Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 27, May, 1981 Afghanistan, Page 30879 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Military and Internal Political Developments - International Attitudes to Soviet Military Presence - Lifting of US Grain Embargo against Soviet Union

During the second half of 1980 and in early 1981 Afghan rebels (mujaheddin or holy warriors) continued to wage guerrilla warfare against the Soviet troops which had entered the country in late December 1979[see 30229 A; 30381 A] and the Afghan Army. Meanwhile, the Soviet- backed Government of President Babrak Karmal continued to experience factional divisions and the President himself was said to have tried to commit suicide on June 13, 1980, when an Afghan guard was reported killed and two others injured in a shootout as Soviet guards tried to disarm him. The Guardian also claimed on July 23 that President Karmal had threatened in a letter written to President Brezhnev the previous month to resign if he was not allowed a freer hand to run the Government.

Administrative changes carried out during 1980 reflected the increasing dominance of the smaller Parcham ("Flag") faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) over the main Khalq ("People") faction, many of whose members were purged in this period. By August 1980 only three Khalqis were said to remain in the Government and the purges had spread to the armed forces, which formed the main basis of support for the Khalq faction.

Both the predecessors of President Karmal-Mr Nur Mohammad Taraki (April 1978-September 1979) and Mr Hafizullah Amin (September-December 1979)-belonged to the Khalq faction. After Mr Amin's death at the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, President Karmal (a Parchamite) had been encouraged by the Soviet Union to bring both factions into the Government to ease tensions, but these had in fact increased[For other details see 29037 A.].

In what appeared to be a move to centralize the administration and reduce the power of, notably, the Interior Ministry (led by Maj. Mohammad Ghulabzoi) as well as to exclude Khalqis from the Government, President Karmal had in July 1980 brought a number of government departments under his own direct control and placed Parchamite officials in charge of finance in nine Afghan provinces where Khalqis had previously been in control. He established four departments responsible to himself as Prime Minister to deal with labour and social security, (ii) Islamic teaching, (iii) administrative reform and provincial affairs and (iv) policies and investment, and a presidential advisory council was later set up in August, made up of appointees from various ministries. The influential Education Minister, Dr Anahita Ratebzad, was subsequently in late November given increased powers to supervise the Ministries of Public Health and Information and Culture.

Also in November 1980 Dr Ratebzad was appointed head of the peace and friendship committee of the PDPA, while the Deputy Finance Minister (Mr Mehrabuddin Pachiawal) and the provincial governor of Herat were appointed respectively head of the state planning commission and president of state organizations (both posts being raised to ministerial level).

On Aug. 17, 1980, Kabul radio confirmed that one of the two Deputy Prime Ministers, Mr Assadullah Sawari (a Khalqi who had been in Moscow since June, officially for medical treatment), had been appointed ambassador to Mongolia. The Minister of Justice, Mr Abdorrashid Arian (also a Khalqi), took on the additional post of Deputy Prime Minister on Sept. 22, it being announced on the same day that Dr Saleh Mohammad Ziray, a member of the PDPA politburo, had been appointed a member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council.

A rebel spokesman announced on Sept. 14 that the Minister for Border Affairs, Mr Faiz Mohammad, had been killed with two other government officials on Sept. 11 as he tried to "buy the loyalty" of tribesmen at the village of Lake Tiga in Paktia province (south-east of Kabul). Mr Muhammed Siddiq Sailani was appointed to replace him on Sept. 22, at which time Mr Abdul Haji Qarizada became Minister of Planning (a post hitherto held by Mr Soltan Ali Keshtmand, a Deputy Prime Minister) and (ii) the Deputy Minister of Industry, Mr Ghulam Mohammed Rahimi, and the Mayor of Kabul (both of them Khalqis) were removed from their posts.

Among government members who lost their lives in 1980 were Mr Mohammad Gholam Masimi, the Deputy Minister of Communications (who was reportedly killed by rebels in Kabul on May 24), and Dr Mohammad Wali Yousufi, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education (who was shot dead in Kabul on July 21 in what appeared to be a factional incident). Brig.-Gen. Abdul Qadir, a member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, was also wounded by a Khalqi militant in Kabul on June 16, 1980.

