The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed

AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 1 of18

Azure Azure'SPRING 576*

WHAT IS AZURE? The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed

Michael B. Oren

Early in the afternoon ofJune 8, 1967, Israeli jets and missile boats opene PAST ISSUES on the USS Liberty, an American surveillance ship opera-ting off the coast Gaza. Struck by rockets, cannons and torpedoes, the vessel suffered extens damage and over 200 casualties. Israeli forces were then engaged in the foi dayof what would soon be called the SixDay War, which wouldresuh in i devastatingdefeat for the combined armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. AZURE IN THE MEDIA At first overshadowed by Israel's stunning victory, the attack on the LiberP destined to become a recurring source oftension between Israel and the Ui States. AlthoughIsrael apologized for the attack and paid compensation to victims, many American officials rejected Israel's claim that the Libertyinci

nnnv had been an honest mistake. Rather, they blamed Israel for what was at bes inexcusable negligence, or at worst the premeditatedmurder ofAmerican servicemen. Such charges persisted in the face ofsuccessive inquiries by a I range of American agencies and Congressional committees, as well as a fill court of inquiry, all ofwhichfound no proof whatsoever that Israel knowir attacked an American ship. On the contrary, the evidence produced by thes RELATED SITES investigations lent further support to Israel's claim that its decision to attacl given the circumstances, a reasonable error.

These findings notwithstanding, the case ofthe assault on the Liberty has n been closed. If anything, the accusations leveled against Israel have grown WRITE TO EDITOR with time. In recent years, an impressive number of former American offici; have gone on record insistingthat the Israeli action was, in fact, deliberate, include Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, who was Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs o (JCS) at the time of the Liberty incident, who has labeled the episode a "co up," adding that he "cannot accept the claimby the Israelis that this was a ( mistaken identity."^ Paul C. Wamke, then Under Secretaryofthe Navy, ha: SUBSCRIPTIONS written that

I found it hard to beheve that it was, in fact, an honest mistake on the part ofthe air force units.... I suspect that in the heat of battle they figured that the presence American ship was inimical to their interests....-

Site Search Similarly, former Secretary ofState Dean Rusk has called the attack "outrageous," adding in a 1990 radio interviewthat "theLiberty was flying I American flag. It was not all that difficult to identify, and my judgment was http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE- Issue #9 - Oren Page 2 of18

somewhere along the line some fairly senior Israeli official gave the go- ahc these attacks....David G. Nes, who at the timeserved as deputyhead of1 American mission in Cairo, puts it morebluntly: "I don'tthinkthat there's a doubtthat it was deliberate.... [It is] one ofthe great cover-ups ofour milit history."" And George Ball, then Under Secretary of State, has called the American government's response to theassault an "elaborate charade.... Ar leaders didnot have the courage to punish Israel for the blatant murder of i citizens.

Support for these charges canbe found in a wide range of publications on1 Liberty incident. Assault on theLiberty^ a 1979 memoir byformer Liberty Jim Ennes, Jr., describes the attack as intentionaland malicious, and argues the truth hasbeenobscured by a massive cover-up conducted by Israel and advocates abroad. Thisallegation hasbeen repeated in Richard Deacon's Tt Israeli Secret Service (1977), in John Ranela^'s The Agency: The Rise an* Declineofthe CIA (1986), and in Andrew and Leslie Cockbum's Dangeroi Liaison: TheInside Story ofthe U.S.-IsraelCovertRelationship (1991). T1 cover-up theory is also central to Stephen Green's Taking Sides: America's Relationswitha Militant Israel (1984), one ofthe best-selling ofall anti-Is polemics. Nor is the charge of Israeli premeditation confined to booksaimc popular audience. It also features prominently inacademic workssuch as 7 USS Liberty: DissentingHistory V5. OfficialHistoryby historian JohnE. I (1993), as well as Donald NefiPs Warriorsfor Jerusalem: The SixDays tha ChangedtheMiddle East (1984), considered bymany scholars a standard the Six DayWar.® Indeed, so powerful is the trendtowards acceptance of I guilt for having planned the attackthat a 1995 issue of theInternationalJc ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence was able to carry the assertion of Reverdy S. Fishel that "all serious scholarship on the subject accepts Israel' assault as havmg been perpetrated quite deliberately...."'

The claimthat Israel's attack on the Liberty was premeditated has also appt persistently inthe press. In 1992, nationally syndicated columnists Roland 1 and Robert Novak dedicated a column, "Twenty-Five Years ofCover-Up,' this charge. Similar accusations havebeenairedon television programs sue ABC's 20/20 and Geraldo Rivera's Now It Can Be Told? The claim is parti( widespread on the Internet, wherea search for the "USS Liberty" yields do sites, fi-om those ofArab propagandists{Birzeit.edu, Salam.org, Palestine Forever) and anti-Semitic hate mongers{The Tangled Web, Jew Watch) to award-winning USSLiberty Homepage, posted by Ennes and other veterar whilethe tenor ofthese pages may differ- the veterans abjure any anti-Sen stressing that several oftheir crewmates were Jewish - their conclusions art indistinguishable: Israelwantonly attackedthe Libertywiththe intention of every manon board, andthen thwartedattemptsto investigate the crime.'®

Refuting this accusation was difficult if not impossible in the past, when th€ official records on the Liberty were designated top-secret and closed to the general public. Withthe recentdeclassification of these documents inthe L States and Israel, however, researchers have gained access to a wealth ofp sources - Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and U.S. military records, Israeli dip correspondence, and memoranda fi"om both the State Department andthe ^ http://www.shalem-org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 3 of18

House. With the aid ofthese materials, the attack on the Liberty can now b reconstructed virtuallyminute-by-minute and with remarkable detail. The p that emerges is not one ofcrime at all, nor even ofcriminal negligence, but string offailed communications, humanerrors, unfortunate coincidences ar equipment failures on both the American and Israeli sides - the kind oftrag senseless mistake that is all too common in the thick ofwar.

