1 Description of the Module Items Description of the Module Subject

Description of the Module

Items Description of the Module Subject Name Sociology Paper Name Classical Sociological Theory

Module Name/Title Methodology, Science, Values, Objectivity & Ideal Types Pre Requisites Methodology, German historicism, positivism, Neo-Kantianism, Verstehen, social sciences Objectives This module seeks to examine Weber’s ideas on methodology of social sciences, through objectivity, value-relevance, and Verstehen. Key words Weber’s methodology, Verstehen, Ideal types, Value-relevance, Value-neutrality, and Objectivity

Module Structure

Methodology, Science, Values, Objectivity & Ideal Introduction, Weber’s methodology, its context, Types Verstehen & science, causality, objectivity, ideal types and values.

Team Details

Role Name Affiliation Principal Investigator Prof Sujata Patel Dept. of Sociology, University of Hyderabad Paper Coordinator Vishal Jadhav Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune Content Writer Rajula Shah Dept. of Sociology, University of Mumbai Content Reviewer Vishal Jadhav Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune Language Editor Vishal Jadhav Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune

CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

METHODOLOGY, SCIENCE, VALUES, OBJECTIVITY AND IDEAL TYPES

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber was, no doubt, one of the brightest intellectuals amongst the early organizers of the sociological thought. An overall evaluation of Weber’s writings demonstrate its historical comprehension of modern Western societies and their economic, political, legal and religious development. Among other things, Weber wrote extensively on the methodology of the social sciences, but his writings on methodology are complex and are the subject of many conflicting interpretations. It is Weber’s methodology that has been extensively read, discussed, debated, sometimes accepted and often refuted for its inconsistencies.

Weber’s approach to social theory was a central feature of his overall work. By and large, Weber was a modernist in his overall approach to social thought. Considering the other two classical sociologists, Marx and Durkheim, Weber had a modernist perspective, which also reflected in his methodology. By bringing together various traditions of social theory, Weber thereby formed a unique theoretical perspective based on history, economics, philosophy, law and comparative historical analysis (Morrison, 2006). Further, when compared to Marx and Durkheim, Weber’s approach was not only more individualist, but also more culture oriented. And both these aspects, individualism and cultural orientation, particularly appear in Weber’s perspective on the methodology of the social sciences.

We open this module bylooking at the major aspects of Weber’s methodology, which is particularly unique to Weberian work and which still remains a topic of agreement, disagreement as well as speculation even today. We will be examining the following: historical background for Weber’s views on the methodological issues in social sciences, Verstehen and science, causality, objectivity, ideal types and values – value-relevance and value-neutrality. All the sub-sections included here, are not airtight compartments, but rather all together represent Weber’s methodology for the social sciences.

WEBER’S METHODOLOGY

Weber’s methodology, with his modernist perspective, has been discussed excessively amongst the sociologists for various reasons. His methodology has always attracted special attention in the 'interrogation' of Max Weber, as he may appear, unclear, confused and at the same time passionate, determinant and complete (Torrance, 1974). It is well known that Weber was completely opposed to pure, abstract theorizing. To the extent that Weber’s theoretical ideas are embedded in his empirical, usually historical research (Ritzer, 2011). Weber’s methodology of the social sciences was not only unique to him but also a very important contribution to study of society that seem to have influenced many scholars later on.

It was between 1902 and 1903 that Weber wrote a series of essays questioning the methodology of investigation in social sciences. Specifically, the term ‘methodology’ refers to the procedures and the principles of inquiry in a particular discipline to obtain knowledge of society. Unlike natural sciences, the methods used in social sciences are not so clear and straightforward. A significant phase of that period was the development of social sciences. In such a context, it became important for Weber to distinguish between the methods of social sciences and the methods of natural sciences. Therefore, specifically two of Weber’s works stand out in particular as being of central importance in the formation of his methodological views: first, a work entitled Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, written between 1902-03 and second, a work called ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences and Social Policy’ written between 1903-04 (Morrison, 2006). It is the latter work, in which Weber discusses at length the aspects of objectivity as a part of methodology for the social sciences.

Weber’s methodology should be understood with the fact that he was greatly inclined towards the study of history, irrespective of being a lawyer and economist. Weber suggested the development of clear concepts so that a causal analysis of historical phenomena can be performed. Therefore, Weber’s perspective and methodology was a fusion of historical and sociological orientations. For Weber, historical sociology was concerned with both individuality as well as generality. For this unification to be achieved, there was development and utilization of general concepts (to be known as “ideal types”) while studying particular individuals, events, or societies (Ritzer, 2011). Thus, with the help of these general concepts, one could arrive at the individuality of each development, thereby determining the causes for differences between such developments.