According to diplomatic sources in March 1981, the Deputy Agriculture Minister, Mr Abdol Ghafar Lakanawal, had been arrested early that month and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen. Baba Jan, dismissed following rumours of anti-government plots. The same sources reported that Col. Khalilday (commander of the Kabul army garrison) had been appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in recognition of his action against "counter-revolutionaries.

Against a background of reports of daily murders of PDPA cadres and purges of Khalqis, units of the 14th division of the Afghan Army were reported to have mutinied at Ghazni (south of Kabul) on July 24, 1980, amid a general upsurge of mutinies and threatened revolts elsewhere in the country. The Soviet Union increased its troop activities in the mutinous areas, concentrating on Ghazni, Wardak and Logar provinces (all south of Kabul), and on Aug. 3 Soviet troops were reported to have taken control of Ghazni garrison after a 10-day battle. A similar offensive was launched at Tangi Wardak (about 24 miles west of the capital) and by the second week in August the Wardak and Logar offensives were said to be over.

Moreover, diplomatic sources said on July 31, 1980, that Soviet troops had recently suppressed an Afghan Army plot to overthrow the Karmal Government.

In other developments, Kabul radio reported on June 14 that three former ministers who had held posts under President Taraki and President Amin had been executed (in addition to the 11 people executed on June 8, 1980 -see page 30362). They were Mr Mohammed Sadiq Alemghar (Planning), Mr Saheb Jan Sahra'i (Border Affairs and also Minister without Portfolio) and Mr Mohammed Zarif (Communications), all of whom had more recently been provincial governors and who belonged to the Khalq faction. Four other former ministers were reported by New Delhi sources at the end of August to have also been executed, namely Prof. Mahmud Suma (Higher Education), Dr Abdurrashid Jalili (Education and later Agriculture), Prof. Mahmud Hashemi (Water and Power) and Mr Khyal Malek Katawazi (Information and Culture).

President Karmal on Oct. 16–24 paid an official visit to Moscow, subsequently remaining in the Soviet Union until Nov. 4 for rest and medical treatment. At a dinner in his honour on Oct. 16 President Brezhnev pledged full Soviet support for "revolutionary Afghanistan" against all outside interference and said that the Soviet Union would carry out its "internationalist duty" to Afghanistan and would not allow "provocations by the forces of imperialism and hegemonism" to deprive Afghanistan of its revolutionary gains.

Mr Brezhnev said: "Feverish military preparations and unrestrained propaganda-even, it can be said, eulogies of nuclear war-have reached an unprecedented level in the United States. … They are talking with amazing cynicism about unleashing nuclear war as of something normal, almost desirable, and are inuring people to accept this criminal idea. … In short, American imperialism is apparently again embarking on a new cold war and creating a situation threatening universal peace and the security of all peoples. … The game they are playing is extremely dangerous and they may themselves become its first victims.'' He denied that the Soviet Union had any designs against third countries and called for a normalization of the Afghanistan situation, beginning with an agreement with Pakistan .

In a statement signed by President Karmal and President Brezhnev on Oct. 16 and published on Oct. 19, both sides declared themselves in favour of a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue which would "contribute to improving the international political climate" .

The two sides stressed that "the way to such a settlement lies through effectively ending intervention from the outside, through reaching appropriate agreements between the Governments of Afghanistan and its neighbours, in the first place Pakistan, on the basis of the known proposals of the [Afghan Government]of May 14, 1980"[see page 30383 andalso below]. They added that no plans "affecting the sovereignty of the people of . Afghanistan or disregarding its legitimate Government would meet with success" and that the withdrawal of the "limited military contingent" of Soviet troops could only be considered in the light of a political settlement and not until guarantees of "non-resumption of subversive activities from abroad against the Afghan people and its Government" were given.

In an address on Soviet television news on Oct. 19 President Karmal thanked the Soviet Union for its military support, praised its "courageous, humane and peaceful" step in standing by its ally, and referred to Soviet troops 'selflessly and devotedly'' performing their internationalist duty.