The USS Liberty was cruising from Norfolk, Virginia to Abidjan on the Iv Coast when, in mid-May 1967, crisis erupted in the Middle East. Without warning, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sent thousands oftroops the Sinai desert, ousted the UN peacekeeping forces stationed there and th< closed the Straits ofTiran - the critical waterway leading to Israel's southei ofEilat - to Israeli shipping.

In weighing its response, the Israeli government consulted with President L Johnson, who, though preoccupied with the Vietnam War, was sympathetic Israel's plight. The President proposed to challenge the Tiran blockade witl international maritime convoy and on May 24, in preparation for this plan, ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet to advance into the eastern Mediterranean. Av the danger ofbecoming embroiled in an Arab-Israeli war, however, Washir cautioned the fleet to remain, until further notice, "outside an arc whose rai 240 miles from Port Said," on the Egyptian coast."

At this time, the Liberty was formally under the conmiand ofthe Sixth Flee although in practice its orders came du-ectly from the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, operating under the aegis ofthe National Security Agency (NSA). named "Rockstar," the 455-foot "Auxiliary General Technical Research Sh (agtr)," as it was euphemistically called, was in fact a signals mtelligence ve (sigint) equipped with cutting-edge listening and decoding devices. Among 294-man crew were several dozen members ofthe Naval Security Group, ^ worked below the starboard deck in an area strictly off-limits even to the L skipper, Cmdr. WilliamL. McGonagle. The ship sported large antennas am discs, but apart from four .50-caliber machine-gun mounts, it had no visibk armaments. The markings "GTR-5" were freshly painted on its bow, and fr mast flew a standard, navy-issue American flag.

As the Sixth Fleet steamed toward the eastern Mediterranean, the Liberty \ for Rota, Spain. There, in addition to supplies, it took on three Marine Cor Arabic translators, augmenting the three NSA Russian-language experts all on board. Then, on May 30, McGonagle received new instructions to sail" speed" to a point just half a mile outside Egyptian and Israeli territorial wat which extended twelve and six nautical miles, respectively, from the coast, order, originating with the JCS, superseded a request by the U.S. Naval Command in Europe (cinceur) to hold the Liberty in Rota "until directed otherwise." Neither cinceur nor McGonagle was aware ofthe Liberty^ obj< later described by the Defense Department as "assuring communications be U.S. government posts... and assisting in... the evacuation ofAmerican citL Though the exact nature ofits mission remains classified, the Liberty was n http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 4 of18

UKCiy seiu lu iidCK iiic iiiuveiiieiii&» ui iiuups miu men ouviei dUVJ Sinai - hence the need for Arabic and Russian translators.

Johnson's idea ofa convoy aimed at breaking the blockade came to nothing Nasser's troops remained mobilized in the Sinai. Syrian and Jordanian force also poised to attack. On the morning ofJune 5, with diplomatic options exhausted, the Israeli government went to war." The IDF launched lightnir and ground strikes against Egypt, quickly gaining the initiative, and repulse attacks from Syria and Jordan. Yet the Israelis remained highly concerned i threats to their coastline, along which most ofthe country's major industria population centers were situated. The Egyptian navy outnumbered Israel's 1 more than five to one in warships and, in a crisis, could call on the support some seventy Soviet vessels in the vicinity.^'' The failure ofthe Israeli navy': attacks on Egyptian and Syrian ports early in the war did little to assuage L fears. Consequently, the IDF Chiefof StaJBF, Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, informed U.S. Naval Attache in Tel Aviv, Cmdr. Ernest Carl Castle, that Israel woul defend its coast with every means at its disposal. Unidentified vessels woul sunk, Rabin advised; the United States should either acknowledge its ships area or remove them."' Nonetheless, the Americans provided Israel with no mformation on the Liberty. The United States had also rejected Israel's reqi for a formal naval liaison. On May 31, Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassad Washington, had warned Under Secretary ofState Eugene V. Rostow that breaks out, we would have no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, and no way to get in touch with the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Before dawn on June 8, three days into the war, the Liberty finally reached destination, barely within international waters north ofthe Sinai coast. Plyii speed offive knots between Port Said and Gaza, the Liberty entered a lane used by commercial freighters, which Egypt had declared closed to neutral vessels. Anxious about his proximity to the fighting, McGonagle asked the Fleet commander, Vice-Adm. WilliamMartin, for permission to pull back f the shore, or else to be provided with a destroyer escort. Martin rejected tl: requests, noting that the Liberty "is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation."

Unbeknownst to both Martin and McGonagle, however, the JCS had repea cabled the Liberty the previous night with mstructions to withdraw to a dis ofone hundred miles from the Egj^tian and Israeli coasts. The transmissio: delayed, however, by the navy's overloaded, overly complex communicatio system, which routed messages as far east as the Philippinesbefore relaying to their destinations. The JCS' orders would not be received by the Liberty the following day, June 9, by which time they would no longer be relevant.

At 5:55 a.m. on June 8, Cmdr. Uri Meretz, a naval observer aboard an Isr; Force (lAF) reconnaissance plane, noted what he believed to be an Americ supply vessel, designated GTR-5, seventy miles west ofthe Gaza coast. At naval headquarters in Haifa, staffoflScers fixed the location ofthe ship witt marker, indicating "unidentified," on their control board. Research 'mJane\ http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren

audio-surveiilance ship ofthe United States, the Liberty.''* The marker was changed to green, for "neutral." Another sighting ofthe ship - "gray, bulky, its bridge amidships" - was made by an Israeli fighter aircraft at 9:00 a.m., i miles north ofEl-Arish, on the Sinai coast, which had fallen to Israeli force day before.'® Neither ofthese reports made mention ofthe 5-by-8-foot Ami flag which, according to the ship's crewmen, was flying fi"om the Liberty*^ starboard halyard.

