By David C. Wa l s h

Did know the ship it was firing on 36 years ago—here, after the attack, listing from a deadly t o rpedo hit—was the USS L i b e r t y ? To d a y, top former U.S. intelligence o f ficials are saying “Ye s .”

COURTESY OF LIBERTY VETERANS’ ASSOCIATION

n 8 June 1967 the electronic intelligence ship relies heavily on newly declassified (or newly interpreted) USS L i b e r t y ( AGTR-5) was on station in interna- documents and more than 500 interviews with U.S. and tional waters 13 miles off the Sinai Peninsula in the Israeli political and military leaders invo l ved in the inci- eastern Mediterranean. The Arab-Israeli War had wo u n d dent, including former Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc- d own, the air was clear, and the seas were light. What hap- Namara, Admiral Isaac Kidd, and Yitzhak Rabin, who wa s pened early that Thursday afternoon is well known. Wi t h- the Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff at the time. Only out warning, a furious attack on the ship commenced from s even of the interviewees, how eve r, were on board the L i b - Israeli Mirage and Mystere jets, followed by Ay a h- c l a s s e r t y during the attack.2 motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Employed were rockets, na- At the Washington Navy Ya r d ’s Education Center, Judge palm, quick-firing 30-mm and 40-mm cannon, .50-caliber Cristol addressed a full house that included active - d u t y machine guns, and torpedoes. Four unshielded .50-caliber U.S. Navy personnel and surviving L i b e r t y c r ew members. machine guns were the L i b e r t y ’s only defense. The one He argued that the evidence “in totality” validated Israel’s Israeli torpedo hit of five launched left a yawning 40- long-standing position: namely, the catastrophe was the foot hole in the hull, devastating the cryptological spaces bitter fruit of mistaken identity and communications ga ff e s b e l ow decks and killing 25 U.S. National Security A g e n cy by both sides.3 The U.S. government quickly accepted Is- (NSA) technicians instantly. r a e l ’s apology 36 years ago, if not its ex p l a n a t i o n . 4 I s r a e l L a t e r, 821 shell holes were counted in the ship’s su- also settled death and injury claims, albeit reluctantly. A n d perstructure and hull. A total of 34 men died, with another in 1980, the United States received $6 million in com- 172 wounded, many disfigured for life, among the high- pensation for the $40-million intelligence ship. est peacetime tolls for any noncombatant U.S. Navy ve s- T h e Liberty I n c i d e n t contains considerable, largely Is- sel and by far the worst single loss to the U.S. intelligence raeli-sourced detail. It also includes a chapter called “Te l e- c o m m u n i t y. It seems a miracle the ship did not go dow n . 1 v i s i o n ’s Perspective ,” in which the author surmises that most survivors—some of whom openly criticize Israel’s R evisiting the Incident domestic policies and its formidable Washington lobby— h ave a political ax to grind. In December 2002, the Naval Historical Center hosted Judge Cristol, with 38 years’ n aval service, mourns the a presentation on the still deeply controversial attack by m e n s ’ deaths and injuries, and his book honors their Federal Judge and retired U.S. Naval Reserve Captain A . courage. But like the Israeli government, the judge is du- Jay Cristol, on a promotional tour for his recent book, T h e bious of the nay sayers. T h ey rely on “conjecture, hearsay Liberty Incident: The 1967 A t t a ck on the U.S. Navy Spy and plain wishful thinking,” flawed or traumatized mem- S h i p. Based on Judge Cristol’s doctoral thesis, the book ories, and “various conspiracy theories,” he says.5

