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Martyrs List Name: Alaa Lastname: Abd Alqadr Joumaa Gender: Male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Edlib Death Place: Details

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Martyrs List Name: Alaa Lastname: Abd Alqadr Joumaa Gender: Male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Edlib Death Place: Details Martyrs list Name: alaa Lastname: abd alqadr joumaa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Edlib Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: boutan Lastname: haji tarboush Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: muhammed Lastname: mouhssn alkaraz Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Damascus Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ali Lastname: adnan kalil Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: haeel Lastname: reda gaybor Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Hama Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: shadi Lastname: abd alrhman alslama Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: rami Lastname: sami abdoush Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: youssef Lastname: ali alamouri Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: adel Lastname: ahmed mosstafa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: adb alsatar Lastname: joumaa albarsh Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Hama Death Place: maart anouaman Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: nazir Lastname: ibrahim alhalabi Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Swaida Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: hussin Lastname: ali abass Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-21 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: bassam Lastname: abd alkareem mousstafa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Damascus Countryside Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: marouan Lastname: mousstafa hassn Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Al Hasaka Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: moussa Lastname: ahmed ibrahim Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Dear Alzour Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: abd alaziz Lastname: muhammed alali Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: shbli Lastname: wassem altawil Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Swaida Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ali Lastname: hussin joumaa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: firas Lastname: suliman alrakab Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-19 Death City: Al Qounetra Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: hussin Lastname: ali abass Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Edlib Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: moussa Lastname: muhammed albashir Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Daraa Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: mazen Lastname: kald alrahil Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Al Qounetra Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: taher Lastname: dyab dyab Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Damascus Countryside Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: maher Lastname: kald aloumar Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Damascus Countryside Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: naji Lastname: fakhr alibrahim Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: abd alaziz Lastname: muhammed almahmoud Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: bahry Lastname: essa alfajr Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: abd alrhman Lastname: muhammed deeb Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Hama Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: toufik Lastname: ali aldouyri Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Al Hasaka Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: oubida Lastname: ibrahim altroudi Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Swaida Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: essa Lastname: hamoud alhanaia Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: amer Lastname: emmad taiba Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: assam Lastname: aid alrfaai Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-18 Death City: Al Qounetra Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: kald Lastname: abd alaziz jarash Gender: male Death Date: 0000-00-00 Death City: Damascus Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ammer Lastname: abd allatif faris Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-17 Death City: Damascus Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: emmad Lastname: ahmed kalaji Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-17 Death City: Edlib Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ayman Lastname: abd alkareem muhammed Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-17 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: saad Lastname: younis afifa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-17 Death City: Hama Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: bassam Lastname: ali esmaeel Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-17 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Muhammad Lastname: mouh alali Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-16 Death City: Dear Alzour Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: satam Lastname: kalil alabou Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-16 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: aouss Lastname: muhammed nazha Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-16 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: moayad Lastname: assad jadoua Gender: male Death Date: 0000-00-00 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: maher Lastname: abd alhak salh Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-16 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Muhammad Lastname: hkmat sultan Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-16 Death City: Hama Death Place: sahl algab Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ammar Lastname: youssef algada Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-10 Death City: Hama Death Place: hama Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Muhammad Lastname: abd alhamid alaouad Gender: male Death Date: 2011-01-16 Death City: Damascus Death Place: reef damascus Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: mouafk Lastname: reda slyk Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Damascus Countryside Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ammar Lastname: massoud oumar Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Damascus Countryside Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Muhammad Lastname: abd alkafi alrahal Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Muhammad Lastname: hassn alhamd Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Al Hasaka Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Ali Lastname: suliman aldabak Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Al Qounetra Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: alaa Lastname: ahmed muhammed alnaama Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: hussin Lastname: ahmed alali Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Al Raqa Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Ahmed Lastname: haboud almousstafa Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Al Raqa Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: abd Lastname: muhammed alabeed Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Dear Alzour Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: ameer Lastname: malk rstoum Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Lattakia Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: bashar Lastname: shaml bshouk Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Aleppo Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: Ahmed Lastname: mahmoud alassi alabd allah Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Dear Alzour Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: hassan Lastname: ahmed shama Gender: male Death Date: 2012-01-14 Death City: Homs Death Place: Details: ----------------------------------------- Name: thaer Lastname: mahmoud hamad
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