The crew would also testify later that six lAF aircraft subsequently flew ov ship, giving them ample opportunity to identify its nationality. Israel Air Fo reports, however, make no fiirther mention ofthe Liberty.^^ There may ind( have been additional Israeli overflights, but the lAF pilots were not looking the Liberty. Their target was Egyptian submarines, which had been spotted coast. At 11:00 a.m., while the hunt for Egyptian submarines was on, the o on duty at Israel's naval headquarters, Capt. Avraham Lunz, concluded his In accordance with procedures, he removed the Liberty's, green marker on i grounds that it was already five hours old and no longer accurate.^°

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Then, at 11;24, a terrific explosion rocked the shores ofEl-Arish. The blasi clearly heard by the men on the Liberty's bridge, who had been navigating according to the town's tallest minaret, and who also noted a thick pall ofs wafting toward them. In El-Arish itself, Israeli forces were convinced they being bombarded fi'om the sea, and the IDF Southern Command reported s two unidentified vessels close offshore. Though the explosion probably resi http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 6 of18

Egyptian and Israeli sources had reported shellingofthe area by Egyptian warships the previous day. There was therefore good reason to conclude t\ Egyptian navy had trained its guns on Sinai.^^

Minutes after the explosion, the Liberty reached the eastern limit ofits patr turned 238 degrees back in the direction ofPort Said. Meanwhile, reports ( naval bombardment on El-Arish continued to reach IDF General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv. Rabin took them seriously, concerned that the si was a prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank advancing Israc troops. He reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in th< area, but also advised caution: Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nej Since no fighter planes were available, the navy was asked to intercede, wil assumption that air cover would be provided later. More than halfan hour without any response fi-om naval headquarters in Haifa. The General StaffJ issued a rebuke: "The coast is being shelled and you - the navy - have done nothing. "22 Capt. Izzy Rahav, who had replaced Lunz in the operations roo: needed no more prodding. He dispatched three torpedo boats ofthe 914th squadron, code-named "Pagoda," to find the enemy vessel responsible for t bombardment and destroy it. The time was 12:05 p.m.

At 1:41 p.m.. Ensign Aharon Yifi-ah, combat mformation officer aboard the flagship ofthese torpedo boats, T-204, informed its captain, Cmdr. Moshe that an unidentified ship had been sighted northeast ofEl-Arish at a range c miles. The ship was sailing toward Egypt at a speed, Yifi-ah estimated, of3 knots.

Yifrah's assessment, twice recalculated and confirmed by him, was pivotal, meant that the ship could not be the Liberty, whose maximum speed was 1 knots. Moreover, the Israelis had standing orders to fire on any unknown v the area sailing at over 20 knots, a speed which, at that time, could only be attained by fighting ships. This information, when added to the ship's direct indicated that the target was an enemy destroyer fleeing toward port after I shelled El-Arish.

The torpedo boats gave chase, but even at their maximum speed of36 knoi did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Rahav then alerted the air force, and two Mirage HI fighters were diverted from the Su Canal, northeast to the sea. When they arrived, the vessel they saw was "gr with two guns in the forecastle, a mast and fiinnel." Making two passes at. feet, formation commander Capt. Spector (IDF records do not provide pile names) reckoned that the ship was a "Z" or Hunt-class destroyer without tl markings (a white cross on a red background) ofthe Israeli navy. Spector t spoke with air force commander Gen. Motti Hod, who asked him repeated whether he could see a flag. The answer was "Negative." Nor were there a distinguishingmarks other than some "black letters" painted on the hull.

LAP Intelligence ChiefCol. Yeshayahu Bareket also claimed to have conta( American Naval Attache Castle at this point in an attempt to ascertain whe the suspect ship was the Liberty, but the latter professed no knowledge ofi http://www.shaIem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 7 of18

McGonagle.^" One fact is clear, however: After two low sweeps by the leac at 1:58 p.m., the Mirages were cleared to attack.

The first salvos caught the Libertys crew in "stand-down" mode; several c were sunning themselves on the deck, unaware ofthe Israeli jets bearing dc them. Before they could take shelter, rockets and 30-mm cannon shells stit- the ship from bow to stem, severing the antennas and setting oil drums on: Nine men were killed in the initial assault, and several times that number wounded, among them McGonagle. Radio operators on board found most frequencies inoperable and barely managed to send an SOS to the Sixth Fie MQrages made three strafing runs and were then joined by two additional ai Israeli Super-Mysteres returning from the Mitla Pass with a payload ofnap After fourteen minutes ofaction, the pilots reported having made good hits eight hundred holes would later be counted in the hull. The entire superstrt ofthe ship, from the main deck to the bridge, was aflame.

Throughout these sorties, no one aboard the Liberty suspected that the plai were Israeli. Indeed, rumors spread that the attackers were Egyptian MiGs the first strike, the visibilitythat had enabled crewmen to identify lAF reconnaissance craft earlier in the day was lost to the smoke ofbattle. One Israeli pilots, curious as to why the vessel had not returned fire, made a fin{ at ninety feet. "I see no flag," he told headquarters. "But there are marking: the hull - Charlie-Tango-Romeo-five.""

WhileEgyptian naval ships were known to disguisetheir identitieswith markings, they usually displayedArabic letters and numbers only. The fact the ship had Western markmgs led Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called offthe jets. Two LAF Hornet helicopters were sent to Ic survivors - Spector had reported seeing men overboard - while the torpedo squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identifical Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat's log, Oren claimed he received it.^'' It was now 2:20 in the afternoon; twenty-four minutes would before the squadron made contact mth the Liberty.

