and Components and Ammunition [The UN 2. The Plan of Action for the Implementation Firearms Protocol], and the UN Programme of of PCASED—a UNDP regional project that su- Action [UNPoA]. pport ECOWAS Member States in the implementation of the Moratorium [Appendix II]. [A]. The OAU/AU’s Bamako Declaration 3. The Code of Conduct for the Implementation This Declaration was developed out of the of the Moratorium. Adopted on 10 December need for a common African approach against 1999, this instrument sets out the details of the SALW proliferation at the July 2001 UN Small Moratorium, its dos and don’ts [Appendix III]. Arms Conference in New York. The OAU/AU The key components of the Code of Conduct Ministerial conference held between 30 No- include: vember and 1 December 2000 in Bamako, Mali - The establishment of National Commissions recommended a number of actions to be un- [NatComs] in each Member State [Article 4]. dertaken both at the national and sub-regio- - The establishment of structures within the nal levels. First, at the national level, it recom- ECOWAS Secretariat to assist Member States’ mended the following: creation of national implementation of the Moratorium and to coordination agencies for small arms; des- monitor compliance [Article 5]. truction of surplus and confiscated weapons; - Reports preparation by member states ‘on development and implementation of public the ordering or procurement of weapons, com- awareness programmes; enhancement of the ponents, and ammunitions covered by the Mo- capacity of national enforcement and secu- ratorium’ purposely to increase transparency rity agencies and officials, including training [Article 6]. and upgrading of equipment and resources; - The establishment of a database and regional and conclusion of bilateral arrangements for arms register [Article 6]. small arms control in common frontier zones. - Review and harmonisation of national legis- Second, the Bamako Declaration sought to ac- lation and administrative procedures [Article complish the codification, harmonisation and 7] standardisation of national norms and the - Training programmes for military security enhancement of sub-regional and continental and police forces [Article 7]. cooperation among police, customs, and bor- - The declaration of weapons and ammunition der control services at the sub-regional level used for peacekeeping operations [Article 8]. [Appendix IV]. Additionally, the creation of the AU Peace and 3. Other African and Global Control Security Council on 9 July 2002 also gave fillip Initiatives. to the fight against SALW proliferation in Afri- Aside from the West African pioneering initia- ca. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment tive, ECOWAS Member States have been invol- of the Peace and Security Council of the AU rei- ved in other initiatives at the continental and terates the growing concern about the nega- global levels. In this respect, three efforts in tive impacts of illicit proliferation of SALW on the search for viable solutions to the scourge the continent’s socio-economic development of SALW proliferation merit scholarly atten- as well as on its peace and security. The Proto- tion, viz; the OAU/AU’s Bamako Declaration, col stresses the need for, and imperative of, a

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 26 perfect and coordinated structure to coopera- pons in All Its Aspects in July 2001. The Con- te to tackle the problem of weapons prolife- ference aimed at reaching decisions on steps ration. States should take to combat small arms proliferation. NGOs, under the umbrella of Inter- [B]. The United Nations Firearms Protocol. national Action Network on Small Arms [IAN- The United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit SA], in close collaboration with other groups Manufacture of, and Trafficking in Firearms, were instrumental to the success of the UN Their Parts, and Components and Ammuni- Conference. NGOs presented evidences on the tion, Supplementing the United Nations Con- problems encountered in separating legal and vention Against Transnational Organised Cri- illegal transfers, and calling for tough controls me [UN Firearms Protocol] is a legally binding on both State and non-State weapons sellers. treaty. The Protocol obligates States to: The conference resulted in the adoption of - promote uniform international standards for a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, the international movement of firearms for and the Eradicate Illicit Trade in SALW in all import, export and transit; Its Aspects [UNPoA]. The UNPoA committed - foster cooperation and the exchange of in- governments to: formation at national, regional and global le- - Make illicit gun production/possession a vels, including firearms identification, detec- criminal offence. ting and tracing; and, - Establish a national coordination agency on - promote international firearms cooperation small arms through the development of an international - Identify and destroy stocks of surplus wea- system to manage commercial shipments. pons Despite the laudable goals of the Protocol, it - Keep track of officially held guns is loaded with a number of difficulties. The - Issue end-user certificates for exports/tran- Protocol is “limited both in scope and content. sit This is because it narrowly defines the term - Notify original supplier nation of re-export of ‘firearms’ and excludes explosives and ex- - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-in- plosive devices as well as State-to-State transactions. The Protocol only focuses on a few Table 1: ECOWAS Signatories to the UN Firearms Proto- areas where it sets out standards for national col as of 23 January 2003. systems and brings a certain level of harmoni- Ratification, Ac- sation between in the areas in covers” [Small Country Signature ceptance, Appro- Arms Survey, 2002: 238]. Available data show val that as of January 2003, only 6 ECOWAS Mem- Benin 17 May 2002 ber States had signed the UN Firearms Proto- col [See Table 1 below]. Burkina Faso 17 October 2001 15 May 2002

Mali 11 July 2001 3 May 2002 [C]. The United Nations Programme of Action [UNPoA] Nigeria 13 November 2001

Following background investigations into the Senegal 17 January 2001 impacts of small arms on civilian population Sierra Leone 27 November 2001 worldwide, the UN convened a Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small arms and Light Wea- Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 27 tegration [DDR] of ex-combatants, including the UNPoA, and the UN Firearms Protocol] collection and destruction are, in premise and provisions, virtually the - Support regional agreements and encourage same. This is because they all call for the moratoria establishment of the national coordination - Mark guns at point of manufacture agencies, weapons destruction, as well as - Maintain records of gun manufacture sensitization programmes for the public. For - Engage in more information exchange example, Article 4 of the Code of Conduct for - Ensure better enforcement of arms embar- the Implementation of the ECOWAS Morato- goes rium and Section II paragraph 4 of the UNPoA - Include civil society organisations in efforts made reference to the establishment of the to prevent small arms proliferation. NatComs and National Coordinating agency respectively purposely to combat arms proli- While the UNPoA gave leeway for countries to feration. In essence, the reality in West Africa explore ways to combat the problem of arms is that most of the NatComs also serve as the proliferation, it is discouraging that there is National Points of Contact. Due to the under- a wide gap between declaration of intention developed nature of the West Africa’s econo- which, oftentimes, lead to the signing, rati- mies, States are financially and technically in- fication of international legal instruments capacitated to maintain two different bodies on the one hand, and implementation of the to coordinate SALW issues within and betwe- stipulations and requirements of these legal en States. Nevertheless, this strategy actually instruments on the other. paid off since it assured effective coordinated Laudable as the rationales behind the adop- efforts towards sustainable strategies and tion of the UNPoA are, they are fraught with programmes to combat illicit trafficking and operational and technical difficulties. First, it use of SALW. is frightening that the UN document is not well known outside the official circles. The 4. The ECOWAS Moratorium and knowledge of the UNPoA is well limited to Institutional Arrangements. civil servants and scholars working on the- A number of institutional arrangements have se issues. Second, considering the prevailing been established for the purpose of imple- adverse socio-economic situations of the en- menting the ECOWAS Moratorium. PCASED tire sub-region, the West African States are was established by the UNDP in March 1999 financially and technically weak. The State and its termination in 2004 led to the esta- institutions tasked to implement the UNPoA blishment of the institutional mechanism are not only under-funded but equally under- known as the ECOWAS Small Arms Control staffed. The UN agencies in Africa as a whole Programme [ECOSAP] that aims at playing pi- are technically ill-equipped to implement the votal roles concerning SALW control in West UN document. This is the more reason why Africa. A Small Arms Unit [SAU] has also been the Africa-based NGOs need to be more com- created within the ECOWAS headquarters in mended and encourage in their resolution to Abuja, Nigeria. publicise and raise awareness about the 2001 and 2003 conferences. [A]. Programme for Coordination and One fundamental area that needs to be dis- Assistance for Security and Development cussed is that, it is apparent that the three [PCASED] instruments [i.e. the Bamako Declaration, PCASED, aimed at supporting the West African

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 28 States in the implementation of the Morato- - Arms collection and destruction; rium, was established to complement the Re- - Mobilisation of resources for the activities of gional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in NatComs; and Africa [UNREC] set up by the United Nations - Information, Education, and Awareness-rai- Department for Disarmament Affairs [UNDDA] sing campaigns. in 1986. PCASED was a multidisciplinary structure in terms of the programmes it is to imple- In spite of the criticisms levied against PCA- ment. As a result, for general management and SED, which Ebo and Mazal [2003: 23] descri- technical supports, it was aided by a number bed as “its rather ad hoc nature. First of all, the of departments and agencies within the UN question of control and direction of PCASED’s system such as the Department for Political activities is not clear. There are also tensions Affairs [UNDPA], the UNDP itself, the UN Offi- between the need to locate the implementa- ce for Project Services [UNOPS], the UNDDA, tion sections of the Moratorium permanen- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian tly within ECOWAS and the attractiveness of Affairs [OCHA], Department of Peacekeeping continuing to work within the UN system for Operations [UNDPKO], and the UN Depart- many PCASED staff [compared to ECOWAS]. ment of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDE- Therefore, the suggestion of converting PCA- SA]. The inputs from these departments to the SED to an ECOWAS programme has received a PCASED were articulated by the UNREC lukewarm reception”. ECOWAS gave credit to It should be emphasised that during its five- PCASED in its implementation of the Morato- year term [1999-2004], PCASED was, despite rium. ECOWAS report on the evaluation of the the problems it encountered, very instrumen- roles of PCASED adopted by the ECOWAS Au- tal in the implementation of the West African thority in January 2003 commended PCASED Moratorium. While the primary responsibility especially concerning the NatComs, training for its [Moratorium] operation rests with the of military and security personnel, enhance- NatComs in each Member State of ECOWAS, ment of weapons controls at border posts [in PCASED assisted and facilitated this respon- particular Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Mali], and sibility [Appendix II]. It was assigned a plan of the enhanced coordination between PCASED action based on nine priority areas of activities and the ECOWAS Secretariat. Additionally, the adopted by the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign report also gave credit to PCASED in the areas Affairs. For all intents and purposes, going by of arms collection and destruction program- the financial, technical and other resources at mes, harmonisation of legislations and regio- its disposal, it was not feasible to accomplish nal arms register and database. some of these objectives in the nearest futu- In spite of the positive assessment of PCASED, re. Thus, the priority areas were reviewed. The as it is common with most institutions, espe- Tripartite Review of April 2001 put down seven cially those in Africa, PCASED was inundated new areas of focus for PCASED: with a lot of difficulties of which budgetary - Establishment of NatComs; and financial limitations and technical diffi- - Provision of technical assistance to Nat- culties plagued its activities. Apart from these, Coms; coordination and collaboration with other UN - Training of armed and security forces; agencies, UNREC in particular, was challenge - Establishment of an Arms Register and Data- of PCASED. base;

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 29 [B]. The United Nations Regional Centre for port to the Government of Togo for the elabo- Peace and Disarmament in Africa [UNREC]. ration of a national strategy of implementa- In accordance with the UN General Assembly tion of the UNPoA and the organisation of a Resolution 40/151g of 16 December 1985, UN- ‘Flame of Peace’ on 31 October 2001. REC was established in 1986 with office loca- - Contribution to, and participation in the cre- ted in the Togolese capital, Lome. Functions ation of a civil society network [WAANSA] to within the framework of the UNDDA, UNREC combat the proliferation of small arms is charged with the overall responsibility of - Contribution to the consultation of West assisting African countries in their efforts to- African civil society organisations in Dakar, wards the implementation of measures of Senegal, aimed at the formulation of a manual peace, arms limitation and disarmament in for training of trainers from civil society orga- close cooperation with the OAU/AU. As alre- nisations on peace, security, and disarmament ady noted, PCASED was originally controlled matters; and, by UNREC. The growth, both in size and ope- - Assistance to the Government of Togo in the rations, of PCASED coupled with the logistic destruction of some 300 000 ammunition sei- problems conditioned by the locations of both zed from gunrunners [Appendix V]. offices [PCASED in Mali and UNREC in Lome], the organisation structure became virtually 5. The Imperatives of Civil Society irrelevant as it resulted in a very serious of Organisations in Combating SALW operational problems. These difficulties and Proliferation. complications eventually resulted in the split As already noted, civil society organisations of the two offices with the appointment of an [CSOs] have been very instrumental in the fi- independent Director for PCASED in 2001. In ght against SALW proliferation in West Africa, spite of the good ideas behind its establish- especially through awareness raising of the ment, the inability of the African states espe- control instruments among the public. This is cially the Togolese government in translating not to say that CSOs are 100% peace promo- into concrete reality the political will that they ters. Apparently, wars do not emerge in a va- demonstrated with regard to the 1986 Agree- cuum. Instead, they are the end products of so- ment establishing UNREC has been its major cial structure and character of society of which quagmire affecting Its efficiency in its disar- the civil society is an integral part. This implies mament and arms control work. Despite the- that civil society can equally be part of the pro- se difficulties, UNREC has been able to record blem of conflict generation or escalation. This some successes in its activities since 2001. The is evidenced in Rwanda. It is believed that the successes, according to the Report on UNREC’s genocide in the country in 1994 could not have activities in the implementation of the UNPoA been possible or taken such horrific magnitu- on small arms, as related to the West African de without the support of civil society groups. sub-region include: The ideology of extreme dislike was not only - Provision of substantive and technical sup- propagated by the Rwandese state, but was port for the Government of Guinea Bissau in also got the blessing of some civil society conducting an assessment into the magnitu- groups including, of course, some segments of de and scope of the small arms problem [July the press. 2001]. Within the context of the conflict manage- - Provision of substantive and technical sup- ment and fight against SALW proliferation in

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 30 West Africa, CSOs have really proved their wor- Box 2: Extracts from the Final Communiqué th through their regular consultations and se- of the WAANSA Foundation Conference minars that have positive impacts on curbing We, 54 representatives of West African Na- SALW proliferation. They have equally influen- tional and Sub-regional Civil Society Orga- ced regional policy making on SALW control nisations from 10 countries and observers through the provision of valuable inputs, etc. from international Organisations and the These efforts reached their zenith with the Government of Ghana, participating in the creation of the West African Action Network Foundation Conference of the West Africa on Small Arms [WAANSA] in May 2002 and the Action Network on Small Arms, held in Ac- evolution of the Dakar Process. Despite the cra, Ghana, at the Royal Ravico Hotel, Nian- progress made by CSOs, it is contends that gua on 20th and 21st May, 2002; “there remains a strong need for more civil so- Extremely concerned about the prolifera- ciety structures, in particular NatComs. CSOs tion and mis-use of SALW, which endanger need to be recognised by the West African go- the security of people, communities and vernments as substantial actors in the fight nations in the West African sub-region; against SALW and it must be ensured that Recognising that the illicit trade in and easy these organisations are empowered to fulfill access to and availability of SALW continue their roles” [Ebo and Mazal, 2003:27]. To really to exacerbate the conflicts and insecurity in fathom the potency of CSOs in this endeavour, the region; this study engages in more a detailed discus- Aware of the relationship between illicit sion of WAANSA. SALW on the one hand, and political instability, the violation of fundamental human [A]. The West African Action Network rights, economic under-development, bad on Small Arms [WAANSA] governance, social injustice, criminality Hosted by the Accra based NGO, the Founda- and violence on the other hand, and how tion for Security and Development in Africa these negatively impact on the entire socie- [FODSA] and convened by the Centre for De- ty particularly on the survival and protec- mocratic Empowerment [CEDE], 27 organisation of women and vulnerable groups such tions from 10 West African States met between as children, people with disabilities and the 20 and 21 May 2002 in Accra Ghana to launch elderly; WAANSA. It [WAANSA] was established with Reaffirming our understanding and appre- the objective of serving as an umbrella orga- ciation of the fact that ECOWAS member nisation for civil society advocacy and action states bear the primary responsibility for against the scourge issuing from illicit traffi- peace and security in the sub-region; cking and proliferation of SALW in the West Convinced that the ECOWAS Moratorium African sub-region. This is to facilitate civil on the manufacture, export and import of society activities in the campaign against the SALW within the sub-region is the major re- proliferation of SALW in West Africa. [See Box gional initiative for dealing with the scour- 2 for details into the rationale for its forma- ge of SALW; tion]. Committed to supporting the Bamako De- claration, the UN Plan of Action on Small Arms and other relevant 8international instruments;