THE GENESIS AND CONTEXT OF WEBER’S METHODOLOGY

Weber’s methodological works were in direct response to his immediate circumstances. The natural sciences grew dramatically between 1880 and 1900 in Europe. Knowledge in physics, biology and chemistry as well as experimental discoveries all advanced steadily. The scientific methodology thus became dominant within the scholarly community. This was followed by a decline in the scholarly tradition of historical and philosophical sciences in explaining the nature of reality (Morrison, 2006). In addition, at the turn of the nineteenth century, most scholars in social science and history were strong adherents of the broad tradition of historicism. According to the tradition of historicism, reality was seen as a historical product. However, historicism holds strong animosity towards abstract concepts (Eliaeson, 2002). The attack of natural sciences and the defence of social sciences, particularly the historicists’ hegemony in Germany, became the basis for the famous Methodenstreit– the controversy over method that related to the issue of preference between a historical and a theoretical approach.

Thus, eventually, the situation resulted in an open clash between the natural sciences and social sciencesquestioning the basis of knowledge and thereby drawing attention to the differences between the methodology of the natural sciences and the methodology of the social sciences. The non-scientific nature of the historical and social sciences was largely criticized. With a general crisis by 1885, a re-examination of the relationship between the scientific method and philosophy took place. By 1890, a movement popularly known as Neo-Kantianism (a return to the work of Immanuel Kant) emerged in order to resolve the problem and thereby questioning the validity of scientific knowledge itself(Morrison, 2006). Neo-Kantianism can be considered the first truly secularized modern scientific methodology (Eliaeson, 2002).Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert – two of the central thinkers of the Neo-Kantian movement – sought specific directions to solve the problem of method (Morrison, 2006). These two scholars seem to have had tremendous influence on the Weber’s thinking about the methodology of social sciences, besides the influences of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel– all close friends of Weber.

Weber’s methodology was connected to the relationship between history and sociology. For this, he is also known as a historical sociologist(Ritzer, 2011). Weberstarted developing his own methodological position by attempting to resolve theoretical disputes in the social sciences pertaining to method. In a series of methodological essays written between 1903 and 1906, 4

Weber outlined the methodological foundations of the social sciences. Weber crystallized the methodological controversy step by step by showing the fundamental differences between the natural and social sciences. Amongst other things, for Weber, social sciences must arrive at a methodology which encompasses both general and individual aspects of historical reality, a procedure he referred to as the ‘ideal type’ (Morrison, 2006).

In Rickert’s theory of knowledge, he used the concept called ‘value relevance’, which Weber absorbed for dealing with issues of subject matter in the social sciences. According to Rickert, since judgement comes before knowing, therefore knowing itself was a kind of valuing. Further, Rickert reasoned that it is impossible to have any judgement about reality without concepts. Therefore, without concepts, knowledge of the empirical world was also impossible. The value relevance thus became important in the subject matter of social sciences. According to the principle of value relevance, Rickert observed, knowledge was not only what was observable, but at the same time, and more importantly, a construction of the object to be described (Morrison, 2006). For weber, knowledge can never be a reproduction of reality. Reality, for Weber, was infinite and inexhaustible (Freund, 1968). And therefore, the generalizing or the individualizing methods of research were both not adequate according to Weber’s understanding of theory of knowledge. Both the methods have their limitations which Weber thought of overcoming by suggesting his methodology of social sciences.

VERSTEHENAND SCIENCE

Verstehen, a German word, stands for understanding. Initially, the concept had its origins in theological hermeneutics. The concept of interpretative understanding, that is Verstehen, was at the centre of the methodological debates amongst the German historians and sociologists of Weber’s time. The hostility characteristic to German historians and sociologists towards the ‘positivistic’ social thought of France and England, was the background against which the idea of interpretative Verstehen was gaining currency (Eliaeson, 2002). It is this contribution to the methodology that is one of Weber’s best-known as well as debatableworks in sociology. Weber’s thoughts on verstehenwere relatively common among German historians of his time and are said to be derived from hermeneutics (a field with specialized approach to the understanding and interpretation of published writings). Weber, of course, did not invent this method, but, merely attempted to extend this idea of understanding the texts to the understanding of social life (Ritzer, 2011).It is absolutely clear that, for Weber, understanding 5

was not the subtle intuitive sympathy favoured by the philosophers, but intellectual, analytical and predictive explanation of action (Sahay, 1971a). Therefore, it wasn’t the emotional understanding of the social action, but instead an intellectual understanding of the social action in a particular context. For Weber, sociology was a science (Eldridge, 1971) and verstehen could be verified in scientific way. And therefore, involved the scientific, objective way of dealing with subjective understanding of any social action. The term was not a psychological one for Weber.