58 Proceedings / June 2003 No Bigots Major General John Morrison, NSA deputy director for operations at the time, commented, “I am offended by Such characterizations, along with the linking of L i b - t h a t .” And retired Army Lieutenant General William Odom, e r t y veterans with Arab extremists and racist groups, sit NSA director from 1985 to 1988, and also unaware of the poorly with the ship’s crew. Indeed, the Internet Web site d i s p l a y, remarked, “I am astonished that Israel should of the L i b e r t y Ve t e r a n s ’ Association (LVA) makes clear put glory on the people who killed my SigInt-ers [sig- that all bigots’ support is unwelcome.6 The suggestion of nals intelligence personnel].” 1 0 The L i b e r t y’s blood-stained prejudice especially upsets Jewish survivors, such as the flag is exhibited at the National Cryptologic Museum in senior engineering offi c e r, George Golden, who receive d Fort Meade, Maryland. the Silver Star for directing heroic efforts to keep the ship afloat. And James Ennes Jr., the LVA historian and Disputed Timelines and Communications s p o kesman accused in Judge Cristol’s book of taking “an irrationally harsh line against Israel,” refers to such as- Although L i b e r t y c r ew members insist the attack lasted sertions as “just silly.”7 about an hour and a quarter, Judge Cristol’s book asserts Ennes, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, was offi- that the Israeli jets and MTBs finished their grisly bu s i - cer of the deck before being badly wounded early in the ness in only 22 to 25 minutes.1 1 attack. He devoted 13 years’ research toward his own book, Ennes recalls being unsettled by the numerous flights Assault on the L i b e r t y. Some half-dozen major—and many over the L i b e r t y by Israeli reconnaissance planes, start- minor—disagreements mark the dispute’s two main ing the previous night and continuing for a six-hour pe- schools: Judge Cristol’s “mistaken identity” and Ennes’s , riod preceding the assault. Trained U.S. Navy observe r s the crew ’s, and several U.S. intelligence professionals’ counted a dozen overflights. Some were made by a lum- “deliberate attack.” bering, Star- o f - D av i d - m a r ked Nord Noratlas “flying box- c a r,” which pulled several times to within mast-clipping M o re Inquiries r a n g e — l ow enough for any Israeli pilot to see a vessel in- capable of harming his country. Since 1967, survivors have pleaded for a more fa r- r e a c h- Melvin Smith, senior enlisted intercept chief, reassured ing government inquiry into the incident. But Judge Cristol Ennes when he overheard the pilots several times identify a rgues that another would be a waste of time. Some 13 the flag as U.S. and the ship for what she wa s . 1 2 At that already have been conducted (five by Congress, one by time, of course, Israel was a friend. Later, despite jam- the U.S. Nav y, and several by Israel). And according to ming of the ship’s distress frequencies, and before all her Cristol, while typically citing recklessness or ineffi c i e n cy, transmitters were shot awa y, the L i b e r t y ’s radio operators all exonerate the Israeli attackers of deliberate intent. managed again to hear the attackers make a positive iden- “ False!” retorts Ennes. Of the 13 inve s t i g ations cited by t i fication in the clear.1 3 Judge Cristol, conceding his new l y Judge Cristol, Ennes observes, “Most were not inve s t i ga- released Israeli transcripts reveal one correct identifi c a- tions. . . . T h ey were merely reports to the boss from ad- tion, states that they are confusing and mutually contra- visors . . . (and) mostly summaries and excerpts of the dictory—typical of the “fog of wa r.”1 4 F u r t h e r, citing Ennes, N aval Court of Inquiry report.”8 he states that no Hebrew linguists were on board the spy Clark Clifford, Chairman of President Lyndon B. John- ship, and that Israeli pilots would not have made unen- s o n ’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, drafted one crypted transmissions.1 5 such inquiry. Judge Cristol characterizes Clifford as angry, Ennes acknowledges that no “official” Hebrew linguists but finding Israel innocent of murder. Ennes infers darke r were on board, but he points out that at least one of the meanings from the same document. doomed NSA men, Russian/Arabic linguist Allen Blue, “Something had gone terribly wrong,” Clifford wrote the understood Hebrew.1 6 As for the jamming, Ennes, quot- President, “and then it had been covered up. I never felt ing Chief Radioman Wayne Smith and an article in P ro - the Israelis had made adequate restitution or ex p l a n a t i o n c e e d i n g s, also notes that the ship could not have been for their . . . unprovo ked actions.” Clifford also termed “un- m i s i d e n t i fied, because the frequencies