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 31 Conscious of the need for collaborative civil and the Evolution of a Draft society actions on the non- proliferation of Supplementary Protocol [The Dakar illicit SALW; Process] Appreciating the existence and role of In- With funding from Comic Relief [London], ternational Action Network on Small Arms the Ford Foundation, and the UNDP/PCASED; as the leading international civil society ne- the Centre for Democracy and Development twork on small arms; [CDD]/ WAANSA organised ‘Civil Society Con- Hereby decide to: sultation on the Review of ECOWAS Mora- Transform the organising Committee of the torium’ was held on 27 January 2003 at Hotel Foundation Conference plus one other par- N’Diambour, Dakar, Senegal, with the Mouve- ticipant into a nine-member Steering Com- ment Contre les Armes Legeres en Afrique de l’Ouest mittee that shall manage the affairs of the [MALAO] as host. The consultation was held at Network during the next two years……… the occasion of the ECOWAS/PCASED evalua- …..Encourage organisations in every coun- tion of the Moratorium. It presented the civil try of West Africa to join WAANSA and beco- society groups the golden opportunity to as- me active participants as well as joining and sess the effectiveness or otherwise of the ECO- actively participating in IANSA for the effec- WAS Moratorium as SALW control instrument tiveness of the Networks at the global and with the goal of making important contribu- sub-regional and national levels;……….. tions to the decisions of the ECOWAS Council of Foreign Ministers, and that of the Authority Consequently, the organisation has received Summit in Dakar at the end of January 2003. the support of the West African governments, This evaluation was imperative considering while it has been described as the best-pla- the fact that despite the existence and promi- ced vehicle for a coordinated sub-regional ci- ses of the ECOWAS Moratorium, the sub-re- vil society action against SALW proliferation. gion is not immune from the scourges of wars. WAANSA is also maintaining good working From the Mano River Basin conflict vortex to relationship with IANSA. Both PCASED and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria through WAANSA signed a Memorandum of Unders- armed insurgencies in Casamance region of tanding [MoU] with the overall aim of coope- Senegal, SALW trafficking has completely je- ration in the following areas: research and do- opardised the socio-economic development, cumentation; publication; advocacy; training political stability, social justice and peace of and capacity-building and networking with the entire West Africa. Thus, the Consultation’s civil society and governmental organisations objectives were to: to enhance human security. However, it re- - Review the Reports of the Moratorium eva- mains in dire need of targeted technical and luation; financial assistance to articulate and imple- - Develop a Draft Supplementary Protocol that ment a medium-term programmatic plan. As seeks to address the role of non-state actors; common with most African NGOs, WAANSA’s - Assess the role of ECOWAS, PCASED, Nat- activities are hindered by financial and other Coms, civil society, and international actors in constraints. the implementation of the Moratorium; and, - Work out advocacy campaigns to make the [B]. Civil Society Consultation on the Moratorium and the proposed protocol bin- Review of the ECOWAS Moratorium ding, with enforceable sanctions.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 32 The Dakar civil society consultation was des- - Enact a Supplementary Protocol on small cribed as a success story because it turned arms. out as a good example of the capacity of the - Establish an effective, efficient and active civil society institutions to influence change small arms unit within ECOWAS Secretariat. via constructive, second-track diplomacy. The - Support and promote a more effective PCA- consultation was able to identify a quite num- SED. ber of inherent flaws and gaps in the ECOWAS - Convert the ECOWAS Moratorium into a per- Moratorium. First, despite the fact the Mora- manent sub-regional convention, without torium was an important and pioneering arms prejudice to the proposed supplementary Pro- control Mechanism in West Africa, its remains tocol. not as legally binding instrument. Hence, its - Introduce and sustain an awareness raising voluntary nature has on many occasions ham- programme at the governmental level pered ECOWAS in enforcing sanction against - Encourage and support civil society in their States [especially Burkina Faso, Liberia, and advocacy activities and programmes Cote d’Ivoire] and private bodies that have - Update and harmonise small arms legislation violated the instrument’s provisions. Though with a view to blocking national gaps and for- the vast majority of countries have exercised a ging a regional legal framework remarkable degree of compliance. The Morato- - Establish, with a sense of urgency, a database rium is, as it is known, a political commitment of experts working on small arms issues. by the leadership as a confidence-building me- - Reassess the location of the observation bu- chanism. The Code of Conduct declares itself a reaux with a view to enhancing the viability legally binding document [Article 1] but in re- and efficiency of an Early Warning and Early ality it is not. Nonetheless, the Moratorium’s Response [EWER] Mechanism40. relevance is noticeable in regulating states’ action, by shaping values and creating expec- Furthermore, the Consultation was able to tations [Small Arms Survey, 2003: 219]. Though, secure its [civil society] participation at the the Consultation saw the need to transform ECOWAS Foreign Ministers meeting held on the Moratorium from a voluntary to a binding 28 January 2003 in Dakar, Senegal where the sub-regional legal instrument, with a corres- consultation’s communiqué was presented to ponding regime of sanctions. the ECOWAS Meeting. Additionally, the Dakar Consultation also called for a Supplementary Protocol, both to cor- 6. ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL rect the gaps in the existing protocol and to in- ARMS AND ECOSAP crease the intensity of advocacy campaign so While most of the ECOWAS efforts on regional as to make the control instrument well known security have been extensively dealt with abo- by the public. The potency of the need for the ve, one important area of achievement that ne- development of a more effective strategic and eds to be discussed with respect to the imple- operational framework for advocacy on SALW mentation and effectiveness of the ECOWAS proliferation in West Africa was also emphasi- Moratorium is the creation of the Small Arms sed. This is to improve the efficiency of the Mo- Unit [SAU] within the ECOWAS headquarters. ratorium. At the end, the West African Civil So- The termination of PCASED paved the way for ciety Evaluation Consultation came out with the establishment of ECOSAP to implement the call on the West African governments to: the newly adopted ECOWAS Small Arms Con-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 33 vention [Appendix VII]. This new programme actors not authorised by the importing Mem- is intended to enable ECOWAS has much more ber State. Armed groups have contributed to control on its arms control measure. ECOSAP destabilising West Africa, and this ban reflects was officially launched on 6 June 2006 in Ba- the particular concerns of the region. This pro- mako, Mali in a ceremony witnessed by ECO- vision of the Convention is unique, and not WAS, UN/UNDP, the AU, and NGOs officials. found in any other international agreement The ‘ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Li- on preventing armed violence. ght Weapons, their Ammunition and other - Regulation of artisan (or local) arms manu- associated materials’ was finally signed by the facturers. Again, local gun manufacture is one ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on of the specific problems in the region, and the 14 June 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria. The adoption Convention requires Member States to create finally completes the much eagerly awaited an inventory of the arms made by these local transformation of the 1998 Moratorium into a manufacturers. In essence, it allows this often legally-binding instrument. As already empha- murky business but brings the local manufac- sised, the Moratorium, despite the fact that it turers within the law. was the world’s first regional small arms Mora- - Procedures for sharing information. The Con- torium, was a voluntary measure. Because of its vention requires Member States to establish voluntary nature, it had little monitoring me- national databases or registries of all small chanism and lacked sanction regime. The new arms in their jurisdiction. This will help identi- Convention is intended to be a permanent fy the sources of any diversion from authorised commitment to reducing the armed conflict to unauthorised gun users, and so help prevent that has plagued the sub—region. The Conven- future diversion. tion monitoring and implementation mecha- - Encourages dialogue between the region and nism is ECOSAP. arms suppliers. There is very little small arms The Convention places outright ban on the manufacturing capacity in West Africa, and so transfer of these small arms and light wea- the majority of weapons in circulation have pons to non-State actors while it allows ECO- been supplied by other countries. WAS Member States access to these weapons - Regulation of small arms possession. The only for the purposes of legitimate national Convention provides a stringent regulatory defence and internal security or participation scheme for anyone wishing to possess small in peacekeeping efforts. The Convention is to, arms. This involves a licensing and registration according to the lead international consultant scheme. on the new instrument, Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, - Management and security of stockpiles. Many assist reduce armed conflict by putting: small arms in West Africa are stored in govern- - A ban on international small arms transfers ment military stockpiles. The Convention re- except those for legitimate self-defence and quires Member States to ensure the security security needs, or for peace support opera- and proper management of these stockpiles, tions. Exemption requests are submitted to to prevent diversion to unauthorised users [ci- the ECOWAS Executive Secretary by Member ted from IANSA Website, 14 April 2007]. States, and there are elaborate and stringent procedures prescribed for determining whe- The ECOWAS headquarters is tasked to deve- ther a transfer shall or shall not be authorised. lop a Plan of Action [PoA] to implement the - A ban on transfers of small arms to non-state Convention’s provisions which will be submit-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 34 ted to Member States for approval. Another vi- solution 50/70B adopted on 12 December 1995, tal area of the Convention is that it authorises appointed a Panel of Governmental Experts on the creation of a group of independent experts Small Arms to prepare a report on the “nature who will assist the Executive Secretary in mo- and causes of the accumulation and transfer of nitoring implementation of the Convention. If SALW” and on “ways and means to prevent and a Member State is found to be in violation of reduce their excessive and destabilising ac- its obligations, the Convention has provision cumulation and transfer, in particular as they for imposing sanctions. This was not the case cause and exacerbate conflict”. The UN report, under the previous Moratorium. Although sig- with special reference to Africa, identified the ned, the Convention is not yet binding. It nee- uncontrolled and easy availability of SALW as ds to be ratified by 9 of the 15 Member States in “not only fuelling conflicts but also exacerba- order to enter into force. Ratification is one of ting violence and criminality”. The UN Panel, the urgent next steps for the ECOWAS Member in paragraph 79(4) of its recommendations, States. Signing the Convention at this point called for the development of plans to disarm is very timely. West African States now have a combatants during peace settlements, and for clear ‘common position’ for the Review Confe- the inclusion “therein plans for weapons collec- rence, signed by their Heads of State. This is a tion and their disposal, preferably by destruc- very powerful mandate! Since small arms cross tion”41. In spite of the UN efforts in promoting borders, eradicating the illicit trade in small weapons destruction during peacekeeping arms requires strong and effective internatio- operations, especially with the call for the de- nal cooperation and commitment. ECOWAS velopment of plans to disarm combatants du- Heads of State and Government have recogni- ring peace settlements, such goals have not sed this in the Convention and the text of the been fully achieved, especially in West Africa. Convention should provide a reference point This is largely because of the absence of com- for West African delegates at this important prehensive strategies for achieving DDR ob- global conference. jectives of the post-war environments. More often than not, it is disheartening that in West MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE Africa, most of the weapons collected oftenti- PROCESSES: ECOWAS AND mes find their ways to other theatres of war; thus the cycle of violence becomes endless THE WEST AFRICAN CIVIL [Badmus, 2005]. For proper understanding of CONFLICTS ECOWAS efforts in combating SALW prolifera- Africa became the epicentre of intrastate con- tion, and most imperatively during peace pro- flicts in the 1990s as the continent witnessed cesses with the overall objective of achieving an unprecedented increase in low-intensity a post conflict peace-building environment in wars. It is estimated that Africa accounted West Africa, this study engages in five [5] case for 90% of world’s total during this period. As studies, viz, the Mano River Basin Tri-states of noted earlier, SALW have been the primary ins- Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry; Mali truments of executing these wars and all the and Niger. Although, ECOWAS was and is still problems associated with them. Despite the- very instrumental in this endeavour, it efforts se negative developments in relations to arms are also complemented by other international management, the UN Secretary General in line institutions, especially the UN. with paragraph 1 of the General Assembly Re-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 35 • Liberia disarmament. The agreement urged the par- While the historical account of the Liberian cities to the conflict to agree and express their vil war has been provided in the earlier part of intent and willingness to disarm under the su- this study, this section analyses exhaustively pervision of ECOMOG; monitored and verified ECOWAS’ efforts in managing arms during pe- by the United Nations Observer Mission in Li- ace support missions in that particular coun- beria [UNOMIL]44. In spite of the good spirit of try. Since disarmament constituted one of the the accord, lack of trust as well as insecurity of fundamental tasks of ECOMOG, while relying the faction leaders eventually saw its failure; on Article 1(2) of the ECOWAS decision that es- that ultimately led to the Abuja accord of Au- tablished it, the peacekeeping force started gust 1996. In accordance with the 1996 agree- consultations in earnest with the rebel leaders ment, disarmament process commenced on in a confidence building processap. The disar- 22 November 1996 with the grand objective of mament process that started well suffered disarming 50 000 combatants from the rebel setbacks as a result of the killing of President movements by 31 January 1997. The reason for Samuel Doe by Prince Yormie Johnson’s led In- this new development could be explained in dependent National Patriotic Front of Liberia two different ways. First, it was apparent to [INPFL] in September 1990. The consequential the faction leaders at that time that the only deteriorating security situations, the ‘doubted’ way to peace was to disarm their combatants ECOMOG credibility, as well as its inability to and second, these leaders too were war wea- arrest the situation saw the replacement of its ried where it dawned on them that the costs Ghanaian Commander Brigadier Arnold Quai- of the war had outweighed its gains. Thus, by noo with a Nigerian General Joshua N. Don- 31 January 1997, more than 20 000 fighters had goyaro who eventually jettisoned ECOMOG’s been demobilised, who held 9 570 weapons, pacifying posturing and the already voluntary and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition [See Ta- disarmament programme. Instead, General ble 2 for details]. Dongoyaro favoured ‘an all-out war to defeat and disarm all the factions’ as aptly captured in the 1997 BASIC Report: The disarmament process did not resume until late 1990 after the ‘all out-war’ policy had failed. Up to this point, a number of cease-fire agreements had been reached between the various factions and ECOMOG. However, fighting continued, due in great part to a fundamental lack of mutual trust as well as the ability of the factions to exploit natural resources including gold and diamonds. As a result, ECOMOG was unable to guarantee nation-wide security, and had insufficient resources to extend its operation to cover all the originally agreed disarmament locations43.

Efforts were intensified to bring peace -to Li beria. Under the auspices of ECOWAS and the UN, two peace agreements were concluded between 1993 and August 1996. At the heart of the 1993 Geneva agreement was the voluntary

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 36 Table 2: Liberia: Disarmament Statistics as at 31 January 1997.

Personnel Weapons Ammunition

Disarmed Estimated Hand Handover Estimated Estimated Faction by for Hand over by by Force for Handover 31/1/97 over 31/1/97 31/1/97

NPFL 12,500 11,553

AFL 7,000 571

ULIMO 6,800 5,622

Others 2,616 1.2 million Total 32,200 20,362 9,570 pieces

Source: BASIC Publication, No. 23, December, 1997

Additionally, ECOMOG force was able to col- During the destruction ceremony, approximately lect 3 783 weapons outside the official disar- 100 ex-combatants, many with war injuries, pro- tested the inaction of the UN and the Taylor govern- mament sites. For example, after the initial ment in aiding ex-combatants, in Monrovia. Liberia voluntary disarmament period, a cache seized has 6 000 registered ex-combatants, many of whom by ECOMOG at the residence of Alhaji Kromah, turned in their weapons in order to receive resettle- leader of the Mandingo-based United Libera- ment money as a part of their reintegration. Howe- ver, many complain that they have in fact received tion Movement of Liberia for Democracy [ULI- nothing. In addition, many ex-combatants were MO—K] faction included an anti-aircraft gun, incensed that billions are being spent on re-buil- two mortars, 660 bombs, 80 grenades, 86 ri- ding Kosovo while Liberians are virtually ignored. fles, and 40 613 rounds of ammunition45. All these factors co-joined to ignite another bloody civil conflict when a rebellion was mounted against The scenario painted above would make one Taylor’s government [Rachel Stohl, 1999: 2] to conclude that the international community had done well in bringing sustainable peace to • Sierra Leone Liberia. Relying on this assertion in its totality The Sierra Leonean civil war that started is misleading. Apparently, while it is true that in March 1991 was widely believed to be an the UN was able to negotiate and convince the offshoot, and the consequences of the Liberian new Liberian president, Mr. Charles Taylor to civil conflict. Led by an Army Corporal, Foday destroy these weapons, it is widely believed Sankoh, the war was estimated to have con- that many weapons were still in the possession sumed more than 75 000 lives, while over 350 of the rebels, while a great number of arms ca- 000 and one million people were internally ches were undiscovered. Furthermore, lack displaced and became refugees in the neigh- of trust and suspicions among war mongers bouring countries respectively [Davies, 2000: hindered disarmament process. This apparen- 350]. The zenith of the civil conflict saw massi- tly explains why the destruction of these we- ve illicit proliferation of SALW among the Repu- apons in August 1999 did virtually nothing to blic of Sierra Leonean Military Forces [RSLMF], secure post-conflict peace building in Liberia. the Revolutionary United Front [RUF], and the Apart from the problems identified above, it military junta of Major Paul Johny Koromah. is argued that Taylor did not fully integrate ex- The international mediation efforts saw the combatants into civil society. In actual fact:

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 37 signing of the November 1996 Abidjan Peace provided a huge amount totaled $41.3 million Accord between the rebel movement and the to the Community Reintegration and Rehabi- government, the failure of which led to the litation Project [CRRP] [Badmus and Ogunmo- signing of the much publicised Lome Peace la, Forthcoming].Another fundamental effort Agreement. Under the Lome Accord, the pro- in this regard is the double programme: (1), the cess of DDR and the establishment of Govern- Economic Recovery Support Fund [ERSF], and ment of National Unity [GoNU] were central. (2), the Training and Employment Programme With this development came the UN Resolu- [TEP]. Both programmes aim at empowering tion 1270 that was fundamental in the UN pea- local communities in the socio-economic re- cekeeping activities in this rather unfortunate alm, and reintegration and rehabilitation of West African country. The resolution led to the the former combatants, providing counseling establishment of a peacekeeping force known and training in skill acquisition. as the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone [UNAMSIL]. The important mission of UNAM- • Guinea Conakry. SIL was to see the parties adhere strictly to the The Guinean experience with SALW prolifera- terms of the Lome Peace Agreement. In line tion dates back to the immediate post-inde- with the Agreement and the spirit of the March pendence period when a national ethnic militia 2000 Bamako Peace Accord under the auspices sprang up. The attempted coup d’etat of No- of ECOWAS, by May 2000, an estimated 12 695 vember 1976 and the eventual military takeo- assorted small arms and 253 535 rounds of am- ver of 1984 further created a security quagmire munition had been collected [Berman, 2000: as SALW with the increased vulnerability of 25]. UNAMSIL peacekeepers also collaborated the Guinean society due to uncontrolled proli- with ECOMOG officers in this endeavour. In feration of weapons. This is because the newly 2001, the Sierra Leonean Police Force with the constituted military government distributed support of the UN through the UNDP launched freely weapons to the pro-regime soldiers to fi- an Arms Collection Programme [ACP] to reco- ght former President Ahmed Sekou Toure’s mi- ver illicit SALW. By May 2002, the Community litia. Despite the fact that Conakry established Arms Collection and Destruction Programme its own NatComs in 2000, its domination by [CACDPA] “had collected over 10 000 weapons. the military and civilians loyal to the military The disarmament and demobilisation of 48 regime dented its credibility and transparency 000 ex-combatants was completed in January and hampered its efficacy as a SALW national 2003, with more than 25 000 weapons and 935 control agency. In the words of Ebo and Mazal 000 rounds of arms” [Ebo and Mazal, 2003]. [2003: 35], “According to the National Commis- The NatCom was established in 2002 to com- sion, some 17 000—18 000 small arms are due plement these efforts despite the fact that it to be publicly destroyed. Guinea has been kno- has not been noticeable. With the Support of wn to receive funding from Canada and USA; the ECOWAS Member States, the World Bank the latter undertake a bilateral project to sup- [the Bank] has also been instrumental in fi- port weapons destruction. Demonstrating po- ghting SALW proliferation in Sierra Leone. The litical will to address the scourge of illicit small Bank established a Trust Fund in support of the arms proliferation, Guinea used its presidency Sierra Leonean Government’s implementation of the UN Security Council to raise and discuss of the DDR Programme to achieve post-war the small arms issue”. sustained peace. It is recorded that the Bank

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 38 • Niger. the Malian example/model. The basic com- At the heart of the West Africa’s Sahel Savan- ponents of the UNDP project are legion. They nah lies Niger Republic, a landlocked country include: (1) Reintegration of ex-combatants, of about 10 million inhabitants. Niger has a which lasted from May 2001 to May 2003; (2) land mass of 1 267 000 Km. and shares bor- a weapon-for-development component kno- ders with Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Benin, Libya, wn as the Small Arms Collection, Destruction and Chad. Economically, the country is poor, and Control; and (3) a Peace, Disarmament and characterised by almost all the negative socio- Education component. This funding for this economic features associated with the Less last component becomes the responsibility of Developed Countries [LDCs]. The socio-eco- the UNDDA. It is interesting to note that, the nomic situations became worst as a result of project planners spent a considerable amount the civil conflict that plagued the country with of time in awareness raising. The campaign nearly 15 rebellious movements contesting also “sought the views of the population on with the government for the control of state the type of developmental projects they nee- apparatus. The Chadian civil war, illicit arms ded. These projects range from the provision of movement from Libya, coupled with illegal water, enhancement in health service delivery, arms trades in northern Nigeria through the improved animal husbandry, education, etc. porous Niger-Nigeria border apparently aided the people were made to rank their felt needs the insurgency as well as SALW proliferation in in order of priority and delivery capacity” [FOS- that country with negative consequences on DA, 2003: 2]. In addendum, the project officers its internal security. In 2003, there were about sought to know the actual number of weapons 4 000 ex-combatants in the country that nee- each community would provide in exchange ded to be reintegrated into civil life. for development projects. The pilot project, Consequent on recognising the destabilising according to Ebo and Mazal, [2003: 38] “only and deleterious effects of SALW and the fact covers about 15% of ex-combatants leaving that tackling the root causes of military insur- around 3 400 ex-combatants in other districts gency in the country requires the need for arms who are not covered by the project. However, destruction, Niger developed a Human Securi- at a meeting in January 2003 the Government ty Approach not only to SALW control but also announced that it intended to develop three to the wider peace and security issues. It is he- more arms-for-development projects, based in artening to learn that Poverty Eradication Pro- Kawar in the Agadez region, Azouak in the nor- gramme became part of the country’s Natio- thwest region, and Tahoua in Timaberi. There nal Conflict Prevention Strategy. Since 2 000 are 3 400 ex-combatants in the districts of Air arms destruction has been the core activity and Azawakwho are not cover by the project”. of the disarmament programme that brought Another important dimension to the success- ‘relative’ peace to the country. Niger embarked ful implementation of the DDR programme in on arms for development project in N’guigmi, Niger is that the country boasts of an effecti- a town in the Difa region that is very close to ve and efficient civil society groups. The NGO, the Niger-Chad border. This is part of the good Femmes et Famille, has been very instrumental governance programme of the UNDP. The pro- in the Niger’s fight against SALW proliferation. ject that started in 2002 is intended to collect The civil society groups are involved in roles an estimated 5 000 SALW in exchange for de- such as educating the rural communities on velopmental project. This apparently followed the primacy of Peace Culture, and training