Weber used the term to refer to the social scientist's attempt to understand both the intention and the context of human action(Elwell, 2003).Whereas, ‘science’ deals with explanation of ‘what is’ and thereby establishing its causes (Freund, 1968).For Weber, verstehendidn’t consist of intuition, or empathy, a common misconception usually held by many critics. It involved systematic and rigorous research and was therefore rational and scientific. By verstehen, Weber meant an interpretive understanding of subjective motivations, the social action, as it is only in an actor’s head, what he/she means by a particular action. Therefore, for Weber, sociology should pay attention to that particular context in which the actor performs a particular social action. This context and the action can only be made meaningful by the application of verstehen that is understanding the context and action of the actor.

There is something uniquely interesting about interpreting Weber’s concept of verstehen. The phenomenon of verstehenis interpreted at a cultural-level (for e.g. Structural Functionalism) as well as at an individual level (for e.g. Symbolic Interactionism), thereby influencing different theoretical perspectives (Ritzer, 2011). There are different opinions about how Weber himself interpreted it and no clear agreement for the same. However, the fact remains that Weber occupies a central role in sociological theory due to such contributions. And Weber’s contribution to understanding aspects of social research seem to have diverged in Interpretivism as a theoretical paradigm.

CAUSALITY

As a part of his methodology, Weber was committed to the study of causality. It was an inclination to study the causes of social phenomena – an attempt where he once again combines the general (nomothetic) and peculiar (idiographic) approaches of the positivists and subjectivists respectively. For Weber, causality was the probability that an event will be 6

followed or accompanied by another event. Much more than historical constants, repetitions, parallels, it implied, according to Weber, looking at the reasons for, and the meanings of, historical changes. He operated from a multi-causal approach in most of his historical works(Ritzer, 2011). Consider, for instance, his study of the relationship between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism, where, he saw the Protestant ethic as one of the causal factors in the rise of the modern spirit of capitalism.

The question of causality, for Weber, was not answered in a one-way model, rather he was attuned to the interrelationships among a number of social factors. Further, his thinking on causality was also greatly influenced by his belief about having a special understanding of social life (verstehen), which eventually makes the causal knowledge of social sciences different from the causal knowledge of the natural sciences (Ritzer, 2011). Thus, social sciences are therefore in a better position, than the natural sciences, due to their emphasis on the understanding of the human conduct.

“OBJECTIVITY”

For any vision of social science, the idea of objectivity remains crucial. Weber is, no doubt, seen as the reference point for the doctrine of an objective social science. However, what is interesting about Weber’s stance on objectivity in social sciences, is his method of attaining that objective (Eliaeson, 2002). With the help of ideal types and accepting one’s subjectivity (value-relevance), Weber argued for objectivity in social sciences.

For Weber, the starting point was ‘relevance for value’. Weber argued that by having value- relevant starting points, the historian does not have to be unobjective. The causal link between the means-and-the-end, however, should be objectively demonstrated. With the help of ‘ideal types’, such causal links can be established. By clearly expressing our value standpoints at the beginning, true objectivity becomes possible. Subjectivity would then result from suppressing the fact of holding such standpoints. Paradoxically, the choice of relevant ideal types is also a matter of subjective choice like the choice of initial value standpoints (Rex, 1971).

Therefore, it should be remembered that by objectivity, Weber did not consider it as same as value-neutrality (Dawe, 1971). As we will see a little later, value-neutrality is argued for only during the later stages of a social research, whereas objectivity should be maintained

throughout the research, in order to make social research more and more scientific. On other words, value-relevance, particularly in the selection of the research, can bring about desired objectivity.