jammed were pe- believable” the explanation that the attack was accidental. culiar to the U.S. Nav y. L i b e r t y Radioman Richard The L i b e r t y’s spotters, for example, had picked out the “ R o c ky” Sturman also recalls that he and other techni- MTBs’ small hull marks, yet the Israeli attackers claimed cians heard the radio jamming.1 7 Judge Cristol rejects such never to have seen the U.S. ship’s much larger ones. Clif- accounts as “myth.”1 8 ford, an intimate of Johnson’s and champion of Israel, urg e d the attackers be “punished,” as did U.S. Secretary of State The Flag Issue Dean Rusk, noting there was “every reason to believe that the USS Liberty was identified, or at least her nationality A gain echoing Israel and citing its reports, Judge Cristol determined . . . one hour before the attack.”9 declares that no U.S. flag was visible. He points to fi l m But instead of punishing the attackers, Israel honors footage of the intact L i b e r t y, taken at an unknown time them in a museum. Told of the display, retired Air Fo r c e from a slow-flying helicopter, which reveals no flag. He

Proceedings / June 2003 59 An Israeli motor torpedo boat passes t a ken the L i b e r t y for the Egyptian close alongside the Liberty during transport. Indeed, before the at- the attack. tack, Israeli headquarters had wrongly reported that some refers also to gun-camera stills “enemy vessel” wa s from one of the attacking Israeli shelling the coast from near jets. These grainy images show the Liberty’s position.25 To b i l l owing smoke “going straight illustrate a resemblance, u p ,” indicating the flag wa s Cristol pairs the ships in l i m p . 1 9 To Judge Cristol, it is silhouette drawings. He therefore unrealistic to think s h ows them, how eve r, as the young, inexperienced pilots could same size. (In fact, the E l h ave seen any flag, especially at 600 Quesir’s length was 275 feet to miles per hour.2 0 the L i b e r t y’s 455.)2 6 Judge Cristol’s Ennes, who maintained logs about such t ext notes the actual difference, bu t details, disagrees. He says that even at the Lib - opines that in the heat of battle such mistake s erty’s slowest steaming speed of 5 knots, the wind put 12 are plausible. knots across Old Glory and kept it wav i n g . 2 1 Since the ship The L i b e r t y’s crewmen deem insulting the notion that was near a combat zone, the crew also was ordered to ke e p a rgu ably the wo r l d ’s most electronically advanced ship “ h e a d ’s-up” by then-Commander William McGonagle, the could be confused with one of its most pedestrian ve s s e l s . ship’s captain. Ensuring unfurled colors was a given. And In this, they join Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford, and other se- after the normal flag was shot down early on, McGonagle nior U.S. officials, as well as author and historian James ordered signalmen to hoist the bright new holiday ensign, Bamford, whose NSA history, Body of Secre t s, devotes a measuring 7-by-13 feet. chapter to the L i b e r t y.2 7 In a January 2003 radio interview, Signalman Joe P r i n c i p a l l y, the El Quseir l a c ked the U.S. ship’s unique Meadors described the flag as fluttering each of seve r a l add-ons, which included, both topside, an 18-foot-wide times he observed it during the attack.2 2 No survivor who satellite dish nearly as tall as the smokestack and a wa d- glanced toward either flag at this time remembers it oth- ing pool-sized microwave dish. The ship bristled, as well, erwise. Regardless, Judge Cristol—whose book offers “pi- with video capture antennae and other exotica found on l o t s ’ eye view” drawings—insists that even this gaudy pa- no other vessel in the world, much less decrepit Arab trans- rade standard would have appeared “tiny” to high-speed port ships.2 8 Ancillary reasons the “deliberate school” re- jet pilots. jects Judge Cristol’s El Quseir defense are as follows: T h e Retired Navy Commander Tom Schaaf is a combat- Egyptian craft tested jet av i a t o r. He attended the Navy Yard lecture, and ➤ F l ew colors markedly dissimilar to the U.S. flag a f t e r ward queried Judge Cristol. Schaaf disbelieves the ➤ Was one-quarter of the L i b e r t y’s tonnage and just nearly claimed 600 mile-per-hour speed for the attacking aircraft, half her length adding in a written critique that pilots would have view e d ➤ Had been out of service for many months a lot more detail than disclosed in film clips. Post-lecture ➤ Was waiting to be scrapped in A l e x a n d r i a answers suggest Judge Cristol flew the Nav y ’s slow e s t ➤ Was illustrated—along with the L i b e r t y—in Ja n e ’s Fi g h t - propeller aircraft and has not seen combat. “He has no ing Ships, to which Israel had access2 9 competence to analyze or discuss jet attack tactics,” Schaaf In addition, the Egyptian c o n c l u d e d . 