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 39 their members in knowledge, understanding, • Mali attitudes, and skills of peace building and In June 1990, Mali was plunged into a fratrici- maintenance. The classical example of this is dal war as a result of the insurgency led by a co- the Training of Trainers in Peace Culture orga- alition of Tuareg rebels, known as Mouvements nised by the Lome based UNREC in collabora- et Fronts Unifies de l’Azaouad [MFUA], fighting tion with the Niger’s NGOs in March 2003. In for autonomy with untold human and mate- a nutshell, Niger stands out in this endeavour rial loss to both the Malian authority and the due to the combination of various factors at rebels. The advent of a democratically elected play, viz, strong civil society network, demons- government in Bamako facilitated and even- trated political will and excellent working rela- tually resulted in the signing of a peace accord, tions with the UN agencies and ECOWAS. [See Le Pacte National, with the Tuareg rebels in April Tables 3 and 4 for statistics on the number of 1992. The preference of a pacific solution to the arms destroyed between 2000 and 2003; and rebellion was particularly remarkable with de- sources of weapons in Niger respectively]. mobilisation of combatants and destruction of collected weapons as the accord’s most stri- Table 3: Ceremonial Arms Destruction in Ni- king features. Central to the peace process was ger: 2000—2003 the fundamental place and roles accorded the Ceremonial No. of Arms Year CBOs at the initial confidence-building stage Place Destroyed of the peace dialogue. Though a structure na- Agadez 1,234 2000 med Commissariat du Nord, was established and tasked to oversee the implementations of the Difa 100 2001 agreement, the country started experiencing Agadez 100 2001 increasing negative spiral of weapons prolife- Agadez 100 2002 ration while attempts at post-conflict peace- building and development were deteriorating N’guigmi 103 2003 into a situation of anarchy. Consequently, the Sources: FOSDA, Focus on Small Arms in West Africa, No. President of the country requested the assis- 4, May 2003, p.2. tance of the then United Secretary General to halt the proliferation of small arms in the coun- Table 4: Sources of Weapons in Niger. try. Between 1994 and 1995, two fact finding From the Cold War pipeline into Chad, missions visited Mali and the neighbouring 1 via the porous Chadian-Nigerian bor- countries and ascertained the problems po- der sed by the illicit weapons proliferation to the From the illicit arms markets in nor- 2 thern Nigeria, via the porous Niger-Ni- country’s security and development. Further- geria border more, the missions’ report concluded that the 3 From Libya weapons proliferation in the countries visited

4 From Mali was a function of the developments in other countries in the West African sub-region. Con- 5 Local manufacturers sequently, two main disarmament strategies From Government stocks stolen by Gue- 6 rillas, now recirculating were recommended, viz, Regional approach and ‘Security First’ approach. This first strategy 7 From caravans from and to Algeria. entails the involvement of Mali’s neighbouring Source: FOSDA, Focus on Small Arms in West Africa, No. states while the ‘Security First’ approach sug- 4, May 2003, p.2.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 40 gests that a socio-economic package addres- national armed forces or resettled in the civi- sing wider security issue had to follow the lian realm [see Table 5 for the statistics on the collection and destruction of weapons, if the disarmament programme in Mali]. latter was to succeed [BASIC Report, 1997: 12]. Table 5, Mali: Demobilisation, Weapons Collected and The Report concluded that to meet this objec- Destruction. tive, it would require “a proportional and integrated approach to disarmament and security” Date Description Number known as the ‘Security First’ approach. No. of individual and Col- Following these recommendations, the Uni- March 1996 2,700 lective Light Weapons Col- ted Nations initiated a dual-track integrated lected approach that was to be viewed as central to March 1996 Ammunition Collected Unspecified the peace agreement. The programme cons- ciously integrated disarmament and develop- Total No. of Weapons Des- March 1996 2,700 ment, while also outlining a division of labour. troyed

Whilst the UN Secretariat took steps to enhan- 1 1 , 0 0 0 — April 1996 No. of Rebel Troops 12,000 ce security by tracking light weapons, the No. of Rebel Troops Inte- October 1996 2,090 UNDP, individual governments and non-go- grated into National Army vernmental organisations addressed key un- No. of Rebel Troops Inte- 300 derlying causes of conflict and poverty. These October 1996 grated into Paramilitary Forces included developmental issues—tackling the No. of Rebel Troops Inte- problem of drought, providing portable water, - October 1996 grated into the Civil Ser- restoring the health delivery system and infras- vice tructure. The peace agreement likewise cre- Total Integrated into Go- 2,540 October 1996 ated ‘Transitional District Colleges’ to handle vernment Structures decentralisation questions, which culminated Total Supported in Indivi- in conferring a ‘special autonomous status’ on September 1997 9,435 dual and Collective Civil the northern rebel territories. Le Pacte National Enterprises was based on goodwill and required a volunta- Total No. Demobilised and 11,975. ry approach to the surrender of weapons. September 1997 Integrated Troops. The ‘Security First’ approach actually paid-off in Mali for by 27 March 1996, weapons already Source: BASIC Publication, No. 23, December, 1997, p. 13 collected were destroyed in a bonfire ‘Flame of Peace’ ceremony in Timbuktu while a peace monument was created with the remains of the melted weapons. With the destruction The Malian peace process and ‘successful’ di- of these weapons, the Mali experience was sarmament programme underscored the pri- described as a success story while it also sho- macy of the symbiotic relationship existing wed the political courage on the parties to the between and among the CBOs, national, re- conflict. Furthermore, the effort saw 3 000 gional, and international efforts in achieving rebels completely disarmed [Poulton and ag a sustainable post-conflict peace-building. Youssouf, 1998] and above all, by September It demonstrates the fact that one single ap- 1997 close to 12 000 combatants in the rebel proach seldom brings easy solution to a very movements had either been absorbed into the complex and difficult problem such as the is-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 41 sue of SALW proliferation. Thus, an inclusive Nevertheless these mixed records of interven- approach to conflict resolution has proved in tion, it is apparent that the organisation is Mali as the surest way to achieving post-con- confronted with challenges that are multifa- flict peace building. In the Malian case, CSOs, ceted in nature. CBOs, especially people at the grassroot were First, due to the underdeveloped nature of recognised and able to play a confidence-buil- the West African economies, countries of the ding role. Furthermore, the involvement of sub-region lack economic wherewithal that, the neighbouring states, especially Burkina apparently, threatening the Community’s abi- Faso, Algeria, Niger and Mauritania in the pe- lity to perform creditably in the area of peace ace process helped in no small ways in halting and security. ECOWAS’ annual budget is no- the flow of new SALW into Mali. The financial thing to write home about in the face of the rewards to the combatants apparently aided organisation’s grandiose plan to, especially, in tackling the root cause of the conflict itself implement its new Mechanism on Conflict and above all, the eventual destruction of the Prevention. Muster enough funds for peace weapons. operation is, oftentimes, problematic as the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone proved. ECOWAS AND THE CHALLEGES OF In the case of Liberia, a Special Emergency REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY Fund of $50 million was endowed by the SMC ……………the difficulties facing an African regio- to which the ECOWAS Member States were re- nal organisation mandating a peace enforcement quested to voluntarily contribute, while it also operation seem more apparent in a region [West appealed to the international community for Africa in this case] that does not have the necessary physical and political infrastructures or financial support. This is surprising because, as said ear- and political infrastructures or financial capacity lier, these countries are poor and going by the to develop security structures for conducting peace opposing political positions demonstrated by operation………….[Ero, 1999: 65] Member States during the Liberian imbroglio, such voluntary contributions failed to mate- If nothing else, the epigraph above clearly tells rialise. The difficulties encounter by ECOWAS us the monumental problems and structural in securing adequate resources for implemen- limitations confronting ECOWAS on matters ting its programmes on conflict prevention relating to peace and security. The ECOWAS/ and resolutions are enormous. Unfortunately, ECOMOG’s responses to the sub-regional the grandiose programmes under the 1999 Pro- conflicts had, at best, been described- asin tocol Relating to Conflict Prevention cannot consistent and imperfect as clearly witnes- be implemented in the absence of assistance sed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Despite these from the international community. The Com- condemnations, ECOMOG was able to record munity levy that imposes 0.5% tax on all ECO- some success in Liberia. This is because: WAS imports has not assessed any ECOWAS Throughout most of the conflict, ECOMOG maintai- Member State for any contribution [ECOWAS, ned a semblance of order in Monrovia and reduced 46 the widespread massacre and mass starvation in 2005] . It is discouraging that most of the parts of Liberia. Indeed, the phrase, ‘Thank God for funds available to ECOWAS for its peace and ECOMOG’, used by the civilian population, was tes- security activities are from the development timony to the efforts by ECOMOG to limit the scale partners. In 2004 for instance, it is reported of the humanitarian tragedy affecting Liberia [Ero, 1999: 72]. that $5 million available to ECOWAS for conflict prevention and resolution were unused

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 42 funds by the UN’s Mission in Liberia [ECOWAS, tres. More recently, the US Agency for Interna- 2005; Dorina, Kapinga-Yvette and Marilyn, tional Development [USAID] allocated $400 2004]. Furthermore, though there is growing 000 to assist ECOWAS in implementing an financial contributions from the development early warning system, strengthen links with partners to ECOWAS’ activities in recent years, civil society, and increase its capacity as a me- but this can be counterproductive if care is not diator in the sub-region’s conflicts” [Dorina, taking. This is because relying too much on ex- Kapinga-Yvette and Marilyn, 2004: 18]. With ternal funding can jeopardise ECOWAS’ activi- this development, the Executive Secretariat is ties by not been able to act independently in now expanding its internal management capa- taking decisions on crucial issues. The overall bilities and surging forward in the implemen- implication of this has been well captured by tation of the 1999 Protocol. Importantly, capa- the former Executive Secretary of the organi- city building is taking place in all departments sation, Ambassador Lansana kouyate that, “if of the Executive Secretariat including finance, we depend 100% on donors, all the good ide- Human Resources, Administration, and other as mentioned may never be realised” [cited in functional area. Concerted efforts are being Berman and Sams, 2000: 146]. In a nutshell, undertaken to address the root causes of con- the inadequacy of funds has, on many occa- flict in the sub-region by strengthening all the sions, hindered ECOWAS’ activities on matters instruments of the Mechanism. Additionally, relating to peace and security. four directors were recently employed for the Another problem of ECOWAS is that, the or- departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian ganisation is under-staffed. The workload at Affairs, Defense/Security and Early Warning as the ECOWAS headquarters is far above what envisioned in the 1999 Mechanism. This will the present staff strength can handle. Given definitely ease the workload of the Deputy the scant resources at their disposal and their Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defen- number, there is, undoubtedly, limit to what se and Security. they can achieve. This scenario is impacting Despite ECOWAS towering figure in peaceke- negatively on the ability of the ECOWAS Secre- eping activities in the West African civil wars, tariat to assume the responsibilities envisa- it has not been involved more actively in the ged for it in the field of security. For instance, development and reconstruction of post-con- the Community Security Mechanism adopted flict societies. Though the organisation has in 1999 established the regional observation not been completely lacking in this area, but centres to report evidence of early warning the issue is that since the organisation’s origi- of conflict47. Apart from the logistic problems nal mandate is to address the socio-economic confronting the centers, their staff strength is issues of West Africa, one would have expected scanty [International Peace Academy and ECO- ECOWAS to face the issues of reconstruction, WAS, 2002]. Though efforts have now been ge- reintegration, and rehabilitation [3Rs] square- ared towards strengthening the efficiency and ly without leaving these tasks for the interna- effectiveness of these centres through increase tional community. Truly, peace-building and the staff strength. In 2002 for instance, “with development projects remain difficult to im- $5.3 million in assistance from the European plement for ECOWAS because of the underde- Union [EU] and the US, ECOWAS developed a veloped nature of the West African economies, communications network to link stations in pervasive poverty, etc all slowing the consoli- Member States with the four observation cen- dation of peace.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 43 Turning to the issue of SALW proliferation as the citizens. Capacity to implement cardinal it impedes efforts to consolidate peace in the aspects of the Moratorium remains generally sub-region, it is unfortunate that despite pro- weak……the region does not have the necessa- mises of the 1998 Moratorium, PCASED was ry staff working on SALW issue daily. ECOWAS, unable to ‘completely’ halt arms proliferation. PCASED (then), and the National Commissions As discussed earlier, the Moratorium is a ‘con- do not have visible and viable resource mobi- fidence-building mechanism’ which is not lisation strategies. In many member states binding and above all, lack regime of sanction. where National Commissions exist, there is no Though PCASED has now been replaced with National Plan of Action on which resource mo- ECOSAP, it is too early to comment on its per- bilisation strategies would be predicated” [Ebo formance. But the bitter truth is that, as with and Mazal, 2003: 40]. We hope that with the PCASED, ECOSAP is going to face similar finan- newly adopted ECOWAS Convention on Small cial crisis. This is because ECOSAP is a project Arms, this problem will be rectified, especially estimated to cost $33 million to implement the with the increased roles accorded the CSOs. newly adopted ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, up till date only $4 million has been mo- bilised. This is delaying ECOSAP to be fully established and staffed. For instance, the newly recruited ECOSAP Director, Mr. Jonathan San- dy has not moved to ECOSAP office in Bamako, rather he is still in Abuja, Nigeria48. Also, there is the crisis of political will among the leadership of the sub-region. Apparently there is a wide gap between their declara- tions/statements and actions. Oftentimes, the ECOWAS leaders do not honour their promises and pledges on matters relating to peace and security. For example on the issue of arms proliferation, various West African governments have issued statements identifying with the objectives of the control instruments, but their actions have the effects of sabotaging the Moratorium. Aggravating this unfortunate development is the impacts of colonialism where states, especially, Francophone members do always buy French positions on matters concerning West Africa’s security. This is the situation of ANAD versus ECOWAS. Also, there apparently general lack of knowledge about the arms control instrument among the public. For instance, it would be “fair to conclude that the Moratorium, so far, belongs to the governments of West Africa, rather than

I want to conclude this paper with a few and se sub-regional rivalries have, on many occa- very brief points. First, following from the fo- sions, threatened to jeopardise ECOWAS’ po- regoing analysis, it is apparent that ECOWAS tentials. Of the 16 ECOWAS member states49, could transcend its present multiple challen- five are Anglophone, nine are Francophone ges and determine its own solutions to its and two are Lusophone. Nigeria that accounts own problems only by ‘genuinely’ integrating for over two-third of the sub-region’s popula- its economic, natural and human resources. tion and its economic hub is, undoubtedly, the Though, the sub-regional institution, in the hegemonic power of ECOWAS, while Ghana last one decade, has performed ‘fairly’ well in also strive for leadership position. Among the the spheres of peace and conflict, and good Francophone, both Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire governance and democratisation, but more are at the forefront and always suspicious of of these efforts are still needed to place the or- Nigeria’s intentions. As shown in our discus- ganisation in the credible place as envisaged sions of the protracted civil conflict in Liberia, by its founders. Undoubtedly, ECOWAS needs both Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso frustra- strong commitments and political will of mem- ted Nigeria’s efforts by being antagonistic to ber states to speed up the implementation the idea of ECOMOG. Furthermore, the rival of its diverse programmes and protocols. The organisations such as ANAD are part of the political will to move beyond the nation-state effects of this balkanisation. This unnecessary is, indeed, imperatively needed and an impor- competition and distrust between this divide tant perquisite to attain some minimal degree must be systematically removed, if a new lease of regional cooperation. This points to the fact of life was to be given to ECOWAS for its maxi- that a more serious political will is desired to mum performance most especially, in the area achieve integration and the genuine sub-re- of peace and security. gional unity. Indeed, strong political will on Third, obviously, human security of citizens the part of the West African leadership requi- and States’ security are threatened by non- red the rejection of extra-African interference State actors as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote in the ECOWAS countries’ internal affairs. This d’Ivoire, Senegal, Nigeria, etc. Armed insur- is because such interference, always, seek to gent groups have equally challenged and ero- maintain political, economic, military, as well ded States’ capacities to perform the constitu- as cultural dominance over former colonies, tional duties of protecting and defending their are antithetical to ECOWAS progress. citizens as well as maintaining law and order. Second, West Africa must strive to move These negatives scenarios, coupled with the beyond the current balkanisation of the sub- presence of bad governance practice in some of region into Francophone and Anglophone the ECOWAS Member State, have constituted divide spurred by colonialism. This situation a security nightmare of the West African sub- has, undoubtedly, engendered fragmented region [Addo, 2005: 65]. It is widely believed by politics among the West African leaders. The- security analysts and researchers that the situ-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 45 ation is spurred by the clear absence of credi- erratic and not well-defined. The Mechanism ble peace enforcement options as was the case has perfectly rectified the lacunas by -esta during the pre-Mechanism ECOWAS peace blishing a formal structure of intervention and making processes. To surmount the problem, procedures to follow in such intervention. there is the need for expediting actions on the While this is a positive development, Prosper process of security sector reform [SSR], both at Addo [2005: 65-66] noted that, “the ECOWAS national and sub-national levels. Such reform Conflict Mechanism is still in its infant stages, must focus on appropriate oversight functions and yet to be fully operationalised. This factor and above all, security agencies must be better should be considered in brokering over-ambi- equipped. Additionally, it is imperative that tious framework-substantive and unrealistic the ECOWAS Member States increase their implementation agreements in peace-making budget expenditure to “adequately resource process”. Apparently, a sense of realism is abso- the security sector towards providing credible lutely needed with regards to what ECOWAS security, rather than holding on to minimalist- can and cannot accomplish. state principles and concepts to the detriment Sixth, the impacts of SALW proliferation on the of peace and security” [Addo, 2005: 65; also see West African security landscape have been well Malan, 2005]. Also, continued Addo, “in line analysed in this study. There is no doubt that with its coercive diplomacy efforts, ECOWAS arms proliferation has bent the sub-region on should ensure that a well-resourced, robust its knees. Despite the promises of the Morato- and credible ECOWAS Standby Force [ESF] rium [during its lifetime], there is presently a could launch and sustain enforcement opera- clear cut gap between arms proliferation and tions as an option of last resort” [Ibid]. human security largely defined as human well- Fourth, to prevent conflict in West Africa and being. SALW proliferation is hampering socio- guarantee security, there is the need to deepen economic developments of the sub-region and the culture of good governance. This calls for deepening, on daily basis, a “culture of violen- the intensification of the African Peer Review ce”. Consequently, there is the need for deter- Mechanism [APRM] process of the New Part- mined efforts on the part of the West African nership for African Development [NEPAD]. The leadership to address the problem of poverty. APRM is a process serve to improve the image This can only be made possible by linking di- of Africa. The peer reviewed process by States sarmament to effective measures to tackle the or even a shadow review by civil society orga- socio-economic causes of demand. Anything nisations will definitely go a long way in expo- short of this is meaningless. Although, most sing and shaming regimes that are promoting of the multilateral institutions’ control efforts or sponsoring instabilities in Africa as a whole are premised on the strategy of security and [Adedeji, 2002: 42]50. development. But the problem is that most of Fifth, going by the present situation in the these efforts are gear towards providing suc- West African sub-region, the gradual imple- cor and quick impact micro projects designed mentation of the ECOWAS Mechanism has to alleviate immediate human suffering. For ‘relatively enhanced’ its security situation disarmament programmes to yield sustai- compared to the pre-Mechanism period. This nable peace and development, policy efforts is because the Pre-Mechanism ECOWAS in- must focus on sustainable security. Long term terventions in conflict situations and peace- developmental projects that will enhance so- making process were highly ad hoc in nature, cio-economic conditions of the people are call

