Planetary Quarantine
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION Technical Report 32-7276 Planetary Quarantine Techniques for the Prevention of Contamination of the Planets by Unsterile Spacefligb t Hardware Charles W. Craven Jet Propulsion Laboratory Robert P. Woffson General Electric Company JET PROPULSION LABORATORY CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY PASADENA, CALIFORNIA December 15, 1967 NATION A L AERONAUT IC S AND SPACE ADM I N ISTRATION Technical Report 32-7276 Planetary Quarantin e Techniques for the Prevention of Contamination of the Planets by Unsterile Spaceflight Hardware Charles W, Craven Jet Propulsion Laboratory Robert P. Wolfson General Electric Company Approved by: WRobillard, Manager Voyager Project Support Division JET PROPULSION LABORATORY CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY PASAD E NA, CAL I FORNI A December 15, 1967 TECHNICAL REPORT 32-1216 Copyright 0 1967 Jet Propulsion Laboratory California Institute of Technology Prepared Under Contract No. NAS 7-100 National Aeronautics & Space Administration Contents I . Introduction ......................... 1 11 . Sources of Contamination ................... 2 A . Inadequately Sterilized Lander ................. 2 B . Recontamination of the Sterile Lander ............... 2 C. Accidental Impact of the Launch Vehicle or Parts of the Launch Vehicle .... 2 D. Accidental Impact of the Unsterile Spacecraft and/or Decay of the Unsterile-Spacecraft Orbit ................... 2 E. Accidental Impacts of Various Standard and Nonstandard Spacecraft Ejecta ...................... 3 111. Mathematical Model ...~ ................. 4 IV. Tests and Experiments ..................... 8 A . The Orbit Insertion Engine ................... 8 B. Bioassay Procedures ..................... 9 C. EjectaSize ........................ 9 D. Manufacturing Debris ..................... 11 E. Attitude Control Gas System .................. 12 F . Unprotected Microorganisms in Space ............... 13 References ........................... 13 Table 1 . Spacecraft Materials ..................... 9 Figures 1. Possible sources of contamination ................ 3 2. Mission events in flight profile .................. 4 3. Mathematical model format .................. 5 4. Input data format ...................... 6 5. Typical distributive output format ................. 6 JPL TECHNlCAL REPORT 32- I2 16 iii Contents (contd) Figures (contd) 6. Orbit mechanics for heliocentric trajectory .............. 7 7. Typical heliocentric orbit mechanics data .............. 8 8 . Particle temperature histories .................. 9 9 . Combustion lethality equipment .................10 10. Combustion lethality equipment simulation of heat exposure for solid motors ...................... 11 11 . Microparticle projector .................... 11 12. Micrometeoroid ejecta size distribution ............... 11 13. Loose particle size distribution (manufacturingdisposition) ........ 12 iv JPL TECHNICAL REPORT 32-7216 Abstract System engineering techniques have been employed to: (1) identify possible sources of contamination; (2) develop required mathematical modeling; and (3) specify tests required to furnish experimental data for system trade-off studies. The mathematical models developed in the study have made possible several sensitivity simulations. These have indicated the importance of the contamination problem and have also pointed out areas where further experimental data or analytical work will be useful. From this study, it will be possible to identify the most likely sources of con- tamination and to indicate corrective action. Knowledge from these studies can be applied to such questions as: (1) aim-point philosophy to be followed in the launch trajectory; (2) the need for decontamination or sterilization of the attitude control gas systems; (3) the recommendation of cleanliness levels during the manufacturing cycle; and (4) whether decontamination or sterilization will be necessary to achieve the required planetary quarantine goal. JP L TECHNICAL REPORT 32- 7 2 16 V Planetary Quarantine Techniques for the Prevention of Contamination of the Planets by Unsterile Spaceflight Hardware 1. Introduction for Planetary Quarantine recommended that the basic probability of that a planet of biological interest will A policy of planetary quarantine has been established be contaminated during the period of biological explora- to insure that no act will be performed during the period tion be adopted as a guiding criterion by all nations en- of planetary exploration that might spoil the scientific gaged in space exploration. investigations of the planets, It is expected that these investigations will include the search for extraterrestrial To meet this criterion, careful consideration must life, and the collection