During that interval, the ship's original flag, having been shredded during tY attack, was replaced by a larger (7-by-13-foot) holiday ensign. As the crew labored to tend to the wounded, extinguish the fire, and bum classifiedpap contact was finally made with the Sixth Fleet. "Help is on the way," replied canierAmerica, which quickly unleashed eight ofits most readily available warplanes - F-104s arm^ with nuclear weapons. Before they reached their objective, however, the jets were recalled by Vice-Adm. Martin. IfRabin ft that the ship was Russian, Martin suspected that its attackers were Russian without authorization from the highest level, he did not want to risk startin nuclear war.^^

Meanwhile, the Israeli torpedo boats came within range. The Liberty was shrouded in smoke, but even so, Oren could see that it could not be the dej that had supposedly shelled El-Arish. Rather, he believed, it was a slower-r http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 8 of18

vessel that had either serviced that destroyer or evacuated enemy soldiers f the beach. At 6,000 meters, Oren's T-204 flagship paused and signaled "A/ "identify yourself." Due to damaged equipment,McGonagle could only rep kind, AA, with a hand-held Aldis lamp.^® Oren rememberedreceiving a sim response from the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al-Awwal, captured by the I navy in the 1956 war, and was sure that he now faced an enemy ship. Cons his naval intelligence manual, he concluded that the vessel in front ofhim - deck line, midship bridge and smokestack - resembled the Egj^tian freightc Quseir. The officers ofthe other two boats reached the same conclusion independently, and followed Oren into battle formation-^®

Any lingering doubts were soon dispelled as the Israeli boats came under si fire from the Liberty. Unaware ofMcGonagle's order not to shoot at the approaching boats, a sailor had opened up with one ofthe Brownings. Anc machine gun also fired, apparently on its own, triggered by exploding ammunition. Oren repeatedly requested permission from naval headquarter return fire. Rahav finally approved.

Ofthe five torpedoes fired at the Liberty only one found its mark, a direct 1 the starboard side, killingtwenty-five, almost all ofthem from the intelliger section. The Israeli crafr closed in, their cannons and machine guns raking 1 Libertys hull and, according to the crew's testimony, its life rafts as well. 0 those rafts, picked up by T-203, was found to bear U.S. Navy markings - tl indication that Oren had that the ship might be American. His suspicions m when while circlingthe badly listing ship, Oren confronted the designation 5. But still no flag was spotted, and it would take another half an hour, unt p.m., to establish the vessel's identity.^'

"I must admit I had mixed feelings about the news - profound regret at hav attacked our fiiends and a tremendous sense ofrelief [that the boat was noi Soviet]," Rabin later recalled.^^ News ofthe ship's American nationality hac arrived during an emergency meeting ofthe General Staffto discuss possib Soviet reprisals. An apology was immediately sent to Castle, and none too as eight conventionally armed warplanes had been launched from the USS Saratoga and sanctioned to "use whatever force required to defend the Lib

As the American jets returned to their carrier, the two Israeli Hornets read Liberty and offered assistance. Oren, shouting through a bullhorn, also trie« communicate with the ship. But McGonagle refused to respond. Realizing, that his assailants had been Israeli, he flagged the torpedo boats away and gestured provocatively at the Hornets. Even Castle himself, arriving just be dusk in another Israeli chopper, was denied permission to land. By 5:05 p.r Israelis had broken offcontact, and the Liberty, navigating virtually withou systems, with 34 dead and 171 wounded aboard, staggered out to sea.

Thecenter ofthe crisis then shifted from the Mediterranean to Washingtoi was only at 9:50 a.m. eastern tune - nearly two hours after the first shots w fired^^ - that the White House received word from the JCS that the Liberty, http://www.shaIem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 9 of18

lucaicu KjKj'LW iiuics iMJiiii ui imu uccii luipcuucu uy mi uiiKiiuwi vessel. Johnson assumed that the Soviets were involved. To forestall fiirthe escalation, he hotlined the Kremlin with news ofthe attack and ofthe dispa jets from the Saratoga.

But then the Israelis informed the Americans ofthe "mistaken action," and Johnson, like Rabin before him, breathed a sigh ofrelief While "strong di was conveyed to Ambassador Harman, so too were the Administration's th for the speed ofIsrael's notification. Apologies soon came in from Prime Is/. LeviEshkol ("Pleaseaccept my profound condolencesand convey my sym to allthe bereavedfamilies") and ForeignMinisterAbbaEban ("I am deepl mortifiedand grieved by the tragic accident involving the livesand safety o Americans"), as wellas from the Israeli charged'affaires in Washington, Ef Evron, a personalfiiend ofJohnson's("I grieve with you over the livesthai lost, and share in the sorrow ofthe parents, wives and children ofthe men - diedin this crueltwist offate"). Within forty-eight hours, the Israeli goverr offered to compensate the victims and their families.^®

At first, Israeli expressions ofregret and offers ofrestitution seemedto sati Administration, whoseinitial reaction was to downplay the incident. Of pai concernwas the danger that the Libertys presencein the area might reinfoj Nasser's charge that the Sixth Fleet had aided Israel in the war - what Wasl called "The Big Lie."^'These reservations soon faded, however, as senior c began to ask pointed questions: Why did the Israelis attack a neutral ship o high seas, without the slightest provocation? How hadtheyfailed to see th< Liberty^ flag or the freshly painted markings on its hull? How could they c- the Liberty with the El-Quseir^ a far slower, smallerboat, with no distinctly antennas? And finally, how could a ship sailing at 5 knots, whose maximun was 18, be gauged at 30?