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 46 for. This is premised on the belief that when also include technical support in articulating people are economically secured, the rate of a Civil Society Regional Action Plan [Ebo and crimes and banditry will be greatly reduced. Mazal, 2003: 42] Seventh, the foregoing calls for serious com- Tenth, it becomes necessary for ECOWAS to mitments to disarmament, demobilisation, intensify its efforts in the area of capacity reintegration and rehabilitation [DDR]. This is building. This is essential for the success of fundamental because by retraining and inte- the newly adopted Small Arms Convention. In grating the demobilised combatants into civil recent years, ECOWAS has embarked on this life and addressing their needs, there is high venture, especially in all the functional areas tendency for the ex-combatants to feel sense at its headquarters. The fact still remains that of belonging. In post-conflict environments, the institution’s focus should be on initiating ECOWAS needs to place particular attention and strengthening regional training program- to DDR by mobilising resources both within mes for the security agents such as the Police, the sub-region and from the development customs, immigration officials to meet their partners to address the special needs of the needs. This should be complemented with the demobilised soldiers in terms of their health adequate provision of the necessary as well as and medical care, education, counseling, and the state-of-the arts tools to make them effi- vocational trainings. cient in the performance of their duties. Eighth, the international community must Eleventh, it well noted that the West African ensure that the newly adopted ECOWAS Small States lack economic wherewithal. Notwiths- Arms Convention is respected. Though, ECO- tanding, they should be more committed to WAS has done fairly well in combating we- honour their pledges. Member States should apons proliferation but there is a persistent not starve ECOWAS so as to realise the pro- and urgent need for a ‘frank’ dialogue betwe- mises of the Convention. In the same manner, en the sub-regional institution and the Was- it is apparent that the success of the control senaar Arrangement on how the Wassenaar instrument in combating weapons prolifera- countries can help contribute ‘genuinely’ to tion also lies with the CSOs, ECOWAS should the implementation of the Convention. The make sure that these organisations do not Arrangement can play an important role in lack funds to continue their sustained advo- this connection via national legislative and cacy campaign to raise awareness among the political measures. In this respect, all weapons public about the Small Arms Conventions and producing countries must inform arms manu- other African and global instruments. Finally, facturers about the West African Convention ECOWAS needs to cooperate more with civil so- and put in place the appropriate national re- ciety organisations. CSOs are of immense help gulations. in both the promotion of the culture of peace Ninth, although the potency of the civil socie- and in keeping pressure on all actors involved ty has been noticed recently, there is the need in weapons proliferation to follow through on for close relationship between and among the their commitments, be they ECOWAS Member CSOs, WAANSA [as an umbrella organisation] States, intergovernmental organisations, such and ECOWAS. Funds should be made available as the UN and the AU, the weapons suppliers to WAANSA so as to intensify its efforts in coor- [Wassenaar countries in this case], or financial dinating and service civil society involvement donor countries. in combating SALW proliferation. This should

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* Isiaka Alani Badmus is presently an Independent A specialist in Regional Security Studies, and Democracy

Researcher based in Lagos, Nigeria (Email: isiakabad@ and Good Governance, Mr. Badmus has over seven excite.com; [email protected]). He was years’ experience in the fields of research, training, and previously a Researcher at the Centre for Social Science administration. He has strong leadership and management

Research and Development [CSSR&D], Lagos, Nigeria, and experience having co-managed a project on Understanding

Senior Programme Officer, Educational Services Consult and Promoting Positive Leadership in Nigeria. A nationwide study

[now Lead City University] Ibadan, Nigeria. His educational supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, New York, background includes a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree USA, and monitored by its West Africa Office, Lagos, Nigeria, in International Relations from the Obafemi Awolowo between March 2002 and March 2006, etc

University, Ile Ife, Nigeria; and a Bachelor’s degree in Law He is the author of numerous publications in major

[LL.B (Hons.)] from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He also peer-referred journals such as: Africa Insight [Pretoria] hold a Diploma in French Language and Civilisation; Post- South Africa; Contexto Internacional [Rio de Janeiro], Brazil;

Graduate Diploma in Democracy and Diversity; and Diploma Afrique et Developpement/Africa Development [CODESRIA] in Peace and Conflict Research fromUniversite de Cocody— Dakar, Senegal; Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of

Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; New School University [TCDS], New Peace Studies,[Manitoba], Canada; Journal of Social Sciences:

York, USA; and Uppsala University, Sweden respectively. Interdisciplinary Reflection of Contemporary Society[New Delhi],

Mr. Badmus has previously held visiting scholar/student India; The Anthropologist: International Journal of Contemporary positions at the Department of Peace and Conflict and Applied Studies of Man [New Delhi]; Development and Socio-

Research, Uppsala University, Sweden [2000]; Fellow of Economic Progress, [Cairo], Egypt; Law and Politics in Africa, Asia, the Transregional Centre for Democratic Studies, New and Latin America [Verfassung Und Recht In Ubersee] [Hamburg],

School University, New York, USA/ Democracy and Diversity Germany; Ufahamu [Professor J.S. Coleman African Studies

Graduate Institute, Cape Town, South Africa [2002]; Uppsala Center, University of California at Los Angeles], USA; etc. His

University/ Swedish Government Scholar to the United forthcoming major study is titled: “Nigeria Defence Policy

Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland [2000]. In addition, and National Security: A Forty Year Appraisal”. His other he won the prestigious Swiss Government [Pro-Helvetia] major book projects are tentatively titled: [1] “Putting Guns scholarship for the 13th Session of the European Summer in Their Place: ECOWAS/Civil Society Organisations Partnership in

University (Euroregion 2001), Institute of Federalism, Securing West Africa”; and [2] “ECOWAS and Conflict Management

University of Fribourg, Switzerland (Not utilized) and has in West Africa”. A polyglot International Relations specialist, attended various noted professional training programmes, Mr. Badmus speaks English and French fluently and passable seminars and conferences in Africa and beyond. Mr. Badmus’ Spanish and Portuguese. current research interests include, but not limited to,

Security Studies/Military Science; Peacekeeping; Conflict 1. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat became a Commission effective from

Prevention; Post-Conflict Peace Building; Civil War Theory/ 1 January 2007 with a President, Vice President, and seven Commissioners

Duration and Termination; Ethnicity and Conflicts in Africa; covering more focused and manageable sectoral areas.

Conflicts in Africa and Post-Conflict Transitions in African 2. The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation

States; International Law of War and Peace [Laws of Armed and Manufacture of SALW, henceforth refer to as ‘the

Conflict]; Disarmament and Arms Control, Humanitarian ECOWAS Moratorium’ or ‘the West African Moratorium’.

Affairs/Complex Humanitarian Emergencies [CHE]; 3. There are currently 639 million SALW circulating globally

Governance, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa; of which about 10 million are in West Africa, see Small Arms and Afro-Asia Relations. Survey, 2001, chapter 2, p. 63.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 51 4. The fifteen signatories to the Treaty of Lagos are: Cote openly that, “this is our first year of independence” was d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, Dahomey [now short-lived as Doe’s administration became tyrannical. For

Benin], Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, details see, Liebenow, 1987

Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, the Gambia and Upper Volta 19. Examples of Doe wickedness abound: He executed 13

[now Burkina Faso]. Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1977. members of Tolbert’s cabinet including, of course, President

The organisation is now comprised of 15 countries with William Tolbert he overthrew and also eliminated all the the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Community in original coupists that brought him to power including

December 2000. Thomas Quiwonkpa. Additionally, ethnicisation of politics

5. Article 2, Treaty of the Economic Community of West became upswellings with the killings of Gio and Mano

African States, 28 May 1975, reprinted in International Legal ethnic groups because Doe thought they were against his

Materials, vol. 14, 1975, p. 1200 government, while his own Krahn ethnic group occupied

6. Also see Badmus, 2006. key positions in government and the military.

7. Interview with Yakubu Gowon, Daily Times [Lagos], 27 July 20. Taylor invaded Liberia with an initial group of less than

1992 cited in Adibe, 1994, p. 102. See Berman and Sams, 2000, 100 men, most of whom were remnants of Brigadier p.80 Quiwonkpa’s supporters who fled to Cote d’Ivoire when

8. A/SP3/5/81 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on their leader was killed. Taylor’s insurgency marked the

Defence, done at Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981 in beginning of the journey of self destruction for Liberia. See

: Nigeria’s Treaties in Force 1970-1990. vol. 4. Lagos: Federal Sesay, 1995

Ministry of Justice, 1990. It entered in force in 1986. 21. Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia [AFL] at this time were

9. ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 22 April 1978, already battered and disarrayed, and the President became a

ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja. refugee in the Executive Mansion.

10. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence [MAD], 22. See ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision

A/SP3/5/81, Chapter 11 Art. 4[b]. A/DEC.1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and the establishment of

11. Ibid., Article 13. ECOMOG for Liberia, Banjul 7 August 1990.

12. Ibid., Article 14 23. What is sure is that Doe wrote the Chairman and Member

13. Ibid, Articles 7-10 of the SMC instead of the ECOWAS Heads of State and

14. Ibid, Article 11 Government in July 1990 requested for the deployment of

15. Ibid, Article 12. peacekeeping force. Though Doe’s deputy Harry Moniba

16. See Aning, 1999 and Adisa, 1993. insisted that President Doe did write the ECOWAS

17. This study is not interested in discussing the origin Chairman, see James Butty “Interview with Harry Moniba”, and dynamics of the war. Rather, it looks at the politics West Africa, 25 February—1 March 1992. Furthermore, the surrounding the establishment of the ECOWAS’ situation was more complicated by the fact that at this

Interventionist Force in Liberia and its divisive effects on the point was Doe actually regarded as the legitimate President regional security, especially from the Francophone States. of Liberia?. Also see Adisa, 1992, p. 216-217; Ofuatey—Kodjoe,

We try to unravel the weaknesses of ECOWAS in instituting 1994. the appropriate collective security mechanism as envisaged 24. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence [MAD], by the 1981 Defence Protocol. A/SP3/5/81

18. The Coup d’etat of 12 April 1980 was highly welcome by the 25. Led by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, these states were indigenous Liberians as it was regarded as the opportunity mainly Francophone members to liberate them from more than a century domination 26. For interesting discussions on the civil war in Sierra and subjugation by the American-Liberians. This coup Leone see, Ero, 1999; Richards, 1996. For analysis on private was, according to George Klay Kieh, “another juncture military companies in Sierra Leone, see Francis, Deng, 1999 critical in Liberia’s political history: it provided an excellent 27. Article 58.2(f) opportunity to transform the country’s age-old neo-colonial 28. “Draft ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, political economy and its vagaries”, see Kieh, 1989. The Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security”, joyous mood of the indigenous Liberians by declaring meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs,

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 52 and Security, Banjul 23-24 July 1998, p. 4, para. 17, cited in Small Arms”, 1997.

Berman and Sams, 2000. 42. The Article urged all factions to surrender their weapons

29. Article 25 of the Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS to the West African peacekeeping force, and refrain from

Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, importing or acquiring all types of arms and ammunition.

Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. 43. See BASIC Publication, No. 23, December 1997.

30. See Berman and Sams, 2000, p. 141-42 44. Mr. Taylor wanted to keep these weapons for the

31. Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict country’s Armed Forces because according to him, Liberia

Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping was too poor to buy new weapons for security purpose. and Security, p. 6, paras 21-23. 45. Other actors were: a Krahn-based ULIMO—J led by

32. Ibid., p. 7, paras 24-27. Roosevelt Johnson; another Krahn-based group, the Liberia

33. bid., pp. 7-8, para. 28. Peace Council [LPC] led by George Boley.

34. It is sad that the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 46. The levy that was adopted in 1996 fully entered into force for Political Affairs despite its centrality in the 1993 Revised in July 2003, see Council of the European Union, “Sixth

ECOWAS Treaty was never established. The office of the ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting Communiqué

Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and 47. Article 23-24 of the Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS

Security [DES/PADS] was just created in 2001 in order to Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and create the capacity to cope with its new peace and security Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. work. 48. See www.malikounda.com. Accessed 15 February, 2007

35. Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict 49. See note no. 4 above

Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping 50. For interesting discussions on NEPAD and Africa’s and Security, pp. 8-9, para. 31. economic development, see Anyang Nyong’o Peter,

36. The composition of the zone is as follow: Zone 1 [The Ghirmazion Aseghedech, and Lamba, Davinder [eds.], 2002.

Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, and Cape

Verde]; Zone 2 [Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger];

Zone 3 [Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone]; Zone 4

[Benin, Nigeria, and Togo].

37. It should be noted that SALW by themselves rarely cause wars in which they are being used, but their easy availability always contribute towards increasing the tempo of, and prolonging these conflicts.

38. Literature is rich on the background and overview of the

ECOWAS Moratorium and other SALW control initiatives in

West Africa. See Ebo and Mazal, 2003.

39. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for

Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is an informal group of 33 arms exporting States: Argentina,

Greece, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Japan, Germany, Czech

Republic, France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Australia,

Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey,

South Korea, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States,

Portugal, Russian Federation, Romania, Sweden, Spain,

Slovakia, Switzerland, Norway, Poland, Denmark, and

Luxembourg.

40. See Consultation communiqué, Dakar, Senegal, 27

January 2003.

41. See “Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 54 Appendix I curity and of Minister of Foreign Affairs held in ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Ex- Banjul on 23 and 24 July 1998, and in Abuja on 26 portation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, to 29 October 1998 respectively, endorsed by us 31 October, 1998. in Abuja on 31 October, 1998; WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CONSIDERING the unqualified approval de- OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST monstrated by Member States of the Wasse- AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS); naar Arrangement and on other arms manu- CONSIDERING the principles and objectives facturers for a moratorium on Light Weapons embodied in the revised ECOWAS Treaty, the in West Africa; Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, HEREBY SOLEMLY DECLEARE A MORATORIUM and the United Nations Charter; ON THE IMPORTATION, EXPORTATION AND CONSIDERING the fact that the proliferation MANUFACTURE OF LIGHT WEAPONS IN ECO- of light weapons constitutes a destabilising WAS MEMBER STATES WHICH SHALL TAKE factor ECOWAS Member States and a threat to EFFECT FROM the peace and security for our people; THE FIRST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1998 FOR A RE- CONSIDERING the resolutions of the United NEWABLE PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS. Nations conference on conflict prevention, di- DIRECT the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, in sarmament and development held in Bamako collaboration with the United Nations system in November 1996; to convene a meeting of Ministers of Foreign CONSIDERING the directives of the fourth ex- Affairs and of expert to launch the operational traordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority framework for the associated measures of the of Heads of State and Government which took moratorium under the Programme for Coordi- place in Lome, on 17 December, 1997, relating nation and Assistance for Security and Develo- to the establishment of a sub-regional mecha- pment (PCASED); nism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security; SEEKING TO ENSURE the success of the mora- CONSIDERING the recommendations of the torium; meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign HEREBY SOLICIT the assistance of the Organi- Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs and Security zation of African Unity, the United Nations and held in Yamoussoukro on 11 and 12 March 1998; the international community in implementing CONSIDERING the reaffirmation of the - com the Programme for Coordination and Assistan- mitment made by the ECOWAS member sta- ce for Security and Development (PCASED); tes at the Oslo Conference held on 1 and 2 April Direct the Executive Secretary, in collabora- 1998, and the declared support of the interna- tion with PCASED to convene a meeting of tional community for the proposal to place a Ministers of Foreign Affairs to assess and eva- moratorium on light weapons in West Africa; luate the moratorium at the end of the initial CONSIDERING the repeated encouragement of three-year period. the United Nations for disarmament in West IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE Africa as stipulated in the relevant Resolution AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COM- of the 50th, 51st and 52nd Sessions of the Gene- MUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIG- ral Assembly; NED THIS DECLARATION. CONSIDERING the outcomes of the meetings DONE AT ABUJA, THIS 3IST DAY OF OCTOBER, of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Se- 1998 IN SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH AND

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 55 FRENCH LANGUAGES BOTH BEIGN EQUALLY Appendix II AUTHENTIC. Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance Signed by: for Security and Development (PCASED) H.E. Mathieu Kerekou--- President of the Re- public of Benin. INTRODUCTION Hon. Ablasse Ouedraogo--- Minister of Foreign The uncontrolled accumulation and prolifera- Affairs for and on behalf of the President of tion of small arms is a major threat to sub-re- Burkina Faso. gional security. Apart from causing destruction Hon. Carlos Alberto Wahanon de Carvalho Vei- of lives and serious human rights violations, ga—Prime Minister of the Republic of Carbo the phenomenon undermines development Verde. efforts. The diffusion of light weapons also H.E. Henri Konan Bedie—President of the Re- fuels conflicts in Africa, engendering increased public of Cote d’Ivoire. criminality and banditry, and the emergence H.E. Col. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh—President of the of the child-soldier. Republic of Gambia. To curb small arms proliferation, the Member H.E. (Rtd.) Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings—Presi- States of the Economic Community of West dent of the Republic of Ghana African States (ECOWAS) declared on 1 Novem- H.E. General Lansana Conte—President of the ber 1998 a moratorium on the import, export Republic of Guinea and manufacture of light weapons in their re- H.E. Joao Bernardo Vieira – President of the Re- gion. The moratorium covers an initial period public of Guinea Bissau of three years which may be extended. The pro- H.E. Charles Taylor—President of the Republic gramme for Coordination and Assistance for of Liberia Security and Development (PCASED) has been H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare—President of the put in place as a support to the moratorium. Republic of Mali S.E. Mohamed A. Ould Moine—Ambassador OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITY AREAS OF PCASED for and on behalf of the President of the Islamic PCASED has been conceived as a programme Republic of Mauritania. which aims to build peace in support of acti- H.E. Ibrahim Mainassare Bare—President of vities that will promote a secure and stable cli- the Republic of Niger. mate for socioeconomic development. H.E. General Abdulsalami Abubakar—Head of In the execution of its activities, PCASED will State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed For- seek the active collaboration of inter-govern- ces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. mental organisations, and civil society organi- H.E. Abdou Diouf—President of the Republic of sations, in particular women’s organisations. Senegal In the exercise of its functions, PCASED will be- H.E. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah---President of nefit from the guidance and technical support the Republic of Sierra Leone of an advisory group consisting of recognised H.E. Gnassingbe Eyadema —President of the regional and other international experts ser- Togolese Republic ving in their personal capacity. Over an initial five-year period, PCASED will support a series of activities in priorities areas such as:

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 56 Priority Areas gh seminars and workshops focusing on the • Establishing a culture of peace issues of light weapons and sustainable deve- • Training programmes for military, security lopment so as to enhance policy making and and police forces public awareness of the challenges involved; • Enhancing weapons controls at border posts • Develop youth initiatives on the problems • Establishment of a database and regional of small arms and the potential hazards of the arms register child soldier; • Collection and destruction of surplus and • Conduct seminars on civil-military relations unauthorised weapons that would focus on the military’s role in an • Facilitating dialogue with producer sup- emerging democratic political culture. pliers • Review and harmonisation of national legis- It will be necessary to develop formal and in- lation and administrative formal education programmes in respect of • procedures these activities. • Mobilising resources for PCASED objectives The formal approach will include devising and and activities teaching appropriate peace education curricu- • Enlarging membership of the Moratorium la in secondary and higher education institutions; and organisation workshops, roundta- I. ESTABLISHING A CULTURE OF PEACE ble discussions and training programmes for If sustainable peace is to be achieved in the students, policy makers and the citizenry. sub-region, appropriate programmes must be The non-formal approaches include sensitisa- put in place to counter the growing culture of tion campaigns using the media and electro- violence– which is buttressed by the prolife- nic means, sponsoring intra-Community rela- ration of light weapons. In this connection, tions. Member States, ECOWAS Executive Secreta- To successfully carry out these activities, riat, PCASED, the United Nations Regional Member States, the ECOWAS Executive Se- Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, cretariat, PCASED, and the United Nations with assistance from their multilateral and bi- Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament lateral partners, will endeavour to: in Africa will seek the active collaboration of • Forge a peace culture in the region through intergovernmental Organisation, UNESCO, community education programmes and advo- civil society organisations, and women’s orga- cacy campaigns whereby local constituencies nisations. would acquire knowledge about, and develop The programme should be commenced as soon the requisite norms against, the possession as possible, given the length of time it will take and accumulation of this class of weapons; a true culture of peace to gain a foothold. • Assist in developing appropriate peace education material for pertinent segments of so- II. TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR MILITARY, ciety such as students, law and order forces, SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES and ordinary citizenry so that a critical mass Effective light weapons control requires of public awareness can be developed on the strengthening the present structure and im- direct and indirect consequences of the accu- proving the capacity of the military, security mulation, proliferation and use of small arms; and police forces through training and impro- • Assist in capacity building for peace throu- ved access to modern arms control methods.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 57 PCASED, in partnership with the ECOWAS Exe- sist Member States in: cutive Secretariat and with assistance from • Controlling frontiers so that the diffusion the relevant partners will assist in: problem, particularly illicit flows (smuggling), • Training military, security and police forces might be stemmed; in modern techniques of effective control of • Enhancing and/or developing an effective ca- arms and ammunition as well as enforcement pacity to “police “arms transfers and flows; of pertinent laws; • Developing a system for detecting and ap- • Developing joint training programmes for prehending illicit trans-border flows; military, security and police forces as well as • Putting in place an effective legal and regu- border guards; latory regime at identifiable points of entry or • Training national trainers on the small arms exit for light weapons; proliferation question. • Conducting relevant studies on borders and related political and security To this end, the Executive Secretariat, PCASED issues (in particular, light weapons)in the re- and the United Nations Regional Centre for gion to understand the nature and gravity of Peace and Disarmament in Africa will develop the diffusion problem, and weapons flow rou- a curriculum that will include: tes so that relevant policy prescriptions may I. General information on the diffusion pro- be formulated; blem including legal and human rights issues; • Organising training sessions for border-cus- II. Modern techniques of maintenance of law toms officials on such issues as: monitoring and order; methods of collecting small arms, end-user certificates, complying with arms dealing with drug trafficking and cross-border embargo and sharing information; and the use crimes, effective ways of maintaining national of various border control technology; weapons arsenals; demobilisation, disarma- • Seeking donor country assistance in provi- ment and reintegration of combatants into ding up-to-date technology to assist border civil society etc.; control efforts. III. Seek financial and technical assistance from partners. PCASED will seek assistance from inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations Training of military, security and police forces with proven expertise in this domain, and whi- should be a continuous activity and should ch have traditionally cooperated in the identi- commence within the shortest possible time. fication of groups and individuals engaged in illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition. III. ENHANCING WEAPONS CONTROLS AT Activities which target improved arms con- BORDER POSTS trols at borders will commence as soon as pos- Light weapons are easy to conceal and this sible and will continue for the entire length of fact, coupled with the prevalence of porous the project. borders and inadequate government control, works to frustrate IV. ESTABLISHING A REGIONAL LIGHT WEA- arms control efforts. PONS DATABASE AND REGISTER PCASED shall, in collaboration with the ECO- The diffusion problem is also accentuated by WAS Executive Secretariat, and with the sup- the ineffective registration and licensing sys- port of bilateral and multilateral partners, as- tems and by the absence of national filing sys-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 58 tems. Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disar- To remedy these inadequacies, PCASED and mament in Africa, a workshop to define the the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace operational modalities for a database and and Disarmament in Africa, in collaboration arms register. The cooperation of relevant with ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, will as- inter-governmental and non-governmental sist Member States: organisations will be sought. Activities rela- • In strengthening and/or establishing natio- ting to the establishment of a database and a nal filing systems/registries on weapons flows regional light weapons register will begin im- so as to contribute to a timely identification mediately and will continue even after the life and prevention of excessive and destabilising span of PCASED. accumulations, as well as facilitate research and policy development; V. COLLECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF SUR- • Creating a Light Weapons Information Mana- PLUS AND UNAUTHORISED WEAPONS gement (LWIM) system; that is, a database re- For there to be enduring peace and security in flecting compilation of national filing systems the sub-region, all surplus weapons must be that would not only facilitate research on the retrieved and destroyed. Such surpluses are issue but also promote transparency and sa- generally made up of the excess from national feguard weapons from loss especially through armouries, and arms collected from peacekee- theft or corruption, in particular at weapons ping missions or as a result of peace accords. storage facilities; They are thus not needed for national security • Improving record-keeping and intelligence- or law and order. gathering as well as creating a transparency Consequently, PCASED and ECOWAS efforts regime in light weapons procurement that in this area will consist in support action to would facilitate information exchange and Member States: promote confidence building while respecting • In establishing a more secure environment the rights and obligations of Member States of which would facilitate post conflict recons- a regional cooperative security system. truction by mopping up excess weapons in Member States through comprehensive volun- PCASED will, at the national level: tary weapons collections programmes (VWCP) • Assist national governments in setting up • To ensure reduction of flows by encouraging and/or enhancing their national filing syste- destruction of surplus weapons. ms especially for captured illegal weapons that would have been taken out of circulation, and PCASED will assist Member States in: ultimately destroyed; • Designing and implementing VWCP such as • Assist governments to better organise natio- amnesties and in-kind incentives; nal holdings and storage facilities; • Developing and implementing sensitisation • Facilitate access by civil society and national and persuasion programmes in the local me- commissions to information on the movement dia (radio, TV, press); of light weapons; • Developing and encouraging inexpensive • Compile information on small arms prolifera- methods of weapons destruction; tion issues and on potential policies and solu- • Working with peacekeeping operations to tions for combating this scourge; design effective strategies for the control of • Organise in collaboration with the United arms during the peace process following an in-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 59 tra or interstate conflict; In addition, PCASED, the ECOWAS Executive • Engaging civil society in arms collection Secretariat, and civil society will endeavour efforts. to ensure the adoption by producer suppliers Activities to collect and destroy surplus and of codes of conduct on the arms trade that will unauthorised light weapons shall commence address international arms brokering, end- immediately and should yield significant re- use, monitoring and licensed production. sults during the initial three years of the mo- Thus, PCASED, the ECOWAS Executive Secreta- ratorium. riat and civil society organisations will: • Continue the dialogue with the Wassenaar VI. FACILITATING DIALOGUE WITH PRODU- Arrangement; and others arms suppliers; CERS AND SUPPLIERS (WASSENAAR ARRAN- • Join efforts with the European Union and GEMENT AND OTHERS) other regional organisation to establish politi- Close collaboration from arms producers and cally-binding, common arms export controls. suppliers is a major determinant of success in the effort to control light weapons diffusion. These activities should be embarked upon im- To ensure that ECOWAS producers respect the mediately and should continue throughout provisions of the moratorium, PCASED and the duration of PCASED. the Executive Secretariat will seek to: • Sensitise producers and suppliers of light VII. REVISING NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND weapons and ammunition, and ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES evolve with them common export control The effective application of the moratorium strategies; in particular by encouraging them is contingent on the existence of an adequate to check the activities of brokering agents so system of national laws, regulations and admi- that the latter would provide relevant and cri- nistrative procedures that will permit effective tical information pertaining to financial and control of the import, export and manufacture transportation arrangements in weapons of light weapons. transactions; Member States will, with assistance from PCA- • Jointly develop codes of conduct that ensures SED, the Executive Secretariat and multilateral transparency in the arms trade and the flows and bilateral partners: of weapons; • Review, update and harmonise national le- • Encourage producers and suppliers to esta- gislation and regulations on light weapons be- blish a database on weapons transfers, and to aring on civilian possession, use and transfer; mark light weapons at the time of manufactu- • Apply legal instruments, such as export and re for ease of tracing. import permits and end-user certificates; • Harmonise different national legislation These are attainable goals if PCASED, the ECO- with a view to developing a regional conven- WAS Executive Secretariat, and civil society tion on light weapons that would relate to the organisations: control and reduction as well as humanitarian • Encourage dialogue between producers/su- law issues; ppliers and between them and buyers; • Set up or strengthen National Commissions • Liaise with the Wassenaar Arrangement and that would develop strategies and policies re- others who are engaged in discussions about lating to small arms diffusing, and coordinate promoting supplier restraints. the relevant technical services. Member States

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 60 shall transmit to the For PCASED to succeed, it must be assured of ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCASED adequate and constant financial, moral and the names and addresses of members of their political support. national commissions thus established. Member States and their bilateral and multi- In order to meet the above objectives, PCASED lateral partners, along with the ECOWAS Exe- shall: cutive Secretariat, PCASED and the United • Initiate a comprehensive study of the legis- Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disar- lative and regulatory instruments relative to mament in Africa shall endeavour to mobilise light weapons in the sub-region; the necessary resources to: • Organise, in conjunction with the ECOWAS • Sustain the PCASED activities as presently Executive Secretariat and bilateral and multi- defined, and lateral partners, workshops and training ses- • Provide a foundation for sustaining this light sions on legislative drafting and harmonisa- weapons diffusion control initiative beyond tion; the initial lifespan of PCASED. • Work with the ECOWAS Executive Secreta- riat on the adoption of a regional convention Continued resource mobilisation will be car- to regulate arms flows within ECOWAS. ried out through an active awareness and public relations campaign designed to publicise Member States can draw inspiration from si- PCASED ’s achievements and needs. milar initiatives such as: Bilateral and multilateral assistance will be • The Declaration of Principles in the context of sought to enable work to begin on this impor- firearms control and transnational organised tant aspect without delay. crimes (ECOSOC). • The “European Union Programme on Preven- IX. ENLARGING MEMBERSHIP OF THE MORA- ting and Combating Illicit Trafficking in -Con TORIUM ventional Arms “(1997). The moratorium regime will enjoy even grea- • The OAS “Inter-American Convention Against ter success with an enlarged membership of the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Fi- African states. rearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Other African countries are therefore encoura- Related Materials “(1997). ged to adhere to the Moratorium or to embark • The 1997 Ottawa “Convention on the Prohi- on similar initiatives. bition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their and Development in Africa will support OAU Destruction and ECOWAS efforts by providing non-ECO- WAS African Member States with regular infor- Activities relative to the review and harmo- mation on the evolution of the Moratorium nisation of national laws and administrative and involving them in its activities. procedures should commence without delay The Centre will initiate immediate action in and should be a continuous process throu- this direction by establishing cooperation ghout the lifespan of the project. ties with other African sub-regional organisations. VIII. MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR PCASED Appendix III. OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 61 Moratorium. Moratorium. References to weapons or arms For the implementation of the Moratorium on in this Code of Conduct shall be deemed to in- the Importation, Exportation and Manufactu- clude ammunition and components. re of Light weapons in West Africa. We, the Heads of State and Government of the INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Economic Community of West African States Article 4 [ECOWAS]; Member States REAFFIRMING our Declaration of 31 October In order to promote and ensure co-ordination 1998 of a Moratorium on the importation, ex- of concrete measures for effective implemen- portation ad manufacture of light weapons tation of the Moratorium at national level, for a period of three years renewable, effective Member States shall establish National Com- from 1 November 1998 missions, made up of representatives of the RECALLING AHG/DEC.137 (XXXV) on the pro- relevant authorities and civil society. The ECO- liferation, illegal circulation and traffic of light WAS Executive secretariat, in collaboration weapons adopted by the 35 Ordinary Session of with the Programme for Co-ordination and the OAU Conference of Heads of State and Go- assistance (PCASED), shall prepare guidelines vernment held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999. to assist Member States in the establishment AWARE of the compelling need to encourage of their National Commissions. and promote actions to support the effective Article 5 application of the Moratorium; ECOWAS Executive Secretariat CONVINCED that observance of the Morato- 1. Structure, staff, and procedures shall be es- rium can best be achieved through transpa- tablished within the ECOWAS Secretariat, in rency and concerted effort, and that the esta- order to: blishment of a Code of Conduct is required for a). Assist Member States’ implementation of this purpose; the Moratorium Article 1 b). Monitor compliance Have hereby agreed as follows: c). Report progress to the Authority of ECO- Binding nature of the Code of Conduct WAS heads of State and Government at regular The ECOWAS Member States shall abide by intervals. this Code of Conduct in order to implement the Moratorium signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 2. Such structures and procedure may include: October 1998 (i) The initial establishment of four Zonal Ob- Article 2 servation Bureaux Scope of Moratorium (ii). Mission to Member States to ascertain The Moratorium shall apply to the import, ex- that existing national arms production is port and manufacture of light weapons as de- brought to a halt, in conformity with the spirit fined in the Annex I to this Code of Conduct. of the Moratorium Article 3 (iii). Obtaining external funding and technical Ammunition and components assistance to support Moratorium-related ac- Import, export and manufacture of compo- tivities. nents and ammunition for the light weapons defined in Annex I shall also be subject to strict ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS control in accordance with the spirit of the Article 6

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 62 Information exchange Article 9 In order to increase transparency, Member Exemptions States shall provide the ECOWAS Executive 1.Member States may seek an exemption the Secretariat an annual report on the ordering Moratorium in order to meet legitimate na- or procurement of weapons, components tional security needs or international peace and ammunition covered by the Moratorium, operations requirements. Such requests for both from national and international sources. exemptions shall be forwarded to the Executi- The ECOWAS Secretariat with the assistance ve Secretariat which shall assess them against of PCASED shall develop an arms register as a criteria developed with technical assistance of confidence building measure, with the inten- PCASED. tion of developing an electronic database of 2.The Executive Secretariat shall circulate the all legitimate stocks of weapons, ammunition request to Member States. Provided there and components covered by the Moratorium. are no objections, the Executive Secretariat Member States shall provide all necessary in- shall issue shall issue a ‘Certificate confirming formation to the arms register and database. Member States’ assent. The document shall The Executive Secretary shall include all this accompany the export license application, to- information in his annual report to the Heads gether with other documentation on end-use of State and Government. as required by arms-exporting states. Should a Article 7 Member State object, the request for exemp- Harmonisation of legislation and administration shall be referred to the ECOWAS Media- tive measures tion and Security Council. Member States shall harmonise and adopt the 3. Exemptions may be granted to pennit indivi- regulatory and administrative measures ne- dual ownership of a single weapon in catego- cessary for exercising control of cross-border ries 1, 2, and 3A of Annex I for hunting or sporting transactions with regard to light weapons, purposes. Applications for such exemptions components and ammunition relating to shall be processed by National Commissions them they shall train the law and order, im- and recommended to the ECOWAS Executive migration, licensing, customs, water resour- Secretariat for approval. The Executive Secre- ces and forestry officials required to put such tariat, with the technical support of PCASED regulatory and administrative measures into shall develop and issue guidelines to National effect. The ECOWAS Secretariat will provide Commissions on the exemptions procedure. the necessary assistance that Member States Article 10 may require fore this purpose. The ECOWAS Visitor Certificates Secretariat shall in this regard, request appro- Member States shall introduce arrangements priate assistance of PCASED. requiring visitors to apply in advance if they Article 8 wish to bring arms covered by the Moratorium Peace operations weapons register into any ECOWAS territory, and to declare such At the beginning of international peace ope- arms on entry. If entry is approved, the con1pe- rations within and outside the ECOWS zone, tent authorities shall issue visitors with an en- all dedicated light weapons and ammunition try certificate on arrival, and an exit certificate shall be declared to the ECOWAS Secretariat so on departure. A register shall be kept of all such as to enable their effective control as well as re- certificates. moval upon completion of the operation.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 63 OPERATIONAL ASPECTS PROMOTION AND EXPANSION Article 11 Article 14 Intra-and inter-state Co-operation Public relations and outreach The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCA- The Executive Secretariat shall, in collabora- SED and in partnership with National Com- tion with Member States, and PCASED deve- missions, shall develop procedures for inter- lop and implement an Information Strategy in state co-operation between customs, law and support of the Moratorium, incorporating and order, and all other relevant officials involved building on the activities already underway. in monitoring and implementing the Mora- The strategy will enhance understanding torium; and shall submit them for approval of and support for the Moratorium within by Member States. The Executive Secretariat the ECOWAS region, throughout Africa, and shall also with the assistance of PCASED and among international organisations and po- in collaboration with Member States, develop tential external funding partners. guidelines for intra-state co-operation betwe- Article 15 en these officials. The Executive Secretariat Resource mobilisation shall facilitate and obtain assistance for the The Executive Secretariat, in partnership with training of officials in intra- and inter-state co- PCASED, shall develop and implement a Re- operation. source Mobilisation Strategy, in order to secu- Article 12 re long term financial support for the Morato- Enhancing border controls rium, and to enhance transparency and good The Executive Secretariat, in conjunction with financial management of resources. Member States and with the assistance of PCA- Article 16 SED, will develop more effective border control Dialogue with suppliers and producers mechanisms, including improved equipment, The Executive Secretariat and individual Mem- and training and co-operation of customs and ber States shall engage in dialogue with na- other border officials. tional and international arms producers and Article 13 suppliers as well as relevant international or- Collection and Destruction of Surplus Wea- ganisations, in order to secure their support pons for and adherence to the spirit and the letter Member States shall in collaboration with of the Moratorium. PCASED shall assist in this the Executive Secretariat, PCASED and other effort. relevant international organisations, carry Article 17 out a systematic collection, registration and Expansion of Moratorium destruction of all weapons, ammunition and Participation in the Moratorium regime may components covered by the Moratorium that be extended to other interested African States. are surplus to national security requirements, The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat shall take were under illegal possession or collection in all necessary measures to encourage other the context of peace accords or upon comple- OAU Member States to adopt the Moratorium tion of international peace operations. and shall work with the United Nations Regio- nal Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Afri- ca to facilitate this. IN FAITH WHEREOF WE THE HEADS OF STA- TE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 64 COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE II. WE HAVE CONSIDERED the reports of the SIGNED THIS CODE OF CONDUCT IN TWO ORI- Secretary-General on the preparation for the GINALS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH BOTH TEXTS Ministerial Conference on the illicit prolifera- BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC. tion, circulation and trafficking of small arms Done at Lome, this 10th day of December, 1999 and light weapons, as well as the report of the first continental meeting of African Experts Appendix IV and the International Bamako Declaration on an African Common Consultation on the illicit proliferation, circu- Position on lation and trafficking of small arms and light the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Traffi- weapons, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from cking of Small Arms and Light Weapons - 1 De- 17 to 19 May 2000, and from 22 to 23 June 2000, cember 2000 respectively. I. WE, THE MINISTERS of the Members States III. In reviewing the situation of the illicit proof the Organisation of African Unity met in Ba- liferation, circulation and trafficking of small mako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December arms and light weapons, WE RECOGNIZE the 2000, to develop an African Common Position progress made at national and regional le- on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Tra- vels in developing action programmes for the fficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in reduction, prevention and management of preparation for the United Nations Conferen- small arms and light weapons proliferation. ce on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light In this regard, we welcome in particular, the Weapons in All Its Aspects, scheduled to take ECOWAS Moratorium of 31 October 1998, its place in New York, from 9 to 20 July, 2001, in accompanying Code of Conduct of 1999 and its accordance with the relevant United Nations Plan of Action under the Programme for Coor- General Assembly Resolutions. Our meeting dination and Assistance for Security and De- was held in pursuance of: velopment (PCASED); the Nairobi Declaration The Decision AHG/Dec. 137 (LXX), adopted by adopted by the Ministers of the countries of the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, on 15 March 2000, and its Coordinated Agenda Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, which called for for Action and an African approach on the problems posed Implementation Plan; the progress towards by the illicit proliferation, circulation and tra- the signature of a SADC Declaration and Pro- fficking of small arms and light weapons, and tocol on Firearms and Ammunition and its for the convening of a Ministerial preparatory Implementation Programme as discussed in conference on this matter prior to the holding August 2000; the Djibouti declaration of the of the United Nations Conference; and the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of decisions adopted on this matter by the Cou- Aden on antipersonnel landmines, of 18 No- ncil of Ministers, at its 68th Ordinary Session vember 2000; as well as the efforts made by held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 1 to ECCAS Member States, within the framework 6 June 1998 (CM/Dec/ 432 (LXVIII), the 71st Or- of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Se- dinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, curity Questions in Central Africa on the pro- from 6 to 10 March 2000 (CM/Dec.501 (LXXI) liferation and illicit circulation of small arms and the 72nd Ordinary Session held in Lome, and light weapons in Central Africa. Togo, from 6 to 8 July 2000 (CM/Dec.527 (LX- IV. WE REAFFIRM our respect for international XII);