2 3 N aval A t t a c h e ’s office in Washington says E l The El Quseir Q u s e i r was painted s i l v e r, not the Since 1967, Israeli spoksmen have insisted the L i b e r t y’s battle- Israeli pilots had confused the L i b e r t y with the ship grey.3 0 I t El Quseir, a 1920s-vintage Egyptian horse cav- is highly un- alry transport said to have been in the area.2 4 J u d g e l i ke l y, NSA Cristol accepts this. Those same inex p e r i e n c e d o fficials on airmen unable to notice the ship’s flag and unique board and hull markings, he maintains, easily could have mis- o ff ex p l a i n , that Israel’s hy p e r v i g i l a n t The skipper of the ship, Commander Wi l l i a m s p y agencies McGonagle, who received the , surveys the damage. would be unac- quainted with these

60 Proceedings / June 2003 fa c t s . 3 1 This suggests a question: why assault so concert- e r t y s p o kesmen bristle at such “ex c u s e s .” Moved mark- edly an unthreatening old Egyptian transport (not to say ers or no, Israeli intelligence would have charted eve r y an unarmed U.S. Navy ship) when she could be escorted ship then in the eastern Mediterranean: Arab, Russian, and to Haifa as a war prize (and the U.S. ship signaled to U.S. The L i b e r t y was the reg i o n ’s only blue-water U.S. quit the area)? N avy ve s s e l . Weeks after the attack, this “mistaken identity” feature— A t t a ck on the Life Rafts along with a half-dozen other disparities between the crew- m e n s ’ and Israel’s positions—was outlined for the Lega l After the attack, Commander McGonagle, his leg shred- A d v i s o r ’s Office by State Department lawyer Carl Salans.3 9 ded and bleeding, yet still at the conn, gave the “prepare As Judge Cristol points out, the Top Secret report (released to abandon ship” order. (For his actions that day, he re- in 1983) drew no conclusions per se.4 0 But L i b e r t y s u r - c e ived the Medal of Honor. The award certificate does not v ivors see its stark comparisons as a refutation of Israel’s mention Israel.) Concurrently, the MTBs circled to position. Ennes terms the report “deva s t a t i n g .”4 1 within 40 or 50 feet. Then, over a 40-minute Perhaps the widest chasm separating the span, according to U.S. Navy ey e- “ m i s t a kens” from the “deliberates” is witnesses, the boats’ g u n n e r s loosed heavy automatic weapons The L i b e r t y limps into Malta at stretcher bearers, fi r e - c o n - with a torpedo hole at her trol teams, and other men waterline and other holes in her still upright on the decks. hull and superstructure fro m The L i b e r t y’s motor whale aircraft fire. boat had been destroy e d , and few life rafts survive d . the Naval Court of Inquiry. But Lieutenant Lloy d Ordered convened a week Painter (Ennes’s relief as of- after the event by Com- ficer of the deck) orga n i z e d m a n d e r-in-Chief Nava l three undamaged ones and Forces Europe, A d m i r a l k i c k ed them over the gun- John McCain, and headed by wales. Two were shot to pieces Rear Admiral Kidd, the hear- immediately in the wa t e r, the ing is dubbed “remarkably com- third hauled aboard one of the tor- petent (and) thorough” by Judge pedo boats.3 2 At this distance, Ennes Cristol, “a doctored sham” by the ve t e r- emphasizes, the large bow and stern marks a n s . 