"Beyond comprehension," fumed SecretaryofState Dean Rusk. "We cann« accept such a situation." ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board chiefClark C known for his pro-Israeliviews, reported to Johnson that the attack was "inexcusable... a flagrant act of grossnegligence for which the Israeli govei should be held completely responsible." While no official could explain whi motivation Israel might havehad for assaulting an American vessel, neither the facts seem to square. Either the Israelis hadexhibited rank incompetenc the midst of a victory that was nothing shortof brilliant - or theyhad strucl Liberty on purpose. Indeed, many inthe Administration had already conclu that the attackwasintentional andthat Israel's explanations wereentirely disingenuous. Increasingly, the charge of negligence gavewayto one of co blooded murder.^®

TheIsraelis moved to dispel these accusations withtwo preliminary reportj the incident. These admitted the IDF's culpability in erroneously reporting '< barrage on El-Arish, miscalculating theLiberty^ speed, andconfusing the s with the El-Quseir. Yet both studies insisted that the attack was an "innoce mistake," with no malice or gross negligence involved.^®

"This makes no goddamned sense at all," remarked UnderSecretary of Sta http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-C)ren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 10 of18

tugene Kostow when presented with these tindmgs on June 10. i he attack wrote Rusk, was "quite literallyincomprehensible... an act ofmilitaryreckl' reflecting wanton disregardfor humanHfe." Further umbrage was taken at Israeli reports' suggestion that the Liberty had no business beingwhere it v had failed to inform Israel ofits presence, and had failed to use all means (semaphores, flares, flags) to identify itselfto the torpedo boats. The Unite States now demanded that Israel not only pay compensation but admit wrongdoingand court-martial those responsible for the attack "in accordar with international law."''°

Israel rebuffed these demands, but at the same time it launched a third and more comprehensive investigation. Headedby military jurist Col. Yeshayal Yerushalmi, the commission delved into the question ofthe control-board markers, the pilots' testimonies and the orders given to the torpedo boats. while critical of the sameintelligence failures noted in the earlier reports, aj as the awkward command relationship between the air force and the navy, Yerushalmi's findings were identical to those of his predecessors. "Forall n regret that our forces were involved in an incident witha vessel belonging i fnendly state," he wrote, "I have not discovered any deviation from the stai ofreasonable conduct whichwould justify a court- martial."*"

Thetop-secret Yerushalmi report was conveyed to the Americans, who rej with the same mix of incredulity and indignation that had marked their resp to the previous reports. But the United Stateswas holding its owninvestig. intothe affair, beginning with the Navy Courtof Inquiry held inMalta shor after the attack. The hearings revealed basic contradictions in the testimoni McGonagleand other officers regardingthe length and sequence ofthe attj and raised the possibility that, due to light winds, the flag might well not ha been visible to Israeli pilots. Furthermore, Rear-Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., th presiding officer, found no evidence that the attack was inany way intentio calling it "a case of mistaken identity." Subsequent closed-door inquiries W' conducted by the CIA, the NSA, the JCS, as well as by both housesof Cor All reached the same conclusion: That the Israeli attack upon the USSLibe been the result oferror, and nothing more.

Yet suspicions of Israel's duplicity inthe incident, evenamong high ofiQcial; lingered. As Rusk asserted manyyears later in his memoirs, "I didn't believ) then, and I don't believe themto this day."''^

The American and Israeli investigative reports go along way toward dispi the charge that the Israelis maliciously opened fire on a ship they knew to t American. In the three decades prior to their declassification, however, nur theories were posited to explainwhy Israel, engaged in war and intemation isolated, would willingly attack its only superpower ally. Now, with the aid recently released documents, it is possible to determine whetheranyof thei hypotheses had a basis in fact. Among the more far-fetched theories that he been suggested is the possibility that the Libertywas attacked because it ha http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren,htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 11 of18

AWMAAAWVft XÂ. %*WAA WiIkWW%<*«>A VTAA \Â. i>AV»AA A ff \Â VAAVîr M.%, ÂVAW%* attempts to draw Jordan into the war so that Jerusalem might be brought u Israeli control.'" But no document, American or Israeli, contains any refere: prisoner executions; neither are they mentioned in any Arabic source that h come to light to date.'" By the same token, the Jordanian attack on Israel o 5 and the fall ofJerusalem to Israeli forces on June 7 took place well befon Liberty's arrival offthe Gaza coast, and none ofthe documents now availal any way link the Liberty incident on June 8 to these events.

Far more serious has been the claimthat the Israelis attacked the Liberty b< it had been eavesdropping on Israel'splansfor capturingthe GolanHeights Adm. Thomas Moorer, writing in the July-August 1997 issue ofTheLink magazine, has speculated that

Israel was preparing to seize the Golan Heights from Syria despite President Joh known opposition to such a move.... And I believe [Israeli Defense Minister] Mo Dayan concluded that he could prevent Washington from becoming aware of wh was up to by destroying the primary source of acquiring that information - the U. Liberty.^^

HistorianDonaldNeff takes the supposition a step further, presenting it as

Ifthe ship could listen in on Israeli military communications, as it could, then th States could discoverIsrael's plans to attack Syria.Foreknowledge of the attack i bring an ultimatum from the United States, an ultimatum that could not be ignor because Israel desperately still needed Washington's support both in the United J and to fend off any threats from the Soviet Union. Without the United States, the Union might dire^yintervene ifIsrael took on its last, comparatively unscathed Syria.

Indeed,Neff goes so far as to posit that Israel actually delayed its attack or until after the Liberty was neutralized.''^

The theory that the attack on the Liberty was motivated by a desireto con( impending Israeliattack on the GolanHeights is not, then, confined to the extremist fnnge, but has madeheadway in importantpolitical and academic circles. In the past, refutingit was dependent largely on appealsto commoi such as that made by Ernest Castle, the former U.S. naval attache, in an int with British television:

Let us presume the Israeli high command was... fearful that the United States wc learn of what was an evidentIsraeli plan to take the Golan, or any other plan on of the Israelis. Would they say, "my golly, that will irritate the United States, om friend. We'dbetter not... let that happen - so let's sink their ship instead"?''