‘IDEAL TYPES’

Weber’s methodology is principally all about ‘conceptualization and also the problem of producing intersubjectively meaningful selections from vast and infinite reality’ (Eliaeson, 2002:46). The first formulation of the notion of ideal types arose in the course of Weber’s thinking as an economic historian and while he was still under the influence of the German historicist Heinrich Rickert(Rex, 1971). Weber’s concept of ‘ideal type’ was first developed by him in a writing entitled ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences and Social Policy’ published in 1905. The theorist who influenced Weber into articulating his theory of the ideal type was Heinrich Rickert. Since Rickert favoured general and individual concepts, Weber rejected Rickert’s theory and formulated his ideal types as an epistemological response to Rickert’s theory (Hekman, 1983). Weber defined the ideal type as a ‘conceptual pattern which brings together certain relationships and historical events into a complex whole whose purpose is to describe historical societies by comparing their internal and external characteristics’. Weber used the ‘ideal type’ as a methodological concept, a technique to describe the comparative features of different societies by outlining their distinct social characteristics (Morrison, 2006). These ideal types have indeed played a key theoretical role in Weber’s work, and not just in empirical research.

For Weber, it was the responsibility of sociologists to develop conceptual tools in order to understand the empirical reality. However, such concepts are only tools, and should not be confused with reality itself. The ideal type was one such important conceptual tool:

An ideal is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. . . . In its conceptual purity, this mental construct . . . cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.It is a utopia.

(Weber, 1903-17/1949:90; italics authors’)

The ideal type can be seen as the sum total of concepts which the researcher constructs purely for the purpose of research. Just as reality is infinite, Weber maintains that no concept can give 8

us complete diversity of the phenomenon (Freund, 1968). However, Weber suggests ‘ideal type’ as a solution. The term signifies ideal, typical, distinctive, characteristic or essential traits or elements of the phenomenon. Here, it should be remembered that ‘ideal’ does not mean ethical that is it has nothing to do with what is exemplary. At a basic level, an ideal type is a conceptual construction of a social scientist on the basis of his/her interests and theoretical orientation, so as to capture the essential features of some social phenomenon (Ritzer, 2011). The ideal-type is a model, not a hypothesis, although specific hypotheses may be derived from it, so as to compare it with empirical 'facts' (Lindbekk, 1992). So, ideal types are like measuring rods that facilitate our understanding of the essential characteristics of a particular phenomenon. Although these are constructed by the social scientists, ideal types are not illogical. At same time, as Weber suggests by calling it a utopia, such a concept only attempts to understand the social phenomenon in a prescribed form (by the social scientist) and thus cannot claim to represent empirical, historical reality. In this sense, Weber clarifies by what is not intended to be an ideal type.

In fact, the ideal type concept is the realization of the principle of sociological rationality argued by Weber as his basic and original contribution to scientific analysis (Sahay, 1971a). For Weber, ideal types are like heuristic devices, not laws, meant to facilitate empirical research for understanding specific aspects of the social world. Also, Weber suggests to derive the ideal types inductively from the real world, rather than deriving it deductively from an abstract theory as a carefully defined set of concepts. This, Weber says, will not help the social scientist to understand the social phenomenon. However, by real world, Weber does not suggest ideal types to be mirror images, but rather one-sided exaggerations of the essence of some social phenomenon, neither too general nor too specific. For Weber, science means unending research (Freund, 1968) and since he believed in non-existence of timeless concepts in the social sciences, he argued for developing new typologies that fits the constantly changing societies(Ritzer, 2011). With this, Weber contends, a researcher can escape from his/her subjectivity, as the ideal types reflect these in a very objective way.

The concepts included in the ideal type are not only 'pure', 'exaggerated' or 'one-sided', but also supposed to have a dynamic, causal, aspect within the society studied. Weber used the word 'teleological' in his first presentation of the ideal-typical approach (Lindbekk, 1992). However, Weber was not seen to be consistent in his usage of ideal type in his substantive works,

irrespective of his clear definition.Ritzer (2011) restates Weber’s different categories/varieties of ideal types as follows:

1. Historical ideal types–relates to any phenomena that existed in a particular historical period. 2. General sociological ideal types –relates to phenomena cutting across many historical periods and society. 3. Action ideal types –pure types of action based on actor’s motivations. 4. Structural ideal types–forms taken by the causes and consequences of social action.

According to Weber, an ideal type can help to reveal the real significance and meaning of the act, that can be apparently different from the subjective meaning assigned by the actor himself/herself to the act (Eliaeson, 2002). Thus, as heuristic tools, Weber’s ideal types were an equally important contribution to the methodology of the social sciences, notwithstanding its inconsistencies.