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 65 law and principles as contained in the Charter and negotiations, jeopardizes the respect for of the United nations, in particular, the res- fundamental human rights, and hinders eco- pect for national sovereignty, non-interferen- nomic development; ce in the internal affairs of Member States, the vi) related to the combating and the eradica- right to individual and collective self-defence, tion of the illicit proliferation, circulation and as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, right of self determination of peoples and the and control of their proliferation; right of Member States to develop their own vii) is both one of supply and demand, trans- defense systems to ensure national security. cends borders and calls for cooperation at all V. WE HAVE DELIBERATED extensively on the levels: local, national, regional, continental various aspects of the problem of the illicit pro- and international. liferation, circulation and trafficking of small 2. WE THEREFORE AGREE that, in order to pro- arms and light weapons, and HAVE AGREED on mote peace, security, stability and sustainable the following African Common Position on the development on the continent, it is vital to illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking address the problem of the illicit proliferation, of small arms and light weapons: circulation and trafficking of small arms and 1. WE EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN that the light weapons in a comprehensive, integrated, problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation sustainable and efficient manner through: and trafficking of small arms and light wea- i) ensuring that the behaviour and conduct pons continues to have devastating conse- of Member States and suppliers are not only quences for stability and development in transparent but also go beyond narrow natio- Africa. We recognize that this problem: nal interests; i) sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, ii) the promotion of measures aimed at res- contributes to the displacement of innocent toring peace, security and confidence among populations and threatens international hu- and between Member States with a view to manitarian law, as well as fuels crime and en- reducing the resort to arms; courages terrorism; iii) the promotion of structures and processes ii) promotes a culture of violence and destabili- to strengthen democracy, the observance of zes societies by creating a propitious environ- human rights, the rule of law and good gover- ment for criminal and contraband activities, nance, as well as economic recovery and gro- in particular, the looting of precious minerals wth; and the illicit trafficking in and abuse of, nar- iv the promotion of conflict prevention mea- cotic drugs and psychotropic substances and sures and the pursuit of negotiated solutions endangered species; to conflicts; iii) has adverse effects on security and deve- v) the promotion of comprehensive solutions lopment, especially on women, refugees and to the problem of the illicit proliferation circu- other vulnerable groups, as well as on infras- lation and trafficking of small arms and light tructure and property; weapons that: iv) also has devastating consequences on chil- - include both control and reduction, as well as dren, a number of whom are victims of armed supply and demand aspects; conflict, while others are forced to become - are based on the coordination and harmoni- child soldiers; zation of the efforts of the v) undermines good governance, peace efforts Member States at regional, continental and

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 66 international levels; of, trafficking in, and illegal possession and use - involve civil society in support of the central of small arms and light weapons, ammunition role of governments, in this regard. and other related materials; vi) the enhancement of the capacity of Mem- iv) develop and implement, where they do not ber States to identify, seize and destroy illi- exist, national programmes for: cit weapons and to put in place measures to - the responsible management of licit arms; control the circulation, possession, transfer - the voluntary surrender of illicit small arms and use of small arms and light weapons; and light weapons; vii) the promotion of a culture of peace by en- - the identification and the destruction by couraging education and public awareness competent national authorities and where ne- programmes on the problems of the illicit cessary, of surplus, obsolete and seized stocks proliferation, circulation and trafficking of in possession of the state, with, as appropria- small arms and light weapons, involving all te, international financial and technical sup- sectors of society; port; viii) the institutionalisation of national - the reintegration of demobilized youth and and regional programmes for action aimed those who possess small arms and light wea- at preventing, controlling and eradicating pons illegally. the illicit proliferation, circulation and tra- v) develop and implement public awareness fficking of small arms and light weapons in programmes on the problem of the prolifera- Africa; and tion and the illicit trafficking of small arms and ix) the respect for international humanita- light weapons; rian law. vi) encourage the adoption of appropriate 3. WE RECOMMEND that Member States national legislation or regulations to prevent should: the breaching of international arms embargo- A. At the National Level es, as decided by the United Nations Security i) put in place, where they do not exist, na- Council; tional coordination Agencies or bodies and vii) take appropriate measures to control arms the appropriate institutional infrastructure transfers by manufacturers, suppliers, traders, responsible for policy guidance, research and brokers, as well as shipping and transit agents, monitoring on all aspects of small arms and in a transparent fashion; light weapons proliferation, control, circula- viii) encourage, where appropriate, the active tion, trafficking and reduction; involvement of civil society in the formulation ii) enhance the capacity of national law en- and implementation of a national action plan forcement and security Agencies and officials to deal with the problem; to deal with all aspects of the arms problem, ix) enter into binding bilateral agreements, including appropriate training on investiga- on a voluntary basis with neighbouring coun- tive procedures, border control and specia- tries, so as to put in place an effective common lized actions, and upgrading of equipment system of control, including the recording, li- and resources; censing and collection of small arms and light iii) adopt, as soon as possible, where they do weapons, within common frontier zones. B. At not exist, the necessary legislative and other the regional level measures to establish as a criminal offence i) Put in place, where they do not exist, mecha- under national law, the illicit manufacturing nisms to coordinate and harmonize efforts to

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 67 address the illicit proliferation, circulation and iv) Enact appropriate legislation and regula- trafficking of smal arms and light weapons; tions to control arms transfers by manufactu- ii) Encourage the codification and harmoniza- rers, suppliers, traders, brokers, shipping and tion of legislation governing the manufacture, transit agents; trading, brokering, possession and use of small v) Enact stringent laws, regulations and ad- arms and ammunition. Common standards ministrative procedures to ensure the effecti- should include, but not be limited to, marking, ve control over the transfer of small arms and record-keeping and control governing im- light weapons, including mechanisms with a ports, exports and the licit trade; view to facilitating the identification of illicit iii) Strengthen regional and continental coo- arms transfers; and peration among police, customs and border vi) Take full advantage of the forthcoming Uni- control services to address the illicit prolifera- ted Nations Conference tomake these com- tion, circulation and trafficking of small arms mitments known. and light weapons. These efforts should inclu- 5. WE CALL for international partnership to de, but not be limited to, training, the exchan- curb the illicit proliferation, circulation and ge of information to support common action trafficking of small arms and light weapons in to contain and reduce illicit small arms and Africa. light weapons trafficking across borders, and In this regard, the conclusion of the necessary Agreements in i WE APPEAL to international institutions to this regard; support initiatives and programmes aimed at iv) Ensure that the manufacturers and sup- eradicating the illicit proliferation, circulation pliers of illicit small arms and light weapons, and trafficking of small arms and light wea- who violate global or continental regulations pons. In this regard, WE REITERATE the call as on the issue, shall be sanctioned. Known contained in the relevant United Nations Ge- brokers and States which act as suppliers of neral Assembly Resolutions for financial and illicitly acquired arms and weapons to com- other appropriate support for the implemen- batants in Member States, should equally be tation of these programmes; sanctioned by the international community. ii) WE APPEAL to Governments, all sector of ci- 4. WE STRONGLY APPEAL to the wider interna- vil society and donor Agencies for the financial tional community and, particularly, to arms and technical support to national programmes supplier countries, to: for the reintegration of demobilized youths i) Accept that trade in small arms should be li- and those in illegal possession of small arms; mited to governments and authorized registe- iii) WE CALL FOR close cooperation between red licensed traders; the OAU, regional economic communities, ii) Actively engage, support and fund the the United Nations Agencies, other interna- efforts of the OAU Member States in addres- tional organizations, in close association with sing the problem of the illicit proliferation, cir- civil society Organizations, in addressing the culation and trafficking of small arms and light illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking weapons in the continent; of small arms and light weapons; iii) Seriously consider ways to discourage and iv) WE URGE OAU Member States, the United eliminate the practice of dumping excess we- Nations, Regional Organizations, Research apons in African countries and in violation of Centers, the civil society and the international arms embargoes; community as a whole, to develop and fund

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 68 action-oriented research aimed at facilitating ACE AND DISARMAMENT IN AFRICA greater awareness and better understanding CONSOLIDATED REPORT FOR THE FIRST BIEN- on the nature and scope of the problem, provi- NIAL MEETING OF STATES ding, whenever possible, a basis for continued advocacy and action on preven- REPORT ON UNREC’S ACTIVITIES IN THE IMPLE- tion measures, and evaluating the impact of MENTATION OF THE UNPoA ON SMALL ARMS these measures; During the period from July 2001 to May 2003, v) WE REQUEST that competent international the following activities were undertaken by Organizations like INTERPOL, UNREC to provide substantive and technical the World Customs Organization (WCO) and support to Member States of the African re- the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disar- gion in the implementation of the Programme mament in Africa, play a more important role of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Wea- in the fight against the illicit proliferation, cir- pons: culation and trafficking of small arms and light Organized in Lome, Togo (25 September 2001) weapons; a Special “African Disarmament Forum” on the vi) WE ENCOURAGE all the Member States of “UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of SALW on the United Nations, to accede to international All It’s Aspects” in order to inform the Diploma- legal instruments on terrorism and internatio- tic corps, the NGO’s, Researchers, etc. on the nal organized crime. outcomes of this conference 6. WE CALL for a realistic and implementable Provided substantive and technical support to programme of action during the 2001 United government experts from the ten countries of Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, in the elaboration and adoption of a curricu- which will take place in New York, from 9- 20 lum for training trainers in the control of small July 2001 and WE SUPPORT the efforts by the arms (July 2001). Organized a training of trai- Chairman of the Preparatory Committee in ners course benefiting over 30 senior security this regard. sector personnel from the police, customs, ar- 7. WE UNDERTAKE to promote and defend this med, security, military, paramilitary and other African common position on the illicit proli- law enforcement agencies of the sub-region in feration, circulation and trafficking of small the control of small arms (Nairobi, Kenya, 19- arms and light 30 November 2001). Finalisation of a Manual weapons during the 2001 UN Conference on for Training Trainers in the Control of Small the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Wea- Arms (January -June 2002). pons in all its aspects. Provided substantive and technical support 8. WE REQUEST the Secretary-General to to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in con- follow up on the implementation of the pre- ducting an assessment into the magnitude sent Declaration and to present regular pro- and scope of the small arms problem in that gress reports to the Council of Ministers. country (July 2001). The Centre drafted a project document which aims to set up a pro- Appendix V gramme to collect and destroy illegal and/or Report on UNREC’s Activities in the Implemen- surplus weapons, contribute towards the di- tation of the UNPoA on Small Arms sarming of some 40.000 ex-combatants still UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CENTRE FOR PE- bearing arms from the days of Guinea-Bissau’s

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 69 three-decade-long struggle for independence (ii) to strengthen their capacities in the area against the Portuguese, as well as the demo- of resource mobilisation and the planning of bilization of an estimated 5.000 soldiers from their activities; and (iii) to reinforce exchange the country’s armed and security forces. of information between the commissions by The Centre provided substantive and technical putting in place a NatCom network. support to the Government of Togo for the ela- The Regional Centre conducted a two-week boration of a national strategy of implementa- fact-finding mission to Sao Tome & Principe tion of the PoA (from 22 September to 4 October) at the re- and the organization of a ceremonial wea- quest of the Government of that country with pons bonfire (Flame of Peace) on 31 October a view to determining the means and ways of 2001. The event marked the official launching collecting small arms illegally held by the civi- of Togo’s National Commission for the Fight lian population. Fielded in Against the Proliferation of Small Arms and the support of a request made by the United Na- Government’s commitment to improve human tions Country Team in Sao Tome & Principe, security, stem gunrunning, violent crime, and the mission also had the mandate to advi- small arms proliferation. ce the Government on ways of disposing of, The Centre contributed to efforts to ensure the among others, explosives and some obsolete implementation of the PoA by participating in weapons. UNREC had elaborated a proposed two Plan of Action to fight against the proliferation international conferences: The Tokyo Follow- of SALW. up Meeting (Japan, 23-25 January 2002) and The Regional Centre, in collaboration with the meeting held in Pretoria, South Africa (18- the United Nations Economic Commission for 21 March 2002) to outline an implementation Africa (UNECA) through its Sub-Regional De- strategy for Member States of the African re- velopment Centre for West Africa (SRDC/W A) gion. based in Niamey (Niger) fielded a data collec- The Centre contributed to and participated in tion mission to the Mano River Union (MRU) the creation in Accra, Ghana (20-21 May 2002) countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone of a civil society network to combat the pro- for a period of three weeks in the course of liferation of small arms, known as the West September and October 2002. The mission ga- African Action Network on Small Aims (WA- thered information and data likely to improve ANSA). Prior to this, the Centre contributed understanding of the magnitude and scope of to a consultation of West African civil society illicit trafficking in small arms and light wea- organizations in Dakar, Senegal (29 April to 2 pons on the common borders of the three MRU May 2002) which was aimed at formulating a countries and wrote a project document ap- manual for training trainers from civil society proved by UNECA which identify practical and organisations on peace, security and disarma- realistic ways and activities to stem illicit we- ment issues. apons flows, consolidate peace and security in The Regional Centre attended in Conakry, Gui- the three countries, as well as to promote arms nea the workshop on National Commissions control and practical disarmament. (NatCom), organized from 4 to 6 June 2002, The Regional Centre engaged discussions by UNDESA and PCASED. The objectives of the for agreeing practical modalities for the im- workshop were (i) to give account of all activi- plementation of a project by the Regional ties carried out by each National Commission; Centre and the Pretoria based Institute for

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 70 Security Studies (ISS) to backstop efforts by gramme of Action adopted by consensus at the the Commission of the African Union (AU) to UN conference in July 2001. The ammunition implement both the Bamako Declaration and destruction ceremony, at which the Director the Programme of Action adopted by the July of the Centre made remarks, was attended, 2001 U.N. Conference on SALW. After two mis- among others, by members of the diplomatic sions at the African Union headquarters (6-8 corps, representatives of international organi- September 2002 and 9-12 February 2003) the sations, civil society organisations and, senior project proposal for the joint UNREC/AU/ISS government and military officials. project on the implementation of Small Arms The Director of the Regional Centre partici- Control Agreements in Africa has been finali- pated, at the invitation of the German Gover- zed. In these perspectives, the African Commis- nment, at a policy dialogue entitled “The UN sion has submitted to DDA a Memorandum of Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Understanding which is under consideration Weapons: Building Capacity and Partnerships by Legal Office. for Implementation”, from 28-29 April, 2003 in The Centre Regional attended in Yaounde Bonn, Germany. (Cameroon) from 19 to 23 November 2002, a It is jointly organised by INWENT Capacity meeting convened to brainstorm on the pos- Building International and the Federal Mi- sibilities of setting up a project entitled “Mi- nistry of Economic Cooperation and Develo- cro- disarmament and Human Security in pment. The dialogue was organised in prepa- Central Africa”. The meeting was organised by ration of the first bi-annual review meeting of the Nigeria-based think-tank African Strategic the implementation of the UN Programme of and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG) in colla- Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the boration with the Pretoria-based Institute for Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons Security Studies (ISS) and the Economic Com- in all Its Aspects held in July 200I. The Director munity of Central African States (ECCAS). The presented a paper on the “Arms Control in the objectives of the meeting were: (i) to analyse Cultural Context: Chances and Risks”. the situation of the micro-disarmament in the sub-region; (ii) to draw a programme of acti- Appendix VI vities to support ECCAS in promoting micro- Draft Supplementary Protocol to the ECOWAS disarmament and human security and; (iii) to Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, determine the role that civil society organisa- and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Wea- tion should play in such a project. pons to Address the Role of Non-State Actors The Regional Centre assisted the Government WORKING DOCUMENT of Togo, through the Ministry of Defence and Preamble the National Commission on the Fight Against We, the Heads of State and Government of the the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Wea- Economic Community of West African States pons, on 14 February 2003, in the destruction (ECOWAS) of some 300,000 ammunition seized from REAFFIRMING our Declaration of 31 October gunrunners. The destroyed ammunition had 1998 of a Moratorium on the Importation, Ex- been mainly seized at border areas along the portation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, common Togo-Ghana border. Togo sees the initially for a period of three years, effective disposal of illicit weapons and ammunition from 1 November, 1998, and renewed in July, as part of its efforts to implement the UN Pro- 2001;

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 71 REAFFIRMING the Code of Conduct for the Im- Article 1: Establishment plementation of the Moratorium, adopted on There is hereby established within ECOWAS 10 December, 1999; a Supplementary Protocol to the Moratorium RECALLING the Protocol Relating to the Me- On Importation, Exportation, and manufactu- chanism for Conflict Prevention, Manage- re of Light Weapons in West Africa, hereafter ment, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, referred to as ‘the Supplementary Protocol’. particularly Articles 50 and 51; CONSIDERING that the proliferation of Small Article 2: Objectives of the Supplementary Arms and Light Weapons has not abated since Protocol the declaration of the Moratorium; The objectives of the Supplementary Protocol RECALLING the Plan of Action of the United shall be as follows: Nations 2001 Small Arms Conference; a. fill loopholes in the Moratorium, with a view AWARE that non-state actors (hereafter NSAs) to achieving effective compliance by state and (mercenaries, armed ethnic militias, civil de- non-state actors with the provisions of the fence forces, rebel movements, and private se- Moratorium; curity companies) remain outside the present b. restrain states from hiring, assisting, or scope of the Moratorium, collaborating with private military compa- AWARE of the compelling need to introduce nies, armed militias, civil defence forces, mechanisms to actualize the objectives of the armed brokers, and other non-state actors Moratorium; whose activities have a direct bearing on the AWARE of the increased and increasing profile proliferation of small arms and light weapons and reach of NSAs in the West African security in West Africa; landscape; c. reposition the Moratorium to respond more RECOGNIZING the indispensable role of Civil effectively to the scourge of the proliferation of Society in the implementation of the Morato- Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa; rium; d. impress on non-state actors the illegality DESIROUS to establish a Supplementary Pro- of their actions in arms proliferation, and the tocol to address and curtail relations between availability of sub-regional legal instruments State Parties and Non-State Actors as related to ensure their possible arrest and prosecution to the illicit transfer of small arms and light now, or in the future; weapons; e. formulate and implement policies that would enhance the capacity of PCASED and Hereby declare that it is illegal for member sta- National Commissions to address the scourge tes to hire, assist, or collaborate with non-sta- of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Wea- te actors (private military companies, armed pons. ethnic militias, civil defence forces and arms brokers), and such interaction would be dee- Article 3: State Parties med to be against the spirit and letter of the State Parties to the Moratorium and to the Su- Moratorium. pplementary Protocol shall i. desist from hiring, assisting, or collaborating with NSAs, except as may be necessitated as part of peace agreement negotiations; ii. initiate national legislation to domesticate