Common sensewould also dictate that the Israelis, in the process ofhandil; defeating three Arab armies, could have easily sunk a single, lightly armed! they had wanted to. In such a case, they would not have attacked the Liber broad daylight with clearlymarked boats and planes- submarines could ha^ the job - nor would they have ultimatelyhalted their fire and offered the shi assistance. http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oreahtm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 12 of18

sense alone. Like the other claims for Israel's alleged motive in attacking th Liberty, the one linkingthe assault to the Golan Heights campaign cannot withstand the scrutiny ofthe newly declassifieddocuments. These confirm Israel made no attempt to hide its preparations for an offensiveagainst Syri that the United States government, relying on regular diplomatic channels, remained fully apprised ofthem. Thus, on June 8, the American consulate i Jerusalem reported that Israel was retaliating for Syria'sbombardment ofIs villages "inan apparent preludeto large-scale attack in effort to seizeHeigl overlookingborder kibbutzim." That same day, U.S. AmbassadorWalwort Barbour in Tel Avivreported that "I would not, repeat not, be surprised if reported Israeli attack [on the Golan] does take place or has alreadydone s and DDF Intelligence ChiefAharon Yarivtold Harry McPherson, a senior\ House aide who was visiting Israel at the time, that "there still remained th< problemand perhaps it would be necessaryto give Syriaa blow."'^

Similarly, the UnitedStatesNational Archives contain no evidence to sugg information obtained bytheLibertyaugmented Washington's already detail picture ofevents on the Golan front and ofIsrael's intentions there. The Isr records, for their part, revealno fear whatsoeverofAmerican opposition t< punishing Syria, but only ofpossible Soviet military intervention. (It was th that ledIsrael to delay its decision to capturethe Golan until the morning o 9.) Nor do they suggest that there was any danger ofan American ultimatu the contrary, fi-om hisconversations withpresidential advisor McGeorge B and other administration officials. Foreign MinisterAbba Eban understood "oflBcial Washington would not be too aggrieved if Syria suffered some pai effects fi-om the war that it had started....""'

Once again, there is no indication in the archives that the Israelis were trou the Liberty, muchless considered it worthy ofattack. Indeed,there is no e^ that anyone in the Israeli government, or the IDF Chief ofStaff, knew oftt ship's presence at all.'®

The USS Liberty was decommissioned in 1968 and later sold for scrap. Th same year, William McGonagle receivedthe Congressional Medal ofHono gallantry displayed during the attack, and Israelpaidover $6 million in rest to the families ofthose wounded and killed. An additional $6 million in dan was paid under a 1980 agreement in which Israel and the United States cor "not to address the issueor motive or reopenthe case for anyreason."'' Bi case remained open nonetheless. While the controversy surrounding similai incidents would subside- the Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark in 1987 the downing ofan Iranianjetliner by the USS Vincennes in 1988come to n the bitterness over the Liberty incident endured. The release ofhitherto cla papers on the incident, however, now enables us to dispel spurioustheoriee the incident, andto conclude that Israel's assault uponthe USS Liberty was tragic error, and nothing more. In light of the new documents, it is now poi to reconstruct the chain ofmishapson the part ofboth sidesthat led to the unintended Israeli attack. http://www.shalenLorg.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 13 of18

crisis-tom Middle East, a mere half-mile beyond Egyptian waters, in an are used by commercial shipping and which Nasser had declared off-limits to n vessels. The Americans did not accede to Chief ofStaffRabin's request for identification ofall U.S. ships m the area or AmbassadorHarman's request strategic liaisonbetween Israel and the Sixth Fleet. The Libertys dispatche: meanwhile, overrode naval orders to keep the ship in Spain, and then failed inform the U.S. attache in Tel Aviv ofits presence near the war zone. Thes mistakes were compounded by the navy's communications system, which d by as much as two days orders to the Liberty to withdraw 100 milesfrom t coast.'2 Even after it was hit, the Americans had difficulty locating the Libe JCS placing it at "60-100 miles north ofEgypt." Ifneither Castle, nor cince even the President ofthe United States could know where the Liberty was, seems unreasonable to expect that the Israelis, in the thick ofbattle, should been able to locate it.

The Israelis, too, committed their own share offateful errors, as the Yerusl report points out: The erroneous reports ofbombardment at El-Arish, the i to replace the Libertys marker on the board after it had been cleared, the o eagerness ofnaval commanders, and worst ofall. Ensign Yifrah's miscalcul ofthe ship's speed. Though Yerushalmi's report suggested reasons for thes< errors - inflexible navalprocedures, the maccuracy ofspeed-measuring dev one is stillleft with a sense ofpoor organization and sloppyexecution. Moi there were breakdowns in communications betweenthe Israeli navyand air stemming fi*om inadequatecommand structure and the immense pressures< multi-fi^ont war. To these factors must be added Israel'sgeneralsensitivity: its coastal defenses, and the exhaustion ofits pilots after four days of uninterrupted combat. Yet none ofthese amountto the kind ofgross negli| ofwhich the Israelis have been accused.

And then there were "badbreaks" that are unfortunately commonplace in v The U.S. planes that were calledback because oftheir nuclearpayload (the mere presence might have warded off the torpedo boats); the Liberty^ inab signal the approaching Israeliboats, and the machine gunner who fired on t and the smoke that hid the identities ofboth the attackers and the attacked.

All ofthese elementscombined to create a tragic "fiiendly fire" incident of kind that clauned the lives ofat leastfifty Israeli soldiers in the SixDayWa caused 5,373 Americancasualties in Vietnam in 1967 alone." Obviously, tl findings can do little to lessen the sufferingofthose American servicemena were wounded in the incident, nor can they be expected to offer comfort tc families ofthe dead. But they should at least permit us to bringto a closev has for a generationremained one ofthe most painful chaptersin the histor America's relationship with the State ofIsrael.

MichaelB. Oren is a SeniorFellow at The Shalem Center in Jerusalem, a, ContributingEditor ofAzure.

http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 14 of18

Notes

The author wishes to thank Mihal Tzur, Director ofthe Israel Defense Forces Archive, i Judge A. Jay Cristol for their assistance in researching this article.