VALUES

The attribution of values always remained the basis of Weber’s sociological analysis (Dawe, 1971). Weber’s notion of value-free sociology has greatly influenced the modern sociological thinking on the role of values in the social sciences. In fact, Max Weber is held as the patron saint of value-free sociology(Farganis, 1974).Although highly complicated, Weber’s views on values are often commonly perceived as social scientists should not let their personal values influence their scientific research. Weber had specific views regarding values in the domain of teaching as well as in research. With little ambiguity on value-freedom in this aspect, Weber argues that academicians should not express their personal values in a classroom. Only the facts should be expressed. This was because, unlike Marx, Weber believed in a possible separation of fact and value (Ritzer, 2011). Further, Weber also did not emphasize the facts of social reality, rather its defining quality: value, significance and meaning (Sahay, 1971b).

However, Weber’s position of value-freedom in social research is much more ambiguous. Interestingly, Weber did not recommend a total elimination of values from social research. While qualifying the concept of value-freedom, Weber did not talk about completely avoiding values, but rather offered an apparently paradoxical solution in which values could be utilized

for the promotion of objectivity instead of subjectivity (Eliaeson, 2002). According to Weber, values played a role only in specific aspects of the research. That is, values should be considered prior to the actual start of the research. Actual data collection should not be mixed or influenced with values of any sort. Selection of a particular study for research can be harmlessly shaped by researcher’s values. This brings us back to one of Weber’s methodological concepts, value relevance, also derived from the work of the German historicist Heinrich Rickert. It means that researchers’ choice of a particular study is influenced by their values which happen to be relevant to their particular society to which they belong (Ritzer, 2011). So, we see that while Weber argues for a complete avoidance of values (of the academicians) with reference to teaching in a classroom, he is more thoughtful in the case of social research as he limits the role of values to only to initial stages of study.

In Weber’s 1917 essay, ‘The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics’, he conceptualizes that value conflicts cannot be resolved by rational means(Eliaeson, 2002). Accordingly, rational reasoning cannot help one to solve the issues arising out of value conflicts. Thus, value-neutrality was as important as value-relevance. Social sciences, for Weber, should not completely part ways with values. For Weber, value-orientation had nothing to do in common with a value judgment or evaluation (ethical or otherwise) of the phenomenon. In fact, value-orientation, Weber argues, determines the questions we put to reality. With this consciousness, a researcher is in a position to acquire limited objective knowledge (Freund, 1968).

However, Weber’s qualification of value-freedom (or value-neutrality) toward value-relevance (or value-orientation) has subsequently been misused and misunderstood (Eliaeson, 2002). Hence, like other aspects of Weber’s works, issues arising out of value-neutrality and value- relevance are also highly debatable.

CONCLUSION

Weber is not only a great classical sociologist, but also, a refined contributor to the methodology of social sciences. One cannot deny the fact that there have been generations of scholars who have provided us with translations and interpretations of Weber’s works, particularly his methodology. This is not to underestimate Weber’s contribution to theoretical ideas, which are also largely influenced by his methodological thinking. In all the attempts 11

pertaining to such interpretations, we see the contradictions and confusions that scholars encounter while interpreting Weber’s methodological writings. Notwithstanding such problematic interpretations of Weber’s work, he still holds the position of one of the greatest sociologists to have contributed to both – methodological and substantive, theoretical ideas in sociology.

Interestingly, Weber was not a ‘methodologist’, he was a historical sociologist. In fact, Weber began writing his ideas in the form of essays on methodology of social sciences at a time when he was not recognized as a sociologist, even by himself. Weber was a lawyer and economist, with an inclination towards history. Nevertheless, Weber became famous in sociology with his contribution – methodological as well as theoretical.

Weber’s ideal type remains as an important conceptual tool ever since this methodological position has advanced by various sociologists, for instance Alfred Schutz. Yet, many consider Weber’s ideal types as completely obsolete term that no longer fits into contemporary situation. But, at a time when there was tremendous emphasis on the methodology of natural sciences to be adopted for social sciences, Weber’s ideal types, along with Verstehen and objectivity, were indeed a scholarly contribution that gave a concrete direction to the methodology of social sciences.

Weber’s perspective on the importance of understanding, while conducting any social research, is of great importance ever since. As Weber perceived it, understandingcan come from an ability to decipher the meaning that actors attribute to their actions and interactions. However, Weber’s methodology is still debated by various scholars. In fact, the innumerable interpretations and debates relating to Weber’s works only show the extent to which his works are read and interpreted. Weber’s ideal types, meaning, verstehen and social action together work as his solution to the methodological debates of his time.