In a televised speech in late December 1980 President Karmal announced the formation of a National Patriotic Front, which he described as a coalition of ethnic and political forces supporting the Government. A "conference of national and patriotic forces" was subsequently held in Kabul in early January 1981 discuss the tasks of such a front, which the Soviet news agency Tass said was to be a mass organization based on an alliance between workers and peasants and bringing together other national and patriotic forces such as the clergy, tribesmen and businessmen; it would promote the patriotic education of the population and the broad involvement of citizens in the affairs of state and society.

A number of Afghan officials who defected from the country in 1980-81 included Mr Akhtar Mohammad Paktiawal, the Afghan delegate to a UNESCO conference in Belgrade, who left for West Germany in late October 1980 after strongly denouncing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in a speech to the meeting. In March 1981 four diplomats at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi left India and sought asylum in the USA, and President Karmal's economic adviser, Mr Muhammad Siddiq Farhang, left Kabul for New Delhi, claiming that when he had accepted the post in early 1980 the President had assured him that Soviet troops would soon be withdrawn and the Afghan people allowed to decide their own future.

Despite the announced withdrawal by the Soviet Union in mid-1980 of between 5,000 and 8,000 troops and over 100 tanks from Afghanistan[see 30461 A], it was estimated that these had been replaced in July by 5,000 to 10,000 fresh troops, some of them organized as anti-guerrilla units, and that 85,000 Soviet troops still remained inside Afghanistan and another 35,000 just over the border.

In early April 1981 diplomatic sources reported that further large contingents of Soviet troops had recently arrived in Afghanistan, most agreeing that the probable figure was between 20,000 and 22,000. The influx followed a statement by President Reagan in a television interview on March 9 that the United States would consider "very definitely" sending arms to the mujaheddin but that no final decision had yet been taken. The Soviet news agency Tass on March 18 accused President Reagan of making "provocative and hostile" statements about Afghanistan which would make a political settlement more difficult, and it announced that the Soviet Union would give "limitless" assistance to the Afghan Government to help it crush the rebels.

By late 1980 the strength of the Afghan Army (which had numbered 80,000-100,000 before the Soviet occupation) had reportedly dropped to about 40,000, and in January 1981 the Government published a general military conscription law lowering the minimum age for recruitment from 21 to 20, establishing compulsory military service for all men aged 20 and over, raising the rates of pay for the armed forces, and allowing the redrafting of those on the reserve list as well as the extension of tours of active duty.

At the end of December a demonstration in Kabul led by about 40 policemen who were protesting against the postponement of their discharge resulted in three people being killed, 15 being injured, the stoning of a ministry and the arrest of a number of policemen including the police chief of Kabul.

In accordance with a plan reportedly drawn up by Soviet advisers, approved by a PDPA plenum at the end of July 1980 and set in motion by a high-level Soviet military delegation which arrived in Kabul in early August, Afghanistan was divided up into seven military regions, each headed by a senior party official and a Soviet general with 1,000 élite Soviet commandos at his disposal. A highly-paid volunteer force of Afghans was also reported to have been formed to infiltrate rebel groups, and small lightly-equipped Soviet combat units introduced to fight pockets of resistance in the mountainous terrain.

According to The New York Times the deployment of Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the seven military commands was as follows: the 201st (Kunduz and Faizabad in the north-east), the 16th (Mazar-i-Sharif in the north), the 275th (Jalalabad in the east), the 360th (Kabul), the 357th (Kandahar in the south-east), the 54th (Herat in the west) and the 68th (Shindand, south of Herat). Kabul was also protected by the 105th airborne division[for earlierdeployment of divisions, see page 30231.]

Other changes in Soviet tactics which were noted in 1980 included the introduction of more experienced soldiers and of helicopter-borne commando assaults in which troops were dropped into areas which had first been cleared by bombing; the presence of Cuban and Vietnamese advisers was also reported but not officially confirmed. Among the aircraft being used in Afghanistan were MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s (more recently), twin-jet Ilyushin-28 bombers and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. Military operations were being launched from Kabul, Herat, Bagram (north of Kabul), Faizabad and Shindand, while Kandahar airport was being built up for similar use.