1. Thomas H, Moorer's foreword to James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty: The Tn ofthe Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship (NewYork: Ivy, 1979), p. ix.

2. Cited in USSLiberty Internet site (www.halcyon.com/jim/ussliberty/liberty.htm).

3. Wisconsin Public Radio station wlfin interview of Dean Rusk by Tom Clark, February cited in USSLiberty Internet site.

4. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter "LBJ"), Oral History of David p. 31.

5. Cited in USSLiberty Internet site.

6. Donald Nefif, Warriorsfor Jerusalem: TheSix Days that Changed the Middle East (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984).

7. Reverdy S. Fishel, "The Attack on the Liberty: An 'Accident'?" in IntemationalJourr, Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3, 1995.

8. June 1992. See also Evans and Novak's "Rememberingthe Liberty," in The Washingt November 6,1991; "The Liberty C^otes," in The Washington Post, November 11,1991; Genrich, editorial page column. The Phoenix Gazette, June 5,1996.

9. ABC's 20/20, May 21, 1987, and NBC's TheStory Behind the Story, January 27,199'. in A. Jay Cristol, TheLibertyIncident, unpublisheddoctoral dissertation.Universityof] 1997, pp. 145-148. Cristol, a federal judge in Miami, is the leading expert on the Libert incident, having devotedyears to its study.

10. Anyone in doubt about the nature ofthe USSLiberty Internet site can follow its link; number of rabidly anti-Israel sites, among them Palestinian Geocities and Paul FindlQ'' Councilfor the National Interest.

11. LBJ, National Security File, History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 18, Joint Chiefs < Military Actions - Straits of Tiran, May 24,1967.

12. LBJ, Box 1-10, The USSLiberty: Department ofDefense Press Release, June 8,196 19: CINCUSNAVEUR Order, May 30,1967; Box 18, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Military Ad Straits of Tiran, May 25, 1967; Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: on the USS Liberty, June 9,1967.

13. For a discussion of Israel's considerations in going to war, see Michael B. Oren, "Di Want the Six Day War?"Azure 7, Spring 1999, pp. 47-86.

14. United States National Archives, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967,Record Group 59 (. "USNA"), USUN, Box 6: CINSTRIKE to AIG, June 2,1967. Ben-Gurion Archive, Diai for May 26,1967. See also Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 25-26.

15. British Public Record Office, FC017/498, Israel - Political Affairs: Tel Aviv to Fore Office, June 5,1967. See also Yitzhak Rabin, TheRabinMemoirs (BerkelQ^: University http://www.shaIem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 15 of18

(..amomia, lyyo;, pp. luu, iiu; niniii ooouiiiau aiia z^ev dciiui, iiie miacK on uie Jb TheAtlantic Monthly, September 1984, p. 81.

16. LBJ, National Security File, History ofthe Middle East Crisis, Box 20: United State.' and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10,1967, pp. 87-88.

17. LBJ, National Security File, History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 19: JCS to USCINCEUR, June 8,1967; Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: At the USSLiberty, June 9,1967; Department ofDefense: USSLiberty Incident, June 15, 1 usna. Chairman Wheeler Files, Box 27: The Court ofInquiry Findings, June 22,1967.

18. Israel Defense Forces Archive, 2104/92/47: "Attack on the Liberty," IDF Historical Department, Research and Instruction Branch, June 1982 (hereafter "IDF, Attack on the Liberty'*). The Israeli fighter pilot originally thought that the ship had fired at him, and destroyers were ordered to find it. The orders were rescinded, however, following fiuihe debriefing ofthe pilot.

19. Israel State Archives (hereafter "ISA"), 4079/26 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident; IDF Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67 C!ol. Y. Yerushalmi (hereafter "ISA, The Yerushalmi Report"). Report by C^l F. Salans, Department ofState Legal Advisor, Sep 21,1967, to the Under Secretary ofState. (Document available on the USSLiberty site.)

20. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. The Liberty was also sailing near "Point Boaz,' the loc which Israeli aircraft entered and exited Sinai - another reason for the heavy air trafiSc t morning. See EDF, Attack on the Liberty, p. 39, note 14.

21. Muhammad Fawzi, The Three Years War (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, 1980), [Arabic]; Cristol, LibertyIncident, p. 30.

22. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. See also Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 108-109.

23. No relation to the author.

24. Interview with Gen. (ret) Mordechai Hod, March 9,1999. Ehud Yanay, No Margin Error: TheMaking ofthe IsraeliAir Force (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p. 257. Clastle and McGonagle's confirmation ofBareket's claim both appear on the USSLiberty site.

25. The Israeli pilot mistook the "G" on the Liberty's hull for a "C." IDF, Attack on the. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

26. Rabin, Memoirs, p. 108. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

27. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, The National Military Corrunand Center: Attack ( USSLiberty, June 9, 1967. See also Cristol, LibertyIncident, p. 55.

28. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. USNA, Chairman Wheele Box 27: The Court ofInquiry Findings, June 22,1967.

29. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

30. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

31. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

32. Rabin, Memoirs, p. 109. http://www.shalem.org.il/aziire/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 16 of18

33. USNA, Box 16: "Liberty Torpedo," June 8,1967; "Inventory of Submarines," 1967; W. Rostow to the President, June 8,1967; Box 15: DOS to CINSTRIKE, June 9, LBJ, Country Files, Box 1-10, The National Military Command Center: Memorandum i Record ofPreliminaiy Information - USSLiberty Strudc by Torpedo, June 8,1967; Box 104/107, The Nation^ Militaiy Command Center: Attack on the USS Liberty, June 9, 1 History ofthe Middle East Crisis, Box 19: JCS to USCINCEUR, June 8, 1967.

34. The United States had gone over to daylight savings time, while Israel had not, and result was a six-hour time difference between Washington and Israel.

35. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Rostow to the President, June Note to the President, June 8,1967; Message to Ko^gin, June 8,1967. See also Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives ofthe Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: H( Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 301-303; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguii p. 388.