4 2 The judge stresses that 14 seamen spoke on the freshly painted ship were unmistakable. The des- at the hearing. But ship’s officers Ennes, Pa i n t e r, ignator number “5” was 6 1/2 feet high and “GTR,” four Golden, and others charge that in dozens of cases, swo r n feet. Her name was in 18-inch lettering, in English.3 3 t e s t i m o ny damaging to Israel’s case was not allowed or, Judge Cristol quotes Lieutenant Pa i n t e r ’s testimony to if allowed, not entered into evidence or made part of the the naval hearing only on the rafts’ casting awa y.3 4 He ig- transcript. Thus, Ennes and the LVA charge, the court’s nores what came next. This act alone, the U.S. sailors Findings of Fact often were unsupported by the ev i d e n c e , c h a rge, proves deliberate intent to destroy a U.S. ship and c o n t r avening Navy rules of procedure.4 3 l e ave no witnesses.3 5 (In 1986, Navy legal expert Lieu- Charles Row l ey, electronic intelligence specialist and tenant Commander Walter Jacobsen agreed, arguing in T h e s h i p ’s photographer, states that a photo he had made dur- Naval Law Rev i ew that it was also a war crime.3 6) Notwith- ing the attack was seized by the naval court without ex- standing the gravity of these accusations, Judge Cristol planation and marked “Top Secret.” It showed the U.S. l e aves aside both the life raft matter and the attack’s in- flag ex t e n d e d . 4 4 Ennes avers not only that his testimony ternational legal ramifications. Israel insists that all shoot- went unentered but also that deck and weather log en- ing ceased immediately after the torpedo attack.3 7 tries in his hand were altered. Written observations had Explaining how either ship could have lobbed naval ar- correctly mirrored others’ to the time he was shot, he re- tillery shells 13-plus miles onto the wa r- w r a c ked Sinai counts, namely: multiple, close preattack overflights by coast, Judge Cristol and the Israeli government again cite Israeli reconnaissance planes, the attack by unmarked jets, “fog of wa r.” T h ey declare that Israeli commanders had and the U.S. flag standing out continually.4 5 Rather than confused an exploding ammunition dump near Sharm el adduce and document facts, former cryptologic technician Sheikh with a coastal bombardment.3 8 Joe Lentini stated recently, the naval hearing helped Israel Judge Cristol points out other areas of confusion. Fo r “get away with murder.”4 6 example, the L i b e r t y was identified correctly early in the Joe Meadors, L i b e r t y signalman, observed at the Nav y morning, but then the error cycle kicked in anew when the Yard gathering: “The Navy cannot inve s t i gate itself.” Mean- m a r ker was moved from a plotting table in Tel Av iv. L i b - while, survivors contest Judge Cristol’s statement that

Proceedings / June 2003 61 Former NSA Officials Agree P residential Recall When the L i b e r t y’s technicians fi- he jamming of unique U.S. frequencies during the L i b e r t y i n c i d e n t nally found an unjammed frequency, Tseems to establish deliberate intent. And in ex c l u s ive interview s t h ey sent a last desperate message with this author, several former high-level National Security A g e n cy to the Sixth Fleet: “Flash Flash (NSA) officials agree. Flash. I pass in the blind.” Jet fi g h t- On 14 February 2003, the “godfather” of the NSA’s Auxiliary General ers launched from the carriers USS Technical Research program, Oliver Kirby, noted that the L i b e r t y wa s A m e r i c a ( C VA-66) and S a ra t o g a “my baby.” Within weeks of the calamity, Kirby, deputy director for op- ( C VA-60). It was too late. Here, a erations/production, read U.S. signals intelligence (SigInt)-generated dispute hinges on several related, transcripts and “staff reports” at NSA’s Fort Meade, Maryland, headquar- m u c h - a rgu ed elements: how many ters. T h ey were of Israeli pilots’ c o nversations, recorded during the at- launches, from which aircraft car- tack. The intercepts made it “absolutely certain” they knew it was a U.S. r i e r, and when? But most important, ship, he said. Kirby’s is the first public disclosure by a top-level NSA w hy did the President issue an order senior of deliberate intent based on personal analyses of SigInt material. recalling the aircraft? Whether some In an interview on 24 February 2003, retired Air Force Major General planes had nuclear bombs is hotly John Morrison, the agency ’s then-second-in-command (and Kirby’s suc- debated, too. cessor), said he had been informed at the time of Kirby’s findings and S u r v ivors speak of the turn- endorsed them. Former NSA Director retired Army Lieutenant General around orders being radio-tele- William