Signs that the Soviet Union intended to prolong its presence in Afghanistan included the commencement of the construction of a new road and rail bridge over the Amu Darya (Oxus) river[see also 29198 A]. It also appeared that the Salang Pass north of Kabul was being widened or a parallel road constructed, while Kabul radio said on Aug. 24 that Kabul airport was being extended to take all types of aircraft in all weathers. US Defence Department sources said at the end of August that an oil pipeline was being laid between Termez (at the Soviet border north of Mazar-i-Sharif) and Pol-i-Khumri (north of Kabul) and that military installations including fuel depots, barracks and administrative centres were being built. Large-scale Soviet financial assistance to Afghanistan was also reported, including support for higher education.

By March 1981, according to United Nations statistics, 1,700,000 Afghans had fled to Pakistan to escape the fighting in their own country. The Pakistan Government was estimated to have spent $100,000,000 on aid to the refugees (who were living mainly in tents in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan) but as from Jan. 1, 1981, it ceased to bear the costs of the internal transport of supplies to the refugee areas. Mr Roman Kahaut, who was in charge of the UN refugee programme in Pakistan, said in March that, partly due to the Pakistani decision, the UN's 1981 aid budget of $51,000,000 would have to be at least doubled.

It was agreed on March 17, 1981, that the World Food Programme would donate $24,200,000 in emergency food aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, raising the total World Food Programme emergency aid to this sector since the Soviet invasion to $64,000,000. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, also pledged £4,000,000 in refugee aid during a visit to Pakistan at the end of March.

Some of the major military activities involving mujaheddin and Soviet-Afghan forces from June 1980 onwards are described below, as well as guerrilla activities within Kabul itself. In June 1980 Soviet troops were reported to have deployed a cordon of tanks, trucks and men between Kabul and the Paghman mountains to the north-west, from where rebels were staging their increasingly frequent raids on the capital[see page 30363]. Heavy fighting was reported at this time in Charikar, Qarabagh and other locations north of the capital, including a three-day Soviet attack involving 200 armoured vehicles in the Koh-i-Daman area.

Unconfirmed reports said that three Russians had been killed on June 10 by hand grenades thrown at them in the Mikoyan suburb of Kabul (a settlement specially built for Soviet personnel) and that another Russian soldier had been stabbed to death on the same day. Also in June, 2,069 school-children were said to have been affected by poisonous tablets which gave off gas when placed in water, and which Kabul radio said had been deliberately placed in schools by "anti- state elements and spies" . Seven Afghans were subsequently in October sentenced to terms ranging from five to 20 years' imprisonment after being found guilty of the mass poisonings, which Tass claimed had been carried out on instructions from a mujaheddin leader, Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to spread panic among the population in Kabul.

Martial law was on June 11, 1980, reported by the US State Department to have been imposed in Kandahar and Herat (both centres of intense anti-Soviet feeling) following a one-day general strike and incidents there the previous week. There was also a general strike in Mazar-i-Sharif in early June and disturbances in Jalalabad (the capital of Nangarhar province, east of Kabul, where rebels were reported to be in virtual total control). On June 22 a general strike announced by means of leaflets (shabnama or "night-letters") was widely followed in Kabul, despite the distribution of government leaflets ordering shops to reopen and an Interior Ministry broadcast which threatened that those who "destroy public peace and order" would be punished, and that "this could include execution" . Schools and government offices were reported to have been unaffected by the strike.

In mid-July 1980 diplomatic sources in New Delhi said that Soviet forces had destroyed more than 50 villages in the past two weeks in bombing and armoured vehicle attacks which were designed to eliminate havens of resistance and as a show of strength to the rural population (although these attacks were denied by Tass).

A Soviet offensive against rebel strongholds in the Panjshir valley north of Kabul began in late August and continued throughout September, when the Soviet troops were said to have been stopped at Rokha (56 miles north-east of Kabul) by boulders blasted down the mountainsides. Some of the heaviest fighting of the year was reported to have occurred in this area, with the Soviet troops believed to be trying to take the valley before the winter snows; the mujaheddin claimed that 1,500 Russians, 20 rebels and 100 civilians had been killed, 208 villages bombed and 35 Soviet tanks and one helicopter destroyed .