36. usna. Box 16: Diplomatic Activity in Connection with the USSLiberty Incident, Jun 1967. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Eshkol to Johnson; Memos President (W. Rostow), Box 17: Barbour to Department ofState, June 8,1967. ISA, 407 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident: Harman to Foreign Ministry, June 10,196 to Johnson, June 9, 1967; Evron to Johnson, June 8,1967.

37. Upon learning ofthe attack, the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Walworth Barbour, \ the State Department that "its [the Libertys] proximity to the scene of the conflict could Arab suspicions ofU.S.-Israeli collusion." Similarly, Ambassador-Designate Richard H. in Egypt wrote, "We had better get our story on the torpedoing of USSLiberty out fast a better be good." See LBJ, National Security File, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplc the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10,1967, pp. 143-144; Box 104/107, Middle East Cairo to Department, June 9,1967.

38. ISA, 4079/26 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident, Harman to Foreign Mini LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Diplomatic Activity in Connectio the USSLiberty Incident, June 14,1967. See also Clark Clifford (with Richard Holbrool Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 446-447; Phil G. Gouli Confirmor Deny: Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper and R 1970), pp. 123-130; Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 93-94.

39. ISA, 4079/26 The Liberty Incident: Bitan to Harman, June 18,1967.

40. ISA, 4079/26 The Liberty Incident: Bitan to Harman, June 18, 1967; Evron to Eban quote), June 19,1967. LBJ, National Security File, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle Crisis: Rusk to Harman, June 10,1967.

41. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. LBJ, National Security File, Country Files, Box 104/1 Middle East Crisis: Diplomatic Activity in Connection with the USSLiberty Incident, Ji 1967. Though none of the Israeli ofBcers involved in the incident stood trial, Capt Rahj dispatched the torpedo boats and called on the air force to attack the Liberty, was forced resign his commission. See Shlomo Erell, Facing the Sea: TheStory ofa Fighting Sailo Commander (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense, 1998). [Hebrew]

42. USNA, Chairman Wheeler Files, Box 27: The Court of Inquiry Findings, June 22, 1 LBJ, National Security File, Special Committee, Box 1-10: Why the USSLiberty Was V Was. Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 86-105. RxidL,AsI Sgwit, p. 388.

43. See, for example, Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy ofSilence: TheAttack on the USS (London: (Quartet Books, 1978). http://www.shalem.org.il/aziire/9-Oren.htm 12/03/2000 AZURE - Issue #9 - Oren Page 17 of18

44. Though Arab archives remain closed, the Six Day (or June) War has yielded numerc memoirs by the civilian and military leaders of Egypt and Jordan. Examples can be four Mahmud Riad, MahmudRiad'sMemoirs (Beirut: Al-Muasasah al-'Arabiyya LilT)irasat Nashr, 1987), vol. 2 [Arabic]; Muhanunad Hassanayn Heikal, 1967: The Explosion (Cai Markaz al-Ahram, 1990) [Arabic]; Abdel-LatifAl-Baghdadi, Afemo/rs (Cairo: al-Makt£ Misri al-Hadith, 1977) [Arabic]; Abdel Muhsin Kamil Murtagi, Major-GeneralMurtag to the Truth (ciro:Dar al-Watan al-Arabi, 1976). [Arabic]

45. The Link, July-August 1997.

46. Ne£F, Warriorsfor Jerusalem, p. 253. Further exposition ofthe theory appears in Ri( Smith, "The Violation ofthe Liberty,*' in the Institutefor Naval Proceedings, Jime 1978

47. Thames TV documentary. Attack on the Liberty, cited in Cristol, LibertyIncident, p

48. LBJ, National Security File, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Jerusalem to the Sea- State, June 8, 1967; Barbour to Department, June 8,1967; Joint Embassy Memorandum 1967.

49. Abba Eban, Personal Witness:Israel Through My Eyes (New York: Putnam, 1992), On Israeli decisionmaking on the Golan, see Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and20 Dc Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978), pp. 100-102 [Hebrew]; Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out C Aviv: Yedi'ot Aharonot, 1987), pp. 244-246 [Hebrew]; Zerah Verhaflig, Fifty Years ana (Jerusalem: Yad Shapira, 1998), pp. 190-191 [Hebrew]; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 113-116.

50. It is ironic, perhaps, that the force of this logic was upheld not only by Israelis but al Arab writers who, sticking to the "Big Lie," alleged that the Liberty had been directing ] strikes in Sinai and was only inadvertently attacked. Suleiman Mathhar, Annals ofthe J Issue: Transcript of the Testimony before the Revolutionary Historical Commission (Cai Kitab al-Huriyya, 1990), pp. 86-88 [Arabic]; Muhammad El-Farra, Years ofNo Decisio (London: KPI, 1987), pp. 58-68; Riad, Memoirs, p. 312; Heikal, The Explosion, pp. 731 Fawzi, The Three Years War, pp. 135-136. The claim also featured prominently in Egyp radio broadcasts; see BBC World Service, Daily Report, Middle East, Africa and Westei Europe B 8, June 16,1967.

51. Details ofthe Israeli compensation payments can be foimd in U.S. Department ofSt Bulletin, vol. Iviii, no. 1512, June 17,1968, and vol. Ix, no. 1562, June 2, 1969, andU.S Department of State Daily News Briefing, DPC 2451, December 18,1980.

52. Congressman John Rhodes, a member of the House Appropriations Committee whic investigated the Navy's communications network in 1971, called the events surrounding Liberty incident a "comedy oferrors," and then added: "Here we are, with the most sopt communications system ever known to mankind, and maybe it is so sophisticated we do know how to operate it." John J. Rhodes, CommitteeHearing Report, p. 394, cited in Ci LibertyIncident, p. 98.

53. FriendlyFire Casualty Statistics on SoutheastAsia, byMonth at the American War Internet site.

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