Odom said on 3 March 2003 that, on the strength of such data, phoned direct from the White House the attack’s deliberateness “just wa s n ’t a disputed issue” within the and Defense Secretary McNamara a g e n cy. On 5 March 2003, retired Navy Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, to the carrier group in the Mediter- NSA director from 1977-1981, said he “flatly rejected” the Cristol/Is- ranean Sea. Judge Cristol answers raeli thesis. “It is just exceedingly difficult to believe that [the L i b e r t y ] that such “secure” communications was not correctly identifi e d .” He said this was based on his talks with were impossible in 1967. This is NSA seniors at the time having direct knowledge. All four were unawa r e misleading, the head of the L i b e r t y’s of any agency official at that time or later who dissented from the “de- 94-man NSA contingent says. Clear liberate” conclusion. —not secure—voice transmissions — D avid C. Wa l s h were used in the recall order, patched through the Naval Security Group relay station in Morocco.4 9 “some” had changed their minds after the inquiry, noting Otherwise, speculation is rife in this area. Some say that he fails to identify them or crew members he claims President Johnson recalled the planes out of fear the at- agree the attack was an accident. Others also have changed t a c kers were Russian and a military response could trig- their minds, including Captain Ward Boston, the senior ger World War III. Others say the President, who at one N avy lawyer under pressure to give a peremptory eva l u- stage believed Egypt had attacked the L i b e r t y , was pre- ation of the Navy Board of Inquiry. In 2002, Boston pared to “nuke” Cairo. Still others believe LBJ, on learn- dropped a bombshell on Judge Cristol’s thesis. He in- ing the culprits were Israeli, would not retaliate for polit- formed Navy Ti m e s that Israel had knowingly assaulted ical reasons. the L i b e r t y and has wo r ked ever since to “try to get out A final aspect of the Judge Cristol treatise, although not of it.” As surprising, he said, was that the court’s presi- part of the point/counterpoint, has engendered the sur- dent, Rear Admiral Kidd, shared this view, but owing to v ivo r s ’ special disdain. The judge all but ignores them. Of political pressure from Washington announced the oppo- 500-plus interviews conducted over more than a decade, site conclusion to the media. “Offi c e r s ,” Boston remarke d , only seven were with crew m e n . 5 0 “If he spoke to us,” says “ o b ey orders.” Boston explained in the interview that he Ennes, “it would blow his thesis out of the water—as the was speaking now in part because “everyone else is shoot- Israelis tried to do with our ship.” He adds, “Not a single ing his mouth off .”4 7 one of us agrees with Cristol.”5 1 Judge Cristol replies that Judge Cristol could not explain what might have in- s u r v ivor/witnesses are not objective. And, unlike Ennes, spired such candor, although he writes that the late A d- he “writes history, not memoirs.” miral Kidd had told him that the attack was in error. None of this may matter, because official support for That is the opposite of what Ennes maintains concerning the crew remains nonexistent. But growing numbers of his “many talks” with Admiral Kidd. Ennes also says that former senior government and military officials have beg u n Admiral Kidd urged him and his group to keep pressing speaking out. Among those in support of the ship’s 200- for an open congressional probe. Meanwhile, Judge Cristol plus survivors, in addition to those mentioned prev i o u s l y has Boston recanting his Navy Ti m e s statements. In real- and in the accompanying sidebar, are: former Chief of i t y, Boston stands firmly behind them.4 8 N aval Operations and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman

62 Proceedings / June 2003 Admiral Thomas Moorer, then CIA Director Richard James Bamford’s NSA history—Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra - S e c ret Na - tional Security A ge n c y (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 2001)—first revealed wa s Helms, then-NSA Director Marshall Carter, Carter’s circling ove r h e a d . Deputy Louis Tordella (who wrote on the Israeli Nav y ’s 1 7Richard Sturman, e-mail, 8 March 2003. See also Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum, p. report, “A nice whitewash!”), NSA “L i b e r t y incident” an- 10, and Richard Smith, “The Violation of the L i b e r t y,” U.S. Naval Institute P ro - c e e d i n g s, June 1978, note 10. Ennes e-mail, 13 March 2003 also notes that the alyst Walter Deeley, and Hayden Peake, professor of in- N aval Court of Inquiry documented the radio frequencies’ j a m m i n g . telligence history at the Joint Military Intelligence Col- 1 8Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 43. 1 9 l ege and retired CIA offi c e r.5 2 Cristol, I n c i d e n t, pp. 73-84. 2 0Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 180. W hy, Judge Cristol was asked at the Navy Yard, did his 2 1Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 75. conclusions run so afoul of such seniors? He answered 2 2I n t e r v i ew, Joe Meadors, Pa c i fica Radio KPFK, Los Angeles, 29 January 2003. 2 3 that although they were respectable men, their contradic- Schaaf critique, quoted in Ennes e-mail, 3 February 2003. 2 4Cristol, I n c i d e n t, pp. 54-55, 81. tions baffled him. In general, he suggests that because 2 5Cristol, I n c i d e n t, pp. 34-35, 38. theirs are not firsthand knowledge, contrarian offi c i a l s ’ 2 6Cristol, I n c i d e n t , p. 154. Two detailed diagrams (pp. 49, 56) show the sun, az- statements may, like the survivors’, be dismissed.5 3 imuth references, MTB positions and other indicia, but the L i b e r t y ’s bow marks are backward, and her stern’s are absent altogether. Judge Cristol is not without his admirers. He counts 2 7Bamford, S e c re t s, pp. 185-239. (besides numerous Israeli officials, Israeli Defense Fo r c e 2 8Bamford, S e c re t s, pp. 176, 207. 2 9 o fficers, and other partisans) former CIA Director A d m i- Ennes, e-mail, 4 March 2003. 3 0Unnamed Egyptian offi c e r, 18 February 2003. ral Stansfied Turner and the carrier A m e r i c a ’s captain, late 3 1NSA Deputy Director Oliver Kirby, interview, 18 February 2003. On Israeli in- Vice Admiral Donald Engen.5 4 But the supernova in this telligence: “They ’re re a l l y g o o d .” 3 2 galaxy is Secretary McNamara. Quoted by Judge Cristol Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum (2002), p. 18. Five witnesses “are willing to testify under oath” to this. as seeing only “tragic error,” McNamara’s stock answer 3 3Ennes, e-mail 3 February 2003. when queried by other L i b e r t y researchers is, “I remem- 3 4Cristol, I n c i d e n t , pp. 57, 180. The book notes only that a “damaged” raft was “re- ber nothing about the incident.” c overed” by an MTB. 3 5Lentini, Pa i n t e r, et, al., interviews, “Dead in the Wa t e r,” BBC-4 television docu- Will the L i b e r t y remain a sort of “Flying Dutchman,” m e n t a r y, 2001. sailing forever around her poor men’s souls? Until sur- 3 6L C d r. Walter Jacobsen, USN, “A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on v ivo rs get what they call “justice”—that elusive open the USS L i b e r t y,” Naval Law Rev i ew, Winter 1986, p. 51. Cristol lecture, 17 Dec. 2002. Answering a question about life raft witness Lt. Lloyd Painter: “It’s a new forum—it seems her restless ghost will do just that. story from 10 years after the attack.” He added, “I believe what Painter said in the (naval court) record.” 3 7Ennes, A s s a u l t, p. 158, note 10, quoting Israeli Commission of Inquiry of 16 June 1967, the so-called Ram Ron Report. 1Background on the attack is largely from James Ennes Jr., Assault on the L i b e r t y : 3 8Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 33. The True Story of the Israeli A t t a ck on an American Intelligence Ship ( N ew Yo r k : 3 9 Random House, 1979, updated version, Gathersbu rg, MD: Reintree Press Ed., Sig- Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum, p. 14. The report was released in 1983 after a long, nature Books, 2002). ex p e n s ive court case filed by a L i b e r t y s u p p o r t e r. 2A. Jay Cristol, T h e Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli A t t a ck on the U.S. Navy 4 0Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 94. Spy Ship (Dulles, VA: Brassey ’s, 2002). 4 1Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum, p. 14. 