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 72 3(i) above; determined by the Mediation and Security iii. where capacity for manufacturing and/or Council. assembly of SA/LW exist within the sub-re- vi. In cases of post conflict peace- building, no gion, state parties will furnish ECOWAS Secre- member of a militia, civil defence force, or any tariat and PCASED with their annual produc- non-state actor shall be deemed qualified to tion data, and details of how such products possess a weapon, unless and until such ele- were distributed. ments have been fully integrated into the re- iv. Member-states shall refrain from giving to, gular armed forces. or receiving from NSAs, and from any form of transaction and collaboration whose end-re- Article 5: The Role of PCASED sult is an increase in the quantity and quality In order to bring the Moratorium in line with of SA/LW by either party the provisions of this Supplementary Protocol, v. WASSENAAR countries, in further coopera- PCASED shall tion with ECOWAS states to ensure the suc- i. review the training curricula of security for- cess of the Moratorium, will undertake not ces to include intelligence, investigation, and to supply weapons to West African NSAs or to possible arrest, of non-state actors involved in their proxies/agents. illicit transfers; ii. Assist National Commissions in setting Article 4: Relationship between State Par- up and enhancing their capacity to monitor ties and NSAs NSAs; i. Each state party shall, via its National Com- iii. Take steps to speed up the review and har- mission, provide to PCASED and the ECOWAS monization of national legislation and admi- Secretariat, an inventory of SA/LW licensed to nistrative procedures, as a priority area of PCA- be carried by private military companies. SED; ii. Each National commission shall maintain iv Take steps to ensure that Voluntary Wea- separate records of SALW recovered from NSAs pons Collection Programmes (VWCPs) are not iii. No official of any member state accused of limited to post conflict reconstruction. To this involvement in arms transfers to NSAs shall end, PCASED will assist National Commissions enjoy the immunity that derives from his/her to establish and enhance permanent structu- office. res for collection of weapons, within the con- iv. State parties hereby undertake to coope- text of viable rehabilitation programmes for rate and share intelligence on the activities bandits and ex-combatants. of NSAs, particularly when and where these relate to illicit arms transfers, either betwe- Article 6: The Role of National Commis- en NSAs, or between Governments and NSAs. sions Such verifiable intelligence will be made avai- In order to bring the Moratorium in line with lable to the ECOWAS Secretariat and PCASED, the provisions of this Supplementary Proto- for further action by the Mediation and Secu- col, National Commissions in each state party rity Council. shall v. NSAs, as represented by their leadership, i. perform oversight functions on government shall be liable for prosecution before relevant relations with NSAs, with a view to ascertai- national courts and international tribunals, ning possible areas of illicit arms transfers and or by any other judicial instrument as may be other areas of illegality;

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 73 ii. monitor the activities of local and foreign Appendix: VII Private Military Companies, and each member ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL ARMS AND state will introduce domestic legislation to LIGHT WEAPONS, THEIR AMMUNITION AND ensure such, OTHER RELATED MATERIALS iii. all non-state actors desirous of operating within any member state, with the intention PREAMBLE of using SA/LW, shall apply to the relevant Na- We, the Heads of State and Government of the tional Commission for a licence to do so Member States of the Economic Community iv. The Police, and other security agencies that of West African States (ECOWAS); licence the use of firearms shall provide the Mindful of Articles 7, 8, and 9 of ECOWAS Re- vised Treaty relating to the creation, composi- National Commissions with records of all li- tion and function of the Conference of Heads cences granted on annual basis on a format to of State and Government: be designed by each National Commission MINDFUL of Article 58 of the revised ECOWAS v. Each National commission will be assisted Treaty relating to Regional Security which sti- by PCASED to establish a Weapons Buy-Back pulates that Member States undertake to work and Weapons-In-Exchange-for-Development to safeguard and consolidate relations condu- Programme. cive to the maintenance of peace, stability and vi. With the assistance of PCASED, National security within the region and to establish and strengthen appropriate mechanisms for the ti- Commissions will establish viable program- mely prevention and resolution of conflicts; mes of encouraging bandits and criminal ele- MINDFUL of Article 77 of the Treaty relating to ments to participate in voluntary weapons sanctions applicable in cases where a Member surrender, and to put in place rehabilitation State fails to fulfil its obligations to the Com- programmes. National Commissions will take munity; necessary steps to publicize the existence of MINDFUL of the relevant provisions of the Pro- weapons collection centers and programmes, tocol on the Community Court of Justice adop- and take further steps to encourage their use; ted on 16 July 1991, the ECOWAS conventions on mutual legal assistance and extradition, vii. National commissions without a mini- signed respectively in Dakar on 29 July 1992 and mum of two (2) CSOs representation shall not Abuja on 6 August 1994; be considered to be properly and functionally MINDFUL of the Protocol on Non-aggression constituted; signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978 and the Proto- col on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters Article 7: Exemptions signed in Freetown on 29 May 1981, and more Member States may seek an exemption from particularly our determination to provide mutual assistance in defence matters in the event this Supplementary Protocol for the purpose of armed aggression or threat of aggression of entering into agreements with Private Mili- against a Member State; tary Companies with the objective of Security RECALLING the principles of the Charter of Sector Reforms/Transformation. the United Nations, particularly the principle Such requests for exemptions shall be forwar- that States shall have the right to defend the- ded to the Executive Secretariat which shall mselves both individually and collectively, the assess them against set criteria for transpa- principle of non-intervention and non-interfe- rency and good governance. In the event of op- rence in internal affairs of another State, and the principle that each Member shall avoid reposition to such application from any member course to the threat or use of force; state, the request for exemption shall be re- RECALLING also the relevant provisions of the

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 74 Constitutive Act of the African Union, inclu- and light weapons has on the prolongation of ding the decision by the Executive Council of armed conflicts and illegal exploitation of na- the African Union requesting the African Union tural resources; Commission to take necessary measures to es- AWARE OF THE NEED to prevent, combat and tablish a legal instrument to prevent, combat eradicate the illicit manufacture and excessi- and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and li- ve accumulation of small arms and light we- ght weapons in Africa; RECALLING equally the ECOWAS Protocol rela- apons, trafficking, detention and use of such ting to the Conflict Prevention, Management arms, which have been seen to have negative and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security effects on the security of each country in the signed in Lome on 10 December 1999, particu- sub-region, human security, international hu- larly Articles 3, 50 and 51 relating to the control manitarian law, sustainable development, and of the proliferation of small arms and light we- human rights; apons and illegal circulation of such arms; DETERMINED to achieve the objectives outli- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT resolutions of the Uni- ted Nations Security Council imposing arms ned in the Declaration on the Moratorium on embargos on countries in the West African the Importation, Exportation and Manufactu- sub-region; re of Light Weapons in ECOWAS Member Sta- ALSO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Bamako De- tes signed in Abuja on 31 October 1998 and in st claration of 1 December 2000 on the common the Code of Conduct for the implementation African position on the proliferation, circula- of the Moratorium adopted in Lome on 10 De- tion and illicit trade in small arms and light cember 1999; weapons; DETERMINED ALSO to consolidate the gains of EQUALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT other inter- the Moratorium on the Importation, Exporta- national, regional and sub-regional initiatives tion and Manufacture of Light Weapons and its aimed at curtailing the proliferation of small Code of Conduct, and to take into account the arms and light weapons, and the decision re- shortcomings observed, with a view to taking lating to the common African position on the corrective measures; review of the United Nations programme of RECOGNISING in this regard the progress action on small arms and light weapons adop- achieved in the implementation of the Mora- ted in Khartoum in January 2006; torium, thanks to contributions by the Plan CONSIDERING that the proliferation of small of Action of the Programme for Coordination arms and light weapons constitutes a major and Assistance for Security and Development destabilising factor in ECOWAS Member Sta- (PCASED); tes and poses a serious threat to the peace and CONSCIOUS of the need to strengthen the stability of our peoples; institutional and operational capacity of the DEEPLY CONCERNED about the uncontrolled ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in order to ena- flow of small arms and light weapons into ble fight more effectively against the prolifera- Africa in general and West Africa in particu- tion of small arms and light weapons, with a lar, and aware of the need to effectively con- view to obtaining the desired results; trol the transfer of arms by suppliers and arms CONSIDERING the United Nations Programme brokers; of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the AWARE of the need to build peace and prevent Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons conflicts in West Africa, and the disastrous in All Its Aspects adopted in 2001; consequences the proliferation of small arms CONSIDERING the United Nations internatio-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 75 nal instrument adopted in 2005 which seeks metres; to enable States to identify and rapidly trace 2. SMALL ARMS: Arms used by one person and small arms and light weapons, and the UN which include notably: Protocol on the manufacture and illicit trade - firearms and other destructive arms or devi- in fire arms, spare parts, components and am- ces such as an exploding bomb, an incendiary munition adopted in 2001; bomb or a gas bomb, a grenade, a rocket laun- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT Security Council Reso- cher, a missile, a missile system or landmine; lution 1325 (2002) on women, peace and securi- - revolvers and pistols with automatic loa- ty which recognises the specific role of women ding; in peace building; - rifles and carbines; DEEPLY CONCERNED by the use of children - machine guns; in armed conflicts, and taking account of the - assault rifles; United Nations Security Council resolutions - light machine guns. on children and armed conflicts; 3. AMMUNITION: Devices destined to be shot RECOGNISING the important contribution of or projected through the means of firearms in- civil society organisations in the fight against cluding among others: the proliferation of small arms and light wea- - cartridges; pons; - projectiles and missiles for light weapons; BEARING IN MIND the Final Communiqué is- - mobile containers with missiles or projecti- sued at the end of the Summit of ECOWAS He- les for anti-aircraft or anti-tank single action ads of State and Government held in Dakar on systems; 30 January 2003 which directed the ECOWAS 1 OTHER RELATED MATERIALS: All compo- Executive Secretariat to examine the possi- nents, parts or spare parts for small arms bility of transforming the Moratorium into a or light weapons or ammunition necessary Convention; for its functioning; or any chemical subs- tance serving as active material used as HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOW propelling or explosive agent; CHAPTER I - DEFINITIONS ET OBJECTIFS 2 ILLICIT: Covers all that is carried out in Article 1: Définitions violation of this Convention; For the purpose of this Convention: 3 MARKING: Inscriptions permitting the 1. LIGHT WEAPONS: Portable arms designed to identification of arms covered by this Con- be used by several persons working together in vention; a team and which include notably: TRACING: Indicates the systematic mo- - heavy machine guns; nitoring of the movements of small arms - portable grenade launchers, mobile or and light weapons and their ammunition mounted; and other related materials, from the ma- - portable anti-aircraft cannons; nufacturer until the end user, with a view - portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil to helping member States competent au- guns; thorities to detect illicit manufacture and - portable anti-tank missile launchers or ro- trading; cket launchers; 4 BROKERING: Work carried out as an in- - portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; termediary between any manufacturer, - mortars with a calibre of less than 100 milli- supplier or distributor of small arms and

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 76 light weapons and any buyer or user; this CHAPTER II - TRANSFER OF SMALL ARMS AND includes the provision of financial support LIGHT WEAPONS and the transportation of small arms and light weapons; Article 3: Prohibition of transfer of small 5 TRANSFER: Includes import, export, tran- arms and light weapons sit, transhipment and transport or any 1 Member States shall ban the transfer of small other movement whatsoever of small arms arms and light weapons and their manufactu- and light weapons, ammunition and other ring materials into their national territory or related materials from or through the terri- from/ through their national territory. tory of a State; 2 Member State shall ban, without exception, 6 NON-STATE ACTORS: Such as any actor transfers of small arms and light weapons to other than State Actors, mercenaries, ar- Non–State Actors that are not explicitly autho- med militias, armed rebel groups and pri- rised by the importing Member. vate security companies. 3 Small arms and light weapons as defined 7 SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS In in this Convention shall not be deemed to be this Convention this shall be deemed to goods for the purpose of Article 45 of ECOWAS include ammunition and other related ma- Revised Treaty of 1993 terials. Article 4: Conditions of Exemption Article 2: Objectives 1 A Member State can request exemption from The objectives of this Convention are: the provisions of Article 3 (b) in order to meet 1 To prevent and combat the excessive and des- legitimate national defence and security nee- tabilising accumulation of small arms and li- ds, or to participate in peace support or other ght weapons within ECOWAS; operations in accordance with the decisions of 2 To continue the efforts for the control of small the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, arms and light weapons within ECOWAS; or other regional or sub-regional body of whi- 3 To consolidate the gains of the Declaration ch it is a member. of the Moratorium on the importation, expor- 2 For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, tation and manufacture of small arms and its Member States shall establish and maintain Code of Conduct. an effective system of export and import licen- 4 To promote trust between the Member Sta- sing or authorisation, as well as of measures tes through concerted and transparent action on international transit, for the transfer of on the control of small arms and light weapons small arms and light weapons. within ECOWAS; 4. Each Member State shall take such measures 5 To build institutional and operational capa- as may be necessary to ensure that licensing or cities of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat authorisation procedures are secure and that and the Member States in the efforts to curb the authenticity of licensing or authorisation the proliferation of small arms and light we- of the documents can be verified and valida- apons, their ammunitions and other related ted. materials; 6 To promote the exchange of information and Article 5: Procedures for Exemption cooperation among the Member States. 1. The request for exemption for an arms transfer is transmitted for examination to the ECO-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 77 WAS Executive Secretariat and must contain tion certificate once issued must accompany information on: the request for an export licence as well as the a) Details of the arms to be transferred- the End-User-Certificate. quantity, exact type and kind of arms using 3 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall ECOWAS classification system, including all forward to the Member States information on serial numbers and other marks; exemptions and refusals granted within 90 b) Details of the supplier – full details (name days. The Executive Secretary shall also compi- of company and representative, address, le and publish a comprehensive annual report and full contact details) of all companies detailing all international arms transfers gran- and individuals involved, including brokers ted exemptions, and a list of refusals. where relevant; c) Details of the supply process – the number Article 6: Cases for Refusal of Exemptions and period of shipments, the routes inclu- for Transfers ding transit locations, the type of transport 1. A transfer shall not be authorised if: to be used, all companies involved in impor- a) Authorisation on export, import, transit, ting, freight forwarding and handling, de- transhipment or brokering considered as tails of the storage and management of the donation has not been provided by all Sta- weapons whilst being transferred, the time tes directly concerned with the transfer; period covered by the activity for which the b) All the required information has not been exemption is requested; supplied to the ECOWAS Executive Secreta- d) Details of the final end user – name of ry; individual/company/institution and repre- c) The arms have not been marked according sentative responsible, confirmation from to requirements under this Convention. relevant national authority that the end 2. A transfer shall not be authorised if its autho- user is authorised to import weapons; risation violates obligations of the requesting e) Details of the end use. Sates as well as those of Member States, under 1 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall apply international law including: the criteria for Article 6 of this Convention for a) Obligations under the Charter of the United exemption requests as well as those of para- Nations – including: graph (a) of this Article. Reasoned opinion of i. Binding resolutions of the United Nations the ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall be sent Security Council such as those imposing confidentially to the Member State in order arms embargoes; to confirm or refuse the opinion given. The -fi ii. The prohibition on the use or threat of nal decision of Member States shall be taken use of force; by consensus. In the absence of a consensus, iii. The prohibition on intervention in the the exemption request as well as the reaso- internal affairs of another State. ned opinion of the Executive Secretary shall be b) Universally accepted principles of interna- submitted for a final decision to the ECOWAS tional humanitarian law. Mediation and Security Council. c) Any other treaty or decision by which the 2 The granting of an exemption shall be trans- Member States are bound, including: mitted to the Member State concerned by the i. binding decisions, including embargoes, ECOWAS Executive Secretary through the is- adopted by relevant international, multi- suing of an exemption certificate. The exemp- lateral, regional and sub-regional bodies,

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 78 such as the African Union Peace and Securi- country or be re-exported, to unauthorized ty Council, to which a State is party; uses or users or into the illicit trade; ii) Prohibitions of arms transfers that arise 2 The Executive Secretary and all Member Sta- in particular treaties which a State is party tes shall provide elements of proof to apply the to, such as OTTAWA Convention on Anti- criteria enunciated in paragraphs a, b, c, d and personnel Mines, the 1980 Convention on e of the present article and to indicate the re- Certain Conventional Weapons and its Pro- fusal of exemption request made by a Member tocols. State. 3. A transfer shall not be authorised if the arms are destined to be used: CHAPTER III - MANUFACTURE OF SMALL ARMS a) for the violation of international humanita- AND LIGHT WEAPONS rian law or infringement of human and peo- ARTICLE 7: Control of the Manufacture of ples’ rights and freedoms, or for the purpose of Small Arms and Light Weapons oppression; 1 Member States shall undertake to control the b) for the commission of serious violations of manufacture of small arms and light weapons international humanitarian law, genocide or within their national territories; crimes against humanity; 2 Each Member State shall regulate the acti- c) to worsen the internal situation in the coun- vities of local small arms and light weapons try of final destination, in terms of provoking manufacturers and shall undertake to adopt or prolonging armed conflicts, or aggravating strategies and policies to the reduction and/ existing tensions; or limitation of the manufacture of small arms d) to carry out terrorist acts or support or en- and light weapons so as to control the local courage terrorism; manufacture as well as their marketing in e) other than for the legitimate defence and se- ECOWAS region. curity needs of the beneficiary country; 3 Member States shall undertake to draft an 4. A transfer shall not be authorised if it is des- exhaustive list of local manufacturers of small tined to: arms and light weapons and the registration of a) be used for or to facilitate the commission each of them into the national arms registers; of violent or organised crime; 4 Where production and/or assembly capaci- b) adversely affect regional security; endanger ties of small arms and light weapons exist wi- peace, contribute to destabilising or uncon- thin the ECOWAS region, Member States shall trolled accumulations of arms or military ca- submit to the Executive Secretary. This data pabilities into a region, or otherwise contribu- shall include the type of the arms and their te to regional instability; quantity on their annual production. c) hinder or obstruct sustainable development and unduly divert human and economic re- ARTICLE 8: Measures of Control for Small sources to armaments of the states involved in Arms and Light Weapons Manufacture the transfer; Without prejudice to the other measures d) involve corrupt practices at any stage – that Member States will undertake to ensure from the supplier, through any middlemen or the effective control of the manufacturing of brokers, to the recipient; smalls arms and light weapons on their natio- 1 A transfer shall not be authorised if it is likely nal territory, a request for the manufacture of to be diverted, within the transit or importing small arms and light weapons will not be gran-

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 79 ted if the requesting person has not given in- the license); formation relating to : iv. full details concerning the method of a) Details of the arms to be manufactured – the transport and transporter(s); quantity, exact type and kind of arms using v. the controlling agency or agencies (at ECOWAS classification system, including all point of departure, transit and entry); serial numbers and other markings; vi. the nature of the transaction (commer- b) The procedure for marking; the procedure cial, non-commercial, private or public, for entering details of each small arm and light conversion, repair); weapon into the national small arms and light vii. where applicable, the insurer and/or weapons register; information on the storage the financial institution intervening in the and management of the weapons after manu- transaction. facture. 3. Records shall be permanently kept in the register. CHAPTER IV - TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION Article 10: ECOWAS Small Arms and Light Article 9: National Database and Registers Weapons Database and Registers of Small Arms and Light Weapons 1 Member States undertake to establish a sub- 1 Member States shall establish where they do regional database and register of small arms not exist already, national computerised re- and light weapons under the ECOWAS Execu- gisters and database of small arms and light tive Secretary as a way of promoting confiden- weapons. ce. 2 The following information shall be recorded 2 The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat shall de- in the national registry: velop in collaboration with the Member States a) Description of the product (type or model, the procedures for the setting up and manage- calibre) and quantity (if it concerns a batch); ment of the database and register as well as b) the content of the marking; the issues to be covered. c) the names and addresses of the former and 3 The Member States shall provide the ECOWAS current owners and, when possible, successive Executive Secretariat with all the necessary in- owners; formation for the operation of the sub-regio- d) the date of registration; nal database and register of small arms and e) information concerning each transaction light weapons. Member States also undertake including: to transmit an annual report to the ECOWAS i. the name and address of the shipper, the Executive Secretary detailing their orders or intermediary (where applicable), the con- purchase of small arms and light weapons. signee and the user indicated on the end- 4 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall pre- user-certificate; sent an annual report on the workings of the ii. the point of departure, transit and des- sub-regional database and register of small tination, as well as the customs references arms and light weapons at the Summit of Hea- and the dates of departure, transit and deli- ds of State and Government. very to the end-user. 5 Records shall be kept in the register perma- iii. the export, transit and import licence nently. (quantities and batches corresponding to the same licence as well as the validity of