of information leading to a better be given to the many possible sources of contamination understanding of the origin of life. Provisions for the that can be identified in the planning of a particular sterilization of all planetary probes or landers are in- flight program, especially a program utilizing an un- cluded in the quarantine to prevent possible contamina- sterilized spacecraft for long-term orbit about a planet. tion that might interfere with attempts to determine the nature and existence of extraterrestrial life. Microorga- A typical flight program for the investigation of Mars nisms could be deposited by an unsterilized lander, de- during the 1970s has been recently defined (Ref. 9). The stroying future chances of determining if life forms have plan calls for two planetary vehicles to be launched originated on the planet. In addition, the quarantine from a single Saturn V. Each of the vehicles will be must be maintained for several years to allow for experi- placed in orbit around Mars. After selection of a suit- ments sufficient to adequately define the planet’s bio- able landing site, each will eject a capsule for deorbit sphere (Refs. 1-6). and landing. The spacecrafts will remain in orbit to per- form various scientific experiments, and to serve as relay The Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the points for information from the separated lander cap- International Council of Scientific Unions has formu- sules. Each capsule will incorporate entry and landing lated general recommendations for planetary quarantine equipment, and a surface laboratory system for surface (Refs. 7 and 8). In May 1966, the COSPAR Subcommittee observations including biological experiments. JPL TECHNICAL REPORT 32-121 6 1 Noncontamination of Mars during the flights is a lead- A. inadequately Sterilized lander ing mission constraint. To make certain this constraint is (1) One or more viable organisms (VOs) remain on the fully considered during early engineering studies, system outer surface of the lander capsule. analysis techniques have been employed to identify all possible sources of contamination, and to evaluate these (2) One or more viable organisms within-the capsule sources with respect to each other to insure that the are released and diffused upon the planetary sur- mission can be accomplished without unduly penalizing face by any one portion of the mission. The purpose of this (a) Disintegration of the capsule upon impact. study is to describe the analysis techniques and experi- ments used, and to point out those sources that may be (b) Erosion of the encapsulated areas. significant and worthy of detailed evaluation. B. Recontamination of the Sterile lander (1) Prior to launch by handling. II. Sources of Contamination (2) During launch (for example, by breach of micro- To identify sources of contamination, it was first nec- biological barrier). essary to develop general constraint guidelines as a base of reference. The following guidelines were used for this (3) During interplanetary transfer by penetration of study (Ref. 10): the microbiological barrier. (1) All aspects of the flight program, including the (4) During barrier release. complex interactions of the spacecraft with the in- (5) After barrier release by unsterile debris. terplanetary environment, shall be examined to isolate every conceivable source of planetary con- (6) During capsule release (for example, by electro- tamination. static attractions). (2) Each separate source of contamination shall be C. Accidental Impact of the launch Vehicle or Parts investigated to yield an adequate understanding of the launch Vehicle of the process through which it occurs. Whenever possible, mathematical models shall be formulated (1) Failure of the launch vehicle retromaneuver, or that adequately characterize the probability of retromaneuver is of insufficient magnitude. contamination. These mathematical models shall (2) Launch vehicle debris (for example, clamps, rings, be based upon standard probabilistic techniques, and bolts) are placed on an impact trajectory. and the limitations and assumptions inherent in (3) Launch vehicle detonates, scattering debris on an their formulation shall be explicitly described in impact trajectory. the explanation of their validity. (3) For those sources of contamination that can be D. Accidental Impact of the Unsterile Spacecraft and/or adequately described by a mathematical model, Decay of the Unsterile-Spacecraft Orbit formulae shall be propounded to calculate the (1) The spacecraft fails after injection into an impact probability of planetary contamination. Conserva- trajectory. tive assumptions shall be employed whenever un- certainties are present in the derivation of these (2) The spacecraft fails after being placed on an im- formulae. pact trajectory