At the end of September a fresh offensive was launched against rebels in the Konar valley, east of Kabul and only a few miles from the Pakistan border, in an apparent effort to seal infiltration routes; only Soviet forces were reported to be deployed in this and other offensives in late 1980. With a similar motive, Soviet troops were active in Paktia province in late October; heavy bombardments were reported in Logar province just south of Kabul, and hundreds of civilians were said to have been killed in a 10-hour battle south-east of Kabul which followed the ambush by mujaheddin of a military convoy travelling to Gardez.

In attacks on Pakistani border areas in September and October in North-West Frontier Province, each of which involved six Mi-24 helicopter gunships, two Pakistani soldiers were killed on Sept. 26 and a helicopter was shot down on Sept. 28; three Afghans were also killed and seven injured when two UN refugee camps were strafed on Oct. 24.

Soviet troops were reported in November to have bombed and strafed central Kandahar, while dozens of villages were said to have been levelled around Herat to drive guerrillas Out into the countryside and crops destroyed around major towns and in the fertile Koh-i-Daman area to deprive them of food. Kabul radio said on Nov. 24 that troops were meeting with success in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Wardak and Parwan, while other sources said at the same time that the Panjshir valley was again under attack. Rebel sources claimed on Dec. 18 that Jalalabad airport had been attacked, six helicopters destroyed and installations damaged, causing several dozen Soviet casualties.

In mid-November Soviet reinforcements were sent to the strategic north-eastern corridor of Wakhan (bordered by China in the east, Soviet Tajikistan in the north and Pakistan in the south), which had already been occupied by Soviet troops some six months previously.

A gun battle had been reported near the Darulaman Palace (headquarters of the Soviet-Afghan military command in south-west Kabul) on Oct. 4, three rebels being reported killed and 14 injured. Various other attacks had been reported in and around Kabul in October and the curfew was on Oct. 16 extended by two hours (10.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m.).

It was reported on April 1, 1981, that the four Afghan Army units which had been guarding the capital had in the interests of greater security been replaced by Soviet forces the previous day and sent to the provinces to fight the mujaheddin. At about the same time, an uprising was reported to have taken place in Herat against the Soviet troops there, in which some Russians were said to have lost their lives.

During 1980 the Soviet Union continued to insist that it could not countenance a withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan unless "external interference" in Afghan affairs ceased, and that any talks on the restoration of peace to the region should take place on the basis of Mr Karmal's proposals announced on May 14, 1980[i.e bilateral talks between Afghanistan and its neighbours, notably Pakistan and Iran, with other countries such as the Soviet Union and the USA providing guarntees against externel interface—see page 30383]. Pakistan, however, was unwilling to enter into talks on a government-to-government basis which would imply a recognition of the Karmal regime.

At the end of December 1980 President Karmal renewed his offer to Pakistan and Iran to open negotiations on the peaceful resolution of problems, and in early 1981 the possibility emerged that such talks might take place between a Pakistani delegation and representatives of the Afghan PDPA to avoid direct government-to-government contacts. It further appeared that an international aspect might be given to such talks by the presence of Sr Javier Pérez de Cuellar, a UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who was on Feb. 11, 1981, named by Dr Kurt Waldheim (the Secretary-General) as UN special representative for Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the UN General Assembly had on Nov. 20, 1980[see 30869 A], inter alia called for the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan and reiterated that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan was essential for a peaceful solution of the problem.