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 80 Article 11: Register of Arms for Peace Ope- Article 13: Prevention of and the Fight rations Against Corruption 1. Member States undertake to: a) Establish a Member States shall institute appropriate and register of small arms and light weapons, their effective measures for cooperation between ammunition and other related material desti- administrative departments concerned and ned for use in peacekeeping operations both law enforcement agencies to curb corruption inside and outside the ECOWAS territory un- associated with the illicit manufacturing of, der the ECOWAS Executive Secretary as a way of ensuring the control of movements of small trafficking in, illicit possession and use of arms and light weapons and their effective small arms and light weapons. withdrawal at the end of peace operations in which Member States are participating. CHAPTER V - OPERATIONAL MECHANISM b) Declare in this regard to the ECOWAS Execu- Article 14: Control of Possession of Small tive Secretariat all small arms and light wea- Arms and Light Weapons by Civilians pons used in peace operations. 1 Member States shall prohibit the possession, c) Declare to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary use and sale of light weapons by civilians. all the small arms and light weapons seized, 2 Member States shall regulate the possession, collected and/or destroyed during peace ope- use and sale of small arms by civilians. rations on their territory and in the ECOWAS 3 Authorisations may be granted to permit in- region. dividual possession of one or more small arms 1 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall take and their ammunition in line with the legis- the necessary measures to ensure the adequa- lation of each Member State. Applications for te recording of the information transmitted such authorisations shall be processed by rele- by the Member States participating to peace vant national authorities. All applicants must operations. the relevant national authority in person. The 2 Records shall be permanently kept in the re- Executive Secretary shall develop and commu- gister. nicate authorisation procedures to the relevant national authority. Article 12: Dialogue with Manufacturers 4 Member States undertake to implement a and Suppliers strict control regime for civilian possession of 1 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary and each the small arms. The authorisation procedure Member State shall strengthen cooperation will involve issuing a license from the relevant and dialogue with national and international national authority for each small arm used by a manufacturers and suppliers of arms as well civilian. Member States shall not grant an au- as with the competent international and re- thorisation if the applicant does not meet the gional organisations in order to ensure their following criteria: support, respect for and compliance with the a) The required minimum age; spirit and the letter of this Convention. b) Applicant does not have criminal record 2 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall take and has not been subject to morality inves- the necessary measures to take advantage of tigation; the information available from Member States c) Proof of a legitimate reason to possess, of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the European carry or use for each small arms; d) Proof Union and other manufacturers and suppliers that the prospective owner has undergone of arms, in order to strengthen the effective safety training and competency training in- implementation of this Convention.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 81 cluding training in the relevant laws regar- communicate them to the relevant authority. ding small arms; 3 If the request is agreed, the competent na- e) Proof that the weapon will be stored in a tional authorities shall issue to the visitors an safe place and separately from its ammuni- entry certificate and an exit declaration at the tion. visitors’ arrival and departure. 1 Member States shall impose a limit on the 4 All certificates shall be recorded by the Mem- number of weapons a licence may cover and ber States concerned in the national small require a ‘cooling off’ period of at least 21 days arms register referred to in compliance with before an authorisation is granted for the pos- the above mentioned Article 9. session of each weapon. Member States shall include an expiration date on each licence and Article 16: Management and Security of authorisations shall be subject to periodic re- Stockpiles view. Contravention of regulations concerning 1 Member States shall take the necessary me- possession of small arms in private hands will asures to ensure the safe and effective mana- allow the small arms to be seized by the au- gement, storage and security of their national thorities, the licence/authorisation revoked, stocks of small arms and light weapons; and adequate sanctions including penalties 2 To this effect, Member States shall establish applied. effective standards and procedures for stock- 2 Member States shall include information re- pile management, storage and security. These garding the civilian possession of small arms standards and procedures shall include: within the national small arm database and a) appropriate site; register established under Article 9 of the pre- b) physical security measures of storage faci- sent Convention; lities; 3 Member States undertake to introduce mini- c) inventory management and record kee- mum penal sanctions for the illicit possession ping; and use of small arms and light weapons and d) staff training; the carrying of unlicensed small arms. e) security during manufacture and transportation; Article 15: Visitors’ Certificates f) sanctions in case of theft or loss. 1 Each Member State shall take the appropria- 1 Member States shall ensure that stockpiles of te measures demanding that visitors wanting small arms and light weapons by manufactu- to import temporarily small arms covered by rers, dealers as well as individuals are secure- this Convention for the duration of their tem- ly stored in accordance with the appropriate porary stay in the ECOWAS region, prepare in standards and procedures; advance an application including information 2 Member States shall undertake to regularly about the purpose, type and marking of small review, in accordance with national laws and arms to be imported into one of the ECOWAS standards, the storage facilities and condi- territories and to declare the arms on their tions of small arms and light weapons held by arrival. Such application shall be addressed to their armed and security forces and other au- the relevant authorities of the Member State thorised bodies in order to identify, for dispo- concerned for decision. sal, surplus and obsolete stocks; 2 ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall issue gui- 3 The Executive Secretary shall ensure, in colla- delines on the procedures to be followed and boration with Member States, that effective

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 82 standards and procedures for stockpile mana- other important part of the arm; gement of weapons collected in the context of b) A “Security marking” shall be applied to all peace operations are duly observed. weapons produced after the entry into force of this Convention. This will permit the identifi- Article 17: Collection and Destruction of cation of the weapons in the event that classic Small Arms and Light Weapons markings have been destroyed or falsified. Se- 1. Member States shall undertake to collect curity markings must be undertaken on com- and/ or destroy: ponent parts that are not easily manipulated a) the arms which are surplus to the natio- after the weapon’s manufacture, and the fal- nal needs or have become obsolete; sification of which would render the weapon b) seized weapons; unusable; c) unmarked weapons; c) Member States that import a small arm that d) illicitly held weapons; is not marked in accordance with the provi- e) arms collected in the implementation of sions outlined under paragraph a) and b) abo- peace accords or programmes for the volun- ve shall: tary handing in of weapons. i. Apply a classic marking if the weapons 1 All weapons so collected must be registered were manufactured before the entry into and securely stored and or destroyed. force of this Convention; 2 Member States undertake to promote and/ ii. Apply a classic marking and a security or carry out programme of voluntary handing marking if the weapons were manufactured in of weapons. after the entry into force of this Convention; failing this, the weapons cannot be impor- Article 18: Marking ted or must be destroyed. 1 For identification purposes, all small arms iii. If the importing country and the year of and light weapons, their ammunition and import are not known at the time of manu- other materials, considered as essential by the facture, the acronym of the importing State supplier, shall be assigned a unique and speci- and the year of importation are marked by fic marking upon manufacture; this marking a competent institution in the importing shall include the following elements: country. 2 For small arms and light weapons covered 3. For ammunition: under this Convention, a) The markings shall include a unique lot num- a) “Classic marking” shall include a unique se- ber, the manufacturer’s identity, as well as the rial number, the manufacturer’s identity, as country and year of manufacture. Information well as the identification of the country and concerning the purchaser’s identity and the year of manufacture. Information concerning country of destination should also be included the purchaser’s identity and the country of if known at the time of manufacture. These de- destination should also be included if known tails must feature at least once on the jacket at the time of manufacture. The markings shall (i.e. cartridge) containing the powder or liquid be expressed alphanumerically. They must be used in the ammunition or explosive. The ma- legible and should be featured on a maximum rkings shall be expressed alphanumerically. number of main parts of the weapon, and at b) The smallest ammunition packaging shall the very least on the part designated by the include information outlined under 2(a). manufacturer as essential as well as on one

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 83 Article 19: Tracing c) Intended use of the information being 1 Member States shall exchange information sought. on illicit small arms and light weapons and 1 Member States receiving a tracing request on seized small arms and light weapons, as shall acknowledge receipt within a reasonable well as trafficking in weapons that contrave- time frame. ne international law or the internal laws of 2 Member States shall provide reliable respon- the States in which the operations take place ses to tracing requests made by other Member (condemnation of the person or institution States within one month from the date of re- implicated, sanctions, disposal, destruction ceipt of the said request. methods, neutralisation). 3 In responding to a tracing request, the re- 2 In the case of other small arms and light wea- quested Member States shall provide all avai- pons, Member States shall exchange the follo- lable information sought by the requesting wing data on a regular basis: Member States that is relevant for the purpose a)on manufacture (the marking system and of tracing illicit small arms and light weapons. techniques used, and authorized manufactu- 4 The requested Member States may seek addi- rers); tional information from the requesting Mem- b) on transfers (exports to and/or imports from ber States where a tracing request does not all other States, transits, information availa- contain the information required in Paragraph ble concerning national legislation, existing 3 (b) above. practices and controls, authorised dealers and brokers); Article 20: Brokering c) on existing stockpiles (management, inven- 1 Member States shall register all citizens and tory, security, surplus, losses, theft, destruc- all companies incorporated in their territory tion). that are brokering small arms and light wea- 1 The Executive Secretary shall receive request pons, including financial agents and transpor- for exemption and shall act in accordance with tation agents on armament and shall make Article 5 of this Convention. such registration a requirement for their licit 2 A Member State may initiate a tracing re- operation. quest through the ECOWAS Executive Secreta- 2 Member States shall ensure that all registe- ry in relation to small arms and light weapons red small arms and light weapons brokering found within its territorial jurisdiction that it agents obtain an explicit authorization for considers to be illicit. each individual transaction in which they are 3 To ensure smooth and effective cooperation involved irrespective of where the arrange- in tracing, requests for assistance in tracing ments take place. illicit small arms or light weapons will contain 3 Member States shall require that all small sufficient information including, inter alia: arms and light weapons brokering license ap- a) Information describing the illicit nature plications for authorisation provide full disclo- of the small arm and light weapon, inclu- sure of relevant import and export licences or ding the legal justification thereof and cir- authorisations and associated relevant docu- cumstances under which the small arm and ments, the names and locations of all broke- light weapon was found; ring and shipping agents involved in the tran- b) Markings, type, calibre and other rele- saction and the transit routes and points of vant information; the small arms and light weapons shipments.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 84 4 Member States shall adopt such legislative Article 23: Public Education and Awareness and other measures to punish and establish as Programmes a criminal offence the illicit brokering of small 1 In the interest of promoting a culture of pe- arms and light weapons. ace, Member States shall design public/com- 5 Brokering activities may be assessed under munity education and awareness programmes Article 1 and 6 of the present Convention. at local, national and regional levels in order to involve the population in the efforts to curb Article 21: Harmonization of Legislative the proliferation of small arms and light wea- Provisions pons. 1 Member States shall undertake to revise and 2 Member States in this regard shall undertake update national legislation to ensure that the to develop and/or strengthen their partner- provisions in this Convention are minimum ship with civil society organisations at local, standards for small arms and light weapons national and regional level including women, control and their ammunition as well as other youth and others, for better information and related materials. raise public awareness on the dangers of the 2 Each Member State shall adopt legislative proliferation of small arms and light weapons. and other necessary measures to establish as a 3 Member States shall encourage civil society criminal offence in the following cases: organisations to play a leading role in creating a) any activity carried out in violation of the awareness and education of the population. provisions of this Convention; b) any activity carried out in violation of an CHAPTER VI - INSTITUITIONAL AND IMPLE- arms embargo imposed by the United Nations, MENTATION ARRANGEMENTS the African Union or ECOWAS; Article 24: Member States 3.The Executive Secretary shall elaborate and 1 Within the framework of the implementation propose to Member States guidelines for har- of this Convention, the States Parties which monization of legislative provisions. have not yet done so, shall establish through regulation or legislation a National Commis- Article 22; Strengthening of Border Con- sion in accordance with Article 51 of the Pro- trols tocol on mechanisms for prevention, manage- Member States, in collaboration with the ECO- ment, resolution of conflict and keeping peace WAS Executive Secretary, shall: and security and with the enforcement of the a) Strengthen sub-regional cooperation among decision of the Conference of Heads of State th defence and security forces, intelligence ser- and Government on December 10 , 1999 on vices, customs and border control officials in the establishment of National Commissions combating the illicit circulation of small arms for the fight against the illicit proliferation and and light weapons. circulation of light weapons. b) Enhancing the capacity of national defence 2 The National Commissions shall be establi- and security forces, law enforcement and secu- shed according to the existing ECOWAS guide- rity agencies, including appropriate training lines contained in the National Manual prepa- in investigative procedures, border control red by ECOWAS. and law enforcement techniques, and upgra- 3 Member States shall allocate a budget line to ding of equipment and resources; ensure effective functioning of National Com- missions

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 85 4 The Member States shall elaborate their Na- 2 Member States shall take the necessary me- tional Action Plans on Small Arms and Light asures to endow the ECOWAS Executive Secre- Weapons. tariat with the institutional and operational 5 Such action plans shall be developed throu- capacities appropriate to the responsibilities gh a national information gathering process given to the Executive Secretary by this Con- involving all relevant national stakeholders vention. including civil society, and the convening of a national forum of all stakeholders to delibera- Article 26: Cooperation Within and Among te on the elements to be included in the Natio- States nal Action Plan. 1. Member States undertake to promote intra– and inter-state cooperation in the implementation of this Convention. To this effect: Article 25: The ECOWAS Executive Secretary 1. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary is respon- a) the ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall pre- sible for supporting and supervising the ap- pare procedures for interstate cooperation be- plication of the provisions of this Convention. tween security forces, the services in charge of To this end the ECOWAS Executive Secretary border controls and all other services concer- shall: ned, in the spirit of this Convention. a) define and carry out the policy for mobilising b) The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall faci- the necessary resources for the implementa- litate and seek assistance for the training of tion of this Convention; officials in intra- and interstate cooperation. b) provide the Member States with the necessary financial and technical support for the re- Article 27: Complaint Procedure Concerning alisation of their activities; Violation of this Convention c) ensure the monitoring and implementation 1 All concerns relating to the violation of this of this Convention; Convention shall be brought to the attention d) present an annual Report to the Summit of of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary who would Heads of State and Government on the status then submit such a complaint to the ECOWAS of implementation of the Convention. Mediation and Security Council; e) if ECOWAS Executive Secretary deems it ne- 2 If the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Coun- cessary, refer a specific urgent and/or serious cil considers that there is a breach of the obli- question regarding the application of this gations under this convention, it shall decide Convention to the ECOWAS Mediation and Se- on the appropriate measures to be taken such curity Council. as sanctions, inquiry, study or refer the matter 1 The Executive Secretary shall develop a Plan to the ECOWAS Court of Justice; of action for the implementation of this Con- 3 This review procedure of complaints shall not vention and submit it to the appreciation mean the impossibility for a State or an indivi- of the Member States for adoption. Such a dual to refer to the ECOWAS Court of Justice if plan shall outline key activities that need to it notes a failure in the application of this Con- be implemented (such as Capacity Building, vention. harmonization of national legislation, border control, public awareness raising, informa- Article 28: Monitoring the Implementation tion exchange among National Commissions, of this Convention strengthening the capacity of civil society, or- 1 In order to ensure the monitoring of and com- ganisations, etc). pliance with the provisions of this Convention,

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 86 the Executive Secretary shall appoint a Group Article 30: Special Provisions of Independent Experts who supports him. The The undertakings ensuing from the provisions Group of Independent Experts shall submit a of this Convention shall not be interpreted as being in contradiction to the spirit and letter report to the Executive Secretary. of the Conventions or Accords linking a Mem- 2 Member States, upon the request of the Exe- ber State with a Third State as long as these cutive Secretary, shall provide the Group of Conventions and Accords are not in contradic- Independent Experts with all information at tion with the spirit and letter of this Conven- their disposal on exemption request. tion. 3 The Group of Independent Experts may seek any other information it shall deem useful for Article 31: Sanctions its work in relation with Member States and Sanctions mentioned in Article 77 of the ECO- through cooperation with Member States of WAS Revised Treaty are applicable to all Mem- the Wassenaar Arrangements, the European ber States whom the ECOWAS Court of Justi- ce would have found to be in violation of this Union and suppliers of arms. Convention. 4 Each Member State shall submit an annual report to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary on Article 32: Final Provisions its activities related to small arms and light (a) Signature, Ratification, Accession and En- weapons as well as other matters in relation try into Force with this Convention, in accordance with the 1 This Convention shall be open for signature to format of report developed by the Executive ECOWAS Member States. It shall be subject to Secretary. ratification. 5 A Conference of all Parties to the Convention 2 It shall enter into force on the date of deposit shall be convened by the Depositary as soon as of the ninth instrument of ratification. possible after the entry into force of this Con- 3 For a signatory that ratifies this Convention vention. The Conference of Heads of State and after the date of the deposit of the ninth ins- Government of member States shall review the trument of ratification, it shall enter into force implementation of this Convention and shall for that signatory on the date of deposit of its have further mandates as decided by Member instrument of ratification. States. Other Conferences of Member States 4 Any ECOWAS Member State that has not sig- shall be held as needed. ned this Convention shall be able to accede to it. In this case, this Convention shall enter into CHAPTER VII - GENERAL AND FINAL PROVI- force for that State upon the date of the depo- SIONS sit of the instrument of accession. Article 29: Interpretation and Dispute Set- tlement b) Amendments 1 Any dispute arising out of the interpretation 1 Any amendment to this Convention proposed and/or the implementation of the Convention by a Member State shall be submitted to the shall be settled by way of negotiation or by re- ECOWAS Executive Secretary who shall notify course to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security the Member States. Council. 2 Decision on the adoption of such an amend- 2 In the absence of a negotiated settlement, ment shall be taken by the Conference of He- the dispute shall be brought before the ECO- ads of State and Government by a two- thirds WAS Court of Justice. majority of the Member States.

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 87 3 An amendment so adopted shall enter into AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) HAVE SIGNED THIS force for all Member States who are party to CONVENTION. TH this Convention after receipt by the Deposi- DONE AT ABUJA, ON THE 14 JUNE 2006, tory of the instrument of ratification by the IN THREE ORIGINALS IN THE ENGLISH, majority of Member States. FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGES, ALL TEXTS, BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC (c) Withdrawal 1 Each Member State shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardised its supreme interests. 2 Withdrawal shall be effected by a Member State giving notice, which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary. The Depository shall circulate such notice to all other Member States. 3 During the period of twelve months referred to in the preceding paragraph, such Member State shall nevertheless continue to observe the provisions of this Convention. d) Depository Authority 1 This Convention shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, who is hereby designated as the Depository of the Conven- tion. 2 The Depositary shall: a) Receive instruments of ratification; b) Register this Convention with the African Union, the United Nations, as well as any other organisation as may be decided by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council; c) Transmit authentic copies of this Conven- tion to all States in the ECOWAS region, and shall notify them of signatures and ratifica- tions and accession of this Convention. IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST

© CEAUP | Isiaka Alani Badmus, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts | WP/CEAUP #2009/01 | www.africanos.eu 88 Autor: Isiaka Alani Badmus Título: Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts Editor: Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto Colecção: e-Working Papers Edição: 1ª (Jan/2009) ISBN: 978-989-8156-11-2 Localização: http://www.africanos.eu Composição: CP Referência bibliográfica: BADMUS, Isiaka Alani. 2009. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: ECOWAS and the West African Civil Conflicts. In e-Working Papers CEAUP. ISBN: 978- 989-8156 Porto: Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto. http://www. africanos.eu Preço: gratuito na edição electrónica, acesso por importação. Solicitação ao leitor: Transmita-nos ([email protected]) a sua opinião sobre este trabalho. ©:É permitida a cópia de partes deste documento, sem qualquer modificação, para utilização individual. Não é permitida qualquer utilização comercial. A reprodução de partes do seu conteúdo é permitida exclusivamente em documentos científicos, com indicação expressa da fonte. Não é permitida a sua disponibilização através de rede electrónica ou qualquer forma de partilha electrónica. Em caso de dúvida ou pedido de autorização contactar directamente o CEAUP ([email protected]).