3Cristol lecture, Education Center, , Washington, DC, 4 2Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 151, Ennes, e-mail, 3 February 2003. 17 February 2002. 4 3Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum, p. 8. 4Ennes, A s s a u l t, Appendix S. 4 4Ennes, A s s a u l t, Addendum, p. 19. 5Cristol, I n c i d e nt, pp. 199, 201. 4 5Ennes, e-mail, 12 March 2003. 6Web site: ussliberty.com. Since the Liberty Ve t e r a n s ’ A s s o c i a t i o n ’s founding in 4 6Te l evision documentary, “Dead in the Wa t e r.” No shipmate is known to contest 1982, survivors have petitioned Congress and successive administrations to probe L e n t i n i ’s view. the attack, invite them to testify openly on what they witnessed, then publicly re- 4 7Navy Ti m e s, 26 June 2002. The same article quotes then-CIA Director Richard lease the full text. The government refuses. Helms on 29 May telling the reporter the attack “was no mistake .” This directly 7Cristol, I n c i d e n t , p. 97, and radio interview, Cristol, Ennes, Joe Meadors, Pa c i fi c a contradicts Judge Cristol and an agency report from 13 June 1967, backing Israel’s Radio KPFK, Los Angeles, 29 January 2003. m i s t a ken-identity claim. 8Ennes e-mail to author, 14 February 2003. 4 8Ennes, e-mail, 21 March 2003. No evidence exists that Boston went public until 9C l i fford Report to the White House, July 1967, and Dean Rusk demarche to Is- he talked to Navy Ti m e s and no sign of a reversal. raeli Ambassador Avraham Harmon, 10 June 1967, in Ennes, A s s a u l t, A p p e n d i x 4 9Cristol, I n c i d e n t, p. 98. Interview with LCdr. David Lewis, USN (Ret.), head of S. Clifford Report, cited in Cristol, I n c i d e n t , notes, p. 263. the L i b e r t y’s 195-man NSA contingent, 28 February 2003. Despite Lew i s ’s senior 1 0 Cristol, “The L i b e r t y I n c i d e n t ,” Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 1997, p. 331, rank and position, “No one asked me to testify” at the naval hearing. Lewis wa s photo and caption. The wheel and bell of MTB-203, which launched the fatal tor- among the wo u n d e d . pedo, are displayed in Haifa ’s Clandestine Immigration and Naval Museum. In- 5 0Ennes, e-mail, 3 February 2003. Most of these were perfunctory exchanges at a t e r v i ew, MGen. John Morrison, USAF (Ret.), 3 March 2003. Interview, former 1992 ve t e r a n s ’ h a p py hour and not interviews, Ennes points out. NSA Director LGen. William Odom, USA (Ret.), 26 March 2003. 5 1Ennes, e-mail, 3 February 2003. 1 1 Cristol, I n c i d e n t , pp. 55, 58. 5 2Bamford, S e c re t s, and Ennes, A s s a u l t. The skipper had always held his tongue. 1 2 Ennes, e-mail 9 March 2003. CPO Melvin Smith was killed shortly thereafter. But besides the “deliberate” remark in 1998 in an oral history (see Bamford, p. 1 3 Ennes, e-mail, 3 March 2003. 233) a few months before dying in 2001 he asked President George W. Bush to 1 4 Cristol, I n c i d e n t , p. 88. Judge Cristol also writes (p. 181) that the Israelis had look into the attack. Retired Captain William McGonagle was ignored. Peake quoted “little knowledge” of warships they were not encountering in battle. He says if in The Intellige n c e r, Summer 2001, that “common sense” ruled out an accident. a nything, the U.S. ship more likely would have been (and at one stage was) con- 5 3Ennes, e-mail, 21 March 2003. fused with a Russian electronic intelligence “trawler” (see pp. 49-50). The 5 4Cristol, I n c i d e n t, book jacket endorsements. implications of an Israeli attack on a Soviet vessel in peacetime require no e l u c i d a t i o n . 1 5 Cristol, I n c i d e n t , pp. 25, 109, 118. Ennes, e-mail, 13 March 2003: “Israeli and American pilots routinely broadcast in the clear. I don’t believe there was (any ) M r. Walsh is a freelance writer and photographer headquartered in the airborne encryption capability in 1967.” Washington, D.C., area. He has wo r ked as a consultant on segments con- 1 6 Ennes, e-mail, 3 March and 9 March 2003. Cristol, I n c i d e n t , p. 137, citing a let- cerning the USS L i b e r t y for CBS New s ’s “60 Minutes” and Britain’s ter to him from an unnamed NSA Hebrew linguist on board an EC-121, which Thames Te l ev i s i o n .

64 Proceedings / June 2003