The third Islamic summit conference was held in Taif (Saudi Arabia) on Jan. 25–29, 1981, and was attended by representatives of 37 countries (including 28 heads of state) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as by Afghan mujaheddin representatives who were not, however, granted observer status. Apart from Afghanistan and Egypt, which had both been suspended from membership of the Islamic Conference organization in January 1980 and May 1979 respectively[see pages 30242; 29953], Iran and Libya were also absent.[For second Islamic summit conference in February 1974, see 26423 A]

In its "Mecca declaration" of Jan. 28 the conference affirmed its determination to find a political solution to the Afghanistan issue based on the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign troops, and urged that the political independence, territorial integrity, non-alignment and right to self- determination of Afghanistan should be respected. Furthermore, in its final statement of Jan. 29 the conference expressed "strong concern" over the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, renewed its demand for the total withdrawal of all foreign troops, and urged that the Islamic Conference should co-operate with the UN Secretary-General and his special envoy to find a just solution to the situation.

Prior to the conference Pakistan had initiated moves to bring about negotiations on the Afghan crisis which would involve Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran under UN auspices.

Mr Agha Shahi, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, announced at the beginning of January 1981 that he had urged Dr Waldheim in a letter of Jan. 2 to convene talks in which government delegations from Iran and Pakistan would meet Afghan PDPA representatives; Dr Ratebzad (the Afghan Education Minister), who at the time was in New Delhi for talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, was reported to have responded that the Afghan Government was willing to discuss outstanding problems with Iran and Pakistan with UN participation.

On the eve of the Islamic conference President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan discussed with Dr Waldheim the possibility of an exploratory mission by a UN special representative and told the summit meeting in a speech on Jan. 26 that he had had "intimations of flexibility in the attitude of the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime" .

While the Taif Islamic conference was in session, proposals on Afghanistan made by President Giscard d'Estaing of France were announced in Paris (on Jan. 27), causing surprise among the summit delegates, who had apparently not been informed in advance. The French proposals envisaged a conference involving not only Iran, Pakistan and India but also the five permanent members of the UN security Council (Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union and the USA); such a conference would not involve Afghanistan itself since it would be limited to those nations accused of interference, with a view to ending such interference and allowing Afghanistan to resume its non-aligned status. It was stated that President Giscard d'Estaing had already put his proposals to President Brezhnev and had contacted other potential participants.

The French Foreign Ministry said on Feb. 17 that a response to the proposals had been received from President Brezhnev on Feb. 3 but did not specify the content of the communication. On Feb. 20 President Karmal of Afghanistan implicitly rejected the idea of a conference when he said that although he presumed President Giscard d'Estaing was a "reasonable person", Afghanistan "defied any attempt to internationalize the Afghan question".

The Afghan Foreign Minister, Mr Shah Mohammad Dost, announced on Feb. 6 that his Government was prepared to hold separate talks with Iran and Pakistan, but a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman responded that the concept of any talks with Afghanistan must be trilateral, even if Iran (which at the time of the Islamic summit was stipulating that any talks must involve the mujaheddin) decided not to take part.

On Aug. 13, 1980, the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, had (in response to a letter of July 9 from the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Andrei Gromyko, in which the latter had complained about Iran's hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union) presented a list of demands aimed at improving bilateral relations. These included a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, an end to Soviet support for the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party, the cessation by Soviet diplomats in Iran of "abnormal actions" against Iran (which had on June 30 expelled a Soviet diplomat for alleged spying), and permission for the opening of an Iranian consulate in Soviet Tajikistan (bordering on northern Afghanistan).

Pakistan stated on Feb. 15 that it would be willing to accept the presence of UN observers or of a contingent from the Islamic or non-aligned blocs to supervise the Afghan border in order to remove any doubts about "external interference" from Pakistan.

The three-member committee set up by the Islamic Conference in May 1980 to seek a political settlement of the Afghan issue held talks on June 20–21 in Mont Pelerin (Switzerland) with representatives of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, led by Prof. Ghulam Abdur Rasoul Sayaf[see pages 30363 and 30242]. However, no common ground emerged between the two sides and separate statements were issued at the conclusion of talks.

The Islamic committee's declaration assured the mujaheddin of the moral and political support of the Islamic nations and noted the "firm will of the Afghans to free their homeland from oppression at any cost" . It then reiterated its aim of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in order to restore political independence, sovereignty and non-alignment to Afghanistan as well as an Islamic identity and freedom to choose its own method of government and its own political, social and economic system. The statement also expressed concern at the presence of the two super-powers in the Persian Gulf area since the invasion of Afghanistan and said that this represented a constant threat to the region. Finally, the committee pledged that it would ensure that vital humanitarian assistance reached the Afghan people. The rebel leaders' statement stressed that their talks with the committee in no way represented a change in their position of refusing to negotiate with Kabul or Moscow. After calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the statement demanded the recognition of the mujaheddin as the sole legitimate representatives of the Afghan people and their own participation in the committee in this capacity, and it pledged that under their leadership Afghanistan would pursue a policy of "active non-alignment" and would decide on its own future freely and without super-power interference. The statement also called for special UN and Islamic meetings to be held on Afghanistan, for the Islamic nations to re-examine their relations with Moscow, and for the Opening of a special Afghan resistance fund, financed partly by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The wing of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i-Islami) led by Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, although identifying itself with the final communiqué, continued to remain outside the coalition of the five smaller groups comprising the Islamic Alliance, which itself was reported around this time to have split into two tendencies and to be deeply divided. The first faction reportedly comprised three moderate groups-the National Liberation Front, led by the Imam Seghbatullah Mujjaddedi; the Movement for the Islamic Revolution, led by Mr Mohammadi; and the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (or Afghan Islamic and Nationalist Revolutionary Council) led by Sayed Ahmed Gailani -while the other faction was made up of two Islamic fundamentalist groups,(i) the Islamic Afghan Association led by Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and (ii) Maulavi Mohammad Yunus Khales's wing of the Islamic Party. The latter were reported to be considering collaboration with Mr Hekmatyar's wing of the Islamic Party which, as stated above, remained independent from the Islamic Alliance.

Other resistance movements reported to be based solely inside Afghanistan (as opposed to being represented in Pakistan) were the (Islamic and socialist) Militant Front of Combatants of Afghanistan, the (extreme left) National United Front and the (tribally and regionally based) Hazara and Nuristan fronts operating in the north-east of the country.

President Sadat of Egypt had disclosed on Nov. 10, 1980, that Egypt was supplying military aid to the mujaheddin, while in March 1981 the Saudi Arabian Government was said to have donated $15,000,000 to the rebels through the Islamic Conference. The Saudi Government subsequently on April 7, 1981, announced the severance of relations with the "illegal Kabul regime" because of the continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

President Brezhnev paid an official visit to India on Dec. 8–11, 1980, during which he had talks with Mrs Gandhi, the Prime Minister. Mrs Gandhi was said by an Indian External Affairs spokesman afterwards to have told the Soviet leader that she could not endorse military intervention but to have recognized that "international situations could develop because of the interaction of events and forces" . Mr Brezhnev for his part was said to have told Mrs Gandhi that troops would not be withdrawn, because US and Pakistani interference continued in Afghanistan.

Mrs Gandhi also said at a reception for Mr Brezhnev on Dec. 9 that India and the Soviet Union had never sought to impose their "perceptions" on each other; although India was concerned about "tension and conflict in the vicinity", their "agreement on vital issues always outweighs divergences" . [This aspect of bilateral relations had also been underlined by the External Affairs Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, in a report to the Indian Parliament on June 17, 1980, on a visit to Moscow earlier that month, when he said that bilaterial relations had "grownfrom strength to strength during the last five months". For visit to india in February 1980 by Mr. Gromyko see page 30382].

A joint declaration issued at the conclusion of the visit stated that the two sides were opposed to "all forms of outside interference in the internal affairs" of south-west Asian countries and that only a "negotiated political solution" could guarantee a lasting settlement of the region's problems. The declaration also called for the dismantling of all foreign military bases.

Among agreements and protocols signed during the visit, the Soviet Union allocated 532,000,000 roubles (£337,000,000) in aid to India, which would be used inter alia to expand the Soviet-built steel plant at Bhilai (Madhya Pradesh) to an annual capacity of 4,000,000 tonnes and to set up a new steel plant at Vishakapatnam (Andhra Pradesh). The two sides signed a five-year trade agreement which would double their trade and make the Soviet Union India's largest trading partner, and the Soviet Union agreed to increase supplies of crude oil from 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 tonnes annually and refined petroleum products from 1,900,000 to 2,250,000 tonnes annually over the next five years. Soviet assistance was also promised in mining, oil exploration and refining and the construction of power plants, and it was agreed that the two countries would collaborate in manufacturing a transport aircraft and that India would accept a contract for the purchase and manufacture of MiG-25 (Foxbat) reconnaissance aircraft.

In the course of his visit President Brezhnev on Dec. 10 proposed in a speech to the Indian Parliament a peace and security plan for the Gulf area.

Addressing "the United States, other Western powers, China, Japan and all states which show interest in this", he said that the following mutual obligations should be agreed on:(i) "not to establish foreign military bases in the area of the Persian Gulf and adjacent islands, and not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there"; (ii) "not to use and not to threaten the use of force against the countries of the Persian Gulf area, and not to interfere in their internal affairs"; (iii) "to respect the non-aligned status chosen by Persian Gulf states, and not to draw them into military groupings with the participation of nuclear powers"; (iv) "to respect the sovereign right of the states of the region to their natural resources"; and(v) "not to raise any obstacles or threats to normal trade exchange and the use of sea lanes linking the states of the region with other countries of the world" .

Expressing the hope that the proposal would meet with the understanding and support of India, President Brezhnev added that "the Indian Ocean has been and remains the sphere of vital interests of its littoral states but not of any other states" . He said that ''powers situated many thousands of kilometres away" from the Gulf had concentrated "a military armada" there and were building up armaments on grounds of a "Soviet threat" to the oil riches of the area. Such talk was "sheer falsification", and the Soviet Union had no intention of "encroaching either on Middle East oil or its supply route" . The US State Department said on Dec. 11 that it could not take Mr Brezhnev's proposals seriously as long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan.

Within the framework of the US build-up of military facilities in the Indian Ocean area[see 30378 A; 30596 A; 30830 A], US Administration officials stated on Aug. 26, 1980, that the United States was prepared to invest as much as $400,000,000 to modernize an Egyptian base at Ras-Banas on the Red Sea coast so that it would be able to accommodate US military aircraft and troops on a temporary basis during periods of crisis in the Middle East. Later reports said that as much as $2,600 million would be needed to modernize the base fully, and President Sadat told the outgoing Carter Administration in January 1981 that the USA would have to bear the full cost of upgrading the facilities there and that Egypt did not intend to sign any formal agreement on access to the base by the United States.

President Reagan on April 24, 1981, lifted the grain embargo imposed by the US against the Soviet Union in January 1980 [see pages 30234-35] and officially extended for another year by President Carter on Jan. 1, 1981; at the same time the embargo on the sale of phosphates and other fertilizers to the Soviet Union (imposed in January-February 1980 -see page 30387) was also lifted.

In a statement on April 24 President Reagan (who had argued during his election campaign that the effect of the embargo had been detrimental to US farmers and of doubtful general impact, since the Soviet Union was able to buy grain elsewhere, notably from Argentina)[see also page 30387] said that the United States had consulted with its allies before taking the step, and that the final decision had been delayed lest the Soviet Union should "mistakenly think it indicated weakening of our position" . He went on: "The United States, along with the vast majority of nations, has condemned and remains opposed to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and other aggressive acts around the world. We will react strongly to acts of aggression wherever they take place. There will never be a weakening of this resolve.''

The Canadian Government had on July 23, 1980, decided not to participate further in the embargo, although it said that it would honour its commitment not to sell the Soviet Union more grain than usual. Subsequently however, in November 1980, Canada completely withdrew support for the US embargo in protest at what it regarded as US attempts to cut into traditional Canadian and Australian grain markets in China. This followed the conclusion in late October of a US contract to sell China more than 24,000,000 tonnes of grain worth $1,000 million over the next four years[see page 30771], which also aroused concern in Australia, although the latter undertook on Nov. 18 to continue to support the embargo against the Soviet Union.-(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Financial Times - Economist - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London) Prev.rep. 30229 A, 30362 A,30381 A,30461 A, 30471 A; Second Islamic Summit

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